to other states or congress or whatever it is that passes those laws, what one point would you press for to make sure it happens? >> so my slight editorializing of the question is that being colorado and being first in, what have we learned that we would pass on to other states contemplating legalization and/or to the federal government? >> sure. this was actually discussed quite a bit at the most recent conference i was at where we had a lot lot of our leaders and regulators there. and absolutely for these other states, go slowly. do not follow colorado's lead. we had extremely tight declines because of e-mailed 64, and as has been referred to before we are playing catch-up. all of this stuff was already on the ground. mind you, medical marijuana, although it started in 2000, it wasn't commercially legalized

until 2009. that's when we saw this explosion of all the stores. . also to get data in order. we have so little data and i think that's really important for good policy to be made before we roll this out and commercialize it, we really need to look at this situation and do it slowly and be very thoughtful and set up the regulations first. >> let me add to what happened in 2009 is attorney general holder on behalf of the obama administration announced that they were going to depriority ipes marijuana offenses. so even though e-mailed -- legalized it in 2000, that's certainly when the momentum started. >> my pieces of advice, i think would be very simple, to not underestimate the lobby and the industry that's behind this.

i think that's something that we are still doing in colorado and i think that the idea that this is a grass roots people's movement, that's just silly. the idea might be. decriminalization might be, but legalization in colorado has become completely synonymous with commercializeation. i would tell them don't underestimate the lobby in the industry and consider separating legalization from commercializeation because you're going to have a lot less guys like me jumping up and down and being ackry about it. >> one thing i want to say is we need to put our kids first and not worry about the money that's being made in the industry. >> i want to note to ben that regardless of whether industry is involved, it's still a grass roots movement isn't it? >> no, absolutely not! >> you know, i guess in

addressing the original question, i think the other speakers, there's a lot of merritt to what they're saying, but go slow. marijuana's been illegal for 80 years. millions and millions of people have been arrested in our country. i'm tired of it. these laws are fundamentally racist in their implementation. they are damaging good people's lives. we need to stop arresting people for marijuana. the state should get on board with this. you need to be thoughtful having said that, about how you set up the regulations. we sat down and said we're going to be the first state to legalize marijuana ever. we're going to try to come up with regulations that make sense. in order for us to crystalize this and do it in a way that we can convey this abstract concept to the public, we call it the campaign to regulate marijuana

like alcohol. when you think about doing that, people 21 and older it's taxed, regulated. that's the beginning framework i believe states should look at when considering passing these laws. >> i think the states were always meant to be if laboratories of democracy in our society and those that are allowed to experiment will develop better systems that other states will emulate. i think we should learn from mistakes and mistakes will be made along the way. the first mistake that colorado rejected was prohibitings. you do not control a drug by driving it underground and giving it to the criminal market. having said that, i'd glea i'm troubled by a lot of advertising. the supreme court has said you could -- personal speech is not as progetted as political speech. i urge states to experiment and find out which models work best. things with edibles, i don't

think they should be banned, but i'm not a huge proponent of edibles. there's lots of lessons to be learned along the way. other states should feel free to experiment and we'll find out which models are best. >> thank you. there were some interesting statistics as always, in a conversation like this. i found it interesting that you compared 866 -- i think that was the number -- of maine establishments in the state of colorado compared to starbucks and mcdonald's. both of which serve substances in their product which are harmful to our children. i would have been more interested in hearing a study comparing the marijuana facilities to alcohol distribution facilities. i think that's the comparison we need to make. sometimes it sounds like the

late 1800s, earlier 1900s prohibitings discussion. those who were adamantly supported, those who were against it. i'm honored to have friends that have chosen to take healing paths and have recovered and are doing very well. however, my question will be sktcally what percentage of your parents are alcohol abuse and what percentage are therefore marijuana abuse or recovery are from the use of marijuana versus the recovery of alcohol. >> let me restate the question i'm going to add my own 2 cents to this, not in the answer but in 2 question. the first question has to do -- this gentleman sites there were comparisons to the number of marijuana outlets to mcdonald's and starbucks. he thought a more likely comparison would be to an

alcohol comparison. my answer to that question, and was noted when i was introduced, i've represented a lot of retail marijuana outlets medical marijuana. there's always a comparison in the ordnances you deal with in each movement that makes some sort of comparison between alcohol and marijuana. my question is is that fair, first of all. let's focus on the confess. the second question actually is a question that i had written down when you were speaking, ben, too, is what is the percentage of marijuana rehab at cedar compared to alcohol rehab? >> we'll have the depreat the last two years at the end of this summer. the number two reason why anyone seeks treatment over 18, so under 18, it's weed but there's a good case to be made because they're adjudicated into that. the number one reason anyone seeks treatment over 18 is

booze, alcohol, number one. number two is marijuana. now, we also have seen an interesting uptick in that in the last year. but you've got to go past the surface of that statement and say, is it availability, perception of risk? it certainly is these things, so if you have another substance that's as widely available and accepted, objectively speaking, alcohol is a less addictive substance than many of the things that lead people into treatment. but it's much more readily available. people start using it earlier. they consume it in greater quantities. so this question is not a simple booze-weed thing. we see weed, we see alcohol. everyone in the cloudy sees more alcohol because alcohol is more prevalent. >> if you have 100 patients how many are recovering from alcohol abuse and how many are there

recovering from marijuana abuse. >> the question is what percentage. >> i can't answer that question with any kind of surety. samsa keeps great numbers on this nationwide. they'll give you the numbers. it's not a small number. it really isn't. it's not huge. it's certainly not alcohol. but you have to ask yourself that question. is that because of the acceptance and prevalence in society or is that substance inherently more x than another. if i give you a number, i'll be making it up. >> hold on. let's finish with this question in terms of the comparison of the alcohol outlets to marijuana outlets. then i'll come back to you and take one more question after you. >> so regarding that slide, i do have another slide that wasn't including here that does talk about pharmacies and liquor

stores and marijuana stores. there still are more marijuana stores. i can't think of the number for liquor stores right off. but we have a graph that speaks to that. when we week with out of state media and talk about how it's easier to get pot than a cup of coffee or a hamburger from mcdonald's, and of course starbucks and mcdonald's are everywhere. it's a way of comparing the two. a lot of out of state people are surprised with and puts things in perspective. i just chose to put that slide in, but anyway -- >> i guess i'm -- i would just add, i 3450e7, certainly there are more liquor licenses in the state o colorado, my questions is probably 10 times as many, restaurants, breweries bars, than there were marijuana shops. >> let me come back to this gentleman. >> short subject. as a supervisor, i was told by the hospital in washington,

d.c., a similar place to where ben works, anytime he felt like 10 percent of the population was going to be abusing some substance, is it people moving from alcohol to marijuana, or is it additive? >> so the question simply is, is there a quantity of people who tend toward addiction and doesn't does it shift with the legalization of marijuana? so maybe there are 10% of the population, for example, that might have been addictive personalities, do they now shift from marijuana to alcohol, marijuana to alcohol else -- something else? >> that's a great confess. and you hinted a much larger conversation which is around the way that addiction manifests inside of our country, and it is about 10 mischaracterize. 10% of folks just end up like me. maybe no matter what. there's a lot of reasons why and we've got a lot of great, great information about it. we've been learning so much about addiction, it's a wronic

disease. the other thing we've learned a lot about are individual drugs. you get somebody like me to differ remember shade the drugs -- differentiate the drugs and how addictive they are and what's -- i'm not going to do that. what i will do is -- because to me it's about addiction. it's not about a particular substance here and a particular substance there. but i will tell you, the biggest predictors -- if 10% of the population is going to end up with an addictive disorder just because, anybody can become an addict. just about anybody can. you consume enough of anything, you can get there. think of coffee, nick teen. just about anybody can get there. in the -- and the biggest predictors for whether or not you're going to get there are age of onset, so when you first used, the frequency of that hues and then of course the potency

of the substance you use. for those of us who are more concerned with addiction it's all about delaying that first use, and making that first use be on a substance that is mild as we can have it be and having some stigma around it so that they don't do it again, and then frequency of use. if you can wait until the frontal lobe's are developing, 24, 26ish on the high end, if everybody waited until 24 to do just about anything, we would bring the rates down to 5% in the country. you would not have the same misuse. the problem is always on the developing brain. that's why this is such an important topic to me. i see this as something that droibts that for young people, not takes away from it. >> i would jump in and say absolutely. that is why we are so concerned with marijuana use right now and the messages that our kids are getting and the availability of

it near schools and 18-year-olds being able to buy it and give it -- you know, there are a lot of 18-year-olds in high school, seniors in high school. there have been talks that we're maybe shifting substances. that's not the statistics that i've seen. we have not decreased our alcohol or drug use for other kinds of drugs as marijuana has escalated. we are just seeing more people use these substances. >> let me take the last question. this gentleman over here. >> yeah, i'm sorry. >> i think, you know, my job is to make marijuana boring. that's what i want to see. that's what the dutch have done. they experimented with legalizing the drug laws and they separated the hard market from the soft drug market. the dealer who dealt marijuana in the old days could also sell more addictive drugs, so they set up the coffee shop system.

