a symphony performed by all relevant countries. [speaking foreign language] >> russia today, and ria, against the background of western sanctions on russia and the sharp depreciation of the ruble, how will china carry out

cooperation with russia, especially in the energy and financial sectors, and what will china and russia do to further strengthen their coordination and cooperation in international affairs? [speaking foreign language] >> the china-russia relationship is not dictated by international advice sis teuds and does not target any third parties. the strong strategy trust the two sides have established, our relationship is becoming more

mature and stable. as comprehensive strategic partners, china and russia have a good tradition of supporting each other. and the friendship between our two peoples provides a strong foundation for strengthening strategic cooperation between the two sides. [speaking foreign language] [speaking foreign language]

>> the practical cooperation between china and russia is based on mutual need. it speaks win-win results and has enormous internal impetus and room for expansion. this year, our practical cooperation is expected to deliver a series of new results. for example, we'll work hard to lift two-way trade to $100 billion u.s. dollars. we will find an agreement to work on the economic belt and

begin our cooperation on that score. we will start full construction of the eastern route of the natural gas pipeline and sign an agreement on the western route of the gas project. we will accelerate joint development and research of long-distance passenger jets. we will start strategic cooperation on the development of russia's far eastern region. and we will strengthen our cooperation on high-speed railways. at the same time, we will continue to intensify our cooperation in the financial oil and gas and nuclear power sectors. [speaking foreign language]

>> china and russia are both permanent members of the u.n. security council. we will continue to carry out strategic coordination and cooperation to maintain international peace and security. this year, both countries will hold a series of activities to commemorate the anniversary of the end of the world's anti-fascist war. we will support each other and jointly uphold international peace and the outcome of the second world world war. thank you. [speaking foreign language]

>> the news agency, this year marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the united nations. this is an important historic moment for the international community to reflect on the past and look to the future. some people say that china wants to challenge and even overturn the current international order and replace it with a new one dominated by china itself. what is your comment? [speaking foreign language]

>> i want to make it very clear that china has always been a constructive force in building the international order. if we can compare the international order and system built around the united nations to a big boat, 70 years ago

china was intimately involved in designing and building that boat. and china was the first country to put its signature on the charter of the united nations. today, we're in this boat together with more than 190 other countries. so, of course, we don't want to upset the boat. rather, we want to work with the other passengers to make sure that this boat will sail forward, steadily and in the right direction. [speaking foreign language]

>> 70 years has passed. the international situation and landscape has changed dramatically. and naturally, the international order needs to be updated. china supports reforming the international order and system. but such reform is not about overturning the current system or starting all over again. rather, it is about seeking new ideas to improve it. the general direction is to promote democracy, the international relations, and the rule of law in global governance, in particular it is very important to safeguard the

legitimate rights and interests of developing countries, which are in the majority, so that we can make the world a more equal, harmonious and safe place. [speaking foreign language] >> thank you. i want to introduce -- i am with the u.s. television network. they declared that both sides have agreed to, quote, strengthen coordination on regional and global challenges. with the president visiting the u.s. later this year, in your view how can this strengthen coordination? help restore the u.s.-china disputes over, for example cybersecurity or the maritime

conflicts in the asia-pacific region? thank you. [speaking foreign language] [speaking foreign language]

>> the president will pay a state visit to the united states this fall, at the invitation of his u.s. counterpart. we expect the two presidents of our countries following their meeting, will have another productive discussion and inject new momentum into efforts to

build a new model of major contributions between china and the united states. the undertaking to build a new model of relations is a pioneering effort. it will not be smooth sailing but it is the logical development, because it accords with the common interests of both sides and the trend of our times. there is a chinese saying. sincerity can work wonders. as long as the two sides show sincerity, the bottom line of no conflict no confrontation cement the foundation of mutual respect, then we can explore the immense possibility of win-win cooperation between china and the united states. [speaking foreign language]

>> china and the united states

are two large countries. it's impossible for there not to be any disagreements between us. and these disagreements will not disappear the moment we commit to build a new model of major country relations. but we shouldn't magnify the problem through a microscope. rather, we should use the telescope to look ahead to the future and make sure we'll move forward in the right direction. as to the beijing-apec meeting the president called for shaping the future through the asia-pacific partnership. many responded enthusiastically to his initiative. china and the united states interact most briefly in the asia-pacific region and our interests intersect the most in this region. the building of a new type of major relationship should begin

with the asia-pacific region. in our view, if both sides can work to establish and deepen strategic trust and have positive interactions, then we can surely jointly contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. [speaking foreign language] >> both china and the united states are major users of the internet. we have common interests in upholding cybersecurity. we hope cyberface will become a -- cyberspace will become a new frontier of our cooperation rather than a new source of

friction. thank you. [speaking foreign language] >> in recent months, major terrorist attacks have frequently hit many parts of the world, from paris from western asia to western africa. what is china's position on fighting terrorism and carrying out international counterterrorism cooperation? [speaking foreign language]

>> terrorism is a common scourge to mankind and the fighting it

is the responsibility of every country. china has always been an active participant in international counterterrorism cooperation. at the same time, we believe that to uproot terrorism, we must remove its breeding ground. and to deny any haven to the specter of terrorism, we have to promote economic and social development appropriately handle regional conflicts and advocate equal dialogue between different civilizations religions and ethnic groups. china has also suffered at the hands of terrorism. and the eastern islamic movement is a clear and present threat to our security. we would like to work with other countries in the spirit of mutual respect and equal-footed cooperation. to jointly address the new threats and new challenges brought by terrorism.

thank you. [speaking foreign language] >> the top leader of the dprk has decided to attend the activities to be held in russia in may, to mark the victory of the great patriotic war. but the dprk leader has not yet

made a visit to china. will the leaders of the dprk and china have a meeting this year, and is it possible that the six party talks can still be resumed? [speaking foreign language] >> china and the dprk are friendly neighbors. chinese people emphasize good faith and value friendship. we cherish our traditional friendship with the dprk and we

seek the normal development of our relations. the china-dprk relationship has a strong foundation. it should not and will not be effected by temporary events. as to when our leaders will meet, it will have to suit the schedule of both sides. [speaking foreign language]

>> the speculation on the korean peninsula is basically stable and china has played a constructive role in bringing that about. it is in the common interests of all relevant parties to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and achieve the de-nuclearization of the peninsula. and the moment the situation there has entered into another delicate period, we call on the relevant countries to exercise calm and restraint and say and do things that will have a positive effect so as to continue to foster the atmosphere and conditions for resuming the sixth party talks. thank you. [speaking foreign language]

>> china radio international. the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on the iranian nuclear issue has been twice extended, and the june deadline is not far away. can you talk about the prospects of the negotiation, and what kind of role will the chinese government play in the negotiations, and what steps is the government going to take to push forward the negotiations? [speaking foreign language]

