>> let's go back to the presidency. >> are we done with this? >> no. i know you are on the fence. >> i think i figured out exactly. >> i'm seriously considering the possibility of running. [applause] >> i've got you something that i think will help you make your decision. it's right here. [laughter] i think they will put it up. there it is. [applause]

>> the problem with this is the vice president is a better speaker. can't upstage the candidate. >> has been __ it has been an honor. let's give a round of applause for governor jeb bush. [applause] ♪ >> andrew keen, the author of "the internet is not the answer" on internet companies and how they make profit. >> in the old days, people went to the factory to work, they

went home, and they had money in the pockets. these days, we're all working for the internet, and we are not paid. it is not a knowledge that we are working for them. worse than that, then we are being packaged up as the product. what the companies are doing is learning more about our behavior from what we've published, what we buy, what we say, we don't say. they are learning about us. and they are transforming us, and repackaging us as the product. not only are we working for free, but that we are being sold. it is the ultimate scam. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on c_span "q&a."

>> here are a few of the comments we recently received on the state of the union address. >> i heard a lot of great things about talking about science and nasa. as a scientist myself, i can appreciate his position. i know there are a lot of great people who do very great science. it is great to see the present them looking towards the future and not the past. >> i thought the rebuttal he gave to the republicans was spectacular. i've not see his speech so improvised in a long time. i'm happy to see that after 50 years of doing things the wrong way, we're getting her act together and opening up trade with a nation that is very important in our hemisphere. the same thing could be related to foreign policy.

we been doing the same thing in afghanistan and iraq, and the middle east as a whole, and we're getting the same results. every 10 years we go into a country, there is a breach of conscience, a blowback. he has killed hundreds, if not thousands, of people without congressional authority. >> i've seen a few things. some of the stuff that has been leading up to the address, i have to argue opposite. they said the unemployment has gone down, the economy has improved, i don't think that is the case. people have to remember that without unemployment colleague only have the extension so long and then you do not qualify for unemployment benefits. those who get dropped from unemployment to not count as unemployed.

that does not mean unemployment has gone down, it needs people are falling through the cracks. if you look at it from that perspective, the unemployment rate is probably 10 points higher than what is being estimated as. >> continue to let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. collis, email us, or send us a tweet. join the c_span conversation, like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> president obama is currently in india. in a joint news conference today, the two leaders announced that they have reached an energy agreement.

issues including viability of supplies in the event of a nuclear accident, and u. s. demands on tracking the whereabouts of nuclear material. president obama is expected to leave india on tuesday when he will travel to saudi arabia to pay his respects to the family of the late king abdullah. nuclear negotiations with iran were the subject of a senate foreign affairs committee meeting. they addressed whether new sanctions should be imposed wall negotiations continue. this is three hours.

[indiscernible] >> californians are here today to ask you to not make new sanctions on iran. ranking member menendez. it is on you to keep the peace in the area.

>> the public needs to be heard on this issue. we want no new sanctions. the people of california want diplomacy not new sanctions. >> i'm going to call the meeting to order. i would say to people in the audience that we would appreciate you for.

we understand that people have strong emotions about what happens in this committee. we hope you will respect the work of the committee. i have never operate __ operated a gavel. i learned when i was young to operate a hammer. my staff will need to be a little more gentle with this. i want to welcome everyone to the committee. we switched sides. that was not symbolic. i understand that because of the number of seats it works better this way. i want to welcome the new members of the committee and say that under senator menendez's leadership, i believe this committee has caused its profile to rise. we passed a number of very important pieces of legislation out of this committee.

i think it is because of the leadership that has happened. i want to thank him for that. i want to say to all committee mmembers that we plan to build on that. we have another very important issues to deal with. the nation has put its trust in us to deal with these issues in a sober way. i think that the issue today that we will be talking about really causes us to remind ourselves of the indispensable nature of u. s. leadership. i think the committee, like any committee, has important things to deal with and we have a urgent things to deal with. we need to do both. important is for us to continue as a committee to show the importance of strategic u. s. engagement and how that improves our economy, and makes us safer here home.

at the same time, we need to make sure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. what will take some time to bill, i would like us to work towards a state department authorization. what that means is that the state department is operating off a policy that we past 13 years ago. if we want to leverage our efforts, what would make sense __ i look forward to working with ranking member minden this in this way __ it would be to ensure that the state department is leveraging those things that we would like to see happen. i would do not want to shy away from physical issues __ this hearing is evidence of that. i want to make sure that we strengthen our nation in the process. today we are here to talk about iran. i want to say to our

participants, thank you for being here. there are legitimate concerns from almost everyone on this committee. it is not in any way disloyal. not an infringement on anyone else to say that we have legitimate concerns. when you think about where we are in the iran negotiations __ we have six u. s. security resolutions __ un resolutions a call for full suspension of enrichment. we then moved to the standard called practical needs. in other words, if you are in iran and you have __ you want to do enrichment, even though that is in violation of the un council security resolution, what are the practical needs of the country? that is the 500 centrifuges. yet, we know negotiations have moved way beyond that. we know that.

we talk about dismantlement. we have concerns of what dismantlement now means. some say it now means simply unplugging, or disconnecting the plumbing, to use course terms. people talk about research and development. we know the iranians are way beyond that in research and development. the agreement itself doesn't speak at all to ballistic missile development. significant concerns for all of us. and we believe __ though i'm not sure this is the case, and maybe it is not true,, and maybe some of you can buy enough today __ we are concerned about what we will cause iran to do given their past military dimensions. i think many of us think that their way down the road in a

military development until 2003. i think we would like to understand the type of technology that their developed. i know this __ there still stiff arming the irea as far as access to the facilities. this continues to cause great concern around the trustworthiness. i think we all know that their destabilizing the region. we watch what is happening in yemen, with hezbollah, with hamas. we know that they are __ even with the minor amounts of money that had been lessened from the sanctions regime that we all work together to put in place __ even with that, we know that has enhanced their ability to destabilize the region. we know that.

you can imagine if we end up with a really bad deal that creates a nuclear arms race in the region and makes the world less safe. and yet, much more money is released, they could destabilize the region even more. i'm proposing legislation __ and i look forward to hearing from you today __ that builds off the one, two, three agreement that we have in place right now. marquis is very familiar with this. 23 times this nation has approved a one, two, three agreement. y'all reach an agreement with the country, and we approve it. senator kerry says that __ i would like to understand today how you like to see us have muster. one way to do it is to have an up_and_down vote. there have been a lot of

discussions about we might do and what we might not do. i talked to prime minister cameron. i talked to the u.k. __ excuse me the european union negotiator. netanyahu is visiting us on this very issue. we've heard no one say that if congress were to weigh in, it would have anyway at destabilizing the negotiations. in fact, we understand that iran's parliament may have to approve their agreement. i hope today you will share with us are appropriate role that we need to play. with that, sorry to give such a long opening comment, ranking member menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me also welcome the new members to this committee.

it is a very important committee to serve on. i welcome you and i think you'll find an extraordinary experience. since this is the first hearing that we have had since the committee has assembled, i want to say during the two years i was chairman, we worked extremely well in a collaborative fashion. this committee was an island of bipartisanship on so many issues that passed the committee. we look forward to working with you in the same context, and with the same goals at the end of the day.

we look forward to you having a very successful chairmanship of the committee. i want to __ in the context of the hearing __ say that i share your concerns that the iranians are playing for tim __ time. over the past 18 months, we've been moving closer to their positions on all key elements __ on the iraq reactor, enrichment, and iran's disclosure of the military dimensions of its nuclear program. i think we need to review how we got this point. iran, over the course of 20 years, to see the international committee and violated un security council resolutions to arrive within weeks of

achieving nuclear breakout capacity. iran came to the table only after the years of impact of sanctions the answer in fact their economic stability. for us to give up the level sanctions that would take years to reimpose, we need a deal that truly reverses their nuclear program, rather than just buying a little time. this is why i'm concerned about more than breakup time. i'm concerned the agreement won't provide a clear picture of the military dimensions of iran's programs __ which are critical to understand how far down the road they were as it relates to weaponization, so that we understand the time frames of any breakout capacity. so that we know just how close

iran is to be able to make a nuclear weapon. i'm concerned that instead of dismantling and closing __ as we were told would be the case at the beginning these negotiations __ the iraq reactor will not __ now be converted. after 18 months of stalling, iran needs to know the other will be consequences for failure. some of us believe those consequences should be additional sanctions. while we're playing nice, iran is playing an asymmetrical game __ violating, in my view, the spirit and intent of sanctions. in november, i ran violated the interim agreement by feeding gas into its centrifuge at the

research facility. the issue of whether this was a violation of the interim agreement is only an issue because of the time of the interim agreement the centrifuge had not been used for enrichment. that is spent, if i've ever heard it. in any case, the action clearly violated the intent of the agreement. it violated ieea. it's interesting to note that as we talk about these agreements, if we are able to get an agreement, it was a group of scientists outside of the administration who noticed this and inform the administration about it. that makes me worried about how verification processes work moving forward.

in december, the un's panel of experts said in a report that iran has been aggressively trying to buy technology for the research reactor that as originally design worried create plutonium for a bomb. under the interim agreement, iran agreed to make no further advances. iran's position is that any purchases alone would not contravene the agreement, only new construction. if you believe that, i have a reactor to sell you. just last week, construction on two new nuclear reactors was announced. one night technical violation of the joint plan of action, and the announcement is clearly meant to leverage further gain on the negotiation.

the very next day, a "washington post" correspondent __ who has been imprisoned for 178 days. as the "washington post" said in a recent publication, it is hard to __ so, we have this whole alternate track that the iranians can cheat on, but because it is typically not in a joint plan of action, we do not call them on it. that's a great opportunity, if you can get it. the you can advance your interests outside of bjp __ jpoa, " a quote not violated. iran is taking steps that can only be interpreted as provocative.

it seems that we are allowing iran to shuffle the deck and deal the cards in this negotiation, and we are playing dealer's choice. frankly, that is not good enough. we need to get in the game. up until now, iran has not been motivated to make tough decisions. i hope there will be an agreement in march. i also believe that we need to make clear that there are consequences to no deal, or to a bad deal. mr. chairman, thank you for holding a hearing. >> thank you, mr. ranking member. to the other members, we do not usually give those long comment on the front and. this is obviously one that both a lot of concern.

the committee will operate by the earlybird rule. if you're here when the gavel goes down, you will know what order you are in. in order __ i know we will not be totally rigid __ since the senator has to go to another meeting, she wants to say somewhat on the front end, i will allow her to do that. >> i have to be at a different meeting down the hall, i so appreciate this. i want to thank both my chairman and ranking member now. we are all here today with the same goal. that is to prevent iran from acquiring a new nuclear weapon. we have different thoughts as to how to do that, that is why the media so critical. we have an historic opportunity to peacefully achieve this goal.

to me, it seems like this give diplomacy a chance to work. to me, it seems like common sense. president obama said that war should be a last resource, not first. i'm concerned. it's not partisan. i have a concern that reaches across party lines that sound colleagues are pushing to enact new sanctions while negotiations are still the table. i do not think that strengthens us. these negotiations are going on right now. in fact, i think if we were to enact the legislation, we would jeopardize a chance of having a far_reaching, comprehensive agreement. we know it will be hard.

our own president has said it will be a 50_50 chance. our own intelligence committee said, new sanctions would undermine the prospects for a successful, comprehensive nuclear agreement with iran. passing the sanctions legislation would threaten the unity that we have with the world. that is critical. i want to quote prime minister kamman was said last week, as the country who stands alongside america, it is the opinion of united kingdom that further sanctions at this point will actually help to bring the talks to successful conclusion. and they could fracture the international community, and i think a new sanctions bill would give iran of possibly to walk away.