the dutch have had this -- relatively easy access to marijuana. they have a lower marijuana use. you don't see a lot of dutch people at the coffee shots. you see tourists, germans and french and americans. so if we can make marijuana boring, and i think it is a relatively boring drug, it takes the glamour out of it. there was an article in the l.a. times recently, some teens talking about, oh, my mother was talking about marijuana, it's like the new facebook when your parents got on fairfax it became uncool pretty quickly. if we can degramorize this and learn from their experiences, i think that would help. >> talk about commercialization legalization i guess the society tal thing maybe we can use this one legalization/commercializeation to rethink alcohol. we've already rethought tobacco. we're rethinking fast foods, gun

laws, things like that. so is there an opportunity in what's just transitioned in colorado to go back to washington or wherever it needs to go to to get the reforms that we need in our society? because tobacco's on television right now saying we target -- the weakest people in society, the youth. there's a commercial i saw this morning. we know alcohol targeted, you know youth, and gun laws are so archaic that they're -- they're crazy, i mean, so can we use this part of the legalization of marijuana? because it's an industry. so why would you pick on this industry and say well, you can't make millions of dollars and you can't do these types of advertising, do the types of things that all industries do. one famous american said corporations are people. so you can't have it both ways.

>> let me make sure i understand the question. i'm a little baffled. besides the allusion to the citizens united decision, the question is, are there lessons in the marijuana legalization experience and debate that would foster reconsideration of other policy issues that are argue big things that are not good for us, fast food, alcohol, etc. >> i guess i wanted to address the issue of advertising. colorado has pretty serious restrictions on marijuana advertising. what you've seen is a cherry picked example of the wrs of the worst, frank -- worst of the worst, frankly. all of those ads appeared in publications that by law have to serve a population i think it's 70% over 25 or something -- 25 years. something like that. those aren't e -- airing on cartoon network and stuff like that. these are ads picked occupy to

scare you. maybe that's good. this is the dawn of a new industry. like it or not, it's here. it should not be joe camel. the industry is not a -- there's not these evil people behind the curtain saying let's addict kids. these are by and large good people who are look to make a living selling this product that is legal in this state. they're not trying to ensnare and entrap kids. so those individuals that are advertising and what i feel cartoonish ways, don't frequent them. complain to our town council, etc. by and large, i think the advertising that is done in this field is pretty good, could certainly be better but, you know by -- we do have lays that prevent them from specifically advertising to kids. >> and it would be nice if we had regulations, too to prevent the candies being sprayed down with marijuana and sold and the vape pens that come in discrete

storms. this stuff is being brought into the schools. the teachers and counselers are having a hard time identifying it but we know it's there. it's a matter of changing the regulations for that, not just the typical advertising and marketing. when we were talking about the netherlands, they don't advertise there it is very discrete. they have been clamping down on it both in the proximity of where these coffee houses can be and also they are not allowing tourists anymore. so -- and anything above 15% t.h.c. is treated as a hard drug. i don't know if you know that. but they are keeping the potency low and that's a big difference. they don't have the highly potent stuff that we have in colorado. >> on the dutch board issue, yes, they're getting tourists and some of the mayors of the border towns clamped down and it blew up in their faces

immediately and many of them had to backtrack. what happened was we would only sell to dutch citizens, no foreigner, right? so that created a job opportunity for a lot of dutch, you know prosecutors who then bought that marijuana, sold it illegally, created a huge black market and more people came to buy it from these people. so that was a failed policy. i think the lesson that can be learned from marijuana in colorado and the rest of the country, when the people lead, the politicians will follow. on certain issues, the third rail issues, the solutions that are complex and easily, you know, smeared with, it takes popular expression to assure politicians that, yes, you can talk about this issue as adults openly. so there are a lot of people who would like some source of principal -- sensible drug control. politicians are terrified of the n.r.a. but if they knew how many people and how many of them in

congress felt the same way if they came out of the closet, you might have a very different discussion. that could be the same with the -- our ban on travel to cuba, for instance. politicians were paralyzed by the fear of negative attack ads. yet, the majority of this people wanted normalization of relations and so on and so forth. >> the reason we're terrified of the n.r.a. is because it's so damn big and we didn't get it to in the beginning. and that's why i'm doing this, because if i'd have been around at the beginning of tobacco, i'd have fought about that if we knew then what we know now. we don't need to wait 60 years until this lobby is even larger that we can't combat it. reasonable conversation today is met with tag lines quick, easy industry tag lines, and i think

now's the time, yeah, engage any way you want to. but we need to have this conversation be much more in dwept than we're able to have it be with the n.r.a., tobacco industry and the alcohol lobby. we have an opportunity to do this right, we have time. so let's consider doing it right. having a smarter conversation about it and not letting business interests rule the day. >> inaudible question] >> i'm going to ask you to wind up the program. i want to thank everybody for their participation and their interest. i want to thank the speakers in particular for their passion, their thoughtfulness their eloquence and their preparation. i invite all of you to look at our programming. we have great programming this winter. i hope you'll attend some future programs. with that said it's cold outside, bundle up, drive

safely, and thank you for being here. [applause] >> and earlier today at the white house, press secretary josh earnest talked about a case that president obama is dealing with right now. blocking president obama's immigration order in texas. he says the justice department will file papers no later than

monday to stay the order of the texas judge. here's a look. >> you said that the administration will make a decision in a couple of days in order to grant a stay of protective [inaudible] has that decision been made and what's the hold-up? >> the department of justice has made a decision to file a stay in this case. i would anticipate that they will file documents at the district court level on monday at the latest, and so when they have filed those duty, they and we will be in a position to talk a little bit more about our legal strategy. that of course is separate and apart from our intent to pursue and appeal -- an appeal. that was something we announced in the immediate aftermath of the decision. and we will seek that appeal because we believe that when you evaluate the legal merits of the arguments, that there is a solid legal foundation for the president to take the steps he announced last year. it's consistent with the way

that previous presidents over the course of several decades have used their executive authority. and that is why we're going to continue to pursue this case through the legal system. >> by filing a stay, what does that mean for people who are filing their permit for paperwork? >> the department of homeland security has put out a statement that at this point they are not prepared to consider them. once we've taken additional steps through this legal process we may be in a position to give you an update about the status of measurementing the program. obviously, some of this will depend on the way that the question of stay is resolved. >> and later today, a discussion about the obama administration's new cuba policy what it means for future relations with cuba. we heard from frank cal zone during the tower forum. you can watch that tonight. on c-span 2 book tv in

primetime. we start with jonathan horn's book "the man who would not be washington." then steven caulk ib looks at stalin paradoxes of power. and rosia discusses the up stairs wife. book tv tonight starting at 8:00 eastern on c-span 2. anna maria a asiata looks at subprime loans with high interest rates that are issues to people with bad credit. and then current policy issues facing u.s. states. plus we'll look for phone calls comments and tweets. all live tomorrow morning at washington journal starting at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> here are some of our features program for this weekend. saturday morning starting at

