irement of redistricting is done under its own procedures. i would think that the power of congress should be at its apex when both commerce and the state -- congress and the state wants to do the same thing. the second thing i would say is, in this room stance -- scalia: no, no, no, not if the same thing violates the state the objection here is a house additional objection. feigin: i do believe this was in the authority of congress. my friend just said that, if the state legislature wanted to, the state legislature could have given this power to the commission. under the second sub clause of the elections clause, congress can do anything that a state legislature can do, which means congress can also give this power to the commission.

the only difference between my friend's scenario and mine is that in my friend's scenario the state legislature would retain the authority to override what the commission has done but that is only in consequence of state legislation over federal legislation. it's not something that a state legislature can override and it is a consequence of congress superceding authority and congress authority under the elections clause. scalia: the second clause is being used to revise the second clause. the second clause can -- congress can do something on its own. but can congress use the second clause to revise with the first clause says? feigin: one thing i want to emphasize is i think the court settled this issue in hildebrandt when it said it was simply doing something that the constitution expressly gave the right to do. i don't think the right way to

think about this is commerce using the second sub clause to rewrite this first. -- congress thank you. >> mr. waxman. waxman: we have before us a suit that the people -- both raises a claim that the framers would have been astonished to consider that federal district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate and is misconceived. arizona defines its legislature in its constitution to include

both the people and two representative bodies. in argument hinges on the premise that in drafting the elections clause, the framers intended to ignore a state definition of its own legislature. it is deeply inconsistent -- scalia: whatever the state calls a legislature suffices under a federal constitution, is that right? waxman: by using the word legislature in connection with the accepted definition of that term in the founding generation. we cited both noah webster and samuel johnson's dictionaries and it was understood that legislature meant the body that makes the law. scalia: give me one provision of

the constitution that uses the term legislature that clearly was not meant to apply to the body of representatives of the people that makes the laws. one provision of the constitution that clearly has your meaning. i looked through them all. i can't find a single one. waxman: the one that most clearly has our meaning which accords with understanding is the one that this court has said in hildebrandt and in smiley -- scalia: this is the only one.

waxman: this may not be the only one. kennedy: since 1913, many states wanted to have direct election of the senators. not one state displaced the legislature. it took the 17th amendment to do that. waxman: that's correct. kennedy: that history works very much against you. the word legislature is not in the constitution. the senators shall be chosen by the legislature. there was no suggestion that this could be displaced. waxman: there is no question that this court has explained repeatedly, first in smith versus hawk which distinguished hildebrandt and the legislative power addressed in article section 1 from the election of senators in article 1 section 3 and again in smiley that made clear that, just as this court

reiterated last week in yates, that it may depend on the function that the term is serving. kennedy: you are saying that the legislature in the now repealed section, that talks about choosing senators, means something different than what it means in the following section. waxman: as this court explained in smith versus hawk, which was decided, which was an article 5 meaning, in smith versus hawk, this court said, in article 1 section 3, election of senators by the legislature, and in article 5, the ratification power. what was at issue was the power to elect and the power to ratify

that specifically comported with the elected representative body. and it used those as examples where often, justice kennedy often the term legislature in the constitution has that meaning. but smith goes on and distinguishes hildebrandt on precisely the grounds we are that what was at issue in hildebrandt under the elections clause is not a particular body, a brick-and-mortar legislature necessarily. it is the legislative power of the state. hildebrandt is very helpful to you. alito: is there any other provision where legislature means anything other than the conventional meaning? how about applying for a constitutional convention? calling on the president to send

in troops to suppress domestic violence? creating a new state out of part of the state of arizona, for example? all of those provisions will use the term legislature. does it mean anything other than the conventional meaning of legislature? feigin: i don't know the answer to that question. alito: do you think it might? feigin: this court has never said that it doesn't. it never said that it does. it has focused a lot of attention on three particular uses of the word legislature in the constitution. the article 5 ratification it has focused a lot of power, the former article 1 section 3 power to elect senators in the legislative body, and the article 1 section 4 power to make the laws in the

provision that is at issue here. i think it is particularly important. i want to get to the language of smiley which my friend embraces. breyer: i would like you to because as i read it, they don't help you very much. a particular statute passed in 1911 helps the government with its statutory argument because a different statute uses similar words. we don't know if it was with the same intent. smiley talks about a sitting legislature and asks whether it's exercise of map-drawing power is a legislative exercise or say more like an impeachment exercise. it does not talk about what is at issue here where you have people outside that building making the legislative decisions. so i can't see those two cases as helping you that much. please argue to the contrary. but the open question here is when legislative power over time expands from a group of people

sitting in the state capitol to those people plus a referendum. and there i don't find much help in the case is one way or the other. feigin: justice breyer, i think that hildebrandt, smiley, hawk and also this court's case decided a few months after smiley and that was quoted last week in yates, the atlantic cleaners and dyers case all support the meaning of the word legislature that we advocate and was in fact the consensus definition of legislature. i agree with you -- scalia: a consensus definition

but you cannot give us where it is clearly used. i don't think it was a consensus definition at all. you plucked that out of a couple of dictionaries. breyer: the dictionary can be used as to determine how the word is used. but the power that legislates. the power that legislates in arizona is the people in the capitol plus the referendum. feigin: one thing is for sure, -- waxman: one thing's for sure if there was any other definition, but the framers on recent term, if i may, charles tiffany, in pages 39 in our brief, who wanted to do away with the second part of the clause that gave congress any

power because he thought it was an impairment on the states rights said, "america is a republic where the people at large either collectively or by representation form the legislature." madison made clear in discussing the constitution that, when he referred to "the legislatures of the state," he meant the existing authorities in the state that comprise the legislative branch of government. james wilson repeatedly interspersed legislature, state, and the people acting -- scalia: let's say the legislature means the body we normally can think of as the legislature. however, at the time there was

no such thing as the referendum or the initiative. so when the dictionaries refer to the power that makes laws, it was always a legislature. it was never the people at large because there was no such thing as the referendum. now that there is a such thing knows a legislature is plus the now that there is a such thing what about saying, ok, legislature means what everybody full citizenry, which is a level higher of democracy. but what we have here is not a level higher of democracy. it is giving this power to an unelected body of five people. as it is constituted here, two of them are elected or selected

by the majority party and two selected by the minority party. what if they decided that all four would be elected by the majority party? waxman: any delegation question -- the issue in this case is what does legislature mean. my friend concedes that whatever the legislature is, it can delegate its authority. so the delegation questions, well, i will endorse whatever i believe my friend would say because the arizona legislature has delegated all time and place and manner of regulations to a single person of the secretary of state, an executive officer and the individual counties that set the precinct, places, the places where you can vote and register, etc. so the question is what is the legislature. if your question is, well, now we know there is something

called an initiative -- of course, we knew this 120 years ago when the first states started reserving in their constitution legislative power to the people by initiative. but to echo something that justice kagan adverted to in the original argument, we are talking about a construction of the word legislature as to all time, place or manner regulation. roberts: why didn't they just say that the rules would be prescribed by each state? waxman: as the court explained in smiley, what the framers wanted was it to be done by a legislation. it wanted a "complete code of holding congressional elections to be acted."