>> the comprehensive settlement of the iranian nuclear issue can help to strengthen the international system against nuclear proliferation promote peace and tranquility in the middle east and provide useful experience for resolving major difficulty issues through negotiation. so we believe the parties should keep at it and finish the negotiation. the possible ramifications of the iranian nuclear negotiations will go far beyond the negotiation itself, and it's not surprising that there might be some ups and downs on the way. at the moment, although there is still some uncertainty about the

prospect of the negotiation we can already see light at the end of the tunnel. the negotiation has reached a critical point and the relevant parties, especially the main protagonist, should make a political decision as soon as possible. china is an important party to the negotiation. and we have made a positive contribution to resolving the difficult issues and the sticking points in the negotiation. we're prepared to work with other relevant parties to finish the marathon negotiation on the iranian nuclear issues at an early date. thank you. >> coming up tonight on c-span remarks from vermont independent senator bernie sanders at the national press club. he spoke about the decline of the middle class and also answered a few questions about a possible 2016 run for the white house. see his comments tonight at 8

eastern. tonight on the communicators the founder and c.e.o. of media communications corporation, on the challenges facing media companies and the fallout from the latest f.c.c. decision affecting the internet. >> i have no doubt that this will increase rates to consumers, if it stays on board. why is that? all kinds of regulatory fees, additional hall rental fees, taxes at the local level. i think the utilities regular utilities, and the states where we operate, are going to get into the act. i haven't found one government that does not want to raise more money and that's going to get an opportunity to raise more money. >> tonight at 8 eastern on the communicators on c-span 2. on tomorrow's washington journal, matthew lee, the state

department reporter, discusses the ongoing discussions over iran's nuclear program. then leonard, from the coalition for public safety, looks at what is being done to reduce the number of u.s. incarcerations. then jobs in the oil gas and mining industries and how they have fared against recent falling crude prices. plus, of course your phone calls, facebook comments and tweets. washington journal live. earlier today ukrainians were asked their opinions on crimea, russia and the west. we heard remarks from former u.s. ambassador to ukraine and a former pentagon official. this is an hour and a half. >> thank you all for coming. in ukraine, it's really the people that are taking the brunt of this current conflict, thousands having died. so it seems really worthwhile to

hear what the ukrainian people have to say about the issues that they're currently embroiled in. that is what we have set out to do. we have a new survey that -- uh-oh. oh. i see. yes. there we go. so we have a new survey that was conducted together with the kiev international institute of sociology, which is a group we worked with numerous times over the years, very highly regarded. the method used was face-to-face, for the most part, telephone, primarily. for the national sample, we had 1005 respondents. then we had an oversample of 403 in the donetsk region, where the conflict is occurring. and then for the ukrainian-held

area of donbas, we have 330. in the rebel-held areas, we have a sample of 240. this shows you divided up the country. i'm going to be giving you the results not just for the nation as a whole but for the various regions, because the differences are quite great. and there was real tension between the different parts of the country. so we have the north and the west over there. and then over here, the east and where the white lines are, you can see the donboss region. then, of course, the south, the crimea, was not surveyed. so the biggest question that we have got to address is whether people thought that the ukraine should move toward the european union or russia. this is a core dispute that is

dominant and have been for some years. we asked the question in a variety of ways. first we asked in terms of, what is your preferred option? a more standard form of a poll question. we said, would you prefer for relations -- for ukraine to have relations that are stronger with the e.u. than russia, stronger with russia than the e.u. or equally strong? and for the nation as a whole less than half, 47%, said stronger with the e.u. almost half but less. so the largest number but still not a majority. and 34% said equally strong. 13% said stronger with russia. now, if you break these out by the regions, you see quite a bit of difference. now, with the west and the north, we are generally aggregating them, because they were within the margin of error.

so they're really quite similar. when they are different, we will call it out. so in the west and the north you have 68% saying they want to be kleesser to -- closer to the european union, while in the south and the east, the most common position is that relations should be equally strong. and in the donbass area, the they said it should be stronger with russia. you see there's a very great difference in terms of the preference. the core point here is that you do not overall have a majority in favor of moving toward the e.u. and when you look at the different regions, it's only in the west and north that you have this majority pulling for a stronger relation with the e.u. now, these attitudes about pulling toward the e.u. are mere attitudes about president petro poroshenko is handling the

crisis in the east. overall, you have a divided response. the white space in between that's the people who don't know or it dendz or didn't -- depends or didn't give an answer. overall, they are divided about poroshenko's handling. here you see 46% in the north approving. the south leaning toward the negative. the east very clearly to the negative, 61%. while in the don youbass rebel-held areas, you have 89% disapproving. by the way, the ukraine-held areas were generally pretty much the same as the east as a whole. all that data is broken out in the questionnaire. now we move to the questions where we ask people to rate scenarios, where we give them options. we're not just asking, what is your preference? but, how would you feel if that happened? and to answer this we give them a scale from zero to 10, where

zero means completely unacceptable. 10 means very acceptable. and five means just tolerable. and by asking questions in this way, you can see whether there is some -- where the potential common ground is, where the flexibilities are. and when you have these kinds of conflicts, that's the kind of thing you need to look for, and we've developed this method in other areas of the world and other conflicting parties between other conflicting parties as well. so what about ukraine moving closer to the e.u.? well overall, 54% say, well, i can live with that. and another 18% say okay, i can tolerate that. so you've got a fairly large number saying that they could tolerate moving closer to the e.u. and in the west and north, very large numbers. now, you move into the south, and 44% say it's acceptable. but 64% say, i could tolerate

it. in the east, it gets weaker. you get to 39% saying unacceptable. and a bare majority saying they could tolerate it. then you get into the rebel-held areas and a clear majority, 62% say no, that's not acceptable. right here you see some of the core dynamics of the attitudes feeding into the conflict. on the ukraine joining the e.u., acceptability drifts downward a bit. 52% acceptable overall 15% just tolerable. very positive attitudes in the west and north. the south okay, can barely -- maybe they could tolerate it. and then in the east, you get half saying, no, they can't. and only 42% saying it's tolerable. and the rebel-held areas a clear majority saying not acceptable for draughn to join -- for ukraine to join the e.u.

what about ukraine moving closer to russia? 60%, not acceptable. and 79% in the western and the north, and 55% in the south opposing moving closer to russia. in the east, okay, you get -- you don't have a majority saying it's acceptable. very important to note that. there's often an assumption that in the east, they really want to move towards russia, but that's not the case, though three quarters say they could tolerate it. and in the rebel-held areas it's rather popular point of view. okay. ukraine joining the customs union, here again, large majorities overall and in the west and north, a majority in the south, rejecting it as unacceptable barely a majority finding it tolerable in the east. a majority in the rebel-held areas finding it tolerable.