10:00 a.m. eastern our nation's governors get together to discuss issues affecting their states. guests include c.e.o. of union square hospitality group and maria bartiromo of fox business news. sunday morning at 11:00 we continue our live coverage of the national governor's association meeting. speakers include jay johnson. on c-span 2, saturday, book tv is on the road. experiencing the literary life of greensboro, north carolina, part of the 2015 c-span city store. and on after words, wes moore replaces his career choices to find his life's purpose. on american history tv on c-span 3, saturday night, just after 7:00, the 1963 interview of

former nation of islam minister malcolm x discussing race relations and opposition to racial sbefwration. sunday at 6:30 p.m. eastern former c.i.a. jonna mendez tells the story of a husband-wife spy team that infiltrated the c.i.a. through the use of sex in the 1970's. let us you know what you think about the programs you're watching. call us at 202-626-3400. e-mail us at comments@c-span.org or send us a tweet. join the c-span conversation. like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> next, a look at the nature of armed conflict and how war has changed over the last 100 years. this is hosted by the international institute for

strategicic status. it's about an hour. >> can we begin? great. welcome all. my name is elliott cohen. i'm a professor at john hopkins and i'm a member of the council of the international institute for strategic studies which makes it a particular pleasure to be here. i think one of my fellow councilmembers is indeed there. i -- well, we get right to it. it's a real pleasure to be with an old friend, h.r. mcmaster. lieutenant general h.r. income master. go back a long -- mcmaster. go back a long way. he's probably known to most of you -- i'll touch on a few of the highlights -- a hero of the first gulf war at a battle called 73 east which made his mark. also made his mark with a

dissertation called dereliction of duty, one of the more important books that has come out with civil-military went on to other commands most notably serving in the iraq war. continuing on to serve in afghanistan. and now i will put your title so i will let you give it to me directly. lieutenant mcmaster: the long title is the army capabilities center director. dr. cohen: really that extraordinary combination of thinker and great military

leader. there are not many in our history. there are a few. it is very few. we are privileged to have somebody with us who has an extraordinarily did he wished record of command and combat. also with an equally distinguished record as a thinker. he was a senior fellow at iiss and remains affiliated with iiss as well. it is wonderful to be here with him, particularly since we are old friends. the way i thought he would do this is begin it as a conversation. i have a couple questions i would like to ask general mcmaster. then i will moderate the discussion from the floor. h.r., the army had just produce some to call the

operating concept. what is it and why does the army needed? lieutenant mcmaster: what a privilege it is to be here with you and at the international institute for strategic studies, an organization that makes a to amend this contribution to international security which has benefited me in my two years and london. i had access to the scholars at the international institute for strategic studies and those who helped us to ministry in helping us understand how the conflict in iraq involved and to help refashion the strategy there in early 2007. what a privilege it is to be here at the international institute for strategic studies. the army operating concept is important because it describes how army forces operate in the future, and one of the things we can do in times of diminished resources and budget constraints is we can think clearly about future war and we need to, in

particular, based on some of the budget constraints. in this concept, we look at the problem of future armed conflicts through the lens of both continuity and change. continuity and the nature of war, changes in the nature of armed conflict, keeping in thing there are things about conflict that do not change a lot, and that is more of its fundamental political nature. the army operating concept, we talk about the army's role in providing foundational capabilities to the joint force, but in particular, how the army has to be prepared to defeat any organizations, but also to consolidate gains to get the sustainable, usual political outcomes. we recognize in the concept the human dimension of war, and the fact that people fight in large measure for the same reasons people fought 2500 years -- fear, honor, and interest.

and understand that, we see in the concept soldiers and leaders have to be able to develop situational understanding in close contact with enemies, but also civilian populations. what is driving conflicts must so we are not just treating symptoms of conflicts. we are dealing with the causes. the third thing we emphasize the army operating concept is that war ends uncertain, that the future course of events has more to do than what you decide to do. it depends on initiatives and reactions of your enemies that are often impossible to predict at the outset of the conflict. in the army operating concept, we do not say we are going to dominate in the future. but we will have to do is be able to adapt continuously to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, over capable and oftentimes elusive and determined enemies. finally we recognize it is a

contest of wills, terms of our soldiers and teams. really, that battle, combat, is the struggle of men and women trying to reconcile their instinct for self-presentation -- self-preservation. how do you develop in your soldiers the ability to operate in these uncertain environments, a persistent danger? how do you held cohesive teams who can operate in these environments, so the continuities are very important. there are also changes in the nature of armed conflict. threats come enemies adversaries, how did they evolve, and what initiatives does the army do as part of the joint force, what we call interorganizational teams bringing in civilian capabilities and multinational teams?

anticipating those missions and how they change based on geopolitics, but also technology which is a third thing what technologies can we integrate into our army to make us more effective while keeping in mind and are me -- keeping in mind enemy technologies. finally, history and lessons learned. what are we learning from conflicts today, and how does that apply. the army operating concept is a description of how armies should operate in the future, based on continuity and change, and based on that description, then of how the army operating concept determines what capabilities we need and our army. this is a starting point for learning, for thinking about future war, learning about future armed conflict, and applying what we are learning to future force capability element. not based on continuity and change, and based on that description, then of how the army operating just things in material, but how we change our doctrine, organizations, how we change leader development and education, how we modify

training to make sure that what we say in the army operating concept, we want to achieve overmatch over our enemies. if you have an overmatch with an enemy, you have a fair fight. we want to achieve overmatch as part of a joint force to a college future missions. dr. cohen: that is great. let me press you a little bit on that. we've been hearing a lot in recent months, years about hybrid warfare, and particular the kinds of things the russians have been up to in eastern ukraine. does that phrase "hybrid warfare " mean anything, and is it new? lieutenant mcmaster: historians will say it is not really new. i think it is reappeared and it has reappeared with a degree of clarity and we can understand better seeing what russia has done in ukraine and currently a

-- ukraine and crimea. it means that russia is competing on multiple powder grounds. multiple contested spates, which war is contested not just in the physical domain, but it is contested on the battleground of information and perception, contested on the battleground of political subversion, and oftentimes these conflicts bleed over into organized crime networks, other transnational dimensions of the conflict. i think it is important to recognize to win an armed conflict you have to be able to be on multiple battlegrounds and contested spaces. in the concept, we recognize this, and what we say is that army forces are critical to projecting not just military power, but national power to deal with these threats. you might say, this is the army say, you project national power?a

to operate effectively in contested environments and environments that are not safe, you better take soldiers with you, be able to apply political influence, develop security forces, and develop institutional capacity to provide support to governments, to rule of law intelligence activities, and so forth. i think this hybrid warfare term is useful because we can see russia using combinations of unconventional forces and conventional forces. we see we have to be prepared for a broad range of threats on these multiple battlegrounds. i think also what russia's actions to see russia using combinations of unconventional forces and conventional really change the geopolitical landscape on the eurasian landmass, and i think to place under duress the existing political order in europe and try to challenge and collapse it is what we see as the value of military forces in

deterring this kind of activity. in particular, land forces. because i am in the army and part of my job is to describe the army's contribution to the joint force, i think what you see with russia and what they have been able to do is wage war with limited objectives. in ukraine, effect a land grab quickly, at very low cost, because the ukrainians were unable to contest it, and then to consolidate that game and portray the reactions of the international community as aeschylus torry. -- as escalatory. you have to do that with land forces. really, it is land forces that give you the ability to ratchet up the cost at frontiers.