roberts: if you had a governor doing it, it presumably would be pursuant to a delegation either from the people or from the legislature. either way, nothing happens until there is an exercise of lawmaking power by the state. it should have been sufficient for the drafters of the constitution to simply say that it would be drafted by each state, whether i referendum or referendum or legislature or by committee. to say by the legislature is totally superfluous. waxman: it is in the power of each state that makes the laws. there might be other constitutional problems arising

either from the first amendment or the 14th amendment, but i think that if mr. clement would agree, if the legislature decided, look, we are going to relegate this responsibility to the governor, that would be a constitutional delegation because it would have been a decision made by the lawmaking body of the state. if i could just make one point and then address justice breyer's question. it would be deeply inconsistent with the enterprise in philadelphia to harbor and to effectuate the notion that our framers intended to set aside both a cornerstone principle of federalism and their aim to bind the people as closely as possible to the national house

of representatives. yes, it is true that that related to the second part giving congress authority. that is because no one questioned the fundamental principles that the sovereign states could choose to allocate their legislative power as they wanted. if there had been any suggestion, the anti-federalists would be screaming bloody murder that the states could not do so. smiley specifically said that -- i am quoting from page 367 -- as the authority is confirmed for the purpose of making laws for the state, it follows in the absence of an indication of a contrary intent that the exercise of the authority must be in accordance with the method the state has chosen as

prescribed for legislated enactments. ginsberg: what he has alluded to is taking the legislature out of the picture entirely. waxman: yes, justice ginsburg. we can see in neither case was legislative power at issue. smiley says we find no suggestion in a federal constitutional provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the state with power to enact laws in any manner other than -- in which the constitution -- breyer: i am quibbling in a sense about the case. but the case is not about the body. everybody agreed it was a legislature.

but when the legislature acts in this instance, is it acting as an electoral body? is it acting as a ratifying body? is it acting as a dissenting body? -- consenting body or is it acting as a legislating body? and that is the answer they get in the form of legislation. here the question is about the body. waxman: that's right. the question is are the people body? by initiative part of the legislature that they hum's -- they themselves have chosen? again, addressing hildebrandt, this is what the court said. and it was because it was the authority of the state to

determine what should constitute its legislative process that the validity of the requirement of the state constitution in its application to congressional elections was sustained. scalia: legislative process there means what it takes the legislature to enact a law. once you assume legislative refers to legislature, your whole argument for smiley just disappears. waxman: the state of arizona like the constitutions of the states of the near majority have defined the legislative power to include the people of the legislative initiative. like this court ordered last week in your eighth, it said that it is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings. for example, the meaning of the word legislature, used several times in the constitution differs in the way it is

employed, depending on the character of the function that body in each instance is calling upon citing smiley. roberts: just -- waxman: the decision in your dates does not. roberts: my point is the supreme court in the months following smiley -- i am not quoting from yeats. i am quoting from atlantic cleaners and dyers. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chief justice. if it may please the court, let me start with the definition of legislature. the critical thing is not what

the framers meant by "the legislature" when they were talking broadly about political theory. what matters is what they meant when they were assigning particular authorities in the state constitution to particular components in the state government. as a number of you have pointed out, there is no doubt when they assigned an authority to the state legislature, they were signing authority to the representative body of the people. that takes us to the smiley case. if the definition of legislature is all that the smiley case turns upon, then with all due respect to my opponent, we win. i am quoting from smiley, not yates or anything else. i am quoting from smiley.

what it meant when adopted, it still means for purposes of interpretation. the legislature was then the representative body which made the laws -- >> that is true. smiley does not help him, i don't think, but it helps you less. but that is the question in the case. everybody assumes. nobody denies, it is those people making this law. the question is, are they legislating when they are doing it? nobody denies, it is those nobody denies they were the legislative power. here we have a different question. is this the legislative power received by referendum? the reason i say that smiley may not help, it says be flexible about that. clement: it says be flexible with the power of the state legislature.

i do find this very helpful, because not only does it answer the body question, but the other side in smiley said, oh, we win this case because legislature means the lawmaking authority and the other section meant, it means the body and the court said, you are right, it means the body, but it is a lawmaking function subject to the gubernatorial veto. i think they would've been flabbergasted to find out that the legislature, which is defined as a representative body of the people, would be cut out completely. kagan: when it comes to this particular provision -- and this provision as compared to the 17th amendment, which is the comparison and the contrast that hawks sets up -- when it comes to this provision, you need to show a lot of respect to the states own decisions about how legislative power ought to be

exercised, and that seems to be the overriding principle of the three cases. clement: i think you have to show respect for the way the state legislature goes about lawmaking, but is completely different to cut the state legislature out of the process entirely. let me avert briefly to the 1911 act. the irony of my friends on the other side, relying on the legislative history of the 1911 act -- at what point in legislative history of 1911, if people in 1911 could read, the statute on the book said it will take in until the state

legislature redistrict and they realized in 1911 the state legislature meant the state legislature, so they better change that law if they wanted to allow the referendum process. so, the 1911 legislative history -- not that i think you should particular spend a lot of time with that -- that it shows that there is a fundamental difference the between the legislature and the people, and as the chief justice pointed out, if there weren't, the framers could have stopped the election clause at each state. of course, -- kagan: you can turn that around and say what that provision shows is exactly what i just said. congress was on board that when you look at that clause, the elections clause, a lot of respect, deference had to be

given to the states' own decision. clement: i am happy giving deference to what the state legislature does. if that is constrained by the gubernatorial veto, overrode by referendum, then the restrictions on the state legislature are fine, but it has to be the state legislature. given to the states' own roberts: thank you, counsel. cases submitted. >> matthew lee is next. a group is seeking to decrease the u.s. prison population. also, nick juliano. washington journal is live on c-span every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. we do phone calls, tweets, and facebook comments. the senate foreign relations committee wednesday examines president obama's request for the authorization to use military force against isis. witnesses include john kerry

ashton carter, and martin dempsey. live coverage starts at 9:30 a.m. eastern on c-span. keep track of the republican-led congress and follow its members through the first session. on c-span, c-span2, c-span radio, and c-span.org. next, a look at ukrainian public opinion from crimea, russia, and the west. a former u.s. ambassador to the ukraine will host the event. this is 90 minutes. >> thank you for that introduction and thank you all for coming very at it seems

worthwhile to hear what the issues that they are currently embroiled in. that is what we have set out to do. and we have a new survey that -- we have a survey that was conducted with the international institute of sociology which is a group that we worked with numerous times over the years that's very highly regarded and at the method the method used was face to face for the most part telephone primarily in the region. for the national sample we had 1,005 and then we had an over sample of 403 specifically in the region where the conflict is occurring. and then for the ukrainian held area we have 330.

