on a thursday night. friday morning, i was the oval office with the president and i ran through what i heard from the israelis. and he said, "make it happen." and by tuesday, we had $250 million from congress to do that. so whatever the tensions whatever the disagreements on various issues, when it comes to the core of the relationship that is, our absolute commitment to israel's security, it's never been stronger. >> if you get a deal that you feel is good and the rest of the negotiating partners feel is good, to what extent do you think you need congress' approval and for what aspect do you or do you not need congress' approval? >> congress is an absolutely integral part of this entire process. from takeoff to flight to landing. the sanctions regime that congress legislated and then the international component that we help bring to bear, without that

iran would not be at the table. simple as that. congress was absolutely critical in getting us to the point that we're at. going forward, congress is going to be critical because, as i said, what we're looking at doing if we get an agreement is initially suspending sanctions which the president can do under his own authority. but then ultimately ending them. and congress has to do that. and the reason we do it this way or we propose to do it this way , is that having the sanctions suspended, creates real leverage to make sure that iran makes good on its commitments. as soon as you end them, that may take some of the -- >> in other words, you're not going to go to congress and ask that the sanctions be ended right away? >> not right away. what we want to see if we get an agreement is iran demonstrating that it's making good on commitments. then congress has a very strong role to play in insisting on that, and then not actually ending as opposed to suspending sanctions until iran has demonstrated it is making good. >> david? >> thanks very much.

good to see you, tony. one more question on iran while we're still on this. many people in congress who i've spoken with seem surprised that at the end of this agreement whenever this agreement ends the iranians are basically free to do what any other signatory of the iaea treaties and so forth -- they could go back and build the number of centrifuges in the tens of thousands the supreme leader has discussed. tell us what we're supposed to think about that. that's a big israeli concern. it's a big concern in congress. and also tell us how this concept of a phased agreement in which the iranians would be frozen for ten years, then may be able to build up slowly might work to alleviate those concerns. >> so without getting into any of the details of the

negotiations, because keep in mind, what's so challenging about these is that it's a classic -- it really is the classic example of nothing's agreed until everything's agreed. and because of these elements are so interrelated, sometimes you hear -- one thing comes out in the media. allegedly something we're proposing to do. and absent the context, it's often misunderstood. let me give you one quick example of that, then i'll answer the question directly. there's a lot of back and forth sometime in the media about how many centrifuges might iran have at the end of this process? we see different numbers. the reason that is going to be a subject of negotiation and the reason that that number in the abstract is meaningless is because if you're looking at assuring that iran must have -- it must take at least a year for it to produce enough fissile material for a weapon, the number of centrifuges is an important component of figuring that out. so is the type of centrifuge, so is the configuration, so is the

stockpile of material that they're allowed to work with. depending on the configuration of those elements, you could have more or fewer centrifuges and still get to your one year. so that's why, looking at some of these elements in isolation is really the wrong way to go. with regard to the end of the process, that is, let's say there's an agreement and it lasts for years, in the double digits. what happens at the end? and the fact is this. there will be a permanent ban on iran pursuing weapons activity. it will have to apply the additional protocol in perpetuity. there will be extensive iaea safeguards that are very significant. and during the process and during the agreement itself, for however long it lasts what we will be learning about the program, every person involved virtually, if not every nook and cranny, that base of knowledge

will exist beyond the duration of the agreement. and then, of course, we would retain the same capacity and probably a greater capacity than we have now to deal with any efforts by iran to actually go to some kind of nuclear weapon. the bush administration put on the table the proposition that iran would be treated as a nonnuclear weapon state after it complied for some period of time with any agreement. and that's exactly what we're doing. that is the purpose of this very, very challenging exercise. at some point in the future, having demonstrated that it's making good on its commitments iran would be treated as a nonnuclear weapon state. but it is going to have a -- we're going to have a knowledge of what's going on that far exceeds what we have now. and again, there will be a permanent ban on weapons. if we see it moving in that

direction, we would be able to do something about it. we will have the same capacity we have today and probably a greater capacity to act on it than we -- in however long it is for the duration of the agreement. >> given the point you just made about having to see the agreement as a whole to get to the one-year breakout period have the selective leaks been very problematic and have they come from israel? >> i think that selective leaks on anything create more confusion than daylight. and that's unfortunate. you know, one of the challenges of this business is that -- and i know david appreciates this -- is that we in government are constantly trying to plug the leaks and our friends like david are constantly trying to pry them out. i think the challenge is whenever there is a leak whether it's on the iran negotiations or anything else, one of the obligations that

