i would highlight the recent remarks by the egyptian leader abdullah. and third we should continue u.s. military effort, to enhance their capabilities, increase their combat effectiveness and support them with training, airpower as required to defeat them and reclaim arias that were overrun. simultaneously, crushing it in rural it in rural arias -- they deny their ability to expand stain actions in iraq. collectively we have a chance to achieve our general objectives. combat and violent extremism worldwide will be a close term effort. especially in area's of intelligence sharing, u.s. military training and assistance and in summary strategic adherence would fit strong,

credible specific dental policies. they would turn this great nation into the position of quality leadership it has earned and kept for many years. a thoughtful, focused and collaborative strategy, formulation process to agree on the few high priority national security goals and objectives should set us on a there course. agreeat the international level active engagement, underpinned with a strong forward resins by u.s. military forces whose credible capabilities are our best deterrent to credible threats worldwide. thank you very much and i am pleased to address western -- questions. >> i want to thank each of the members of this panel and i would like to start with general keane, a question to you about

the fight we faced against radical islam, you said that you believe our policy has failed that essentially al qaeda has grown four fold in the last five years. can you help us understand what you think would be the strongest strategy in terms of defeating radical islam and can you speak to the strategy incan you help yemen? >> as you noted radical islam is clearly on the rise. our policy of disengaging has contributed to that rise. obviously this is a very ambitious movement. given the scale of it which i tried to display on the map which goes from northern and western africa all the way to south asia, as you look at all

of that read on the map, al qaeda central does not control all of those affiliate. what they have in common, what they're connected tissue is, is that they share a common geopolitical believe driven by a religious ideology to dominate their host country governments which they are conducting insurgency at and at al qaeda central, it is a very ambitious geopolitical objective and that is to dominate muslim land initially and then world on the nation. given that and given where they are and the swap of territories and -- swath of countries and territories they are involved in, there is no waiting that is nathan deal with a country -- a

problem of this -- there is no way that the united states can deal with a problem of this scale, nor should it. we dealt with it in a wise fashion, we brought countries together who shared values and political beliefs and formed a political and military alliance. there is no othertogether way that you can cope with this scale of a problem without bringing the countries involved, together, whether they had interests in the region or outside of the region as many do because of the export of terrorism and develop a strategy to deal with it. this isn't about the united states driving a strategy, this is about bringing countries together. much of what has to be done in the region has to do with those countries themselves, those are

the conditions that exist. the issues are -- what the arabs ring was about -- arab spring was about, it was seeking political reform, social justice and economic opportunity. the radical islamic saw the arabs ring as an opportunity and it became an accelerant for them . using that as a backdrop that drives you, those issues are still there. political reform, social injustice and lack of economic opportunity. we have to bring those countries together to recognize those problems and then point out what general mattis pointed out as well, we have to share technology and share training, we can help a lot and we have

been fighting this enemy for 13 years. there is much that we can do if we take a comprehensive strategic approach as opposed to what i think is a fragmented approach now and it does not get at the long-term problem. the long-term -- you have to see the long-term solution and then have midterm objectives to a copper ship. that is the only answer that is possible. otherwise we will just protract this thing and take these things -- what about after isis? will there be something else? you bet. if we don't take a comprehensive view. in terms of yemen, it is frustrating to watch what has happened. we have been working with the host country and conducting direct action missions with them. this is a qa p as we will not --

aqap as we well know. they knew that they no longer had global reach. al qaeda central always wanted to take the jihad to europe and the united states are they could drive us out of the region and most importantly tried our ideas out of the region which is an anathema to them. the fact that they joined aqap and they gave been leaders to do it, they put together capabilities to conduct out of region attacks in the united states and most recently in paris, france. i think we have a big? of where we are going -- i think

we have a big question mark of where we are going forward. where we aregiven what has taken place with the iranian imposed overthrow of the government. they are also opposed to aqap but are also fundamentally opposed to america and its interest. it begs the question whether we're going to have the cooperation with the new government in yemen that we had with the old government. >> i would call on senator reid right now. >> thank you madam chairwoman, general mattis, you made it very clear that we have capabilities with respect to the middle east in terms of military solutions but it also has been pointed out that there is very high cost there. if we choose to use military, as you said, if americans take ownership, this will be a very serious war.

that is still your goal? >> yes sir, it is. >> can you give us an idea of the scale, the idea of the forces and the top line -- i think your point is very well made which is, if we are going in to something, we have to go in with the idea that it will be difficult and costly. >> what you just quoted was something i said in response to a question, as you recall. in this case, we have to get to a very detailed level of understanding, what is the political objective we are out to accomplish. i don't know what it is now. once we find that to a jesuit level of definition, a strict definition, at that point we allocate the means. if we orchestrate this correctly

as has been pointed out by the other members of the panel, with allies, the clarity and the commitment of the united states can draw in the full commitment of others. we should not think that a tentative and halfhearted commitment on our part saying we're willing to go in but not doing the fighting would draw all commitment from others. they are going to be willing to match us that when you live next to this terrible threat, they have to not doing the fighting would assume we are in fully or they will have to moderate their response. once we feel that level of commitment, our requirement would actually go down because others would be willing to come in and go full throated in support. >> general queen -- general keane, do you throated agree that unless there is political cohesion in iraq, that the government

recognizes and integrates the various sectarian groups that military efforts will be ineffectual? >> absolutely. we can be a little bit encouraged by a body. a study that just returned from baghdad meeting with officials a body is moving -- abahdi is moving in the right direction. officials a body isthe way that he undermined political inclusion despite his rhetoric in iraq particularly after we pulled out of their was tragic. the sunni tries -- tribes are key as fox pointed out. and right now while some of them are fighting against isis, most of them are not and the harsh

reality is, to get them to move, to take isis on, they will have to be convinced that there is reckoning for long-term political inclusion in this government. it is a major issue. the provincepolitical will be largely sunni tribes with them to participate. sunni tribes also be needed in a counter force to retake mozul. they will be a supporting force. it is key and we have known that from the outset. >> in effect, the politics would drive the military operations.

without effective political reconciliation or signals from and dad, -- from baghdad, our military efforts are not -- won't be particularly successful? >> it would be hard to visualize a scenario with a successful counteroffensive to retake the territory that has been lost without significant sunni tribe participation. >> let me switch again, to admiral fallon. thank you for making yourself available, but one of the points that was raised in the testimony, was the radical fallon. islam, one of the company factors is, within radical islam, you have sunni radicals, jihadists and shia radicals and

they have a mutual animosity which is even greater than their animosity toward other groups. the sunni believe the shia are apostates, etc.. how do which is even greater you reconcile that in terms of our operations in the middle east, particularly in terms of the ran. -- iran. that complicates an already competent situation. -- complicated situation. >> piece of cake. we wish. the reality here is that these things are complex and there are a host of issues and interest and every -- reality here is that these

i think that we might consider a couple things. first of all in these particularly vexing things that have so many aspects, we probably ought to step back and take a look at our long-term large interests. iran. it has been a problem for us for decades. exacerbated by the fact that we had no interaction to speak up until recently for these many decades. we find their activities extremely distasteful and we basically detest many of the things they have done and continue to do, they promote a brand of radicalism that has spread well beyond their borders and we have been at our wits and

to figure out what to do. my thought is that sooner or later we will have to seriously sit down as i think we are trying and have a dialogue. we are not -- we could, one option would be to invade iran, that has been proposed before at what cost? anybody when a push that idea forward in a meaningful way? i doubt it. so at some time we will have to figure out how to come to grips with this. how you do that? you recognize that everybody has a dog in the fight and they all want something and we have to decide to find what things we might accept some role for them in the region, but some things we are not going to accept. we don't want any part of the nuclear weapons program they seem to be embarked on.

