narrative the last three years. once upon a time, they talked about how the southern regime try to oppress and crushed them. emergence of a new narrative. it is quite telling of this coalition, they start talking about how a coalition of conservative forces, the islamist tribes were really the guys who led the fight against them between 2004 and 2010. there is some truth to that, but not the entire story. saleh has been angry for the last three or four years about the fact that he was thrown out of power by people who had been part of his regime for a number of years and this same conservative block. what we have seen is the two groups come together first and foremost to get rid of these and secondly to try and alter the outcomes of the national dialogue conference to create an

outcome more amenable to their interests. and what we saw over the past year is the houthis first gaining control over an area. that got very little interest in the international media, the small militia. by the time they reached sana'a, they built things up from the grassroots. they were in a very strong bargaining position. the issue comes to the second point i made, which is people pulling back and working out a deal for themselves. when you reach the outskirts of sana'a the expectation was that the coalition of forces would bring themselves to the front and work out a deal. instead, fighting broke out and

we saw the houthis working to make sure that this fits this coalition of conservative forces. that they no longer pose a threat to them in the long return. they were so successful that they ended up taking over sana'a. what we have seen since then is this issue for them of being in the strongest possible bargaining position and not really needing to pay attention to the outcomes of this national dialogue conference, this 10 month series of peace talks held in yemen and ended over a year ago. that was the first time the houthis had participated in

national context, and they had lots of concessions because of it. they were not in a bargaining position to push back. they came out publicly and started complaining and particularly the political bureau started complaining loudly about the decision to move towards the federal model of governance. we seen them building up to a point where they were in a position there was no balancing and opposing force as long as they are in the coalition with the various tribes or allies and various people that decided they wanted to get rid of this conservative bloc and brings us more or less to where we are today. now we are seeing them in the interesting position where they are overreaching and their coalition of forces is in such a position of relative strength in that there is no other force that can really counter balance them that they can do more or less what we like. i think that they are getting a little bit excited but also making some bad moves.

when we talk about what happened lat week, it is described as a coup. i would argue that it is a slow burning coup. a coup in slow motion where people are gradually taking over the apparatus of the state. each time they get to a new point, they realize they can go further. we saw overreach on the part of the houthis but possibly the beginning of split of the coalition of forces that allowed the houthis to be the most visible element of the takeover of the state. the draft constitution was finished in december. around two weeks ago, the chief of staff was bringing it to a committee formed at the end of

the national dialogue to have them look at the draft and pass it to be put to referendum. the houthis were led to believe it would contain provisions for six regional federal states, which is something that they oppose deeply, and he decided to abduct the chief of staff. in return the president and head of the military sent the presidential guard out on to the streets in order to reclaim the city and the houthis again retaliated. what happened after that is actually largely down to conjecture. remember that the houthis are not the only people in sana'a. my understanding, and nobody is going to get the right and wrong answer out of this. good information is very, very hard to come by, but my understanding is you had an issue of two different groups. the saleh loyalists, including the national security bureau and security office, and the presidential palace and home of of the president and the houthis feeling that they had to step in and this points out the issue and the point. two groups egging each other on to go a little further.

now that he has resigned, which the houthis didn't want. they wanted a weak president and someone they could dictate terms to. they find themselves in a position it is possible for saleh to put someone that he feels is amenable to his interests into place. at the moment, two conversations going on. one about a presidential council, which is something that is being negotiated by the u.n. with the various political parties at the moment, and also the question of the existing constitution in yemen which according to saleh's party means that the speaker of the house, a saleh loyalist, becomes interim president. and then the houthis pushing for their own version of a military presidential council. now we are at a point where the interests are diverging and what we are likely to see is new positioning and people trying to work out the relative strengths to each other and strike a bargain internally and that is

where we are left at today. >> thank you, peter. charles? >> i want to do a little more about the houthi and who are they and where do they come from. they are a changing organization. it is not the same thing that it is when it began. and it is also itself not sure what it is at this point. some of the confusion comes from confusion within the houthi movement. it began as college students in the late 1980's and early 1990's. they were counteracting influences from saudi arabia and the government.

at some point, hussein al-houthi got involved and he is the one that really militarized the group. of course, yemen, everybody is militarized. he began to say we need to take a more defense position and he is the one that also provoked the president and came up with the chant. you know, death to america. death to israel. curse the jews. long live islam. and that chant is not meant to be anti-american. it was meant -- it was meant to stick a thorn in the side of the president who at the time was defending the u.s. embassy and defending his relationship on the war on terror with the bush administration. and so the thorn was to say we

are authentically yemeni. we do not serve foreign interests. we are not the holding to the wahabi in saudi arabia. we are authentically yemeni, and the thorn worked. that is when the conflicts began. the conflicts introduce another dynamic in the movement in the sense that now the movement is dealing with tribal and military relations up in the north. they are successful largely because the yemeni military is split in itself and fighting each other as much as they are fighting the houthi. it is a force that can stand up to the regime. everyone upset with the regime the houthi began to create a coalition of those rejecting the main components of the regime. that gained lots of support. a lot of people who were rejecting houthi rule right now,

supported them back in the regime. the saleh regime had problems in -- three failures. the south and far north. both were regions that were subject to war. both were regions that lost wars. both were regions that saleh couldn't bring into his coalition and network and couldn't incorporate them politically and they remained outside. there are two large areas of yemen that are outside of the coalition patriots network, his political group. they are putting pressure on. and then the final straw is the regime splits in two with the defections and we have the arab spring. the national dialogue, which is internationally backed by the gulf states, but also the u.n. and united states, it is basically holding the saleh regime together where it has

split in half. brings them back together again. and then through the mechanism of the national dialogue tries to bring the southerners in and bring the houthis into the dialogue. that is the transition speed from 2012 to 2014. they participated in the national dialogue and they as opposed to the southern, fully participated and could make decisions and came up with their stances and whatnot. the transitional government failed. it failed largely because competition that was going on underneath. the power blocs underneath were fighting each other rather than governing.

you had saleh and his supporters. then you have isla feeling good like they are going to win the next set of elections, and there is a lot of competition within the institutions about trying to gain influence to position themselves best for the coming elections. government basically doesn't happen. if you ask the yemenis if the government is gone they say it has been gone since 2011. people ask, is the yemeni state going to fail? i would say how would you know it if it did because there is no state really. that is the way yemenis have felt for the last -- and that gradually built up to where people on the street had little interest in the national dialogue and felt it was irrelevant to their lives. the security situation was very bad. there was a lot of resentment against the whole process. i point to january of 2014. took a new stance. they said okay look, this interim government is going to fail.

not going to be able to pull off the transition and we will step in and shape it directly. this is the point where i, the question of its relationship with iran comes in. the one place where the iranians had a big impact, and that is funding, because in yemen in order to build militias and the coalitions you got to pay people. yemen is a poor country. it is not coming from taxes. there is not enough money to fund that kind of a movement. that is the big impact that the iranians had on it. it begins they take the place there and nobody paid attention to it. these are long enemies, got rid of them, good. then they moved down to amran, a key place because that is the seat of one of the key supporters in the military and the family of the leadership of the tribal confederation was located there. it is a key place of his supporters in the military.