those writing about them have i think is to give it the, if possible, the context and the explanation. so things are not seen in isolation. >> speaking of davids who get leaks, david ignatius. we'll go to the goliaths after this. >> i'll happily answer to that summons. tony, let me ask you about two issues that will arise if you do get an agreement. and the first is the i would say likely demand of other countries in the region that they be allowed to have the same nuclear capability, threshold capability, with enrichment, centrifuges, etc., that the agreement with grant iran. and how do you envision dealing

with that problem? second, the day after the agreement is the day before iran's threat to regional security through its proxies foreign policy, yemen beirut, baghdad going to be there? how does the administration envision dealing with that problem in a world where you have an agreement? >> great. thanks, david. so with regard to whether other countries may see this as a model to follow, i think it's about the last model any other country would want to follow. what is the iranian model? it as decade or more of sanctions, of isolation, of economic decline, as a result of its efforts to pursue enrichment and reprocessing programs. and our policy remains that countries that don't have that

technology ideally should not have it. the other thing that i think makes iran no role model for anyone is that, as i noted, any agreement is going to have an exceptionally intrusive access/inspections monitoring regime. i doubt strongly other countries in the region or elsewhere would want to have what iran is going to have to accept if there's going to be any agreement. so i really don't see it as a model that anyone would want to follow. with regard to threats to regional security, you're exactly right. i want to make it very clear that even as we pursued this agreement with iran on the nuclear program, we have worked very, very vigorously to push back and counter and enforce the various sanctions and mechanisms that are out there to deal with iran's actions and behaviors

that are profoundly objectionable. whether it is support for terrorism, whether it is destabilizing activities in other countries that threaten some of our partners and allies, or indeed for that matter its own activities at home. and so what you've seen throughout this effort is the very vigorous enforcement of sanctions, including in the nuclear area, which we made very clear we would continue to strongly enforce all the existing sanctions and we have. but also in the terrorism area. in the issue of destabilizing other countries. we have over the course of the interim agreement designated sanctioned, more than 100 entities and individuals in all of those different areas. we've interdicted shipments to various countries that have been problematic. we've continued to vigorously enforce and monitor all of the anti-proliferation requirements. and we've also worked over the

last 6.5 years to build up the capacity of our partners in the gulf to deal with iranian aggression and destabilizing activities. we've worked very closely with the gcc. we've put in place different capabilities that strengthen their ability to deal with problems. we are working with the gcc as an entity. in fact, one of the things that we did in terms of arms, the supply of arms and weapons, they can be treated as an entity for the purpose of acquiring arms from the united states. so all of that will continue as long as the activities that iran is pursuing continues. let me just add two things without exaggerating. first of all, inherently, the biggest threat to stability in the region would be iran armed with a nuclear weapon. so to the extent the agreement takes that off the table, that is profoundly in the interests not only of the united states

, but also of countries in the region. second, i think that there are some elements in iran that are trying to approach their policies around the world in a somewhat more pragmatic fashion. not because they are necessarily good guys or like us, but because they see it as in iran's interests. to the extent that those people emerge in a stronger position and those who are pursuing the most noxious policies around the world are in a different position, that wouldn't be a bad thing either. but again, that's not a big aspect of this, but at least it's something to consider. >> you just said something that caught my ear, which is that you're allowing the gcc to acquire weapons directly. do you think that should or could lead to a path where some arab nations create their own nato, as general sissy in egypt and the saudiss, emiraties, and others, and is that something we should encourage?

>> we hear money morp from our -- more and more from our partners interests in doing something like that. you're hearing from the jordanians, saudis, emirates egyptians, different ideas in that direction. moving from talking about it to acting on it is, of course, a big challenge. but as a general proposition their ability to come together and act in a unified way to deal with challenges would be a good thing. now, we're seeing some of that in the context of the anti-isil coalition where these countries are flying with us and flying together, and that's helpful. but i think seeing this kind of initiative coming out of the region, coming from these countries, is important. and now the question is whether they can move from thinking about it and talking about it to starting to put in place some practical elements.

