and direction. that's actually what our companies have done together. but it's something that i think our country has to address. this is where, i believe, the country leaders have to come together with rules of conduct. it's the wild west out there today. there are no rules. and this is what government should do. they should say here's what we're going to do and not do. then as long as people know that, you don't surprise your citizens. you don't surprise your companies in terms of the directions. >> question about one or two recommend along those lines? >> first thing i would do is really educate your people that most of the problems come from somebody not following process and procedures. for all the complexity, usually the most important issues is somebody just left their password open. somebody took code home. there's good reasons for doing that. second, you need an overall security strategy. and you need to put not somebody good on it -- because it's the kiss of death to say to your

security officer, go fix it for me. it has to start with the c.e.o., to say this is a top priority for us as a company. but it is the thing that will slow our industry and can do billions of dollars of brand damage just like that, if bad >> question about one or two specific things that you would guys misuse the data. >> john? >> john, with the "wall street journal." take us back to india for a second and your enthusiasm about modi. there have been a lot of c.e.o.'s that have come back and said this is india's time. they've said that with congress in charge. what's different this time? >> sure. so i bet on india big-time almost 15 years ago as a vehicle for emerging countries and graduating 600,000 engineers a year. our

country only graduates 60,000 in the category i'm interested in. it's the top 5% of their populous who goes into these schools. unbelievably good talent. india's issues have been self-inflicted. and i think if you were to talk to c.e.o.'s three years ago, most of them would point out that they couldn't solve their problems. 76% of their economy is internally generated, so they don't have the problem with trade that china or other countries do. that's a nice way of saying they control their economy. their parties were so divisive. there was clearly corruption at the top. they didn't execute. they had no courage. and so what's different is you have a leader who is going to execute. like anything else, you don't want to make the expectations so high you can't deliver. he will make the tough decisions. he's

captured the imagination of the people. he's captured the imagination of the business community. we all know spending is more than half confidence in the business community. and the citizens. and he's streamlining government. he controls all the political operations. so he doesn't have to deal with a divided, using our words congress and senate, in terms of the direction. so that's why you see people suddenly enthusiastic. if they don't mess it up, they're going to have a great run. again, i'm going to bet again on india in a big way. that's different than many other emerging markets. you've got the problems in russia and china in terms of the challenges. would you agree with that, john? >> i don't know whether he has proved himself yet. i'm not sure modi has had a chance to prove himself yet. there have

been so many moments of enthusiasm about india that get caught in the bureaucratic traffic jam that then unholds. it was just interesting to hear you, this early in his tenure, so forcefully endorsing a belief that there's going to really be change. >> well, john, part of what i do, i bet on market transitions. we won't always be right. but you've got to bet before it becomes obvious. is it a given he'll be successful? >> well, john, part of what i do, i bet on market transitions. we won't always be right. but you've got to bet before it becomes obvious. is no. they have all the weaknesses of the world's largest democracy. but they have the youngest world population, a great education system for the very top. they need to bring that through. so if they execute, i think they're going to have a great run. you can handicap it, in terms of it, maybe two times out of three or play out. >> over here, please. >> ivan. what was your thought process in the purchase of scientific atlanta? i always thought that the cable boxes, set top boxes, were going to be the center of the connected home. when you bought it, i was excited, because i thought there would be no better company to make that happen. yet nothing has really evolved on the set-top box in the past 10 years. and the time since you brought it. >> three thoughts. whenever you interface to your customers, if you're trying to be something other than just a transport or network, you say, where do they make their money?

my view, and it has not changed, the vast majority of service providers around the world make their money on video. it would not only be 95% of the load on the network, it will also be the entertainment. netflix, comcast are going after that. or some of the european companies, on buying sports teams. the scientific atlanta decision for us, brought us into the most relevant space for the customers. and they had a unique expertise the customer did not have. what is occurring now, however, is the set-top boxes are comot commodityizing. so the ability to move from set-top boxes into the cloud with video into the cloud is the next transition we've got to make. it's hard to do. the margins on set-top boxes have dropped a fair amount. but there are areas you have to play for the service providers. the number one is video.

the number two is mobility. the number three area is, how do they transform themselves to provide a different level of capability to their individual customers, to small to medium business and to enterprise? and how quickly they can develop these new services. if you align with their top priorities, you're going to sell them a lot. if you don't align with the top priorities and all you're doing is providing boxes, you're going to get killed by the white-label players. the boxes they sell it at extremely low margins. that's the play we're making, and it's been a good one for us in terms of relevance and service providers.

>> a couple more questions for those who have them. all right. yes, please. >> i'm aning investigative reporter. i'm curious, if you would be kind enough to elaborate a little more on the organized crime attacks on security. are they all in eastern europe, russia, china? >> no. they're everywhere. if you watch what is occurring organized crime, you know, it's like in the movies. why do you rob a bank? that's where the money is. the organized crime everywhere in the world is beginning to look at if you're going to try to take money from people or from companies, how do you do it in this new electronic age? unfortunately, they're getting remarkably sophisticated. some of the strong players are out in eastern europe. some of them are out of lavin out of latin america. unfortunately, their

ability to get the sophistication of the attacks down -- so many people think well it's just software connected to somebody's electronic device. 99.9% of the security issues are done different ways. this is one that i think is going to be with us for a while. it's one that each consumer, unfortunately, has to become educated on. what are the implications if you open up a letter that looks like it's sent from your bank that actually was somebody else doing fishing? and this is where i think there's opportunities for companies to really be successful in the security segment. we're going to try to take a negative and make a very positive. time will tell if we'll be as successful as i believe we can be. we're going to try to take a >> one last question. >> christian blum from. the name emc came up.

you guys have been mentioned as being potentially in the mix. i was just wondering if you'd want to comment on that. >> first, i think joe is a very good leader. emc is a very good partner for us. what we did with emc is in the storage business, we partnered with them, net app, now ibm, to lead in the data centers in terms of direction. what we've done different than many of our counterparts is we've combined all of our products to work together. so we really have uniquely gone across each of our product areas and service areas, so it's one front in terms of direction, emc decided not to do that, which perhaps opened up some of the challenges. you don't want to comment on activity with a given company,

but i'll make an exception on this one. we usually get the opportunity for almost every move in the industry. the name emc came up. we usually -- we treat the people well, et cetera. if joe and i were going to do something here, we would have done it a year or two ago in terms of the direction. so that's back to the market transitions question. >> all right. that's a very candid answer. glad we could end on that. it's been great visiting with you. my image of you climbing up a hill with a smile on your face is what i'd take away. great to have you. thank you very much. please give warm applause to john chambers. >> final words. >> thank you very much indeed. you're clearly getting more than enough sleep. time to come back to work. and john, if i may extraordinary, 20 years at the top of the technology sector an extraordinary period of longevity. when you became c.e.o. of cisco, steve jobs was still in exile from apple. the first iphone was almost a decade way. mark zuckerburg was in the sixth grade. and ali babba was simply a fictional character.

ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed, all of you for being here. you can see this again. please join us for our next viewpoints breakfast, which will be december 8 with denise morrison, the c.e.o. of the campbell soup company. it will be december, it will be cold it will be a perfect time to be talking about soup and all those other great products. thank you very much! enjoy your day! ♪ [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015]

i want to thank him for being here and i'll properly introduce him in a moment. the president has sent forward a request for the

authorization for the use of military force. because of the nature and the way that this is happening that the conflict has been ongoing for about six months now, i think one of the things that most people here are concerned about is that there is a level of confidence in what we're doing and that it is going to achieve the stated goals that the president has laid out. and i don't know of anybody more equipped to come before us today than general allen, who served our country with great distinction. i think many people feel decently well about what is happening in iraq. i think there are a lot of questions relative to syria. my sense is today you'll have a number of questions regarding that. and we hope that what you'll do general allen is give us an honest assessment as to the end state we would like to see happen in iraq and syria when we complete the activities that we're involved in. and understand the political and military strategy that we have under way. and to give us a little sense of time frame relative to the various activities that are necessary. i was just in iraq last week in both baghdad andish isherbil with our kurdish friends and ankara with our turkish

friends. the shia militias are everywhere in iraq as people know. general sulayman who was head of the force for iran has now become a celebrity in iraq. and i have to say it feels very strange to be there knowing much of the activity we have under way while it is necessary is really to iran's benefit. and i know there is a lot of concerns that after this activity is completed, if we're successful with isis, which i know we will be, and in essence the next issue is going to be dealing with security of our forces there with the shia militias. i was happy to see that turkey has gone ahead and signed an agreement, to train and equip agreement, that's something you made happen and thank you for that.