they moved into sana'a. when they take sana'a, they portray themselves as revolutionaries. they say we are revolutionaries, we are a continuation of the 2011 revolution. we are here to implement the national dialogue. we are here to make sure it happens, that the outcomes are enforced. they set up committees that were going into all of the ministries and overseeing them. they went in and incorporated into the police forces incorporated themselves into the military. they very much need the national

state. this is what i call the schizophrenic behavior. this is the learning process they are going through. they want to have all of the guns in the north. the guns in the north were turned against them. they are very insecure. they want to be the biggest gun in the north. they are now. they have taken all the guns. they got ahold of the missile divisions in sana'a now. they have all the guns now. what they did not realize, or did not seem to have in mind is that they also have to govern. in yemen, there is this assertion of power. when they went in and blew up all of the islac party headquarters. in 1984 islac blew up all in the south. now it is payback. that is how yemen works. this is the way they understood power.

they were going to blow up their opponents' houses. they would take the bigger guns and whatnot but they forgot the other part, which is the state. the state is important in yemen. not just all of the coalitions but the state is important and the state is important because the state brings all of yemen's diverse components together. at this point, the houthi have totally alienated everybody. they came in trying to help the state when they are actually undermining the state. they are doing things by force rather than by process by institution building. they have alienated the entire southern and eastern area. they have stepped back. right now, they are going to try and incorporate themselves into a broader state. the key thing i am looking for

is not what is happening in sana'a, but what is happening in the east. they amassed their forces. islac and tribal forces of the east have amassed their forces. the saudis have said that is a redline and have massed their forces. if that comes to war, we are looking at civil war. that is where the oil is. tribes have turned it off. they have stopped the flow of oil. will that be negotiated settlement, or a military one? if it is a military one, the houthis will win the initial battle, but will lose the war. if they are able to hold it off and keep it in the political process, i think there is still some hope for a future of yemen. >> thanks, charles. >> hello. good morning. it is humbling to speak after peter and professor charles. difficult times. we are at a point where i had a first meeting with bobby about

the houthis. we were scratching our heads, trying to analyze the movement. it was the next hezbollah in yemen or something that just originated in the country. i will be short in my speech and would like to engage audience more than talking. i will give you updates what is happening right now. yesterday at the end of the fourth talks hosted in mozambique with the various political players, it seems that we are heading towards a presidential council. there is an agreement by all of the players on the presidential council, but there is a problem with the number of representatives in the council. the time frame. how long would the council stay in power? what are the priorities for the council? how are we going to process this council?

is it going to go through the parliament or be by political consensus? it seems this there is a lot of divisions to the point that when i actually walked into the building i was informed that the g.p.c. pulled out from the meeting. and they pulled out because they want to ensure that this process goes through the parliament and the parliament is two articles. 115 and 116. 115 means that the president had consider that his resignation will be accepted. the resignation has not been officially accepted so legally speaking he is still the head of the state. he is not on active duty as head of state or commander in chief but legally still the president. article 116 will give the power ot the parliament and speaker of the house when the two deputies will be the commander in chief and within 90 days will hold elections. a lot of people were personally targeted. the southerners feel that the

houthis' movement was looking down on them, not respecting them. they have historical problems with the houthis. so one day they are in and one day they are out. it seems at this point that they are moving along with the houthis regarding a presidential council. but the situation is fluid and changing every day. this is not about sunnis in yemen. this is a political crisis with resolutions hopefully. i spoke to the factons involved in the discussions today. they all talked about problems but reassured me they are moving towards political resolution. no one wants to pick up the guns and fight.

professor charles says they know that the houthis can win short-term battles, but in the end no one is going to win. my consistent advice is to look at the picture of yemen not as a single group is able to manage and dominate the country. if you use force, it is not sustainable. why did we end up in this place? i think peter and professor charles mentioned a lot of points. i want to quickly do some highlights. in 2011, the former government regime elements started acting as opposition. although they still were in the government and then the opposition, traditional opposition powers started to act -- turned to act as an opposition. so you have everybody in the government acting as an opposition. it was confusing. you would talk to officials about sort of things that had to do with my job and people were acting like they are the opposition and i was like no you are the decision maker now. your are them now.

the second problem is mistrust everyone distrusts the other side. the third point was the strong loyalty to the clan and party and faction which was unfortunately due to the weak identity of the state of the country that the smaller identity is dominated how people looked at things. people were always loyal to them and the party and the tribe more than anything else. n.d.c., one of my big criticisms is one of the important things to discuss was the federal issue and regional issue. should have been discussed from day one, not at the last phase. i would think being the devil's advocate people would say they wanted to leave that at the end because it was a difficult topic and they didn't want to start with it because it would have ruined the process itself. the silent majority. i think the majority of the yemenis are the silent majority.

traditionally looked forward to speak about their position via elections and at this point i think the professor said charles in 2013, if they ran elections they would have probably dominated the parliament. i don't agree. but at this point we don't know who would dominate elections. two months ago, perhaps the houthis would have dominated. people are sick and tired of people trying to push an agenda that doesn't have cohesion. we are not looking at the bigger picture. yemen is heading towards economic crisis. serious fiscal crisis already began, and i always say that we are not -- it is very hard to define yemen as a failed or dysfunctional state. it is a yemeni state. that is what it is and how it works, but it will become a

failed state the day that we are not able to pay salaries and the public servants refuse to go to work. i was surprised a lot of my colleagues even under gunfire went to work and offer basic services and keep doing what they are doing. others won't do that. the houthis at this point today dominate the scene in most of the northern provinces. especially in the capital. but the big challenge is in the traditional areas and the central regions where i come from. they have strong popular support, but it came to the point when people saw what happened, they were like never mind about that, we are not going to be in line with them. and the south. i think the south today this morning, our southern groups try to occupy and seize and then the

brigade sent reenforcement and pushed them back. so everybody see what the houthis did as an example of setting precedent. this is how you should do, violence and capture properties and business and that will work because it will be the status quo and everybody in the -- apparently in the international community will just play along. in the long-term, what i fear is that the houthis are not able to form a political consensus in managing the transition. the g.c.c. and saudis will not be strong supporters of any houthi-dominated government. they made a statement supporting the president and rejecting any possibility of a presidential council. the international community, i think the core of the houthis' argument is the peace and national participation agreement.

but they see that as an agreement with the president and if he is no longer in the picture it will not be as important as the initiatives a u.n. security council resolutions and the national conference. that is something that we could rally people around at this point and not just focus on. seems each faction focuses on the agreement that would serve them the best. the international dialogue is something that we could work on the economic crisis. in the last three quarters we lost $600 million from the oil. 60% of the government revenues comes from oil. the donors pledges to yemen out of the seven point plus billion dollars promised and pledged to yemen we only have absorbed less than 38%. there is money there, but people

are not going to invest in this situation. a regional diplomat described this to me. he is like i'm seeing a building that is collapsing and you are telling me to invest in it. and my sense is telling me that i would not invest in this building. let the building collapse and then rebuild. and my counter argument, i'm like yes, but if the building collapses there are neighbors around the building and when the building goes down it will damage the neighbors, too. not a clearcut position. and there is no security vacuum to extend. people are reporting at this point it seems that the popular committees and the military and police and tribes are managing the security of their areas but if the houthis continue expanding they will have a chance to recruit more from the tribes or traditionally against the houthis and then have perhaps isis or others trying to

come in the country and other groups and other sort of counter insurgency is going to form. a disturbing chaotic solution. and the last point is what will be the future of u.s.-yemeni relationship in a houthi-dominated government? so far, everyone is panicking and freaking out with the recent reports and analysis. i advise journalists not to rush in coming up with statements and positions and let the dust settle down in the next 48 hours. i think by sunday night we will have a good idea of what will happen. why sunday night? because today the houthis started their we call it expanded national congress which is supposed to be -- reminds me of our former president saleh general people congress in 1982 where he brought different factions under one umbrella and