>> p.j. crowley? >> picking up on isil, you and the vice president have spent probably as much time focused on iraq as anybody else in the administration over the past six years. how do you assess the performance of the abadi governments so far? they seem to be saying the right things but on the ground, do you see a change as of yet in the relationship between the baghdad government and the sunni community? and then secondly, on libya, given the egyptian action and the aftermath of the beheading of the cop took -- coptic christians, should we view libya as a third front in the campaign against isil? >> thanks, p.j. i think the abadi government has taken significant strides to try to improvement the relationship with the sunni community and create buy-in so that community sees its future not with isil , but with iraq. it's a work in progress.

it's usually challenging. i think they're in the middle of it, not at the end of it. but specifically, we saw the formation of a more inclusive government. we saw the naming after this had been on ice for a long time of a sunni defense minister. we saw the prime minister take important steps, for example disbanding the office of the commander in chief, which had been prime minister maliki's way of having control over the military outside the chain of command. that was disbanded. dozens of generals were dismissed who were either ineffective or had very sectarian agendas. we've seen legislation that had been stalled start to move including on debathification. the council of ministers sent it back to the council of representatives a couple of weeks ago, there's back and forth there. then very significantly legislation to form a national guard that would allow members of sunni tribes to be part of a security force defending their own communities but attached to the state through training and equipping and salaries.

that legislation is probably going to take time, about but in the interim, the abadi administration agreed that it would try to train and pay for and integrate with the iraqi security forces tribal fighters. and they made a commitment to do that with about 7,500, primarily in anbar and innua, and they've reached that number. so on all of those fronts we're seeing progress. we also saw a budget that was passed that provides significant resources for the sunni governance. on the other hand, one of the big challenges has been that as the iraqi security forces in some places have moved to take back territory lost to isil, in the early going the shiite militia were a critical component of their success. and a number of those militia have been responsible for abuses and for revenge on the sunni community that had nothing to do with isil, they were victimized by it.

that's something that needs to be reined in in a very serious manner. what's interesting has been that leaders in the shia community, especially the grand ayatollah sistani, have very publicly pushed back on the abuses of the shia militia. i would say it's a work in progress. but what's critical is, in taking back the territory lost to isil, the integration of the tribal fighters with the iraqi security forces. we're intimately involved in that. we're putting them together at the al assad base where we have trainers. as that moves forward, then i think you'll see that, you know, abadi's making real progress in actually showing the sunni community that the future is with iraq and not with isil. >> james? >> and libya. >> libya. so libya presents a real challenge. because it -- to the extent that it becomes mired in civil war

and truly chaotic, then it becomes a natural area that extremists will look to for a haven. because they prey on places that have weak governments, weak security forces and are in conflict. so we have a very strong incentive to try and prevent that from happening. right now, there's a significant effort under way led by the united nations to try and form a national unity government. the only good thing that's emerged from the recent atrocities in libya conducted by isil or affiliates is it seems to have at least marginally concentrated the minds of all the different actors that there's something even more dangerous at stake than the differences that they have. and that is the potential for isil and affiliated groups to get a real strong foothold in libya. so that may help us get to a unity government. if that happens then the international community is in a better place to provide the assistance libya needs and start

to build the bulwark against extremists taking root in libya. >> coming up on this switch continents for a second, asia, you were just out there, take a wild stab and guess china may have come up with our allies. i wonder -- i want to ask two related debates. one is how all-powerful is xi jinping now? is there anything left of collective leadership in china? and the other is a narrative i see taking shape -- versus other views that we really -- what we see now as far as fairly tight repression began in '99 or going way back, maybe 1989. but where do you see him now? >> look, i think it would be hard for me or for anyone else

to really decipher exactly what is going on internally in china in terms of the sort of internal power politics of it. but it does seem, as a sort of outside observer, that the president has worked hard to consolidate his authority and his power and has had some success in doing that. what i can talk about really is the state of the relationship and what we're trying to do together. and i think what we've seen, especially over the last year or so, is we've expanded the foundation for cooperation. and we're working together in more places productively than we have i think at any time in the past. and so just at the end of the year, as you know and saw, the leadership that we were able to exert with china on climate change was significant. china's efforts to deal with ebola, in part at our urging

were significant. and beyond that, the military to military relationship is in a better place than it's been as a result of efforts, exchanges confidence-building measures, et cetera. going forward into this year with the state visit to president xi and a pretty active agenda, we have i think the ability to continue to expand and deepen some of that cooperation. at the same time, part of this relationship is being very direct and very forthright about our differences. and not trying to sidestep them or ignore them. and that's exactly the nature of the conversations that i had when i was out there, and obviously, others have had, and the secretary of state, the president, etc. but i think when i step back, i guess i think about two things. when i try to imagine how china should be looking at this or might want to think about looking at this. and i had these conversations with some of our counterparts.