at the same time, i know there is a lot of concerns now about how we deal with assad's vero bombs as we train and equip these individuals, how do we protect them from the barrel bonds which cause them to diminish in greater numbers than they can be trained. i'm sure you'll talk about that. there is a lost discussion as you you know on the ground there about the exclusion zone. i know you have questions about that. and no fly discussions. it may be taking place to draw turkey more into what is happening in syria itself, which i think most of it -- most of us believe is very important. so as we -- as i close, i want to say we owe it to our nation as we consider this to know that the full range of america's elements of national power, diplomatic, economic, and military means are aligned aligned in such a way to get to the administration's stated goals. because of the nature of this decision, one, again this being made after a fact, all of us need to have confidence that

the administration is truly committed to achieving the stated goals that they laid out and i think your testimony here is going to be very valuable to us. with that, i would like to turn to our distinguished ranking member, senator menendez who has been a great partner on all of these issues. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for calling the hearing and for our work forward on this. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for calling the hearing and for our work forward on this. and general allen, welcome back to the committee and thank you for your distinguished service to our country in so many different ways including your present position as a special envoy. although this hearing is not focused on the administration's proposed authorization for the use of military force against isil, it is by nature an opportunity to probe the focused on the administration's

dynamics of our current anti-isil strategy that will inform our discussion of an aumf. and specifically with a strategy that relies on u.s. air power and logistics, intelligence and training support, but not on u.s. troops on the ground would be successful in achieving our ultimate goal to end the barbaric rampage of isil. there are those who believe that it is up to our local partners on the ground to ultimately take this war across the finish line. i've heard from others who believe isil can be defeated -- cannot be defeated without a significant u.s. ground commitment. so i would like to hear from you, general allen, where you come down on what will be required to eradicate isil, given that we hear reports from secretary carter's meetings in kuwait that while the anti-isil strategy does not require fundamental recalibration, our coalition partners can be doing more. my view personally is that the united states must help combat isil and restore stability to the region. and we must follow through on

co-director of the 21st century security and intelligence contributions, not the coordination of the military activities, i remain nonetheless closely synced with my colleagues in the military and we meet regularly with other departments and agencies involved to review the progress of theactivities. we're discussion the next steps. now that we largely achieved the objectives of the campaign's first phase, to blunt isil's strategic operational and tactical momentum in iraq. through over 2500 coordinated coalition air strikes in support of our partners on the

ground, we degraded isil's leadership, logistical and operational capabilities and we're denying it essential sanctuary in iraq from which it can plan and execute attacks. with new zealand's very welcome announcement yesterday that it will provide military trainers to build the capacity of the iraqi security forces, a dozen coalition nations now participating in these efforts are operating from multiple sites across iraq. still, the situation in iraq remains complex. and the road ahead will be challenging and nonlinear. considering where we were only eight months ago, one can begin to see how the first phase of the strategy is delivering results. as i appear before this esteemed committee today, it is important to recall that in june of last year, isil burst into the international scene as a seemingly irresistible force. it conquered a city, mosul, of 1.5 million, then poured south down the tigris river valley toward baghdad, taking cities and towns and villages along the way. outside tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over a thousand iraqi army recruits. to the west it broke through the border town and poured east toward baghdad. isil's spokesman vowed, quote, toward baghdad, taking cities and towns and villages along the way. outside tikrit, it rounded up the battle will soon rage in baghdad. and the holy city of karbala unquote. shortly there after isil launched a multiple prong attack further into northern iraq, massacring minority populations, and enslaving hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands of yazidis and opening a clear route to erbil the region's

capital. then the united states acted. since our first air strikes in august, isil's advance has been blunted. and they have been driven back from the approaches to baghdad and erbil. isil lost half of its iraq based leadership. thousands of hardened fighters and is no longer able to mass and maneuver effectively and to commune communicate as an effective force. iraqis standing on their feet. the the peshmerga has taken control of the mosul dam, the crossing with syria, the sinjar mountain, zumar and the kissic road junction which eliminated a supply route for isil from syria to mosul. these forces also broke the siege of the oil refinery and have begun to push north into the tigris valley.

to the west, sunni tribes are working with iraqi security forces to retake the land in the heart of al anbar, a land i know well. last weekend under the cover of to the west, sunni tribes are bad weather, isil launched an attack on the town of al baghdadi, near the air base in al anbar where our forces are located with the danes and australians to help to train iraqi soldiers and tribal volunteers. isil as it has done over and over again rampaged through the town, killing civilians and driving hundreds of families into the safe haven of the air base. but the iraqis did not sit idle. they organized and fought back. the prime minister went to the joint operations center in baghdad and ordered an immediate counterattack. town, killing civilians and driving hundreds of families into the safe haven of the air base. but the iraqis did not sit idle. they organized and fought back. the prime minister went to the joint operations center in baghdad and ordered an immediate counterattack. the minister of defense flew to al assad to organize available forces and iraqi army commander sent an armored column from baghdad to road march to al baghdadi to join the attack. and sunni tribal volunteers organized to support and in some cases led the attack. today, much of al baghdadi is back in the hands of the local

and tribal forces and as i was at al assad last month and my deputy was there just three days ago, i would tell you that all americans would be proud to see what our troops are doing there, helping the rackiesy s deputy was there just three days ago, i would tell you that all americans would be proud to see what our troops are doing there, helping the rackiesy s yiraqis and the tribes. this is only the start and isil will remain a substantial foe. but any aura of the invincibility of isil has been shattered. isil is not invincible. it is defeatable. and it is being defeated by iraqi forces, defending and taking back their towns and their cities and ultimately their country with the support of the united states and the coalition. and importantly, very importantly, the aura of the so-called caliphate is destroyed. and the future of the so-called caliph is very much in doubt. because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in syria, the situation there is more challenging and more complex. still, we're working closely

with regional partners to establish sites for training, and equipping vetted and moderate syrian opposition elements to train approximately 5,000 troops per year for the next three years. these and other military aspects of the campaign will inevitably receive the most attention. but as i've seen in the four previous coalition efforts in which i've been involved, it will ultimately be the attack on the town of al aggregate pressure of the campaign activity over multiple, mutually supporting lines of effort that will determine the campaign's success. this is why when i visit a coalition capital, when i meet with the prime minister or a king or a president, i describe the coalition's counterisil strategy as being organized around multiple lines of effort. the military line to deny safe with regional partners to haven and provide security assistance, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, disrupting isil's financial resources providing humanitarian relief and support to its victims, and countermessaging or defeating the idea of isil. since mid-september i've travelled to 21 partner capitals, several of them multiple times to meet with national leadership there.

and in that short span we have assembled a global coalition of 62 nations and international organizations. of the many recent visits leaders expressed heightened concern for the immediate and generational challenge presented by foreign fighters and rightly so. through capacity building in leaders expressed heightened the balkans, criminal justice efforts in north africa, and changes to laws in more than a dozen countries, partners are working together to make it more difficult for citizens to fight in syria and iraq. even with the expanded measures, foreign fighters continue to make their weay to the battlefield. we must continue to harmonize our processes and promote intelligence sharing among our efforts in north africa, and partners.