but their time is being stressed right now. certainly the economic conditions. there has been apparently a pretty notable effect of sanctions working against them in the people thatcertainly the economic usually take the brunt of this are the common folk and not the leaders. nonetheless they had a dramatic impact on that country and the price of oil is a detriment to them. frankly they have not been particularly successful. i think that we cannot expect that we will have one solution that will solve these problem. back to first things first. let's decide what we want for the long-term. can we accept iran playing some kind of role in this region, if so how do we get from where we are today to there. at a tactical level, allowing

them to get away with instigation's and things, other places, we should not permit, tactically i think we act to block those things when we can. the fact that you have sunnis and she is at each other's throats in many places, is something we will not go in and say, sit down and stop this, we are not going to solve it, but i think we act strategically in trying to decide where we want our place to be and then we work hard against those things at the tactical level that are a problem. so iraq is a real problem. the way things going will not be acceptable and we will have to continue to do what we are doing to take back the territory they have lost. >> senator ernst. >> thank you madam chair. gentlemen, thank you for being

here today and i appreciate your service on this senator ernst. panel as well as your years of service to the united states, we are very great all for that. i do agree that we have to have a national security strategy and this is very important. what we have seen and all of you had mentioned that with sequestration, our effects globally have been diminished. we are reacting in a knee-jerk way to threats as they become visible. we don't have an over arching strategy anywhere today and i think that is a great detriment to all of the citizens here in the united they. what i would like to focus on is what what we have seen in iraq. i served in iraq from 2003 to 2004 at a low company level, we invested so much effort in that region and we with drew from that region before many of our

military leaders believed we should. i do believei do believe we are seeing that in afghanistan also. these are arias, especially when it comes to afghanistan, it is not talked about so much in the media. we seem to focus on one issue at a time rather than looking at threats globally. with afghanistan, we about so much in the media. see that we have a proposed timeline for with trawl and general keen you stated that perhaps we won't be ready by 2016 to withdraw our troops. on saturday i was at a sendoff ceremony for the three 61st medical logistics company deploying to afghanistan and their mission is to assist in the withdrawal of troops. how long, general keen, do you believe that it will take for

us realistically forget the timeline proposed, for the afghan national security forces to fill a role and be able to sustain and keep open those lines of communication, to maintain security within afghanistan or are we eating what is happening in iraq? >> it is a -- repeating what is happening in iraq? >> that is a great question. iraq? >>we have been at this thing for 13 years. in 13 years, given the united states, you would think we could revolve this on a verbal terms to ourselves, that it has not happened. the facts are that policy decisions drove the 13 year war it was policy that drove us to a war in iraq and put afghanistan on a diet or eight years. we never got back to it until 2009 when the current resident data decision to increase forces

in afghanistan. but here is the problem, when we increase those forces in afghanistan, the surge, crystal and betray us got 25% less than they needed to do the job and as a result we were never able to apply the surge forces in the easternafghanistan, the part of afghanistan as we did successfully in the south. another policy decision pull those forces out after the objection of general petraeus in our judgment maturely and no application of surge forces whatsoever dealt with the haqqani network in the east. the facts are that he haqqani network is in those safe havens in the east, they are embedded and the afghan national security forces, this is my judgment, does not have the capability to be able to deal with that harsh reality. what makes this so serious?

strategically inside of afghanistan and everything gets lit up in kabul and is done by the county network. they are in the environs right now with the support infrastructure surrounding kabul. the only thing we can do to change that dimension is increase the capacity of the afghan national security forces and by god we got to hold them at 352. anybody coming to you and telling you that we should put the afghan national security forces on the decline is absolutely foolish and irresponsible. we have to hold to that line and this congress has got to fund it. probably for at least four or five more years. otherwise we don't have a chance. secondly, we have got to step up for what two presidents have

failed to do and that is deal with these sanctuaries in pakistan from which intelligence support and training for operations inside afghanistan comes. this is afghan taliban sanctuaries in pakistan and specifically the hut on the networks should be targeted just like al qaeda. in targeting them he will disrupt the command and control and disrupt their operations. then we begin to have a chance. secondly, we cannot pull out our counterterrorism forces of 2016. these are the guys who take down high-value targets. when we do that in iraq it was a disaster. when al qaeda began to rise as we pulled out we could not see it and we could not hit it. if we do that in afghanistan, it is a death knell for afghanistan. yes, 13 years is a long time to

be there, but to squander those gains in the face of what we are dealing with makes no sense to me. i don't know how long we would need to keep those troops squander there right now the plan is the full amount after 2016. we are talking likely, a number around 10,000 troops, most of them would be in the train, assist and advise role. a small portion of them would be in combat and that is our direct action. if we educated to the american people what this really is, i think they could possibly support it and i would hope the congress would support it. what drives their to far to should be conditions on the ground and our commanders assessment as well. >> i do agree and many sacrifices have been made there

and we are falling into those same mistakes. i would rather see a fully engaged and defeat these threats rather than half step. thank you gentlemen and thank you madam chair. >> senator kaine. >> thank you madam and thank you to the witnesses for the excellent testimony, i heard a lot i agreed with and a lot i disagreed with and that is why you are here, to promote our thinking. it seems there are two very solid points of agreement, first that we are taking a fragmented, reactive approach to global challenges and second at the fragmented approach may be driven or exacerbated by budgetary dysfunction and indecision here in washington. ideally we would have a strategy and build a budget support strategy secondarily we would allow budget to drive strategy

but we have been allowing budgetary indecision to drive strategy which is by far the worst thing to do. i think our approach is a fragmented one and i think it is exacerbated by budgetary indecision. we had a overarching national security strategy beginning with president truman deciding to support greece after world war ii. weit explained a lot of what we did, even things like the creation of the peace corps. you might like the strategy or not but it was a unified strategy and when the unit -- soviet union collapsed, we went case-by-case and after 9/11 we had a strategy again but over time that was not a big enough strategy for a nation like this -- us and we have devolved after 14 years of war and we're back to the case-by-case approach that is reactive which is hard

for the allies and citizens to understand. it seems like, if you look at an analogy to world war ii, it is not a bipolar composition, it is a tri-polar one. the president is visiting european nations and south american nations, they are many democracies and we are the leader. then there are the jihadists. many are nonstate actors and that is a new challenge. the competition today is between these regimes and jihadist. it is critical and you have raised important questions. betweenin tackling the jihad is him threat, each of you have an active in battling this threat

using military means but we all understand that part of the jihad is him accelerant is disinfecting young people and the a luer of young -- allure of young people into the jihadist element because of their lack of opportunities, what should we do to counter the radicalization of young people? how can we assist regional actors in doing that so we can shut off the allure of foreign fighters like isil? >> senator, i think that what you have to look at is a definition of the problem that is so rigorous that some of the solution start coming forward for example, there are two basic rands of jihadist terrorists. one comes out of tehran, we know it as lebanese hezbollah

