sold asisil as an organization is likely to evolve strategically. morphing, rebranding, and associating with other terrorist groups, while continuing to threaten the that is its and our allies. second, the proposed aumf wisely does not include any geographical restrictions. because isil already shows signs of metastasizing outside of syria and iraq. third, the president proposed authorization provides great flexibility in the military means we need as we pursue our strategy, with one exception. the proposed aumf does not authorize long-term, large-scale offensive ground combat operations, like those we conducted in iraq and afghanistan. because our strategy does not call for them. instead, local forces must provide the in during presence needed for an enduring victory

against isil. and forth and finally, the proposed aumf expires in four years. i understand the reason for the proposed sunset provision. it derives from the important principle stemming from the constitution that makes the grave matter of enacting an authorization for the use of military force a shared responsibility of the president and congress. the president's proposed authorization affords the american people the chance to assess our progress in three years time, and provides next president and the next congress the opportunity to reauthorize it, if they find it necessary. to me, this is a sensible and principal provision, even though i cannot assure that the counter isil campaign will be completed in three years.

now, in addition to providing the authority and flexibility to wage a successful campaign, i said i had another key consideration. sending the right signals to the troops. it will demonstrate to our personnel that their government stands behind them. as secretary kerry explained, it will signal to our coalition partners and adversary that the united states government has come together to address a serious challenge. we all took an oath to protect the nation and its interests but to do so we must work together. i know everyone on this committee takes the isil threat seriously. president obama and everyone at this table does as well. we encourage a serious debate. but i urge you to pass the president's amf because it provides the authority and flex wage and recurrent campaign and

-- current campaign and because it will demonstrate to our men and women in uniform that all of us stand unflinchingly behind them. thank you, mr. chairman. >> distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. let me add my personal thoughts and prayers to those at the loss of the folks on that helicopter. it is a reminder to us that those who serve put themselves at risk in training and combat. we will work with the services to ensure that those survivors -- i should say their family members -- will be well cared for. >> the committee will join in. >> i appreciate the opportunity to be here today. i just returned yesterday from a trip to the middle east. i spent a day in baghdad with iraqi and u.s. leaders discussing our strategy.

i spent a day with our french counterpart. and to thousands of -- and 2000 of france's sailors and marines aboard the aircraft carrier charles de gaulle in the arabian gulf. these two great vessels sitting side-by-side, their combat aircraft and their crews are a powerful image. it is actually the solidarity of all of our coalition members is fundamental to the strength of our campaign against this trans regional threat that isil represents. the government of iraq has a lot of work to do to make sure that isil is defeated and stays defeated. that will take time. i have been consulted on the proposed authorization for the use of military force against isil.

it is suitable to the campaign. we should expect our enemies will continue to adapt their tactics and we will adapt our s> . support for an amuf -- i met with some of them over this past weekend and they are performing magnificently as you would expect. i thank you for your commitment to our men and women in uniform and i look forward to your questions. senator corker: thank you all for your testimony. let me begin with secretary carter and chairman dempsey. i know that secretary kerry mentioned he felt the amuf we have from 2001 and 2002 gives the united states the legal authority to do what is now occurring. i just wonder if both of you would answer yes or no if you believe that to be the case. >> yes. >> yes.

everyone is that has come before believes currently we are operating under a legal premise with what we are doing against isis today. secretary carter and chairman dempsey, has there been any indication to the people we are dealing with the congress today is not behind what is happening on the ground with isis? defense secretary carter: i cannot speak to that, mr. chairman. the folks i have talked to do in fact believe the outrageous secretary kerry described on the part of isil warned the operation they are involved in.

senator corker: there is no when you deal with that congress -- defense secretary carter: i have talked to people. they know a hearing like this is going on and they know its purpose. i presume they welcome a good outcome of it. senator corker: chairman dempsey? german dempsey: i have no data to suggest that they have any doubt about the support of congress or the american people. senator corker: we have had some great conversations and always appreciate your candor. i know you have responded this into other committees, or at least publicly. should there be any concern of people here that iran is influencing the outcome against isis? does have shia militia on the ground, does have some of their own personnel on the ground. is that a concern anyone that cares about u.s. national interests should have? chairman dempsey: of course.

there are six things that from the military perspective concern us about iranian influence. for them a regional, two of them are global. the four regional concerns are surrogates and proxies, weapons trafficking, ballistic missile technologies, and mines they have developed with the intent to be able to close the straits and certain circumstances would cause them to. the two global threats are there nuclear aspirations for a weapon, which is being dealt with through the negotiations on a diplomatic track and ciber is and cyber is the other threat they pose.

they are concerning, of course. senator corker: as it relates to dealing with tikrit, should we care that iran's militias and others are involved in helping move isis out of those areas? or will help move out of those areas when we begin the muzzle -- attack. chairman dempsey: there is concern that anything anyone does to counter isil is a good outcome -- the activities of the iranians is a positive thing in the military terms against isil, but we are all concerned about what happens after the drums stopped -- stop beating and isis

is defeated and whether the government of iraq will remain on a path to provide an inclusive government for all of the various groups. we are very concerned about that. senator corker: when it appears isis is on the -- towards their in, the shia militia and others would turn on our own military and other negative things could occur at that time. >> we have no indications that they intend to turn on us. but what we are watching carefully is whether the militias, they call themselves the popular mobilization forces, when they recapture lost territory, whether they engage in acts of retribution and ethnic cleansing. there is no indication that that is a widespread event that this point, but we are watching closely. senator corker: i know we have talked about syria. this is a term even the

administration has begun to utilize themselves. it would appear that in syria we are in sort of a containment mode. that we are not taking aggressive steps to turn the tide there. we are involved in some aerial attacks. it is more of a containment mode. when we say iraq first, it is really syria and containment. we have a train and equip program right now. i wonder if you could talk to us about two major decisions. if we are going to try to equip folks in other countries that are being trained against isis -- there has been an alleged other program that is against us assad himself. if we are going to have a n overt program that is going to deal with isis, i would assume we would consider it only moral that if we are going to train

them and bring them men, that we would supply air power and other support to protect them, especially from assad's barrel bombs. i know that senator graham may have asked a question about whether this amuf provides that legal authority. i would just like to ask you does it provide the legal authority for our military to protect those we are training in other places against isis, to protect them against assad. in other words, take assad on. and also i would like to ask you to talk to us about why we have not yet agreed into the air exclusion zone that turkey has asked us to approve that would more fully bring them in on the ground in syria and get something much more positive occurring, at least as it relates to having some ground effort there. chairman dempsey: i take it you are looking straight at me so i assume the question is for me.

let me briefly describe the way military we characterize our campaign against isil. i would not say that our goal is to simply contain isil inside syria, but rather we have at this point -- our main ever it is in a wreck because we have a credible ground partner for whom we supply this airpower to distribute and degrade and defeat isil inside of iraq. we don't have that credible partner inside of syria yet. we are taking steps to build a partner. in the meantime, we are attacking them where we can, using isr. it is intended to disrupt their activities so they cannot complement each other. it was formerly, before he began this effort, that they could transit freely across that syrian-iraqi border.

