has partnered to learn about the history and literary life of tulsa, oklahoma. >> woody guthrie is best known for his writing of "this land is your land," but he is known for much more than that. he was an advocate for people who were disenfranchised. those people who were migrant workers from oklahoma, kansas and texas during the dustbowl era. he saw this vast difference between those who were the halves and the have-nots and became their spokesman through his music. he recorded few songs of his own. we have a listening station that features 46 of his songs. that's what makes the recordings that he did make so significant. >> ♪ this land is your land,

this land is my land, from california, to the new york island ♪ >> sunday afternoon at 2:00 on american history tv on c-span3. >> congress continues on its two-week recess, several members are traveling. nancy pelosi is in cambodia with a bipartisan delegation of members. the delegation visited the halo trust facility in cambodia. the delegation will travel to vietnam, korea and japan. john boehner is in the middle east. he met with iraq's prime minister. the speaker will travel to israel later this week. a press release says he and a delegation -- as the

deadline approaches tonight for an iranian nuclear agreement, we present a discussion about nuclear weapons, national security and the future of the bomb. posted by the panel discussion for the southern methodist university tower center for political studies and includes a former commander of u.s. strategic command. >> good evening. welcome to smu and the special forum on nuclear weapons. welcome also to the security and strategy program here at smu. the new initiative we started about a year ago which combines the study of national security with the study of grand strategy and strategy in war time. it features events that have scholars and practitioners in the same room to flesh out the discussion of really important and critical issues for international security. thanks first to our board

members. thank you for being with us tonight. nuclear weapons are in the news. you can't avoid them. if you turn on the tv, read the newspaper, you'll see stories ominous stories about nuclear weapons. a few weeks ago i opened the "new york times" and i found an op-ed ominously titled "north korea's nuclear expansion." and the story said, it quoted an administration official warning about north korea's reckless pursuit of a larger and larger nuclear program, but the op-ed went on to criticize the administration for doing too little to stop it. obviously the ongoing debate about iran and its nuclear ambitions is tied to a broader fear of proliferation in the middle east. "time" magazine this week, this monday had an article called "the middle east nuclear race is already under way." these stories aren't just about nuclear proliferation, the spread of nuclear arms.

they're also about strategies as in how might the countries use nuclear weapons to achieve their political objectives? reuters for instance on sunday had a scary story with the title "russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at denmark if it joins the nato shield." u.p.i. on tuesday, "russia demands removal of u.s. nuclear missiles from europe." meanwhile, "u.s. analysts, some u.s. analysts are calling for returning tactical nuclear weapons to europe ala 1980." all of this might feel a little peculiar and seem strange. after all, it wasn't long ago that foreign policy luminaries and national security luminaries were speaking openly about a world without nuclear weapons. it was only in 2007 that in the pages of "the wall street journal" an op-ed by george schultz, henry kissinger, sam nunn none of them starry-eyed

pacifists called openly for global disarmament. two years later the president gave a very stirring speech in prague in which he echoed their call and america's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. seems to be a bipartisan ks aggressive movement toward getting rid of these things. and yet that doesn't seem to be happening. if you read the news you're seeing stories of new nuclear powers, north korea, potentially iran. you're also seeing stories about the traditional great powers who are modernizing their arsenals, china, russia, and the united states. the united states nuclear modernization program is particularly interesting for our purposes tonight. it's not going to be cheap. the congressional budget office recently estimated that it's going to be on the order of $350 billion over the next decade alone. the economist magazine also had

a big story, big special issue on nuclear weapons a couple weeks ago. they summed it all up. quote, 25 years after the soviet collapse the world is entering a new nuclear age. nuclear strategy has become the cockpit of foes jostling with the five original nuclear weapons powers whose own dealings are infected by suspicion and rivalry. scary stuff. why are new nuclear powers acquiring weapons? why are traditional great powers modernizing their forces despite all the calls for disarmament and proliferation? put another way, what is the value of nuclear weapons? what is the strategic logic of acquiring and deploying these forces? how have leaders from the past thought about the relationship between nuclear weapons and national security? and how does it fit in today with our broader foreign policy programs?

i can't think of many better people to answer these questions than the two gentlemen seated with us today. professor francis gavin, the frank stanton share in nuclear facility policy it at m.i.t. before going to m.i.t. for a long time he was the professor of international affairs and director of the strauss center for international security and law at the university of texas. he writes widely on diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nuclear weapons and his latest book is called the nuclear state craft history and strategy in america's atomic age. to his right is general c. robert keeler of the air force who until recently was commander of the united states strategic command. in that role he was directly responsible to the secretary of defense and the presidents of the plans and operations of all u.s. forces conducting global strategic deterrents, nuclear alert, space, cyber space associated operations. after leaving the air force and leaving strategic command he went to stanford university

where he is currently the lead lecturer at the center for international security and cooperation. we'll have professor gavin speak for about 20 to 25 minutes turn over the floor to the general, and then open the floor to q & a. i'm sure there will be many questions. >> well, it is a real honor to return to one of my favorite places, the tower center, at smu. and to be on a panel with such a distinguished public servant and it is also a real pleasure to be here with my old friend and colleague josh rogner who has done an amazing job here as you all know with the security and strategy program here at smu and i think has really turned smu and the tower center into a go-to place for these conversations. i think we should all thank josh

for his amazing job. [applause] the history of the nuclear age is marked by a puzzle. thermonuclear weapons are monstrous, potentially civilization ending weapons whose use would be not only immoral and senseless but increasingly unthinkable. yet, we intuit it is the very destructiveness of the weapons that prevented the recurrence of great power wars since 1945. why? great power land wars have been the scurge of asia for 31 years before the united states dropped atomic weapons on hiroshima and nagasaki, wars that killed tens of millions on the battlefield and tens of

millions more through disease and political upheaval. 70 years ago most responsible people expected a third world war to follow the first and the second with consequences far worse than the first two. thankfully, that war never came and to misuse the title from a famous book it has led many people to proclaim, thank god for the atom bomb. did nuclear weapons prevent world war three and do these weapons have the intended effect of stabilizing world politics by making great power war unthinkable. this is the foundation of what we've come to call to terms and our whole way of thinking about newscast leer weapons is centered on this concept. much of united states national security policy has been driven for well over half a century by the idea that an attack upon the united states or i should add its allies might elicit a nuclear response even if our adversaries did not use nuclear weapons. and we've come to take this posture so for granted that we've long since forgotten how novel it is. or how unusual, given american history such as strategy is. think about it for a moment.