but here again, you don't have a majority, even in the rebel-held areas for joining the eurasian customs union. now, this is the area where we actually found the most consensus. ukraine forming a neutral position between the e.u. and russia. overall, 63% say it's at least tolerable. 71% tolerable in the north. but views more divided in the west. this is one unusual case where the west and north are different. so you have a kind of divided between not acceptable and tolerable in the west. so some tension there. but 65% find it tolerable in the south. 74% tolerable in the east. 67% tolerable in the rebel-held areas. so this is quite interesting to us, because this really points

to a point of consensus, even between the different regions where you don't have a majority in any area rejecting the idea. what about ukraine joining nato? this has gotten a lot of attention. a lot of concern about that, something that putin is very concerned about. and you have only 51% overall the saying that this would be tolerable. so you -- it's not popular. you might think, oh ukraine they're feeling threatened by russia. they might want to join nato. well, you do find that 66% -- well 51 frs finding -- 51% finding it just acceptable acceptable. in the south 55%, not acceptable. east, 68%, not acceptable. the rebel-held areas overwhelmingly 82%, not acceptable. does that mean that people would be willing to agree to not join nato if russia agrees to not

interfere in the ukraine? that got well, you know, promising -- another question, 41% saying this should not. 36%, should. a lot of people not answering. in the west, overwhelmingly, no, they should not. in the north, only a slight plurality saying they should not. in the south, views divided. in the east, support for the idea. so it's, again, a very mixed picture on the idea of making this commitment. but only in one area, in the west, you have a majority saying this should not happen. how do people look at the conflict? first, surprising finding, in my mind. how do people feel about the ukrainian government using military force to regain territory held by the separatists? well, only a plurality approve. now, that's a very large in the west and north, but divided in the south and a large majority

disapproving in the east. so this whole effort on the part of the ukrainian government to regain the territory does not have majority support overall. not surprising from that perspective. you get very large majorities in every area approving of the september minsk agreement. the recent update occurred the day we went into the field, so we were not able to ask about it, but basically the terms are the same so i think we can use this as a reference point. what about the u.s. providing military weapons and equipment to the ukrainian government? well 52% favor it. a bare majority. but not a large majority. and you get a lot of division. 70% approve in the west and north. divided in the south. and a clear majority opposed in

the east. so this is not a consensus position. it's somewhat consistent with the ambivalence about using force to try to regain territory held by the separatists. all right. well, how do they view the outside players? looking at putin, his handling of the crisis in the east, 79% disapprove. very negative findings. overwhelmingly negative in the west and north. very negative in the south. even majority negative in the east. only in the rebel-held areas do you find a majority that is positive. and you think, oh, now there's this whole love affair with russia. well that's about russian influence in the world. overall, you get a -- only in the rebel-held areas do you get a majority having a positive view of russia's influence in the world. and in the east, the views are divided. so i would underscore here,

there is not a pull toward russia in the east. there's just a resistance to moving westward. what about the idea that russia having the right to intervene to protect russian citizens and speakers as putin has claimed? overwhelming majority say that russia does not have that right, and these majorities are in all the major regions. only in the rebel-held areas is there a divided response. but this argument is really basically not going down well at all. how do people view what angela merkel is doing with regard to handling the crisis? 40% approve 20% disapprove. a lukewarm point of view that's consistent in all the regions. what about barack obama? divided response overall. many people not even giving an answer. only a modest plurality in the

west and north. negative plurality in the south. and the east. in terms of u.s. influence in the world, 45% positive. better than russia. particularly in the west and north. but when you get down to the east and the rebel-held areas you get a fairly negative point of view. okay. what about the potential outcomes of the conflict? first, again, what is their preference? and options are to have one nation. two options. ukraine govern it as it is now or one nation in certain donbass having more autonomy. or it is annexed by russia. and as you can see, the scenarios, overwhelmingly, tiny percentages endorsing them. by far the most popular view is

that ukraine should stay governed as it is now. but 22% say -- this is built into the minsk agreement -- that certain donbass areas would have more autonomy. but, again, a lot of differences in the west and the north. overwhelming majorities want ukraine to stay governed as now, as does a majority of 59% in the south. in the east, you get still very small numbers calling for secession. very important number there. only 12% and 10% for the scenarios of secession. overall, you get two-thirds basically wanting to keep the nation together in the east, with the division about whether these certain donbass regions should have greater autonomy. in the rebel-held areas, you do not have majorities calling for secession. only four in 10 overall call for

some kind of secession. and a majority calls for some scenario that involves the ukraine staying as one nation. okay. rating the scenarios, ukraine remains as one nation, governed as it is now, in all areas, you have majorities finding that acceptable, except the rebel-held areas where it's 60%. so they are really set on having this greater autonomy for the donbass. in the east, you'll see it in a moment. so the idea of the ukraine remaining one nation, but a greater atony, you have -- autonomy, you have overall 57% support it. and only 51% in the west and north find this tolerable. so there's some resistance on this idea, which is built into

the minsk agreement, as you may recall, though it's not a permanent thing. and only a modest plurality majority in the south see it as tolerable. and not very many overall see it as acceptable. in the east, here too you only have 49% saying it's acceptable. but 72% saying it's tolerable. and in the rebel-held areas, you have a more substantial support for the idea. okay. i'll go quickly. you can see that the ideas of secession do not get much -- are rejected as unacceptable in most parts of the country. divided response in the east. but a few, only a quarter see it as acceptable. this is sort of the secession with the donbass as in. in the rebel-held areas only 45% endorse it as acceptable. two-thirds find it acceptable. tolerable. sorry.

and the views are even more negative about secession and annexation by russia. what about the crimea? that's a -- have they pretty much written off the crimea? well, the answer is no. we gave them three options. crimea being part of the ukrainian state and getting it back should be a top priority. second position. don't accept the loss of crimea but getting it back is not a top priority. and third, ukraine should accept crimea becoming part of russia again. overall, you can see striking, only 18% endorse the idea of basically writing off the crimea. the only debate is about whether it should be a top priority or not to get it back right away. and the dominant view 51%, is

that it should not be a top priority. but not writing it often. and interestingly in no area do you have a majority saying that the crimea should be written off, including the east, though that's the largest -- the area with the largest number, 41% ready to write it off. but 59%, even in the east, say that crimea should continue to be part of ukraine and that they should aspire to get it back. okay. so if you want to get more -- a more complete report, in the questionnaire, you can go to our website, publicconsultation.org, without the dash. and i look forward to our discussion. thank you for your attention. [applause]

>> thanks very much, dr. kull. before we go to our panel, i would just like to open up the floor very briefly for technical questions about the poll. if we have larger questions, let's save them for the next section of the discussion. if anybody would like to know about the methodology, about the way the poll was conducted technical questions, please. yes, go ahead, sir. >> go ahead. >> the numbers that separate out the east -- >> can we get a -- >> 10% of the population of the ukraine. when you get to the other number that some -- to the national number do you rate them by population or are those raw numbers? >> they're weighted according to the population. >> so in each region -- in each region -- >> yes. >> you're taking whatever that region's opinion was, then taking the population in that

region times that, in essence, and then summing for the nation its population -- it's populationing weighted, you're telling me. >> we weight the aggregate number according to the representation and population, correct. the same with the donbass regions. those are all weighted down. numbers are in the miks but everything -- mix, but the numbers are weighted down. in the east, we did weight it according to the current percentage of the population, which is significantly lower because there have been quite a few -- >> i'm sorry. i was remiss in my job as moderator. please do identify yourselves if you want to speak. i believe you had a question, ma'am. >> my name is marisa. i'm the owner of my own company. my question is about sampling. and the respondents. when they responded to these questions, who did they think this information was going to?