they are no longer able to do that -- they are isolated and degraded in syria while we conduct our main efforts inside of iraq. it provides to your question about whether the amuf provides legal authority to protect the syrian forces, the answer is no. the administration has not added any syrian regime or assad component to the amuf. although we are in active , discussion about what support we would supply once the new syrian forces are fielded. now militarily, there is a very pragmatic reason, a moral obligation -- let me not speak to that -- senator corker: we are spending congress's money to train and equip people to go against isis , and yet we know assad will

barrel bombs them. i'm asking -- so the president has sent us an amuf that does not allow us to protect them against what we know they will be facing down the road. that to me is somewhat odd and does not seem congruent with previous steps relative to train and equip. can you understand why? chairman dempsey: i'm not discounting the moral obligation. i'm giving you military advice. militarily, there is a pragmatic reason to support them. that is, we will not be able to recruit men into that force unless we agree to support them at some level. senator corker: militarily, we have had a good crop that signed up on the front in, or at least that is my's my understanding. we cannot recruit more if we are not able to protect them and the

amuf we have before us does not allow us to protect them. is that what you are saying? senator corker: we are under active discussion -- part of that discussion is the legal authority to do so. senator corker: i know i am way over but the air exclusion zone, what is keeping us from those types of -- chairman dempsey: we have been in two rounds of discussion with our turkish counterparts about that. we are continuing to develop that option should it be asked for. >> senator boxer had to go to be part of that hearing. i asked that her statement be included in the record. i have heard all of you refer to no geographic limitation. for the purposes of the record, let it reflect that the amuf passed out last year that the democrats put together has no

geographic limitation. so, i think -- although that was a subject of debate. nonetheless, it came to the conclusion that it has no geographic limitation. to that extent, i know you have all raised it and i want to deal with it. let me ask you, general dempsey, is it fair to say that iran's sponsored shia militias in iraq fighting isil is definitely their immediate interest? would it also be fair to say that they have others beyond that? chairman dempsey: that has not become evident, but is of great concern to us who have served in iraq since 2003. iran is not a new entrant into the crucible of iraq. they have been there since 2004. and in some cases, their influence, their economic

influence and other ways as contributed to the future of iraqi. in other ways it has been , disruptive to the inclusiveness or potential for an inclusive governance. i share your concerns. we are watching carefully. the tikrit operation will be a strategic inflection point. in terms of using our concerns or increasing them. >> i would like to believe it is only to fight isil, but i don't believe their purpose is -- at the and of the day, we have different goals as it relates to iraq, both in the short term and long term of a democratic multiethnic government. it's a continuing concern. chairman dempsey, you said in

-- correct me if i am wrong here -- something to the extent that the authorization is proposed by the administration. it deals with our campaign as we have presently divisive. is that a fair statement? does it also deal with a campaign that may alter? chairman dempsey: it deals with the campaign as presently designed, and has statements in there. i'm not sure what part of it you might -- senator menendez: if your campaign as presently designed it needs to change to the realities of what is happening. do you believe the authorization will allow you to do that?

chairman dempsey: yes, i do. as as most of us who have studied and served against these kind of threats at, we believe the primary way you defeat these groups is with partners in the region and through sustainment through a broad coalition. the u.s. forces involved should be enabling, not necessarily leading the effort. although, it does provide -- first of all, i will always go back to the commander in chief through the secretary of defense of defense and recommend whatever i think is necessary to accomplish the task. as i presently conceive of this threat and how to defeat it, this amuf is adequate to the task. senator menendez: i appreciate that answer because it underlines the challenge that members of the committee have in getting to the right point to support the president, to

degrade and defeat isil, and not to provide the open ended ness. if you believe it has the wherewithal to be a feature criteria, that is the essence of the challenge. last week before the armed services committee, you in response to questions set your -- said that your view of what enduring combat operations would mean would be mission specific. is that fair to say? chairman dempsey: it is not a doctrinal term. it is a statement of the commander in chief's intent. senator menendez: we all know it may be the intent of someone not to have any large-scale, long-term offensive combat troops. but that intention can change along the way. that is part of our challenge here.

general allen testified before this committee last week and we asked him what is no enduring offensive combat operations mean to you. he said that could mean as long as two weeks or two years. considering his experience, it was not an insignificant statement. secretary carter, what does it mean to you as the secretary of defense who oversees all the armed forces. of course, under the president's command. what does no enduring offensive combat operations me to you? defense secretary carter: there are two ingredients to this. the how and the when. and the amuf as proposed is -- as i noted -- provides for a

wide range of activities to defeat isil. but it has one significant limitation. which is the one you refer to. which essentially does not authorize the kind of campaign we conducted in iraq and afghanistan. that is not what we foresee as necessary for the defeat of isil. it meets my objective of having necessary possibility. but there is that limitation. that is what the meaning of those words is. as regards to the three-year limit, that is not based on assessment of how long the campaign will take, but how our system works here. senator menendez: it can still

commit thousands of troops or a long period of time. and so it may not be the size of , afghanistan or iraq. that is part of our challenge. final questions. secretary kerry, one of the criticisms of the presidents's proposed amuf is that it does not make clear that it is this amuf and not that he doesn't want that the 2001 -- and not the 2001 amuf that governs this situation. the isil amuf precedes any other amuf? secretary of state john kerry: only if it was absolutely clear that there was no limitation whatsoever with respect to the

other activities authorized by the 2001 amuf. that is the principal authorization with respect to al qaeda and other efforts. the president has made it clear, if the congress passes an authorization, that is what he will rely on with respect to isis. senator menendez: there is no reason -- secretary of state john kerry: as long as it is clear. senator menendez: over the weekend, boko haram declared allegiance to isil. would they be a target? >> it anticipates the

possibility of other groups aligning with isil. the text says the amuf would cover such groups that associate with or fight alongside if they also have the intent of threatening americans. both of those tests would be applied. senator menendez: swearing allegiance would be enough then? >> it says associated with isil , and threatening americans. >> i want to thank you all for recognizing what happened this morning in my home state of florida. it is inherently dangerous work even under training. our thoughts and prayers go out to them and their families and loved ones. secretary carter, i want to ask

you about iran. their iran's goal is to become the regional -- most dominant regional power. they see american military presence in the region as a threat or impediment to that goal. defense secretary carter: yes. >> they are never excited to see additional american troops. defense secretary carter: i cannot imagine that bombing isil is unwelcome to them. i don't know what they are thinking. >> general dempsey, you agree that the iranians are not fans. they are not fans of u.s. military department in the --

deployment in the middle east. i believe much of our strategy with regards to isis is being driven by desire not to upset iran so that they don't walk away from the negotiating table. tell me why i'm wrong. secretary of state john kerry: the facts completely contradict that. i'm not at liberty to discuss all of them here for a lot of different reasons. in classified session, i could but at this delicate stage, i'm not sure that is advisable. >> can you state that iran's feelings about our military presence in the region and -- the fact that they would be upset if we increased military presence on the ground, can you tell me today that under no circumstances is how iran would react to an increase of military action. as we heard from secretary carter they are not fans of us , bombing isis because it involves our presence in the region. are you telling us that is a nonfactor in the negotiation? or is that something you cannot discuss?