from the founding until 1950 the united states had entered no permanent alliances, was almost completely demobilized during peace time, pursued strategies that allowed it to be hit first and mobilize slowly and massively to win wars of attrition. that is how the united states fought war and planned strategy up until 1950. this strategy allowed for powerful civilian control over the military and strong legislative oversight over the executive branch in matters of war and peace while paving the way to relative isolation from world affairs. the nuclear revolution and the strategies the united states adopted to deal with it demanded something quite different. permanent alliances, forward military deployment, and an often preemptive military strategy that left enormous discretion in the hands of battle field commanders and permanently shifted the power to make war away from congress to the president. again, this strategy is premised on the idea that deterrence the promise of awful retribution

if attacked kept the united states relatively safe and the world relatively stable for decades. most importantly, it's widely believed it prevented thermonuclear war. but do we know this to be true? how can we be sure that thermonuclear weapons and the deterrence that flowed from them actually kept peace and stability? in fact, we cannot. the problem is that we're trying to understand something that thank god, never happened, and we hope will never happen. a thermonuclear war. we have an almost impossible time understanding the causes for things that did happen. as many unresolved arguments over what caused the first world war demonstrate. trying to understand why something didn't happen, why we did not have a thermal nuclear war is a methodological nightmare that eludes answer from even our most powerful and sophisticated social science methods. while the idea of nuclear deterrence is intuitively compelling one can imagine other explanations to the peace and stability

of world affairs after 1945. the scholar john mueller once argued nuclear weapons were unneeded to keep the peace. that the world had tired of war after two global con flag rations, that the overwhelming conventional might of the united states was enough to scare any possible rival and that great power war like slavery or dueling was a cultural practice that was increasingly seen as repulsive and not to be pursued. there are other explanations for the so-called long peace. for centuries, land for example had been the source of state power. but a variety of factors from massively increasing agricultural yields we arguably have too much food in the world, not too little which is historically unprecedented, to flatening demographic trends, to the development of post industrial technologically driven economies has made conquests too expensive. in other words, who needs land when it's far better to be singapore than the ukraine? which may not have been true in 1920. my point here is there's lots of other explanations from norms

and taboos to military factors to explain the absence of great power wars since 1945. the simple fact is we don't know what caused peace. now, for myself, i strongly believe nuclear deterrence made an enormous difference but i can't prove it. people will tell you they can but certainty on this question is impossible. now, why does this matter? there are two crucial trends as josh mentioned this introduction shaping the nuclear world, pulling in different directions, and how you assess them depends on how you think about the question of deterrence. the first is the so-called global zero movement which josh explained. the idea that the world should move toward eliminating nuclear weapons all together. this is actually officially an american aspiration laid out by president obama in his 2009 prague speech though presidents as diverse as jimmy carter and ronald reagan also shared this goal.

the other strand reveals that nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in world politics. we all know about the current tense negotiation over iran's nuclear program. less well known is the significant expansion and modernization of the nuclear programs of russia, china, and pakistan. the united states is also going through a multi billion dollar modernization program as josh mentioned. so one strand moves the world toward delegitimizing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. the other strand pulls in the opposite direction highlighting the importance to states of nuclear weapons for achieving their national security and foreign policy objectives. which is correct? these world views and the policies that flow from them are enormously consequential and we need to vigorously argue and debate over them. the debate must recognize, however, that the answer to the most important question, the one that matters more than any policy question in the world today, how

to avoid a nuclear war, will never be known with certainty. we must be both rigorous and humble as we explore these issues. of course the right course also turns on a number of other important questions from the past. questions as elusive as they are consequential. i'm a historian and historians love to deal in puzzles. i want to present three of them very briefly. and depending on how you think about these puzzles, how you answer them, how you understand the past, will help shape how you think about contemporary future nuclear dilemmas and choices. they should also get the fundamental questions surrounding nuclear weapons, deterrence, peace, and stability. the first important question how close did we come to thermonuclear war during the cold war? now, there's at least three ways to look at this. first, through the course of the cold war did nuclear weapons and the strategies the super

powers employed make great power war in a nuclear exchange more or less likely? second, how did nuclear weapons affect their behavior and the risk of nuclear war during sharp political crises? in other words, did nuclear weapons make crises more or less likely? was it harder or easier to exit without the risk of war? how high were the risks of an accidental nuclear launch or accident? now, on this question nuclear weapons clearly had contradictory effects. the fears and horrors of thermonuclear war no doubt gave leaders pause during stable times and during crises. one can't read this history without some feeling of terror. the recent book "command and control" joins others in highlighting the mistakes, accidents, and near misses that plagued nuclear management on both sides of the cold war.