this kind of information sharing has also allowed the coalition to make significant gains in synchronizing practices to block isil's access to banks within the region and globally. this includes stemming the flow of private donations and restricting isil's ability to generate oil revenues. we're now expanding these efforts to counter isil's efforts to informal networks. the coalition is also supporting the united states efforts to provide food and aid and supply critical and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable children and women and men from harsh winter conditions in the region. the ravaged communities isil leaves in its wake bare witness to the true identity, one where actively we're working with coalition partners to expose with arab partners taking a leading role. isil was attractive to many recruit because of its proclamation of the so-called caliphate and the sense of inevitability it promoted. the last six months have amply demonstrated that isil is really operating as a criminal gang and a death cult, under increasing pressure as it sends naive and gullible recruits to die by the hundreds. coalition partners are working together as never before to share messages, engage traditional and social media and

underscore the vision of religious leaders who reject isil's millennialist vision. as the president announced, we're partnering with the united arab emirates to create a joint messaging center that will contest isil's offensive and extremist messages for the long-term and seeking to create a network of these centers, a global network, where regional consortium of nations can dispute and dominate the information space filled with isil's messaging. the president has outlined a framework for the authorities he believes will be necessary to pursue this long-term campaign with this formal request to the congress for the authorization for the use military force against isil. the aumf requests using our unique capabilities instead of large scale deployments of ground forces. taking the fight to isil requires that we be flexible and

patient in our efforts. it also requires close coordination with this committee and with the congress so that we're constantly evaluating our tactics and strategy and that we resource them appropriately. chairman and ranking member menendez, i thank you for the opportunity to be before this committee today and to continue that process of coordination and consultation with you and i look forward to taking your questions. >> we thank you for the testimony. and for your great service to our country. yesterday senator kerry testified that he felt like that today the administration already has, because of the '01 aumf and the '02 aumf the authority to conduct the operations that are being conducted against in iraq and syria. do you agree with that assessment? >> i do, chairman. >> okay. so it is an interesting place that we find ourselves, where six months after conflicts have begun, a new aumf is being

offered and i know that in order to pursue one properly through congress, that's the standard process which i appreciate. but it is an interesting place that those authorities already exist. the train and equip program you've been able to negotiate, many been able to negotiate, many concerns have been raised about the fact that most of the free syria initially was targeting assad. now we're organizing these against isis. we're going against an entirely different recruitment group to do that. are we finding that to be on easy recruitment process? >> we -- as we began this, chairman, we weren't sure frankly, how that recruitment process would unfold. just two days ago i had the opportunity to have a conversation with the great

soldier that the united states has put against this challenge the general layout of. the numbers were much high than we thought and it's been very encouraging. we've had an encouraging sense that there is an interest in this outcome. >> my sense is there are, based on my experiences last week, there are larger groups of people willing to go against isis initially in this train and equip program than some initially thought is that correct? >> that is correct. >> one of the big moral dilemmas is that as we train and equip these folks, we know that assad is barrel bombing other members of the members of the army today. but my understanding is there's been significant discussions with turkey over an air exclusion zone in the northwestern aleppo area and a new fly zone along the border.

and that's been the issue that's hinder them getting more involved in the content, even though they're working with us more fully than they have. that has been the issue that has kept them from actually getting more involved. it's also my understanding that that decision, the decision to do that is at the president's desk. it's at the white house and he's nod made a decision yet as to whether to engage. can you update us on that or tell us the effect of that decision not being made on turkey getting more involved in the conflict open helping us with the ground operations you were talking about earlier? >> well, i'll start by reciting what i've said before with respect to turdy. -- with respect to turkey. we have an old friendship with turkey and they are an ally. and where we began this

conversation just some months ago and where we are today, i think there's been significant progress from the conversation about turkey's role in the coalition and all that we want to accomplish together, and in particular what we would like to accomplish in syria. that conversation isn't over. but there has been much progress. i just met with a turkish delegation yesterday and i intend to head back in the very near future to continue that conversation. and part of that conversation obviously is those measures or are those measures that can be taken either collectively or by a larger coalition to provide protection for the modern syrian elements that we support and ultimately will produce over time. i won't get into the specific details of the conversation but that's an important conversation and we're going to continue the conversation in the future. >> it is fair to say that there are significant decisions that our government needs to make and if they're made, could break a logjam relative to greater involvement by turkey.

that would be a fair assessment am i right? >> it is a fair assessment. the details of what that conversation can be can lead us in several directions. there was the initial conversation about a formal no-fly zone which was very specifically and purposefully laid out on a map. the real issue isn't necessarily a no-fly zone. it's how do we protect our allies. putting all measures together necessary to provide for that protection is the heart of the conversation that we're going to continue to have with the turks. >> one final question and i'll stop and turn it over to senator menendez. in the event that we needed to protect those that we're training and equipping and other members of the free syrian army, in the event we needed to protect them against assad barrel bombing them, do you

believe that that is something that needs an additional authority other than what is now being requested? >> i would have to study that, chairman. my hope is that we'd be able to provide the kind of protection that they need and they deserve within the authorization that we're currently proposing. >> you would want to make sure that we knew that that type of authorization was a part of anything we may do? >> i think so, yes, sir. that's going to be clearly a part of the outcome. >> okay. senator menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen, you're a retired u.s. marine four star general, you were the former commander of nato's international security assistance force and the u.s. forces in afghanistan for about a year and a half and then you became the senior adviser to the secretary of defense on middle east security. you commanded during that a period of time 150,000 u.s. and

nato forces in afghanistan during a critical period of the war. i put that out there, one in recognition of the service, and, two, in also the framework of my question. what does enduring -- no enduring combat forces mean? >> well, i think obviously the nature of the contingency or the emergency or the potential conflict will give us the indications of what kinds of measures would need to be taken in the aggregate to deal with that emergency, to give the president the kinds of options that he needs in order to protect the lives of american citizens and americans interests in the homeland. each one of these emergencies

will be different. each one will require a different aggregation of american hard and soft power ultimately to solve them. i think it would be difficult to put necessarily a level of precision against the word enduring. i think what we'll seek to do -- and i believe this administration and future administrations would be obviously very interested in consulting with the congress about each particular emergency -- >> i appreciate a consultation. the problem is you reference your answer in the context of emergencies. but no enduring offensive combat troops doesn't necessarily only apply to emergencies. if you send 20,000 troops in there four months, is that enduring? >> again, senator, i think that trying to put a specific amount of time on the word enduring -- >> so it's neither time nor size?

>> i think we take a full appreciation of what we're facing. and i believe that we give the president the options necessary in order to deal with the emergency. and enduring might only be two weeks. but enduring might be two years. we need to make sure we put the right resources against the contingency and give us the amount of time necessary, us being all of the american people, the time necessary to solve the problem. >> and i think you've obviously stated the challenge that we have. two weeks is one thing, two years is another. and this is the problem with the language as it exists. there is no clear defining element of the authorization given to the president in which hundreds but maybe tens of thousands of troops could be sent. they could be sent for long periods of time. that's a challenge.

so how we get our arms around that, you know, i think i can fairly speak for democrats. we want to fight isil. but we can't provide a blank check to this or any future president, because everything that's envisioned goes beyond this president. i wanted to use your expertise to put my arms around it. following up on the chairman's questions, isn't it basically true that unless we buy into something that is about getting rid of assad turkey is not really going to engage here with us in the way that we want them to? >> the turks have not indicated that to me in our conversation. i think we share the same goal with respect to syria, that is that the solution to syria is not going to be determined by military force. that ultimately we desire a military outcome in syria that is one of the syrian people and that outcome does not include bashar al assad.

but i have not had the requirement that we take concerted effort against bashar al assad as a precondition for the turks to have any greater role in the coalition to deal with isil. >> isn't it true that turdy at this point is still allowing -- that turkey at this point is still allowing foreign fighters to cross its borders into syria? >> if foreign fighters get across the border, it's not because the turks allow it. i had a conversation with them yesterday. i've watched them grip the problem. it is a greater problem that me of us had imagined at the beginning. they've attempted to strengthen their border crossing protocols. we're seeking greater intelligence sharing with them in that regard. we're restructuring some

elements of the coalition, specifically to focus the capabilities of nations on the issue of the movement and the dealing of foreign fighters through transit states of which the turks are going to play an important role in that process within the coalition. do foreign fighters cross turkey and get into syria? yes, they do. do the turks permit that? i don't think so. >> one final question. iran is in the midst of iraq. it's in the midst of syria. do we share much rale goals with iran? >> well, i'll say that our goals with respect to iraq is that we return iraq to the sovereign control of the people and the government. >> do you think the iranians share that view? >> i believe so. i believe the iranians would believe that their interests -- would consider their interests are best served -- >> because they have significant influence in iraq?