and to make it unpalatable to the power like russia to take that kind of integration action with unconventional forces under the cover of conventional forces. what you have seen with hybrid warfare, you see the role of combined arms capabilities. a lot of people sometimes question the army, why are you developing new combat vehicles? are you trying to go back to the cold war? those who say that are advocating for world war i capabilities. the western front is a good base to start. it is a combined capabilities, mobile protected firepower is important as a tool, along with special forces and conventional forces, applied in commendation. i think what russia has done is show us what combined forces can

do. you can overstated that russia is changing the geostrategic landscape there with tanks right now. there is a value in that kind of combined arms capability. then i think what we have said in the army operating concept is our differential advantage in the army and in the american joint force does not come with any single capability. it comes with how we combine capabilities. our differential advantage is not a technology. advancing technology is probably the element of our differential advantage that is most easily transferable to our adversaries. china has been engaged in the largest theft of intellectual property in our history. combinations of technology with skilled soldiers and teams. i think there is a lot you can draw from the recent experience in ukraine, and i think it

highlights in large measure the importance of land forces as part of the joint team and the importance of combined arms and joint capabilities, what we call in the army operating concept joint combined arms operations. dr. cohen: let me ask you a couple personal questions, which i think will help enrich the discussion. you really had quite extraordinarily a range of combat experiences, from being a troop commander to being on a very senior staff in afghanistan. it is extraordinary. could you tell me the top three lessons you have taken from your personal experience fighting this country's wars in iraq and afghanistan? lieutenant mcmaster: a great question. i think what those experiences have demonstrated to me again is

really a point i made earlier, is that there are important continuities in the nature of war. whenever we try to do -- do not try to turn worked as some think that is alien to its nature, that is when we have problems. we have problems when we do not recognize the nature of wars. an overall lesson and it is a great question because the lessons that we learn from the wars in afghanistan and iraq will be as important as the outcomes of those wars. i think we are at real risk of learning the wrong road lessons -- the wrong lessons. the number one lesson is that we need to -- is that we neglect the continuities. if you think of afghanistan in 2001 and our ability to empower muhajirjahadeen, we

achieved a military victory very quickly. but they were not conducive to consolidating the gains and getting to those outcomes,. the militias we empowered were able to effect state capture over nationstate institutions and functions that had to be real built from the ground up because of the civil war from 1992 to 1996 because of the dismantlement of those institutions under the taliban. those militias worked into organized crime networks, criminalized a tradition networks him to pursue criminal agendas and political agendas to consolidate power in advance of a post-u.s. afghanistan. the activities they engaged in were hollowing out institutions we were trying to build. institutions are critical two afghanistan to regenerate.

so i think a lesson from afghanistan is that war is an extension of politics. you have to conduct operations in a way to a congress political objectives and consolidate those gains. iraq is not doing enough to allay the concerns of the minority populations and actually doing thing that exacerbated the fears of those communities and set conditions for the evolution of that conflict from a decentralized localized hybrid insurgency into a large-scale communal conflict. and disaster. i think the number one lesson is that neglect of continuities and the nature of war at your peril. whenever a new concept comes along, like revolution military fares or defense transformation, that promises fast and efficient war in the future, we have to be

skeptical about that. the second thing, and this is a lesson that goes back to the gulf war and any combat experience that i have had and all my colleagues in my army and marine corps in particular have had, is the human dimension of war and the psychological dimension of war and the importance of training and beater development and the development of cohesive confident teams. and so the this is important because to quote a person who found it all this continuity battle, he said war is aimed at the disintegration of human groups. how do you build soldiers and units that can operate in an environment of persistent danger and deal with all of the difficulties you have to cope with especially seeing fellow soldiers killed and be able to continue your mission? i think it is important for the american public to understand

what it takes to build is capable, cohesive, confident teams. we undervalue that. one of the things we have heard in recent months and years is do not worry about cutting the army, because you can just read grow it when you need it. -- regrow it when you need it. it undervalues the human dimension of war and the importance of developing leaders over time. we have to develop these competencies across a career. you have to train under tough conditions. what happened in combat -- what happens in combat? you have to do with casualties. building that friction, that uncertainty in your training so that as we say in the concept our forces are ready to win in a concept world in an environment of uncertainty and complexity, so that is the second big lesson that we have to make sure we stay focused on the moral

ethical, and psychological preparation of soldiers in units for combat. and we have to obviously inculcate into our units the army values, our warrior ethos. when you are in these environments, you have to make sure that you steal your soldiers against what can be an erosion of the moral character. and so that is the second big thing, i think, that i have learned and i think is relevant to future armed conflict. and then the third thing i think that we have all learned is the need for us to be able to operate effectively with multiple partners, so that these problems we are facing isil, these are the enemies of all civilized people, people who want to impose a meat evil order, who want to commit mass murder as a printable tactic -- as a printable tactic. is in the interest of all civilization in these modern day

frontiers between barbarism and civilization that we be able to work together, and the conference here in washington is extremely important. so i think we have to be able to develop relationships with partners, other members of the civilized world and to do that through preparing our leaders, army leaders, to really felt -- develop empathy for others, and also to be able to engage in what we have called in the army, made this a competency for our leaders, cross-cultural negotiation mediation understanding people's interests, being able to map those interests, to recognize that winning and prevailing in these sort of contests does not come from just capacity building. is really understanding who you are working with, and then to be able to exert influence,

to help convince people that it is in their interest to take actions that are compatible with yours. we have made mistakes in sort of assuming that we are dealing with neutral state institutions and leaders when we developed capacity within iraq, during a time when that ministry was captured by shia islamist militias. and then this ministry and its forces have been party to a sectarian civil war and it helped create a humanitarian crisis of colossal scale. but not putting the politics and human understanding at the center i think we inadvertently have exacerbated that situation. i'm talking about pre-2006. we have to operate with multiple partners with our eyes open, put our interests and politics at

the center of those engagements. so those are three egg lessons -- three big lessons. dr. cohen: last question. could you tell us the three figures who have most influenced your understanding of war and the nature of military leadership? lieutenant mcmaster: there are so many so many great historians and leaders. i would say that from combat leadership in terms of meeting soldiers to close in and destroy an enemy general ernest harmon. he was a calvaryman. what i admire about him is he made the transition from horse calvary and the pre-automotive revolution in a very facile way because he was imaginative. he understood continuities

and changes changes in the character of conflict, and was an effective combat commander because he was attuned to the human dimension of war. he said the most important thing in conflict is leadership. the most important thing you can do is put leaders in positions of leadership. i have got a copy of his writings, and his notes on combat action in tunisia. another great thing about him is he learned and learn from combat in north africa, and he read this paper and sent it out to his colleagues in other infantry divisions and armored division so they could benefit from what he learned prior to the d-day invasions. if you go through that document -- i use that document to prepare art cavalry troops for operations in desert storm. some fundamental things. he said armored units are like a

good football team. he said rugby team. a good team knows about eight plays and they use these place in combination. so battle drills, rehearsed responses too predictable situations -- rehearsed responses to predictable situations. these are things that have informed our preparation in 1991, written in 1942, 1943. so ernest carmen is one of those guys -- ernest harmon is one of those guys. in terms of physical military leadership, george marshall, and i think that he set the example in terms of civil military relations. he was a scholar of civil

military relations and he set a gym in this example for officers to understand what your duty is and also what your duty is not. it is your job to give your best advice, but not your job to advocate for policy, because nobody likes generals to make policy, and this is a key lesson to not cross that line between advice and advocacy. it is a blurry line, but in terms of professional responsibility and adhering to civil control, george marshall. how about amanda did -- to manage and -- how about imaginative leadership, george washington. george washington i think is underappreciated as a leader. and i think if you read fis cher's book, you get an accretion of how he saw opportunities -- you get an

appreciation of how he saw opportunities. and i think that is because he had also been a student of war and warfare. he had experience during the french and indian wars, but he really developed his ability to lead by reading and thinking. so i think across all three of these leaders is a commitment to learning the profession and studying wars in with, depth, -- in width, depth, and concept. so we inculcate are in our leaders a love for lifelong learning. you're essentially saying, all i need is my personal expense and we will be able to figure out any wartime situation. of course not. you need to think to be a true

professional and our military, and our army. dr. cohen: wonderful answer. why don't we move to questions. i will think people will be concise. if you could identify yourself and your institutional affiliation, and we will be passing microphones around. gentleman over there. >> thank you. i am retired from the u.s. foreign service. so you mentioned not only achieving a military win over the enemy but consolidating gains great along the lines of consolidation, i wonder if you could discuss the issue which i believe is somewhat controversial, about disbanding the iraqi army and the -- under ambassador bremmer that has been written about a lot. i wonder if you could make a comment on that action. lieutenant mcmaster: these mistakes are very clear in retrospect. there are no easy solutions in