reading documents from both sides of the cold war from 1958 to 1961 berlin crisis, 1962 cuban missile crisis, or the set of challenges during the 1983 nato archer exercise give one pause. perhaps more importantly, the most important and dangerous crises of the cold war were generated by the very existence of nuclear weapons. in other words if one tried the counterfactual of a world without nuclear weapons for example the cuban missile crisis makes no sense. even the crisis over west berlin from 1958 to 1961 if it were as we now believe initiated by the soviet union's anger over the united states moving to arm west germany with nuclear weapons, is nuclear to the core. the crisis of the euro missiles in the 1970's. the soviet fear of a nato first

strike in the early 1980's. it is hard to create a counterfactual where these occur in a nonnuclear world. could it be that in a nonnuclear cold war the united states and the soviet union and nato in the warsaw pact balance each other perfectly, grudgingly accepting each other's fear of influence and avoiding major crises? who knows? but it's a scenario at least worth thinking about. the second important question, why do states pursue nuclear weapons and why have far fewer pursued them than anyone would have predicted in, say 1965 or 1995? is the less nuclearized world than we expected a product of the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty? remember the 1960's people predicted 20, 30, 40 nuclear weapons states by the start of the 21st century. is this low number or relatively low number because of an emerging norm even taboo against the use of and possession of nuclear weapons? is it because of a demand of

being an open, politically liberal capitalistic state conflict with the goals of acquiring nuclear weapons as a scholar has claimed? or has it been american nuclear nonproliferation efforts everything from norms to treaties to threats to sanctions to even considering preventative military strikes to sprawling alliances and security agreements around the world? has that been the key factor keeping the number of nuclear weapons states in the single digits? again, we don't know. we can't be sure. but there's lots of argument. the one interesting surprise that will point out in the historical record is the united states went to great lengths greater lengths than we perhaps realized in the past, to keep its friends and allies nonnuclear than it did even its enemies. countries ranging from west germany to japan to south korea and australia and italy and sweden the list goes on and on. in fact it showed a willingness to work with its adversary the soviet union against its allies to accomplish the same.

the third important question is an age-old one. how much is enough? in other words, what are the force and strategy requirements for nuclear deterrence? are they different than the requirements for assuring allies? and can state achieve meaningful nuclear superiority? if so, what are the benefits of achieving such primacy? this is a complex question but during the cold war there were two leading views. many of the academic and think tank analysts, renowned thinkers like bernard brody, robert jere vice, and ken waltz, believed once the state possessed surviveable nuclear forces enough nuclear weapons that even an attack upon them allowed them to unleash unacceptable damage on the enemy, that once you achieved that state there was really no point in building more forces. strategic stability was then achieved.

and building more, larger, or more accurate strategic nuclear forces or spending money on things like missile defense was a way to potentially destable ize. many americans did not seem to accept this and the united states continued after the 1972 strategic arms treaty and antiballistic missile treaty to seek faster, more accurate stealthier nuclear forces. multi billion dollar programs like the exeeper, b 1 and b 2, cruz missiles, per shalling 2, upgrades, missile defense, and massive investments in antisubmarine warfare, all systems by the way oriented toward counterforce and if one follows the logic of such systems potential first use revealed the united states sought nuclear superiority.

what did they think they were getting for this massive investment, for these systems that arguably at least according to some analysts undermine strategic stability? and did they get what they sought? there is by the way a limited but quite revealing bit of evidence that the soviet side understood that the americans were trying to acquire meaningful superiority in the 1970's and 1980's based upon capabilities russia neither had the technology nor the economic resources to match and it worried them quite a bit. which is an interesting contrast by the way to what appears to be a much different attitude in china today where despite an increasingly vigorous foreign policy and military expansion, based upon an impressive economic and technological base, the people's republic of china seems relatively sanguine about being on the shortened of the nuclear blavents united states. answering these three questions would go a long way toward helping us navigate the nuclear choices we have in front of us that josh so eloquently laid out. now i wish i could provide you

with concrete answers to these and other important puzzles but historians traffic in uncertainty and context and they are far better at asking hard questions and throwing cold water on those that would provide easy answers. which is probably why i don't get invited to more terrific events like this. it's hard to get excited by a speaker whose conclusions are, it's complicated, or it all depends, or we can't really know. that said, i do look forward to discussing these and any other questions you have and hearing from my distinguished fellow panelists. thank you very much. [applause] gen. kehler: i'm going paperless tonight. my screen has gone blank so give me a moment. let me see if i can make this do something it was supposed to do.

there we go. i can say something now. thanks for inviting me to the tower center. this is a big honor for me. i always enjoy coming to panel discussions like this, particularly when the audience is filled with a mixture of people like tonight. including a fair number of undergraduates. i'm gratified to see so many undergraduates because i think these issues in particular, well it used to get discussed in many places through the cold war, at the end there was a tendency to not talk about these issues. the conversations we have now are long overdue. it is the first time i have visited smu. it is a very beautiful campus. i walked around today. i wish i could spend more time here. i promise i will come back at some point and walk around and get to see some of the things you guys have told me about. i'm pleased to be on stage with

the professor. i'm fascinated by his review of the u.s. arsenal and the questions that he posed and the puzzles that he talked about are spot on. the a very interesting conversations and necessary. i might yield a little bit of a bucket of cold water myself because i will speak with a little more certainty, but i will say i think he raises fair points about how certain we can be about some of our tried and true assumptions related to nuclear weapons and deterrents. as you heard, i served for almost 39 years in uniform. much associated with the strategic forces so the opinions you would hear from me are mine and they will have a military flavor to them.