i think it's such iran the cat really deal with america. in the end, they may not be able to, and we may not be able to either. it's all about timing. we know that. everything is not timing. this is not the time. in closing, let me say, i opposed the legislation i've seen so far. i've not seen the new proposal, and look forward seeing it. i work in legislation was senator paul to send a clear and unequivocal signal that iran will be held accountable for its actions, and any failure to meet its commitments will be met with swift action from congress. our bill, in essence, would allow for expedited consideration by congress, if the present in consultation

with the intelligence community determines that iran has violated any existing nuclear agreement. senator paul and i are putting the final touches on this bill. we think it is a modern proposal. i think we will see three options. one that would essentially do nothing. one that perhaps goes too quickly to sanctions. center paul will be working on that with me. he is very excited to share. thank you so much for this opportunity. >> just to be clear before we moved that witnesses. there has an a lot of confusion as to what this committee does. this committee will be looking at ways for congress to weigh in.

one of those is to approve up and down a deal. that is what we do with every civic nuclear deal that comes our way. with that, i want to move to the witnesses. our first witness is antony blinken. he assumed his post after being approved by the senate in december. he is a former national security advisor to the president. welcome back. our second witness today's david cohen, the under secretary of state. i want to thank you both for being here.

we would remind you that your full statements, without objection, will be included in the record. if you could keep your remarks to around five minutes, we would appreciate it. i know there will be numbers of questions. we look forward to testimony. >> mr. chairman, ranking member menendez, thank you very much. mr. chairman, congratulations to your chairmanship. i very much look forward to working with you. i think it's very appropriately restrained hearings here today in this conference on the subject of iran and nuclear negotiations. it is of paramount importance to our national security. secretary kerry, undersecretary sherman, and her whole team was in geneva last week as part of the effort to get to an

agreement where we can be sure that iran's nuclear program is used for peaceful purposes. i want to let you know where that is today. i will try to give you as much detail as i can. it is hard to get into some detail in the public without undermining the negotiations. we are making made to continue. we share the same goal to make the world a safer place by resolving the international committees concerns. our core goals are clear and consistent. any agreement reached must successfully cut off the pathways that iran has. the uranian pathways, plutonium pathways, and a potential covert pathway. any agreement must require

stringent access to maximize the international communities abilities to recommend any attempt. , any agreement must deal with the issues that you and ranking member menendez alluded to, and including the missile question, etc.. in exchange, the international committee would provide sanctions relief. such relief would be structured so that sanctions could be quickly reimposed.

i would like to provide information as to exactly where we are in a close setting. overall, rss that remain so we have an incredible chance to reach a deal that is in the best interest of american security and our allies and partners. our goal is to reach the major elements of the deal by march, and the technical details by june. in our judgment, we are negotiating from the position of strength. thanks to the interim agreement that we reach, iran's program was fundamentally frozen. before, iran had about 200 kg of uranium that could be quickly converted into weapons grade material.

today, iran has no 20% enriched uranium. it has none. iran was making real progress on the iraq operator. it would have provided iran with a plutonium path to a bomb. today, it is frozen in place. iran had installed about 19,000 centrifuges. today, 9000 of them are not functional. iran has installed no new centrifuges. expect this had less frequent access to iran's facility.

today, there is daily axis to the facilities. iae hhas consistently reported that iran has lived up to its commitment. as we asked iran to uphold commitment, we have upheld our commitment to the limited release of $4 billion. that releases dwarfed by the vast amount denied to iran. the entire sanctions architecture remains in place and david can talk about that. congress, as has been mentioned, is considering additional sanctions should negotiations fail. let me say about that, i understand that this is to

further put pressure on iran. we very much appreciate, but is a strong held view that new sanctions at this time are both unnecessary and far from enhancing negotiations __ they risk undermining our hard work. they are unnecessary because as i noted, iran already is under intense pressure from the application of existing sanctions. in recent months, that has actually grown stronger in the dramatic drop of oil prices. the senate could impose additional measures, and the magician would support actions, and iran is aware. the new sanctions at this point

are not necessary. but we also think that they put us in risk. let me briefly fling wide. we committed to not impose new nuclear related sanctions wall this is in effect. after breach fire, a new sanctions enacted by congress would be viewed by iran as the u. s. breaking out of the agreement. even if such legislation is not technically nor arguably a violation, we believe it would be perceived as such. the intelligence community thinks the same thing and so do our partners. this could produce one of several consequences.

first, the passage of new sanctions could provoke iran to leave the talks, and pursue its nuclear program. __ reversing everything we have achieved. second, even if iran does not want the way, its negotiators are much more likely to adopt __ finally, if our international partners believe that the u. s. is reacting prematurely, their willingness to enforce the existing sanctions, nevermind add additional sanctions, would wayne. up until now, we have kept countries on board. we have largely demonstrate that we are serious about policy and try to reach an agreement advances in security. if they lose at conviction, the united states could be isolated.

we can debate whether any of these things would happen or of all that would happen. what i can tell you is this __ those who have been engaged with iranians in our international partners in these negotiations for several years, it is their best judgment. why run these risk and jeopardized the possibility of a deal? in our judgment, there's nothing to gain and a lot to be lost. as senator boxer noted, this is shared by many of our partners. i think you would hear the french, german, and others say silly things in the next few days. final point __ i want to assure

you that we will continue to confront iranian actions that threaten our security and our partners. including its support for terrorist groups and destabilizing the region. we will continue to spotlight human rights violations, and we will continue to defend and develop the capacities of our partners. thank you very much. >> mr. cohen, if you could keep your comments to five, we would think you. >> good morning. thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. as this is likely my last appeared before this committee before i assume my new duties, i want to thank former chairman menendez and the current chairman for your courtesy. there is no higher national

security priority than assuring that iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. present them obama has made clear that we will do everything in her power to keep that from happening. for us of the treasury that has meant working with the administration, congress, and international powers to have the most powerful sanctions in history. in many respects, the sanctions have worked exactly as designed. they had brought iran to the negotiating table. as we sit here today, no one knows whether the negotiation will ultimately yield the competent to deal. we, like you, are dedicated to a democratic path. as we do so, iran's economy remains subject to intense

pressure. iran halted progress on its nuclear program, rolled it back in many respects. in exchange, i ran received limited and reversible release. this means that iran is still cut off from the international financial system. it is unable to export even half the oil it was exporting in 2012. it is barred by sections from freely accessing its oil reserves. the sanctions are not just words on the books, we had vigorously enforce them. since the signing of the jpoa,

we have imposed over $350 million in penalties for ssanction evasion. let me say a few metrics. in 2014 alone, our sanctions deprives iran of $40 billion of oil revenues. altogether, since 2012, our oil sanctions have cost iran more than $200 billion in lost exports and oil proceeds it cannot access. iran's currency has depreciated by about 16%. iran's economy today is about 15% to 20% smaller than it would've been if it remained on its pre_2012 growth trajectory.

because of the sanctions iran is subject to, iran is negotiate with the backing of the wall. accordingly, we see no reason to impose additional sanctions now. in fact, we think that new station legislation would be counter effective. today, iran's nuclear program is exposing that it remains under enormous pressure. we have been able to hold together the international sanction coalition. enacting new sanctions now threatens to unravel this. if congress enacts new sanctions now, in negotiations prove successful, our international partners may blame us and not iran. overall, support for the regime will decline, making it more difficult to maintain or intensify sanction pressures.

we would lose the additional insight into iraq in nuclear programs. make no mistake, this administration understands the power of sanctions. sanctions are key component. we are not sanctioned doubters. neither do we believe that the layering on of additional sanctions are the right move. they are one tool in our toolbook, along with diplomacy, and a number of ways that we project our. if the policy does not succeed, the present them said he will be the first person to come to congress and say, we need to tighten the screws. in our view, this is the opportunity to make diplomacy succeed. thank you and i look forward to address your questions. >> thank you both.

again, i want everyone to understand that this is not the committee that deals with sanctions. i know that witnesses certainly have the opportunity to say anything that they wish in testimony. that is not the issue that is before us. i'm sure you may get some questions about other things that i __ i __ iran today. may i ask, do you think congress has a role to play in these negotiations? >> yes i do. first, we would not be where we are without the role the congress authority plate. i think the sanctions that have been imposed to dateare what brought i ran to the table. second, i think it is vital that we remain in close consultation with you as negotiations proceed. we want to continue that.

finally, if we get to the end game and if we get resolution, in our judgment, the best way to ensure that iran complies with its obligations would be to suspend the existing sanctions __ not in them __ to test iran's compliance. all along, from the beginning to where we are now, congress's role as central. >> thank you. i think one of the things we all know is that when the sanctions were put in place, we gave this administration that national security waiver. i think you also know that want to suspend these, and you agree to do that with the p5, in essence, what will happen is the entire regime will fall apart. i sent you some legislation

and i'm disappointed they do not address that in your opening comments. we do not want to do something that infringes upon getting to a good deal. we've asked is appropriate for us to at least be able to weigh in, since we did in fact put the sanctions in place. i would ask you this __ do you believe congress can have the ability of up or down on any agreement? in the same framework that we do on 1 to 3 agreements. would you oppose this body taken up legislation to deal with that in an up or down vote on senate floor? >> i've had an opportunity to look at what you are proposing.

let me say about that, first of all, how much we appreciate your leadership on this, and the intent of what you are proposing. i also fully understand the desire for the congress to have some kind of up or down vote on whatever is agreed to. from where i sit now, i thinkyou also appreciate the position of the administration on the importance of maintaining the executive prerogative to include agreements that advance our national security interests. there is a percent of __ concerned that this could set a precedent. it will not be a tree where all parties are required to take similar actions themselves. it will not be an arms control sanction. and it is not exactly at 123 23

agreement_ rather, this would be the international community putting strong limits on iran. >> as i could, the __ i think the answer is no. we could easily deal with this by passing legislation that would put away with waivers. then you have to come to us. i do not understand. you have talked about the sanctions. i've talked to our french negotiators directly. i talked to her u.k. negotiators directly. i talked to prime minister cameron directly. i talked last night at length in office to the negotiater on behalf of the un.

i was in israel this weekend, and talk to the prime minister. i bet no one that believes that a swaying and will do anything to destabilize these negotiations. many have said that knowing that congress has to approve the deal would be a great backstop to strengthen it. i do not understand __ again, we could just do away. we were generous with the passage of the sanctions. we could just do away with the waiver and have you have to come with us. why would you oppose congress weighing in on an issue of this importance. and secretary of kerry to say pass muster, and yet, every effort be pushed away.

not having the ability to weigh in on this deal. >> mr. chairman, let me adjust a few concerns. in terms of the negotiations themselves, the knowledge that there would be very early on this kind of boat, in our judgment, could undermine the credibility of our commitments to the __ >> does iran in parliament not need to weigh in on the agreement? >> under their laws, they may be required to. >> on the one hand, we would negotiate in such a way as to that we know the supreme leader could go against what the iranian parliament wants to do. yet, you would say it would not be important for the greatest deliberative body in the world

to weigh in on this issue. the body that put together this regime that the international community is building off of. >> let me suggest two things. first, there's a concern that if a judgment is reached immediately, yea or nay, it may be too soon to judge if iran will comply. if congress had been asked to go on the interim agreement, i suspect many who now believe the agreement has reached strong results would have voted it down. i think giving the iranians time to demonstrate clearly to you and us that they're making good on the agreements make sense. second, if your leverage is enhanced, and congresses leverage is enhanced.

and, if they don't make good on the agreements, congress acts. >> my time is up. i would support a series of votes, if that is what you're saying. i would support an initial vote on the deal, and i think congress would be more than glad to work with you on a series of votes as you move along. i would say, after serving on this committee, and after y'all spending tremendous amounts of time dissing the sanctions regime, we are trying to find a constructive way for congress to play its rightful role. i'm very disappointed that in essence the administration is saying, we do not want __ even though congress put us in this place __ congress to play a role in one of the most

important agreements that may take place in the demonstration. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have to be honest with you, the more i hear from the menstruation, the more it sounds like talking points. it speaks to the rain in narrative of victimization __ when they are the ones with original sin and an illicit nuclear program going back over the course of 20 years, that they are unwilling to come clean on. i do not know why we feel compelled to make the case when in fact __ do dispute any of the things i said in my opening statement? as it relates to un monitors, as it relates to any those other elements. yes or no? >> nno, the giro largely correct.