and in the rebel held areas we have a sample of 240. this shows you how we have divided the country. i'm going to be giving you the results not just for the nation as a whole but for the various regions because the differences are quite great and there is tension between the different parts of the country so we have the north and the west end where the lines are you can see the region and then of course the south and crimea was not surveyed. so the biggest question that we thought to address is whether people thought that ukraine should move towards the european union or russia.

this is a court dispute that is dominant and has been for some years. first we asked in terms of what is your preferred option, more standard form of the question and we stand with you prefer for ukraine to have relations that are stronger with the eu then russia stronger with russia than the eu or equally strong, and for the nation as a whole, less than half, 47% said stronger with the eu. almost half, but less. the largest number but still not a majority and 34% said equally strong, 13% stronger with russia. now out by the regions you see quite a difference. with the west and the north, we are generally aggregating because they were lifting the margin of error so they are quite similar. when they are different we will

call it out. in the west and the northeast 68% saying they want to be closer to the european union. while in the south and in the east the position is that the relations should be equally strong and in the donbass area the plurality is the relations should be stronger with russia so there is a very great difference in terms of the preference and the core point is that you do not overall have the majority in favor of moving towards the eu and when you look at the different regions it is only in the west the west and the north that you have this majority polling for a stronger relation with the eu. now, these attitudes are about how the president is handling the crisis in the east. overall you have a divided response.

the white space in between are the people that don't know or it depends on any given answer. so basically overall the users are divided on his handling of the crisis. but here again, you see 46% in the west or north approving and then in the south leaning towards the negative while in donbass rebel held areas. and they were generally pretty much the same in the east as a whole that you can have all of the data broken out in the question. so, now we move into the questions where we ask people to rate scenarios where we give them options and we are not just asking what is your preference but how would you feel if that happened and to answer this we give them a scale from zero to ten being completely unacceptable and five means just

tolerable. and by asking questions in this way, you can see whether that potential common ground is and where the flexibilities are and if you have this conflict that is the kind of thing that you need to look for to develop this method in other areas of the world and other conflicting parties as well. so what about ukraine moving closer to the eu backs overall, 54% say i could live with that and another 18% say i could tolerate that so you get a fairly large number saying that they could tolerate moving closer to the eu and in the west and north it's very large numbers. as you move into the south, 44% say that it's acceptable but 64% say i could tolerate it.

you get into 39% saying unacceptable and a majority saying they could tolerate it and then you get into the rebel held areas and the majority saying no that's not acceptable. so right here you see some of the dynamics of the attitudes that are feeding into the conflict. on the ukraine joining the acceptability of 52%, very positive attitudes in the west and the north, the south okay , can barely -- maybe you can tolerate it and then in the east have to say no they can't and only 42% say it's tolerable and the clear majority says it's not acceptable for ukraine to join. what about moving closer to russia? you get 50% not acceptable and

79% in the west and north the north and 55% in the south opposing and moving closer to russia. in the east okay you don't have a majority. it's very important to note there is an assumption they want to move towards russia but that's not the case. though three quarters say they could tolerate it. and in the rebel held areas it is a rather popular view. ukraine here again largely geordie's overall and in the west end of the north of the majority of the south rejected barely a majority find it intolerable in the east but here you don't have a majority even in the rebel held areas for joining the eurasia customs unit this is the area we found the

most consensus. ukraine affirming a natural individual position between the eu and russia and overall 63% say that it's at least tolerable and 71%, tolerable in the north but it's more divided than the west. this is one of the unusual cases where they are different so you have a kind of divided between non- acceptable and tolerable so there is tension. but 65% find it tolerable in the south and 74% tolerable in the east and 67, tolerable in the rebel held areas. so this is quite interesting to us because this points to the

consensus even between the different regions where you don't have a majority in the area of rejecting the idea. what about ukraine joining nato, something putin is very concerned about and you have 61% saying this would be tolerable so you might think they are threatened by russia they might really want to move to join nato. you do find that 66% of 51% find it's just acceptable in the north, 62% in the west but in the south it's not acceptable to east 68% not acceptable in the rebel held areas overwhelmingly not acceptable. does that mean they might be willing to agree to not join nato if russia agrees to not interfere in ukraine and the

that got -- well, another question given the 41% saying they should not 36, they should, a lot come a lot of people not a lot of people not answering and in the west overwhelmingly know they should not put in the north only a slight plurality saying should not end in the south w. is divided while in the east they support the ideas of again it's a very mixed picture on this idea of making this commitment but only in one area in the west you have a majority saying that it shouldn't have been. how do people look at the

conflict, first how do people feel about the ukrainian government using military force to gain territory held by the separatists? only a plurality of proof. that's very large in the west and the north of divided in the south and large majority disapproving in the east, so this whole effort on the part of the ukrainian government to regain the territory does not have a majority support overall. not surprising from that perspective you get a very large majorities in every area approving of the september minsk agreement. the recent update occurred today we went into the field so we were not able to ask about it but basically the terms are the same so we can use this as a good reference. what about the u.s. providing military weapons into clement to

-- and equipment to the ukrainian government? 52% favor it. you get a lot of division on the 70% in the west and north divided in the south and the clear majority opposed in the east. so this is not a consensus position and its width of the ambivalence about using force to try to regain territory held by the separatists. how do they view the outside players? his handling of the crisis in the east, 79% disapproved. overwhelmingly negative in the west end of west and the north and in the south and even a majority in the east. only in the rebel held areas you find a majority that's positive. and you think now there's this whole love affair with russia. overall on the invisible held -- only in the rebel-held areas

do you get a majority having a positive view of russia's influence and in the east it is divided. so i must underscore here there isn't a pool towards russia in -- a pull towards russia in the east. there's just a resistance to moving westward. what about the idea of russia having the right to intervene to protect russian citizens and speakers as putin has claimed? an overwhelming majority say that russia doesn't have that right and these majorities are all of the major regions only in the rebel held areas is there a divided response but this argument is really basically not going down well at all. how do people view what angela merkel is doing regarding the crisis? 40% approve, 42% disapprove and a lukewarm point of view that is consistently consistent all of the regions. what about barack obama?

divided response overall. many people are not even getting an answer only a modest plurality in the west and north, negative plurality in the south and the east. in terms of u.s. influence in the world, 45% positive better than russia particularly in the west and west and the north but when you get down to the east you get a fairly negative point of view. what about the potential outcomes of the conflict lacks -- conflict? first again what is their preference and the options are to have one nation. now were having more autonomy of the two options become independent. and as you can see there were scenarios overwhelmingly tiny percentages endorsing them and by far the most popular view is that ukraine would govern as it is now.