declared war on us in 1980 reemploy the embassy in beirut what the paratroopers derricks and the marine barracks and we have seen them continue to mark on unchecked i our counterterrorism efforts. as we define these, we don't give them any inadvertent support by giving them legitimacy. then we determine if this is not in our best interest, then how do we support the countervailing forces? talking to his own clear it -- clerics, we got to quit doing this and dressing up in the guise of islam. there are people out there, the

united arab emirates, called little sparta because they always stuck with us through everything. there are countervailing people in the region, leaders of the region and we should be fully in support. if we don't define this threat and break it out and identify the countervailing forces and come up with a strategy that supports exactly what you're talking about, then we will continue to be spectators. x let me ask you this. i think you all are on the same page with the other item, do you think it is a mistake to use a calendar to determine in date of our afghanistan in volcker and -- involvement? >> certainly that is the case. i think we need a little clarity

and definition again. would talk about withdrawal from afghanistan, from my view, we got into the same morass in iraq a few years ago. it was this idea that not by withdrawing from many places, but for continuing engagement. what we're talking about is what i believe is arctic put in place, our major combat engagements have ceased and are not likely to be reengaged. however, we ought to be continually engaged with them in assisting them in training and supporting them and in some

areas, using special forces in areas that we have capabilities and they do not, when we see things that challenge our interest. we ought to do certain things to help this government move along. we may have a chance to actually see a long-term good outcome here. >> everybody gets confused, we in up with something in the media where they will pick on a specific work somewhere. >> senator graham. >> i really enjoyed this and gotten a lot out of it. it's given me a lot to think about, right frankly. i just regret -- to our media friends who are your, thank you

for coming. maybe if we had tom brady, we would fill up a room, but that is the world in which we live in. talking about consequential veins, and we have a couple of reporters here. this is a generation -- generational story. somebody will be dealing with this long after we are gone. let me tell you why i think they lose. what we are selling, very few people actually want to buy. the radical islamic way of life is not embraced by most people in the religion. we just need to provide them the capacity to fight back over there so we can be protected here. does that make sense? how do you do that. sequestration -- do you all agree that it should be if not

repealed replaced? all agree. if we do not replace sequestration, ability to do with the national security threat you describe is greatly diminished. is that correct? was at a correct assessment? would you agree that our nato allies are on a path to reduce their capability? so we have two things going on. we have any on the rise, america cutting her budget and are nato allies reducing their budgets to help us as partners. is that a formula for disaster? >> party close. >> general mathis, you said if we cut state department funding under the 150 account foreign assistance, you will need more ammunition. do you still agree with that? >> i do, sir. we need a comprehensive approach. >> can i give you an example?

>> lie my frustrations was inability to delegate enough time to engage in central asia. what i saw back in those times about a half-dozen years ago was that we had people who were looking for something other than what they had, the soviet union. they were concerned about being in the squeeze between resurgent russia and china, and we were a lifeline. we had almost no engagement because we didn't have the resource, the interest of time to devote to things like telling people what things are really like in america. we used to have these kind of storefront shops. that has all disappeared. >> i cannot agree with you more but we have a very light military footprint in africa, is that correct? >> very much so. >> it's a continent very much up

in air in terms of hat will turn out. i just want the members of the committee to know that i'm the chairman of the foreign operations account. if you think sequestration is bad for the military, your to see what it does to our ability to engage the world peacefully. it absolutely destroys it, which is insane. we're on the verge of eradicating malaria. we are making great progress with aids, malaria polio. how many marines did we have in the second battle of falluja to retake falluja? do you remember? >> it would have probably been somewhere around -- including the supporting elements, probably around 10,000. >> so we had army personnel assisting their, was that correct? >> yes. how in the world it would go

into mosul -- if the past is any indication of the future, if we had 10,000 or rings -- and i think it was about nine thousand, actually, engaged in helping the iraqi security forces liberate falluja from al qaeda and iraq, how in the world could we do this in mosul without a larger american component? can you envision that being successful without more american help? >> i don't know for sure. as i said in my remarks, we are advising -- we made a policy decision not to commit ground combat forced to do that. i basically agree with that decision. >> you said we need brigades at the ready in kuwait. you said we needed people on the front line, is that correct?

>> absolutely. >> what numbers that come out to in your mind? >> i think we can get very close to a number in train and assist and advising something close to 10,000. not the few hundred that we are currently doing. i'm talking about frontline advisors. >> i have 30 seconds left. so we have 3000 on the ground today, we need 10,000 in your opinion. i think that is correct. if we lose in most, if we take isil on and lose, that's a bad day for all of us, do you agree? don't take them on if you can't win. syria -- how many of you support a no-fly zone, a buffer zone? >> i do. >> not until we figure out what we want the end state to look like. >> fair enough regrets i've been part of a tenure effort in iraq.

>> let me just ask this simple question. one of the reasons that isil was defeated in kobani, and i want to tip my hat to our coalition forces, is that you had the kurds fighting isil on the ground. what happens if we send a free syrian army trained up into syria to fight isil and we don't neutralize a sock cost airpower -- assad's airpower? >> the facts are, he is engaging of free syrian army right now. the free syrian army today on the ground -- what is so frustrating about this, when the moderate rebels took on the aside regime back in 2010 -- do you remember this? they had the momentum. this is what happened. the iranians jumped in with 5000

has below to assist and russian airplanes flying in with supplies every single day. the free syrian army came to us, the momentum shifted. many of you were on the dance card when they came through town here. even i was on it. what did they want? they wanted simply this. we need arms to be able to stop tank systems and antiaircraft systems, to shoot down his airplanes. we don't need your troops are your airpower. let us fight this war ourselves we think we can win it, and we said no. we have never recovered from that decision. that decision was revisited again by the tray is, connecticut, and dempsey. petraeus vetted that force as

the cia director. we have never recovered from that decision. >> but we may have missed the opportunity to work with the free syrian army. or going to have to really look at what options we have. >> the only comment i would make is that we consider here in ring our hands and bemoan the past in a lot of situations. we need to deal with the present. so for now, forget the past except for lessons learned for new strategies but we need to figure out what is going to take right now to move forward. >> syria and iraq are great platforms to it -- to attack the united states. if we keep screwing around with this and these guys get stronger any year from now they are still in place, were going to get hit. it's time to put these guys on the run. let me tell you about the in game. america is going to get attacked if we don't do with the threat

in iraq and syria. do you agree with that? >> 100%. >> thank you. >> thank you madam chair. i want thank all of you for your extraordinary service. we are so much in your debt. america has already been attacked and now we have lost a number of our young people already to isil. tragically, in my home state. they said they are a caliphate which means they either grow or they go. in iraq, i would like to get your best idea, you are really influential in working with me to there and trying to push back before. how do we coordinate with them work with them to push isis out of iraq and syria?