iraq. if you were to recall too much of the army, for example you could have exacerbated the fears of certain elements of the shia community after the collapse of the regime, and maybe that could have led to other problems. there were no easy solutions but i think if you look at policy decisions in the immediate military fair three over the hussein -- military victory over the hussein regime, it seems we were trying to make it is hard on ourselves as we could. and that is involving the decision not to recall portions of the army. and not recognizing that the majority of the army was shia to begin with, that this was a symbol of national identity, not to recognize that war is waged for fear, honor, and an jurist -- and interest. not recalling portions of the army was the violation of a sense of honor of iraqi and arab

nationals. and then it helps this localized hybrid insurgency coalesced over time. other decisions involving severe deep application -- d ebaathification exacerbated that problem, as well as other decisions. i think whenever we do not put politics at the center of the conflict and understand what is the political objective and want to achieve a strategy to get there, then subordinate everything to that strategy. that was what we were able to achieve in the rewrite of the iraqi campaign, trying to catch up to the evolution of this conflict in early 2007. we were able to do it because we had david pierce, a colleague of yours, who had done the arak study group project which was largely not getting the attention it was needing

in 2003. and then he and ambassador robert ford and toby dodge of iiss wrote the political strategy and wrote a diplomatic strategy these. so the key is asking the right questions up front, what is the nature of the conflict am a what are our vital interests that are at stake, what are the objectives, what is the political strategy which by 2007 -- and to do that by establishing remediate mechanisms that would allow us to influence that from the bottom-up and top-down, and then develop mechanisms over time to get that political accommodation between iraq's communities that we remove support for al qaeda

andin bracket every thing was subordinated to that. the strategy was to go offer after the irreconcilable's. the best agreement was we are going to kick your asked militarily. we've got to move communities to that military accommodation, and the other move was to get people to stop shooting each other because it is tough to come to an accommodation when you are shooting each other. it was to break the cycle of violence. it also drove our security efforts, how do we do development, were all subordinated to a political strategy. that was one of the key lessons to get back to eliot's question and we did make mistakes early in the iraqi war that in many ways made it as hard on us as we could take it.

dr. cohen: gentleman over there. >> could you talk more about how the army is preparing its soldiers in the transition from combat operations to the peacetime army, if there is such a thing, so that they do not lose their more riled, they maintained their proficiency and also how we are helping our allies think about that in their own forces. lieutenant mcmaster: great points. we were not anticipating a postwar period, right, even just a year ago, and just a little bit over a year, and if you look at what has occurred since that time, we mentioned russia and its actions earlier, i think we

see that everybody recognizes that it is narcissistic to think that if you leave a war it stops, that in fact wars continued even after you leave. if you leaving movie in the movie, movie is still playing. you seen that dynamic in iraq and are anticipating continued environments in afghanistan although there are promising to launch their regionally and with the change of leadership there. i think what i think our army recognizes and is important recognize this outside the army is that demands on land forces in a postwar period tend to go up historically. so we are in a period now where we see our army getting smaller amateur medically smaller, but the demand for land forces going up. and so we have about 150,000 soldiers deployed overseas now.

iraqi and afghanistan -- iraq and of skin it, but also forward -- iraq and afghanistan. also forward deployed. and so we are engaged in a broad range of activities with special operations forces and conventional forces in 120 countries now for our army. so i think this into dissipation -- this anticipation of a. of peace and lack of engagement of land forces may be premature. in terms of keeping our leaders challenged and engaged in that i think we see a number of challenges with which our soldiers and leaders are engaged across the globe. the other thing i will tell you is that we are endeavoring to institutionalize dozens of other -- institutionalize the lessons

of the last 13 years of war and in terms of what we have learned about combat leadership, philosophy of mission command, which is decentralized operations based on mission orders. ofand we recognize that to deal with complexity, these kinds of complex environments, we have to trust, we need trust up and down our chain of command. if anybody is looking for a challenge, looking to be able to serve something bigger than yourselves, sign up for the u.s.. what you see is you see soldiers and leaders who are continuing to extend their service because they are aware of not just the demands on them, that the service places but on the less tangible rewards of service. what are those? i think these are

underappreciated by our society, and this is something we need to communicate more effectively. a come with -- they come with being bigger than yourself, that you can make contributions to efforts that are important to the future and the security of all humanity, and we can see that dramatically today across the greater middle east, for example. i think you also are than part of a team, where the man or woman next you will get everything, including their own lives for you. so i think there are tremendous rewards of service that you do not become aware of until you are part of that kind of military organization that takes on the qualities of a family. so i think as leaders we have to maintain does on subtrust with our subordinate leaders and units. we have to challenge them. there's no shortage of challenges right. soldiers join the army because they expect it to be hard. they are disappointed when it is not. i think the army does a great job of challenges agreeing -- of

challenging and bring out the best in young men and women. the reports of the time of peace where people become bored disinterested, it is not going to happen. i do not think it is going to happen. i cannot see it happening in the foreseeable future anyway. dr. cohen: all the way in the back. >> general, thanks very much for your service. and all of our conflicts for the past 40 years and for your vision and originality of thought, i wonder if i could ask you to comment on stability in asia and how to preserve it, deterrence, resolution of disputes peacefully, and how you see the role of the army in that. lieutenant mcmaster: thank you for that question. as you know, we have 55,000

soldiers committed to the pacific theater, the largest of any other theaters. there's this idea that with this shift in emphasis to the pacific that suddenly the army is interested. the army has always been interested in the pacific, as opposed to pre-world war i period. and we will continue to play a finally important role. what does the army do in the architecture of the pacific and maintaining the security order that has led to the global economy we have benefited from and to secure countries in asia and globally have benefited from and stability in asia? it is going to be analogous to what we have done in the past. the army provides foundational

capabilities. we are the foundation of the joint force. what that means is the army provides multiple options to the president and secretary of defense across all theaters, and what does that mean? that means theatre majestic capabilities intelligence, communications capabilities, but also what we provide is a tangible and credible commitment of the united states of america. you know better than anybody the role of land forces in establishing and maintaining security. i mentioned the key role in northeast asia for army forces but what you see is that applies broadly across the region. and in particular, i think that working through partners and in asia the dominant military service in our partner countries is the army. and so i think that that is a vitally important role, that army forces connect to regional

engagement and regionally aligned forces to develop the capabilities of partners to work on interoperability, and to send a clear message to any powers in asia who would want to try to establish some kind of a hegemonic order that would restrict freedom of trade and congress or coerce our partners in the region, that is not worth it that there is an alternative path which is a path of not confrontation and continuing to benefit from the economic order of which american security -- for which american security has provided a foundation. we think it terms of military capabilities for a theater like the pacific where you rely on freedom of movement and action in the air space, maritime, and increasingly cyberspace domains, that army forces play an important role for the fundamental reason that people live on land obviously, and any

problems that manifest themselves in the maritime, air space, or cyberspace domains originate on land to begin with. as technology is transferred to other countries or other countries who steal those capabilities, who can then challenge what has been now multi-decade dominance in those fluid domains i think it is going to be important for the army forced have the capability to conduct what we call expeditionary maneuvers. this is the deployment of forces into unexpected locations with the appropriate combinations of mobility protection, and lethality, to defeat an enemy organization and established a control of territory to secure populations, and consolidate gains come up and increasingly thing to project power out for from land into the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains to injure freedom of movement and action of our joint forces. and restrict use of those

domains by our enemies. there is a lot written about this, obviously, and the office of net assessment and other think tanks in d.c. have worked on this so-called how we develop an answer that. the army plays an important role as part of the joint force. from the military operations perspective, the term i would uses expeditionary maneuver, and i think maneuver is important. when we look at theaters, oftentimes we tend to look at potential military operations is a big targeting exercise. and we reduce war to a bunch of targets that we then engage with standoff capabilities. then what we fail to recognize is what is important in coercing an enemy or deterring an enemy -- is that you need to have available a root force option