but 22% say that this is built into the minsk agreement that certain donbass areas would have more autonomy. but again, a lot of differences in the west and north overwhelming majorities want of ukraine tuesday governed as it is now and 59% in the south and in the east you still get a very small numbers. only 12% and 10% for the scenarios of the secession. two thirds wanting to keep the nation together with a division about whether these should have greater autonomy. in the rebel held areas, you do not have majorities calling for secession and a majority calls

for some scenario that involves ukraine staying as one nation. rating the scenarios ukraine remains as one nation governed as it is now and you have the majority finding that acceptable except the rebel held areas so they are set on having this greater autonomy and in the east you will see in a moment. so the idea of ukraine remaining one nation but a greater autonomy, you have overall 57% supportive and only 51% and in the west end by find this

intolerable so there is resistance that is built into the minsk agreement as you may recall. only a modest plurality majority in the south see this as tolerable. not very many see as acceptable. in the east you have 49% saying that it's acceptable to 72% that 72% saying that it's tolerable in the rebel held areas you have more substantial support for the idea. okay. i will go quickly continuing the idea of the secession are rejected as unacceptable in most parts of the country divided response in the east but only a quarter see it as acceptable. in the rebel held areas, again only 45% endorse it as acceptable though two thirds would find it acceptable or tolerable.

the views are even more negative about the secession and annexation by russia. what about crimea? have they pretty much written off crimea? the answer is no. we gave them three options. crimea being part of the ukrainian state and getting it back should be a top priority. getting it back is not a top priority and third ukraine should accept crimea becoming part of russia again and overall you can see only 18% endorsed the idea of basically writing off.

the only debate is about whether it should be a top priority or not to get it back right away and the dominant view of the 51% is that it should not be a top priority but interestingly in no area do you have a majority saying that it should be written off including in the east, the area with the largest number of 41% are ready to write it off. but 59% in the east sea that crimea should continue to be part of ukraine and that they should aspire to get it back. if you want to get a more complete report in the questionnaire you can go to our website publicconsultation.org and we look forward to the discussion. thank you for your attention. [applause]

>> before we go to the panel, i would like to open up the floor very briefly for technical questions about the poll. if we have larger questions but save them for the next session of the discussion but if you would like to know about the methodology and the way the poll was conducted. >> [inaudible] when they get to the other number is that by weighted by population -- >> they are weighted according to the population. in each region you are taking whatever that regions opinion was and taking the population in that region times that and then

summing for the population accordingly. >> we wake the aggregated number according to the representation in the population and the same with the regions are all weighted down so the numbers are in the mix but everything is weighted down and for the east the dead weight it down according to the current percentage which is low. >> i am remiss in my job, please do identify yourselves when you want to speak. >> i am the owner of my own company. my question is about sampling and of the respondents when they responded to these questions who did they think this information was going to?

>> it was simply stated that this was the international institute of sociology and they were not given any more information. the questions that went to the country as part of a whole there part of an omnibus, and a number of sponsors though that wasn't true in the donbass region. hispanic and i'm assuming the questions that were posed were in the ukrainian language? >> whatever the local language keep in mind in the south end of the east the majority speak russian and in the north a majority speak ukrainian but whatever language they naturally spoke was the language that was used.

>> do you believe that there may be a relationship between the language used in the question itself and the results? >> that would be an interesting study to do. i doubt it. there might be a slight effect but basically whatever language people want to use they could use. by the way, on the rebel held area helping identify the area that was based on -- where people said they were because those lines can move. >> thank you very much for your good work. >> i believer there's a question here. >> i professor at virginia tech and i worked on a pole in the southeast and about the donbass rebel held. so you are breaking that out in the east so when we see the east -- >> it's all aggregated.

>> so it is within the east? >> correct. >> what is the aggregate number of people? in the first face-to-face -- >> there's a little over 40. >> so we are talking about 240 people only 40 of whom -- >> some of those may have been by phone. >> are you confident you can do face to face polling when there is aw ar going on?

>> that is why the telephone was used as extensively as it was. whenever you are doing surveys in a conflict area there is some compromise involved and you should always look at the numbers with some question in your mind. if you see a robust effect you should have confidence in it but if it is down to some granular difference differences i wouldn't stress them too much. but what we found was a rather strong readiness to distance themselves and to say that they were not wanting to move closer to russia even in the rebel held areas so that gives more confidence to people to see what was on their mind. >> perhaps one more question >> perhaps one more question on the technical side. this doesn't preclude to asking questions in the larger section. back here. >> from the state department i wondered from the phone surveys you did for the landline only --

>> landline only. >> and i'm curious what the non- response rate was. >> i'm sorry that i don't have that available. we just got the tape on friday. i'm assuming it was a scramble to fully finish it but i will get back to you on that if you want. >> okay. >> great. very interesting questions. let's move on to the main panel now. and first i would like to introduce the ambassador who is the acting executive vice president of the united states for peace, u.s. institute of peace -- from 2011 to 2013 he was the special coordinator for the middle east transition in the u.s. state department so he was, as the title suggests coordinating american support for the revolutions, very interesting job. from 2006 to 2009 he served as the u.s. ambassador to ukraine

and before that he was with the u.s. government representative. he served a number of other very important diplomatic and government functions whi we probably don't have time to list in their entirety and suffice it to say that he was also a graduate of the united states military academy at west point and served in the army for a number of years as an officer. i would also like to introduce doctor catherine -- a friend who's a professor at the school of public policy at the university of maryland. she has been in that position at least since 2006 and advises in the area of international security and u.s. foreign policy. before that she served in the clinton administration as the

president's deputy assistant secretary of defense for russia, ukraine and eurasia and as the secretary defends representative defence's representative to nato in brussels and of course she's held a number of other prestigious positions in the u.s. foreign policy before that but again in the interest of brevity i think we will just -- she says i should indeed leave it at that. [laughter] so we are going to have to have a very spirited discussion and i would like to call on the panel participants to each addressed the study. should we give ten minutes for each of you? >> max. >> and then we will have what i hope it's is a spirited discussion with the audience. we are going to go to 12:30 but if things are pretty passionate about i think that we should give leeway to go on for another few minutes perhaps as late as 12:45 but without further ado let's hear the panelist remarks.

>> i am very pleased to be able to comment on this. i will pull out from the results that steven just discouraged -- just described to you, some of the conclusions that i draw from this which i hope we can have a good spirited conversation and i suspect we will have differing views about this. i have three points i will try to cover in less than ten minutes. one is ukraine has decided that its future is in europe. my second point is ukraine is more united than ever in the face of russia and my third point is one that i think we will elaborate on more and that is the ukrainians have not forgotten crimea and we shouldn't either.

so ukraine has decided that its future is in europe. steven asked, if it were up to you which course should ukraine take? 47% of all of the ukrainians surveyed including those i would say in the "separatist" held supported by the russians including a 47% would prefer stronger relations with the eu. 13% would prefer stronger relations with the russians. so 47% for the eu and 13% for strong relations with russia. that is the first data point that i would pull out. the second one is 72% of all of the ukrainians surveyed would find it either acceptable or tolerable to move closer to the eu. 60% would find it unacceptable

to move closer to the russians. again a strong indication of which direction they would prefer. when you talk to them about joining the 67% would find it either acceptable or tolerable. 67% of all surveyed. that includes the separatists and the east and the south and finally, 51% as i think steven mentioned 51% of the ukrainians would find it acceptable or tolerable for ukraine to join nato. steve mentioned that it's only 51%. well, 51% of ukrainians having watched this movement of the sentiment for and against nato over the years, 51% saying now they would either prefer order to find it acceptable joining is remarkable.