secretary of state john kerry: they would welcome our bombing additionally of isis. they want us to destroy isis and they want to destroy isis. isis is a threat to them and the region. i think you are misreading it if you think there is not a mutual interest with respect to them with every country in the region. >> if the u.s. sent more military personnel, they would support that? iran would support that? secretary of state john kerry: they are not going to come out and openly support it. obviously, they would be nervous about it, but they are not going to object to it. we have bigger problems with that because the shia militia might have something to say about it. other people might react very adversely to that. but, what is important with respect your question is to understand this. and this has been a misreading by a lot of people appear on the hill. there is no grand bargain being

discussed here in the context of this negotiation. this is about nuclear weapon potential. that is it. and the president has made it absolutely clear they will not get a nuclear weapon. the presumption has been that we somehow aren't aware of that goal even as we negotiate thateven as we negotiated that rule. it's almost insulting we are going to negotiate anything that allows a nuclear weapon. >> i am saying it is influence.

we have 62 countries. including five sunni countries that for the first time ever are engaged in military action in another country in the region. >> general dempsey outlined the need to have a broad coalition that involves sunni countries. these are also deeply concerned about it around. our negotiations have impacted trust level with critical allies. >> that is flat wrong. they all articulated their support for what we are doing.

they believe we are better off trying to prevent them diplomatically first, provided it prevents them from getting the bomb. that is the test. a bunch of people were trying to give this a grade before the test was taken. >> you are saying our allies are perfectly comfortable. >> they are apprehensive. they want to make sure, just as members of congress want to make sure the deal that is struck will prevent them. >> are you sure of the details? are they apprehensive of that? or are they comfortable with what you have shared? >> the senior minister of the

world sat with me at a press conference in which he articulated the support for what they are doing. >> we have seen it emerge in libya. can you even comment about what we are seeing with regards to the competition between them and al qaeda and the taliban on, and how does this allow us to form a strategy that allows them to deal with the second threat? >> they have rebranded themselves to the issa lie d.l. to. to answer your question guys -- to the eiffel ideology.

-- isil ideology. number one, that they have an affiliate with the ideology but that they demonstrate intent regionally or globally. >> in afghanistan we have a significant threat, more so than other parts of the world. the growth of an affiliate could goes -- could pose a threat potentially. >> it will initially pose a threat to the government of afghanistan and could over time pose a threat to us. >> thank you. i think the three of you for your incredible service to the

country. first, let me say i supported the use of force. as i was listening to secretary carter was the objective and thought about what we had recommended, i thought it satisfied your concerns. i think some republicans were reluctant to support the use of force in the last conference because the administration had not come up with the threat. i was somewhat surprised the administration did not bring forward a resolution that was more consistent with what we developed in the last congress and would have comp list -- accomplished the objectives.

let me bring up three concerns. first dealing with the 2001 authorization, why there is nothing in that. all three give me concerns. in regards to the 2001 authorization, that was passed rather easily to go against those who attacked our country in 2001. i think many were surprised those were used today. it is the longest use of force in american history. eight years longer than the

revolutionary war. 10 years longer than world war ii. one third of the authorization for military force by congress have included limitations of time. that is not an unusual provision to be placed. congress and the administration need to work together. circumstances change. secretary carter i was very impressed by your comments. you fully understand the three-year sunset on isis specific authorization. even though i cannot ensure the counter eiffel campaign will be completed in three years. for the same provision if

congress chose to include a three-year sunset on the 2001 provision, would it be your view the sensible and provision to include, even though you could not ensure a military operation for those responsible can be completed in that time, that it would be up to the next administration to come forward? >> thank you for that. i can't give you a clear answer to that question. let me say why. the 2001 authorization covered al qaeda and its successive generations, which have extended for 14 years. there is still an al qaeda in the arabian peninsula. they intend to attack this

country, and we need to protect ourselves. >> is that also true of isis? >> there is now a 14 year history of the tenacity of al qaeda and its offshoots and their intent to attack our country. i think you need to take that into account of whether it makes sense to put a sunset on that one. this one we are embarking on is a new campaign, a new group. i respect the desire to have a sunset clause that doesn't derive from any characteristic i know of that it will wrap up in three years. i think we have history in al qaeda that it has lasted quite a

long time. >> if this is a new campaign, i don't understand how you can use a 2001 authorization to justify the use of force. i think you can't have it both ways. i don't understand the distinction when you're saying it is an new campaign and we don't know what is going on. we are still using 2001 authorization. >> the president has indicated a desire and willingness to revisit the 2001 ums, which i also think makes sense in view of what you said. it has been 14 years. we have to protect ourselves against al qaeda. >> our congress will meet again

and will always take up with the next administration. i want to get one question on and during combat troops. -- in during combat troops. it came up as lasting permanence on my iphone. would you tell me why the term could not be interpreted to include operations such as in iraq and afghanistan, since we did not intend our troops to be there on a permanent basis? why couldn't you interpret that light which to include a ground campaign similar to what we saw in iraq?

>> i'm not a lawyer, but the interpretation i gave is the interpretation is those who drafted and it is intended to rule out the kind of campaign we waged in iraq and afghanistan because we don't foresee that kind of campaign is necessary. that is one of those things that was supposed to cover. that me ask secretary kerry to add to that. >> i think the president has been clear on this. there is a huge distinction between the operations did in afghanistan and iraq, where clearly we submitted a large number of troops to offensive

actions on the ground. the president has offered definitions that provide limitations here. i think the english language provides them also. i don't happen to agree with the comment about two weeks and two years. i don't think anyone contemplates years. what he has thought of only and what general dempsey has been clear about is not giving up the option under some circumstances where you might want somebody either special forces or embedded to be accompanying and assisting in some way. i think it has been clear how limited it is or an effort to

protect and defend u.s. personnel or citizens, which is momentary. an effort to rescue people. perhaps a specific targeted operation against leadership, for instance. perhaps intelligence collecting and sharing. there has been a range laid out but the purpose is to have a concept that is well understood that this extremely limited but not so limiting that our military can't do what it needs to do to protect america's interest or american personnel but it's not contemplating years, not even months to my knowledge. what it would contemplate is a current operation along the lines i just described. >> i am just pointing out that most of us thought it would not be used today.

this goes to the next administration, so the next administration would have the authority and may have a totally different view on that. >> it may indeed, which is why president obama said i am going to put it in the three-year range. he thought that through. he said, i don't want the new president to come in and face the type of choice i've faced on day one, which had to be made in 30 days with respect to afghanistan, so he gave it the distance of the year to allow the administration to get people in place, to evaluating and make a decision, but most importantly, this is where there is a probably accepted an absolutely clear congressional responsibility. congress will step in. i would think you would be welcoming this opportunity to double check the administration, to be able to make sure this is accomplishing the goals you

want. i would think this would be an debated in that respect although i understand there are principles were people say we don't want limitations at all, but this fits within the capacity to get a major vote out of congress. that's something you have to think about. when i testified in december and two weeks ago, i think i made it clear our interests are best served if there is a very powerful vote in support of this. we don't have a message of america's commitment and of our willingness to stay at it to get the job done if this is a marginal vote in congress. >> thank you. we do welcome this opportunity. we also welcome the opportunity to weigh in on the final iran deal, and with that, senator