which is an option to compel an outcome. land force capabilities play a complementary role to the joint force standoff capabilities because it demonstrates commitment and you are able to do positive things on land, whereas with standoff capabilities tend to be punitive in nature, and i can be bolstering capabilities, and so forth. i see the army today as having an important role and asia in terms of theater security architecture and as i mentioned, it is the largest commitment of soldiers abroad of any theater. and i see it growing in importance depending on the favor of other powers in the region and the threats they pose to international security and to

our partners and allies. dr. cohen: this gentleman over there. >> thank you very much, and thanks for a fantastic b rief. it is fascinating to hear you speak. i am an associate professor at the national defense university. my question relates to the issue you mentioned previously institutionalization of capabilities. it strikes me the army has learned anymany hard-won lessons and has had to rely on ad hoc mechanisms. we can think of the human terrain teams or provisional reconstruction teams and the capabilities hard to advise and assist and mentor security forces in host nations. i was wondering, we're not going back from an era of warfare as you rightly pointed out, but in the aftermath of what we call youiraq operations, what

changes have been made to institution allies the capabilities within the army? dr. cohen: i will ask you to give a fairly brief answer, because we are running up on 11:30. i will throw one more question at you after you answer this one. lieutenant mcmaster: thanks. a great question. the army has done quite a bit. adaptation in conflict will always help an institution's ability to a sword and make permanent those adaptations. the institutional army is catching up to a lot of those hard-won lessons. our doctrine has changed. there are implications across that. the army brigade manual, an important manual to understand how we fight him has new chapters. the first is on understanding

the environment, the conflict, the local dynamics within a particular area. we used to think that to the old days, we see yourself, the enemy, conflict, and the train -- i got it. -- and that terrain -- i got it. also religious and tribal dynamics. so we have institutionalized that in our dock in training, and in the competencies we have developed. the army has come up with a strategy that emphasizes language and religion and culture and the kind of understanding from the very beginning, from preconditioning all the way through colonel, once you become part of the problem. so we get that going early in leaders' carreras.

so leaders to vomit is a huge aspect of all of this. a lot of the adaptations include resiliency training for its advanced cognition and be able to identify [indiscernible] that is all institutionalized in programs of instruction. the first manifestation is these were add-ons. now they are integrated into our training and scenarios and our educational opportunities. our training environments. we have an organization called the training brain operation center. how cool is that? what this does is it takes big data from conflicts and it classifies data and on classifies it. now we have that rich texture and all that data that fees to interact exercises as well. we are not going to go back on

this. some people say we need to go back on the basics. so we need to go back to fighting wars as we would like to fight them rather than as they are, no, we're not going to do that. i think we have made great strides in troy we institutionalize and lots of what our lessons in either competencies in training doctrine, organization as well. with the changes to abrogate and other organizations, it is a work in progress, and the one thing i would highlight in the concept and ask you to read it, one of the perks that come to iiss, free copies in the back, but injure we have established a framework for learning. the army learns enthusiastically, but lot of the time not with a lot of finance. so we have all these -- with a lot of finesse. so we have all these lessons. what we have said is we know

we're going to be wrong about future war. no matter how hard you try you will be off the mark. so what is the best way to make sure you're not far from asking the right question? we have asked 21st order questions. the first is one you alluded to, is how to develop and sustain a high degree of situation understanding against adaptive enemies and complex and environments? if we work with our multinational partners, with civilian partners and states, then we can really advance our capability in that area. so that is what we've done to institutionalize. we have a framework for learning, then use for learning -- of venues for learning,

practical experience exercises multinational exercises interoperability work we are doing, so we now we have that faced -- so now we have a place to put together to develop position organizational the moment i'll training, solutions to those problems. so i'm excited about it something that general odierno and his staff is driven about. you want to innovate. what we have said is innovation is attendant in our army operating concept. it is changing our ideas into valued outcomes. it is changing it into a without you outcome. there's a temporal dimension. we have to innovate fast enough to stay ahead of determined enemies.

we're determined to get it up faster and innovate better with a high degree of clarity. i am excited about being part of that effort in our army. dr. cohen: let me ask you the last question. understanding the politics is uncertain to that warfare even more so if you had to guess what is the way or the ways in which you think the next war will actually be very different from iraq and afghanistan? lieutenant mcmaster: here are things i am concerned about in terms of keeping pace with changes in the character of warfare. what would be different? what we are seeing is seeing enemies, late our advantages. the enemies are doing for things that are doing that are changes in the character of warfare. the first is avoid our capabilities. on land, you have tens of thousands of so-called targets

people and all of them are joined to avoid being classified as such. so we have to consider the countermeasures adopted now. they are going to evade our capabilities. they will disrupt our capabilities. our network strike capabilities, communication capabilities, dependence on technological advantages, will be at-risk. what does that mean for us? we have to develop systems that degrade gracefully, be able to operate degraded and in much more contested environments. we think our ability to dominate in the air space airtime cyberspace domains is going to be in question. so we will operate on land that facilitates freedom of action of movement in those more contested the main street so wedomains.

one of the things i'm concerned about him access to commercial satellite imagery unmanned aerial systems, and capabilities with autonomous systems, long-range missile capabilities, tied to weapons of mass destruction. it is a narcissistic way to define it. there's a tremendous offense of capability by potential enemies that is analogous to the v1 and v2 threat from europe and world war ii. i think what we're seeing increasingly our enemies using long-range missile capabilities in urban areas and restrictive terrain which is will demand a joint force answer.

our army has got to be prepared to contribute to that through expeditionary maneuver capabilities. then our enemies will expand on to other battlegrounds. this is a battleground of political subversion, the connection of crying networks and what is -- of crime networks, and what is different? we need better integration of civilian capabilities. finance will be more important than ever. the ability to integrate law enforcement with military operations. we need to ramp that up along the lines of what treasury does. but treasury is limited in their capacity. they are in example of what we can do from an interdepartmental perspective. we have to get better at defeating organizations whose broad range of capabilities

succumbed from all the elements of national power and organized to do that. we have to look at these organizations and analyze them based on who they are, what they are trying to achieve, what is their strategy to achieve it, then we have to map these networks in terms interdepartmental perspective. we have to get better at defeating of knowing then networks on the rolls but see flows through the networks internationally of people, money, weapons, narcotics, and other commodities. and then we have to be able to understand relationships between enemy networks and licit networks in state institutions, who are aiding and abetting these regions and victimizing in a innocent people. then we have to apply influence in a manner. we have a name and address we can do with that. but how about other authorities we can bring to bear?

law enforcement authorities, extraterritorial jurisdictions, and authorities they can be brought to bear, travel bans, visa denials targeted sanctions. i recommend a book -- some great work on this. how do we go after these networks? what are the sources of strength of these networks and what are their vulnerabilities? these groups that are supposed to be religious groups -- i think their criminal not only because they commit asked murder of innocent people, but because they rely on criminality for their source of strength and funding and ability to mobilize resources. so i think greater vulnerabilities? does so i see greater threats, greater threats to international security that have emerged from these hybrid

realizations and see great demands on forces because when he we have seen is our advances may not be our bandages paid have to work more effectively as a joint team to counter enemies who take -- who evade our capabilities, who disrupt our capabilities, who expand onto other battlegrounds and emulate a capabilities. dr. cohen: h.r. described a pretty daunting world. i will say for a lot of other people as well, i'm glad you are one of the people who will be leading the army through it. h.thank you very much. >> tonight a discussion on the administration's new cuba policy. here's a portion of remarks from the executive director of the center for a free cuba. >> presence had talked about

transparency and he had conducted a secret negotiation that even key people in the state department did not learn about until about three or four months ago. i also said frankly being a cuban that i do not know why the president thinks that by talking to rival castrol -- to castro that they could determine the future of cuba. i think the president announced a policy that is full of misunderstanding and misconceptions. he read some things from a teleprompter that are really nonsense, i am sorry to say. when people say that the president wants to reestablish relations with cuba, united states has had diplomatic relations with cuba since 1977. the american mission in cuba, where an ambassador served, is the largest diplomatic mission in cuba and has been for years.