>> so, bigoted sheet in a series of ways. and we get to worry about their perceptions. to quote from your testimony __ even if such sanctions are not arguably a technical violation of the joint plan of action, we believe they would be perceived as such by iran. so, we're worried about their perceptions by our perception of what they're doing to advance their nuclear interests can be just clearly swept under the rug. i also think it is important reading from your testimony to put the joint plan of action in the appropriate context. you say __ instead of limiting work on the centrifuge, it could resume its effort and

significantly improve its nuclear capabilities in a relatively short time frame. let's be honest but with the joint plan of action is. it's a freeze. it's a freeze that scientists have come before this committee to say that if they break the deal, they need about three months. i don't know iif people in the audience can participate here, but they need about three months. i'm not a scientist, but i will accept their testimony is pretty much substantive as to where they need to go. any sanctions that we have imposed have taken minimum six months to give me time to the world. that puts us beyond the timeframe, if they make a decision to move in a different direction.

let's be honest that at one time, but now the iranians do not believe that there is a credible use of military force on the table, should they not make a deal and moved to break through on nuclear capabilities for weapons. you are telling the committee, and you can look astray in the eye and say, perspective sanctions that don't take place until july __ well after the period of time of not just a framework __ i've been told they will not even be a written document for that __ tthat takes place in july after a deal has been consummated or not. it would only take place if the deal has not been consummated. and even with presidential waivers at that. in time. it was some how make them walk

away from a deal. that's tough to believe in. it defies common sense. if i want to make a deal, something that you will do, and my ability to make that deal will make me want to walk away. that is not common sense. i get that you all hung up on the sanctions. i get the talk about perception that is not necessarily violation but will be perceived as such. so we have to worry about the iranians perceptions while he we swallow up what they're doing independently. let me ask you this, isn't it true that the deal you're striving towards is not to eliminate any iranian breakout

capabilities, but to constrain the time in which you will get notice of such capabilities. is that a fair statement? >> yes it is. >> we are not a laminating iranians capabilities. isn't it also true that we cannot lift sanctions, we can only wage them. >> that is largely correct. >> so iranians will make a deal, but the next present of the united states may decide that this is not in our interest because it will only give us a limited period of time and they will go ahead and say sorry, we are not waiving sanctions anymore. iranians will need to make hard decisions that they had been unwilling to make for 18 months. i heard this movie has been played before. 20 years.

last june we heard from the president, just give me time. that was seven months ago. we are going to do all of this ultimately be in a position in which if they don't make a deal, we are exactly where we are at. no immediate consequence to them . very cap time is the shorter -- is shorter than the time it will take to break out new sanctions. now you are telling me that you don't even want to -- the iranians have made it clear that their parliament has to vote on this issue. why is it possible that tehran will treat us parliament better than the administration in the greatest democracy in the world is willing to treat its congress? i look forward to looking at your legislation. i have suggested some ways in

which it might be stronger. >> can i quickly addressed the ranking members' points? ranking member, i think we're most worried about not iranian perceptions, but the perceptions of our partners who are critical to enforcing the sanctions and what we've heard from them including from prime minister cameron as recently as last week, including from our french and british colleagues, is that further sanctions now, or the threat of sanctions, or even trigger legislation, risks unraveling the international coalition that we've built to impose the sanctions. at the end of the day, it will be much easier if we wind up suspending sanctions in the event of an agreement of some kind to reimpose them quickly if we've kept the international coalition together. so what we're most concerned about, and focused on, is that.

it's not iranian perceptions. although it does matter, because, look, iran is not immune to politics, either. they have their own. they have people who are negotiating, who are not friends of ours, who are not good guys but who may be more pragmatic because they're looking at the future of their country and trying to get out from the burdens that they're under. so we do want to do what we can to make sure that they're not penalized. but what is critical is our partners and our ability both to sustain the sanctions, and if we have to, to increase them. second, i think under the japoa, this is different than the past. in the past, it's true, we've engaged with iran and talked to them without having something like the japoa that froze the program, in some respects rolled it back and created much better access to learn more about it. you're exactly right that under those circumstances the iranians would be able to talk and advance their program at the same time. that is not what is happening now. this has been a good interim deal for us in our security, as we've pursued whether we can get to a final deal. i think the framework you asked about, what we hope to get to in march, is the agreement on all of the core elements.

what commitments the iranians would make. then, it will take some time to translate that in to tremendous technical detail. that's why we would need the time until june to do that. that's what we hope to be able to present to you if we get to yes at the end of march. i do believe that iran believes that there is the very credible threat of force. but what is motivating it primarily now and what brought it to the table is the tremendous economic burden it is under. thank you. >> senator menendez, i appreciate your willingness to look at some legislation that would give us an up or down vote on this issue. i would say in response to mr. lincoln's -- blinkin's comments i've talked with our international partner partners -- partners. not a single one of them has any concerns whatsoever with congress having the ability to vote up or down on final deal. many of them believe it strengthens our hands. with that mr. garner, senator gardner. >> thank you mr. chairman, and secretary lincoln i don't want

to mischaracterize anything that you've said in your response to determine corker. so i want to clarify perhaps a comment that i heard wrong. you mentioned that in the discussion the possibility of the legislation, the chairman has sent over to you the possibility of that legislation undermining the credibility of our negotiators. could you expound on that comment? and is that what you, indeed said? >> the -- in the context of these negotiations, if we get to an understanding, part of this our commitment, should the iranians make the commitments necessary to convince us and our partners that their program would be for peaceful purposes in return, their expectation is that something would be done about the sanctions. they, of course, would like us to end the sanctions immediately. that is something we will not do. and undersecretary cohen can address that. we believe that the best way to proceed is based on the not only the commitments they make, but also the steps they take to

implement those commitments that initially we suspend, not end, certain sanctions. and that over time, as they demonstrate that they're making good, at that point, we get to actually ending them and congress would have to do that and play a role there. the concern that we would have is that if we're saying we're going to be suspending certain sanctions early on, and yet that is still subject to an initial vote by the congress in some fashion, they will doubt our ability to actually deliver on our commitment. that's a concern that could make the negotiations more complicated. >> and many of our partners around the world, that they believe this legislation would undermine the credibility of our negotiators? >> i can't say that. i have not talked to any of our partners personally about the proposed legislation that the chairman is proposing. or -- >> it's been -- >> what i was talking about was actually sanctions legislation including trigger legislation.

>> i mean it has been fairly public in terms of the news reports about the proposed legislation. the idea is that we would put forward, no one -- this is strictly administration's position, and none of our partners. >> we would have to ask them. i don't know what their position would be on that. >> you mentioned talk about the iran not being immune to politics. and so following up on president rouhani, does he have the support within the iranian government within the politics within iran to accept an agreement from the united states international community regardless of how flexible and the united states is and the international community with sanctions during negotiations? >> i think you asked the $64,000 question. the short answer is, we don't know. that really is the test. can iran do what is necessary to get to yes, and to meet the very stringent requirements that we have, and that our partners have? that's exactly what we are testing now. i would say to you, senator, that over the course of these negotiations, we have seen the gaps close. and iran, after initially absolutely rejecting certain steps that we believe are necessary, of being open to them.

here's what's particularly complicated about this. this is one of those situations where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. so we may have in the course of the negotiations an agreement in principle on one aspect. and we've talked about several of them. iraq, natanz, possible military dimensions of the program, et cetera. but unless and until we're able to conclude all of the elements, then nothing is agreed to. so what we've seen is that on specific chapters, critical chapters, they have moved closer to a point where we would find their commitments acceptable in answering our requirements. on others we're just not there yet. and it goes to your question, do they have enough political space to make the agreement? i think what we'll find that out over the next two months. >> going back to the japoa, do you believe the corker legislation would violate the intent of the japoa? >> no. >> so again, the -- it would not violate the intent of the japoa. but would it give us the ability to weigh in, as congress, the

ability to perform, advise and consent obligations under our constitution? so it's strictly the administration's concern that this would interfere with their negotiations? >> again i think some of the concerns are that, and the japoa i think may be illustrative of this, if members have been asked to pronounce themselves within a month or so on the japoa, i suspect that many members initially might have given it a thumb's down because there was great skepticism about it. i think the japoa has proved itself through the results it's achieved over the course of the agreement, and i think a lot of minds were changed. for example our israeli partners who were very skeptical of the japoa initially acknowledge to us that it's been a success. so one concern is that pronouncing ourselves on the agreement before we've demonstrated whether iran's going to live up to it and meet its commitments i think may be premature. second there are some elements that, you know, we can certainly talk about. there is a, as i read it, a compliance requirement that is

on a fairly tight hair trigger. that is, if there's a violation that is detected, then within five days, sanctions would have to be reimposed. we've had situations under the japoa, where we have identified things, and actually ranking member menendez mentioned a few of them, which we believe were violations of the japoa, the iranians believed they were not. there may be circumstances where it's a good-faith difference. we have a mechanism in place under the japoa to litigate those disputes and in every instance, when iran was doing something that we thought was problematic it was litigated and they ceased their activities. for example the i.r.5. so that would be another concern. and then finally, one of the concerns, mr. chairman, just to put this on the table, too while we're talking about it is, as i read it, it does rule out a japoa extension. and again, it is our strong intent to try and reach a basic agreement in march, and then to conclude all of the technical details by june. but i would not want to prematurely rule out in a sense

arbitrarily any extensions if we're on the verge of completing the technical details in june but still have is to dot and ts to cross. we might want a little more time. i wouldn't want to rule that out. >> by all accounts iran remains a state sponsored terror, one of the world's foremost violators of human rights. these discussions have been involving the regime on nuclear issues. the record as state sponsored terrorism of human rights continues to be abysmal but if the refusal to impose additional sanctions while we discuss the nuclear issues, would you support additional sanctions on -- target the regime of terrorism and human rights violations? >> undersecretary cohen can address this. i would just say very simply that we have been vigorously implementing sanctions in other areas against iran, including on the question of human rights including on the question of support for terrorism, but maybe undersecretary cohen can address that. >> and just very briefly senator, just three weeks ago or

so, we imposed some additional sanctions with respect to iran's violation of human rights. the use of tech cog firms in iran to stifle dissent. in the period since the japoa has gone into effect among the 100 or so sanctions that we've been -- that we have imposed have been focused specifically on iran's support for edward j. -- support for terrorism. >> thank you. and we would certainly love input, love engagement like you're doing with iran. we'd like the same respect. so if you have some details you'd like to talk with us about, that would be fine. senator markey? >> thank you, mr. chairman. now, i've heard that the right agreement here includes a one-year breakout period of

duration of 15 to 20 years would be the agreement. now, the iraq reactor would be neutralized. and there would be a full scope safe guards under the additional protocol. those are the highlights the way i understand it. are the iranians willing to give up the heavy water reactor at alack? >> senator, i think you've covered many of the key details that would be required. there's some others. the short answer is, unless iraq is neutralized so that it is not able to produce plutonium that can be reprocessed for a weapon we don't have a deal. there are different ways of doing that. one of the things that our negotiators are looking at, and the folks who -- the scientists who know the technical details are the different ways of doing that. that's part of the negotiations.