johnson. >> words matter. i know we are discussing use of military force, but this is puzzling. you said the authorization needs to be extremely limited but show the commitment of the united states. i don't see how you reconcile those terms. let's talk about the joint recognition past in 2001 and why the current activity is tenuously connected to that at best. the joint resolution was to authorize the use of united states forces against those responsible for recent attacks against the united states. specifically it said the president is authorized to use appropriate force against those nations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on september 11, 2001, or harbored such persons in order to prevent huger

attacks by such organizations or persons. i'm puzzled by the fact the administration is firmly of the view they already have statutory authority to conduct what they are conducting. i guess there is nobody pushing back that hard on that. now we are talking about a new authorization, and i'm puzzled by the fact that in a commander-in-chief if they already believe they have the authority to do what is conducted, why would they limit that in any way, shape or form? particularly you said you wanted to dispel doubt. that sentence unmistakable message. this is the authorization we are discussing. let's talk about the specific words. it says the president is authorized, subject to the limitations of subsection c to

use force necessary against isil or associated forces as defined in section five. this sounds like a contract. limitations, the authority does not authorize the use of united states armed forces in and during ground combat authorizations. that's not the dispelling of doubt. the use of military force will terminate three years after the authorization. i'm not seeing that sending an unmistakable message. this was passed on december 8. the president is authorized and directed to employ the entire force of the united states and the resources of government to carry on war against the imperial government of japan and to bring the conflict to a successful determination.

all of the resources are pledged by the congress of the united states. if we are discussing language to dispel all doubt, send an unmistakable message, which authorizations would you want to have at your back? >> i'm not going to compare something from 1941 to a conflict with a nonstate actor. >> secretary carter. it has always puzzled me. why would anybody want to pick a fight with the united states? why is ice is putting on videotape the barbaric beheadings of americans and other westerners? why would they do that? why would anybody want to pick a fight with the united states? >> i can only say and read as

you can see and read what they say, which is they intend to create an islamic state, and they regard us and our friends and allies as standing in the way of that, and they have shown their willingness to attack americans and to attack our allies and interests. >> i would never pick a fight with chairman dempsey's military. the only way i would pick that fight is if i really didn't think america would be serious about coming back to defeat me, to try to accomplish that goal. i want to talk about the current ground forces against isis. do we know what the structure is? how many iraqi security forces are there? how many kurds? how many sponsored by iran?

what is the current structure of boots on the ground? backs>> i have to get back to you on the number. >> there is approximately 1000 sunni tribal folks there is one brigade. those are the sponsored forces. there are approximately 20,000 of the shia militia. >> so the shia militia dramatically outnumber iraqi security forces? >> they do. >> the shia militia are iranian sponsored, correct? >> i would describe them as iranian trained and equipped.

>> secretary carter, i think you said the outcome of to credit would explain a lot of things. what did you mean by that? >> i believe it was general dempsey who made that statement so i will let him explain himself. i agree with that. >> here's what i meant by that. there is no doubt the combination of popular forces and iraqi security forces, they are going to run isil out of to crit. the question is what comes after their willingness to allow sunni families to move back into their neighborhoods whether they're willing to restore basic services or whether it results in atrocities of retribution. that's what i meant. >> senator rubio's his line of questioning is if iran is the

one sponsoring the victories they are going to have influence in iraq, and that is going to be very tenuous and very dangerous for the regional peace. correct? do you want to address that? aren't you concerned about iran's growing influence in iraq ? >> am concerned about growing efforts in the region. we made it clear that is an administrative concerned. their influence in syria and of course iraq. i think you have to look historically. a lot of things are happening in the region. the history between persia and

arab world shia is complicated. remember, iraq and iran had a 10 year war. people were gassed. iranians did not respond. there are a lot of interesting facets as to how that played out. iran's influence spread, and we are deeply concerned about it. if you are concerned about it now, think about what happens. we heard this in the floor of the house, and you heard it else where. if they had a nuclear weapon, that's why the administration believes the first step is to prevent access to nuclear weapon or develop a nuclear weapon. that's our goal, to try to do that diplomatically, and if it

can't be achieved diplomatically, we have a lot of options available to us. we are eyes wide open with respect to what is happening. we have made it clear to our friends in the region and elsewhere they don't disappear. if we were to get an agreement we still have these other issues with iran. we will need to be working on the ways in which members will be coming here to washington in the next month to continue the dialogue we had in the region last week. i am confident we will take the steps necessary to counter what iran is doing in other ways. >> i am not seeing the full

commitment. we're seeing the dangerous influence of iran. >> thank you. we are now in the eighth month of the war that began on the eighth of august. there has not been a congressional authorization of the war except for the vote that no committee has taken it up. i view that as highly challenging and disturbing in terms of the way the nation makes the most grave decision we are supposed to make. count me among many members of congress who believe the authorizations are not sufficient to cover military action. if we act to authorize it, there is precedent for congressional authorizations after the beginning of military conflicts, but if we do not act to authorize it, i think from a legal standpoint it would be

catastrophic. i also agree the authorization should be strong and bipartisan. for those who have been fighting this battle without congress weighing in to indicate whether they think it's in national interest or not, i cannot imagine asking people to risk their lives with us not having done our job. if we were to pass in a partisan way, that would not send a message that would make people risking their lives feel very good about the risk they are taking. i want to talk about the definition from a mission standpoint. the language is in the proposed authorization and is given some tone and coloration by the president transmittal letter. it says the administration drafting would not authorize large-scale ground combat authorizations like those our nation conducted in iraq and of canada stand, and you used that

as a limitation -- and afghanistan and you use that. in the first gulf war troops were deployed overseas for up to seven months. would that be an enduring combat operation? >> senator i think an operation that large, a state on state operation is not something we foresee as the kind of campaign we would mount against isil and not foreseen by this a ums -- aumf. the fundamental nature is one in which we are seeking the last thing defeat of iso--- isil.

we need someone on the ground who sustains the victory after forces are defeated. that's why our fight is an enabling fight. we are trying to develop ground forces that would do it. >> i want to ask about that point. i'm trying to figure out, is there some meaning to this definition. 697,000 troops for seven months, is that an enduring combat mission? >> it wouldn't lead to the defeat of isil. i can say with credibility no. >> that would not be allowed? >> i agree. >> with respect to the concept secretary carter raised.

the foreign relations committee had two meetings with some strong allies in this mission. the location of the combined air operations center at the air force base. the king of jordan said to us, this is not your fight. it's our fight, when we were asking about ground troops. isis is born and bred in this region. it is a terrorist rett born and bred in this region. they are claiming a mantle we revere for a perverted and. it is not america's fight. we want your help. we don't want american ground troops because it could send the message this is the united states against isil or the west

against iso--- isil. this needs to be our ground effort, and we appreciate your support. i'm looking for metrics in terms of if we all agree with the proposition this needs to be a region policing itself with the assistance of the united states, tell me what that means with respect to what ground troop levels could be appropriate or inappropriate? on the airstrike campaign of the 2800 airstrike the u.s. has done 80% of airstrikes. we have done 80% of the airstrikes. the airstrikes is u.s.. what i am worried is list the words but the concept. this has got to be the region's fight against its own terrorism. as it gets to the point where we

have to contemplate a significant amount of ground troops, it almost means it has been lost from the beginning. there is no amount of ground troops we could put into iraq or syria to win the battles. we cannot create a recruiting bonanza for eiffel. the president has said how he would like to use ground troops. i see a real danger of a ground troop creep converting this. i would love your thoughts about how to give this some flesh in the definition. >> i think this authorization itself guards against that.