as you heard, i will take a minute and i will piggyback on what professor gavin said. i think his points bear repeating. let me do it with a little bit of my own military slant. no question about it -- nuclear weapons have occupied a unique space since august of 1945. i would assert while nuclear weapons were conceived to win a war, shortly after their use they became a critical tool to prevent a war. in my humble view, that was there great value and remains that value today. we can debate how certain we can be that is what had happened but i think there is some evidence that would suggest that, in fact, nuclear weapons have been war preventing weapons. why? obviously, nuclear weapons are unprecedented with their potential to inflict enormous disruption over a very short

time with long-term physical and psychological. they were woven into the fabric of our national security strategy and is the ultimate guarantor of our security and our allies. nuclear superiority became an affordable mean to compensate for conventional inferiority for the united states and its allies in during the cold war, if you recall. many of you don't. more on that later. but, if you ever read anything about the cold war, there was a large conventional inferiority on the part of nato vis-a-vis the warsaw pact. the ground forces in particular. deterrent was the objective of having nuclear weapons. the policies, strategies and employment plans were designed

to convince adversaries and they would not achieve their goals by attacking us. that is the benefit of deterrence. or they would pay too high of a price. nuclear deterrence fit with the cold war strategy of containment. to be sure, nuclear weapons the not eliminate all conflicts or will they ever, but the threat of nuclear war imposed limits, compelled caution and forced leaders to stop and ponder the consequences of escalation before they acted. i think the evidence of this is clear in korea, berlin, vietnam, the middle east and elsewhere. the notion of war between the major powers change in august of 1945. while i do not believe we entered a long time of peace that is what we have seen certainly -- the world has not seen a hot war between the major powers since august of 1945.

it would be speculation for sure just that i completely agree with professor gavin on that point. it is speculation to say because of nuclear weapons, but i look prior to 1945 when conventional deterrence was attempted by the great powers, whether that was the great white fleet, battleship building, whatever the form it took never lasted. the world found itself in large global conflicts that were increasingly violent and deadly as time passed. but, so i would argue from my perspective nuclear deterrence worked. but, there are some interesting questions about that and today some people would say well, ok it worked then, that was then. the conditions no longer exist

today. the weapons create more risk than benefit to our national security. i don't think that is true. let me take a couple of minutes to explain why i think that is true. for those of us that served in the cold war, it does not seem like very much time has passed. yet, an entire generation of men and women have served in the u.s. armed forces since the cold war ended. some have completed an entire 20 year career. actually, 24 years if you count 1991 as the end of the cold war. for the last 10 to 15 years or so while i was still on active duty, i would occasionally use a cold war example to describe something to the younger troops. i would get a blank stare in return. an army friend of mine is part of this recent return some u.s. ground forces the europe as a demonstration of the fact we could reinforce nato if we had to. there were famous examples of that during the cold war -- they were called reforger exercises.

a colleague of mine said he was talking to his troops just like it was reforging and they looked at him like a grandpa. the cold war has been over for a long time. i believe we know it. today's men and women often use weapons designed and built during the cold war, but their experience is shaped by iraq and afghanistan and libya and kosovo and against violent extremists not a face-off between the iron curtain and central europe with the threat of a large-scale nuclear war. for me, the war ended in september of 1991. i was in command of a unit on the day when president george h.w. bush ordered all of our nuclear bombers and their supporting tankers and half of our intercontinental ballistic missiles off of cold war alert status.

in short order, he implemented other initiatives that have dramatic effects on u.s. posture and stockpile as well. yes, we still retained a nuclear deterrent force, ballistic missiles and intercontinental missiles on alert. for those of us in the field the cold war was over. while we had hoped for long periods of peace dividend, the 21st century has brought new challenges. today's threats are more complex than the existential threat posed by the soviet union in the 20th century. today's threat include hybrid combinations of strategy tactics and capabilities. they included nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, traditional conventional and nonconventional weapons that can be wielded by state and nonstate actors alike. uncertainty and complexity dominate the global security landscape today. violent extremism is the most

likely threat the u.s. faces. the most dire threat is an extremist with a nuclear weapon. but, that is not the only threat we face. adversaries and potential adversaries continue to pursue capabilities, conduct strategic attacks against the u.s. and the allies as a main component of their security strategies. such attacks are defined by their affect and not the weapon used. it could involve nuclear or conventional kinetic or non-kinetic weapons. such attacks could arrive at our doorsteps through space or cyberspace or even in a non-traditional way. i would argue the attacks of 9/11 were strategic attacks on the united states. while the likelihood of a massive nuclear attack on the u.s. has receded thankfully, russia, china and north korea all have the capability to inflict terrible casualties and damage on the u.s. and our

allies over the course of several hours with nuclear weapons. russia and china are pursuing aggressive modernization. senior russian leaders have recently restated their commitment to their own nuclear deterrence. i have been a bit surprised by the amount of nuclear saber rattling the russians have been doing. nuclear weapons formed the basis of deterrence in india and pakistan. north korea openly advertises its possession of nuclear weapons and works on ballistic missiles that will deliver them against the regional allies and the united states itself and overtly threatened to use them as a most famously did back in 2013. as you see in the press, negotiations continue with iran and the outcome remains to be seen. others to include some of our allies can acquire nuclear weapons depending on the behavior of their neighbors.

there is a simple reason why many of our adversaries and potential adversaries see nuclear weapons as essential to their security. after watching the u.s. project power along the globe for the last 20 years, these and other potential adversaries are looking to compel the u.s. to restrain its action or in a crisis or conflict, to restrict our options and intimidate our allies and partners through the threat of escalation, possibly to nuclear use. it is the cold war in reverse. other threatening nuclear use for u.s. superiority. i don't see a world without nuclear weapons on the horizon anytime soon, something president obama acknowledged. while strategic attack the 21st century could take many forms, a nuclear attack on the u.s. or our allies remains absolutely the worst case scenario. therefore, deterring strategic attack, including nuclear attack, must remain the number

one priority for the department of defense. 21st century deterrence concepts still sound familiar. deny benefits and impose costs and a range of options for the president to use as needed in a conflict. the commitment to insure our allies and partners by extending our umbrella to them. how we apply those concepts in the 21st century is very different. 21st century deterrence must be tailored to a wide variety of actors and scenarios. one size can no longer fit all. 21st century determines demands the flexible application of the full range of complementary military capability. strong conventional forces missile defenses, brazilian space and cyberspace capabilities, effective command and control and the ultimate possibility of a u.s. nuclear response in extreme