first, one of the primary sources of friction as you know, jim, better than anyone in the region region, is china's maritime activities in the south china senkakus, et cetera. this has caused a number of countries to come to us in ways they haven't in the past. one of the things i suggested to counterparts in china in some of our meetings, you know, our countries are obviously very different. different systems, different evolutions etc. and this was a little simplistic but nonetheless relevant. and that is in many ways, china now, at least in the region, is where the united states was after world war ii. then our leaders had to decide how they would use our emerging power on the world scene. and they made incredibly wise decisions to take the lead in creating institutions, writing rules, establishing norms, that bound us. and so on one level, restrained

the full exercise of our power. but at the same time, had the incredible beneficial effect of telling other countries, oh, you don't have to band together against the united states to check its power, because you have a voice, you have a say you have the ability to help lead the direction of the world. and i suggested to some of our colleagues in china that this was relevant and interesting history as they thought about their approach to their emerging power. the other thing i'd say is this. when you think about the wealth of a nation today, in the past , we defined it classically, how many people do you have? how big is your land mass? what's the size of your military? what's the abundance of your natural resources? all of those things are critically important and the good news for the united states is, we're doing very well, our wealth is great in all those areas. but i think there is a very strong consensus that in the

21st century, the true wealth of the nation is measured by its human resource and the ability of a country to maximize that resource, to allow it to debate, to create, to innovate, to think for itself. and there we also have, i think, a position of great prominence and privilege in the world. and it's something too that our chinese friends might want to reflect about. >> kimberly dozer, maybe you can get congress bowman's microphone and move up a little bit. thanks. press the red button, yeah. >> two-part question on countering violent extremism. first of all, how do you keep the pressure on? and second of all, how do you deal with the fight over what to call the militants? on cve a number of people i spoke to who attended the meetings this past week said great ideas, but the same ideas as before. and the moment the attention is gone, there's not enough money

there's not enough consistency. and in terms of calling them islamic militants versus criminal extremists, which are your arab partners that asked you to call them criminal extremists instead of the other? and how do you keep the republican comments about this from destroying your gnaw -- neutrality? >> i've got to say i sat through a big part of the meeting last week and then read the parts that i wasn't able to stay for. i learned a tremendous amount. from listening to people who had been confronting this problem in different places and different aspects of the problem around the world. and just for that reason alone i thought it was an incredibly invaluable exercise. but it also builds i think it builds solidarity and a common plan of action going

forward. so let me just say a couple of things quickly and i'll get to the specific questions. first, one of the questions we grapple with is, why do we see this? why is this happening? and particularly, you've seen a significant expansion in the number of foreign fighters. people who travel from one country to another to get into the fight or to conduct acts of terrorism, more accurately. and one of the things that was striking, i think, in listening to this is that, you know, there's actually no one story. when you talk to the experts who have had a chance to talk to people who have gone from one country to another to join extremist groups, it's an incredible mix. some are pious. some are not. some are troubled, some are incredibly well-adjusted and would do very well in their societies if they stayed put. some seem to have a humanitarian calling because they believe some of the false stories that are told to them. others are attracted by the notion of adventure and thrill-seeking. and then some, of course actually are committed to the sort of totalitarian vision that isil and other groups have.

so one of the first so the first challenge is, actually, at least this is one of the things that i picked up, is that there's actually no one story. which makes it even more complicated to deal with. if there was one driving reason or one clear explanation for why people engaged in these activities, it would be a lot easier to deal with. now, there are some common denominators that did come out. one of the driving things is a perception amongst some that somehow, islam is under threat. and, again, this is a per verted narrative. but that's one of the elements that seems to come out. another element that seems to be something of a common denominator is individuals who feel like they have no stake in the societies that they're in. and no future. that, too, can be a driver. a lack of critical thinking skills. it is a common denominator in the studies that have been done.

and then, of course, in the countries in question, themselves, state repression corruption etc. are all , drivers. and, of course, for those of us who are dealing with foreign fighters who are coming back some of these folks are coming back disillusioned because the stories they were told by isil or other groups turned out not to be true. and, hopefully, they can be reintegrated. oirs are going to come back deeply troubled. psychologically, they have to be helped. but then you're going to have a very dangerous core to come back with experience, with skills further radicalized who are going to try and make trouble at home, and they have to be dilt with very drektly. -- and they have to be guilt with very directly. so what do you do about all of this? i think there are two components, at least, in what we've been trying to do.