>> they have regional interest and those interests are in iraq. that's not something that should surprise us or necessarily alarm us. >> i'm looking beyond. so if we think an accommodation with iran to fight isil is good, the aftermath of that in iraq, in syria, in yemen and elsewhere in my view is not so good. so times we look at the short game versus the long one and i'm concerned about what the long one is. >> i would not propose that we're accommodating iran and iraq at this moment. we're undertaking the measures that we're undertaking in iraq with the iraqis. but as you have pointed out and your question presupposed, the iranians have an interest in the stable iraq, just as we in the region have an interest in the stable iraq. that doesn't mean we're accommodating the iranians by the measures we're taking in iraq.

>> general allen, thank you for your service. i do not envy your task. in your testimony you say that isis has lost half of its iraq based leadership. how do we know that? >> i'm sorry, say again your question, sir. >> you say that isis has lost half of its iraq-based leadership? how do we know that? do we have pretty good intelligence on this? >> we actually do have pretty good intelligence on this matter. the process of tracking the elements within the senior esh longs of isil's leadership we've been tracking them and dealing with them. >> in the last six months you we've aptly demonstrated that isil now finds itself under pressure. how many people are coming into

the battle, actually being drawn and recruited by what they see in isis versus the people that really are dying? >> well i think that's a difficult number to -- >> is it positive or negative? are more people joining the fight versus what we're able to -- >> i would say two things. the numbers are up and they're up because we are now tracking the numbers in ways that we haven't before. i think the numbers are also up because of the caliphate. and that has created a magnetism for those elements that want to be part of this, that want to support this, this emergence within their own sense of their faith. and so that has created a recruiting opportunity for isil that they had not had before. so we're going to continue to track those numbers. it's not just a matter of dealing with those numbers in the battle space. we're dealing with those numbers by virtue of taking other measures. as my testimony indicated, we operate along five lines of effort.

the military line is one of them. another line where we'll be seeing more traction be realized as time goes on will be the consortium of nations that have taking the necessary steps to make it difficult to be recruited in a country, to transit out of that country and ultimately get to the battle space. plus, as isil, the so-called caliphate as it continues and receive blow after blow, using that to message what this organization is to decrease its attractiveness to other those that might otherwise be attracted. it would take all of those measures in concert. >> that leads to me next question. defeat sounds good. but can you describe what defeat looks like? >> it is that this organization has been rendered ineffective in

its capability of being an external threat to iraq. we're not going to eradicate or annihilate isil. most of the organizations that we've dealt with before, there will be some residue of that organization for a long period of time to come. but with we don't want it to be abilities to threaten iraq ore other states in the region. we want to generate funding which limits dramatically its operational decision-making and capabilities to affect discretion with respect to its recruiting and battlefield capabilities. we want to compete with it and ultimately overcome or defeat its message in the information sphere where it's assured significant capability. we know how we want to deal with them in the financial sphere and the information sphere and all of those together constitute -- will constitute the defeat of isil.

>> you mentioned the establishment of the caliphate the article in the atlantic really laid out that that is a draw, that is a pull, that establishes a certain benchmark, a certain motivation for people being recruited. it relies on territorial gains or holding on territory. is that part of defeat, deny them territory. >> absolutely. >> so that that caliphate no longer exists? we're talking about december mags. that's what secretary kerry -- that was the word he used, decimate. kind of like after nazi germany, people scattered around the world. that's not what i'm hearing from you. >> decimation is clearly one of the terms that we might apply to it. we want them to have in

operational capability in the end. break them up into small organizations that don't have the capacity as it begins to attempt to mass to be a threat. >> define a small organization. again, i'm just trying to get some sense of what we mean by defeat. it sounds great, deny them operational capabilities. are we talking about taking 30,000 down to 500? >> it will take time. it will take time that will ultimately be realized in a number of ways, breaking up the organization through kinetic and military service means, it will take time to reduce the message and the attractiveness that gives it the capacity to regenerate its forces, it will take time to deny it to the international financial system that gives it the capability of restoring itself or generating capabilities. all of those things together, if we deny the access, defeat their information, break them up into small groups, then that's defeat.

>> i'm out of time. thank you, general. >> senator carden. >> thank you very much for your continued service to our country. these are extremely challenges times and we're very proud of your leadership. >> thank you, sir. >> you're urging us to be patient, that this is going to take some time in order to achieve our mission of not only degrading but destroying and defeating isil. you believe, as i understand that the authorizations previously passed by congress give the administration the authorizations for use of force. but i also understand you support the president's request to congress? >> i do. i do, sir. >> and of course the president's request for congress is pretty specific on isil and expires in three years.

it's clear that there may well be a need for a continued military presence beyond that three years. >> i would say probably a need for military activity, u.s. activity in some form or another, yes, sir. >> and i think that's an honest assessment. >> sure. >> and if i understand the reasoning behind the request is that the current administration recognizes it will be up to the next administration to come back to get the next congress and administration together on the continued commitment to fight terrorists and what use of force will be necessary. >> i can't answer that precisely but it would seem that's a logical reason for that. >> so my point is, why doesn't that also apply to 2001 authorization of force? here we're talking about a threat that was identified last year that we are currently combating, recognizing that the campaign or use of force may well go beyond three years.

but it's the prerogative of the next congress and administration to define the authorizations that are needed. the 2001 authorization, which was passed against a known threat against the united states and afghanistan now still being used to a threat such as isil wouldn't the same logic apply that congress should define the 2001 authorization contemporary with the current needs t after al qaeda? >> i've traveled to many of the is coalition and one of the things that has been clear to me as i have traveled to these capitals has been the really substantial gratitude of

the coalition for american leadership. and the willingness for america to act. and in so many ways, these nations, the coalition, see isil in a very different way than they ever saw al qaeda. they're grateful for our leadership and our willingness to act. and i believe that that aumf, which is specifically tailored to isil, with a strong support of the congress, gives not just the president the options that are necessary ultimately to deal with this new and unique threat, but it also reinforces the image of the american leadership that i think is so deeply wanted by our partners and so deeply needed by this country and ultimately by the coalition to deal with isil the way we want to. >> and i understand that and it's limited to three years. >> that's right. >> would you agree that our success in iraq in dealing with

isil very much depends upon the sunni tribes taking a leadership role in stopping the advancement of isil, that it's difficult for the shiites and the western force to be able to get the type of confidence in the community to with stand the recruitments of isil? >> i put it slightly differently. i would absolutely agree with you. but i think it takes decisive sunni leadership as well within iraq. but the tribes will be essential to the outcome. >> your question is correct, sir. >> what is your confidence level in the government of iraq and baghdad and its ability to work with the sunni tribal leaders to

give them the confidence that their centralized government represents their interest and protects their interest? it's a hard sale, senator. because previously we asked the sunni tribes to trust the central government in baghdad under maliki. it didn't work out too well for them. but i've met with them and been pleased frankly, very pleased at their willingness to accept the leadership of prime minister abadi and the minister of the interior and helping them to be a principle mechanism. that has been an encouraging sign for me, frankly, to see them not just as a group of tribes but also as leaders of the tribes be public and forthcoming in their willingness to support the central government in iraq and in particular prime minister abadi. >> i really do appreciate your service. >> yes, sir. >> senator paul. >> general allen, thanks for your testimony.

what percentage would you say is an estimate of how many of the official iraqi army are sunni versus shiite? >> i'll have to take the question. the standing army, the prepond dance is the majority is shia. i'll take the question. >> it's on the hills of what senator carden is asking. the iraqi army being shia. i think to have an enduring victory there's some question whether you can have an enduring victory and occupy mosul. so i think that still is a significant political problem and a significant military problem as well. of the chief tans that fought in the surnl, what percentage are engaged on our side now fight against isis, what percentage on the shrines and what percentage indifferent? >> those are numbers that are difficult to give you with any precision. the ones i fought alongside in '07 and '08, the ones i've

spoken to without exception have indicated their desire to fight, to recover their lands, to ultimately return to the tribes and ultimately to iraq. they've been forthcoming in their desire to do that. >> and the chief tans are no longer in the area? >> many of them are. some at great risk traveled out of the area it mately to speak with us. but they are. and many of them are in ie man and they're in other places. >> with regard to arming the kurds, there were reports a month or two ago that germany wanted to send arms directly to them but there were objections by our government saying everything had to go to baghdad. are the arms forced to go

through baghdad to get the kurds? >> i'll take the question but let me offer this. baghdad has not disapproved any request that the kurds have made for weapons. we have attempted to work with baghdad to streamline to the maximum extent possible to reduce any delays that may inhibit or impair the expeditious delivery of arms and equipment to the kurds. >> do you think this includes sufficient technology and long range weaponry to meet their needs and their requests? >> all that is coming. as you know, sir, through the support of the congress we're training and equipping 12 iraqi brigades, and the peshmerga brigades will be armed and equipped with the same sophisticated weapons that the other brigades will receive. >> is there any possibility that any of that could be transported to the kurds?