>> when you think about the sunnis it's not a homogeneous organization to say the least. we have irreconcilable sunni tribes. many of them are former saddam hussein regime elements and they will continue to fight with isis. what happened before in iraq informs us of this when they push back against al qaeda in on more prosody -- province and moved into other places were sunnis live. they know they have made a bet with strange fellows there. they know it is not in their interest to support the long-term objectives of isis. isis wants to govern the

populations it controls. right now in mosul, this is what life is like. all universities and school systems are shut down. the only schools that are operating or the dross as indoctrinating radical islam is, isis police, and a medical school they are forcing students into to become doctors to take care of their wounded. second they do not run government services very well. garbage is on the street. the people in most are not even socializing with extended family members who don't live in their immediate vicinity. life is they know it, teaming marketplaces traffic jams, a thriving community, is gone. we know that that exists. we know that isis and

reconcilable sunnis are on a collision course. what we have to do is incentivize them more than what we're doing. one of the things -- obviously a body that is key to this, secondly we need to go into and more province and we have some plans to train and arm sunni tribe. we have to be willing to be on the ground with them when they take the fight to isis. we need advisors with them. we need people to help coordinate support with them. that will incentivize them. we need to help accelerate that timetable for them. good thing we have working for us, again, to emphasize this, is isis itself. here's the problem we have. the political leadership in iraq does not want to wait, because the pressure they have on them

from the people in most and the conditions i'm describing to you are very real and they are accountable to those conditions. they want to go faster. the u.s. is pulling back and saying were not ready. the military in iraq wants to go faster because it is answering to its national leadership. we are not ready to do this yet. we are not applying enough resources to it, senator. >> are we not ready because we don't have the ability to do it or because we do not have the plan to do what is necessary? >> mostly, i believe lessig can draft a counteroffensive plan to take back most and also to take back and more province, we know how to do that. most of this is about resources

and dealing with what most of us believe is relatively weak, indigenous land on the ground. >> here is my fear, that this is a hotbed. this is where they are communicating with people in our country who attack us in syria and in iraq and with isis. if we have resources in this area, it seems to me that we either eliminate them or there's going to be a catastrophe in our own country. i would like to hear what you think about how we start to go on the move in syria as well. >> we don't let military capability. what we lack is the political will. if we figure out who sign we are

on here, and you look at what a leaky did to break trust with those tribes, i think the new prime minister only has about a 50-50 chance of restoring that trust as far as putting in a sunni minister of defense, was a great step, i think. what were going to have to decide what the interstate is and commit resources we have not committed it. >> i am out of time, but i just want to thank all of you for coming here today, for continuing to serve us, because the people of our country continue to need your help. thank you very much. >> senator sullivan. >> i also want to thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. tremendous service to our country. i think there is broad agreement certainly among the three of you and among all the panelists here on the importance of comprehensive strategy that

integrates all elements of american power. all of our resources. we have talked about economics diplomatic's, we talked about finance. certainly we are focused on military. one instrument of american power that we haven't really discussed , has not really come up in the conversation yet. maybe it's because 10 years ago it didn't exist. as an instrument of power american energy. as you know, we are once again on the verge, if we haven't already gotten there, of being the world's energy superpower, a position that we used to occupy several decades ago. now we are back. oil, gas renewables, and from the perspective of dealing with long-term national security threats, whether it's iran russia china isis, i just want

to start with two questions for you, general teen. -- general king. have critical and beneficial to think it is in dealing with these longer-term strategies that we now have this tremendous resource in america, which is energy. not only for own citizens, that we can export to our allies. do you think and undermines america's security when we undertake policies, as the current administration does on a regular basis. we undermine policies that enable us to responsibly develop our own energy resources that can benefit us as a nation and our national security. >> certainly energy independence for the united states and the rapid growth that has taken place most recently is certainly

an added measure of our national security. and i am delighted to see it. my own view of it, i'm not an energy expert, is that certainly we should do whatever we can to ensure that independence, and i'm convinced we can still protect the environment while we are doing it. but its relationship to the world is significant. you hit on it. europeans are tied like an umbilical cord to gluten in an russia because of energy independence. -- tied to putin. also, we have to be realistic. radical islam and what is taking place in these countries laid out on this map is a fundamental, geopolitical movement.

they are operating in countries where there are not democracies and where there are significant conditions providing a groundswell for this kind of activity. they would be doing that regardless of saudi or not. we got to understando that. il, which were on the way to doing, it doesn't change the harsh reality of iran's march to jill -- geopolitical control of muslim countries. >> at like to move from the strategic to the tactical. i had the honor the last 18 months of serving of serving in the marine corps forces reserves. i was just out with some of my

marines at fort lewis washington this past weekend. they send their greetings. as you know, that mission is to deploy small forces with foreign army, other supporting arms. general mattis, this question is for you. to make progress on the ground, against isil, is there any scenario you could see that would not include integrated supporting arms firepower and are therefore enforces that can do that, or is that something that is an area that pretty much needed to have american troops whether special forces units doing that kind of mission?

>> no strange, canadians british, french, they can do that through coordination and integration, but no one has the capacity are probably the frequency of training that permits us to do it best. i would only suggest that as you look at this is the kind of forces that can work with allies, this committee, whether it be the army green berets even to the point of looking at our army brigades today differently than we looked at them and just conventional war fighters 10 years ago, they have capabilities to do much of this and kind of steel the spine of the allied forces that we have the political will to put them in. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much, madam chair. i want to thank all three of you for your very substantial and

provocative testimony. general keane, you describe life in mosul where schools are set up to radicalize the population where just everyday life has changed. one wonders how long isil can so-called god or in this way. so you are indicating that we in the united states should have people on the ground, when the people in iraq finally get to the point where they want to fight isil. the question becomes been, when is that time? would you say that is perhaps a major role for our intelligence community to inform us as to when that critical point is that we need to be there to help the people fight back? i would also like to ask that question of general keane.

>> that's a very tough question, senator. the only thing i can do is just look back a little bit. we had insurgency began in iraq in the spring and summer of 2003. led by saddam hussein and his people. al qaeda fell in on that very quickly. then in 2006, two or three years later, sunni tribes who were aligned with them initially began to push back. much of it was literally driven by women, frankly, because the women were putting pressure on the tribal leaders that they did not want their children and grandchildren to live like this for generations to come, with seven sentry taliban-ism, under

the threat of what al qaeda was doing, controlling every aspect of their life. that frustration is already there. i do believe that given the fact that particularly in and bar province, this has existed before the accelerant will be faster and not take three years. i'm going to make an assumption that our intelligence community, with the use of informants and others, are monitoring what is taking place, and we have some sense of what the conditions are , and more importantly, what the attitude and behavior are of the people themselves. let's also be honest that there is just so much those people in most will be able to do against a well armed and well-equipped force, as isis is in most will

and in suburbs. to eject them out of their will take a conventional military force to do that, supported by care power and some pretty good intelligence on where people are. the attitude and support the people will be a factor, but i don't believe it will be decisive. what will be decisive is the use of military force to defeat that military organization there. >> and the conventional military force should be the iraqi military themselves. >> very much so. the peshmerga have the will to fight in the skill. they don't have all the weapons they need. the iraqi army -- and by the way, the iraqi army probably is in a little better shape waste on some recent reports i just

got this weekend from people who returned that many of the media reports are suggesting. >> the best fighters in the shia militia are -- >> general, i am sorry to cut you off. >> go-ahead, i will stop. >> i have a couple questions in regard to the asia-pacific rebound, you indicated in your testimony the importance of the navy and familiarity with the asia-pacific area because of your previous position. so the navy is intending to put 60% of our ships in the area, so for the two of you i would like to know how this is viewed by