these are people who are beyond the reach of reason. we go at them with everything we have. that is why we had done in the case of isil, is built strong military component. we are working with other countries to cut off financing and stop or slow the spread of foreign fighters. and we need to work on the message, the narrative to get at the appeal. home and security borders, all of that. vitally important and we're pouring tremendous amount of energy and resources in that but it has to be done in collaboration with others. but equally important, and it is not an either/or, choose one or the other. prevention is usually important, too. we want to try to encounter the appeal so that those who are susceptible to signing up are fewer in number. i think it is interesting. some of the things we heard last week, what are some of the tools in doing this? one of the most interesting things that jumps out at me was

one word -- parents. most parents don't want their kids to go off to syria or iraq. they desperately want to finds way to convince their kids if they get any knowledge that that's what they're thinking, not to do it. working with aaron's with committed is, helping to educate, giving them tools. that can be effective. the internet has been a profoundly powerful tool for extremists to attract recruits. this is a challenge we are deeply engaged in. friday's reasons, we are often not the best messenger. getting countries to step up, not just countries, identifying the right individuals who actually have the ability to reach people, that is critically important and we're working on that. two other things, this notion and this is a much longer-term

effort, how do you convince people in france or germany or denmark are bigger other place that they really do have a stake in the future of their societies. and that they don't become as susceptible as they are to some of these extremist narratives , which is important. two of the three charlie hebdo attackers went to prison, became ideological. that is something we also need to get a grip on. to come to your question about the so-called islamic label. i think it is a profound mistake to put that label on what we're seeing for two reasons. first of all, it is exactly what the extremists want. they want to be legitimized by an association with religion. we would be playing into their narrative.

second -- and by the way, i think this was pointed out in a piece the other day. there are 1.6 billion muslims. we would be allowing 0.0019% of particular group to define the entire group? that makes no sense. and, beyond that, the second reason is it actually has the potential to alienate the people that you need on the front lines combatting this problem. and that's exact lyly what we heard from most, if not all, from what i've heard from ministers and other delegates in the town last week. >> maybe you can grab david's mic or somebody. greg, you're coming next. you can keep the mic on. >> thanks, tony. last week, the un's special envoy for syria, he said in a private reefing, iran has been

supporting sere y regime to the tune of $35 billion annually. which is an astonishing figure. it is a must 10% of iran's gdp. i'm wondering if you can comment on that and if you can comment about has there been any evolution in iran's regional policies since the election? we're seeing a willingness to engage united states on a nuclear issue, but over the last year and a half, heavy seen any difference and original policies? thank you. >> thanks. second question first. i haven't seen any difference. if anything, i've seen iran trying to take advantage of different openings, for example, in yemen. and we've seen a continuation of destabilizing activities support for terrorist groups. i think there's been -- you could make the case that for reasons of their own, they've done some positive things in

iraq, not in any coordination or -- or cooperation with us because it advanced their interest. but that's their own agenda. the people who are responsible -- what we're doing is entirely segregated from everything else on the nuclear file. it has been walled off. and the people who are responsible for trying to pursue the agreement on behalf of iran are not the same people who are really in charge of their policy in other areas. so there seems to be a little bit of a dichotomy between the way they're approaching the nuclear issue, which has been, you know, i would say largely pragmatic which doesn't mean we , will get to an agreement versus their activity in other areas which have been arguably accelerated. second, with regard to the support of syria, i can't vouj -- vouch for the number that stefan said, but there's no doubt a significant amount of resources. and these are resources that

arguably, can't afford. which, hopefully, may be one incentive for iran to think about putting its weight and influence behind some kind of negotiated political tran sigsz. -- transition. the same goes for russia. there are also expanding significant resources to support al-assad. resources they also don't really have the luxury of spending in that way. one would hope that they will think twice going forward that it might be to their benefit to not have to make the same type of expenditures and help move in the direction of a political transition that allows syria to remain intact, its institutions in tact. but takes the magnet for extremism, which is bad for russia and bad for iran in terms of isil, away. and that's assad. >> mr. secretary, my question is

about linkage and to what extent you and your colleagues have been thinking about that. you spoke today very eloquently and many leaders of the administration has spoken also about the impact of our sanctions and european sanctions on russia and what kind of an adverse effect they have had. to what extent on a measurement from zero to 10 is there concern at the administration there may be linkage that results from that? to what extent are we relying upon russian cooperation for successful result with iran? >> it's a really interesting question and one that we've been looking at. here's what i can tell you in terms of practical observation. what has been interesting because i think it is a matter of self interest, when it comes to the iran nuclear