circumstances for vital national interests. we no longer have to threaten nuclear use to compensate for conventional inferiority, but no combination of conventional, kinetic or cyber capabilities can hold of that risk. no combination with the same risks of long-term and short-term effects of nuclear weapons. in a future conflict, nuclear options will provide the president with the ability to hold the enemy's most critical assets at risk, compel the enemy to consider the consequences of his actions in ways no conventional weapon can do and prevent the enemy from escalating by threatening us with nuclear attack. our allies and partners will rely on the security guarantee our nuclear forces provide as well. from my point of view, absent some unforeseen change or until a suitable replacement comes

along, nuclear weapons will contribute to our national security and the security of our allies for quite some time and they will do that by providing the president with options. underwriting our freedom of actions and compelling the adversary. they may be fewer in numbers they certainly need to be focused on her highest strategic deterrence needs. they need to be woven into a doctrine that contemplates their use in extreme circumstances where our vital national security interests are at stake. it must be seen as a tool in an expanded kit of options that include conventional and non-kinetic weapons. they must be under the strictest possible control of the president of the united states. they must be modern and sustainable. this is the dilemma -- i used to get asked this question while testifying on the hill and i would say we happened to be in the worst place at a bad time.

we find ourselves in need of modernization of our nuclear arsenal at the very time budgets are declining. we have weapons of that still play a vital role in our national security. others are modernizing their arsenals. our deterrent to include the stockpile of delivery systems and communication systems has reached a critical point in sustainment and modernization. many of the weapons and other industrial-based things that we have today were really acquired during the reagan defense buildup and are over 30 years old. the newest b-52's were built in the 1960's. i flew in a kc135 tanker some years ago. two youngsters, two captains in the front. they were youngsters compared to

everybody else on the airplane. i said to them -- we were doing that thing that generals do. we were flying somewhere over the world in the middle of the night and it was quiet and cold. i went forward into the cockpit and chatted. i was chatting them up and they were doing what young crew members do -- pretending like they were interested. [laughter] i asked one of them -- when did you come to active duty -- to make a long story short, the airplane we were flying in was made long before he was born. i didn't feel -- it didn't bother me a whole lot. you get to some point where the system has to be modernized and upgraded and we are there. i think it was really well outlined in 2010 where it was clear about our need to sustain and modernize our deterrent systems, including the weapons and delivery platforms and command and control support. we ought to retain the triad of

nuclear forces. i'm happy to talk about that in the questions and answers. we should maintain a modern infrastructure and maintain a highly capable workforce. some of you need to become a part of that workforce whether you are working on policies or associated with it or the engineering -- we need you. we need to pursue a viable hedge strategy that reduces the overall number of weapons while assuring the reliability of the individual weapons are high. clarity, consensus and visual commitment are needed from the top down and need to be aligned with the relevance and assurance of 21st century concepts. so, let me say in conclusion, i think our nuclear deterrent has served us very well since august of 1945 and i think it will continue to play a vital role in our national security for a long time. thank you again for inviting me and a look forward to your questions. thank you. [applause]

mr. avey: we will do the q&a. i will take the privilege of asking the first question. i think we have a microphone going around. i would like to ask a question to both of you. first, professor gavin -- you make a plea for humility. a hard question to answer. we have a room full of people want to know so how do you approach this subject? you do this for a living. you studied this issue deeply. how did you start to answer what is essentially an unanswerable question? for general kehler, i was taken with your description of the changes from the cold war and the present security environment. the world has seemed to become

more complex, a greater variety of threats and instruments. you also said nuclear weapons would only be used in extreme circumstances against military style targets when they are a vital national security interest. that suggests to me that nuclear weapons are still reserved for great powers who can do the united states grave danger. if i am right and the conditions for use are that narrowly constrained then why don't we look for the cold war for lessons rather than trying to craft new strategies of deterrence? mr. gavin: that is a terrific question. i certainly -- humility should not necessarily discourage somebody from curiosity. that is the first thing i say to all my students. my attitude towards this developed because as i started learning about these questions

when i was their age -- i was an undergraduate at the university of chicago, taking classes called things like strategies and armed control. the sort of very learned materials we read were from great scholars and thinkers that come from places like rand and important universities. used incredibly sophisticated methods like game. to sort of explain what they thought should have happened given the consequences of the nuclear revolution. as i became a historian and look at records, i was surprised and stunned and humbled to find the gap between what the theorists thought should have happened and what policymakers actually did and how they wrestled with these

questions. you take an extreme example -- someone like thomas schelling, perhaps one of the most brilliant strategists of the nuclear age, the father of nuclear strategy. someone whose writings were at the core of our understanding of deterrence, the manipulation of risk. the way he described how policymakers should think about it in terms of how they should assess risks seemed completely different than the way policymakers thought about it. there was an example of a paper he wrote about during the berlin crisis where he essentially suggested the problem with nuclear weapons, you need to credibly show you can use them so one thing a president can do in a crisis was the fire one shot somewhere in the middle of the ukraine or russia to show the soviets we meant business.

you get the impression this document was circulated around. no person in the right mind would ever think this way. the logic of nuclear weapons the level of responsibility of using them -- you will not do a demonstration shot. what struck me was there is this gap between the way strategists and intellectuals thought about this question and the way many day-to-day diplomacy and crises and management of international relations intersected. they were much different. in fact, a few things became clear -- there was not one president with the possible exception of nixon. they found the burden of responsability terrible. they understood the deterrence.

there was this palpable sense of responsibility but that it was beyond the thinking. that is not the way we learn about this. there were a series of things like that that may be realize it was one thing to talk about these things theoretically. it is quite another to talk about them as the president is thinking about using them. one of the best places you can get is listening to the presidential tapes, the kennedy tapes during the cuban missile crisis and afterwards. one gets the sense of the loneliness of president kennedy having to make this decision and how unhelpful much of the information he was getting.