china, and how is this resoce rce -- how is this resource placement seen by our allies and enemies. >> i think 60% of too few is probably too few. but i think that anything that we can do to ensure our allies of their economic and territorial future is not going to be under the veto of the chinese, it would not be welcome out in the pacific. >> a low hawk, senator nash -- aloha, senator. >> i think is not particularly handled well at all. just a few facts 60% versus 50%, which is what we in the navy would say, and we are going

to stick during the navy, -- stick to the navy, during the cold war, the navy leadership tried to press more of a slogan because of the vast size of the pacific and so forth. if you take just one denomination, aircraft carriers that is one aircraft carrier based on today's fleet. by the way that carrier is already in the pacific. so most of this is just chatter, pretty mindless, 280 ships, 10% of that is a 20, so what are we really talking about? not a whole lot. but the perceptions are all over the place. if you are chinese you use this is a great example. blah blah law, and you use this

as a justification in some respects to push to increase their military capabilities. so i think it is overblown the reality is it that we need to be engaged in the far east in the asia-pacific, and given the size and the spoke -- and the scope of the place we need to work with our long-term allies out there, the japanese, the australians, and others, and those that support us, but at the same time, we have got to work this difficult task of trying to figure out how we collaborate in ways that make sense with the chinese for the long-term. it is a huge country, huge impact, blah blah blah, so you know we don't need to have another cold war, we don't need to have another road to conflict with these guys. we have very interesting deep

relationships with them in every aspect except military with them. and i think that is where it needs to be. i think the military leadership in our country is working on this right now we need to continue this. >> thank you very much. >> senator tillis. >> thank you for your extraordinary record of service, and you made a comment that we seem to be at a low point with our middle east policy ineffectiveness over the last four decades. can you indicate anything over the last six or eight years that you think would be something positive that we have done and that we should hold on -- build on in the context of things that are not working? >> yes sir, i can, we have been in somewhat of a strategy-free environment for quite sometime within this administration. we have policies that go on and come off and i think that if you were to look at the fact that maliki was put out of office with our full support, they're

inside baghdad i think that was a positive step, we cannot get iraq to fight this enemy when they have a prime minister who basically declared kurds and sunnis persona non grata in their own country. i think the engagement of the president going to saudi arabia as we speak is certainly a positive point. you know, i would have to think more senator, but i will take that for the record, and if i think more on that, i will get back to you, we have disappointed a lot of runs up there from tel aviv to riyadh -- a lot of friends out there from tel aviv to riyadh. >> i think radical islam is -- radical islamists and did not

seize our dangerous words, why don't we use those? >> they are all ideologies themselves that another generation had to deal with. we beat not theism with brute force -- nazism with brute force. and i think islamists can be beaten, after all, what they are running from and why they do not want the united states in the region, it is not because god just because of our guns, it is because of our ideas. it is democracy and capitalism that is a threat to them, and they don't want our ideas

polluting those governments that they are attending to overflow so that they move in a direction of those ideas. so that is what argues that, because we want to run from the ideological aspect of the thing and you have to face it. you have to explain it. you have to undermine and you have to counter it. >> senator, i think that one of the problems today with this radical jihadist stuff is that we give it credibility. i don't view this problem in the same context as i view, for example, the need to make sure that this country is a fundamentally sound in his political, economic, and other aspects going forward for our future. nor do i think it is in the same relative merit as our long-term relationship with china. and the extent to which we hype

everything that seems to happen with these characters i think is one of the reasons why they are attractive to the disenfranchised and the folks that are struggling in other countries, and the folks that see this as a chance to gain glory and go help out the crusade. so i think we would be well served to tamp this stuff down to this army, if you would, in iraq and syria, is certainly not the 82nd airborne or the first marine division by any means. it is a pickup band of jihadists that share blah blah blog, we have gone through that, they are not in the same league with our capabilities, and to the extent of which we continue to hype them is really counterproductive to what we are doing and what we should be doing. >> there has been a lot of discussion in the middle east

and some of you say in the opening statements that we should encourage them, and what should we focus on and what should we expect if you had a crystal ball to see in the ukraine and other areas in that region if we don't act? what specific steps should we take be on what has been done to send a message? we talked about economic actions, but other actions to send a message to the russians that what they are doing is unacceptable and that we are in a better position to react to? >> well, i mentioned some of those in my remarks, and i think we have to admit to ourselves that our diplomatic efforts using sanctions as the mainstream have not dissuaded putin from what he is attempted to achieve, what i think is a new political order in eastern europe, post-cold war.

whether he is a strategic thinker or a tactical thinker or whether he is impulsive and he reacts to sort of current events, i think is beside the point. i'll think we should waste a lot of time talking about that. effect of the matter is, he is acting, and he is taking advantage of the situation. it is a huge opportunity for him. he senses that europe has sexless leadership it is not going to respond, and he has also put the united states in that category, and this is advantage to himself as a result of it. we have to convince them that we are serious. that they don't really matter to us. otherwise i think he keeps coming. certainly we want to avoid a military conflict with him, and i think that there are steps that we can take to do that. one is what was discussed before

about helping with energy and removing some of the energy dependence of that europeans have on him, but secondly, listen, the threat has shifted so we have a threat in eastern europe on nato's in eastern flank, let's shift nato forces to that area, not just temporal early -- just temporarily in and out, but demonstrate to him to article five really does matter. i roughly convinced in his conference room, he has people sitting around the table with him saying "do we really believe that america will respond with the threat that we pose in estonia?" and they are answering that question. we don't want that question on the table. we want to take that question off the table. and i think we could do that. now whether we put the missile-defense back into where we took it out at the beginning of this and ministration, i

think that needs to be reluctant. i am not kabul -- i'm not confident of that. i think that needs to be reluctant terms of where we place it. but certainly, it is a disgrace that we haven't been able to provide arms to ukrainians who want to push back and have a history of courageous military interaction to protect their own people. they are not asking for anything else, they are not asking for troops, they are not asking for air power, all they wanted were the weapons, and we stiffed them on it. one person commented that it is not surprising that put in is on the move again in eastern ukraine, but her efforts have not worked because they don't have anything behind it. we need to put some things on the table that will strengthen our diplomatic efforts, and we have not been doing that. >> thank you, madam chair.