negotiations, the russians have been a constructive partner and they have remained a constructive partner. they have tried to advance constructive ideas in the course of these negotiations. so the profound difference that we have with them over ukraine has not bled into the iran nuclear negotiations. i would say similarly, although it is less acute because not as much is happening on north korea, that is not been especially problematic, either. i think what one can take from that is, in part, that where russia concludes that a particular issue and cooperation in the context of that issue advances its own interest, it's going to keep doing it irrespective of what's going on with ukraine or anything else. at least, that's been the case to date. i think one of the many

frustrations about the actions that russia chose to take in ukraine is that we have built, over some years, better cooperation with russia on a number of fronts that were obviously beneficial to our own security and interest. and presumably, beneficial to theirs. whether it was new start whether it was iran, whether it was afghanistan where rush sha -- russia has been important in allowing us to move people and material in and out. but that is no longer where we are in the relationship. the bottom line is, where it self interest is clearly at stake and cooperation advances that self-interest continues.

>> thank you. so how do you assess putin's intentions towards the three baltic states? is nato absolutely committed to defending them? and does nato have the military capability to do so whether it would be a conventional kind of aggression or, as we've seen them do in crimea and in the eastern provinces of ukraine, this sort of new, ser up tishsz -- surreptitious advances of ukraine? >> the answer is yes. period. with regard to the third part of the question, do we have the means to defend? again, the answer is yes. and one of the things that we've been working on since this crisis erupted was to take very concrete steps, not only to reassure our partners and allies, but also to enhance the capacity to deal with these kinds of challenges. i'm confident that if it came to

that -- thank you. the answer is yes. the first part of the question is a lot harder. and i don't know -- it's hard to read intentions. i think one thing i take from what's happening in ukraine, to some extent, there is been a lot of improvising by russia to deal with a fast-changing situation that was into be spinning out of control. but i think, unfortunately, from the improvising, as i try to make the case earlier, has asked the put it in a place where it is going to be a real strategic loss for them. but i can't put myself in that mindset. i do think that it would be a very serious mistake for anyone to doubt our commitment to -- and the commitment of other allies, to our nato commitments.

>> but what would that kind of defensive action look like if they used, say in latvia, the kind of mo the used in crimea? >> i'm not going to speck late -- speculate on what might happen in the future or hypothetical situations. i can say that they're looking very hard on acting on how they can better position themselves should something like that happen. but it is hard to really speculate about something like that. >> professor? >> thank you and thank you for this very conference of statement today. i would like to ask a semi-academic question back on ukraine, the perennial gap -- my question has to do with the perennial gap between words and deeds in our foreign policies. specifically, on ukraine.

it appears to me that when we talk about independence and sovereignty, when we talk about -- i think you mentioned, maybe not that were the sanctity of its borders some are we not promising more than what our allies in the atlantic alliance are prepared to deliver? >> charles, to date, at least, one of the great strengths, if not the greatest strength, the approach that we've taken in the ukraine, is that we've sustained a solidarity among our parter and allies. and we've managed to do virtually everything jointly and in lock step. and there's been criticism along the way that we should have gone further and faster, for example very's points on sanctions, and the presidents believe very strongly that we're actually much more effective if we can sustain that kind of joint action in solidarity

particularly, when it comes to exerting pressure. and, so, what we've seen, at leased up until now, is rather extraordinary unity with the major european partners on ukraine. it is not easy, as you know better than anyone. there are determined as pressures that governments are under to take different directions on this. but thanks in no small measure am at least in my judgment, first and foremost, to the president's leadership because i witnessed this firsthand. and it is stuff that doesn't get seen on a daily basis. but the constant calls and meetings led by him throughout have made a huge difference in keeping people on the same page. and of course, folks working for the president or the secretary engaging on this, that has made a huge difference. but we've also seen extraordinary leadership from our partners, starting with

angela merkel. and pray minister cameron president hollande and others. so we put a premium on tried to sustain that cooperation and coronation and nudity, again because that's how we're more affected. and, again, conversely, if we allowed putin to divide us, that would be a strategic success for him that we don't want and and can ill afford. but this is, as we've started out at the beginning saying, this is a very challenging situation. you have a country that is right there on ukraine's border with significant resources in terms of its military and proxies that it is supplying a supporting, promoting. and the idea that this can be reversed militarily, i think, is probably unlikely, which is why on a more asymmetric response,