>> it was simply stated that this was the kiev international institute of sociology. and they were not given any more information. the questions that went to the country as a whole were part of an omnibus so there were a number of sponsors for the survey as a whole, though that wasn't true of the telephone parts in the donbass region. >> i'm assuming that the questions that were posed was in the ukrainian language? >> whatever the current -- whatever the local language was. and keep in mind that in both the south and east, the majority speak russian. and in the west and the north, the majority speak ukrainian. but whatever language they naturally spoke was the language that was used. >> do you believe that there may be a relationship between the

language used in the questionnaire itself and the results? >> that would be an interesting study to do. i doubt it. there might be a slight effect. but basically, whatever -- you know, whatever language people want to use, they could use. oh, by the way, on the rebel-held areas, how we identified the rebel-held areas, that was based on what people -- where people said they were, because those lines can move. >> thank you very much for your good work. >> thank you. >> and i believe there was a question here as well. >> hi. george professor at virginia tech. and i've worked with kiev on a poll in ukraine in december, the southeast. and about the donbass, rebel held so you're breaking that out from within the east. so when we see the east, then we see donbass rebel-held. >> it's all aggregated.

>> so the donbass rebel held is in the east figures? >> correct. >> whoawhat is the aggregate number in the donbass rebel held? you did 200 with the phone. but in the first wave, face to face -- >> there was a little over 40, i think it was. >> so we're talking about 240 people. only 40 of whom were face to face for that particular -- >> some of those may actually have been by phone as well. >> okay. are you confident that that -- you know, you can do face-to-face polling in an area where there's a war going on? >> there are challenges, which is why the telephone was used as extensively as it was. there are down sides to the telephone too. but whenever you're dealing with doing surveys in a conflict area, you're -- you know, there's some compromise involved and you should always look at the numbers with some, you know question in your mind and not -- if you see a robust effect you

can have confidence in it. but, you know, if it's down to some pretty granular differences, i wouldn't stress them too much. but what we found was a rather strong readiness to distance themselves from russia and to say that they were not wanting to move closer to russia, even in the rebel-held areas. so that gives me more confidence that the people were feeling comfortable to say what was on their mind. >> perhaps one more question on the technical side. of course, this doesn't preclude asking other questions during the larger session. yes. back here. >> hi. michelle from the state department. i'm wondering, for the phone surveys that you did, were they landline only, or were they mixed -- >> land line only. >> i'm curious what the nonresponse rate was for the phone poll and the face-to-face. >> i'm sorry. i don't have that available. we just got the data on friday and we have not -- it was a

scramble to fully finish it. but i'll get back to you on that, if you want. >> okay. great. well, very interesting questions. so let's move on to the main panel now. and first of all, i would like to introduce ambassador william taylor, who is the acting executive haven't of the united states institute of peace. united states institute of peace. thank you very much. from 2011 to 2013, he was the special coordinator for middle east transitions in the u.s. state department. so he was coordinating american support for the revolutions of the arab spring. very interesting job. from 2006 to 2009, he served as u.s. ambassador to ukraine. and before that, he was part

of -- he was the u.s. government representative to the mid east quartet. he's served a number of other government functions which we probably don't have time to list. suffice to say that he was also a graduate of the united states military academy at west point. and served the u.s. army for a number of years as an officer. and just in time. >> just in time! ha! no thanks to a.a.a. >> it's been known to happen. i don't -- i will introduce dr. catherine kelleher, who is the college park professor of the school of public policy at the university of maryland. she has been in that position since 2006. yes? and she advises in the area of international security and u.s. foreign policy. before that, well, somewhat farther before that, she served in the clinton administration as

the president's deputy assistant secretary of defense for russia, ukraine and eurasia. and as the secretary of defense's representative to nato in brussels. of course, she has held a number of other very prestigious conditions in u.s. foreign policy before that. but, again, in the interests of brevity, i think we'll just -- yes, and she says i should indeed leave it at that. >> ha ha! >> so we're going to have, i hope a very spirited discussion. i'd like to call on the panel participants to each address the study. should we give it 10 minutes for each of you? >> max. >> and then we'll have what i hope will be a very spirited discussion with the audience. we're going to go to 12:30, but if things are pretty passionate then i think we should leave a little leeway to go on for another few minutes, perhaps as late as 12:45. without further ado, let's get

into it and let's hear the panelists' remarks. >> thank you very much. good to see you. i'm very pleased to be able to comment on this. i will pull out from the results that steven just described to you, some of the conclusions that i draw from this, which i hope will not -- i hope it will be controversial. i hope we can have a good spirited conversation. and there are some in the room, i suspect, who will have issues about this. i have three points here that i will try to do in less than 10 minutes. one is ukraine has decided that its future is in europe. we'll come back to this. but i think you can poll this. my second point is ukraine is more united than ever in the face of russian aggression. and my third point is one that i think catherine will elaborate on more. and that is the ukrainians have not forgotten crimea. and we shouldn't either. so let me do the

so ukraine has decided that its future is in europe. if it were up to you which course should ukraine take? 47% of all of the ukrainians surveyed including those i would say in the separatist held supported by the russians including a 47% would prefer stronger relations with the eu. 13% would prefer stronger relations with the russians. so 47% for the eu and 13% for strong relations with russia. that is the first data point that i would pull out. the second one is 72% of all of the ukrainians surveyed would find it either acceptable or tolerable to move closer to the du. -- the eu.