>> thank you very much and let me thank all three of you for your services, but no importantly -- but more importantly, for your testimony today. i think that admiral fallon said what we are going to do today and what we do in the future is 2020 -- 20/20. today we have less volunteers for the military, and we all believe that they would have some intermingling of volunteers versus the draft and that we would not have a 13 year war and we would have had better decisions and better direction if you will, because people would have demanded it. hindsight being 20/20 i get this question asked a lot.

people asked if he should have ever entered iraq, should we have ever declared war on iraq should we have ever gotten out? gaddafi, we took gaddafi out? what we do in syria, should we take out a sod? -- should we take out aaas -- assad? should we -- -- should should we double down? should we in syria? how much affect you think we will have to find people that will fight isil that will turn and then fight assad? the turks want us to go and

commit to fight him and isis. i want to open the door and see what you all go with it. let's start with admiral fallon. >> senator, i would not go back and speculate beyond the merits of how good or how bad each of those decisions were based on where we are, except to say -- >> the reason i am saying so, is because we're close to making that same decision -- >> so i think that the lesson that i would take would to say where are we now? >> got you. >> what are the chances if we are in a different place, but i would like to go back, if i could come at your opening comic, because i think it is the most -- comment, because i think it is the most important thing for the long term as i look at our country and our ability to

address national security issues and the future health of this nation, and that is the very, very small percentage of this population that is in any way shape, or form, actively engaged within the uniform services. we have had a lot of rhetoric in the past dozen years or so, but as we go forward, what i see that really concerns me is a growing gap between the few that are actually engaged in this and i get the feeling that a lot of people kind of think that it is just a job, this is their job, they are going to go and fight this thing. is that will we really want to have in this country? are we going to have better decisions when we have that view, that we have a professional paid army that takes care of everyone and everyone else builds their own thing. i think this is a huge problem and we ignore it at our peril. thank you. >> you know, starting with the

all volunteer force, i served as did jim and fox also, in the draft military, and transitioned to a volunteer force post-vietnam. as a result of that, i think that the force is the best this country has ever put together, and there is nothing quite like it any other place in the world, and i attribute that to a couple of reasons. one, the force looks like america, in its diversity, ethnicity, etc., and to come a they want to be there and they want to accept the burden and the responsibility that comes with it. in the draft military, we had so many there that did not want to be there. it was frustrating to deal with them. we did a lot of social rehabilitation for people.

i don't believe that is what a global power is about frankly and i think that the skills that are needed in the military today , it is a prerequisite -- and i have similar concerns, 1% are involved, but i don't think going back to revisit the draft that is conscription is the answer to that. secondly, on iraq and syria iraq itself i was a four star the time, but i did not think, i was shocked in the first week of december of 2001 that we had made a decision to go to war in iraq. just as we toppled the taliban

and, i was asking why, and when, etc. i could see the need for it at some point, certainly, because of the w d -- wmd issue, but my job was to stay on top of al qaeda, which was the reason that we were on duty in afghanistan and if they were going to run into every hole, we were going to follow them, but after what took place here, that was my motivation. in syria listen, syria is as complex a thing that we have had honor play and you can be on any side of the issue and make reasonable cents. the only thing that concerns me about this, and i respect jim when he says these things, but i think what we try to achieve in syria is that some form of government stays in partnership

with moderate forces to help run the country. so you are looking towards a political solution. but i just know that we are on a collision course that right now in syria with isis is expanding control and dominance inside the country at the same time, we are trying to push back on them with a ground force that is being pounded by the assad regime. and if we continue to let that happen, the free syrian army and the force that we are trying to support is going to go away, and that is the reality of it. do you do something about that? do try to make some attempts on that? with all the geopolitical things that it entails? and my answer is that we should try. and it is hard. it is not hopeless. >> madam chair, may i just indulge the fallen tear versus --

>> yes sir, i think this has been bad for the country, i would only add on the decision to invade a country to go into -- i don't know what our policy is on syria, i don't know what the state is and what the people want to accomplish, and if people wander into a war on that, you are probably going to get what our policy is on lost on your way somewhere. we should never go into these countries unless there is a reasonable chance for a better outcome, and war is fundamentally unpredictable, so that means a long-term commitment with a clear and fully resourced sound strategy to get there otherwise don't go in and look at libya in your rearview mirror and wonder what you have done. >> i don't want to leave this with the impression that i endorse the return to conscription, i don't at all but i think we are to be

seriously considering how we motivate people for service in this country, not just in the military, but on a range of things, but the way we are headed right now causes -- >> luckily, we have volunteer right now as compared with the draft, if you will -- >> if you have a mixed service situation in this country, you would have no difficulty filling the villa terry with people who would volunteer. >> if we had all volunteer army doing vietnam, we would still be in vietnam. >> senator king. >> thank you madam chair. somebody asked up in maine recently what my job consisted of, and i thought for a minute and i said it is applied history with a minor in communications and your testimony today has been ample evidence that this is really all about history.

i have a lot of favorite quotes from mark twain, but my all-time favorite is that history does not always repeat itself, but usually rhymes and that is what we're talking about here today. talking about history. which you all agree, and i don't need lengthy answers, that leaving afghanistan prematurely would be a major strategic mistake for this country. >> yes sir. >> yes. >> admiral fallon, do you agree? i'll think the american people realize the progress that has been made in afghanistan, it is fumbling the ball on the five yard line, and it is a modest additional commitment in terms of think the american people realize the progress that people and

treasure would maintain those benefits, and i think general keane, you testify without that, and you say that is lost. one of the -- >> one of the problems that we are having.

this in that region and then all hell would break loose there i don't think that would work in this case, even though i do agree with you that the internal contradictions inside communism and the internal jihadists thinking would rot from the inside out, just with coming us. >> where the historic era well breaks down is the piece of this and the communications and i think you mentioned seventh century, i don't know which century it is, but the danger now is that we are dealing with people with seventh century ethics and 20th century weapons and it strikes me as intelligence as being one of the key elements in this battle perhaps more so than ever. let me conclude with a couple of

questions about iran. we are engaged in this negotiation that is going to come to some kind of conclusion, we believe in the next two or three months. i don't believe in the likelihood of an additional extension. what if those talks fail? what if we end up with no deal or a deal that is just not acceptable in terms of containing i ron's ambitions -- iran's ambitions? >> we have to ensure that that they have the ability to enrich fuel and a rigorous inspection regime where we will have confidence that they are not going to engage in the nile and deceit in their weapons program. if it fails, we would have to re-energize and elevate the economic sanctions, perhaps even

point -- even to the plate of a blockade and i think that defeat of iranian interests in that area could reverberate right back into to ron and their many people -- tehran and the iranian people would come out into the streets. but the oppressive powers are strong and the alternative to the economic and some of these peripheral efforts working would probably end up being war. >> i was just in the middle east last weekend talking with people in the gulf states, and we know that we are dealing in some ways with an agent civil war between sunnis and shiites but in the gulf states, they are very worried about iran's expansion even outside of the nuclear area. we are now talking about an

agent civil war between the persians and the arabs. i don't think many people realize of it iranians are not arabs, this goes back to darius and in some ways, you have people trying to re-create the ottoman empire and some people trying to re-create the persian empire and here we are trying to wind our way through 2000 your old disputes. that is not really a question but general keane, your thoughts? >> i think our behavior with iran over the years have been pretty atrocious. they took down our embassy in lebanon, they took down the annex, they took down the kuwait embassy, they took down air force barracks and a general -- one of our generals believe that a trained has below -- has blah

-- hezbollah fighter use an ied exclusivelythrough a single series of -- >> ever counted any of that. this is a nonpartisan nonresponse -- bipartisan nonresponse. >> here we go into negotiations by a regime who stated an objective is to dominate the region. they are beginning to do that and want a nuclear weapons to guarantee their preservation and to help in their geopolitical objectives. the beginning of these negotiations, we are permitting the uranium and thousands of thousands of centrifuges. we are already behind. the only negotiation that should

have been done is suspend the program and we will take off the sanctions. that is not where we are. i believe if it fails we go back tough, crippling economic sanctions. bring in the national security agencies. lay down in front of them what they can do to get after them. we can sit down and have more dialogue with these guys. somehow we can work towards mutual interests in the region went -- when the stated interest are truly regional domination and we have already given up too much to them as we speak. >> i want to thank these gentlemen. this has been there he helpful. >> thank you. >> a cannot agree more.