it is not for lack of a diplomatic presence in cuba that we are where we are. and i also said and i stop here that the notion of saying if something has not works, we got to do something else. something has to work. just because something design -- just because something does not work means you need to try some the else. >> you can watch the entire program tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. tonight on c-span2 "book tv" on prime time. " the man who would not be washington." then "stalin: volume 1."

then "the upstairs wife." starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. tomorrow a look at subprime loans which have higher interest then "washington post" political reporter discusses current policy issues facing u.s. states. plus we'll be taking your calls facebook comments and tweets. all on "washington journal" live saturday on c-span. release the after the war, some

buried the memories and with it the history of this camp. now more than 60 years later. >> this sunday on q & a on the only family during world war ii at crystal city, texas and what she says the real reason for the camp. >> the government says to the fathers we have a deal for you. we'll reunite with your families in the crystal city entournamentinternment

camp. but they used it as roosevelt's primary prisoner exchange in the center program. sunday sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span and a. >> earlier today they held discussion on cyber security issues and the law. this is 50 minutes. good morning again. i promised i would be back in a few minutes and i am from a different podium. and i'll talk about that in a few minutes. this is a new format we're experiencing with. we're trying to throw c-span off. they had to widen the lens or you got it. thanks for braving the cold.

did everybody get a copy of the book outside. that's your reward for coming this morning. there it is, thank you very much. please be sure to get one. show your friends and neighbors and put it on your coffee table because it marks you as special you came out the coldest day in the last 100 years. allow me for just a second to let you peek behind the a b a's bureaucratic curtain. they look at the topics such as programs and publications and outreach, things the committee has done. holly of course puts our reports together and every year we receive top reviews. in preparation for this year's review, we were looking at our previous year and what we had done, what our speakers have spoken on and we noted something interesting and that is this. all of our programs, all of our

publications and all of you are legal community outreached mirrored the issues of the day and that's what set us apart from all the other a. b. a. committees. we are timely and relevant to the national security discussion. in keeping were w that tradition, today we have a unique format. first of all for this breakfast summit we have a tag team. they both work for the alumni of our committee. please tell her i said hello. you have their very, very impressive bios so i won't take up precious time in reading them to you. i will just note that, yes, they do for dhs and we'll donations to help pay their salaries at the end of the week. let me welcome them to our break

breakfast and these two podiums. [applause] >> good morning, thank you, jim, for the introduction. holly for arranging all this. holly always does such a great job pulling off these events and enjoy working with her. if i could give you more introduction. i'm the associate general counsel at the department of homeland security -- for the national of programs directorat and andy is my client so we're having attorney-client discussion. it's privileged so please don't tell anybody about the conversation we're about to have. but originally i reached out to holly and harvey and jim and had talked about the idea of doing a

briefing on some of the new legislation and the new legislative proposals and the new executive order that we knew was about to come and they said great, let's do that and the more i thought about it and the more i thought this is a great way to put an audience to sleep is to have a lawyer talking about the mechanics of new legislation. andy agreed to come with me and we get to do a tag team. i'm the play by play commentator and he gets to do the color commentary. he's going to tell you what all these laws mean and the new authorities mean in daily operations. >> absolutely. so, i was trying to think of a good comparison and you look like a sports talk radio crowd out there, don't you? we're like "mike & mike" on the radio. well, no -- well, he's mike and

i'm mike. andy is not a big sports fan. "mike & mike", mike is the brains and mike is the braun and one is the arm chair fan and the other was an actual football player. so i don't know how that works with us exactly but you're the actual practitioner and i'm the straight man. >> i think i just got called the braun and not the brain. so i'll take that back. i had the opportunity to characterize it so i'll take that opportunity. so what we thought we would do is give you a broad sense of why this is important time for us to be talking. and late december the congress passed and the president signed several new pieces of legislation that provide dhs and

others with new authorities and few weeks later the president sent a new legislative package to the congress on cyber security again. several of which strengthened dh a's role and then the president came to our work site and gave a speech from our work site which was a great experience for our workforce. of course the white house cyber security summit was last week and that was -- our secretary was very involved with that a number of the rest of our leadership and at the summit released an executive order that we'll talk.

when dhs first started, it didn't pull upon an existing historic agency with great back bench of capability. we've been in this surge mode of creating something since the inception of dhs. what i'd say is the last few months really recognize that we have come into our own in the last years. we have a level of capability now that we have extraordinary demand from our customers and i would say that our customers are three fold in cyber security, federal, civilian government agencies and state local and territorial and private sector. you have to used to go out and really sell people on what we could do for them, now they're beating down the door and i think we have seen that recognized by the president coming to speak at the organization, by the congress formalizing our roles and

responsibilities and authorities and by the executive actions that have come lately really giving us more work to do. i think it's a recognition that the reward for good work is more work and we're definitely in that position right now. >> i think there are some great opportunities for dhs, but my client is recognizing there are responsibilities associated with the new opportunities and i think it's great that we have such a capable team. we thought we would give you a sense of what dhs's unique contribution, what we see dhs's contribution is. of course many organizations in government and outside that have an important role to play, we're just talking breakfast about the national association of

directors. we thought we would emphasize the three areas where dhs pay as unique contribution. first is dhs has a strong record of imbedding privacy and civil liberty into its programs. dhs had the first statutory called officer. when the department first started, the home hand security act incorporated a number of interests endeavors first and one of them was to create these two positions civil libertarian positions that reported directly to the secretary. many of us may know i was the first officer at the department so i started the first day with the chief privacy officer. connor kelly is the center for democracy and technology. we looked at each and said, what do we make for each other now and we had officers next to one

another and tried to figure out where to go. i was at dhs until 2009 and left and returned a couple of years ago and that perspective has really helped me as i have come back and really been so pleased to see that it it didn't just stay on an org start but these commitment been really incorporated into the daily life of national protection and programs director and others in the department. it's the commitment to privacy has been written into strategy. it's been written into standard operating procedure and daily tactically the folks who work and concept has begun to take

hold. i don't know if you want to comment on it it. >> i think i what i would add from a cyber security perspective ty /* it's strategic. as a practitioner where i recognize and i think most people in this field recognize that to effectively secure cyber space, we need to trust of the people that we're working to secure. if we don't build in strong civil liberty protections then we're not going to succeed as practitioners. i think that he a critical.

i fully agree that's a core strength for us. >> dhs's expert cease in public-private partnerships. one scholar that i read recently said that the development of public private partnerships the single most development in the field of homeland security. all across the department we're working on it constantly. it's very important in the cyber security field, isn't it? >> absolutely. when i came on board of my organization i made explicit something that was implicit. within m m pd, the part in which we work, our organization we're a customer service organization. we don't have any competing interests other than helping those three customers i mentioned before become more secure. so it's one of our core avenue. we've been given the job of, that's

a pretty big job and you don't it one at a time. you have to do it through a structure that scales and ability to reach partner with a few core organizations and have them reach out themselves to recover the rest of the united states. that's what the public-private partnership means for us. >> all right. the third distinctive i'll touch on is that dhs provides a civilian non law enforcement enforcement interface with the private sector and the public on these issues. that's a really critical part of the cyber security environment. >> we should be clear. dhs obviously does have key organizations that are part of it. the secret service and homeland security and federal protective service. but within m m pd and our cyber security role, it's not law enforcement and we're not

intelligence. that goes back to that customer service ethos i just mentioned. when i help a cyber security company that's been broken into, my only motivation is get the bad guys and get the company back on their feet. i'm not trying to prosecute or gather intelligence. those are important actions for the government to take. and if i'm on site helping a company i'll encourage them every day to bring in law enforcement to help prosecute whoever broke into them. they can still get help from me and i think that's really key. it helps to have that customer service focus so we don't have any other competing goals. >> so that's just a broad overview of the three distinctives. we thought we would talk you through five pieces of legislation, executive order and legislative proposals. we'll run through them and i'll describe the technical aspects