60% would find it unacceptable to move closer to the russians. again, a strong indication of which direction they would prefer. when you talk to them about joining the eu, 67% would find it either acceptable or tolerable. 67% of all surveyed. that includes the separatists and the east and the south and finally, 51% as i think steven mentioned, 51% of the ukrainians would find it acceptable or tolerable for ukraine to join nato. steve mentioned that it's only 51%. well, 51% of ukrainians having watched this movement of the sentiment for and against nato over the years, 51% saying now they would either prefer order

-- or would find it acceptable joining his remarkable. it was in the 20, 25%. so this is a dramatic increase. so my first point is they have clearly decided to move towards europe. second, they are more united now than ever. 85% of ukrainians surveyed across the country, prefer for a united united ukraine. 85% wanting united ukraine, 63% just as it is governed now and another 22% when you add some autonomy for the regions. it is a pretty strong number i would say. 85% for the united ukraine. even in the east, it is 68%.

in the separatist region, it is 61% as you pointed out, so that is a strong indication of the broad support for the unified ukraine across the country. 79% disapprove putin's actions. 26% even in the rebel held areas is 26%. so he's not done himself any favors in ukraine. 87% say he doesn't have the right to protect russian citizens were russian speakers and again, 41% would agree with that. so i find this to be pretty dramatic rejection of the russian point of view. last point, and again i will defer to catherine on this, 82% of all ukrainians surveyed want to keep crimea either right away or they want to get it back but

over time. i was just there north into the -- to observe the presidential elections and they were as free and fair as you could hope for and the people sitting around the polling booth observing had nothing much to observe. there was no funny business as there always has been. so they were happy to talk and one of the conversations that i had was about crimea and you will be happy to know that the informal assessment i got was the same, a lot of people said it's going to take some time. crimea is clearly part of ukraine. it will take some time and we will take as much time as we need for the economy to recover

and when it recovers, crimea will come back. so those are my three points. >> i apologize for being late. let me start with a somewhat longer view than bill has presented to you. i think what is amazing about the results, particularly after the winter that we have observed and the attempt to set up a cease-fire, is how clear most of the respondents were. they had a clear understanding about ukraine and its independence and they rejected every point however the question was asked or whatever the topic is, the idea that russia has the

right of protection for russian minorities and that it had some way to make that decision they -- that decision. they clearly assert this is however the question is asked. they also favor an outcome that gives them access not necessarily equal access to that access to both the west and russia so it isn't something that is the black-and-white that is often reflected in the press accounts. they understand where they are geopolitically. they know that parts of their country have had major markets with russia. they hope that there will be a peaceful outcome to all of this and that it will be possible to

continue in the middle position they have to a degree already enjoyed between east and west but the preference is to be an independent european country. and they do not see themselves as necessarily being forced by anything to be brought into the orbit of either russia or europe or the united states. it's clear that vladimir putin is the big loser both in terms of what i just said and in the way that he is viewed. his popularity was never 100% in ukraine or even much more than 50%, but he did have a good regard up until about two years ago.

now there is an assumption, in fact the state acknowledged as far as they're concerned, that there are russian forces no matter where people live, no matter what they are looking at , there are russian forces in ukraine. the west hasn't enjoyed a huge increase but there is regard for european leaders. this angela merkel is regarded over 50% as doing positive things. and europe while it hasn't done all that the eu should have done and there is a stress that they should have done more than simply policy by assertion dot -- but europe has done in some measure what it should do in order to help ukraine economically and politically. the united states -- perhaps the

questions are asked about how you rate president obama's performance, how you would look at the question of weaponization. here is the predictable result in the breakdown within ukraine to be observed. mainly obama is doing a strong plurality and the question of arming ukraine is given a strong plurality with particular infinity as of the west and in the north. it is however not as strong as this european accent that i've reported before. another incident of clear-eyedness and perhaps cynicism is given the long march to even get to where we are today is that the rejection of the previous president and the understanding that it was a corrupt regime and it has a

fairly strong rating on the score from one to ten a little over eight in the view of most ukrainians that it was very corrupt. however, it is also a judgment made about the present government. only slightly less corrupt than the past regime. and that's true in the east for their regime's as well as the north, west, and south about the ukrainian regime. i think the whole question is the issue that has almost gone unnoticed in the western press reports in the last five or six months or almost a year now is a done deal but most worrying about its still present in their consciousness and most of them

take the position that in the long-term they should seek their crimean reintegration. they do not want to see their crimea or the east somehow disentangled from ukraine and ultimately to end up being integrated into russia. and the result is that for now , they have other things on their plate but this is an issue they wish to restore. however new a nation, however much of a conglomerate of a number of historical legacies which are necessarily terribly congruent, but it is the ukraine majority of the respondents wanted to see reestablished. >> thank you very much to both of the panelists for that. now let's before we open the

floor for questions i had a question of my own i would like to direct to the director of the survey. but i would also be of course very interested to hear the others as well. the separatist held areas come off as quite an outlier. they are quite distinct. we have any sense of the factors that are influencing that and is it a matter of coercion by the separatists were a matter of greater exposure to the russian information policy because we know it is quite intense or is it something about the conduct of the war in those areas do we have any sense that has influenced that particular data plan? >> i think maybe the other commentators may have more

background than i. basically i think the strength of these attitudes are not something that could have just been created from the outside. people are not that malleable. so there were some feelings along those lines before the recent events. and clearly there are -- russia has intensified them and has enabled them to be expressed and created a whole narrative that's amplified. but at the same time they haven't fully bought the attitudes are strong enough that you should assume that it is something that is homegrown to some extent a something that was simply created from the outside.

>> we have some evidence on this question and crimea where there was a referendum they say and according it was what, 98% support for becoming part of russia and that was during a time when the russian army occupied crimea so it wasn't a free and fair election but i'm prepared to believe that it over half would have said the same thing so i would agree there is clearly a discontent in that part. >> i would just like to add that this is spoken as a fan i think it shows the effect particularly among the russian speakers who depend on russian television in

those areas as a source of information their view of the world is a constant 24 hour of russian information policies. the effect of television particularly monopoly television and the fact that as the crisis started there was almost nothing comparable to the organized information going on in that part which was voluntarily chosen. it's possible to get radio and others but from russian speakers already discontented. this has been truly i think a study in how television and the into the virile and images have been used those affect attitude and i think it is something that we need to look at and think about what lessons that should have for us as a country and

perhaps even as individuals. >> what we see is more resistant -- resistance to moving westward and the desire for something that political restructuring to russia. there isn't a desire to move closer to russia. there is more resistance. all of that implies is the cultural phenomenon more than a political phenomenon. >> let's go to the audience. i believe i see a hand right here. and let's identify ourselves. >> thank you very much. this is very interesting. i wanted to follow up in the

direction that was suggested. the best number i have is 3.3 million people regionally and 1.6 million people have fled, 1 million in ukraine and half a million in russia at least and 100,000 in other countries. so they are in ukraine and the second by its is that he used land lines. young people use mobile phones in ukraine so you get an older age cohort or did you try to check that when asking in this part of ukraine while the

younger ones tend to be more ukrainian. >> in the donbass it was weighted by age, so that factor was counted. and in various ways the institute seeks to adjust any kind of bias that comes from the use of landline phones. >> that is definitely the >> -- that is definitely a factor. 19% of the whole region has left and you might mention those that stayed behind have different attitudes, so that tells what is

going on in the region right now and it also had the effect of decreasing the presence of the east in the national aggregate weighted by the distribution. but yes they have a lesser effect on the aggregate national numbers. >> [inaudible] >> they have been reviewed carefully but it is a good read of the people that are there now responding. >> the george mason university school.