but the bottom line is absent satisfaction on iraq we will not have a deal. >> have they agreed to take iraq's heavy water processing capacity off the table? >> as of this moment, no. >> they have not. and on fordow, your testimony pointed out that before the japoa, iran had about 200 kilograms of enriched uranium in a form that could quickly be enriched into a weapons-grade level. and produced much of the material at the fordow facility. you say they no longer have that capacity. what do the iranians then expect to do with their civilian nuclear sites specifically the underground facility at fordow under the agreement that you're negotiating right now? without getting into the details of what we're negotiating, but again we'd be happy to discuss that in a closed setting, again in the case of fordow, any agreement has to eliminate its production

of 20% fissile material in a permanent fashion. so that's something that would be critical to the agreement. >> i wrote a book back in 1982 on the international atomic energy agency and i concluded at the time it was a paper tiger in terms of its ability to put in place the kinds of intrusive inspections that would ensure that there was not a breakout. and so, what i'd like to do here, just to give you a chance just to talk about the inspections regime, that other countries abide by, and what iran is now negotiating, so right now, 122 countries have agreed to allow the iaea to inspect nuclear sites any time they want, with as little as two hours' advance notice. can you tell us a little bit then about what the iaea inspectors can do in terms of visiting fordow and natanz, and

other facilities if they want to go in with no notice essentially, which is what the other 122 countries allow to happen? >> that is exactly the kind of thing, again, without getting into the specifics and the details, exactly the kind of thing we would be striving to achieve. that, in fact, any agreement with iran would require the kind of access, monitoring and transparency that actually would put iran in a place that's exceptional. that no other country has to abide by, precisely because over these many years as has been alluded to, they have forfeited the trust and confidence of the international community. so we would be looking not only at the additional protocol, but other steps which i can talk about in a different setting that would give us, and give our partners confidence that we had all along in effect the production and supply chain, the minds, the mills, the centrifuge production facilities, and then the uranium and plutonium facilities, if any, themselves that we had access.

and also, this would require access to military facilities, and i should add -- >> so what are they telling you about parchin? their willingness to allow for iaea inspectors to go in to that site? >> what i'd like is for your permission to leave any of the specific details of where we are in the negotiations including what they've expressed a willingness to do and not do to a classified briefing which we will be happy to bring you up to date. >> i think it's very important for the united states to understand exactly what will be the level of intrusiveness into each one of the sites. and finally, although there are so many things that we can talk about here, it has been reported that saudi arabia and jordan are interested in pursuing nuclear cooperation agreements with the united states. how will we be able to convince those countries to agree not to demand the right to enrich uranium as part of those agreements if we allow iran to continue to maintain its enrichment capability as part of

a final agreement? and i put that in the context of the 123 agreement and the chairman already referred to this, the 123 agreement with the united arab emirates, which again i thought was a mistake. as i think a mistake would be made if we had an agreement with saudi arabia, for example. it just will trigger a cascading effect if there is not a sense that there is equal treatment. could you talk about that a little bit? i think it's very important for us to go to the next step in terms of what is the reaction of saudi arabia, if iran has this capability. >> first of all senator, let me note your own leadership on these issues and the work you've done over the years on this. we have a very clear policy of trying to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing second nothing. we're working to discourage proliferation technology beyond countries that already possess it. i think any resolution we reach with iran will be exactly the opposite of a model for any

other country. i don't think any country would want to follow the path that iran has followed to get to where it is. which has involved a decade or more of increasingly onerous sanctions, isolation, and an economy in tatters. that doesn't make any sense. so i think iran is actually the countermodel, and it sends a very strong signal to the rest of the word, that this is not the path to pursue. if you want to have a peaceful nuclear program, and get the most advanced technology, which we could provide under a 123 agreement for example. so i think it's actually very powerful in the other direction. >> we can pursue this further, but again, i think a no enrichment policy is the correct policy. especially as it sets a precedent for saudi arabia united arab emirates, and others, and especially since the iranians are clearly intending on building 8 to 10 nuclear

power plants, as they are flaring ten nuclear power plants worth of nuclear electricity generating capacity on a daily basis. ok so we just have to understand fully what the long-term emily indications are. thank you mr. chairman. >> senator grasso. >> thank you mr. chairman. secretary cohen, in a meeting in the white house last week the president said he thought the chances of a deal were about -- were less than 50% and i think you said exactly the same thing today. when you look at odds like that i think it's important for us to take in to consideration the pie -- the possibility that this does not succeed, and what we need to do in case of an arrangement -- agreement isn't received isn't able to come out. you had said that the if there is not a deal that the congress and this administration would move quickly to enact new sanctions if iran were to walk away from the talks. so could you talk about some specific additional sanctions that you think the administration would at least support imposing on iran if the diplomatic talks fall apart, and nothing is achieved? >> senator, we have, as you know, over the course of the

last several years, focused in a number of important areas on iran's ability to sell its oil, on its access to international financial system, on its ability to trade, and on investments in iran's various -- i think all of those issues would be ones that we would explore and likely focus on in additional sanctions. i'm not prepared to tell you specifically today what the detailed sanctions would be. but we -- but i think those broad areas, which have been, i think, quite effective, would be areas where we'd be -- >> you make the point where you say those are things we'd be interested in exploring. and so then the question naturally leads to, how long would it actually take until sanctions were imposed that would actually have a meaningful impact on what's happening? >> i think that's an important question. i know that ranking member menendez commented earlier about the phase-in time for certain sanctions.

and for some legislation in the past we have had relatively delayed phase-ins. particularly as we start to do some brand-new things. in other areas, the phase-in time has been quite short. to cite just one example with the ndaa of 2012 there was a requirement that we block all iranian financial institutions. so impose sanctions on iranian financial institutions. that was implemented in a matter of weeks after that legislation was enacted. so there is -- there are precedents where new sanctions new legislative sanctions, can go into effect very quickly. executive sanctions, when we act by executive order, they're immediately effective, and so go into effect the day that they are announced. and just one final point, even with sanctions that have some delayed phase-in, business and industry adjust before the effective date of the sanctions. so if it's a two-month phase-in you see financial institutions you see businesses immediately beginning to scale back their

activity so that they're not caught up short when the sanctions go into effect. so we can impose sanctions very, very quickly. if need be. >> and since the combined impact of sanctions, not just by the united states, but by others has its initial impact on the ground, have there been these with -- about imposing sanctions across the board that would snap back into place? >> we have an ongoing discussion with partners and others around the world about sanctions and about what the future may hold. so i don't want to get into any of the details of those conversations, but absolutely. >> a number of us have just come back from saudi arabia, from qatar, from israel, have visited members of the free syrian army and this has to do with what happens when sanction relief occurs and where the money is spent that goes to iran, what we have heard from the commanders on the ground of the free syrian army is when sanctions were relieved in the past money went

into iran which then immediately went to help finance efforts with assad. in syria, that assad at this point buying at this point is buying oil and food staples from isis, so an indirect funding through assad to isis. so i'm wondering how you see what happens on the ground at least what we heard visiting with the free syrian army. >> it's terribly concerning. no question about it. i will say that our sense of what iran has been doing with the funds to which it has been given access that were otherwise frozen is primarily to use those to try to prop up its economy, which has the deputy secretary said is in tatters. but we have been very much focused on iran's support for terrorist organizations for the syrian regime throughout this process.

and we'll continue to take action where we see an ability to do so. >> obviously, hamas, hezbollah. >> absolutely senator. >> if i can visit with you about proliferation. the other thing we heard, and i think senator markey talked about, if iran is able to antony -- proliferate, who can do and what interests are going to be. we heard saudi arabia is interested in pursuing a development program or purchasing nuclear weapons from pakistan. there is that concern that this could result in actually instead of eliminating nuclear arms resulting in an arm's race in the middle east. can you comment on that? >> yes, senator, thank you. what's most likely to lead to a nuclear arms race is iran getting a nuclear weapon. that would open the flood gates and we would go down a path that no one wants to go down. as i suggested earlier, it's our judgment on what iran has done

is hardly going to be a model for any other country. i don't think any other country would want to subject itself to the burdens that have been imposed by the international community over the last decade or more for its efforts to pursue a nuclear weapon. the isolation, the sanctions the state of this economy, the message that that sends to everyone else is this is not what you want to do. what you want to do is to respect international norms and indeed we're prepared to work with countries that do that. also to provide for them for peaceful purposes the most advanced technology for their nuclear power programs, but not enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. so i think the message it sends is one of following international norms, not violating. >> as as a final thought, i agree if iran has a nuclear weapon that will happen.

the question is if they are allowed to enrich at a level that far exceeds what they really need for energy use. there's a mathematical calculation for what they need plus the potential of how much they want to enrich and the concern that even the approval of that could result in this additional proliferation and arms race. >> our entire focus is on ensuring that as a practical matter they are not able to produce enough material for a bomb in less than one year. that would give us plenty of time to take action with the international community or alone if necessary to counter that effort. i should say we're being very conservative about this at least in my judgment. as you know, it's not just the material. it's having a weapon, it's the assessment of our intelligence community that they were pursuing a weaponization program, at least until 2003.

the evidence suggests they stopped them, but this is something we remain individual -- very vigilant about. it's also the capacity to being able to make that together. but what is most visible, what is most easiest to see, account for, measure is the material. and that's why in this agreement what we're focused on is making sure that the constraints are so severe and the access so exceptional that we would be able to see if they tried to break out and would have plenty -- and that we would have plenty of time to do something about it. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i understand that senator purdue has preferred to senator johnson for time reasons. i would say to the audience we appreciate you being here and listening. we don't appreciate being involved in the dialogue so if you could keep comments to -- senator murphy.

>> thank you very much, senator corker, congratulations on. -- i wanted to accept your invitation and focus some of my questions on the jurisdiction of this committee and maybe sneak in a last question on sanctions. mr. chairman, as you know, i have been one of the strongest proponents of congress exercising its constitutional authority and responsibility when it comes to being coequal with executive branch with respect to the management of foreign affairs. that's why i think it's absolutely inessential -- an essential requirement that this committee continue our work on the constitution spells out very clearly that it's our responsibility to declare war and we need to weigh in on what is happening today in syria and iraq. the constitution is also equally clear as to when the congress has the responsibility to weigh in on international agreements entered into on behalf of the united states by the executive.

there's a long standing precedent on what constitutes a treaty requiring the u.s. congress to weigh in and what constitutes a nontreaty obligation entered into by the executive. it's important to understand the difference between the two. i accept the caution that secretary blinken made to us about a new precedent that we might be setting about weighing in on this agreement and what it would mean for future agreements. i also work about our ability in the current political context to have a reasonable, productive debate on international agreement of this import. the fact is that we can't even approve treaty recognizing disability rights. we have an agreement on illegal arms trafficking that was opposed only by iran, north korea and syria at its inception and we can't even begin a discussion about that treaty here.

so i worry about our ability to process this. but i do understand the concerns that the chairman is raising. so i want to maybe direct a few questions to our witnesses about the concerns. the first is that a suspension of sanctions is part of an agreement with the iranians. has the effect of being a permanent sanctions, thus essentially eliminating our ability to weigh in with a statutory removal of the sanctions. so i guess i will ask secretary cohen this question. do you believe if an agreement was reached that led to a suspension of the sanctions that that would be an effective unraveling of the sanctions?

or do you believe that it if the iranians didn't live up to that agreement, we would have the ability to put back in place sanctions that were suspended? >> it's a legitimate concern that senator corker is raising and would be good to hear your thoughts. >> absolutely, and it is a legitimate concern and one that is foremost in the minds as this agreement is being negotiated, which is that whatever relief there would be from sanctions, from our own sanctions as well as from the sanctions that have been imposed through the u.n. security council would be in relation to steps taken by iran. so as secretary blinken noted earlier, the idea here is for phased sanctions relief, phased and tied to specific milestones that the iranians would have to meet. that is in part designed to ensure that if the iranians don't meet those milestones, we

can reimpose the sanctions quickly because they will have been suspended, not terminated. it's important that our international partners as part of that agreement are buying into that same phased approach so that if iran doesn't meet its milestones, doesn't fulfill its commitments, not only will our sanctions go back into effect, others will as well and they are all committed to reimposing the sanctions. so i think it is a legitimate concern, but one we're trying to address by the way the agreement is being constructed. >> it was a legitimate concern raised about the jpoa that did not end upcoming true. people said this would be unraveling of the sanctions, and even our loudest critics now accept that those sanctions can be reinstituted because they have held together. secretary blinken, just talk about what happens if we reach an agreement that our partners are enthusiastic about, they are

able to get domestic support for and congress disapproves it, what happens in that situation? our partners have consented to and the administration has consented to but congress rejects? >> you're putting the spotlight on a fundamental point that's important to keep in mind as a general proposition, which is we're nots the only ones who have a vote in this. it's our partners who are critical to a sustaining and if it comes to that actually increasing sanctions. so we are working to keep them on board has been a critical effort by the president repeatedly over these years. there are several partners, for example, for whom implementing these sanctions is a real economic burden or poses real burdens. keeping them on board is going

to be an effort. so if we wind up in a situation where we reached an agreement that all of our partners believe is in their security interests our security interests, the security interests of other partners beyond those making the agreement and then that agreement was to be in some fashion unravelled here, i think what would result is the sanctions regime that so many in this chamber have labored so hard to put in place, that would likely unravel. so far from being able to implement additional sanctions we would be unable to implement the existing regime. iran would be off in that sense potentially scot-free. that's at least a danger we would have to grapple with. >> one question on sanctions. as a potential tool to the negotiating table, consider a resolution from the united states congress stating our clear intent upon the failure of negotiations to reach fruition

to enact the kind of crippling sanctions that we're all beginning a discussion about today. clearly it would be nonbinding but would put the majority of the senate on record stating our intention to move very quickly and expeditiously with sanctions. would that resolution be a violation of the jpoa and would it be helpful to your negotiating position over the course of the next few months? >> i don't believe it would be a violation, and i think it would be consistent with the approach that we have taken enabling us both to make clear what would follow if iranians do not reach an agreement and at the same time not putting us in position where we risk destabilizing the strong coalition that we built to impose sanctions. so it sounds at least on the surface that that would be consistent with the approach that we're taking. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman.