that is not to say there are not smart things that cannot be helpful. i think many people that write on the subject, bomb iran, don't bomb iran, speak with a certainty that has no justification in historical record. that does not mean they were necessarily right but i think more humility would lead to a little more nuanced thinking on questions of extraordinary importance. gen. kehler: before i answer the question, let me piggyback with professor gavin here. military people do not like them either. i think this is not about liking the weapons. this is about, at least, it has always been for me -- it is not about liking them, it is about understanding the world we live in has them and they have national security implications

for us. therefore, we've learned how to do with them which does lead to the question so what does that mean now? i think it is a bit of the chicken and the egg discussion to say the cold war shaped nuclear weapons and vice versa. that is the old -- somebody one said good hitting defeats good pitching and vice versa. there is something to that here as well. i do believe that the way we talk about them, the way our employment policies were written and disclosed, i think the evolution of massive retaliation to flexible response. all of those things happened were uniquely suited to the cold war. and, as i tried to make the

point, this is no longer a cold war world. so, i'm always a little bit leery when we tried to make it like the cold war. so, i think an understanding of what deterrence means in the 21st century is how we should use nuclear weapons -- a friend of mine says that i have read military friends that say we have never used them and in others you say we use it everyday. i come down on that side of the fence. i believe we use our weapons every single day. but, when we had the cold war with the soviet union, we viewed that as a monolith.

we believed we understood how they made decisions. we believed we understood who made those decisions. therefore, when we were trying to construct deterrence strategies, we thought we knew who we were trying to influence and what mattered to them. we need that kind of understanding for a far broader range of adversaries now or potential adversaries. who makes decisions in some of the places with the greatest unrest is? how do you deter them? what combination of things would deter them and how would nuclear weapons play in that combination? i think that is a different way of approaching our nuclear deterrent in the 21st century. it places great difficulty with the intelligence community because if you go to the intelligence community and say i need to know who makes decisions in this place over here and how they make them and what they value the most, that is a tough problem. it took us a long time to figure that out with the soviet union.

be careful about talking with any certainty on any of these subjects. i believe that we have got to understand the world we are in now. this is a very different international security environment that we have faced in the last century. in fact, the compelling security problems of the last century -- imperialism, fascism, nazism communism -- have largely been relegated to the history books. some of it echoes a little bit but largely that is relegated to the history books. we have a different world today. to assume that we would be structuring our nuclear deterrent the same way we did during the cold war, i think it is a big mistake. understanding this notion of tailored deterrence, what combination of factors will be the most effective in deterring any given country and then understanding that yes, u.s. policy is that we will only

consider using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances when vital national security interests are a stake. does that limit the other nuclear powers provided in the nuclear posture review of 2010? but, by the way, i think that is a worthy goal -- deterring nuclear use by those who have them. i think that is a worthy goal because we are -- sometimes we talk about the an enormous destructive potential in any individual -- one of our individual ballistic missile submarines -- unleashing the equivalent of world war ii out of one platform. that is only half of the description. the other half is you can do it in 30 minutes. these weapons are unlike any other weapons we have. as long as we have them, my view is we better understand how they

fit in a grand strategy of deterrence that has to be tailored to individual actors in today's world. mr. avey: we have time for q&a. we have the microphone going out. >> thank you. i really enjoyed the presentation. to follow a bit of what you just said, you look at deterrence from the standpoint of america's natural -- national interests. if you were president rouhani would you accept the standpoint -- how would you evaluate the

nuclear posture, the potential usage, assuming they would not want a strike on israel which would lead to the mutual destruction that would follow? >> a complicated question, mr. investor. i demand easier questions. [laughter] -- mr. ambassador. i do not think i can speculate on what the iranians would say. i have read in the press that they said they have considered acquiring them for their own national security interests. i don't know that they have made that decision, whether or not to acquire them. my left the inside conversations a little over a year ago, i thought they had not made their decision yet.

i don't know what they would say, exactly. i can tell you what others have said. the russians have been clear that they see their nuclear deterrence as offsetting not only our nuclear arsenal but our conventional to build these as well. -- capabilities as well. they have written about it publicly since desert storm. but we were able to do conventionally. they call it the reconnaissance strike complex. this marriage of satellites and aircraft and other things that resulted in precision strikes. countries will pursue these weapons or retain them for their own national security interests. that is part of our deterrence, "to understand what those reasons are -- "able to understand what those reasons are. >> thank you for coming.

i was very interested -- one thing that has been bothering me , the terrorism content we now have pa. terrorism as a policy now that we see. we have always thought nobody would get on a plane and blow it up because they would die. now come we see that is not always true. how do you factor that in with deterrence? they know if they bomb us, we will bomb back. they don't care. >> a great question. it gets to the credibility of your current -- your deterrent.

one of the reasons we have taken the position that says that nuclear weapons need to be only one twill in a deterrent to a kid -- one tool in a deterrent to ol kit -- how does our nuclear deterrence work today in the context of those kinds of threats and the emergence of some very sophisticated conventional capabilities and perhaps nongenetic capabilities as time passes here? how do we put those pieces together to put a critical question for us. there is not a great deal of certainty here. there is uncertainty associated with all of this. i will say that the threat of

violent extremists with a nuclear weapon has been taken very seriously. you can look at the nuclear posturing and other policy documents from several administrations that talk about elevating that to the top of the agenda. that drives the nonproliferation and counter proliferation i think arms control is at least attached to that in some way, in terms of securing nuclear material, and we take that challenge seriously. how we put the right mixture of deterrence factors together and capabilities is a very good question and one that has caused a lot of my colleagues a to lose their sleep. >> i would like to piggyback off of that question and ask you

both to comment on the likelihood of a nonstate actor or terrorists actually getting a hold of nuclear material and how they might do that and if that is likely. i guess my question would be can you talk about some of the regimes and how they would act with that kind of material? where might we be worried that nonstate actors and terrorists could obtain this? prof. gavin: it strikes me, and what general kehler says is absolutely right, and is is from the outside as an absolute success. it is obviously a great concern since the cold war and after the september 11 attacks, and it is striking, at least to an outsider, how many in national