>> that's a question we should pose to the department of defense but i'll take the question. >> thank you. with regard to ultimate victory with regard to trying to get turkey involved, do you think there's any possibility of an agreement wean the turks and the kurds, particularly the turkish kurds to accept and agreement where there would be a kurdish homeland not in turkish territory that would encourage turkey then to participate more heavily and is anybody in the state department trying to come to an accommodation between the turks and the kurds? >> not to my knowledge. >> take that message to them too, please. thank you. >> senator if i may, on the one comment that you made to the shia and iraqi security forces the actions that are going to be taken in these towns are going to be more than simply those of the clearing force. what's going to be important to

recognize is there will be follow along after the clearing force. we're working closely with the iraqis for the hold force which will be hopefully the sunni police which will actually secure and provide support to the iraqi population that will just have been liberated. the governance element, the most important aspect of the clearance, the immediate humanitarian assistant necessary to provide for relief of the populations. it's more complexion than just the clearing force. while we may have to accept that there is a large presence of the shia elements within the iraqi military, i know that there's a very strong effort under way to ensure that the sunnis are deeply entangled where in all of the other aspects of the recovery of the population. >> one quick follow-up to that. i think you might get more support from the sunni people if you were leafletting the place saying it's led by sunni generals. i think our problem was mosul was being occupied by a shiite force and they didn't say long once push came to shove they were pretty much gone. thank you.

>> senator markey. >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. thank you, general, so much for your service. in the authorization for the use of military force text that the administration provided to this committee, it said it would prohibit enduring ground forces. and this was meant to convey that large numbers of troops wouldn't be on the ground for a long time. whatever that means. i voted for the 2001 resolution and i'm reminded that the u.s. combat operations in afghanistan were dubbed operation enduring

freedom. we are now past 13 years in that enduring fight and that resolution, of course, was also the basis for the justification of our actions in somalia, in yemen and the administration is saying quite clearly that they oppose the repeal of that. and that the operations that are going on right now in fact are consistent with that 2001 resolution. now that causes great problems to me and i think many members of the committee. because even in the absence of the passage of a new aumf, the administration is maintaining that they have the authority to continue as they have for 13 years under operation enduring

freedom. and so that obviously is a problem for us, because that sits there as an underlying authority for the next president, democrat or republican, who is sworn in on january 20th, 2017. and most of us will be sitting here at that time as your successor is sitting here. and perhaps not with the same interpretation of the word enduring. so my questions then go to, is this going to open up a potential for an open-ended war in the middle east? will it allow for unfettered deployment of ground troops? and ultimately whether or not we are opening up pandora's box especially in syria. so my first question to you goes to president assad and what the

goal will be underneath this authorization in terms of the removal of president assad which has been historically an objective that the united states has said is important. so could you tell us what president assad and his removal represents as one of the goals that exists in training 5,000 troops in syria for the next three years in a row, as the long term objective after the defeat of isis? >> well our political goal, the policy goal ultimately is that the process of change of assad's departure should occur through a political process and that ultimately he should depart and not be part of the future of the political landscape in syria. the role of the program is to

first and foremost, give those elements of the moderate syrian opposition we're supporting the capacity to defend themselves, to build better field credibility and ultimately to use those elements and forces to deal with stash and the context of the strategy to deal with stash. at the same time we're building that capacity, our hope would be to build within the political echelon, a sophistication that the two together, the political and the military echelon are the critical force that will have a place at the table during the political process that will see the replacement of assad. >> it seems to me that's a ten-year proposition. and if that's the case, we should be talking in a ten-year

period. we can finish iraq over the next three years, but then that's a much longer process and we should just understand what the long term goal requires of us inside syria. and just saying assad's name over and over again will help us focus on the ultimate objective that the free syrian army is going to have in that country and then what we're signing up for in terms of the long term military effort inside of that country. and if i -- and i thank you, mr. chairman, for the opportunity to ask this one final question which is, the basic tension that king abdullah was talking about, which is that of the americans providing help to fight the war but not claiming credit, so it does not look like a kru said -- like a crusade inside that region, can you talk about that so that the people in the region do not view this as an u.s.-led coalition against isil because ultimately that then comes back to haunt us.

that was the message that we were receiving from all across the middle east. >> well i think, senator, king abdullah of jordan has been very clear throughout the period of this coalition that in the end the solution to the problems of the region must not only look like but must be the function of those states within the region to take concerted action supported by the united states and supported by a broader global coalition for those concerted actions to be successful. it's very important obviously that the solution have an arab face and a muslim voice with respect to dealing with the so-called caliphate and all that it has brought to the region. and the king and other muslim and arab leaders in the region have been very clear on the

desire that they -- not just appear but really are exercising leadership frontally in this process. >> i don't think the people in that region view it that way. but it has to be our goal. we have to switch it so that it's not us. senator paul was referring to that, that it has to be an indigenous muslim-led effort and i don't think right now that's the internal view. thank you. >> senator isaacson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen, thank you for your service to the country. i followed you closely on tv the last couple of months and i think you've done a great job. we're operating under the 2001 aumf is that correct? >> that's correct. >> would it be fair to say that the one the president sent to us to consider is actually eliminating aumf compared to the 2001 authorization?

>> it is specifically intended to deal with the threat of isil that's correct >> but it's limiting in the authority of the president would have primarily by the interpretation of the enduring phrase, is that correct?? >> enduring and the expectation as he's described it in the proposed legislation on the size and kinds of forces that might be applied, measures that might be applied, is that correct? >> i voted for the 2001 authorization when i was here. it came on the heels of 9/11/2001. it was passed at a time when americans had flags raised and the patriotism in our country was at an all-time high, at least in my lifetime and my memory. are we going to have to wait for that type of event to happen before we use whatever it take to destroy this evil? meaning isil and those like

them? >> i think we're taking those measures now to get after the evil that is isil. it's an evil we haven't seen before in a very long time. just today the fbi rolled up three individuals in this country that were intent of joining ice until the battle space or doing ill to the american people. and as long as we're at the front edge of this taking those kinds of measures, we have the boss oblt of keeping it from becoming something like a 9/11. >> in your printed statement and i presume it's part of your remarks you said verbally, you said it will be the aggregate pressure of the coalition's active over the mutual supported lines of effort that will determine a campaign's success. >> that's right. >> what are the mutually supported lines that you're speaking about? >> working more aligned in the community of nations, to limit the flow of foreign fighters, to

deal with the measures to take the measures necessary to deal with the ability to limit isil's capacity to generate revenue ultimately to support its operations and to give it discretion to take action against us or potentially or allies. to provide support to those elements of the population in the region that have been displaced by virtue of the activities of isil or have been directly suppressed by the boot of isil's conquests and sub tro gags. and then very importantly to work together to in the information space, ultimately to defeat the idea of dash. and the coalition is working very hard. i've just come back from southeast asia where i met with the leadership of several countries there. they're watching with great interest and concern those things that are occurring in the middle east, which could spread

into their region, and they're interested in joining us in ways that can limit the ability of those organizations there to travel to the battle space or to limit their ability to directly challenge the authorities of those countries. so it's not just the countries of the middle east, it's not just the countries of europe it's the countries of southeast asia. and very importantly within the confines of effort. working closely to outreach the indigenous populations of the country in ways that the can dispel the image of the caliphate. in ways to work with the religious leaders and tribal leaders in those countries with populations that may be at risk, to work with teachers and clerics and family to reduce the attraction to this extremist message. and the combination of all of