thank you so much for your interest. i have to bring to point. what we see here is, we don't know how we deal with it. it is an issue of meaning and what do they mean by a european union. the second point it's hard to sustain this particular site we speak about the european union . most of all people living in ukraine only 80% of the survey because of economic crisis. you also speak about the issue where ukraine has better capacity to deal with posttraumatic stress disorder.

lot of issues connected. a lot of uprise with the junior european union and the were also stationed to know that memberships were not on the table at all. there was some discussion of the association because they still have a perception to go to the european union. that will not happen. it will bring more frustration. there will be more restrictions. how do we sustain this particular situation that will probably change with the ongoing process. regarding the unity of the nation again, it is a huge problem you just discussed here but also this historic divide.

the second question is about sustainability. and what we see is we need to bring this issue into the ukraine so my question for you do we compare others where the european union and international community, what do we do with ukraine to sustain the unity there? >> that is the kind of question we were trying to answer with which do you favor and when this happened, how would you feel on this scale? if this happened and this happened? and breaking it out by your region, so we have tried to find how robust the support and the

resistance and what we see is if you look across all of the areas, the one where you get the least resistance, the most convergence is a kind of unusual position. -- neutral position. you get a fair number who say they could tolerate moving to the eu but there is also a probation about it that shows up in the numbers in a variety of ways which are in the rebel held areas. so that is the kind of thing we are trying to get at and yes there are some pretty intense resistance. so these kinds of decisions are not made simply by the referendum so that if you choose between the eu and the european

customs union, more people would save eu -- eurasian customs. but in other polls, you do not have a majority favoring the eu either. i would agree with you that you need to not simply look at the top line response. but, what are the levels of resistance in different parts of the country? because a small number of people as we know can create a lot of trouble in the effort to create a coherent country and ukraine is already pretty precarious. catherine could probably speak for this better than i. the mixed language, the mixed religion, links to europe and russia. it is not as coherent a nation

as most european nations. >> i believe dr. kelleher wanted to address your point. you were at the defense department during the baltic war. >> right. and nato. >> at nato as well. so you might have an interesting perspective on that. >> let me say, the right to have questions about the future with, in an association with the e.u. and because when it was posed at any point in the last two decades, there are several european nations who steadfastly oppose any further expansion of membership, particularly to the ukraine. i think it's in some case simple greed of the southern states who don't feel they have their share of benefit yet. and they fear ukraine as a compelling competitor in that

way but there are also others who stress other themes , particularly the religious question. the real problem though is, i think, it is a false analogy to look at bosnia, serbias and coasia. that's a very different set of wars and leadership and histories than ukraine is. i think while ukraine is an amalgam, there is no question, out of various historical periods and backgrounds. what strikes me as encouraging particularly out of the survey that steve has done, is in fact this enthusiasm for ukraine as a separate entity. as an identifiable entity. as one with which individuals identified themselves. i think the analogy is probably better made to germany where

even in a divided country one that that's reinforced in every way that the leadership could, there still was the sense of fundamental germanness as a bound of unity. i think to some extent it is also true in ireland. so i think that at least is a competing model for what happens to divided societies. particularly divided societies that are divided by conflict or tension and i think whatever else you take from the survey , you should take that sense that even aer all of the things that have happened, there is the sense ukrainians belong together. and an interesting openness, to various forms of association including perhaps more independence.

we asked one set of questions that specifically addressed the idea of limited autonomy for some people and it is in fact, while people don't see it as the favorite alternative, they're at least willing to look at it. and that strikes me as, as opposed to bosnia war, the war the yugoslav succession, if you will, is a very different attitude about what the future might involve. >> so i believe, ambassador taylor -- >> to your question about how to sustain the enthusiasm. first of all, now, there is a broad civil society enthusiasm that we saw in the madon we haven't really seen before. so i think that is knew. i think that is something that can sustain. some members of that civil society are now in rada. they have gone, they have been elected. they're part of the politics

now. they can move that. the second thing about the point about there have been have been nations in the e.u. who have opposed expansion in the e.u. as well as in nato, it's going to take time for the ukrainians to develop the capabilities, the characteristics, the norms, the standards required in order to be a real applicant, a real serious membership applicant for both eu and nato. and so, attitudes can change in europe. they have changed. so we don't have to worry, we should be concerned about what today's attitude is but itneed not be that way forever. >> excellent point. so, well, this gentleman, please . >> hi. sorry i didn't introduce myself before. my name is ernie robson. this is kind of a technical

question and kind of a policy question. where did karka and maripol, fall in the east, west, north, south? if there was a center of russianism in ukraine, it was karkov, although when the '91 '92 time happened, there was a massive exodus back to russia. but still, you know, it strikes me that those areas that i'm asking about had strong leadership that was not interested in russia, and the others did not, and get to the passion part later. >> i'm sorry my answer will be very short. we just don't have enough --

[inaudible] >> excuse me. i'm clay ramsey, research director. the what you are referred to is included in the region of the east as we have it demarcated. when you see numbers for the east, there is hardly ever any difference beyond the margin of area between those and what you see for the whole region. >> the other point of this is that herzon, also right in that area, odessa, farther to the east, was the target of these little green men, the russians attempted to move into herzon at the same time they were going into donbas and invaded crimea and the people resisted. they got no traction. the russians were pushed back. and, again we see, as you have indicated, that people in harkiv

also have not been eager to move in that direcon. so again, this is indication that is a real different herzon even when i was there in 2008 and colin clary was there. this is a different ukraine now. >> it is -- could i just? there is also just a considerable difference. let me take the military. many of the military who served in my time, namely the first decade in ukraine, were retiring in place from the russian army. they were russian. there was no question. a major form of communication was in the russian language. everyone thought that was fine. that is not the case today. there may be still individuals but there is an entire generation.

it has been 20 years. it has been this long period not a peaceful period certainly but with lots and lots of change. within that process the formation of identity around language in part, mostly about the way in which the nation has operated on, even on the individual level, i think has changed what was true in the '90s, particularly the early '90s, to a quite different profile at the moment. >> so wehad a hand up over here. and then over there. >> thank you very much. thank you very much. i also found it fascinating, professor kelleher's reference to germany, that despite all the years separately there was this sense of being one nation. the question though arises, what kind of nation does the area believe they are? is there a sense after

everything that happened remaining russian? that brings me to the huge difference from what i see between the opinions of non-occupied areas and occupied areas as to what to do next because people are there, being bombed, dying, lost all their property. many of them. so that actually explains the outlook i guess to a great extent. it would certainly for me. and i see that 55% would not mind even being annexed by russia. even the donetsk rebel-held areas. page 19. 65% would love to secede from

ukraine in the donbas rebel-held areas. on the other hand, if you look at it, 41% of the same people say that russia does not have the right to interfere to protect the citizens. so you think, and they disapprove of what putin does in the area to a great extent. so i think there is a great confusion in the minds and i guess russian propaganda in the country to a great extent of this and the reason i think so because on page 20 it says that the east believes the most and the fact that the west will support ukraine in transformation. to translated into russian, they are sold. they sold themselves to the west. >> so the question is? >> so the question is, do we know what indeed these areas want and, on a more like

chechnya or germany or bosnia, who are they? really very unclear. is it clear to them? that's what i don't understand. >> i would say this, i think even in the eastern part of the country, the notion of the nation still being, still obtaining, still existing, still being a -- and even an expectation that it will continue, those are signs to me are that is present. it is more that there's an insistence on some changes and greater autonomy for these regions and again i see this more culturally rooted rather than a desire for secession. as i see it, looking at all the numbers, if you look at them as totality that when you talk about secession is at this point more of an expression of the intensity of feeling of wanting that sense of autonomy and of resistance to this whole westward movement.