trying to find strategic -- this congress is pressuring all the political players. come up with a solution, otherwise, we are going to step in. thank you. >> okay. thank you to all three of you. a lot of great detail here. what i would like to do is back up a bit and i will ask the panelists to discuss a little further, and then we will have time for questions from the audience, including from some of the overflow people. one thing i would like to press further is, who the houthis really are, what do they want? muhammad, you mentioned it is not a sectarian problem. sectarianism has not historically been an issue in yemen and yet it is clearly an issue. it is partly, as i understand it, a caste problems. the houthis come from not only zaidi, who were kind of an aristocratic group. and the houthus have taken that

and made a kind of a new ideological soup out of it with all kinds of accusations, i think are mostly not true, but some people have converted up there. they are clearly pragmatic in some ways. that is a good thing. aligned with ali abdullah saleh is not in the eyes of some people a beautiful thing, but shows that they are willing to negotiate. why are they against the six

region federalism plan? and i'm interested in knowing also a little bit more, whatever we know about how they make decisions and what some of their long-term goals for yemen are? before i press you guys individually about that, the second question is maybe simpler but possibly of higher priority to a lot of people here. what are the u.s. options in this context? they seem to be awfully limited. we have the potential, as you were saying, for a serious civil war in yemen. we have the conservative forces out who are seriously opposed to what the houthis are doing in the country, and the saudis seem inflexible. who is going to bridge the gap and does the u.s. have the diplomatic dexterity to do that? peter, maybe i could ask you. you have written about the questions about how they make

decisions and feel about federalism and what are their goals? >> the important thing to remember with the houthis is the leader of the movement was not the guy that was initially seen as being the big man among the houthi. he was a young man when his older brother died and eventually ascends into the leadership. hussein dies in 1984, and he takes over. that is false. another local trial leader who was not part of the family took over day-to-day management of the group and did not do well in the next two wars and it was only really the second war when the field commander was put in place. a quiet young guy. scholarly and religious, but doesn't have the charisma of his brother. we have only really seen him as a personality, someone appearing on tv developing into someone

who is a good public speaker and makes coherent sense the last two, three years. we have someone taking over his brother's reins but largely on the basis he is a decent field commander and a smart guy and can bring people around him. then you look at the people around him. a core and circle around him about whom we know very little. people he trusts very much and generally limited to people who haven't gone out with the movement that we called houthis and that is the inner layer that i call the houthis and they are religious. everyone outside of that layer is much more pragmatic about things and the coalition of forces taking over northwest yemen the last three, four years has really been the odd mixture of people who are ideologically on the houthis' side and they are tribal guys. you have the tribes working with the houthis. what i have been told from a

number of different people from inside is look, people will work with the houthis as long as they serve their interests, but the second they start screwing up and people start associating me with this group i will walk away and the houthis will be left with a small core group. they have built up a strong coalition of forces, but you have the young guy who has been isolated in the outside world his entire life and even more so now. drive from place to place on a day to day basis and gets the information from the field commanders, not all of whom are on page with him. a disjointed movement and feels like they moved on a day to bay basis and make up policy on the hoof and it is important to remember that, i think. >> if we could just -- if you could briefly address that, and then we are running out of time so we will need to take some questions.

x i described the hutus of strategy as to words, why not. the hutus are a young evolving movement. when we look at the hutus, it is new. i think, put it this way a lot of people are having a hard time working with the popular committees. when we look at yemen's population, the popular committees are formed mainly in these young kids they were under tribal and government forces.

these are the words of a former hutu official this is the month that you created. these are the sons of orphans. these are people who have never seen the inside of a clinic, or hospital. the government, the people of yemen, i think, forgot about the hutus. the clan became a center point. like the pope. a figurehead. this is what we have today, a struggle between the two main factions. you have the political people that you could work with at this point.

it seems that the military side of them movement is dominating. the saudi's are very sensitive for a good reason. they came into saudi territory killed soldiers. this is a sensitive topic. at the end of the day, we need to no longer pretends -- pretends. >> i have to ask you to be brief. >> they don't support the hutus. sadie is in, as all religions.

a few things they have done that is not traditional practice. that is something new. they are establishing their dominance area they show their dominance. if evolving. >> ok. >> thank you. my question is about the role of iran and when did the hutus -- >> as you mentioned, for the

first time in yemen's history they celebrates on a this year -- celebrate sana this year. >> the iranians want influence in yemen and they don't care who it is. they deal with student activist. in 2011 you could raise her hand and get a ticket to go into training. it is not that she is in -- shiasm is a determinate thing. when it first broke out, they said, we want to defend our brothers. it was a small part of it. the actual practice of sadie is

an -- zadism in yemen is a indigenous practice. it is not replace -- replicating irani and she is him. their key objective is security. they are going to make sure they have the guns in the future. it is a domestic agenda. it doesn't have anything to do with the rainthey are going to make sure they have the guns in the future. and. we have not talked about saudi arabia.

can you tell us more about it. >> i will be simple without saudi support. let me add one more thing about it. you are backing these guys. the first thing that happened was that the saudi's asked for an audience. they will bill -- deal. they want to make sure that yemen is not a vulnerability. that is why the answer, when we

have time to give proper respect , that is what the saudi's did not want. now, they built up their forces. they are moving in all of the ways that the hutus don't want them to move. they are during -- doing it to open a bargain. i would suspect that the eastern desert tribes are not going to have a final word in that. they are going to have a big word in the way that that issue is settled. that is where the hootie will trade horses. >> the message i was given when i left yemen was loud and clear.

the saudi's were looking at the hootie takeover of the capital. they didn't know if they were going to spend that money on arms. these guys need to pay. they need to pay a political price for what they have done. the saudi position, was, we are not going to give any money to yemen. it is still broke. their position is, let's let it happen. we can pay the price for collapsing yemen economy. >> into a have time? a question for the overflow, this is how are increased calls for

certain actions being addressed question mark >> >> when they moved in it in powered iraq. it seems they are still stuck at this point. they don't have a unified -- that is one of the things that made it an effective movement. i think the movement is reacting more than working on a plan. there are daily events where there is clashing. they are trying to work, but everybody is now behind the barrier and defending themselves. we are seeing the country

evolving into four groups. the fourth group -- we have new challenges more issues to work on. >> let me add one thing on that, we recognize that most of the government officials are loyal to hattie. the hattie has the greatest -- he became a hero. the iraq is on the outside. the iraq fees hattie is a traitor. >> i'm a former diplomat.

we have a key issue here, the minority want to dominate the country and in pose their agenda and private interest on the election. we were so close to the problem through the dial-up and the outcome of the national dialogue. with the sixth region system -- no one has answered. why don't they want federalism. >> i will jump in. the issue of how to divide, a are for federal state.

but how the divisions are made that is the issue. that was an issue that was not resolved at the national dialogue. they wanted the division of the former states. they said that would lead to succession. he agreed -- appointed to a can of -- committee, the reasons were designed to divide it into two. thought was joined into fauna and was caught off -- cut off from water access. what they wanted was, the ability to amend the draft. they wanted control of the committee that has the power to amend it. >> it is also a bargaining tool with iraq.

by addressing federalism, they are trying to create a position where they can say, you get sure one region, but you don't get a foreign state. >> they are sending a clear message that they are involved in this process. >> that puts an end to it. thank you for coming. [applause] >> keep track of the republican led congress and follow its members. c-span.org.

this week marked the 50th anniversary of former minister winston churchill. prime minister david cameron and others paid tribute to winston churchill in a ceremony. this is about 20 minutes. >> [no audio] [no audio]