when i was there, it was in the 20, 25%. so this is a dramatic increase. so my first point is they have clearly decided to move towards europe. second, they are more united now than ever. 85% of ukrainians surveyed across the country through for a -- are for a united united ukraine. 85% wanting united ukraine, 63% just as it is governed now and another 22% when you add some autonomy for the region's. as if it is a pretty strong number i would say. 85% for the united ukraine. even in the east it is 68%.

in the separatist region of 61% at 61% as you pointed out so that is a strong indication of of the broad support for the unified ukraine across the country. 79% disapprove of the actions. 26% even in the rebel held areas is 26%. so he's not done himself any favors in ukraine. 87% say he doesn't have the right to protect russian citizens were russian speakers and again 41% would agree with that. so i find this to be pretty dramatic rejection from the russian point of view. last point, and again i will defer to catherine on this, 82% of all ukrainians surveyed want to keep crimea either right away or they want to get it back but over time.

i was just there north into the presidential elections were as free and fair as you could hope for and the people sitting around the polling booth observing had nothing much to observe. there was no funny business as there always has been. so they were happy to talk and one of the conversations that i had was about crimea and you will be happy to know that the informal assessment i got was the same, a lot of people said it's going to take some time. crimea is clearly part of ukraine. it will take some time and we will take as much time as we need for the economy to recover and when it recovers, crimea will come back.

so those are my three-point. i think i am under ten minutes. >> i apologize for being late. let me start with a somewhat longer be within bill has -- view that bill has presented to you. i think what is amazing about the results particularly after the winter that we have observed and the attempt to set up a cease-fire is how clear most of the respondents were. they had a clear understanding about ukraine and its independence and they rejected at every point however the question was asked or whatever the topic is and the idea that

russia has the right of protection for russian minorities and that it had some way to make that decision they clearly as it is however the question is asked. they also favor an outcome that gives them access not necessarily equal access to that access to both the west and russia so it isn't something that is the black-and-white that is often reflected in the press accounts. they understand where they are geopolitically. they know that parts of their country have had major markets with russia. they hope that there will be a peaceful outcome to all of this and that it will be possible to

continue in the middle position they have to a degree already enjoyed between east and west but the preference is to be an independent european country. and they do not see themselves as necessarily being forced by anything to be brought into the orbit of either russia or europe or the united states. it's clear that vladimir putin is the big loser both in terms of what i just said and in the way that he is viewed. his popularity was never 100% in ukraine or even much more than 50% but he did have a good regard up until about two years ago. now there is an assumption in fact the state acknowledged as

far as they're concerned that there are russian forces no matter where people live, no matter what they are looking at there are russian forces in ukraine. the west hasn't enjoyed a huge increase but there is regard for european leaders. this angela merkel and francois hollande regarded as over 50 50% doing positive things. and europe while it hasn't done all that it could have done and there is a stress that they should have done more than

simply policy by assertion dot europe has done in some measure what it should do in order to help ukraine economically and politically. the united states perhaps hte the questions are asked about how you rate president obama's performance and how you would look at the question of weaponization, here is the predictable result in the breakdown within ukraine to be observed. mainly obama is doing a strong plurality and the question of arming ukraine is given a strong plurality with particular enthusiasm in the west and in the north. it is however not as strong as this european accents that i've reported before. another incident and perhaps cynicism is given the long march to even get to where we are

today is that the rejection of the previous president and the understanding that it was a corrupt regime and it has a fairly strong rating on the score from one to ten a little over eight in the view of most ukrainians that it was very corrupt. however, that is also a judgment made about the present government. only slightly less corrupt than the past regime. and that's true in the east for their regimes as well as the north, west and south about the ukrainian regime. i think the whole question is , that crimea -- the issue that has almost gone unnoticed in the western press reports in the last five or six months or almost a year now is a done deal

but most worrying about its still present in their consciousness and most of them take the position that in the long-term they should seek their reintegration. they do not want to see their either crimea or the east somehow disentangled from ukraine and ultimately to end up being integrated into russia. and the result is that for now they have other things on their plate but this is an issue they wish to restore. however new a nation, however conglomerate a number of historical legacies which are necessarily terribly congruent but it is the ukraine majority of the respondents wanted to see reestablished. >> thank you very much to both of the panelists for that. now let's before we open the

floor for questions i had a question of my own i would like to direct to the director of the survey. but i would also be of course very interested to hear the others as well. the separatist held areas come off as quite an outlier. they are quite distinct. do we have any sense of the factors that are influencing that and is it a matter of coercion by the separatists were a matter of greater exposure to the russian information policy because we know it is quite intense or is it something about the conduct of the war in those areas do we have any sense that has influenced that particular data plan? >> i think maybe the other commentators may have more

background than i. basically i think the strength of these attitudes are not something that could have just been created from the outside. people are not that malleable. so there were some feelings along those lines before the recent events. and clearly there are -- russia has intensified them and has enabled them to be expressed and created a whole narrative that's amplified. but at the same time they haven't fully bought the narrative and the attitudes are strong enough that you should assume that it is something that is homegrown to some extent a

-- extent. that is isn't something that was simply created from the outside. >> we have some evidence on this question and crimea where there was a referendum they say and according it was what, 98% support for becoming part of russia and that was during a time when the russian army occupied crimea so it wasn't a free and fair election but i'm prepared to believe that it over half would have said the same thing so i would agree there is clearly a discontent in that part. >> i would just like to add that this is spoken as a fan i think it shows the effect particularly

among the russian speakers who depend on russian television in those areas as a source of information their view of the world is a constant 24 hour of russian information policies. the effect of television particularly monopoly television and the fact that as the crisis started there was almost nothing comparable to the organized information going on in that part which was voluntarily chosen. it's possible to get radio and others but from russian speakers already discontented, this has been truly i think a study in how television and the into the virile and images have been used does affect attitude and i think it is something that we need to

look at and think about what lessons that should have for us as a country and perhaps even as individual's. >> what we see is more resistant to moving westward and the desire for something that -- some kind of political restructuring to russia. there isn't a desire to move closer to russia. there is more resistance. all of that implies is the cultural phenomenon more than a political phenomenon. >> let's go to the audience. i believe i see a hand right here. and let's identify ourselves. >> thank you very much. this is very interesting. i wanted to follow up in the

question here. i see two additional biases in the direction that was suggested. the best number i have is 3.3 million people regionally and 1.6 million people have fled, 1 million in ukraine and half a million in russia at least and 100,000 in other countries. so they are in ukraine and the second bias is that he used land lines. young people use mobile phones

in ukraine so you get an older age cohort or did you try to check that when asking in this part of ukraine while the younger ones tend to be more ukrainian. >> in the donbass, it was weighted by age, so that factor was counted. and in various ways the kiev institute seeks to adjust any kind of bias that comes from the use of landline phones. >> what about the refugees? >> that is definitely a factor. 19% of the whole region has left and you might mention those that stayed behind have different attitudes but so that tells what

is going on in the region right now and it also had the effect of decreasing the presence of the east in the national aggregate weighted by the distribution. but yes they have a lesser effect on the aggregate national numbers. >> [inaudible] >> they have been reviewed carefully but it is a good read of the people that are there now responding. >> good evening. the george mason university school. thank you very much a [inaudible] what we see here is

attitudes of people, but we don't know how possible so it is an issue of meaning and what do they mean by joining the european union? and the second point it's hard to sustain this particular site we speak about the european union now mostly if all people living in ukraine only 80% of the survey because of economic crisis. you also speak about the issue where ukraine has better capacity to deal with posttraumatic stress disorder.