then it is a formulated desire to really secede which could be a very complicated thing for such a small little area and annexation with, by russia, you know, the numbers that people, that even the rebel-held areas express about russia are not overwhelmingly positive. so it's -- i don't read it that the nation has essentially fragmented as much as there is within it intense conflict about which way to go. i think it is very important to keep in mind that you know, we did -- there were these swings, you know. that yanukovych was elected. if i may, i wanted to show one other number that thought might come up. how people feel about the ending of yanukovych's presidential

term and you can see that majorities in the south and a larger majority in the east disapprove of yanukovych's departure. in overwhelming majority in the rebel-held areas. what yanukovych represented isn't simply like, oh, now everybody is ready to move east. so it is still alive but, when i put up all the factors together, i still -- i see a readiness to assume that there is some way this can be, ultimately be pulled together. >> way it is pulled together is through having a regular set of elections in that part of the country. they haven't had elections in that part of the country. were -- that part of the country that

were in any way serious. and once they do, once they elect people, to make these kinds of decisions then that kind of negotiation can go on with the government. >> i would also say, perhaps referring to my earlier comment , this is one of the talking points that has been most strongly emphasized in, on russian television. a drumbeat. this is possible. this is desirable. you find this tracking of the points of russian propaganda. >> wait? what's desirable? >> secession. annexation to russia is desirable. i would only like to draw, if you will permit me an example from my own home city, which is boston. after the revolutionary war they lost 25% of their population who went either back to england or to canada because they didn't like the result. and there is always voting with your feet. i think though, and this is

where i feel it is closer to the german example, very few east germans went any place else. they did not leave. they did not go en masse to other places because ultimately , they felt this was their homeland. >> some went west of course. >> yes, but within the country. within the country. you don't see massive outmigration. you don't see people even changing their address within the european union. >> one other point, the support for the minsk agreement being large majorities in every region i think is a very strong indicator that they're still trying to work it out. >> let's try to get as many questions as possible. you, sir. we have a lot of questions. we'll try to get through them because i think there is still a lot of questions out there. >> thanks. >> can you identify yourself. >> i'm chad nagel.

i'm an attorney. i was going to ask the question in the first round but i decided it didn't qualify. you had one question about the opinion of ukrainians toward putin, but it related specifically to his handling of the war. and i was wondering, i mean , although in a vox popular type exercise where you're asking ordinary people most concerned how they will pay their next utility bill, this might not qualify, but maybe it would be interesting to someone, perhaps you did get a sense of opinions towards the russian political regime. i suppose, as opposed to putin that he is the center of it. and by that i mean, the concept of what has come to be called the power vertical. so that it seems that putin's popularity within russia, if we're to believe their official

published results is not in spite of but because of this perception that there is this strong man who ultimately is ultimately responsible for the fate of the whole nation. in ukraine's history, ancient history but post-soviet history , has been sort after pendulum swing between these go phenomenon. you had yanukovych -- >> i don't mean to interrupt you. we're having very long questions today. we need a question. >> you get to the a sense to which ukrainians favor a disperal of power in their political system where there are checks on the power of a leader, like you see with poroshenko many checks are formal within the street and formal and constitutional or whether they do pine for this sort of strong man. >> thank you very much much. the negative attitudes towards putin certainly suggest to the

contrary and rejection of his claim of right to intervene to protect russian speakers, speak to that as well. by the way, russian speakers, we pulled them out and they reject the idea as well. as for views of russia more broadly, we did have the question about russia's role in influence in the world more broadly and russia did not do very well, except in somewhat of the rebel-held areas. the overall finding of the survey is that we're not seeing a clear attraction to russia as much as in the east as much as resistance to moving westward. so the idea that they look over there and say oh, what they have , over there in russia, with you know, a strong leader and so on, that is appealing. i do not interpret it that way. >> so can we go over here to the gentleman in the blue tie.

>> hello. i'm a visiting fellow at ctr. my question is actually, there has been a lot of talk about criticizing russia's actions but, do you know, in what way, western ukrainians are already sacrificed themselves or their loved ones in eastern ukraine? thank you. >> i'm not sure how to speak to that. certainly there is a strong desire to move western but, many questions, particularly in the north, we find a readiness to have neutrality only if 48% in the west were, so that wasn't acceptable. so, would that translate into readiness?

well, there is not a lot of enthusiasm for using military force to regain territory. more so in the west and north but still, trepidation, not overwhelming and the support for the minsk agreement with built in accommodation to provide greater autonomy in the dunbas. so, i think butternut altogether, i see stronger signs of a desire to find some agreement then than a readiness to use for example to get a maximal outcome. >> okay. so this lady here with the glasses. then after here we'll go to the gentleman there. >> hi. i'm teresa hitchens, senior research scholar at center for studies at maryland. quick question.

given all the data and what you have found about the attitudes and the ukraine, what are your recommendations for u.s. policy? [laughter] >> thank you very much. >> so i have some recommendations. i think we should support ukraine very strongly financially. i think we should support ukraine very strongly militarily. i think international community should do both of those things. she knows better than anyone about the financial problems ukraine faces. we along with the imf and others should be there supporting them. we should also defend and beef up the defenses in the nato nations that border russia. so that is an important -- if we're trying to deter the russians from doing what they have been doing, that is, first invading crimea and then invading the southeastern part of ukraine, and we don't want to do that more, then we need to push back.

we need to push back by reinforcing militarily the the countries that are in nato on the periphery. we need to support ukraine and need to provide them, the ukrainians weapons in order to resist. >> there you go. >> yes. i'd like to add in addition to bill's prescription a different perspective. and here i think my position is somewhat like that of angela merkel. we have to realize what has happened is the undermining of the european security system. it isn't just ukraine. it is the question of all of the agreements that have been broken, all of the solemn commitments and quite frankly, a lot of the ease with which we've lived in the last 25 years has led to an expectation this will continue forever. we have to realize this is a political problem that is of enormous significance and that will only be solved when we come to a political solution.