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>> the home of the churchill

family, ladies and gentlemen. this morning it is my privilege to pay tribute on behalf of all colleagues to sir winston churchill as a parliamentarian for his service, for his output and for his recognition and fulfillment of the role of the house of commons. amazingly and in a sense staggeringly, winston churchill served as a member of the house of commons for 63 years and 360 days. only with some reluctance standing down as a parliamentarian at the october 1964 election.

having rather enjoyed his brief tenure or as father of the house. churchill fought 21 parliamentary elections and 116. he represented no fewer than five parliamentary constituency including three as diverse and he stood under no fewer than five banners including liberal conservative and independent constitutionalist. by comparison, his eight year spell as prime minister seems rather short. i think it is noteworthy and

emblematic of the whole significance and stature of the man that he never became a man noteworthy and -- member of the house of lords despite many invitations opportunities, and possibly exultation's to become one. he was a green benches man. e-house of commons man through and through. -- a house of commons man. that speaks, ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, for his service. his service was amazing, so too with his output. for over that six decade.

churchill delivered thousands of speeches and many millions of words. of course it is a truism that those speeches and words greatly impressed. i think it is noteworthy and amusing to observe that they didn't impress absolutely everybody. when winston churchill finally became leader of the conservative party one of his own flock duly unimpressed sneeringly dismissed churchill is a -- as a word spinner. what this misguided soul, whose name is an known -- unknown to

you. it is left unstated. of course it is also, a fact of significance, that his unforgettable radio broadcasts were for the most part repetitions of oratory already used in the house of commons. they were word for word reproductions of speeches delivered in the chamber. churchill thoughts -- thought that if those speeches past muster and met the test of that more demanding of audiences in

those most perilous of times the chances were that the country would come with him. i think in our overall appreciation of churchill, the parliamentarian, perhaps the single most important point is churchill's recognition. the house of commons was not an element of our democracy. the house of commons was the essence of our democracy. precisely because of that recognition, churchill felt strongly that so far as was humanly possible, the house of commons in wartime, should operate as the house of commons did in peacetime. he believed and upheld the

principle consistently and with passion. the searing searchlight of scrutiny were vital, both to test the executive branch and conferred the ethical legitimacy of the office required. ladies and gentlemen if 1940 was winston churchill's finest hour, the house of commons was assuredly his finest forum. 50 years from the passing of the great man, this parliamentary man continues to inspire. when, in 50 years time, the

hundred anniversary takes place he will continue similarly to inspire us. it is with great pride that on behalf of all of my colleagues across the house, i salute him and i tribute him. in closing i say, the biggest tribute that we can pay to that child, the late and great sir winston churchill, is to hold on to the function of the house of commons which he fought so hard and effectively to retain. and by his example, he invested the institution. [applause]

>> we are here to honor a great leader and a great briton. a full 50 years since his funeral when the cranes along when the streets were lined with those vast silent crowds, the sheer brilliance of winston churchill remains undimmed. i will never forget the first time i heard that voice. i was at my grandmother's house as a young boy and i was looking through a box of dusty old things and i found some vinyl records of those great speeches.

i will never forget putting on the record player and hearing those phrases boom out. "victory at all costs," "victory however long and hard the road may be." and of course, the one that struck me most -- "some chicken some neck." he made a big impression on me as a boy. now that i am prime minister there are so many churchills to respect and admire. the global statesman -- it was he who first recognize the people's republic of china. go tp israel and he helped to realize the dream of a jewish homeland. go to pakistan a you can imagine him fighting on the front yeaier. the battle to britain's

acquisition of the h-bomb. throughout it all, he was at the heart of events. there is churchill the bottles of number 10. the practice of taking his cabinet out to lunch. sadly for my cabinet, this not the current regime. [laughter] often overlooked, churchill the reformer. he was a man who pushed for prison reform, championed old age pension introduced labor exchanges for the unemployed. he believed the nation was made great not just by its military might, but how they treated its poorest and freelist citizens. that is an important part of his legacy. if there is one aspect of this great man i admire more than any other is it is churchill the patriot. he knew britain was not just a place on a map, but a force in the world with a destiny to

shape events and a duty to stand up for freedom. that is why in 1940 after france had fallen, before america or russia entered the war, he said this -- "hitler knows he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. if we can stand up to him, all europe and maybe free and the life of the world may move forward into broad sunlit." may 1940, those few days, that vital decision was the most important moment in our nation's long history. a time when britain saved ourselves, save europe and quite possibly saved the world. we were so incredibly fortunate to have at that time a leader so strong and so resolute. churchill was confident that freedom and democracy would win over barbarism and tyranny and it did.

with every affront to freedom in this century, we must remember that coverage and that resolved in the last century. 50 years ago when sir winston churchill was dying, my older brother was a tiny baby and my mother used to wrap them up some days, put him in his crib and we'll him to the gate -- wheel him to the gate. they would stand out the house as a mark of respect. such was the affection, such is the affection. history has been kind to winston churchill. not because he wrote it, but because he shaped it. he left a britain more free, more secure, more brave and more proud. for that, we must always be grateful to them. thank you. [applause]

>> this speech was originally delivered by winston churchill on the 21st of june, 1955 when availing a statue of himself. " it has been my luck to live as a grown-up person to more than half of the most violent country in human record. i remember well the scene at the close of the victorian era. the vast majority of the nation looked with confidence upon our island as the center of a vast empire spreading all over the world. as its leader in commerce, manufacturer and invention. as the model of finance and fiscal policy. as the author of parliamentary government and all guarded by

the unchallengeable power of a navy which only cost about 20 million pounds a year. little did we realize how mighty was the world which was growing up around us. or how terrible and gigantic the struggles into which its people were to be plunged. now, we look upon a different prospect. all the values and the fortunes have changed. we have emerged on the victorious side of from two world wars in which scores of millions have perished. they were wars within their scope and scale seemed fark is a pass -- far to surprass our resources and at times the brightness with doom. today we see our small island with its dense population and

delicate elastic but still precarious means of existence. no longer enjoying the ascendant and power of bygone days. but yet preserving in no poor measure the respect and goodwill of large portions of mankind and exercising in the new and far larger organization into which we have come in which we have helped to found. a wortyhy and growing share of influence. if this is so, it is because in the fearful ordeals of peace and war through which we have passed our duty, and have faithfully fought the enemies of peace, we may all be proud to have lived through such a period. i do not feel that our generation has any need to be

abast our ancestors. if which this hall reminds us. but now, i leave the past and i leave the present. it is to the future we must turn our gaze. i am on the side of the optimist. i do not believe that humanity is going to destroy itself. i have for some time thought it would be a good thing if the leaders of the great nations talked freely with one another without too much formality of diplomacy. i'm very glad this is now going to happen. we must not the immediate success. whatever is the outcome, we must persevere in the maintenance of peace through strength. a period of relaxation of

tension may well be all that is now within our grasp but such a phase would not be sterile. on the contrary. it would give the time for science to show the magnitude of her blessings rather than of her terrors. this again may lead us into a more genial time of opinion and resolve. let's go forward and say our part in this." thank you. [applause] >> next, house hearing with the fema director on the rest of -- disaster recovery programs. then scott walker talking about the record and the challenges he faces. after that, vice president joe biden's remarks in philadelphia.