>> senator johnson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to thank the senator for switching positions with me here. mr. blinken, just reviewing the security council resolutions the goal or the requirement of u.n. 1696 was to ask or call for iran to suspend enrichment of uranium. the same requirement, suspended enrichment. the nuclear program must be verified as only peaceful, and i'll come back to that. 1803, reaffirmed the previous four resolutions. 1929 calls for the halt of enrichment by iran. who or at what point in time did we abandon that requirement? >> senator, thank you. i think what we know is and what

we have seen is that iran has mastered the fuel cycle. nothing we do can do that. we can't sanction away that knowledge, we can't bomb it away, they have mastered it. so in our judgment what is critical to our security and that of our partners is to establish a comprehensive solution that gives us the confidence because of the extraordinary stringent restrictions on that program as well as the exceptional access that inspectors would have that as a practical matter they cannot produce the material to make a bomb. that is the way to get at the concerns that motivated the u.n. security council. >> pretty simple question. when did we abandon the goal of not allowing them to enrich uranium? >> in the course of the negotiations with them, i think it became clear not only to us but also to all of our partners that iran was not going to give up as a practical matter some very limited forms of enrichment in the event of an agreement.

>> so in the jopoa we basically abandoned that, correct? >> in the course of the negotiations and they foresee a final resolution that includes a limited and constrained enrichment capacity. >> mr. cohen, you said there's no higher priority to prevent ooin from obtaining a nuclear weapon. i believe this is your quote your goal was to guarantee. how can you possibly guarantee they will not obtain a nuclear weapon? >> senator, the intention and i think it's consistent with what secretary blinken has said, is to ensure if there's a deal to to be had here that the timeline for breakout is such that we would be in a position to respond so that if iran does not

adhere to its commitments under an agreement will be able to take action to ensure that they do not obtain a nuclear weapon. >> there would be military action then. give ourselves enough time so they cannot obtain a nuclear weapon? is that the administration's policy? >> there are a variety of steps that could be taken upon the detection that iran was not adhering to its commitments. >> we have had testimony how expensive it is to enrich uranium and also if you have a peaceful nuclear program there's no reason to enrich uranium because you can obtain it readily in the open market, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> with that in mind, mr. blinken, you said earlier, you can't imagine the country would the harm to its economy that iran is subjecting itself to. why is iran subjecting itself to the isolation, the sanctions and the harm to the economy if

it were not other than to obtain a nuclear weapon? >> i think it's an excellent question. a way we believe is they clearly had military aspirations for their program and indeed at least until 2003 were pursuing weaponization activities. one can certainly ask why a country that's so rich in oil resources would need an expansive nuclear program, even a civil nuclear program. those are all extremely good questions. here's what they say, and i'm not saying that i agree with any of this. they say they want to devote more of their oil resources to exports and remain energy self-sufficient, hence a nuclear power program. >> again, which they could obtain the material on the open market. >> that's exactly right. >> so again, isn't the answer obvious that they can make this pain go away tomorrow, end the isolations, end the sanctions,

improve their economy by just suspending, ending, halting their nuclear enrichment program, but they are not doing that. >> that's something we have pointed out to them repeatedly. >> how do we ever have a successful negotiation? how do we ever get a good deal with the regime that's behaving this way? >> so i think a few things should happen, and this is the subject of a lot of analysis and assessments and also this is something we can discuss in a different setting. i'm not vouching for any way shape or form, but i do think what's developed over time is a sense of national pride about the program, a huge investment ironically, made in the program and a desire to sustain some pieces of it. from our perspective what's critical to our security and that of our partners is if they are going to have a nuclear power.

program it's so constrained, so limited that it cannot as a practical matter be used to produce material for a nuclear weapon and would give us plenty of time to do something about it if they did. >> why does the president of the united states believe he's the sole person that can actually decide whether or not the deal with iran is a good deal or a bad deal for our entire nation? why does the president believe he's the only person that should have that authority and does not believe this is really more like a treaty that would require ratification by congress? >> senator, i don't think that he believes that or that we believe that. as we discussed earlier, one of the most powerful levers we have to make sure that iran makes good on any commitments it makes under an acord if one is reach -- reached is precisely the ability of congress after iran has made. good on its commitments to actually end big pieces of the

sanctions that congress has put in place. that's a tremendous power. congress has to be fully part and parcel in doing this, just as congress was critical to establishing the sanctions regime, just as we seek these consultations going forward on the details. at the end of this, the role is absolutely critical. so you'll have a strong vote. that is why we want to keep ending the sanctions to the far end of the process to hold iran to whatever commitments it makes. >> thank you. >> senator kain? >> i have been a strong supporter of the administration's diplomatic efforts with iran. we all share the goal of an iran with no nuclear weapons and the

determination of such intent diplomatically rather than militarily is preferable to everyone. i think the jpoa has been a success. there are those who predicted it would lead to unraveling. those predicted it would lead to a surge in the iranian economy it didn't. i think skeptics at the origin now realize that the jpoa has largely been successful. with respect to a final deal, i have a series of significant concerns. first a deep skepticism about iran. the u.s. has had to position to potentially engage in an evacuation of the u.s. embassy. a very, very serious contingency that's likely enough we have had to position military assets there it. all understand that the effort to topple the government in yemen has been supported and funded through tehran. tehran has basically turned the assad regime into a puppet state.

they have done that in iraq for years. they are currently involved in activities to destabilize the governments of nations as near as bahrain. so separate and aparts, iran is engaged in activity today that should make us be deeply skeptical about their intentions. second, i'm worried about the negotiation and the potential consequences of it. the united states was engaged in a negotiation with libya over the dismantling of the nuclear program and they gave up their nuclear weapons. libya is no good example for anything now, but imagine the chaos if the weapons had had survived. we were involved in a deal and it dismantled their weapons program. the united states was involved in a nuclear negotiation with north korea where we asked them to freeze their program.

they cheated and they have nuclear weapons now. i want this deal to look more like the deal with libya, a dismantlement than trying to make a deal about let's freeze it with a nation that has proven to be untrust worthy because if it's only that kind of a deal the end result is more likely to be the north korean situation. iran has made it plain in the course of this negotiation. this is not an negotiation about iran dismantling a nuclear weapons program. it's a negotiation about trying to buy a year of time to have an alarm bell ring and act. we're already going down a path in this negotiation, in my view, where it's more like the korean scenario than the libyan scenario. the number of centrifuges that have been contemplated. the enrichment capacity does not trouble me and that could be part of the deal, but it would have to be a capacity consistent only with the civilian nuclear program and not civilian plus a whole lot more and the kinds of things i've been hearing about the number of centrifuges

contemplated in this deal. this is not consistent with a purely civilian program. and finally, the point that was made by senator gardner, this is going to trigger an arms race in the region. our allies and others are telling us this. and if all we get with a deal like this is iran agreeing to we'll give you a year before we break out, other nations are going to say, ok, i have to be able to have nuclear capacity within a year. they are going to have to engage in those behaviors. if it's just a year we're buying, they will undertake similar activity. i think congress has to weigh in on a final deal. i support the jpoa, i support the administration's diplomacy, but we have to weigh in and the reason we have to, and i understood senator murphy's point, he's right about many such deals, but he's not right about this deal. because this it deal is fundamentally about one thing on our side.

under what conditions will a congressionally imposed sanctions regime be dismantled. if the administration was negotiating about other things and saying we're not going to touch the sanctions regime at all, then congressional approval wouldn't be warranted. but there's no condition under which you're going to bring a deal back that doesn't want relief from sanctions. and so since this deal is fundamentally the only lever we have is the sanctions regime iaea effectively implemented by the administration that's bought -- brought iran to the table. the only lever is the congressional imposed sanctions regime, and i don't think that while limited waivers were certainly contemplated, i don't think a blanket suspension was contemplated by that language. it's very important for congress to be able to weigh in in this deal. especially given the actor we're dealing with. a couple quick questions. how confident are you for either

of you that the united states or -- united states can detect nuclear sites? i understand newer and newer it rations of technology are harder to detect. how confident are you and talk about the way you're approaching the inspection? >> thank you, senator, i can also address the other important comments you made. what we know is this. the access that has already been achieved under the agreement is beyond anything we have had and that's already enhanced the ability of the iea and our own people to have a better understanding of what iran is doing and what it's not doing. any agreement that we reach, this is something we can go into in a classified setting, would have to have more stringent requirements still in terms of monitoring, in terms of access in terms of transparency. can we significantly increase

our ability and the ability of the international community to detect an effort by iran to develop a covert program or to break out from its program? i think we can be in a much stronger place, clearly a much stronger place if we're able to get the agreement we want, and clearly in a much better place we would be if there's no agreement or if we were in the world. by the way, i should have mentioned earlier in response to several questions including senator markey, one of the other reasons i don't think countries are going to rush to do what iran did is precisely because of the limitations in terms of tran -- transparency, inspections monitoring that will be imposed on their nuclear program in the event of some kind of resolution. that's something that, again, most other countries will not want to live with because this would have to go well beyond what's required of other countries.

i would just say also very quickly, senator, we share your concerns and the concerns of other members of the committee of iran's actions in other areas. that's precisely why we're vigorously implementing sanctions and taking other actions to push back on efforts to destabilize other countries on their efforts to proliferate and support terrorism. that will not end even if david -- if we can get an accord with them on the nuclear program. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. the administration was very clear, mr. cohen, and thank you for being here today, at the start that the sanction relief would be very limited, but the enforcement would be very stringent. yet in the last six months, we have only had one public announcement of a sanction enforcement action. can you speak to that and speak -- has iran stopped its

procurement efforts and attempts to bypass our financial sanctions? >> as i noted since the jpoa went into effect, we have imposed sanctions on close to 100 entities that were related to iran, including some just at the end of december. a set of individuals and companies involved in trying to assist iran in getting access to u.s. dollars, which remains forbidden. we have had a series of actions taken over the last several months. some in august, some previously. we act when we have the information available to us to take the public actions and announce them. that is the tip of the iceberg. we have been continuing to work on ensuring that the sanctions remain in place and remain firmly in place throughout this period as we were previously.