primarily through exerting pressure i believe, over time, , is going to produce ree -- produce results that we looking for. but to do that, we need to keep the unity that we have with the europeans. >> thank you. tony, a slightly more personal question, if i you spent six may. years working in a white house and in an nsc that gained a reputation for being extremely covetous of the most sensitive you know, foreign policy files , was accused from time-to-time of micromanaging and there was clear frustration in the agencies with you know, on the , part of many people who felt that they just didn't have enough leeway. you've now gone to one of those agencies. so i'm wondering what life is like at the other end of the telescope? >> so, on my second day at the state department, we had a large staff meeting. and i said that i had come to one conclusion after 48 hours at state, is that micromanagement

from the white house has to stop. [laughter] look, my own experience, mark, and different people see this different ways, having worked in the clinton administration and having at least been a witness to the bush administration from congress, my sense is that this is the same story with different degrees, maybe, in virtually every administration. there are inhernt institutional challenges that are built into the system between the white house and the state department or the pentagon and, you know, you pick your agency. and sometimes it's a function of, in terms of how far up the dial you're going, the individuals, maybe it's a function of the issues at play, but it seems to be this is something that's just -- that's just baked in and built in. i like to think that when iflgs -- when i was still at the white house working on the interagency process, as the deputy national

security adviser that in fact, we ran a very inclusive process where all of the agencies and departments were at the table had their say and indeed, drug policy in most areas. that was the wait was supposed to work. and that is the way, at least in my small part, i try to make it work. so again, i think some of the frustrations and concerns they get expressed just him to be the natural product of the institutional relationship that exists in any administration. >> i've been given the signal that there's only one more question. and two people have been on the list for a while. so i'm going to ask both of you to ask the question together -- secretary blinken can use it as a springboard for his closing statement. >> i'm just wondering, we had a minsk agreement the other day.

i don't think it was never not under fire. did you know that is what was going to happen? is that what you expected? are there any red lines in ukraine as farce the administration is concerned? >> doyle, whiteout you ask one as well? -- why don't you ask one as well? >> i hope you'll take this as a welcome imitation to go back to restart of the session, tony knows your vigorous rebuttal of critics who worry the administration isn't doing an f leadership. some of that criticism is partisan, but not all of it is. there are plenty of possible explanations for why that concern arises. you have a bad patch, still conditioned by the cold war expect instant results. take yourself to the 40,000 foot level and right as the history of this administration's transformation of american

leadership. [laughter] >> first, david's question on ukraine. >> i think it is easier now. [laughter] >> look, it was a land grab. it was done after -- it was before the minsk agreement was signed. it was pretty far along. the cease-fire was supposed to take effect on sunday and it didn't. the separatist grabbed what they could, aided and abetted by russia. in my judgment, that needs to be accounted for going forward. i think it's clear, also going forward, that the cease-fire needs to be fully implemented. the heavy weapons need to be pulled back. and i think you heard the secretary say -- i can't remember if it was today or yesterday, probably yesterday at this point that absent those

initial steps being taken, we're going to have to deepen and extend the pressure on russia. and we're talking very closely to our european partners right now about next steps if these two very basic things, cease-fire, pullback of the heavy weapons, agreed to by russia, don't take place. that is what we're looking for. and we're looking for that in the coming days. if it doesn't happen, we will take account of that. on the 40,000 foot question, boy, that would take a while to try to answer with any kind of adequacy. i guess i would say this. you can look at the specifics of how the administration has handled different challenges, worked on different opportunities. you can look at the sort of big muscle movements of trying to bring to conclusion two large wars.

you can look at the big muscle movements out of these trade agreements which, were they to happen, tpp and ultimately teta, would cover about 75% of global gdp. you look at the big movement of climate change and whether we get a significant step forward in paris at the end of the year. but i guess, if i had to step back, i think what we're try to do is to look at a few basically guiding principles that we've tried to put in place. we obviously are not perfect in adhering to them, no one is. one, we're try to act with the sense of general purpose. it is probably the purpose that is extended from the beginning of the republic. and that is to look out for the security of our citizens, to try to advance economic prosperity to try to promote our values and maybe one added element, which

is to try and strengthen some of the institutions of international order. so we have worked to do that. we have tried to act and lead from a position of strength. that started with china get our economic house in order. -- we have tried to get our economic house in order. i think we're in a much better position than we have been. when i was in china last week i've been a previously with vice president biden in the depths of our economic crisis. that was a point i think jim will remember, when the chinese love to talk about, oh, maybe we should not keep our money in the united states it is so risky, to which the vice president said, go-ahead, take it out. they didn't because even in the depth of our crisis, it remained the best place the safest place. the vice president said than in our member well to the chinese leadership, it is never a good bet to bet against the united states. and i think at least right now where we are, he was right.