the most significant guard against that is what king abdullah said and secretary carter and general dempsey and all of us believe that, the enduring transformation that has to take place here is not going to take place if the united states just comes in as we were to knock out isil and that is it and go away. that is not going to happen. we can do that, actually. we have the capacity. but we're not asking to do that and they are not asking us to do that. i think they understand that the implications of that would actually be to aid in the recruitment, to create a bigger problem than we face today. in answer to the question asked earlier, why do these guys like taking us on? if it is just us that is how they grow and that is what they want. we are not getting suckered into that. that is why we built the 62 coalition and worked so hard to

get these five arab countries engaged in the kinetic activities with us. it is precisely to deny them that narrative. and so, as we go forward here, we think the best thing that could happen is what is happening now. this is in fact indigenous. it is springing up. the sunni are gaining confidence in anbar. there are several battles taking place right now. not just in tikrit. there are two others. two out of three, where we have played a central role has not been as heralded but it is making a difference. the sunni arabs are prosecuting that. as long as we continue to work on the integration, the internal inclusivity of iraq and its government. as long as we continue to help the iraqis to do this themselves, help the region feel empowered, that is a long-term recipe for the united states to not have to put ourselves on the line as we have historically.

we think we are on the right track here. in fact, the very strategy we are pursuing adheres to the very standards you most want to have in place in order to protect against mission creep. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your testimony. this committee had particularly the chairman, months and months ago for an aumf. for language to come from the administration. we are glad it is here and i think it is overdue. it would have been useful to have that language or some kind of language from the administration early on. i know the administration was not comfortable with the language passed. i think many of us were uncomfortable with the limitations that were there. at the same time, we all

recognize that we may have to endure some degree of ambiguity in the language. we see it here when we talk about what is enduring. in exchange for a resolution that can pass with the bipartisan majority. at what point does it become -- since the administration believes it had the authority to move under the old aumf, at what point does it become not useful to have an aumf that would pass with a partisan vote? is it worse than no aumf at all? secretary of state kerry: is it worse than no aumf? absolutely. we are convinced we have authority. that is not the issue here. senator johnson asked about that earlier.

we had the authority because isil was al qaeda. what they changed was their name and then grew worse. four years, i think it was about 13 years, going back to 2011, it called itself al qaeda in iraq. that is who they were. al qaeda in iraq. they had an extensive history of conducting attacks against u.s. coalition going way back in that time.

they had a long relationship between al qaeda and osama bin laden. they viewed themselves and still do as the legitimate heirs of the osama bin laden mantle. they still view that. they just they see themselves in a more aggressive term. that is why they have had some disagreement in tactics with al qaeda from whom they separated from. but separating does not change who they are and where they came from when we first engaged in a fight with them. there is legitimacy to the 2001 effort because it began a long time ago against this very group that simply changed its name and some of its tactics. it does not change the threat to the united states. obviously, we will continue to prosecute that. senators have raised the concern that we are operating under the longest aumf ever. there is a much greater clarity and a much greater force that comes from a statement from the congress that this reincarnated entity and this current, this current metastasizing that is

taking place is not going to be tolerated, specifically. that is important. to answer an earlier question, are there some questions from some people about the staying power of the united states of america? sometimes you hear that. i hear that, in the course of diplomacy. and i think it is important to answer that in this context at this time. >> i like secretary carter's formulation of the need of the aumf to provide flexibility for the forces to be waged. and second, the message you just sent, it needs to send a message to our allies and

adversaries that we are in it for the long haul and backup the efforts of our allies and that they understand what their role is as well. i do believe an aumf is certainly needed if we have a campaign that is going to go on for a long time. i'm not troubled by the sunset provisions. we can come back in three years and revisit this with a new administration. i might wish for more firm language with regard to what an enduring force is but we also need to value language that can get a good bipartisan majority to send that message. that is important too. as we know in this body, we never get everything we want. i commend the administration for coming forward and listening to us. and for consulting and listening to others as well. so, i hope we can move forward and i appreciate your testimony. >> senator murphy.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to all of our witnesses. thank you for your extraordinary gestures to come back to this committee over and over again both in public and private to work on this most important question that the foreign relations committee and congress takes up, the question of when to commit u.s. personnel into war. i remain as frustrated as many of my colleagues over this question over definitions. every different member of the administration that we talk to seems to have a slightly different interpretation of what these words mean and i can't blame them. as secretary carter said, there is no historical operational

definition of these words. i think the lack of consistency has hampered our efforts to get on the same page together. if we resort to just an understanding that these words mean something less than what happened in iraq and afghanistan, that really is no limitation at all. i am barely a lawyer. i practiced for four years, but i remember the concept of statues being voided because of the vagueness. i fear this would suffer that same problem if we were not able to get a consistent understanding of what those terms mean. i want to ask, one point of clarification on a piece of this terminology. that is back to you, secretary carter. i was pleased by the language in the draft from the administration defining associated forces, including this limitation that it would be restricted to organizations that were actively engaged in fights against the united states. i just want to clarify, you said

in your testimony it would be limited to associated forces that's where actively engaged against the united states but the language actually says engaged in hostilities against the united states or our partners. as to the the question of boko haram, if it is covered under this. so long as they are engaged in hostilities against the coalition partner, isn't it true that this authorization would give the united states the ability, subject to the other restrictions in the authorization, to engage in hostilities against that organization? >> i think you are reading it right. >> given that reading, let me ask again, would boko haram, pledging allegiance to isis, be covered if the country in which they were engaging in hostilities was a partner to the united states.

defense secretary carter: i can't give you a legal answer but i can give you a commonsense answer. this is a an aumf that focuses on isis. we have authorities already alluded to in the 2001, which also cover other situations, including some that might involve boko haram that allows us to take action to protect ourselves in that case. but this is focused on isil and the associated forces there. when they engage in operations against us or our coalition partners, that can be interpreted but has not yet been interpreted to cover other groups like boko haram. just to be clear, under the 2001 authorities, this is important to me, because we have to protect ourselves, there are authorities under the 2001 also

that could extend to boko haram depending on their behavior and the kinds of actions we need to take to protect ourselves. these are always in my experience, and again, i'm not a lawyer, just observing this as secretary of defense, our councils try to interpret the law and such a way that we are acting lawfully and consistent with the intent of the legislation and are able to take actions to protect ourselves. sometimes they get to those determinations when a particular instance arises. i think it is important when we have this -- this is the last point i will make -- to err on the side of caution of flexibility. i think someone said earlier that this language could allow an awful lot. the "how" part of the provision.