that means things that don't quite get as much attention as a designation action but working directly with partners around the world, reaching out directly to companies that we think might be getting close to the line and making sure that they understand the peril that they are courting. so there have been actions well beyond the 100 designations that we have taken that have altogether, i think, resulted in the sanctions remaining in place, remaining robust over the course of the jpoa. and as the senator noted, there were a lot of people who questioned whether the sanctions would remain in place. i think we have managed to keep our sanctions regime very firmly in place and have managed to ensure that the pressure on iran from the sanctions that have been developed in congress with

the administration, with our partners continuing to apply that pressure throughout this period and continue to provide the leverage that our negotiators need. >> i yield the balance of my time. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you both for being here. you know, deputy secretary blinken, i certainly share the view that it's important for us to keep our coalition together if we're going to be successful. and one concern that i have is to what extent we're going to be able to do that given what's happening with russia. i wonder if you could talk a little bit about what russia is doing today. there's a notice of an agreement that iran and russia have just signed and clearly the sanctions

that we have taken against russia over ukraine seems like it's going to have an impact on what's happening are iran. can you talk about russia's willingness to be part of this effort and to what extent we're seeing their commitment being reduced or not. >> at least as of this moment, what we have seen in the context of the negotiations with iran is russia continuing to play a constructive role. and i can see how that would be surprising and indeed one of the things that i think was a concern was whether russia would because of what we are doing to impose severe penalties for its actions in ukraine because of disputes over other courses of action they have taken that this would rebound in the negotiations, but i have to tell you that at least to date as of now, they continue to play a

constructive role and they have been very helpful in pushing iran in the direction that it has to go in if it's going to get any kind of resolution. david may want to address anything on the sanctions piece. >> i think we have imposed a whole set of very powerful sanctions on russia. it has, i think, we won't go into great detail here in this setting, but it's had an effect on the russian economy and on, i think, how they are perceiving what's happening in ukraine. i think secretary blinken is right. it has not, to our knowledge sort of bled over into the iran negotiations. >> if you would talk a little bit more about that because one of the things that i thought was very telling was when russia

cancelled the missile deal with iran several years ago and we've got putin, i was in an armed services committee hearing where the former national security adviser talked about putin's comments about using nuclear weapons during this ukraine conflict and suggesting that that might be a possibility at some point. so to what extent do we believe that russia continues to be very concerned about iran developing a nuclear weapon and how is what's happening in ukraine affecting that? >> senator, i think it does share that concern, which i think explains largely why it has been at least again until now a constructive partner in the efforts to make sure we put in place something that denies

as a practical matter the ability to develop material. there have been reports over the course of the negotiations of iran starting to do deals -- excuse me, russia starting to do deals with iran. none of that has materialized and if any other country seeks to evade the sanctions, the treasury department will come down on them as they have throughout this process. there's pressure on russia to look for new markets, new >> if i could elaborate on one point, the first reports of a

potential deal came up in the fall of 2013. at that point, i recall testifying and saying if russia were to do such a thing that we would take actions and impose sanctions. it was met with skeptical looks on the notion we would ever impose sanctions on russia. i think we have disabused the russians of any notion if they were to engage in behavior that sanctionable including working with iranians on a goods deal. >> shortly after the jpoa was negotiated, there was a lot of noise in some of the european capitals about trade deals with iran and trade delegations that were being sent to iran. can you talk about what's happening to date, if any of those have successfully negotiated any deals assuming there was an agreement that

would be reached and sanctions would be lifted? >> this has been a long standing concern of yours and something that we have been watching very closely, as have our colleagues at the state department. we're not aware of any deals that have been struck in the event that a negotiation is successful. and i will say under our sanctions authority, executive contracts of that sort where you have an agreement that goes into effect when a future event occurs are sanctionable. a deal, a future is immediately sanctionable today. >> do we have any idea how many delegations have actually

visited tehran? >> i don't have that number right at hand. there have certainly been quite a few that have visited, no question about that, but we have tracked it. we have reached out on many occasions to some of the sponsors of these trips, some of the entities that are involved to make sure they understand what the rules of the road still are. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses. like many in this room, i have been supportive of these negotiations. i applaud the administration for undertaking them. i think it's incumbent on us to look for every avenue. we often say that the purpose of sanctions is to get parties to the table. they are at the table and so i'm confused by the notion that some

would want to impose additional sanctions while negotiations are going on. we recognize that the purpose is to bring people to the negotiating table. having said that, i'm a skeptical as anyone that tehran will actually come through and follow through on their agreements for the long term. and i certainly hope they do. i am as concerned as you are about breaking up this coalition that we have. these sanctions have been effective because they are multilateral. and i'm very concerned that that will break up. they are at the table because this has been iran versus the west rather than iran versus the u.s. and i think that's what we need to make sure as it continues. so i'm sensitive to the administration's concern that congress move ahead now with additional sanctions even triggered that might upset the negotiations and fracture the coalition, effective coalition that we have. i do believe that if the administration thinks that they can include an agreement and move on without congress weighing in, however, at some point on that agreement, that's

a bridge too far. i will be anxious to see the administration's response, and i look forward to those discussions, as well. i am glad to see that treasury has lessened its load a bit by changing our policy towards cuba and that we aren't spending so much time and resources and can free up resources and time and effort to make sure that these agreements and sanctions we currently have and future

sanctions, should they be ramped up, that we have the resources to actually do that. a lot of the questions i had have been answered already, so i would just say that i applaud the chairman for putting forward the proposal he has in terms of congress waiting in on an ultimate agreement. i hope that we are sensitive to these negotiations. i do believe, as many of us have discussed, if this jpoa were to continue in perpetuity, it would not be a bad thing. as long as that breakup time is significant enough and iran isn't progressing towards a

nuclear weapon, that is what our goal should be. i hope that we can stick with these negotiations. i hope that they are fruitful in the end, but i'm certainly willing to play as constructive a role i can as a member of this committee to make sure that happens. >> thank you, senator. senator cowan's. >> thank you for holding this hearing and the constructive relationship you and our ranking member have had. i support the administration's strong, determined efforts to bring iran to the table and the congressionally-enacted sanctions have made a critical difference in changing the trajectory of iran's illicit nuclear weapons program. i have suspicions of iran's intentions and actions, their support for terror, and developments in yemen that suggests a they continue to engage in activities not just related to their nuclear weapons program but in many other ranges that should give us d about any

agreement with them. nonetheless, i think we've made significant progress in continuing negotiations. i will just reassert that no deal is better than a bad deal. a deal that we cannot ultimately enforce and that we cannot ultimately live with in terms of where it leaves us in the long-term or short-term is worse than no deal at all. one of my concerns is whether or not we will have the time to react, will be able to detect cheating, leakage, whether we will be able to sustain the sanctions coalition you have so successfully convened and put into place. just a comment to the nominee to

be the deputy director of the cia -- my congratulations on your great leadership and work in sanctions enforcement. one positive of the omnibus was an increase in the research -- resources for sanctions enforcement. whether it is the lightning of the load senator flake referenced or an increase in resources, it is my hope and my confidence that your successor will continue the same determined enforcement of sanctions that has been the hallmark of your time there. let's get into where this deal as imagined and described would leave us. one of my core concerns has expressed eloquently earlier by senator kaine is that we are no longer negotiating the dismantling of iran's nuclear infrastructure. we are negotiating for them to retain enough facilities that we are positive that their breakout

time is no less than a year. what does that leave us in 2021 or shortly thereafter? i know the exact length of the agreement is not finalized, and how do we avoid the regional proliferation that would come from an agreement that basically locks in iran as a threshold nuclear power, and how do we ensure that the message that the world takes from this isn't that we have assented to their being a nuclear weapons capable power? >> first of all, we share your deep suspicions about iran and its actions. that is precisely why we are driving to get a deal that satisfies very stringent requirements. we fully agree with you that no deal is better than a bad deal. there have been other

opportunities to take a bad deal. some of our partners would've been willing to settle for things we simply will not settle for. we agree with the premise you and other members of this committee have put forward. in terms of where iran is at the end of this, in our judgment the one-year breakout time is critical but also very conservative. besides the material for a weapon, they need a weapon itself. we will be vigilant about their efforts to return to weaponization. they need the ability to deliver a weapon. we will be vigilant about that. we are being conservative because quite frankly it is hard to imagine iran or any other country breaking out in that fashion when they get to one weapon's worth of material.

it would be much more logical to accumulate enough for several weapons. if we have one year, we believe that would give us plenty of time to take whatever steps are necessary to reverse that action. it may be resuming economic pressure. it may a military pressure. they won't be a threshold state at the end of this. they can't become a nuclear weapons state. they will -- there will be a permanent ban on weapons activity. they will have to ensure protocol that there is no undeclared program. there will be an extensive iaea safeguard to ensure that there is no diversion. for the duration, we will have enhanced monitoring and access. that will allow us to understand better than ever before every note, every cranny, every person, every place, every document involved, so even beyond the duration, that knowledge will give us much greater ability to detect whether they are trying in any fashion to breakout. at the end of whatever the duration is, we retain the capacity we have today to take action if they do something that threatens our security. we will be no worse off, and indeed we will be infinitely better off, even the knowledge we will accumulate over time about their program. the idea that iran would be treated at the end of this kind of agreement as a non-nuclear weapons state was one that was

first advanced by the previous administration. indeed, our partners around the world, and this goes to what senator flake said a moment ago -- the purpose of the sanctions has been to get iran to the table in order to negotiate something that gives the international community confidence that any program iran has is going to be for peaceful purposes. should they violate those commitments, we would be able to do something about it so that, as an effective matter, they cannot breakout. that is what we are striving to achieve. we hope that we can get there by march. >> i'm concerned that centrifuge r&d also be a part of negotiations. perhaps in the first phase, it wasn't as fully embraced as it should've been. my sense it now is. there are two ways they could expand their breakout time, one of the accumulation of fissile material. i think the jpl way -- jpoa has dealt with it.

the core concern going forward is that they would not be allowed in any way going forward to engage in the sorts of r&d to change their breakout time on the backside. any to shut down any sort of centrifuge r&d. >> if i could for just 10 seconds, thank you for your kind wishes on my new assignment. i want to assure you, members of this committee, and anybody else who may be watching, the team that will remain a treasury after i move along is completely committed to ensuring that the implementation of sanctions will be robust, probably even better without me being there. that team i worked with closely over the past several years is the team that will remain. i am certain that our sanctions will continue to be very well enforced. >> you have done a great job

with limited resources. i wish you the best of luck in your new opportunity. >> senator paul? >> when our founders brought together our government, they brought together co-week of branches. the hope was that they would pick ambition against ambition. the ambitions of congress to maintain power would be pitted against an executive that would want more power. this back and forth would check and balance power. i'm glad to see that there is some exhibition that on both sides of the aisle congress is trying to pitted their ambition against the executive. in saying this, i believe that we have all concluded, both

congress and the executive, that final passage has to be done by congress. we are arguing over waivers, suspension of waivers, and how long these will be. if we get to the crux, maybe there could be an agreement. when we rewrite this legislation, any legislation moving forward, we need to be more careful with the waivers we give. as we move forward, i have been one who says, new sanctions in the middle of negotiations is a huge mistake and may well break up the sanctions coalition, may

drive a iran away from the table. i have been one who wants sanctions because i don't want war frankly. there are many on our site who say, we don't need 535 generals. the president should do what he needs to do. i think there is a certain analogy to diplomacy that we don't need 535 negotiators. i don't want to give up my right to approve of the negotiation. you want a suspension to go on to the end of the president's term. if i am the iranians, why would i want to go through all of this to have sanctions relieved for a

year? you have a greater ability to negotiate once you affirm the law that will have to pass the final negotiations. admit to it. come to an agreement with senator corker. admit to the law, and then we can have permanent sanctions relief, trade with iran, if they will submit. they will be more assured of what we are doing and of the agreement if they know it has to pass us. i have heard it whispered, those republicans will never approve anything. as you listen to us all the way around, i think there is a nuance of opinion. there are several of us on this

site who do not say, no, we will not vote to approve an agreement. you want to to know that we have the right to vote so that you talk to us, the chairman. i have been working with senator boxer on an agreement that would not be new sanctions. it would be, if they do not comply with the current agreement, sanctions would renew. i would like to marry that with what senator corker is talking about, the admission -- this would be an admission and a signal -- you will have to get our agreement in the end. is there any kind of compromise? maybe. i think you need to talk to senator corker. could there be something that is a period of time?