[inaudible] a lot of issues connected with the junior european union and the were also stationed to know that memberships were not on the table with some discussion of the association because they still have a perception to go to the european union. that will not happen. [indiscernible] it will bring more frustration. how do we sustain this particular situation that will probably change with the ongoing process and in the unity of the nation again it is a huge problem you just discussed here but also this historic divide.

and what we see is we need to bring this issue to view crain -- ukraine, so my question for you do we compare others where the european union and international community what do we do with ukraine to sustain this unity there? >> that is the kind of question we were trying to answer with which do you favor and when this happened how would you feel on this scale if this happened and this happened and breaking it out by your region so we have tried to find how robust the support and the resistance and

what we see is if you look across all of the areas, the one where you get the least resistance, the most convergence is a kind of unusual position. you get a fair number who say that they could tolerate that moving toward the eu, but there is also trepidation that shows up in the numbers in a variety of ways which are in the rebel held areas, so that is the kind of thing we are trying to get get at and yes there are some pretty intense resistance. so these kind of decisions are not made simply by the referendum so that if you choose between the eu and the european

customs union, more people would say that eu combined sorry eurasian customs. but in other polls you do not have a majority favoring the eu either. i would quite agree with you that you need to not simply look at the topline response, but what are the levels in different parts of the country. ukraine is a pretty precarious country with mixed language and proximity to europe. it is not as coherent a nation

as most european nations. >> i believe dr. kelleher wanted to address your point. you were at the defense department during the baltic war. >> right. and nato. >> at nato as well. so you might have an interesting perspective on that. >> let me say, the right to have questions about the future with, in an association with the e.u. and the, because, quite frankly when it was posed at any point in the last two decades, there are several european nations who steadfastly oppose any further expansion of membership, particularly to the ukraine. i think it's, in some case simple greed of the southern states who don't feel they have their share of benefit yet. and they fear ukraine as a compelling competitor in that

way. but there are also others who stress other themes particularly the religious question. the real problem though is, i think, it is a false analogy to look at bosnia, serbias and croatia. that's a very different set of wars and leadership, and histories, than ukraine is. i think while ukraine is an amalgam, there is no question, out of various historical periods and backgrounds, what strikes me as encouraging, particularly out of the survey that steve has done, is in fact this enthusiasm for ukraine as a separate entity. as an identifiable entity. as one with which individuals identified themselves. i think the analogy is probably

better made to germany, where even in a divided country one that that's reinforced in every way that the leadership could, there still was the sense of fundamental germanness as a bound of unity. i think to some extent it is also true in ireland of the so i i think that at least is a competing model for what happens to divided societies. particularly divided societies that are divided by conflict or tension and i think whatever else you take from the survey you should take that sense that even after all of the things that have happened, there is the sense ukrainians belong together. and an interesting openness, to various forms of association including perhaps more independence. we asked one set of questions that specifically addressed the idea of limited autonomy for

some of the eastern, and it is in fact, while people don't see it as the favorite alternative they're at least willing to look at it. and that strikes me as, as opposed to bosnia war, the war of the yugoslav succession, if you will, is a very different attitude about what the future might involve. >> so i believe, ambassador taylor -- >> real quickly, to your question about how to sustain the enthusiasm. first of all, now, there is a broad civil society enthusiasm that we saw in the madon we that we haven't really seen before. so i think that is knew.

i think that is something that can sustain. some members of that civil society are now in rada. they have gone, they have been elected. they're part of the politics now. they can move that. the second thing about the point about there have been have been nations in the e.u. who have opposed expansion in the e.u. as well as in nato, it's going to take time for the ukrainians to develop the capabilities, the characteristics, the norms, the standards required in order to be a real applicant, a real serious membership applicant for both eu and nato. and so, attitudes can change in europe. they have changed. so we don't have to worry, we should be concerned about what today's attitude is but itneed -- it need not be that way forever. excellent point. so, well, this gentleman, please >> hi. sorry i didn't introduce myself before.

my name is ernie robson. this is kind of a technical question and kind of a policy question. where did karka, maripol, fall in the east, west, north, south? if there was a center of karkov, although when the '91, '92 time happened, there was a massive exodus back to russia. but still, you know, it strikes me that those areas that i'm asking about had strong leadership that was not interested in russia, and the others did not, and get to the passion part later. >> i'm sorry my answer will be very short. we just don't have enough -- >> excuse me. i'm clay ramsey, research director. the what you are referred to is

included in the region of the east as we have it demarcated. when you see numbers for the east, there is hardly ever any difference beyond the margin of area between those and what you see for the whole region. >> the other point of this is that herzon, also right in that area, odessa, farther to the east, was the target of these little green men, the russians attempted to move into herzon at the same time they were going into donbas and invaded crimea and the people resisted. they got no traction. the russians were pushed back. and, again we see, as you have indicated, that people in harkiv also have not been eager to move in that direcon. so again, this is indication, that is a real different herzon

even when i was there in 2008 and colin clary was there. this is a different ukraine now. >> it is -- could i just? there is also just a considerable difference. let me take the military. many of the military who served in my time, namely the first decade in ukraine, were retiring in place from the russian army. they were russian. there was no question. a major form of communication was in the russian language. everyone thought that was fine. that is not the case today. there may be still individuals but there is an entire generation. it has been 20 years. it has been this long period, not a peaceful period certainly but with lots and lots of change.

within that process the formation of identity around language in part, mostly about the way in which the nation has operated on, even on the individual level, i think has changed what was true in the '90s, particularly the early '90s, to a quite different profile at the moment. >> so wehad a hand up over here. and then over there. >> thank you very much. thank you very much. i also found it fascinating, professor kelleher's reference to germany, that despite all the years separately there was this sense of being one nation. the question though arises, what kind of nation does the area believe they are? is there a sense after everything that happened remaining russian? that brings me to the huge difference from what i see between the opinions of non-occupied areas and occupied areas as to what to do next because people are there, being bombed, dying, lost all their property. many of them.

so that actually explains the outlook i guess to a great extent. it would certainly for me. and i see that 55% would not mind even being annexed by russia. even the donetsk rebel-held areas. page 19. 65% would love to secede from

ukraine in the donbas rebel-held areas. on the other hand, if you look at it, 41% of the same people say that russia does not have the right to interfere to protect the citizens. so you think, and they disapprove of what putin does in the area to a great extent. so i think there is a great confusion in the minds and i guess russian propaganda in the country to a great extent of this and the reason i think so, because on page 20 it says that the east believes the most and the fact that the west will support ukraine in transformation. to translated into russian, they are sold. they sold themselves to the west.