-- international security initiatives, how much cooperation there has been on the international front to deal with this absolutely critical issue. i do think there was a period of time after 9/11 when perhaps the threat was overstated, and i think partially the threat was overstated, and partially there has been a policy in the intelligence international cooperation that clearly has to be the most important thing that you have to worry about. the obvious places and problems that you would worry about would be north korea selling things, pakistan collapsing, and is striking that the kinds of things we thought about 20 years ago, the initiatives seem to have done a very good job at making this far less than

of a concern, but certainly i imagine this would be a priority of any administration. general: i agree. this is probably a double negative. this will never not be a concern. gen. kehler: this is one of the things that the academic policy divide is at its greatest . if you talk to any policymaker, there are few that you run into that don't say this is on the top of their list of things to worry about. if you go to an academic conference, most of my colleagues and josh bosch colleagues says this is not a likely event, and certainly the risks are lower than they were during the cold war, but i have

come to the conclusion that that is not really helping very much if you are a policymaker, even if it is a low probability, the consequences are so catastrophic and unthinkable, but you still have to spend an enormous amount of time thinking about it and worrying about it. general kehler: that's absolutely right. the risk is so great that we cannot ever take that from its right place. a lot of work has been done, and is going on now there are a lot of people who get up every day and get up worrying about this problem, and rightfully so. it is one that i do not believe we can ever take our focus off of for one minute. >> it seems like in a conversation you know, the public briefing with the

russians, the russian threat. if you could reference, how likely is it that they use nuclear weapons? [indiscernible] gen. kehler: a deadly in. if you go back, i want to say was released in 2012, although i may have the date wrong, every president sometime during their term issued this new guidance to the military about how we would employ nuclear weapons. there was an unclassified fact sheet released and a report to

congress. congress asked for an unclassified report and there was one, as a result of present obama's nuclear guidance. in the unclassified realm, it is specifically mention, this possibility or potential for small limited uses as part of a regional conflict. it is a planning problem that the military has to deal with. it is one that also occupies a lot of deterrence -- deterrent thinking. specifically in my command, and regional commands as well. there is a lot of thought that goes into how we will never get to that point. how we can make sure to manage a crisis so that that eventuality does not become attracted. at the end of the day, this is really about the train that kind of use, and making sure that we understand what would

compelling adversary. how can we put the right combination of deterrent tools together to make sure that does not happen. yes, it is a planning problem for us. something, again, the report from congress said that was a possibility. that the likelihood of a massive exchange had receded, but we still had to be prepared for that as well because of the deterrence aspects about that. we have heard the russians talk about their new doctrine, and part of that is that perhaps we should use nuclear weapons early , instead of rather than late. >> [indiscernible] gen. kehler: no, i would not want to speculate on that. other than i would say, i think my job certainly as head of strategic command is to make

sure the president has options. >> i was wondering if -- you said so much on the war and on terror, how close are we to terrorist attacks? we are spending more on the war on terror than anything else. gen. kehler: you asked another very difficult question and is about priorities. you know, again, the statistics of whether or not we will be the subject of a terrorist attack is only part of the story. the issue is that when it occurs, we have people who are killed or injured. look at the boston marathon as an example. it is a terrible event. a terrible tragedy.

doing everything we can possibly do to make sure that doesn't happen, i think it belongs in the top priority where it is. however, it is not the only party that we have to worry about, or the only national security priority that we have to be concerned about. certainly, you have seen in the press in the last several days where congress is debating this very issue in the budget debate that they are having about the department of defense and whether to exceed the budget cap amounts, etc.. this is the ongoing question right now, the need to do many things at once and the question is how do we pay for that, while we still maintain our economic strength. it is a very tough problem. >> i would like to pose a

question which is it seems that we should just worry about the position nuclear weapons and not the -- that we have to worry about the use of that nuclear weapon, and not the position. prof. gavin: that is an interesting question. most of our academic studies focus on proliferation once these weapons are out, and who wants them. tvery rarely is it the question of what people will do when they have them. as you know, there's a lot of argument about this. nuclear weapons are not very

good at getting defense. you can't take territory with them. they are very bad offensive weapons. they are defensive weapons. therefore, when a state wants them, typically, so the argument goes, would be to prevent others from interfering in their lives. if that were the argument, then someone might say, well i don't really have to worry about them that much. some states might want to prevent the united states from interfering in their business. i think that some analysts say that this is one way of looking at this. another way of looking at this is saying, no, in fact, nuclear weapons might embolden leaders. they might encourage them to engage in blackmail, to manipulate the inherent uncertainty of the situation.

one of the things, as i look back, to the late 50's was that there were far fewer weapons in the united states. if one looks closely the calculation was that the united states would be responsible and back down. using nuclear weapons is so terrifying. leaving nuclear weapons in certain hands, you can people's responsibility to get what you want. this is something that congressman shelley pointed out. he thought that they would get the united states to back down and get berlin, and then his advisers that, what if they don't? that is absolutely terrifying. there are two completely different arguments here, and

how you answer that. i think, again, it depends on the state in question. it is fairly clear that if your state like france, a status quo power, you have nuclear weapons and probably want them for your own deterrent purposes. sweden wanted them. that is white -- why australia one of them. but there are other countries like north korea, and it is clear that they just want them for deterrent purposes. this debate centers around iran. if you think iran just wants them for deterrent purposes, then we would prefer them to have them, but that is not the -- prefer them to not have them but that is not the end of the world. if they have them, with the behavior like -- and would they

behave more like khrushchev or like north korea? you are absolutely right though, i think these things are used even when they are not used. whether they are used for purposes of blackmail, coercion, is what makes him so terrifying. >> i have a couple of questions. my first is a follow-up to a question. you mentioned the boston bombing. how would nuclear weapons deter acts such as the boston marathon bombing? is my first question. my second question is you are speaking about the importance of holding up our nuclear arsenal and modernizing it, how can we do that without setting off a new arms race? gen. kehler: i will take a stab

at both of those. i think it is a stretch to suggest that nuclear weapons would deter someone, who is going to do some they like the boston bombing. in the tway first century, with a variety security situations that we face, i think understanding how nuclear weapons play in our overall deterrence calculation is very important. there's a lot of work that still needs to be done in that regard. we find is also in this very interesting, challenging, may be unique time in world history regarding national security. i think it is hard to know though, sometimes, who is deterred from doing what by what?