we could do years of negotiations to get 120 days of sanctions relief. they want permanent relief. we want something from them. we want them to live in a safe nonnuclear world. we keep asking for more and more. centrifuges have to be a part of this. i don't know that you gain a lot in the administration by saying, we are not going to agree what senator corker is saying. in doing so, you bring us to an impasse. there is a chance at an override of a veto. i'm somebody who wants to work to find a middle ground, but i want you to include some of the language senator corker is talking about admitting -- we don't want to be consulted. i want you to ask for permission, and i want you to present the agreement to us, and i want you to present an agreement we all like. it will get everybody, but i think the vast majority will vote for a reasonable thing. let's see if we connect chile read proposals, -- if we can

actually read proposals and see if there is some kind of common ground we can find. >> first of all, as a matter of basic principle, i personally absolutely welcome the opportunity to consult closely with the chairman, the ranking member, every member of this committee on the way forward on iran and any other issues before us in foreign policy and national security. we can absolutely continue this conversation. this is a question of judgment i think. our best judgment right now is this. senator, you pointed to something important. what the iranians want is permanent relief. precisely by holding back that permanent relief until, over a significant time, they've demonstrated -- >> the idea of suspension is not a bad idea. however, then you need to work with us. i like the idea. we vote on a one-year suspension. let's find out if they are complying. let's vote again on another

year. don't just think you are going to be able to do it by yourselves. if you acknowledge have to bring it to us, sell us, democracy is messy -- you got to come and sell us on something. we are your boss. we are your co-equals in this. i fully believe that you can bring -- if you have all p5 plus one on board with a negotiated settlement, i think you can sell it to us. i think it's not an impossible sell. >> thank you, senator. i will say consultations up until this point have been a phone call in the morning that something is happening, and generally speaking, while we are receiving that phone call, reading "in your times," or someone else reports, so i do want to associate myself with his comments. senator udall? >> thank you, senator corker. let me join with others in thanking you and senator menendez in terms of trying to work through things. you have shown it when your positions were reversed, your willingness to get bipartisan agreements. i very much appreciate having the witnesses here today. a lot of what i'm going to say -- i'm going to repeat many of the things that have been said but i also support the negotiations. i think it is very important

that congress doesn't torpedo them and disrupt them. the message you are getting from us is we want a hard-nosed negotiation. we want to be involved in the process. part of it is going through this hearing. one of the things you are saying that is absolutely key is if we were alone doing sanctions without all of these other countries, we would be in a much different situation. it is holding the coalition together that is tremendously important. i think we need to remember that. when we move forward with whatever negotiations continue we want to keep the pressure on. i want to to comment on that. i have a couple of questions here. one is, how quickly could we put additional sanctions in place if we had a failure? that is one. another is an observation -- we hear a lot about the spring later in iran. we hear a lot about the president. then we hear a lot about the hardline. what role do the various players there -- who is really going to determine iran signing on to this deal? as you follow this, you begin to wonder who is in charge there. if you have an agreement, who could undermine it in the future? i'm going to go ahead and let you take a shot at a couple of those who may be follow-up in a minute. >> why don't i take the question about how quickly we can impose sanctions? i think the answer to that is very quickly. it has been done in the past

with some legislation and active. there have been sanctions that have gone into effect in a matter of weeks. in some of the executive actions we've taken, those sections are almost immediately effective. the answer is, we would be able to, working with congress as well is working on our own impose additional sanctions as quickly as we want to. >> do you think, secretary cohen, other countries we are

working with, if things developed in a negative way, that they would be willing to join us on that? >> it is a crucial question. the willingness of other countries continue to work with us on imposing sanctions contrary to the economic interests of these countries, is dependent on their continuing belief that we are seeking a negotiated resolution.

in the future, if the talks break down, the ability to hold together the coalition to intensify the sanctions is going to depend in large part on who our partners perceive is to blame for the breakdown. so long as we do everything in our power to try to achieve an agreement that meets our needs and the needs of our partners, and it is iran that is to blame for not reaching an agreement, you will have a much better chance of holding together the two national coalition and being able to intensify the pressure on iran. >> in regard to your question about who is in charge, we have perfect knowledge of this. hope we have -- what we have assessed, there are clearly different power centers in iran. have a tendency to look at iran as if it is the one country in the world that doesn't have politics. in fact, it does. the supreme leader is the first among equals for some time, but there are other critical constituencies that factor in. of the most powerful things that happened in iran was actually the election of president rouhani. in our judgment, that was a reaction to the desire of the iranian people to improve the economy, to get out from the isolation they are under, and to move iran in a different correction. within the confines of the system, that was what president rouhani was trying to be responsive to. i think the supreme leader has

to measure that in factoring in how much leeway he is going to give to the negotiators in the nuclear context. to date, as the iaea continues to confirm, iran has made good on the commitments it has made under the interim agreement. going forward, if the power center changed, as we've made very clear, iran, if it violated the agreement in any fashion would be subject to an intense reaction from us, and as the under secretary said, if we are able to preserve the unity of the international coalition you pointed out the beginning of your remarks, that would give us a much greater ability to respond effectively to any decision by iran to violate the commitments that it makes. >> thank you very much.

>> senator rubio? >> secretary bullington, much of the debate has been about the role of congress and our need to trust and the ability of the administration to craft a good deal and the fact that we would be consulted. i want to take you back to the last time you were before this committee, and i asked you a question about whether there would be any changes in cuba policy. your answer -- "anything in the future that might be done in cuba would be done in full consultation with of this committee.' you told me that the last time you were here before this committee. who did the administration consulted with on this committee before it announced the changes? >> senator, i regret that i did not live up to the standard that i sent during that hearing and in the remarks you just quoted. i think i could've done a better job in engaging with you and consulting with you in advance. i regret that.

>> did you consult with the chairman? >> a number of members were reached out to, consulted. what happened was this -- >> who were the members consulted? >> if i could come back to you on that, i would need to discuss. i would need to get an accounting of that, and make sure that any members consulted would -- >> i can assure you that i was not consulted. >> you were the chairman at the time. were you not consulted? >> no. there is a difference between notification and consultation. to be notified when it's going to happen is not consultation. >> we are being told that we are going to be in the loop on everything happening with iran. have an example very recently where we were not in the loop. >> senator, as you know, this

was a delicate situation in which we were trying to get our delegates back. we were trying to get our asset back. in the endgame of that, there was a lot going on to make sure that happened in a safe and secure way. i come back to what i said at the outset. >> i am not correlate with the allen gross release. i'm correlate with the -- quarreling with the policy change. the use of the word consultation as defined by the administration in the last instance i just cited is problematic. i don't want to make this about cuba. i also asked whether there would be changes in policy outside of the democratic order. i asked you whether those changes -- when you say move forward, move forward on democratic reforms, not simply economic reforms, you said, that simply economic reforms.

we don't see any democratic reforms. we saw a release of 53 visitors. one of them was released a full year before december 17. five have been rearrested. since the deal was done, 200 new arrests have occurred in cuba. here is why that is relevant. we are being asked to sit tight. we are going to be fully consulted. it sounds like the only people fully consulted are the people who agree with the administration. if you don't agree, you will be notified. my second point goes to the question that senator udall asked about why the iranians would undergo some much pain in pursuit of this. the answer to who is in charge

is ultimately who they call the supreme leader, the ayatollah. >> he is the first among equals, but he has other constituencies he has to factor in. >> can they agree to a change without his approval, given the support he has in the legislative branch? >> highly unlikely. >> the ayatollah is not simply a head of state as we normally see it. he is a radical cleric who views himself -- he doesn't just a view iran as a nationstate but iran as a cause, as henry kissinger has described it. the cause is to have the entire world living under the flag of islam. it goes further and states that the ayatollah, notches the leader of iran, but the leader of all muslims in the world -- isn't that accurate? iran is where he lives, but he views his mandate as extending

to the whole world. these are unambiguous statements on their part. he doesn't just view himself as a cleric. he views himself as a temporary filling for the 13th imam who, under shia, is an imam who will emerge one day and govern the entire world under the flag of islam. the stated purpose for iran is to serve as a base. that is what motivates him. we are a scribing to his regime nationstate characteristics of a normal country that has a cost-benefit analysis about what is in the natural interest of iran. i don't dispute that there might be some leaders who hold those views, but the ayatollah doesn't view it that way. he views his obligation as to bring about the arrival of the 13th mom -- imam. under his clerical interpretation and that of many in the shia, the 13th imam cannot emerge until there is a cataclysmic showdown. when a country led by a person who wants there to be a cataclysmic showdown between the muslim and non-muslim world has designs on a nuclear weapon, now we have cause for concern. that is why they expand their military capability, and that is

why they want a nuclear weapon. they have shown that they reject everything that is not islamic. they reject legitimacy of the u.n. they reject legitimacy of the u.s. they accept the benefits of these international orders. for example, their seat at the u.n., while still being able to reject her obligations. what have they done? into the has three, the position of the world was, no enrichment. and it became, you can enrich up to 20%. then it became, you can enrich up to 20% as long as you said it overseas. now it is, you can enrich up to 20% in iran as long as it is for medical purposes. it is pretty impressive how they've been able to use this process. maybe over the next five years we will build a bomb for them.

the other two components of the nuclear program move forward unabated. you can buy weapons designs of right now. you can download it online potentially if it is a crude weapon. the missile program continues unabated. they continue to test long-range missile capabilities, not to mention adding to their already considerable conventional weapons capability. this is why we are concerned and have a right to be concerned. this is not a traditional nationstate. this is a cleric-led regime, a clerical government with the clear intent of ultimately one day unifying the entire world under their radical version of islam, led by someone who believes that will only happen after he tackles and showdown with the west. -- after a cataclysmic showdown with the west. we have real reasons to believe that they will be willing to sis

-- except a short-term suspension because their long-term view is, at the end of the day, they will be at a showdown point. that is why we are skeptical about this deal. we are not dealing with belgium. we are dealing with a radical cleric with a radical view of his role in the world. he wants nuclear weapons to be able to do it. i'll take anyone here would dispute that even if they agree to a short suspension, -- i don't kick anyone here would dispute that even if they agree to a suspension, you can always invent a pretext for why you now need a weapon, because of the hostilities of the west, because it is time for the 13th imam to emerge, whatever. they will have the weapons design and the delivery system and the weapons. that is why we are so skeptical. >> just to respond briefly, we share your concerns and skepticism precisely because of iran's along track record that

you alluded to. it's why any agreement we reach will have to have imposed stringent requirements on transparency and monitoring to give us confidence they will not break up. with regard to consultations going forward, on this issue, it is my sense over the past months and past years, the administration has been here in closed sessions, open hearings one-on-one conversations smaller group conversations to lay out extensively where we are, where we are trying to go. i commit to, mr. chairman, senator rubio, others, that going forward we will not only continue that would expand that and be up here anytime that you want, any place to talk about where we are. some of that we have to do in closed session or in a private room because the negotiations are ongoing, but we want to make sure that you see the full details of what we are trying to

achieve. with regard to the suspicions about iran and the supreme leader, we share them. we could spend all day going through the outrageous things that he has said in the past about us, israel, but sometimes, reality has a way of intruding. no matter what it is that he may believe or what he may want, no matter his exceptional role in the system, and i think you are right about that, he has to deal with the realities iran is facing. he has seen a country that has been subjected to extraordinary pressure economically, that has been isolated, and he has seen politically that a lot of the iranian people do not like that. president rouhani's election was a response to that. you seen him give the negotiators more leeway than frankly we would have expected.

he has kept of the talks going. at the end of the day, we will have to judge whether what we have achieved in any kind of solution meets our security interests. we will not take a bad deal precisely because we share your concerns and share your suspicions. this is not happening in a vacuum. we also have to ask ourselves continuously, as compared to what? if we are not able to reach an agreement, it may become increasingly difficult to sustain the sanctions regime. it depends on what secretary cohen said, who is perceived as being responsible for the failure to get an agreement. we have held our partners there. a large part of it is because they believe we are trying to drive to an agreement. that is the purpose, to get them to the table. we start from the same spot you do. we are very suspicious. we also see the reality of the supreme leader's thinking.