>> of the political landscape has changed with the 114th congress. not only are there 43 new republicans and 50 new democrats in the house, there is also 108 women in congress including the first african-american republican in the house and the first woman veteran in the senate. keep track on c-span.org. the page has lots of useful information, including voting results and statistics about each session of congress. new congress, best access on c-span, c-span2, c-span radio and c-span.org. >> on tuesday, the fema director was on capitol hill to testify on disaster recovery before a house transportation subcommittee. he called for steps to be taken before disasters strike like improving infrastructure.

this is two hours and 15 minutes. >> committee comes to order. i'd like to thank chairman for the opportunity to serve as chairman of the subcommittee ranking member, welcome back. i look forward to building on our bipartisan record of accomplishments from last congress. let me welcome the new and returning members. last congress, we saved $2.2 billion on gsa projects and passed the sandy recovery improvement act. these were major accomplishments and i thank everyone who is involved in them. this congress, my two top priorities, are going to be public buildings reform and

disaster legislation. i think that we can exceed the gsa savings from last congress and we have some important reforms to tack physical the emergency management world. i hope that we can have disaster legislation and a gsa reform bill ready for the committee to consider in the first hall of this year. the purpose of today's hearing is to launch a public policy debate about the growing human and financial costs of disasters and to review if we, as a nation, are responding in a most appropriate and cost effective way. the private sector and government are spend an ever increasing amount of money on disasters. fema alone has obligated more than $178 million since 1989 over 1,300 presidentially disaster declarations. those numbers are going up.

and i don't believe we fully understand why, and what can be done to reduce those losses and protect our citizens. over the past eight years, chairman schuster and this committee made reforms through the post katrina emergency management reform act and the sandy recovery improvement act. these bills and the hard work of fema and our state and local partners have made tremendous improvements to our disaster response capabilities since hurricane katrina. now is the time to take a look at how the nation responds to disasters and where we want to head in the future. there has not been a comprehensive assessment of disaster aid in trends in at least 20 years. in recent years, specifically in reaction to hurricanes katrina and sandy, significant disaster aid has been provided outside the standard disaster relief

programs. there are many questions we should try and answer. for example, how much do we really spend on disasters? where is the money going? and what are the key drivers of those cost increases? how have disaster programs evolved over time? are there still target -- are they still targeted at the greatest need and are they cost beneficial. what are the principle guiding federal assistance and how is it used to rebuild in the wake of a disaster. answers may surprise you as they have surprised me. i notice that mr. mccarthy's testimony only a handful of disasters account for over 90% of all disaster spending since 1989. but we want to understand why

federal disaster -- they had to be saved by a helicopter. the women there told me that they never -- they can never live in that home again. i will never forget that preparing for natural disasters is about more than the loss of possessions. it's our friends and neighbors' lives that could be at stake if we do not plan in advance.

as we were rebuilding, i was amazed at much of the federal assistance was to rebuild in the same place in the same way. leaving people vulnerable to the next storm. we have to be compassionate and responsive to our citizens and also have to -- have the duty to be good stewards of the taxpayer dollars. i am committed to establishing a framework to tackle these issues and come up with solutions that are driven by facts and data rather than the emotion that is inevitably following a disaster. i don't have all the answers but we will put together the right people to get them. the first step is this hearing. where we have brought together some key people to launch this discussion. i am also excited to announce that following this hearing on february 26th, we will host the first of several roundtables on this topic. the first roundtable will look at disaster losses from all

levels of government and the private sector. i look forward to the ongoing conversations starting with hearing from our witnesses here today, and i want to thank you all for being here. i ask unanimous consent that membered of the full committee not on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the submitt committee at the hearing and ask questions. without objection so ordered. i now call on the ranking member of the subcommittee, mr. carson, for a brief opening statement. >> thank you, chairman, and welcome to the first hearing of the 114th congress. i'm pleased to return as ranking member of the subcommittee and look forward to continue the good working relationship we both share are. as my friend, chairman barletta, stated were able to partner in the last congress and i'm deeply thankful the chairman is back, ready for warfare, looking good and looking fit as always.

also i'd be remiss if i didn't mention a legend and a true american icon and that's the honorable eleanor holmes norton, so among the many issues we'll hear i'm interested in examining the training programs available to our first responders, ensuring timely and efficient emergency response when and wherever disaster strikes is critical. some of the emergency managers in the great hoosier state of indiana have reach out to me regarding the limited accessibility of fema training centers. we must make certain that adequate programs are available and that sufficient access is available to those training programs. further, after a disaster, very sadly hear stories about elderly and disabled individuals having to feign for themes because they were not adequately informed prior to the storm, or they were

unable to access resources after the storm. this was particularly the case after hurricane sandy. we must ensure that emergency preparedness and response systems are inclusive of vulnerable populations and those with language barriers. moreover, in their written testimony, mema discusses concerns about level of support services states should be required to provide. i understand their concern but it is 2015 and no one should be left behind. especially our most vulnerable neighbors. so, i think it's very imperative we revisit the same issues in this congress to ensure that everyone has access to the same information and resources, and thank you, mr. chairman. i look forward to working with you. >> thank you, ranking member carson. we have two panels of witnesses today. our first panel we have administrator fugate, current administrator of fema, who brings tremendous emergency management experience as well as successes and implementing key reforms and driving progress at

fema. on our second panel, we'll be joined by mr. fran mccarthy, an expert that will show us the trend in disaster assistance hour and assistance has evolved over time. mr. brian koon, the director of the florida division of emergency management is here to talk about his experience as well as help us see things from a state perspective. administrator david paulison who led fema in the wake of hurricane katrina and through the post katrina emergency management reform act. he will discuss the changes he has seen in disasters and provide some thoughts on ways to address the rising costs of disasters. finally, we're joined by chief brian finnessy, who will share his experience in emergency management, specifically the alarming trends in wildfire

activity in this country. i ask unanimous consent our witnesses' full statements be included in the record without objection, so ordered. since your written testimony has been made a part of the record the subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony to five minutes. administrator fugate, you may proceed. >> thank you, ranking member other members of the committee. in my written statement is talked about some of the to go things we have been working on since the sandy recovery improvement act passed. this committee, you helped us address many issues that it came up repeat lid. first off i have to recognize the fact that you gave us the authority to recognize the tribal governments as an entity that could deal directly with the president in requesting disaster declaration, something they sought for a long time. this committee made sure it was part of the legislation. you have also given us tools we identified in lessons learned in

imagining debris and also making sure as we begin the process of rebuilding, we're able to speed up the process of identifying those large projects, obligating moneys and allowing more discretion to state and local officials on how to build back better. that was an important tool that we began using as far back as some damage from hurricane irene, with the state of vermont. it is giving us flexibility that states and local governments have asked for in building back better and building back to the future. this trends and disasters are not surprising to me. with an aging infrastructure concentration of populations and highly vulnerable areas, that fortunately don't have a lot of disasters. when they do occur, the costs are substantial. particularly when you look at what happens when the number of public buildings that are under or uninsured are damaged or destroyed. i think things such as dealing

with individual losses that were uninsured, dealing with debris costs, dealing with response costs, are always going to be part of the formula. but when you look at most recently in sandy, the billion dollars and more in some projects we're having to pay to rebuild structures, it's important for us to make sure that in the future we have built back those structures to where they are insurable and look at making sure the insurance provisions are more strenuously applied and less opportunities to allow structures to come back for repeated assistance because they weren't insured. we firmly believe we should do more diligent work with state and local partners to ensure when we build back, we just don't look at old data, we just don't use cost benefit analysis to account for the future etch also need to engage the private sector more strongly in insuring risk and in those areas where the private sector cannot insure risks, ask hard questions, should we build back where we were, should we build back the