>> so the question is? >> so the question is, do we know what indeed these areas want and, on a more like chechnya or germany or bosnia, who are they? really very unclear. is it clear to them? that's what i don't understand. >> i would say this, i think even in the eastern part of the country, the notion of the nation still being, still obtaining, still existing, still being a -- and even an expectation that it will continue, those are signs to me are that is present. it is more that there's an insistence on some changes and greater autonomy for these regions and again i see this more culturally rooted rather than a desire for secession. as i see it, looking at all the numbers, if you look at them as totality that when you talk about secession is at this point more of an expression of the intensity of feeling of wanting

that sense of autonomy and of resistance to this whole westward movement. then it is a formulated desire to really secede which could be a very complicated thing for such a small little area and annexation with, by russia, you know, the numbers that people, that even the rebel-held areas express about russia are not overwhelmingly positive. so it's -- i don't read it that the nation has essentially fragmented as much as there is within it intense conflict about which way to go. i think it is very important to keep in mind that you know, we did -- there were these swings, you know. that yanukovych was elected. if i may, i wanted to show one other number that thought might come up.

how people feel about the ending of yanukovych's presidential term and you can see that majorities in the south and a larger majority in the east disapprove of yanukovych's departure. in overwhelming majority in the rebel-held areas. what yanukovych represented isn't simply like, oh, now everybody is ready to move east.

so it is still alive but, when i put up all the factors together, i still -- i see a readiness to assume that there is some way this can be, ultimately be pulled together. >> way it is pulled together is through having a regular set of elections in that part of the country. they haven't had elections in that part of the country. were -- that part of the country that were in any way serious. and once they do, once they elect people, to make these kinds of decisions then that kind of negotiation can go on with the government. >> i would also say, perhaps referring to my earlier comment, this is one of the talking points that has been most strongly emphasized in, on russian television. a drumbeat. this is possible. this is desirable. you find this tracking of the points of russian propaganda. >> wait? what's desirable? >> secession. annexation to russia is desirable. i would only like to draw, if you will permit me an example from my own home city, which is boston. after the revolutionary war they lost 25% of their population who went either back to england or

to canada because they didn't like the result. and there is always voting with your feet. i think though, and this is where i feel it is closer to the german example, very few east germans went any place else. they did not leave. they did not go en masse to other places because ultimately, they felt this was their homeland. >> some went west of course. >> yes, but within the country. within the country. you don't see massive outmigration. you don't see people even changing their address within the european union. >> one other point, the support for the minsk agreement being large majorities in every region i think is a very strong indicator that they're still trying to work it out. >> let's try to get as many questions as possible. you, sir. we have a lot of questions. we'll try to get through them because i think there is still a lot of questions out there. >> thanks. >> can you identify yourself. >> i'm chad nagel. i'm an attorney.

i was going to ask the question in the first round but i decided it didn't qualify. you had one question about the opinion of ukrainians toward putin, but it related specifically to his handling of the war. and i was wondering, i mean, although in a vox popular type exercise where you're asking ordinary people most concerned how they will pay their next utility bill, this might not qualify, but maybe it would be interesting to someone, perhaps you did get a sense of opinions towards the russian political regime. i suppose, as opposed to putin that he is the center of it. and by that i mean, the concept of what has come to be called the power vertical. so that it seems that putin's popularity within russia, if we're to believe their official published results is not in spite of but because of this perception that there is this strong man who ultimately is ultimately responsible for the fate of the whole nation. in ukraine's history, ancient history but post-soviet history, has been sort after pendulum swing between these go phenomenon. you had yanukovych --

>> i don't mean to interrupt you. we're having very long questions today. we need a question. >> you get to the a sense to which ukrainians favor a disperal of power in their political system where there are checks on the power of a leader, like you see with poroshenko, many checks are formal within the street and formal and constitutional or whether they do pine for this sort of strong man. >> thank you very much much. the negative attitudes towards putin certainly suggest to the

contrary and rejection of his claim of right to intervene to protect russian speakers, speak to that as well. by the way, russian speakers, we pulled them out and they reject the idea as well. as for views of russia more broadly, we did have the question about russia's role in influence in the world more broadly and russia did not do very well, except in somewhat of the rebel-held areas. the overall finding of the survey is that we're not seeing a clear attraction to russia as much as in the east as much as resistance to moving westward. so the idea that they look over there and say, oh, what they have over there in russia, with, you know, a strong leader and so on, that is appealing. i do not interpret it that way. >> so can we go over here to the gentleman in the blue tie. >> hello. i'm a visiting fellow at ctr. my question is actually, there has been a lot of talk about criticizing russia's actions but, do you know, in what way, western ukrainians are already sacrificed themselves or their loved ones in eastern ukraine? thank you.

>> i'm not sure how to speak to that. certainly there is a strong desire to move western but, many questions, particularly in the north, we find a readiness to have neutrality only if 48% in the west were, so that wasn't acceptable. so, would that translate into readiness? well, there is not a lot of enthusiasm for using military force to regain territory. more so in the west and north but still, trepidation, not overwhelming and the support for the minsk agreement with built in accommodation to provide greater autonomy in the dunbas. so, i think butternut altogether, i see stronger signs of a desire to find some agreement then than a readiness to use for example to get a maximal outcome. >> okay. so this lady here with the glasses. then after here we'll go to the gentleman there. >> hi. i'm teresa hitchens, senior research scholar at center for studies at maryland. quick question. given all the data and what you have found about the attitudes and the ukraine, what are your recommendations for u.s. policy? >> thank you very much. >> so i have some recommendations. i think we should support ukraine very strongly financially. i think we should support ukraine very strongly militarily. i think international community should do both of those things. she knows better than anyone about the financial problems ukraine faces. we along with the imf and others should be there supporting them. we should also defend and beef up the defenses in the nato nations that border russia. so that is an important -- if we're trying to deter the russians from doing what they have been doing, that is, first

invading crimea and then invading the southeastern part of ukraine, and we don't want to do that more, then we need to push back. we need to push back by reinforcing militarily the the countries that are in nato on the periphery. we need to support ukraine and need to provide them, the ukrainians weapons in order to resist. >> there you go. >> yes. i'd like to add in addition to bill's prescription a different perspective. and here i think my position is somewhat like that of angela merkel. we have to realize what has happened is the undermining of the european security system. it isn't just ukraine. it is the question of all of the agreements that have been broken, all of the solemn commitments and quite frankly, a lot of the ease with which we've lived in the last 25 years has led to an expectation this will continue forever. we have to realize this is a political problem that is of enormous significance and that will only be solved when we come to a political solution. and that so far as i can see, is the moment, if not, on the horizon.