of the piece of legislation and andy will have the fun part and describe what it actually means and what it means for his priority in his organization and daily operations and that kind of thing. so the first is in december the president signed the national cyber security protection act of 2014. let me just describe it quickly. it establishes in law the national cyber security and communications integration center or the nkik. if you have been to the n kick raise your hand. some people could. it codifies the n kick as a central player in the federal government's information sharing about risks with the private sector. and it codifies it as an entity that provides security technical assist assist he knows. every time i talk about the n kick and i realize that we

really need to describe the n kick first. maybe could you do that and then i'll talk a little bit about the legislation. what is the n kick. >> you need to secure yourself of the you're a government agency, what does it mean to have cyber security? we talked to a lot of folks who are just wrapping their heads around this con set. what we tell them is it's not that complicated. as an organization you need to do three things to secure self. the first is to implement best practices and that gets you two thirds of the way home. strong i.t. management and implementing best practices like those in the cyber security framework, that's a core part of what you're doing. that takes care of the noise. you get 80% of the threats you just solved by doing. that but then you have the more sophisticated bad guys, adversaries, organized crime that are capable and maybe they're after your organization. you implemented the best

practices and raise the tkpwar and now you do information sharing. it's this, it's nothing particularly complicated. but right now the bad guys can try the same attack against a thousand companies and if they're not picky, they'll hit ten of those companies successfully and that's enough for them. actually right now they can probably hit 200 out of a thousand that they try and be successful. the cost for them is extraordinarily low and have a high return on vinnestments. they try a thousand companies and the first one they succeed into breaking into learn something or in fact maybe the first one that successfully defends against them. learns something and says be on the lookout for that active shares that. and the other 999 companies receive the information are able to protect themselves and suddenly the cost of the bad guy is reversed. what used to be a really scaleable thing and they could keep trying at no cost and keep trying until they succeeded has

been inverted. when they try, they're likely to learn what they do and share that information and inoculate everybody else and trying itself has cost for the bad guys. that's what information sharing does for us. that's part two. first part is best practices and the second part is information sharing. third part is instant response. because ultimately this is about risk management. and risk management almost inevitably means there is risk that is be -- that is accepted and there will be intrusions, for example, that happen. so you have to be prepared for when that happens and respond effectively. how does the n kick help organizations with this? it's not the part that focuses on promise you will gating best practices but more on the operational side. they prevent by information sharing and respond once they happen. information sharing we second out analytic reports all day every day. these provide a little bit more high level context, threat after

is going after this sector and this is what it looks like when they attack or try to intrude upon you. we also send out cyber threat caters. if you get an e-mail from this e-mail address it's a fishing e-mail and they're trying to break in. block this e-mail address or this i.p. address is sending malicious traffic. be alert if you get communication from this address. now, that's preventing intrusions through information sharing. as i mentioned before sometimes incidence will happen. now, at the most basic level a private sector company could reach out and say, hey, i we found this tool on you are network. tell us what it did and we'll break it down and analyze it and say, this is what this tool does. so you, the victim, can figure out what happened on your network. we can take the information about the tool and again share it out to our partners.

or, company can say or government agency can say, we've got bad guys at our networks and we need your help and we'll send a team on site to help them out. they'll help them clean the bad guys off the networks which is often very difficult. once you get a hacker on your network getting them off can be a real challenge. we'll help them get them off the network and get them restored whether it's an infrastruck tkher or government agency. we want to get them up on their feet and running again. finally we coordinate national response. so if there's a cyber incident that has implications beyond one agency and beyond multiple companies it's a massive incidence it's our job to coordinate what the government does and to provide that common operating picture for what's happening on the ground. and all of the activity generates information and we share it back out. it's a cycle the more that people ask for our help the more

we're able to help the individual company but derive information we can push out so other agencies can secure themselves. what i will tell you for those who haven't been there it happens in a flashy looking cool room. we have all these screens on the wall showing all this stuff happening across the world on the internet and it's a fun place to go look. a lot of serious work gets done there, but it is a cool looking room. i highly recommend you take an opportunity for a tour if that presents itself. >> let me give the nuts and bolts of the legislation and will develop. first thing is the composition of the n kick. they authorize to representatives on the floor from federal agencies, primarily those who are leads from different sectors, energy, treasury or the like. i's authorized to have law enforcement there which is an important part of the n kick.

state, local governments and private sector which includes both owners and operators, but also information sharing and analysis accordingsation. organizations that group together sectors and represent sectors there on the floor. so by statute the n kick is authorized to have this multidiscipline nation eclectic group of people and extremely helpful to have in statute that these people are authorized to be there and work together those of hugh are lawyers appreciate some of the legal issues we've dealt with over the years and now in statue. do you want to expand on the composition? >> no. >> the statue talks about the roles and responsibilities. it's charged with being an interface and providing shared information awareness and coordinating the sharing of information related to cyber security risks and incidence

across the federal government. so, the act provides the authority for the n kick to provide upon request technical assistance to those who need it and incident capabilities to a local partner or those in the private sector and that could include at distribution, mitigation or remediation. you referenced some of that. they're fly away teams that we reference and they're authorized now by statute to do that kind of work. anything you want to add there? >> other than the only thing i want to add is you will particularly appreciate why this is helpful to us. now i have found that most general counsels are happy go lucky people willing to let things fly, whatever happens, happens. maybe not. general counsels are usually this to help manage risks to their organization and they see a lot of risk in bringing in an outside organization to help them out. so having in statute or

responsibly to send a my away team to help a company out isn't going to eliminate the risk but does a lot to mitigate the returns so. when we have an incident where we think it's important to help them out and every minute matters, the fact that a general counsel can see that we're authorized in statute to take this kind of action helps speed the process along and this is the process where minutes and hours matter. that's extraordinarily helpful for us and one example where a positive authorization is really value forable ---ible for us. >> andy is not a lawyer so we'll criticize the pro tpelgs. but i'll defend the lawyers. i think what andy is right. but approaching c. i.o.'s and those with the organizations with the organization we can help you and who are are you, and where does this come from, well now it is laid out in statute directly. in previous years the n kick has operated and operated under the

broad authorities of the homeland security act. it's -- we have had the authority to operate the n kick but it was under the broad authorities of the homeland security act and required a complicated complicated of the presidential directive and that takes a precious time away from what should be focused on the response. and so the congress decided we'll put this in statute and we'll clearly establish what its authorities are and eliminate that issue of time. i want to eco what andy said. as attorneys this will be extremely helpful. we've been talking about the private sector. mostly we've been talking about the proeuf it sector. let's look at the second piece of legislation which is the dotgov environment. it's a great way to start a new

way with a bank and riveting discussion of fizz pha but that's what we'll try to do, those who don't recognize sarcasm there, but it is very helpful. so the federal information security modernization act of 2014 grounds in statute dhs's role to administer the implementation of cyber security policies and practices within the federal branch. many of you know that fizz pha has been around for many years and primarily produced paper reports that agencies submit through o & m to the congress on their practices. and that is an out dated system. and so the modernization of act of 2014 brings us into 2014 and establishes dhs's role.

57bd andy, what are the -- >> you make fizz pha joke and they're rolling on the ground. we think it's a great source of humor when we make jokes about it and technology gists are known for our rich and normal sense of humor. fizz pha lays the groundwork for how the government manages its i.t. risk. and that makes it critically important and i think the combination of fizz pha and some other acts passed really recognize how the world has changed. and that we're moving from a world in which i.t. happened at the very edges of the organization, at the far -- the most outer edges of a department or agency to a world where to manage your i.t. effectively there has to be some level of centralization and governance whether at the agency level or department c. i.o. has had to have cog dance over what is

happening over their department which has not always been the case to the government level where dhs a can play that roll across departments and agencies hand in hand with omb understanding where they need to make improvements and how they're secure and giving them the feedback and really holding agencies accountable with o & m with whether or not they're effectively managing their cyber risks. >> the federal modernization act gives us the tools that we need to do that. it's twofold. first it establishes and clarifies the role as that government wide for the civilian government measure and motivator of cyber security for departments and agencies and then the second thing it does it helps us move away from this thick binder compliance approach to cyber security to approach where