way it was, or do we need to change? because if anything we know that many areas are subject to repeated disasters. i personally went into arkansas last year to see damage from a tornado. i saw a school, fortunately not occupied, nearly completed, that was destroyed. i was informed by our staff there from the regional office the school was being rebuilt from a 2010 tornado. where it had been destroyed. it was destroyed again. what really troubled me was, we did not have an opportunity or did not seek the opportunity to make sure the school had safe rooms in it. and we have committed to and have now established that in tornado-prone areas when we are dealing with schools and other public structures-we will fine a way to make sure that we fund safe rooms to protect children during tornadoes. so you have given us a lot of

tools. many of them are still in the implementation phase. some of them have not gone asaphia as i would like. part of it was the implementation and getting buy-in from partners at the state and local level. i'm seeing early success and i think it will be a good discussion to have with you and the committee over our findings, our challenges, and where success is taking place. i firmly believe the role of the federal government is to support and not supplant our state and local officials, that fema is a support agency, and the cost of disasters is a shared responsibility. but i do think it's appropriate that when disasters exceed the capabilities of the state and local governments that we must be there to support them, not only the initial response but to ensure successful recovery. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for your testimony, administrator fugate. i will now begin the first round of questions limited to five minutes for each member. if there are additional

questions following the first round, we'll have additional rounds of questions as needed. we all know disaster costs are going up dramatically. what do you think are driving those costs and can we do anything about them? >> well, one way that people have said to look at disaster costs is reduce eligibility or raise thresholds for declares disasters, but as i think you see the smaller disasters are not what drives the majority of the big ticket items. it's the larger events itch think it comes back to in many cases we have aging infrastructure, we have dense populated areas in vulnerable zones whether it's from hurricanes, flooding earthquakes, and those costs, i think, historically, were things that we looked at-insurance and other tools, to manage the risk.

but that risk has now, i think moved more toward this federal taxpayer in the fema programs. i think over time it was the unintended consequences of the programs we were seen as a -- instead of being support of last resort, often times the first resort for the coverage of insurable property that was not insured and those losses. again, it is really the decision that we have to look at how do we best insure communities are able to rebuild and at the same time don't support or continue growing the risk. i think we have to understand, there's a certain amount of risk out there right now elm we have modeled some disasters. they're actually bigger than sandy, the exposure for just south florida from a repeat of the great miami hurricane would be in the hubs of billions of dollars, federal costs exceeding both sandy and katrina. so it is, i think, something we need to look at. but more importantly we have to make sure as we good in after disaster, we're setting the stage for the future, not come back and repeat it over. >> we continue to see new disaster aid programs emerge ad hoc in reaction to disasters.

they all seem to have different rules and requirement does do not seem well-coordinated or focused on obtaining the best outcomes. is this something congress should take a look at, so that we can streamline these programs and ensure that they're cost effective? >> mr. chairman, we go back to the post katrina emergency management format. one thing you directed fema to do ex-were slowing in doing it but it news in place is to build a national recovery framework to take the various programs programs and localite more wholeis likely when working with state and local partners. congress needs to know the total costs. there shouldn't be hidden costs in other appropriations. i caution the flexibility of the programs and the fact we deal with preexisting condition, that fema's programs going to deal with, that necessaryibility is often times -- let me give you an example of community block grant dollars.

when we deal with housing issues in a disaster it's generally the affordable housing based that was heavily damaged-wasn't insured, and we're not the program that rebuilds permanent housing. we deal with the temporary response. so, if we're not able to partner with hud the risk is a rebound effect. we meet need needs but there's no solution long-term. these is why in katrina people in travel trailers for years because we did not approach this at the beginning low his particularly, we have to standard looking at affordable housing and start programs almost simultaneously to the recovery programs. the flexability and ability to take the different programs are important tool wes should not discard. it's important to have a total accounting of the real cost of disasters, not just what the stafford act may be providing. >> what incentive does you think the federal government do provide to states to encourage better disaster preparation,

planning, budgeting and smarter rebuilding to reduce future losses and costs. >> the state, fema will present to you -- if i put my state hat on i would look for more federal participation early in the process. one thing i've heard from both the general accounting office and the ig we are tooth be raising the threshold for disaster. i'm against that for several reasons. it penalizes long population states buts them in almost unintolerable level to get, and smaller states would have little impact. many states have developed their own public assistance program but only apply to generally after they've been denied for federal assistance. there's almost a disincentive for a state to manage smaller disasters for fear if they do that it may not make them eligible for fema disaster declaration under the president's authority. what we have been looking at is

our current model is once you reach the threshold the president declares a disaster, we cost share back to the first dollar. we have been exploring what if you didn't raise the threshold but look how far back to we go and give states more predictability how much they are responsible for before we do come in with federal assistance and base not just per capita but impact those state, economy, budget reserves, the exalt of the state. i think some states have been very progressive in this areas. others, the state legislatures have seen that the federal government will come in, go back to the first dollar and have resistance to building their own capacity. if we can build more capacity for the reoccurring, routine disasters at the state and local

level, it would allow us to focus on the large disasters itch don't think it necessarily brings the big dollar ticket items down but does start building more capacity across the states for reoccur events we find ourselves involved in. >> thank you. i will now recognize each member for five minutes of questions, and i'll start with ranking member carson. >> thank you, chairman. thank you, administrator fugate. the international association of fire chiefs notes that fema does not fully reimburse fire departments for their firefighting efforts when called to service. in addition, fema does not cover full wages required by the fair labor standards act or the back costs replacing a firefighter dispatch on a mutual aid agreement. sir, is fema prohibited by statute from fully reimbursing fire departments for costs? if not, why is fema not fully reimbursing the fire departments? >> i would need, congressman specific information. i would have to look at the cases. fema funds those extraordinary

costs above and beyond what was budgeted. you were already bucketed to respond to fires and you debt declared that does not necessarily become eligible but over time costs of backfill where you're supporting mutual aid under the emergency management systems compact across state lines, comes back to what the mutual aid agreements are ahead of time. one of our challenges has been unless there's an obligation to pay, just because you have a disaster declaration doesn't make it eligible. we do try to look at the nonbudgetted extraordinary costs, we try to be very aggressive in identifying those costs. we don't go back and do 100%. our cost share its 75-25 and then the state and locals determine how to do that. under fire management assistant grant costs we do not go back to the first dollar because each state has an annualized budget for firefighting, so we look at extraordinary costs. if your office will share with us the specific details we'll research that, but my position has always been, if it's

eligible, it's eligible and we look at extraordinary costs above what they budgeted for the day-to-day activities should be reimbursable but specifically to what case and how much, if they can give me examples we'll look at it and try to make sure we were doing the right thing during that time frame. >> thank you, sir. >> now recognize mr. carbello. >> thank you, mr. chairman. administrator fugate, thank you for your presence here this morning and thank you for your service to the people of florida over so many years. we remember you fondly and miss you at times. so thank you very much. i present south florida where a large portion of my district lives on or near the coast. one of the constant worries hear from my constituents back home especially in the florida keys is the need to reform the national flood insurance program. i'm a cosponsor of the flood insurance premium parity act bill that extended the recent

reform to business properties and owner-occupied second homes. i feel it is critical these properties receive the same relief already provided to residential properties and single-family homes afforded to them under bigger waters act of 2012. can you share your thoughts on what best can be done to provide affordable flood insurance for my constituents? do you feel that we should apply to commercial properties and second homes the same formula for yearly rate increases received by residential properties? >> well, first of all, y'all may miss me but you got a great guy in bryan koons so the state is in good hands. you opened up a very good philosophical debate and a can of worms how far the insurance program should go. here's my question. if the private insurance companies cannot insure it, is it something the federal government should assume the risk?