it does. the president, if you're hearing different things, the thing i would listen to is what the president says. he said he does not foresee and this language does not authorize the kind of thing that iraq and afghanistan represented. and he gave examples of the kind of campaign that we intend to wage, which secretary kerry noted earlier. ones in which we are enabling a force which provides the lasting victory against isil. that is our approach because that is the right approach to get a lasting victory against isil. but i think in my role and the chairman's role, some latitude there in the language is appreciated because we need to be able to do what we need to do to protect ourselves. this encompasses the campaign against isil as we now foresee

it and one can reasonably foresee it. that is essential because we need to win this campaign. >> a minute remaining. there has been a lot of talk about sending consistent, bipartisan messages to our enemies. i agree. i did not think there has been much division on the message that we have been sending to crisis. we stand united that we should take this fight to them. in the last few days there has been significant division on the message we're sending to iran. an exceptional, i would argue unprecedented, letter from 47 of our colleagues to the ayatollah himself, that many of us believe has the effect and intent of undermining the authority of the president. secretary kerry, you are here before us, this is a subject of great debate within the senate today.

what do you believe are the ramifications of this letter? what do you believe is your interpretation of the facts of that letter, that state that any agreement signed by the united states expires as soon as another president is sworn in? share with us your thoughts on whether this is helpful or hurtful to our efforts to try to divorce iran from any future nuclear ambition. secretary of state kerry: my reaction to the letter was utter disbelief. during my 29 years here in the senate, i have never heard of, nor even heard of it being proposed, anything comparable to this. if i had, i can guarantee that no matter who was president or what the issue was, i would have certainly rejected it. i think nobody is questioning anybody's right to dissent. any senator can go to the floor

any day and raise any of the questions that were raised in that. but to write to the leaders right in the middle of negotiation, particularly the leader they have criticized other people for even engaging with or writing to, to write and suggest that they are going to give a constitutional lesson which by the way, was absolutely incorrect, is quite stunning. this letter ignores more than two centuries of precedence in the conduct of american foreign-policy. formal treaties obviously require the advice and consent of the senate. that is in the constitution. but the vast majority of international arrangements and

agreements do not. around the world today, we have all kinds of executive agreements that we deal with. protection of our troops, the recent agreement with afghanistan, any number of noncontroversial and broadly supported foreign policy bills. the executive agreement is a necessary tool used by presidents from both parties used for centuries, literally. it is recognized and accepted by congress from the earliest period of american history. with respect to the talks, we have been clear from the beginning. we are not negotiating a legally binding plan. we are negotiating a plan that will have a capacity for enforcement.

we don't even have diplomatic relations with iran right now. the senators' letter erroneously asserts this is a legally binding plan. it is incorrect when it says that congress can actually modify the terms of an agreement at any time. that is flat wrong. they do not have the right to modify an agreement reached, executive to executive, between leaders of the country. could another president come in with another attitude? no president, if this agreement meets its task and does what it is supposed to do, in conjunction with china, russia france, germany, great britain all of whom are going to sign or not sign off, i would like to see the next president of this country say this is good, turn around and nullify it on behalf of the united states. that is not going to happen. i have to tell you, knowing what we know about this, this risks undermining the confidence that

foreign governments in thousands of important agreements, committed to between the united states and other countries. it purports to tell the world that if you want confidence in your dealings with america, you have to negotiate with 535 members of congress. that is both untrue and profoundly a bad suggestion to make. that aside from the legalities this letter also raises question of judgment and policy. we know that there are people in iran opposed to any negotiation. we know that a comprehensive solution is not going to happen if iran's leaders are not willing to make hard choices about their nuclear program. we know that a nuclear armed iran is unacceptable.

>> mr. secretary, i know that is a well-written speech -- >> this is not a speech. this is about the impact of this irresponsible letter. that letter does not have legal authority. i think you have to ask, what people are trying to accomplish. the author of the letter says he does not want the agreement to be made and he thinks that before the judgment is made, it is a mistake. i'm asked by one senator what the impact is and i am laying out what the impact is. i'm sorry if people do not want to hear it. >> five minutes and 26 seconds later, i would say that i did not sign the letter and i am very disappointed that you have gone back back on your statement that any agreement must pass muster with congress. the way we pass muster is we

vote. i think all of us are very disappointed with the veto threat and the stiff arming that is taking place. >> let me just -- >> senator gardner. >> you have the right to vote any day. >> secretary carter, secretary kerry, general dempsey, i want to thank you all for testifying today. this issue of authorizing military force is one of the most serious issues congress can consider. i am concerned about perhaps mixed messages from the administration regarding the isil threat. on march 3, general austin stated that isis is losing its fight against us yet only a week earlier, on february 26, director clapper said the organization remains a formidable and brutal threat and is increasing its influence. the threat from isil is real and requires a carefully coordinated strategy to ensure its complete destruction. i look forward to hearing how we

can ensure its bi-partisan success. i want to understand the details and to fully know that you're not unnecessarily restraining or restricting our ability to win. secretary carter, in your remarks, you say that, i cannot tell you that our mission to defeat isil be completed in three years, the sunset clause proposed by the president is a sensible provision. you heard the senators all talk about this. if the aumf is not authorized, in three years, the president can continue to use the authorities? >> that is correct.

that is the legal interpretation of the 2001 aumf. the stated intent of the president is to revisit the 2001 aumf after this one as well. he has said that and that is a totally different subject. >> in your verbal comments, you stated that, what a shame it would be to have a safe haven. and i believe you are referring to the geographic limitations. could the three year time limitation be interpreted as a safe haven as well? defense secretary carter: it certainly shouldn't be. it has not by anyone involved in

drafting the aumf. it is, as i said, it is not a number or time period derived from our thinking about the campaign. it is derived from the constitution and the election cycle. it is for sure the that in our system that there will be a new president in three years. it is for sure that he or she will have had one year to get themselves on their feet. therefore, it foresees and leaves latitude for this to be revisited. that is something i respect as a consequence of our political system. it is not the consequence of a battlefield dynamic or campaign we are waging. obviously, we hope to wrap it up as soon as possible. but i specifically said i cannot tell you it will be over in three years. >> we have had testimony from others who have talked about the ability to go for three years, that we would not be able to defeat in three years but what we would be able to do in three years -- is it the right time?

should there be no time limit? defense secretary carter: the number three has to do with our political system, not the defeat of isis. i respect the people who do not want a sunset, but i think the logic of three years derives from our political system. there is no foreseeing how long it will take to defeat isil, any more than you can begin any campaign and know when it will end. >> secretary carter, you said in your comments that enduring, i believe it was in response to senator cardin, that enduring is not afghanistan and iraq. could you give a clearer definition than the term enduring? defense secretary carter: the president, when he explained the provision which describes how the campaign is authorized to be waged, explained that he was not, he was not saying, and this was very sensible to me enumerating the things that we could do. he was setting a limit, which is the language of enduring offense of ground operations, to mean something like iraq and

afghanistan. not foreseen in our campaign not asking for 34. he also gave some illustrations. >> just to go back. i am sorry to interrupt. that is the definition that is the best we can get on enduring, not afghanistan and iraq? >> it make sense to me not to try to enumerate everything we may find it necessary to do in the course of this campaign. >> just to go back. i am sorry to interrupt. that is the definition that is the best we can get on enduring, not afghanistan and iraq? >> it make sense to me not to try to enumerate everything we may find it necessary to do in the course of this campaign. instead, the text sets an outer