those activities together we think will pressure and ultimately put the kinds of pressure on dash first to defend ourselves and ultimately to defeat the organization. >> on that point and very briefly because my time will be up in 45 seconds. >> yes, sir. >> are we doing enough to counter act the use of social media and technology to communicate exactly what you're talking about? what you heard about in southeast asia and what i've heard from on trips i've taken is the fear they'll use social media and the modern mechanisms that we have today to spread their ideology and fear around the world. >> they're doing it now. it is in fact an explicit objective within our evers among the many nations involved to do just that. obviously in nations where free speech is an issue, that we have to accommodate that aspect of our relationship with industry that owns these platforms to ensure that we're either able to intradistrict that message or work with industry to remove the message many its own content. we're working closely with industry and with our partners to counter that message across

all of the social media. >> thank you for your time and your service. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. senator boxer. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman, ranking member menendez. general, thank you so much for your dedication to this nation. i want to thank the president for the wisdom he showed in appointing you as the special envoy. i find your presentation to be very direct, no frills, just straightforward and i appreciate it. under article one, section eight, congress has the power to declare war. i know you agree with that, yes? >> yes, ma'am. >> so i hope you can then understand what we would want to be very precise when we do that. because we're sent here by a lot of people who have a lot of kids who serve in the military. and they're the fabric of our

community. so we want to be careful. and i just want to say i'm not even going to ask you to expand on this enduring word because you've said it very clearly. your definition is no enduring presence could mean a two week presence of american combat boots on the ground or a two-year presence of american combat boots on the ground. and that answers a question the democrats on this committee have been searching for this deaf -- this definition. and i think what you have proven with your honesty here is that there is none. because it's the eye of the beholder. when you say to me if i vote for this no enduring combat presence and i'm sending my kids there in any state for two years, i would argue with you, you've misinterpreted it. yet, the congressional research service says there's really no definition and if i wanted to take an administration to court because i would say as a member

of congress i said no enduring presence, crs says i wouldn't have a legal leg to stand on because this is no definition. so i just think it's very important the administration hear this once again. i know poor secretary kerry had to hear it over and over again from our side yesterday. but we're very uncomfortable with this language. and when senator menendez was chairman, he cobbled together a good aumf that united all of us on our side because he essentially said no combat troops with these exceptions and he put in the kind of exceptions i think you would agree with, special forces operations, search and rescue, protecting personnel. and we would urge you, please, to go back and take a look at it. just feel very strong. and i want to ask you questions that have nothing to do with that because i think you and i would probably disagree on that subject. there's no point in going over it again.

but i am very concerned about u.s. military support for the kurds. and you answered the question in a very sure way, which is wonderful. you said, oh, no problem. however the kurds aren't saying that. so i want to call to your attention a recent interview with bloomberg view just three weeks ago. the head of the expressed concern about our commitment to the kurds. these are our boots on the ground. these are our boots on the ground. he said quote we're starting to have doubts that there might be a political decision on what kind of equipment will be given the kurds. we're fighting with the rest of the world against this terrorist organization. we're putting our lives on the line. all we ask for is the sufficient equipment to protect these lives. so i need you to respond to that. is that off base? what do you think about that?

do you take that comment seriously? does it concern you? >> i listen very carefully to what the kurds have to say. and they have in so many ways demonstrated battlefield excellence and courage that should elicit all, all of our respect. but we have worked very carefully and very closely with the kurds. and your question presupposes and is correct that american support to the kurds have given them the capacity and more broadly and more recently coalition support to the kurds has given them the ability to do much of what they have been able to accomplish, recovery of mosul dam, the seizure of kisook junction. the many things they've done is because the coalition has been in close support with them. at the same time, in several different rounds, we've worked

very hard with coalition member to respond to kurdish requests for equipment and that equipment has been flowing in. also in the context of the $1.6 billion that was appropriated for the train and equip program for the 12 iraqi army brigades three of which are peshmerga, they're getting exactly the same sophisticated equipment that the kurds -- >> my question was not about how good they are. we agree. they are saying they do not feel they have enough equipment. and i'm just saying, you're saying everything is rosy. they're complaining about it. as one senator, i can't speak for anyone else. they are our boots on the ground. we need to get them what they need. i know there's pressure from certain factions but if they're going to be our boots on the ground, we've got to give them what they need. thank you. >> thank you. senator rubio. >> thank you for your service to our country and your willingness to come back in and help with this new endeavor of great difficulty.

i know we're not debating the authorization for use of force but i want to ask you, it's my understanding from our review of the process that only two times in our history has congress authorized the use of force with limitations and both were u.n. peacekeeping missions. and so the question that i would have now is if our objective here is the defeat of isis would it not be prudent to authorize the commander in chief to move forward in that regard and allow him as commander in chief and any future commander in chief, whoever they may be, to decide what the appropriate strategy is moving forward. what would be wrong with simply authorizing the president to defeat them? >> well the strategy that the president has approved in fact does envision the defeat of dash.

>> i understand the strategy duds. for purposes of an authorization from congress -- i know you've endorsed today what the president wants to do. and i understand that that's what the president thinks he can get passed. but from a military point of view, wouldn't it be appropriate to authorize the president to do whatever it takes to defeat them? >> the president needs the options that he -- that should be available to him ultimately to defeat dash. >> is it possible to defeat isis would them being ultimately defeated by someone on the ground. someone is going to have to confront them on the ground an defeat them there. >> yes. >> can you update us on efforts -- i've seen some conversation amongst the regional countries about the potential for a coalition of armed forces together, the egyptians, the turks, the saudis, perhaps some of the kingdoms, jordan, et cetera, who could provide a coalition of local forces who could play that role with significant u.s. assistance from the air.

has there been any progress played made in that? is that being activity discussed with the nations? >> i would really prefer to have this sort of a conversation in a closed session. >> let me move to a separate topic. the nature of the conflict, isis has already proven they're going to move in -- for a group of this to take hold and be able to grow, they need ungoverned vacuum spaces. that's what's attracted them to libya, the ability to operate uncontested in terms of another government, et cetera. it is important to understand

that as this conflict continues, the possibility continues to grow that isis, in addition to being based in ear ya and iraq will look to other places where they can set up nodes of operation, libya season a example but potentially training camps in afghanistan, any place where a vacuum opens up is attractive and appealing for them. as we put forth our strategy and the congress deliberates the authority it gives the president, that reality needs to be taken into account, correct? >> i agree, yes, sir. >> the last question is about the nature of the conflict. it's been talked about in the past that isis is some sort of a group of monsters that take on these acts of extreme violence. but these are not just random acts of extreme violence. this is a group -- their barbarism has a purpose at the end of the day, to purify that region to their form of islam at the exclusion of non-sunni islam but especially of nonislamic populations. and in that realm it is clear that christians and yazidis, but recently christians in particular are increased dark in this area.

they target the christians as a way to shock the world and as an effort to carry out the ultimate goal of profaning the region for islam. is there not a deep religious component to isis's strategy here. they're trying to again using a term they would use, not one that i necessarily enjoy using but cleanse the region of infidels and nonbelieves and in that realm they've specifically targeted christians for these sorts of atrocities they're committing on an ongoing basis that we saw yesterday again. >> i would say yes to that. the interpretation that they apply to all of those segments of the population that live within the area that they control has permitted them to do the things that they have done to certain elements of the population. to i absolutely agree with you. their interpretation of their responsibility ushered the so-call caliphate is to take action against certain elements of the population and treat them one way and certain elements of

the population and treat them another way. it's based on their historic interpretation. >> thank you, senator cain. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you general allen for the service. i want to thank you. you did very significant and important work with respect to trying to provide a security road map for the west bank in the event of a peace deal between israeli and palestinian leaders. whether the leaders will do what their citizens want them to do and find such a deal is up to them. but it shouldn't go unnoticed that you have worked hard on that and your work then and in this context in the best traditions of american diplomacy. i want to thank you for that. >> thank you, sir. >> i want to ask you a question and then ask two questions about means. senator johnson was quizzing you about what is defeat of isil. they're not a state. they say they're a state they're not. they're not islamic. they say they are. they're not.