>> again, this committee is not proposing anything that breaks us apart from the international partners that we have. i know you keep referring to that. that's a red herring that keeps being thrown out. we are asking for consultation and a vote on the deal that we have been so involved in making happening -- making happen. >> put me in the column with the skeptics in this committee such as the chairman and ranking member. i have been sitting through this from the beginning. i thought these guys were going to scam you from the beginning and i'm convinced that they have done that. i think they've got test setup for what could be a cash they've got us set up for what could be a disaster. first of all, what you've got to do is look at the background articulated by senator rubio. in addition to that, look at the efforts we have had in the past. look in the chapter about president rouhani's book about

how he was using the peace process to actually continue their ambitions to get a nuclear weapon. use that as your background. then think about the u.n. resolution that said, iran, you can't do this. iran said, we are going to do it no matter what. we aren't going to negotiate unless you guys agree that we can have some kind of a program. now they've crossed that bridge. if you are going to do this, you are going to continue with your nuclear ambitions going in the direction senator rubio has suggested. why wouldn't you sit down with

your enemy, negotiate this kind of deal, and now you know exactly what the enemy is going to know? you are going to know what the inspection regime is. you know how they are going to go about this. you are going to be able to put together a system where you can continue your ambitions while the people who are supposed to be curtailing you are going about what they are going about, and you know all the ways they are going to do it. i think you guys are going to be bamboozled. i hope you come in here sunday and say, doofus, you have no idea what you are talking about. i don't think this is going to happen. these guys are bad people. every time i'm on the intelligence committee, i sit here, and whether it is syria or iraq or hezbollah, wherever it pops up, whose fingerprints are on this? it is the iranians. it is getting late.

i appreciate what you guys are doing. bless you. i hope you can pull it off, but i've got to tell you. i thought from the beginning you are going to get scammed, and every day that goes by, and as i listen to how these negotiations are going, i think you're getting scammed. i hope i'm dead wrong. >> i would just say very quickly a couple of things. i think with regard to what president rouhani did his past life as a negotiator -- first of all, we were inspired by that in looking at what we insisted on in the interim agreement. it is precisely because we didn't want iran to repeat what it has done in the past, which is endless time talking at the table while it has gone on with its program. i would say also, i think he is a politician. i suspect some of what he wrote in his book was to appeal as a politician to other iranians. again, we start from your premise that this is not about trusting.

this is about absolutely verifying all of the commitments that they make. with regard to the inspections and access and monitoring peace, -- piece, this is fundamental to any resolution we would reach. i believe that we will have the ability if we reach the kind of agreement we want to reach to significantly enhance our ability and the ability of the

international community throughout the entire production line to know what they are doing, when they are doing it. he would develop a base of knowledge about the people, the places, the techniques that would stand us in good stead even beyond the duration of the agreement. right now, based on what we have achieved to date, prime minister netanyahu can before the united nations a couple years ago and held up at the drawing of the bomb, and there was that line getting close. that was the 20% enrichment. he was right. that was critically important. it was being produced at a very facility. that has stopped under the jpoa. the other pathways to a bomb -- looking at within my two at the irak facility -- we had deep concerns about it. once that facility is turned on and fueled, it is problematic, not impossible, but problematic to deal with. we stopped at that in its tracks. no fuel. no progress. natanz, building up a bunch of lower centrifuges and building up a massive stockpile that could be quickly converted to a higher grade -- there too, no next generation centrifuges wrist -- installed. stockpiles cap. -- capped.

>> i appreciate that. i hope it works. any inspection regime, any regime you put together for doing this, they are going to know all about it. they are going to know the details of it. just remember that their objective is not your objective. our objective is to stop them. their objective is to get to that point, and into in doing so, not get attacked in the meantime. there are technologies that can get around it. i hope you are right. on a very parochial matter, as we are speaking right now, the president is on his way to idaho. while he is there, pursuant to a request from us, he's going to meet with a woman by the name of this is abba dini. her husband is in prison and iran. there are three americans there. for the life of me -- 20 sherman has had to sit there and listen

to me say this -- why you guys cut loose all of that money when they are so cash hungry without putting your hand on it and saying, we are going to take it off when those kaiser free, i cannot believe they wouldn't cut of those guys lose. the administration says it is the compassionate arm of the government. so be it. use some compassion. let's get this guy home. he has no business being in jail in iran sibley because -- simply because he is a christian. my time is up. >> senator, can i say you are absolutely right? the three prisoners must be released regardless of anything else we are doing with iran. it's an entirely distinct issue. they are wrongly imprisoned. we need to find robert levinson and bring him home. we also think tying that to any agreement, success or failure, is not the best way to get them out. i think you know this -- the only issue that we raise with them on the margins of the nuclear talks every single time, other than the nuclear talks are those who are unjustly imprisoned in iran. we are working every day to get them home. >> get it done. >> senator menendez? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your courtesy.

secretary, let's be honest. as it relates to consultation, there were long consultations with members who were in agreement with the president's proposed policy changes but none who might be in disagreement. that is on cuba. that gives rise to the concern that there will be no consultations but notification only to those of us who may concern about the nature of any agreement or continuous sanctions. it was the subject of your conversation with me when you were a nominee, questions i asked you before the committee. i'm disappointed. with reference to march 24, if there is a "deal," will that deal be written? >> at this point, i cannot tell you. the expectation would be that we would be able to show all of the critical elements of the deal, and whether there would be an actual initial agreement that would be turned into a technical agreement, i can't tell you. >> wouldn't the outlines of the deal be something that the iranians and the p5 plus one could sign on to? >> it would be my expectation, but as i sit here today, i cannot tell you exactly the form. >> it concerns me that we may not have written agreement. if there is no deal on march 24, what then? >> senator, i think if there is

no agreement on the core elements of the deal by march 24, it will depend on exactly where we are. >> you may say, let's keep it going. >> if it is clear by then that we are simply not going to get to yes, by which i mean, it is clear that the iranians will not meet the requirements, i think we will have to work closely with you on what the next steps will be. if, however, we have closed off most of the key chapters, but let's say, for arguments sake, one key chapter remains, is something we would want to talk to you about. sitting here today, a lot depends on where we are. if we conclude by the end of march that they are simply not going to do what they need to do, that puts us in a different position. >> are any of those 100 sanctions you talked about that you levied, was iran complicit

in any of them in terms of trying to evade sanctions, or was the individual working on their own? >> for some number of them, at least some of them were iranian citizens, people in iran, and others, there is no question that iran was waiting of what was under way. >> during this time, there were efforts by iran to evade sanctions. fortunately in those instances you caught them. it gives me another concern about their intent. let me say a couple of observations. with reference to senator paul and senator boxer, not sure legislation that says, this is what will happen if there is no deal or a violation of the deal, which you said you think is acceptable, is really any different from what we are

saying. i think that is nuance, at best. it is interesting to note that sanctions on russia visa v ukraine haven't caused them to walk away from what they think is an important deal to be achieved. the suggestion that sanctions, whether you have concluded a deal or not -- if the russians wouldn't walk away with sanctions on ukraine, i think it's pretty telling. to be very honest with you, the overwhelming number of sanctions that this committee has levied to the congress have overwhelmingly had a much more significant lead time than

immediate position. obviously, the time for necessary for it to have an effect on iran has been even greater. there is no such thing as an immediate sanction that ultimately has an immediate effect. there are few of those. i don't know, but it seems to me it took us a fair amount of time to know about a covert operation. him -- i hate to see that doing something covert would take as long. finally, you stated that we would have the same ability to respond in the future should iran breakout, and we would have all options on the table. i think that ignores the reality that iran will be in a different position. iran will be able to sell more than 2 million barrels of oil. it will have access to $100 billion in reserves currently being held overseas, and it will have the ability to procure critical items for its program. it gets a lot from an agreement that would require no dismantling of the program. we get a one-year alarm bell which may not be enough time to react in a nonmilitary faction

-- fashion. the president telling people sanctions, they break the coalition, and we may be left with only a military option. i will tell you something -- if you have nothing in place after a no-deal situation, the president may vary we'll -- well be in a position where his only option is a military option or accepting iran as a military state. that is a terrible set of circumstances. maybe you don't hear that. maybe there is another set of secret deals or letters on the side that we don't know about. there have been a lot of those. maybe you can tell us whether there are are any we should be waiting for. >> there are not. >> that is good to know. hopefully, there are none that will surface afterwards, or else we will have to have a different conversation. no one has worked harder to try to get you to the point to succeed. by the same token, i have to be honest. you need to succeed in a way that is meaningful at the end of the day.

there is a bit of a trust problem. when you have secret deals, when you don't consult, which is to say, ask -- and we are thinking about proceeding in this course, what you think about that, versus telling us, this is what we've done. that is notification, not consultation. and secretary -- when wendy sherman and secretary cohen were here in the past, -- it creates concerns about when you raise alarm bells, and then you harold -- herald it is part of your ability to get iran to negotiate. aspirations, how to strike a deal with north korea. realism is that they ended up being a nuclear-armed mistake. that is what we are trying to avoid.

maybe there is another set of secret deals or letters on the side that we don't know about. there have been a lot of those. maybe you can tell us whether there are are any we should be waiting for. >> there are not. >> that is good to know. hopefully, there are none that will surface afterwards, or else we will have to have a different conversation. no one has worked harder to try to get you to the point to succeed. by the same token, i have to be honest. you need to succeed in a way that is meaningful at the end of the day. there is a bit of a trust problem.

when you have secret deals, when you don't consult, which is to say, ask -- and we are thinking about proceeding in this course, what you think about that, versus telling us, this is what we've done. that is notification, not consultation. and secretary -- when wendy sherman and secretary cohen were here in the past, -- it creates concerns about when you raise alarm bells, and then you harold -- herald it is part of your ability to get iran to negotiate. aspirations, how to strike a deal with north korea. realism is that they ended up being a nuclear-armed mistake. that is what we are trying to avoid. >> thank you for all of her efforts to bring us to this point. i look forward over the next few days to see if there is some common ground to address the consultation and congress possible role ultimately. i do want to say one thing. i know there have been a lot of discussions about bibi netanyahu's prop at the u.n. it is fair to note that wish -- that with additional research that iran has done, they are moving way up the food chain in terms of centrifuge development. they can move so much more quickly from zero to 90%. i think you are all aware of that. that is the concern we have.

the research and development component, the things they are doing to move rapidly towards being able to reach 90%. let me give a few closing comments. i want you to be successful. i wake up every day wanting our nation to be successful in every endeavor. i think i have shunted this administration my desire to work

towards common ground to try to solve problems. i want these negotiations to be successful. i think our concerns are -- i had one of the most impactful meetings, along with a number of people on the committee, in israel in the last couple of days -- the concerns are, as you look back over the history of the last 10 years, iran has stayed here, and the p5 began here. as we have progressed, the p5 have continued to move towards their position. i would just argue that having congress as a backstop as you enter these final steps, having congress as a backstop, somebody you do in fact not only have to consult with but seek their

approval, would be somewhat of an anchor to keep us from continuing to move towards their position. i think would be very typical for you to say that there hasn't been a continual movement towards their position. you look at where we began with the human security resolution. you look at where we began with us potentially agreeing with them to having enough centrifuges to serve their "practical needs," which every scientist has said was about 500 centrifuges. i think you would tell me we have moved way beyond that. congress can be an excellent backstop to you as you are moving down the road. i think senator kaine probably expressed it better than any of us. when we entered into