we're doing risk transferance anytime the private sector can't cover the risk and we take on the responsibility, you, the taxpayers, are back can it. that may be good policy. that may be the desire and intend of congress, which i would support if that's the desire. i must caution that in transferring the risk back to the flood insurance program, which is over $20 billion in debt, we have to understand that it not a sound program, will not be able to pay back its debt and growing that exposure may be good policy but i think it's one we need to go forward and understand what the risk is. the challenge is understanding the built infrastructure and how we protect that, but also how do we enforce the future and ensure we don't continue to grow that risk? that does not mean we cannot build in coastal areas. it does mean we have to build differently. so i think the question that i would narrow back down to is we've got a lot of businesses. we have a lot of homes, a lot of property that is exposed.

insurance is not available or not affordable. it will be a huge economic loss to local jurisdictions from tax based losses, business losses, jobs lost. if it makes sense to insure that, then we will implement it. but i also caution that we have to make sure we don't set up an unfair system that continues to grow risk by allowing people then to build in areas without taking the steps, which can be more costly, but then transfer that risk back to us, the federal taxpayer. it's a shared responsibility, it is an interesting debate. we would be more than willing to engage in it but we have to be up front there are many people both in congress and outside that do not want to grow the flood insurance program and the exposure others who think they do. we would be interested in participating in the debate but we really think this is the sense of congress, we need guidance from congress on what this should be. >> thank you. the state of florida has learned a lot since 1992 and has changed a lot.

do you feel that the state is adequately prepared today for a potential storm -- you referred to one earlier, great miami storm? do you feel that we have done enough from your perspective to prepare and to mitigate potential damages? >> i'll leave it to brian to talk about what under leadership he and governor scott have been able to achieve. to point out one thing florida did. it was a hard, painful lesson but under governor bush it the establish. statewide mandatory building codes. learning the lessons of south florida and then across the state. the one thing that is saving taxpayers more money and making sure you still have commercially available insurance is the fact that florida did strengthen its building code and enforces it across all counties and cities. a courageous step given many people said it would make homes unaffordable. the reality was without the

building code they would have been uninsurable. as we continue to see citizens shrink as more people buy into the florida market it a testament to better built homes for the environment they're in, and this is the lesson all states should pay attention to. when you have the right building codes and land use to manage risk, that risk can come down to the point where it's insurance and the private sector can manage future risks without defaulting back to federal programs. >> thank you, thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. i recognize miss newton for five minutes. >> thank you very much. glad to see you back in the chair. fugate, the nation's capitol barely escaped sandy. we were very grateful, just like we escaped the snowfall this time. but we know from all the scientists tell us we're headed for major disasters.

they tell us that there's no longer debate about whether there is climate change. but about how to manage climate change. so i'm interested in issues and i will be talking to the next panel about predisaster mitigation. a member was asking about florida. i notice they're building right in the ocean virtually, trying to do some predisaster mitigation as they do. fema has been helpful with the 17th street levee. without that levee, the monumental core would be exposed to horrific flooding. rebuilding downtown washington

in the monumental core and those steps have been taken. i certainly hope since those steps were taken and that levee was done before the final word was in on climate change, i will be interested in your view as whether or not you think that levee could forestall a seriously sandy-like storm, but i'm also -- because it's taken so long, interested in the drawing of the flood maps. as i understand it -- this is what gives government a bad name. the drawing of the flood maps -- i'm sorry -- the work of the army corps of engineers for certification is done separately from fema, or from other agencies. why can't that work be

done concurrently? so that they look to see that the levee is constructed properly and they get on with the next step, rather than in some sequential fashion, which assures it will be delayed? >> as far as that, i will take that back to staff. i know we have been going around and round trying to get these built and get maps updated. part of what you gave us with the sandy recovery improvement act, things like the environmental historical reviews which the agencies used to do independently we now do concurrently. so we're taking small steps to look at the projected. the president has given good direction on this. when we're doing these capital improvements, we shouldn't be spending years doing the studies. we're not going to change the requirements but doesn't mean we should do each study and wait for the next study. so we're moving in that direction but not as fast as we should. as far as the protection for the

future, none of these designs are the 100% solution. they're designed are risk anyone percent or more and you identified one of our challenges. we always looked admit gaiting back to -- at mitigating back to a one percent or less risk. unfortunately we saw this in sandy. some mitigation work done after hurricane irene was done to that standard and sandy went over. so maybe one percent makes sense for a lot of things but for critical infrastructure like hospitals, fire stations, maybe we should build to a higher standard. we're currently working with an agency on the federal side to look at, should we come up with a more stringent standard, not just building one foot above the base flood elevation, perhaps even building higher, not because we have data to drive that per se but because of the uncertainty of the future data and these investments of literally tens to hundreds to billions of dollars of our

future, making sure we're building that future with that uncertainty. >> i very much appreciate what you're saying. the monumental core is irreplaceable. i realize this means further delay -- whether you could look into the 17th street levee and see whether it should be altered now to make sure it meets standards you just indicated may be necessary. could i ask one more question in light of a recent tragedy that occurred here, the ramada tragedy where we lost human life and more than 80 people went to the hospital. it was sadly reported, at least initially, looks like coordination in terms of communication, underground and aboveground and even underground was lacking. now, this is what is it, 13

years after 9/11, and of course, fema is there for natural as well as terrorist disasters. have you -- is fema considered this apparent failure, what it could mean, not only in a real natural disaster but, heaven forbid, in a terror act or disaster? are you involved in this disaster and helping ramada and the various agencies, city and federal involved, to right this situation so that we are -- particularly underground there is the kind of communication that could enable rescue to occur? >> yes, ma'am. looking at this -- first of all

i have a personal equity in this. that's the subway i ride home on. i was not in town. it went a little earlier than i normally depart but i am on that train monday through friday, both coming in and going home. i know that very spot in the tunnel. i can tell you, anytime a train stops in a tunnel now, people start looking around. where before it was just look the normal pause. people are now looking around going, why are we stopped? our national region office work with all those entities. i would ask we need to wait to get more from the investigation to find out what did happen. but we'll pledge our support through the national capital region to the district and to metro for the -- any assistance they require from us, both from planning, training and exercising to be better prepared for future incidents. >> thank you. the national capital regional

office is currently involved with this investigation, and with this work. >> we're not involved in the investigation but we are there to support all the parties if they request us, and i think what will happen when we do get details and look at the recommendations of what to do better, we would be in a position to support both the district and metro if they request our assistance. >> thank you. >> thank you. chair recognizes the gentleman from louisiana, mr. graves. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. fugate, thank you for being here today. i appreciate your testimony and share a lot of friends, paul rainwater and kevin davidson and others. in your testimony, i notice you made reverence to the study that was done by congressional budget office noting that every one dollar invested in mitigation activities saves three dollars in the course of the fema study, i notice last year in fema's budget is a recall they were zeroing out the predisaster mitigation. just curious, you made reverence

in your testimony -- curious about your -- how fema has responded to the find little of -- findings of the studies. >> the challenge for the predisaster mitigation fund has been it's diminished over time and was increasingly being directed where it would go. you asked to us cut our budgets. each year. we had to make decisions where those cuts took place. we think mitigation is important. but we also knew the capacity to respond, recover, and manage all the other programs were important, too. there's been a lot of talk about the predisaster mitigation and its role, and the cost savings. i would also be pragmatic in saying those savings are realized if the structure you mitigate gets hit again. >> sure. i'll give you an example. hurricane katrina, if you add everything up from the 2005 hurricanes you get $150 billion in total spending.