they're a mutation of islam. you talk about defeating the idea of isil. they're an i'd logical driven death cult. we have to grapple with the question of what does defeat look like. i'm very practical about this. i want to protect americans from isil. that's what i want to do. i want to protect americans from isil and i want to protect the allies who ask for our help. the defeat of the ideology, we could be chasing a phantom but i want to protect the americans and defend the allies who ask for that. on the means side, a question about the ground troops issues. in the last three weeks we've had meetings with king abdullah and the mayor of cutter. king abdullah said this is our fight, not yours and basically suggested that u.s. ground troops would not be a good idea. the emir of cutter was actually even more straightforward about that today.

he said, i don't want american ground troops in. he actually -- he didn't suggest this to hum. he brought up that it may be a recruiting bonanza for isil. it's against the west, now we can really recruit people. >> i think that's accurate. >> the ground troop thing is a wordsmithing issue, but that's subsidiary to the bigger issue. do we become an occupier, a recruiting tool for isil. king abdullah's notion, this terrorism is board and bred in the region. the region has got to stand up against it. if the region is not willing to stand up against it there's nothing that the u.s. can do that will ultimately lead to a success. we can't police a region that won't police itself. when the leaders from the region say american ground troops are a

bad idea, that's a powerful thought to those of us who are going to be voting on authorizations. how would you respond to that notion that the presence in any significant way of american ground troops changes the character of this making it the west against isil rather than a region needing to police its own extremism? >> i do agree with the amir and the king. the presence, infusion of a large db i think this is where they would be a little more precise if even the opportunity. the presence of a large conventional maneuver force would change the nature of the conversation. pu it's really important to understand that during iraq and during afghanistan and in the way we have responded to other similar challenges around the

world, the united states brings to bear a variety of really important capabilities. the first is the capacity of our strategic leadership. just our leadership alone has brought to bear 62 nations against this challenge. our leadership brought to bear the first night of our strike operations five, five arab air forces flying along on the wing of the united states air force in strikes against isil targets in syria. that's not anything that any of us could have imagined a year ago. so our strategic leadership counts as an enabler to the process. other ways and means -- your question is really important. other ways and means that we can bring success to the arab solution to this is providing technical support, intelligence support, focused special operations strike capabilities the training and equipping that we're doing today, some of which can be done in country, some of

which can be done offshore in partner nations. the ag gags of those activities undertaken with partners in the region ultimately to achieve the ends that we seek. the united states and our coalition partners have many means at our disposal from leadership all the way through to potential for special operations strike to give our arab partners exactly what they want, which is the capacity for them to be the defeat mechanism in the end. >> thank you. mr. chairman. >> senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you general allen for your service and your time and testimony today. and again, we have to recognize that isis is a real threat to this country and it requires a comprehensive strategy and the commitment to their total destruction, i think, is the only thing that we can, we can accept.

i'm glad the president has made the effort to forward the aumf to congress. obviously i look forward to working with the president on the au,f and this committee. in the letter that the president transmitted along with his language for the aumf, he stated, and i'll quote, i have directed a comprehensive and sustained strategy to degrade and defeat isil. degrade and defeat isil. as part of this, we are conducting system mat particular air strikes against eisenhowerisis in iraq and syria. the u.s. has conducted about 250 air strikes. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> since operation irthe operation began. is the pace of the operation sufficient to eradicate isil at this point? >> well, eradication is not the end state that we are seeking at this particular moment.

our hope -- hope is not the term that i want to use. what our expectation is, given the strategy of the u.s. co- coalition air power and ultimately syrian forces will over time give us the strategic outcome that we desire. the combination of all those things together is what we anticipate . >> so besides the air strikes then does the president's comprehensive and sustained strategy envision? >> several things. the first is to provide the stability of the iraqi government which is essential. we're working with the government in respect to reforms in partnership with the body of government which is inclined to see it that way. we're working closely with the iraqi security forces to prepare them for a long-term counter offensive which will remove them from the country.

we're working as an international coalition on behalf of iraq to pressure and generate funds and resources necessary for its long-term survival. we're working as an international coalition to staunch the flow of foreign fighters to dash has difficulty replacing its combat forces. we're going to share intelligence so we're working with the iraqis to give them a clear picture of what we understand dash to be and also so that we can defend ourselves and homeland for the potential of dash activities within the united states.

and then, of course, we're working very closely with our partners to provide humanitarian assistance to those elements of the population that will need to be recovered and relieved as we liberate them from the presence of dash in their population centers and then finally to work together with iraq and our partners and beyond the defeat of dash, which is the defeat of its ideas over the long term. >> and the operations that we just discussed, does that change at all. >> commanders take stock of the operational environment and ultimately and takes advantage of the opportunities available to them in the operational environment. we could well find that, based on our current estimates, that the activities that we'll undertake in the counter offensive will follow along the pace and timeline that we anticipate. but we could easily find, that as a counter offensive unfolds that daesh is unwilling to

defeat at the hands of the iraq security forces which with what we want to see. so we may see that the operational environment could change and it's the responsibility of our very capable commanders in this case to constantly be monitoring the success of the unfolding operation to ensure we're getting the most out of the resources that we have and if we need more resources, that we ask for them. >> thank you, mr. chairman. senator murphy? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. general allen, thank you for your service. thank you for your answers to the questions.

they are very helpful. he want to build on some questions from senator menendez and boxer on the language that we have before us. a lot of attention has been on enduring between what our offensive forces and what are defensive forces. just so i understand this, you've talked about the potential limitations under the enduring limitation but so long as the presence of troops is considered defensive, there is no limitation in this authorization of military force as to the number of troops or the duration of their time in the conflict area, so long as they are considered defensive forces. >> again, i'm not sponsoring the legislation. but the -- i think your point is correct in that regard. >> i thought your answer to senator mccain's question was definitive.

i know you worry, as the president does, that a large-scale of deployment of troops could become recruiting fodder. do you think that that changes if our category zags of the forces are offensive or defensive if we have 100,000 defensive troops? i don't think this president is going to authorize this but this is a three-year authorization so the next president will get the chance to decide differently. will it matter in terms of the ability for extremists to recruit as to whether our troops there were categorized as defensive versus offensive? >> i -- again, these are all individual measures. it depends on how the crisis has unfolded. it depends on the region in which those forces may be

involved. it would depend on the activities that would have occurred prior to the introduction of forces that we might call defensive. it's just not possible to give a specific answer to that question. you know, i would have a difficult time understanding how we have 100,000 forces in a defensive environment if we hadn't had substantial offensive operations to begin with and that would, of course, change the regional view and the perspective on our forces and the outcome. so i think there may be occasions where we have facilities or concentrations of friends and allies need to be defended. the rationale that we would use for the insertion of our allied troops to defend those locations or those populations would be very, very important. so i think each of those circumstances will have to be judged independently.

>> and do you have a sense -- i know you're not the sponsor of this legislation but you were there -- as to what the limits of that word defensive are. if our forces were there taking fire from an isil position and you do advance on that position to eliminate it in order to defend our troops, i assume that that action in that time and space would be considered defensive in the sense that it was necessary in order to defend our troops or coalition troops. >> well, yes. in that particular answer, yes. again, we would probably, prior to the deployment of those forces, have come forward with as clear an explanation as we could as to what defensive would look like in the context of accomplishing that mission and accomplishing those tasks associated with defense.