limit. it does not try to enumerate everything. the president's language did illustrate some things and secretary kerry cited them, but it does not try to say everything we might have to do. that is a good sensible thing for a military campaign. >> two more questions. secretary kerry, in response to senator rubio, you said i believe that several of the middle east counterparts that you have been talking to, you have shared with them details or some details of the negotiations with iran. am i misunderstanding your response? secretary of state kerry: we shared with them an outline. we haven't shared with them -- actually, we briefed them. we had our team go down and brief them. >> are those the same details that we have been briefed on? secretary of state kerry: you

have been getting it much more in depth. >> thank you. to general dempsey, talking about the peshmerga. in terms of percentage, if you look at the isf overall, the fights undertaken against isil what weight of effort would you say that the peshmerga or others fighting in the region are currently pursuing against isil? general dempsey: the early successes were largely through peshmerga. that's will evolve over time, but they had been carrying the majority of the effort so far. >> are they carrying out a third? three quarters, 90%? general dempsey: the early effort to blunt isil's momentum

were with the peshmerga. >> reports in the news and other places state that peshmerga have only been getting 10% of the arms rigid through baghdad. is that correct? >> i don't have the percentage. i can take it for the record. there was friction early on with the government of iraq to provide weapons to peshmerga but we have managed our way through that. >> right now, you confidence that it has been settled or resolved? general dempsey: i'm confident we have broken through the initial fiction, but it does not mean it will not recur. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you secretary kerry and secretary carter and general dempsey for being here. i was very pleased when the administration sent over language for the aumf. i supported the aumf that passed

out of this committee in the last congress because i think as you all said, it is very important for our men and women who might be putting themselves at risk in the fight against isil to know that they have the support of congress. i think it is very important for the american public to know, to hear this debate, and know congress is supporting whatever actions that we take. with respect to that, one of the places where i think i would have issue with the language that was sent over by the administration is with respect to the reporting on the ongoing actions. as you all know the language in the aumf that the administration sent over said the president shall report to congress at least once every six months on specific actions taken pursuant to this operation.

in looking at the aumf that passed the committee in december, the reporting requirements are much more robust and much more comprehensive. it requests reporting every 60 days and it also requests a comprehensive strategy report that would be clear to congress and therefore to the american people the specific political and dramatic objectives of the united states in the region. it asks for a clearly defined military objective and the list goes on. while i appreciate there might be concern about the level of detail requested, it still seems to me that there is a benefit

from providing additional detail about the mission and more frequent periodic reporting. i think that is important not just for congress, i think there are also some benefits to the operation, because it makes it very clear in writing, at some level, what the plan is. i was always taught, a plan is not a plan unless you have written it down somewhere, unless you have got something that you can refer to. can i ask you secretary kerry to respond to that and perhaps secretary carter and general dempsey might want to as well? secretary of state kerry: first of all, believe me, the plan is reduced to writing and the president reviews it and there is an enormous amount of analysis that goes into this. you are right that it needs to be specific. but i think there needs to be a

a balance between the effort put into reporting and fighting the war and getting the job done. i have asked the state department to do a review of all the reports we have to do and the numbers of people and hours that are put into reports that frankly, don't often get thoroughly read and digested. i think there is a briefing the process, that in my memory here, works pretty well. six month, when you think of it, is a fair amount of time. it is not so much time in the course of this in terms of the review process that it does not do the job. when you mix in the numbers of classified briefings, hearings that will take place and so forth. we are not trying to resist accountability, i assure you

but surely we can find a way to balance so that there is not an excess of paper turning and process that actually gets in the way of getting things done. i think there is a balance personally. i haven't talked to my colleagues about it, but i think, i assume they might feel the same way. >> certainly, i might agree that there should be a balance. i'm just questioning if the balance in the language sent over is the right balance. i don't know secretary carter or general them to want to add to that. defense secretary carter: i think balance is the right word and you are both seeking that and i agree with the principle. general dempsey: i would add, it is for you to determine how to exercise your oversight authority. but, it was a line somewhat with how we do reporting and there was a logic in that. >> i want to make sure i

understood something that i think you said, secretary carter. and that was that -- i didn't get this quote down exactly correct, that you said something about believing that the 2001 aumf gives us the ability to protect ourselves if we are attacked? did i understand that accurately? defense secretary carter: it is more specific than that and the legal interpretation is more specific than that. i was simply saying that the existence of that since 2001 has provided the authority under which we have protected ourselves. it is quite clear we need to protect ourselves. >> the question i have is do we need need that aumf to protect ourselves if attacked. what i'm try to figure out is why -- is whether we should insert specific language in this aumf that acknowledges that the fight we are engaged in now is covered by this aumf and

therefore the 2001 is not part of the action that we are doing now. >> i will explain my understanding and ask secretary kerry to add. the text explicitly states that this supersedes the 2002 aumf. >> that i understand. >> the president has also indicated his willingness and desire to revisit the 2001 aumf. the only thing i would say is that it is important that as we do that, i understand the desire to revisit the 2001 aumf, we do need the continuing authority that this new one does not provide to continue to to protect us against others not

isil. we need that in order to protect the country. if we replace the 2001, that is fine with me as long as a gives us the authority to protect ourselves. >> i've seen press reports that the white house is open to congress inserting legislative language on this point as we did when we passed it out of the committee in december. secretary kerry, do you know if that is correct? if the administration would accept the kind of language? secretary of state kerry: i don't know specifically if the decision has been made to accept the language, though i do know specifically the president has said -- it would sort of invite the notion of having language, -- because he has said if you pass the aumf with respect to isil now, he would rely on his authority for isil on that aumf.

not the 2001. that would seem to leave it open. i do not want to conclusively say they would accept. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. have a question for chairman dempsey but i want to thank you personally for your lifetime of service and i hope you will take my echo of the request earlier to give condolences for the heroes who lost their lives last night. in his recent address to congress, prime minister netanyahu stated, quote, when it comes to iran and isil, the enemy of your enemy is your enemy. would you respond to that from a military perspective? general dempsey: well, i won't respond to the prime minister's choice of words or how he determines his national interests.

in terms of our national interests, we have six things concerning us. one of them happens to be iran's nuclear program. >> after two wars and 14 years later, al qaeda still exists. that is not a criticism, it is a reality. i would like for you to help me define what we see from a military point what a victory against isil would be. >> thank you for asking. we rarely have a chance to talk about the overall scheme here, if you will. isil is trans-regional, which is to say they are not just confined to iraq and syria. they are generational, which suggests the duration of this campaign will be prolonged. we are seeking to find a sustainable level of effort.

i did not have a chance to respond on the differences from the aumfs from 1984 and 2015. the use of military force in a state on state conflict is very different from a state on a actor. the military brings three things. we own two lines of effort out of nine against isil. the other lines of effort our governance, counter financing, humanitarian relief, so forth. the two things we're doing are using direct action, notably with our airstrikes. the other is building partner capacity, which is to say, building up the ability of the peshmerga, the sunni tribal leaders, to reject isil. it will only be permanently defeated if they reject the ideology. not simply by as cutting off its head. it has got to be rejected from within.