i appreciate all of you. i have a couple of questions. from a lack of detention policies of that has resulted. we should not get into another fight without resolving this issue. could you help us understand what are the consequences? they were detained at guantanamo. there are additional 77. why does it matter? what is it impacts to us as it

regards the policy? >> the implication first and foremost as we go into a fight and were not even certain of ourselves of holding prisoners that we have taken into the fight. for example in 1944, we do not take the pow camps and let them get another shot at us in normandy. we kept usthem until the war was over. if the enemy wants to fight or be a truck driver, they do not have a significant role. if you sign up with this enemy they should know we are coming after you. if the commander-in-chief sends us out there. if taken prisoner, you will be prisoner until the war is over. this is not war fighting 301 or advanced were fighting, this is 101.

the biggest concern i have having been in the infantry for many years, if our troops find that they are taking someone prisoner a second time and they have scraped one of their buddies off the pavement and zipped him into a bag, the potential for maintaining the ethical imperative we expect of our armed forces is going to be undercut if in fact the integrity of our war effort does not take those people off the battlefield permanently if taken prisoner. they will take things into their own hands under the pressures of warfare. i think what we have to do was have a repeatable detainee policy salome take them, we hold them's -- so when we take them we hold them and there is no confusion about their future. i would go by the geneva convention and maintain them with red cross oversight until the war was over.

>> thank you, general. let me just say i fully agree with what you said about providing arms to ukraine. i think it is a disgrace and i cannot understand why this administration has not provided these arms so they can defend themselves against russian aggression. i think we are sending the wrong message of their -- message there. the other consideration is in signing the budapest memorandum, why would any nation give up its nuclear weapons when we will not provide a basic defensive arms when they are faced with aggression on their own territory? i would like you to comment on what are the implications of that as we ask other nations to give up their nuclear weapons? i don't understand why they would do it when they see our behavior. >> i totally agree. we went back on an agreement.

we went back on our word. i believe that is one of the reasons that putin is looking at nato itself and saying to himself is this still of the organization that helped force the collapse of the soviet union back in 1991 or has this organization lost its moral fiber? i think when we break agreements like that, even though ukraine was not a member of nato, clearly the deal that was made was in their interest as well as the world's interest. we foreclosed on it and shame on us for doing that. i do believe it has significant implications, not just to other countries who we believe our friends, but because it does encourage vladimir putin. common sense does tell you that and his behavior underscores that.

>> i want to follow up on the discussion of iran. looking at their behavior, i think general keane you said we are already behind on this deal in terms of what we have agreed to. so as we look at this, the negotiations that are going on, what does a good deal look like? and, given the implications of this for our national security, i believe that congress should have a say in that agreement. what isdoes a good deal look like? one that they can ensure they cannot immediately gear up their nuclear weapons program again. finally, i don't see any resolutions whatsoever in these negotiations of their missile programs their seeking icbm capabilities that could hit our east coast. also their activities as the largest state sponsor of

terrorism. can you help us understand what we should be looking for and the other two issues i think are very important to us in terms of their activity? >> as i have said, i don't think there is a good deal here at all. because what we are arguing over is the technology that will drive the times to develop a weapon. our negotiators are trying to pull out some of those technologies to extend the amount of time it would take to develop a weapon. we have been in this dance step before with the uranium's -- iranians going back 15 years. it is always to step forwards and one step back. that is where we are. i have absolutely no confidence if we made a deal that the iranians will not undermine that and move fast forward to be able to develop a nuclear weapon must faster than what we think.

i think history is on the side of that argument. i'm not optimistic at all about this. i will give the administration credit for well-intentioned motivations. i don't want to get into that. i cannot because you have to get into people's heads. the fact of the matter is we should be very concerned about a bad deal here because i believe we are on a path to it. let's be honest with ourselves. this regime, the supreme leader is not giving up on having a nuclear weapon. anybody that thinks that is delusional and naive. he is on a path to it, he is god. in charge now not the other. he has a sophisticated leader that is working this very well to achieve his objectives

geopolitically. i'm not confident at all. the only deal that makes any sense to me is dismantle the program and pull the sanctions but we are not there. this administration will not do that. we are already passed that. >> madam chair, i think the economic sanctions work better than i ever anticipated. the administration had to try. it gave us credibility with the international community. it also, i think, puts us in a position to define what a good deal is. to go to the heart of your question, i think it is a rigorous inspection regime that gives us confidence it will not have a breakout capability and no ability to enrich uranium beyond peaceful purposes at all. if that cannot be achieved, we have a bad deal.

>> admiral? >> somebody made the point earlier that history does not exactly repeat itself. but, during the cold war we w ere squared off against communist ideology that was based in the soviet union that was diametrically opposed to everything we believe in the political, economic and individual freedoms that we held very dear to ourselves. yet, we recognized that we had interests to try to ensure that we would not get plunged into yet another conflict with staggering potential consequences. we ended up negotiating with the soviets. we did not trust them, they did not trust us. but, we thought there was some

longer-term, higher objectives that needed to be achieved. i think were not in a dissimilar situation. we should not give them that credibility but it is a problem that we cannot keep ignoring. if we come up with an agreement that the negotiators feel is reasonable, the key thing is going to be an ability to identify the key aspects to the best to our ability. i think that is really important. >> senator reid. >> thank you very much. i will echo senator kaine's remarks. this has been useful. one of the thoughts i had it listening to senator's question is the history always drives us. in the cold war, we had a nexus and to enemy -- the soviet union. they were engaged in a lot of provocative movements.

they invaded hungary in the 1950 's. they were attempting to establish nuclear missiles 90 miles from our source in the 1960's and yet we continue to negotiate with them. we did it with the same kind of skepticism that we all have towards the iranians. nobody trusted crewthat much. i think it is important as has been suggested by all of you that we follow through on these negotiations with the iranians until we get to eight resolution. -- a resolution. we are on the high road. we define what a good solution is. we had international support. if they cannot make that standard, we are in a much stronger position to move collectively. i think that is important to note. let me ask a question that gives a notion of what i think you said general we have to be

very clear died of that will be start something -- where it is going to go. you raise the issue of escalation. the notion that if we take a step -- we solve the problem. in fact, in every situation i can think of, the first step will prompt a counter response by the other side. with respect to the ukraine, if we were to give offensive weapons to the ukrainians, what do you think he will do? polish troops out -- pull his troops out? again, will be get into a situation where we find ourselves in much more precarious position? >> senator reid, every action has a reaction.

it is a fundamentally unpredictable situation but we have to wargame it and look ahead. i think in light of the worsening economic situation. , putin's ability to act independently will be circumscribed. i believe that it may very well lead to a higher level of violence. at the same time, i think it could become akin to napoleons bleeding ulcer in spain. the ukraine could become the kind of -- which his foreign-policy is hammered back in line with the international order of respect for state boundaries and that sort of thing as he starts having higher physical costs more troops coming home dead from this sort of thing.