>> you're going to get stuck with a lot of hypothetical questions on these two phrases enduring and offensive and defensive because we're stuck with trying to figure them out. part of the success of the awakening was not just persuasion but also the transfer of substantial resources to tribes. we effectively paid tribes in various ways in order to compensate them from moving away from insurgency and coalition forces. how do we educate as we move forward once again a strategy of trying to win over these forces? >> that's a really important question. i was deep in that process and we did, in fact, provide direct support and we gave that direct support to the tribes in so many ways because the central government was incapable of doing it. and when we provided that support, as you well recall,

fundamentally the operational environment changed very quickly in '07 and '08. i think what we learned from that was not the fundamental change in the battle space that favored us, it was the long-term outcome of the sons of iraq, which was the hand-over of the responsibility to resource the sons of iraq to the central government in iraq. and that didn't work out frankly. because it was never clear to us whether maliki intended to support them or not. in this case, we seek in every possible way, both to encourage and support the central government, to bridge those elements now by supporting them being present in the training process and ultimately ensuring that the linkage between the shaiks and the sunni leaders is effective with the government not in a handoff later. one of the most important

messages or lessons that have come from this. >> and does that include financial resources from the iraqi government to these tribes. >> yes, in the context, for example, of the 2015 budget by the iraqis and there is a way for the recruitment of tribal elements and into the national guard organizations. those organizations will belong to the governor and support and be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. that entity will belong to the ministry of defense and paid by national funds. so the mechanism is under way right now where we are training tribal elements in anbar right now, they are being trained by the iraqi government.

we're providing the training. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator flake. thank you for your testimony. we've got a vote so we need to go quickly. just a couple of questions quickly. how important do you think -- and i apologize if you answered this before i came. how important do you think it is to have this usmf? -- this a umf -- aumf? >> i think it's very important. the united states has exerted great leadership in bringing together these countries ultimately to support the restoration of the situation in iraq, its sovereignty and

ultimately to help to deal the defeat daesh. isil is a threat that is unique in our time and certainly unique in the time that i have been in the service and while the elements of the aumf will be treated by this administration and many of the members have brought up important points for clarity or for continued discussion, i think that's extraordinarily important, the message that it sends, that the administration is in a constant conversation and dialogue. but most importantly in support of the u.s. leadership globally on this issue, a strong bipartisan vote to support the aumf compliments the leadership that the united states has exerted in this crisis. >> thank you. both our adversaries and our allies need to speak with one voice here. >> exactly. >> is there one that is more important in that regard or equally important for both of them to hear these messages? >> our friends who are in the

coalition in the 21 capitals i've traveled to have been extraordinarily grateful for the american leadership on this issue. but what i want is for our adversaries not to be able to sleep at night because we have the unqualified support of the congress in our actions necessary to defeat this enemy. >> at what point is the impact of this aumf diminished if we have language -- if we try to include every point of view and every nuance as opposed to something straightforward that we're in this to win? at what point does it become less important? >> it would be difficult for me to answer, senator, but i would just hope that the consultation between the administration and this committee puts the language in there that the president needs to defend the american people, to defend our country but also to deal the defeat that daesh that it desperately needs. >> well, other examples of aumf, there hasn't been much change. we have basically done what the administration has asked for.

there's been some amendments in recent aumfs but, by in large, it's been rather straightforward language, rather short. i frankly think the language that the administration put forward is a good start and it may be amended some but i would caution the committee and the congress in general, the senate and the house from going too far to make it all things to everyone. and probably diminish the importance of it. thank you for your service and thank you for your testimony here. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you, senator. senator king, i know, had a follow-up. >> i wanted to ask about one of the lines of effort that we're working on in a fairly significant way and that's the humanitarian relief line. the u.s. is the most generous nation in the world in terms of humanitarian relief in relation to refugees to syria but the problem is getting worse in some ways because of closing of borders with lebanon, too many

refugees there, turkey with border issues is probably less willing to see waves and waves of syrians coming over. and so what are we doing in tandem with the other nations to try to deal with the humanitarian crisis to deal with all of these displaced folks in syria whether they are displaced because of assad, cholera poverty outbreaks, i wonder if the humanitarian efforts are in tandem with other nations. >> i'll give you a partial answer and take the question and give you the ability of the department to come back. we obviously take that very seriously. we have the relief efforts that, as you point out, have been generously supported by the united states and others directly to the populations of syria and iraq. we have the u.n. appeals which need a lot more assistance to bring those appeals up to 100%.

we're in the depth of a winter which has made this more urgent and timely and we have the front-line states struggling with the influx of syrian refugees. turkey, lebanon and jordan. we need to give them the support necessary to ensure these demographic changes that they are experiencing are, in the end, not destabilizing to their stability and their security. and then very importantly is the humanitarian assistance that will follow in trace of the counteroffensive when that ultimately kicks off. it could be argued that the clearing operation will be important to remove daesh out of the population center. but we're going to find that these people have lived under indescribable conditions.

and so our ability to quickly apply the humanitarian assistance necessary to the female populations, to the more broadly the liberated populations, to the internally displaced persons that will come home as we begin to clear these population centers of daesh supporting their return to their homes, the necessary humanitarian assistance to the restoration of the central services, electricity, water and then ultimately reconstruction. as your question presupposes this is a huge bill and a huge undertaking to -- should be to everyone's satisfaction or at least optimism. many of the members of the coalition have been very clear in their willingness to support

the broader u.n. effort for the region and the front-line states and a number other of the coalition members have put their hands in the air to be leaders of and supporters to that very important humanitarian effort that will follow right on closely on the heels of the clearing operation that will move daesh out of iraq. so it's a multifaceted multi-layered, complex issue but in the end i think the humanitarian issue is one of the death blows that daesh will experience. >> you talked about the complexity of the no-fly zones and i would commend this along the border of jordan or turkey or both that would be justified by u.n. security council resolutions in place, promoting crossword or delivery of humanitarian aid.

that would be humanitarian zones for people whether they are following bashar al assad, the winter, hunger whatever, once the borders have been closed and can't transit across the borders, i hope we would contemplate some form of safe haven for these citizens who are suffering so badly and what i think is the worst refugee crisis since world war ii. >> that is correct, sir. >> that would be in the form of some type of a no fly zone. >> because no fly has the military, you know, label right up front, i call it a humanitarian safe haven zone but i would want such a zone to be protected from whoever may be seeking safety. yes. >> very good. >> well, general, i know you have a hard stop in 20 minutes and i think we've -- you've certainly helped us in the ways that we wanted you to help us. we appreciate your testimony. i would have one question and that is is you talked about the

need for congress to be behind the need for dealing with isil. there's been discussions about the length of time from an aumf standpoint. is there anything about the time frame? i know the president has asked whether it's longer or shorter. but is there anything about that that you think matters at all relative to what you're talking about appealing to? our enemies and allies together? >> well, our intent with respect to daesh is to end its abilities, to deal that defeat to them as quickly as we can. if it takes longer than three years, my suspicion would be that we would come back to this committee and request an extension. >> and if it was shorter than that, it wouldn't trouble you either? >> it wouldn't trouble me at all if daesh was defeated in less than three years. >> no.

[laughter] that would not trouble us either. does the length of time really particularly matter to you from the standpoint of the allies and those that that we're defeating or is it just more congress getting behind the effort in a bipartisan way? >> i think it's the latter. >> well, listen, i called over the weekend while you were on your way to kuwait. we all view you as someone who is an outstanding public servant. we appreciate the way you've gone about your work. i know it's difficult. i know decisions don't always get made in the manner or time frame that someone like you wants to seek this, get this done in the appropriate way but i think your demeanor, the way you talk with all of us is certainly very, very well received.

we wish you well in what you're doing. >> honor to be with you. thank you, sir. good day, sir. >> and with that, the record will be open until friday for any questions. we would ask that you and your staff respond to those in a fairly timely fashion. meeting adjourned. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

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visit to galveston, texas. >> c ho -- with the opening of the suez canal, sailing ships were almost dealt a deathblow. with the opening of the canal ships had a shorter route to the far east, to india, to all of those markets. sailing ships really needed to find a way to make their own living. so instead of high-value cargo they started carrying lower value cargoes, coal, oil cotton etc. they really found their niche in carrying any kind of cargo that did not require getting to market a very fast pace. >> watch all of our events from galveston saturday, march 7, at noon eastern.

>> the house is back today to continue the k-12 education bill that would eliminate no child left behind school requirements and give that to states. vital votes are expected by the end of the week. they are also looking at legislation to fund the homeland security department. you can follow the house life here on c-span, when members gavel back end at 10:00 eastern. up next, "washington journal," live with your calls in today's news. -- and today's news. coming up, congressional reaction to the on land -- ongoing homeland security negotiation. senate majority leader mitch mcconnell has agreed to introduce a bill without language locking the president's immigration order.

later, it's the democratic perspective with california congressman, the chair of the house democratic congress. those, plus your calls, tweets, and e-mails. ♪ host: by a vote of 98-2, an impasse over funding homeland security department. a final vote without language blocking the president's executive action is expected today. all eyes turned to the house. we want to get your thoughts on this. should the house gop separate homeland security funding from -- over immigration. republicans, (202) 748-8001.