and that so far as i can see, is the moment, if not, on the horizon. so we better think very hard if only because we will have lost an enormous amount of effort and we may in the process destroy the economy of both ukraine and russia after we have spent 25 years trying to bring them into the community of nations. >> so this gentleman here on the aisle please. then we'll go over there. >> i came with the students from the elliott school. i want to bring it back to the points the lady from george mason had, sustainability and reform of progress in the nation. the e.u. and us, kind of as nato and european union as a total , have been using a carrot stick and the balkans.

how do the countries in the back 10 years there is extreme backsliding with regard to those situations? how do we avoid that with regard to ukraine and reapproach that situation in the balkans? >> i think just perhaps to just continue my last comment what we did was relax. we thought if we them enough money, they would simply in their prosperity do what we wanted them to do, sort of naturally. doesn't work like that. and nobody has spent either the time or quite frankly the commitment of their own defense budgets or their overseas aid budgets to the extent that was necessary to sustain the commitments that we made. and until we do that, we can't be surprised at the results. >> so ukrainian reforms are difficult. very difficult for the ukrainian government to undertake. they're exactly as you say, there needs to be something out there. there needs to be a carrot out there. one thing that could be out

there which europeans don't like to hear is eu membership. another thing that could be out there for military reform is nato membership. so those two things if they are real, if we seriously have them as something out there, not immediately because as we say earlier it will take a lot of time for them to the meet the standards, that was a motivation for a lot of the east europeans to do the very difficult economic reforms in order to get into the e.u. ukraine can be offered the same. >> so, over here. >> sam, international institute for strategic studies. question for professor kull. how strong in a regional and global context are the regional divides that you demonstrated to us today? i'm income is this -- do you see divisions like this based on regions much other countries issues other countries are facing?

is it ukraine particularly regionally divided looking on your regional or global context based on your experience working in other countries? >> we have done surveys around the world as part of the world public opinion.org network and ukraine has been part of that network and surveyed over 20 nations and as we were going along, we were always surprised how heterogeneous ukraine was. so this is very unusual. if you go look around the united states, you would be amazed how homogenous the united states is. people have this idea of all those heterogenity in many parts of country but that is very normal. so this is extremely unusual. it has always looked to us like a precarious state and so it is really not surprising that

things are breaking out the way they are. and that -- we can only underscore in terms of policy implications but that should be understood how precarious it is and just getting a majority or something like that isn't -- that is probably not going to create consensus because, across the nation as a whole because of their different parts of the country, chunks of the country where majorities are really opposed. then you have real potential for instability. >> excellent point. so, this gentleman on the aisle please. >> from the hoover institution. question for steve i think mainly. in that the numbers you have shown us suggest to me that the most likely outcome is a frozen conflict. like all those others we've seen before around a borders of the russia. so why isn't the model something more like moldova, something more like ukraine -- like

georgia and all those other places where these frozen conflicts are going on and on without any real resolution? of course the implications of that are fairly clear. you don't need to be sketched out. >> i think others here may be able to better comment. yes, the majorities across the country supporting the minsk agreement suggest that this is going to be some kind of a framework and the emphasis in the eastern regions on having some kind of autonomy, along the lines that are referenced there. i don't know if you need to think of it as strictly frozen. there are -- i see the elements of basically some kind of agreement, not necessarily full-scale federalism but, just some kind of greater autonomy so

that -- one of the key questions, why do people in the east, what is it they're really afraid of, right? and i understand we haven't fully defined that. but the numbers to me suggest they could get to comfort with that and those, in the west could get to comfort with this greater autonomy. the elements are here of some agreement that is organic, there are people who could get to some significant -- something that feels like something like normalcy. >> i would agree. it doesn't have to be a frozen conflict. i mean just as steve says, the mince agreement. if fully implemented would not lead to a frozen conflict. that is, there would be some additional autonomy not yet designed not just for dunbas

but for all in the country would have additional -- and mr. poroshenko talked about that. and there have been those kind of discussions but also in the minsk agreement is the withdrawal of foreign forces and that means russian forces f -- forces. that happens there can be osce controlling the border monitoring the border between russia and ukraine so that the russian forces can't continue to come in. that means then that the government in kiev would kiev would control the entire area. there wouldn't be a frozen conflict. there are questions whether the misnk ii agreement would fully last but nonetheless if it were fully implemented it , wouldn't have to be completely frozen. >> [inaudible] couldn't hear you. he says the point is there will be continuing russian interference. >> jim, this is what i mean

about the political solution. there has to be an overarching political solution that perhaps would give to take bill's scenario with the e.u. with different powers or backed by a firmer consensus than there is at the moment but it is going to take a long time. i also think this theme of ukraineness which i mentioned before, which is different moldova transnistra. that is barely acknowledged. that it is a russian outpost as far as most inhabitants can returned. -- are concerned. you're talking about enormous religious and cultural differences that have been there and recognized for a very long time. this isn't the case. this isn't that kind of huge walls that have been there for three centuries.

i think we have reason to be more optimistic but we'll have to work at it. >> ok. nobody seems to be rushing for the exits. i think we can get away with one more question. how about here on the aisle. >> hi. katrina, u.s. mission to the osce. i have a little more pessimistic view on this in that russia's goal to have federalized ukraine where they defacto can influence the east use as a veto to control the region. what do you think about that. >> that may be russia's goal but that doesn't mean they get there. >> when i view these statistics , to become a that is why i am pessimistic. people are not sure where they want to go and i worry we will see a lack of will to the west. they don't really know where they will go and russia can use this and leverage this to influence the country.

>> i would emphasize that the more ukraine moves westward, the greater the opportunities are for russia to try to influence the eastern part of the country because you will have more alienated people in the eastern part of the country. to the extent that people in the east have a assurances that they're not going to be pulled, kicking and screaming into europe, the less russia will have a source or means of leverage. >> well, thank you very much. i think we'll probably leave it at that. we've gone a little bit over the time but not too much. thank you very much for coming today. i think we can all agree that we've learned a great deal, a great deal of very substantive information about this situation and i thank our panelists for giving us a very, very solid and informed view. and please, we welcome your

comments on social media and any feedback you want to give us. thanks very much for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> the political landscape has changed with the 114th congress. thereupon the republicans and one democrat in the senate. they're also an hundred eight women in congress, including the first african-american republican in the house and the first woman veteran of the senate. keep track of congress using congressional chronicle.

it has useful information including voting rights and each clicks coming up tonight senator bernie sanders of vermont discusses the middle class in the future of the country. then president obama speaking at the national league of cities about technology and jobs. the supreme court oral argument regarding who has the authority to draw convert -- congressional district lines in arizona. an article from the washington post, gop letter to iran deepens white house i are. and already heated battle over negotiations to curtail iran's nuclear program came more tense when 47 republican senators sent a