based on back of the envelope calculation we did in louisiana we spent $8 billion on the front end we could have saved $80 million to $90 million in recovery. mrs. holmes norton made a very appropriate connection between the corps of engineers and fema. numerous instances, the corps of engineers has been directed by congress to carry out various mitigation or resilience projects and some projectness the case of louisiana have been in the development faces in excess of 20 years during that period of time fema expended over a billion dollars in response or recovery claims in these same project areas, and one case i remember the -- where fema exceeded a billion dollars in payouts. the entire project was estimated to cost $586 million. can you talk a little bit about your coordination with the corps of engineers to ensure that these mitigation measures, if predisaster mitigation is off the table, which personally i

believe may be penny wise and found foolish -- can you talk about the coordination there to ensure the resiliency of these communities and cost savings of your agency? >> we work very closely with the corps of engineers, both in flood insurance mitigation response and recovery. i also have to point out you can authorize a lot of projects. if you don't fund them they don't get built. if you go back and you pull the budget and you look at how many projects did the corps been authorized for and you look at the funding, there's a significant mismatch. again, if we were able to foretell the future and know exactly where disasters were happening we would probably be better at strategizing where to make investments. but we have potential risk in places that have not seen a lot of disaster, yet the exposure is tremendous. so, again, we do work with the corps but i think it again comes back to, you're making very hard choices. you have to make appropriations decisions.

there's no doubt. not enough money to do everything. and again, for the corps, there are often times more projects identified than they have funding, and they're having to make decisions across the states, the territories, where to make those investments. >> well, look, personally in regards to the corps of engineers the cut in funding is largely in response to their inability to perform, which you may not share that opinion based on my personal experience, but one thing we posed to fema years ago what the idea of having flexibility in hmgp when the core projects were not fun end about yielded to the taxpayer cost savings for disaster mitigation, yet fema -- were we unable to work that out. could you perhaps talk about that? as i recall there was a prohibition in using those dollars in cases where you had a federally authorized project in place, regardless of whether there was funding or not. >> well, it's kind of goes back to authorization language and appropriations language. where we do have prohibitions

against duplicating under finding sources. what we try to do, and we had some success, where a project was not originally authorized by the corps, and we were able fund but the corps was able to fund it. we were able to get good outcomes but i think it comes back to when we have nonduplication of federal efforts, one program is already authorized, maybe didn't have the funds to do it, is again this is something the committee looked at, there is additional language you want us to have in the stafford act? but the question i have is, we don't want to routinely supplant or get into augmenting other federal budgets if you're not not funding it. we don't want to look at a disaster fund to sidestep the appropriations of congress about something the committee can give is guidance on. generally it's because if it's already authorized in another program, there are limitations on what we are able to do. it would actually be exceeding

congress' intent and authorization for us. so we'll work with the committee. i don't have a real issue with that but i also caution that some of the feedback i've gotten we don't want to open up a can of worms for the disaster relief fund is bypassing congress' intent by funding things come chose not to fund that year. >> thank you. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. costello. >> thank you, mr. chairman. administrator fugate, i recall as a county commissioner following either before or just following a storm of significant magnitude, speaking with my emergency services department and then describing the obligations they needed to undertake to apply for and ultimately process an application for fema disaster assistance grants or grant, the question is, looking at the recent gao report, fema was criticized for the significant costs they incurred to

administer disaster assistance grants. my question, what is fema doing to reduce its own administrative costs as well as administrative burden often placed on states and locals who are trying to get the assistance to where it is needed for recovery? >> first up, one tool we have used aggressively has been moving away from putting in a lot of staff and renting temporary facilities on smaller disasters when we can work from the region. so that's driving down costs. the other one this tool you gave us in the sandy recovery improvement act and that's allowing us to do alternative projects and being able to use an estimated cost and come to a resolution on a project cost without doing actual costs. i'd like to get rid of the oversight. i'd like to get rid of a lot of the burden. i'd like to simplify the program dozen where we're able to make this determination and get funds to people appropriately you have given us those tools. on the other hand, you also hold

us extremely accountable for any overpayments or any ineligible cost. that requires a bit of oversight. so there's a balance there. i think the commitee struck an extremely important balance with recovery and improvement act by allowing us to move away from all the actual costs where we have to continue to audit and review and survey the progress of the construction of a project to being able to come to resolution on the front end, make a determination, agree to that and make the payout. i think we're doing this with the understanding that we have accountability, both to this committee and to the taxpayers to make sure we're only approving what was eligible, but at the same time significantly reducing our costs and overhead of managing that, and it's giving more flexibility to the local jurisdictions. this is a new tool. not every state has embraced it. new jersey has not been as aggressive as new york. could be because the projects in new york lent them to project. but we have seen in the brief,

oklahoma was able to take advantage of these tools and it vastly sped up their experience with debris and cost reimbursement. so, knowing what we have had in the past and what we have had going forward, i have seen improvements. we need to constantly work on that to get it better. there's balance between too much burden and not being accountable to the taxpayer. >> i can certainly appreciate that balance. following up on the sandy recovery act, which you mentioned, the increase in small project thresholds to $120,000 is one of the things you were alluding to in terms of simplified procedures. without suggesting it should be increased or decreased, could you share your observationed on if further efficiency expedited recoveries could be realize if that threshold were modified or are you comfortable with where that is? >> i'm not a comfortable. i let staff talk me out of where i wanted to go. i thought that number should

have been higher. we were looking at the percentage of project that would follow -- majority of them do but i think there's room to move it up. ewe have a lot of federal programs thats a much larger dollar figures in simplified grant processes. i am comfortable that through the ig's oversight, and our ability to really focus in on what is eligible, that we can move that higher. i would also like to encourage input from our colleagues at the state and local levels through their organizations, but i think it's something the committee should look at, is we don't want to just raise the threshold so we don't have any accountability. i think there's a lot of things that we could do with that would simplify the oversight with not significantly grow the risk, in exposure for uneligible work and would drive down the cost and speed up recovery. so, what that number should be i would like to work with the committee. i think we can go higher than $120,000. i thought we should when we started this.

but staff was able to pull the data and as the chairman says we want to be data driven weapon looked at data and the majority of the projects falling into this category fall into that. >> like 95%. >> i still think there is room november it higher. my ideal world will have small rejected up to the thrown of alternative projected and speed up disasters. the thresholds is a million dollars. i think, again, we give states the flexibility to choose how they want to dot. if we can maintain fiscal accountable i'm knock opposed to raising the men thresh hold for mall project. i defer to my state colleagues how high it should be. ... approvement act?

i think there's something we can do. time is money when it comes to rebuilding. i would like to recognize each member for an additional five minutes. for questions. i will start. we saw first-hand the tremendous progress already being made to rebuild and protect n.y.u. medical center in new york city particularly when compared to the significant delays experienced by charity hospital in new orleans, can you attribute the expedited recovery to the new authorities granted to fema in the sandry recovery improvement act? >> um as far as benefits of the sandy recovery reimprovement act is a very important tool and the other lesson that we have learned from is the events of katrina is that there are certain types of projects that are technically difficult that

exceed the average capacity for people to manage and you need expert so we engage very early. and identify where the projects will be whether they are hospitals or other large public infrastructures. we brought in a lot of experts. it wasn't until you passed a sandy recovery improvement act that we had the resolution had we been using an old program and using actual costs, there would have been more uncertainty for the application can't on what they could and could not do. it would have been more overhead in making those decisions and they would not have had the ability to get what they were going to get from us and move forward. as it is, we have obligated the majority of those funds. they are now engaged in repair and construction. we still have projects from katrina that have not even been resolved yet. so i think that one, better understanding the complex its and projects on the fronten and two you gave usa tool, we did not have before to more engage