it requires a different application of military instruments than if we would be fighting a state on state actor. one more thing. the military does three things. direct actions, building partners, and enabling others. what we are doing with the french in mali, against al qaeda. that is what we are doing. that is what this aumf allows and the limiting principle. i sense that some of us are looking for a limiting principle. the limiting principle is the way this particular enemy will be defeated. it won't be defeated by u.s. military power alone. >> you mentioned you are concerned about what happens afterwards. with regard to sectarian violence at the board. if we are victorious against isil in iraq, it looks like iran is also victorious. because their efforts there are

behind this shia militia. can you speak to that? in terms of that part of the definition of victory. what can we do from a military standpoint once we declare victory over isil in iraq and syria? >> there is a lot in that question. iran is going to be influential in iraq and has been. i'm concerned about the way they wield that influence. there are ways they can wield that to promote a better iraq, economically for example. there are ways they could wield that influence to create a state where the sunni and kurds are no longer welcome. it is my concern about the latter that we are watching carefully as this tikrit unfolds. as for declaring victory against isil, that is not for us to declare. as i said, very much we can

enable it and support a coalition and hold a coalition together. we can build into the region, we can harden the region against it militarily. but the ideology has to be defeated by those in the region. >> i am concerned about iran's stature in the region. particularly relating to assad and hezbollah. we have a partner in crime here where you run is also going to be successful and strengthen their position. let me echo one thing i heard on both sides this morning. i want you to pass this along to your men and women in service. we hope we will end up unified. i absolutely believe we have to be like-minded. this is bigger than any partisan position. this is about the security of our country. this is bigger than the middle east, then our national security, this is about global security. i would like to follow about asymmetric and symmetric conversation.

you are talking about the asymmetric question with regards to iraq and the middle east. i'm concerned and would like to have you respond and perhaps secretary carter as well, what impact does that have on our long-term strategy relative to symmetric threats. i know we don't talk about the people's republic of china and russia in this conversation, but it is all interrelated and i would like to see how this relates in your mind to the longer-term strategy. >> thank you, senator. for the first time in my 40 years, we have both state and nonstate threats to our national interests. in my first 25 years, it was all about state threats, notably the soviet union. the last 15 years, it is all about nonstate actors. we live now in an environment where we have threats emanating from both states and nonstate. we are actually adapting quite well. if we don't have budget help on the issue of sequestration, it

is going to be difficult to manage both threats. >> thank you. senator markey. >> thank you. i want to thank secretary kerry for his strong words about the letter that was sent by our 47 colleagues to the government of iran. i think that was a serious breach of protocol and an exercise in bad judgment especially at this very sensitive time. i thank the secretary for taking that very strong position in this hearing. secretary carter, what i would like to ask you is how this extends to libya and what this authorization could mean, given the increasing stronghold that isis has in many parts of libya, and what it could portend in

terms of u.s. commitment to their removal of isil from libya. defense secretary carter: thank you. there are those in libya who use the term rebranding themselves as isil. that is not the only place we see that. it is certainly going on in libya. therefore, this aumf could apply to operations in and around libya against those groups depending upon their behavior and whether they had met the criteria of the aumf. and also, because of the 2001 aumf's extent as well, that could also cover actions we

might need to take in libya as it has in the past, if there are successor groups to al qaeda. will both of those might apply to libya and these are the kinds of her determinations made as these cases arise. all but you do see in this social media fueled movement called isil, people who are wannabees, or want to join, are putting up the flag of isil and we need to recognize that that is a characteristic of the campaign and that is why the aumf has the language it does. >> if i may move back over to syria. in terms of what all of this means for our long-term american commitment, our goal is to remove assad. the goal of iran and russia to keep assad in office.

iran most prominently. what does this mean in terms of the commitment that we are making to have the moderate syrians depose, takeout, assad? that is their goal. are we committing to back them in their effort to depose him? because that is their stated public goal. so, how do we square up this aumf potentially with that longer-term goal which our principal allies inside of syria would have. >> senator, this is isil

specific. there are those who wish it would include assad, but it doesn't. we are supporting the moderate opposition, directly, in the efforts focused on assad. the congress, and we're grateful for it, have approved for the program, $500 million, and that program is about to be up and running. in addition to that, there are other activities focused on the issue of assad. but specific to the aumf it is isil and it does not authorize activities against assad. >> but in strengthening the moderate syrians, whose goal is to remove assad, are we not at a

minimum, indirectly helping that goal to be achieved by potentially eliminating good thread of isil to that goal. are we contemplating as a result a longer stay in syria to accomplish that goal? >> when you say a stay in syria, we are not in syria. >> i mean our military support for taking out isil and strengthening the moderate syrians. >> we are committed to strengthening the moderate syrians, we are committed to other activities that are

specifically focused on the assad regime, but this authorization and the efforts to deal with isil are focused on degrading and destroying isil. that particular military activity, should that goal be accomplished, would then cease and desist. but the effort to support the moderate opposition will continue. obviously, if isis is eliminated and the moderate opposition has gained capacity as a consequence of that particular fight, they're going to be strengthened in their other activities, and we have made that argument openly and publicly. >> how long, in your opinion general, do you think is will take for assad to be removed? given his current state? general dempsey: two very different questions. the diplomatic line of effort is the primary line of effort

right now. i have not been asked to apply the military line of effort to remove assad. i would defer to others to how long it will take. the position of the united states is clear. he has given up the legitimacy of governing people he is oppressing. >> thank you. >> just to respond to senator markey and secretary kerry previous comment, i would like to ask anonymous consent to enter into the record a copy of congress.gov where senator kerry and senator obama cosponsored a bill to ensure that congress had a vote on the agreement that we reached with iraq. i understand that sometimes in this world where you stand is where you sit, but i would like

to balance out some of the discussion today and understand that positions change depending on what side of the table you are sitting on. >> if i may, mr. chairman, i was referring to the timing of the delivery of the letter, given the negotiations in which secretary kerry is now engaging in. i continue to believe it was an inappropriate document for the time in which it was delivered. it was not timely. >> thank you. >> thank you all for your service to the country. we appreciate your patience. i had a college professor who once said the mind can only absorb what the seat can endure. we hope we will not keep much longer. i have one question for secretary kerry. i'm not asking the question, i would like to thank you for your service. you do a great job for the american people and you have a job where the commander in chief -- any question i ask you, would

not be fair if it had the political connotation to it. secretary kerry, we have served together for a long time and you know this is really a political issue in part and has political overtones. i believe the senators' remarks about the need to come together as congress is important. here is what i want to ask you secretary kerry. the first president to ever mention radical islam was thomas jefferson. general dempsey has talked about this as an enduring conflict. he talked about it evolving regionally and being trans-regional. we know isil is in the maghrib. we have had attacks in paris and brussels. it is a growing threat. here is my question. if we had problems dating all the way back to thomas jefferson

and it is a growing regional threat, having a time limit does not make much sense to me. we have the united commitment to fight isil and defeat isil but as general dempsey has said, that is not the easiest definition to write into words. it is a combination of a number of things. on the term of enduring, i think it means not special forces but troops deployed. i understand that that would be something the president would like to come back to congress and get authorization for. wouldn't we be better off sending a clear signal that there is no end to this conflict we win the victory? >> thank you.

i appreciate it. you don't have to commit yourself on behalf of the administration. >> let me think you personally because i'm delighted he stayed on the committee. you gave up a couple of seats of seniority. i want to express my appreciation. i know you will be a strong voice for some of the things that always get paid attention to, particularly in africa. i don't think there's any doubt. i believe that the three years if they are accompanied by the vote that is necessary here and by the accompanying commitments