so we better think very hard if only because we will have lost an enormous amount of effort and we may in the process destroy the economy of both ukraine and russia after we have spent 25 years trying to bring them into the community of nations. >> so this gentleman here on the aisle please. then we'll go over there. >> i came with the students from the elliott school. i want to bring it back to the points the lady from george mason had, sustainability and reform of progress in the nation.

the e.u. and us, kind of as nato and european union as a total, have been using a carrot stick and the balkans. how do the countries in the back 10 years there is extreme backsliding with regard to those situations? how do we avoid that with regard to ukraine and reapproach that situation in the balkans? >> i think just perhaps to just continue my last comment, what we did was relax. we thought if we them enough money, they would simply in their prosperity do what we wanted them to do, sort of naturally. doesn't work like that. and nobody has spent either the time or quite frankly the commitment of their own defense budgets or their overseas aid budgets to the extent that was necessary to sustain the commitments that we made. and until we do that, we can't be surprised at the results. >> so ukrainian reforms are difficult. very difficult for the ukrainian government to undertake. they're exactly as you say, there needs to be something out there. there needs to be a carrot out there. one thing that could be out there which europeans don't like to hear is eu membership. another thing that could be out there for military reform is nato membership. so those two things if they are real, if we seriously have them as something out there, not

immediately because as we say earlier it will take a lot of time for them to the meet the standards, that was a motivation for a lot of the east europeans to do the very difficult economic reforms in order to get into the e.u. ukraine can be offered the same. >> so, over here. >> sam, international institute for strategic studies. question for professor kull. how strong in a regional and global context are the regional divides that you demonstrated to us today? i'm income is this -- do you see divisions like this based on regions much other countries, issues other countries are facing? is it ukraine particularly regionally divided looking on your regional or global context based on your experience working in other countries?

>> we have done surveys around the world as part of the world public opinion.org network and ukraine has been part of that network and surveyed over 20 nations and as we were going along, we were always surprised how heterogeneous ukraine was. so this is very unusual. if you go look around the united states, you would be amazed how homogenous the united states is. people have this idea of all those heterogenity in many parts of country but that is very normal. so this is extremely unusual. it has always looked to us like

a precarious state and so it is really not surprising that things are breaking out the way they are. and that -- we can only underscore in terms of policy implications, but that should be understood how precarious it is and just getting a majority or something like that isn't -- that is probably not going to create consensus because, across the nation as a whole because of their different parts of the country, chunks of the country where majorities are really opposed. then you have real potential for instability. >> excellent point. so, this gentleman on the aisle please. >> from the hoover institution. question for steve i think mainly. in that the numbers you have shown us suggest to me that the most likely outcome is a frozen conflict. like all those others we've seen before around a borders of the russia. so why isn't the model something more like moldova, something more like ukraine -- like georgia and all those other places where these frozen conflicts are going on and on without any real resolution? of course the implications of that are fairly clear. you don't need to be sketched out.

>> i think others here may be able to better comment. yes, the majorities across the country supporting the minsk agreement suggest that this is going to be some kind of a framework and the emphasis in the eastern regions on having some kind of autonomy, along the lines that are referenced there. i don't know if you need to think of it as strictly frozen. there are -- i see the elements of basically some kind of agreement, not necessarily full-scale federalism but, just some kind of greater autonomy so that -- one of the key

questions, why do people in the east, what is it they're really afraid of, right? and i understand we haven't fully defined that. but the numbers to me suggest they could get to comfort with that and those, in the west could get to comfort with this greater autonomy. the elements are here of some agreement that is organic, there are people who could get to some significant -- something that feels like something like normalcy. >> i would agree. it doesn't have to be a frozen conflict. i mean just as steve says, the mince agreement. if fully implemented would not lead to a frozen conflict. that is, there would be some additional autonomy not yet designed, not just for dunbas, but for all in the country would have additional -- and mr. poroshenko talked about that. and there have been those kind of discussions but also in the

minsk agreement is the withdrawal of foreign forces and that means russian forces f -- forces. that happens there can be osce controlling the border monitoring the border between russia and ukraine so that the russian forces can't continue to come in. that means then that the government in kiev would kiev would control the entire area. there wouldn't be a frozen conflict. there are questions whether the misnk ii agreement would fully last but nonetheless if it were fully implemented, it wouldn't have to be completely frozen. >> couldn't hear you. he says the point is there will be continuing russian interference.

>> jim, this is what i mean about the political solution. there has to be an overarching political solution that perhaps would give to take bill's scenario with the e.u. with different powers or backed by a firmer consensus than there is at the moment but it is going to take a long time. i also think this theme of ukraineness which i mentioned before, which is different moldova transnistra. that is barely acknowledged. that it is a russian outpost as far as most inhabitants can returned. -- are concerned. you're talking about enormous religious and cultural differences that have been there and recognized for a very long time. this isn't the case. this isn't that kind of huge walls that have been there for three centuries. i think we have reason to be more optimistic but we'll have

to work at it. >> ok. nobody seems to be rushing for the exits. i think we can get away with one more question. how about here on the aisle. >> hi. katrina, u.s. mission to the osce. i have a little more pessimistic view on this in that russia's goal to have federalized ukraine where they defacto can influence the east use as a veto to control the region. what do you think about that. >> that may be russia's goal but that doesn't mean they get there. >> when i view these statistics, to become a that is why i am pessimistic. people are not sure where they want to go and i worry we will see a lack of will to the west. they don't really know where they will go and russia can use this and leverage this to influence the country. >> i would emphasize that the more ukraine moves westward, the

greater the opportunities are for russia to try to influence the eastern part of the country because you will have more alienated people in the eastern part of the country. to the extent that people in the east have a assurances that they're not going to be pulled kicking and screaming into europe, the less russia will have a source or means of leverage. >> well, thank you very much. i think we'll probably leave it at that. we've gone a little bit over the time but not too much. thank you very much for coming today. i think we can all agree that we've learned a great deal, a great deal of very substantive information about this situation and i thank our panelists for giving us a very, very solid and informed view. and please, we welcome your comments on social media and any feedback you want to give us. thanks very much for coming.

>> state treasury and defense department testified about the ukraine hiche russia conflict. see it live starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. >> senator bernie sanders of vermont discusses the middle class and future of the country. and president obama speaks about technology and jobs. later a supreme court case regarding who has the authority to draw district lines in arizona and challenging dees for the affordable care act

senator brooke, a first african-american to be elected and eleanor homes norton and see >> the promotion of a drug actually starts seven to 10 years before drug comes on the market. while it is illegal for a company to market a drug before it is approved by the fda, it is not i