it is going to be a tragedy so long as russia decides to continue what they are doing. we are asking ourselves are we willing to support the ukrainian people who want to defend themselves. on that one, i am one way about it. of course, we support them. >> i think the putin strategy is quite clever, maybe even brilliant when you think about it. he's using soldiers in disguise as special operation forces in civilian close. they have created an uprising that is not even there. they appeal for a more military assistance and he provides prequel -- people who don't identify themselves as what country they come from. so-called soldiers in disguise. ps trumped up everything to include the requirement for a bit -- he has trumped up everything to include the requirement for a military response. it is up to escalate because this is an uprising.

an interesting phenomenon. i think we will continue to see it again and again. one is we need to deal with this strategy that he is using and what should we do about it. number two, i think the harsh reality is that putin has done all of the escalation himself. and, he is the one that brought paramilitary forces in. very sophisticated equipment. he is the one that brought multiple armor and mechanized divisions and put them on the border and rushed them across the border -- tanks, artillery antiaircraft. it is his forces that shut down an airliner. all of the escalation has really been done by him.

and, i believe that providing some assistance to the ukrainians as much as that would be material assistance -- because i always believe that conflict is fundamentally a test of will and some suit taught us that the ultimate objective of wars to break your opponents will -- i give arms and assistance to the ukrainians not just for the physical capability it enhances them, but also to demonstrate that we are behind them to help them with their will and their spine. they have this natural fortitude knowing their history to stand up to it. that is where i am on it. i'm not concerned about escalation because putin has done all of that already. >> can you comment please? >> surely. we think about russia -- it is a

great example of a place we should think more strategicallya and not be channeling ourselves. i think the guy is very opportunistic. he took advantage of a very interesting situation. he has ego whatever. but, what else might we do to get this guy's attention? this country has some very significant internal problems. look at birth rates health longevity, the reality that it is a one trick economic pony and right now the trends are not going in the right direction. as highlighted earlier we have a phenomenal new energy card in our national capabilities here. how might we think about using that that might get this guy's attention and get him to back off? he thought he was pretty clever

when he went to the chinese and said let's make a deal. it is a way to play off the americans. we might think about coming around and working things with the chinese. i think there is more than one way to skin a cat here. at don't think the only solution is just ago to throw troops at it. we might decide it is on our best interest to give support to the ukrainians. i think we might think very seriously about support to our other eastern european nato allies. i think we should think bigger and deal with russia a little longer term. >> thank you. >> senator sessions. >> thank you all. i was able to hear all of your opening statements. i think this is a fine of group of statements we have had been a longtime. it goes towards the decisions this congress needs to make and

the administration needs to be making. we are on a path that is not going to be successful. i want to thank you for your honest and direct statements about that. i am more hopeful than some. i think we can make some progress here. general keane, i think you would knowledge -- acknowledged it is important that iraq get its act together with regards to the shia the sunni and the kurds and to work together. i don't take that to be a statement that we should not seek to be offensive as soon as possible even right now. it seems to me that, you talked about will, i saw a recent article by a major general who talks about will and diminishing

hope. showing isis that they are not going to be successful. one of the prospects of us -- beginning to retake more territories in iraq and removing this hope that it out there that seems to be attracting more soldiers from around the region to the isis camps. >> i think i understand what you are saying. i certainly agree with the policy that we should use local indigenous forces as well as coalition air to retake lost the territory. there has been some modest retaking of territory already. but, nowhere near what needs to be done to return the integrity and sovereignty to iraq.

that will only take place by a counter offensive campaign up those two river valleys -- one to the west and once of the north -- one to the north. that said, i think it is prudent to do that with those indigenous forces but to be robustly assisted, not in a way we are planning to do now with frontline advisors who will be down where the fighting takes place which means they are at risk. they are not in direct combat but in combat units that will be fighting. that is a given. >> that is what you think has to be done? >> yes. i think that is a prudent measure. can we retake mosul if we put combat brigades on the ground with coalition brigades now? yes, we can.

but, here is the problem with that. one is i have great difficulty looking u.s. soldiers in the face again to do something like that after what happened after 2011 when we pulled out because policy decision squandered the game. two, it is not just the issue of retaking mosul and falluja it is the issue of being able to hold it. isis will not stand down after we drive them out. we have known enough about this war in iraq and afghanistan -- you drive an enemy out, that is one thing. we have to make sure we hold it and prevent the enemy from coming back. that is why i do believe it is the right thing that you try to use these local forces even though we know that is not a strong as hand as we would like. strengthen that hand to the maximum capability we can without introducing ground

combat forces and then put emphasis on once we clear it out holding what is there. that will be the challenge because isis will come back and undermine it. that is why i don't think combat forces now is the right answer, u.s., forces. -- combat forces. if we have any lack of confidence that we will be able to retake the lost territory and we still believe it is strategically important for us in a rack to do that -- iraq to do that, then i would have combat brigades on reserve in kuwait as a backup to accomplish the mission if the mission does fail. that would be coalition brigades as well. >> the three of you have commanded. let's compare this to libya. we have quite a different situation. we stood shoulder to

shoulder with the iraqis. we lost thousands of american troops. to me, to say we won't even have a few soldiers in the front of the advance at this point to reserve -- preserve what i think you agree as possible and to oust isil would be a colossal mistake. general, do you feel a special strategic bond with the iraqis that we have worked with for over a decade? >> senator, i do. however, and giving you strategic advice, i try to divorce myself. we have to be very pragmatic about this. i will tell you that the senior military officers, we all explained that the success we

achieved by 2010, 2011 was reversible. the democratic processes and the military capability are too -- what has happened here was foreseeable. i the intelligence community was very blunt about this potential. what we have to look at right now is we play the ball where it lies. right now i believe we should embed those who can help plan these operations. we have to put them together -- >> that could present gains? doing that, in your professional opinion, would allow us to see g ains occur from that? >> because you are integrating the air and ground effort at the point of contact. you would see a much faster decision process. yes, sir, it would.

>> my time is up. thank you. it was a colossal error in 2011 to completely withdraw. this was predictable as senator mccain and others predicted. >> senator blumenthal. >> thanks. i want to join in my thinking senator mccain for convening this hearing which has been extremely valuable. i have been following here and in a variety of meetings away. i think your insights and experience reflects each of your stored very service to our nation. i thank you for what you have done to make sure we are strong and our security is as robust as possible. i agree with the point that has been made i think fairly repeatedly that we should be doing more to assist ukraine.

the congress agrees as well because we passed -- the president signed it as well -- the ukraine freedom support act of 2013 which has yet to my knowledge been implemented. my question to each of you because this act is very broad and what it authorizes by way of weaponry and defensive services and training, using that $350 million, what specifically do you think would be most helpful to the ukrainians? there is a lot of artillery that is being used against them. you made reference to the russian troops disguised as civilians. what specifically can we provide? is it antitank missiles? is it more body armor?

can you be more specific as to what you would advise the president to provide? >> senator, i cannot. i'm not familiar enough with the specifics on that battlefield. i think it is something that gives them more intelligence. anti-artillery radar would be helpful but i'm not the right person to answer that. >> general keane. >> what they have been asking for is they want more intelligence than what they currently have. i believe we have begun the to help them with some of that. they do want antitank weapons. shoulder fired missiles. they also want heavy weapons. one of the problems we have here