so we've tried to leave from the the position of strength, with what will remain the strongest military, by far, in the world. we have made the smart investments in that. the third, we've tried, as a general principle, to actually live and lead from our values. doing that at home to the extent possible, so you know, bringing , health care to 30 million more americans. that resonates around the world and i have heard it from traveling around the world. from working hard on closing guantánamo to ending torture jeter steps we have taken to demonstrate we're serious about living our values. we have tried to lead from the proposition that doing so with partners is the smarter and more effective way to advance our

interests around the world. we spent a lot of time working on building partner capacity working on cooperating with established partners, building the capacity of new ones. and that has very positive moments and then also frustrations. it's a long-term process. but we're infinitely better off doing it with partners where we can. we've also tried to make the case that we needed to use all the elements of national power. and not over-rely on one muscle. so the military element has remained critical. our economic strength has remained critical. but we've also sought to energize our diplomacy, to advance development, to tackle some of these large, underlying issues. i think one of the hallmarks is going to be, and people debate and dispute this, but the president believes strongly that

it doesn't really make a great deal of sense to bog down tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of americans in foreign lands for decades at a time when there may be other means of dealing with the security threats. so i think that's been something. finally, i would say we're trying to lead with a sense of perspective. here's what i mean by that. the fact of the matter is, this is a period of extraordinary change around the world, with nick faultlines that are moving. some good, some bad, some indifferent. it's what you make of it. and we see all of those fault lines very acutely in the middle east. where you have changing relationships among states and within states between the old , order and new aspirants, empowered individuals. conflicts that may be ethnic or religious in nature.

new technology that is bring people together, but also creating greater vulnerabilities. and i think what's important is at least for me, that i take away from this, is a lot of this is not about us. and we have to have some humility in thinking that we are the cause of every problem, or the solution. because so much of this has nothing to do with us. but the problem is, it affects us. if we don't deal with it, to the best of our ability, it will bite us even harder. beyond that, even if it is not about us and even if we can fix everything more than any other country honor, we have an ability -- at least on the margins -- to shape change, to mitigate some of challenges and downsized hopefully, to maximize some of its opportunities. so that is the perspective we've brought to bare. that is for a much how the president and the secretary would see them. you can run down the checklist

of where it has worked, where it hasn't worked, where it is still a work in progress. at the main thing of it with is what i started with. the notion that the united states is somehow not leading that we're not more engaged in more places than ever before is a simple thought experiment -- take us out of the picture of what all of the sings look like. i can tell you, they look a heck of a lot worse. thanks. [applause] i want to thank michelle smith and the robert smith foun dags -- foundation for sponsoring this. i want to pay my respects to deputy antony blinken. thank you for what you do. >> federal reserve chair janet yellen delivers the semi-on a terry policy report -- semi monetary policy report this morning.

starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern live on c-span3. secretary of state john kerry testifies today before the senate foreign relations committee. he will be question on the state department's 2016 budget request and challenges abroad, including isis, russia, and iran. that is live at 2:30 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> the political landscape has changed with the 114th congress. not only are there 43 new republicans and 15 new democrats in the house and 12 no republicans and one democrat in the senate, there's also 108 women in congress, clued in the first african-american republican in the house and the first woman veteran in the senate. keep track of the members of congress using congressional chronicle on c-span.org. it is lots of useful information

including voting results and statistics about each session of congress access to c-span, c-span2 c-span.org. >> coming up next, "washington journal" live with your phone calls. 45 minutes, walter jones discusses new authorization for military use being debated this week. texas representative sheila jackson lee looks at immigration

issues and homeland security spending. state and local government debt collection practices. host: good morning. it's tuesday, february 24, 2015. the senate yesterday evening failed to advance a bill aimed at funding that agency. the sticking point has been over to repeal president obama's executive order on immigration as senate majority leader mitch mcconnell new way forward today. we are opening our phones to you on the immigration debate and the looming department of homeland security shutdown. we want to know how you