i think that it's hard to know perhaps, let's put it that way, taking a play from professor gavin from earlier, it is hard to know where they're these nuclear weapons do play a factor. there are some places where they probably do, in this new security environment, beyond just the traditional sense that we have had. i think that requires a lot of academic work, to tell you the truth. i have made that appeal before at academic institutions like this, and i think that is one of the reasons that i have wanted to come, is to stimulate conversation in places like this, and you will take this and have these conversations and look at this with an academic sense and it is very valuable and i think very necessary. in the second question regarding the arms race, i did we are in a different position. it does not mean you cannot have another nuclear arms race somehow, and i am disturbed when

parties say they are going to walk away from treaties. i think the inf treaty, in my view, this is my personal view i think the arms control treaties, because they have been done in a mutual way and they have been largely verifiable, i think they have enhanced our security. and so, i am in favor of enhancing our security in whatever way we can do, and i think arms control has a piece of that, and so i think it is a little bit of a different environment today than we were in the cold war, but modernization, in and of itself, does not, in my view, stimulate a new arms race. we are doing that modernization within a box these days. we have a policy box that we are operating in that needs to be self-imposed, and that policy box describes how we will go about doing life extensions on

our existing weapons, not build new weapons, but rely on existing weapons, and i think because we are in the new start era, we have a box in which we have limits and numbers that we can't exceed, and i think that puts another layer of control, if you will, in the arms race. i think the economic limiters could factor into what we do but in the three points of the strategic triad, we can see that a nuclear submarine would not be saved to put in the ocean. submarine tubes can only go up so many times and then you have to build a new tube. that is the way it works. i am not a navy guy and i am not

a naval architect, by believe them when they say that. regarding the bombers, the idea for a replacement bomber is actually more of a dual capable platform. the kind of platform that we would use in the conventional sense. like we have used the b-52's, we used them as a conventional bomber, and that is how we see the conventional world out there, and that just a need for a long range, penetrating platform. i think the dual capable nature of the bomber, we will need up bomber even if we say for some reason it won't be nuclear. we will need up bomber because of the range payload, distances we have to be concerned about. this leads us to the icbms.

i think we still get a benefit out of the icbm force. a great benefit of modernizing their is also important. we are in a need to invest while we are facing declining budgets. i'm glad i'm not in the decision making process any more dev. >> i want to zoom out. keeping in mind that -- can you hear me? gen. kehler: i can see you now. bama hello. terrorism, a lot of it can be routed from remnants of the cold war in afghanistan, and be able to recruit a lot of the guys.

i said to give up the u.s. being one of the largest arms exporters, and being one of the largest arms transporters, and where these stockpiles are taken, and then, i start thinking about, you know, how much does corporatism influence policy? to an increasing amount, i would say. i would like to know either or both of your reactions, and if it is feasible to limit our exporting as far as getting these corporations to get these out here, and as far as the frustration and experience of the members of a critically larger construct, what is your response to that, and we can take it whichever way. gen. kehler: that is such a great question.

a great question for a professor. [laughter] prof. gavin: and i would say that is a great question for a general. there are two separate questions. there is the first part, and that is the discussion of corporate interest in u.s. national policy, and this is one of the subjects that i think i find almost no evidence that any major national security decision was influenced by the desire to make money or to satisfy a corporation, and i think this is one of the great mythologies of foreign policy, so i would be open to it if i saw one of the documents, but i think i have been struck, and i does not -- it does not mean that mistakes can't be made or even things that get downright morally problematic, but i have had very little example of national security leaders of saying well, in an ideal world we would not do this, that lockheed martin wants us to do this, so

we had better. i have never seen documents about this, so it is kind of you know, a pleasant trotsky -esque trope, but i don't think it exists. i think that one of the many tools regarding national security decision-makers is to have and provide arms and weapons and support to their allies and at times, those arms have gotten and been used, perhaps not for the test purposes or have fallen into the bad hands of others. i think, it is completely legitimate to critique on a case-by-case basis whether or not those arms exports policies

had been affected and wise. i think there are cases when it has been and when it hasn't been. at the time, it appeared wise and was probably an important policy countering the soviet union in afghanistan. i think people thought it was wise of the time. it had unintended consequences, most policies have unintended consequences. you can assess it based on that. i would separate those two issues out. >> i was hoping that you could expand on the knowing the enemy and parallel that to our current status, or any application of

big data and national security. if you could talk a little bit about that in terms of our modern enemy, and potentially the space race going on and modernization of weapons. prof. gavin: that is yours general. gen. kehler: there is no question that -- first of all let me separate deterrence. they are related, but deterrence is about an adversary. assurances not an ally. we use those in the same sentence, but they are not the same thing, really. what assures an ally may or may not did and adversary. what deters and adversary, may or may not deter an ally. we have to mindful of both of those needs. when we are structuring our force when we are dealing with all kinds of factors like going to our cap relations.

this second thing i would say is that there is no question in my mind that this notion of what some have called tailored deterrence, where you looking specifically adversary light adversary, or actor by actor you pick your way to describe who you're trying to deter. to really have some kind of confidence about how to go about it requires a deep understanding of who they are how they think, what they do how they decide, who decides although the things that go with it. we did not know it right away in the cold war about the soviet union, that took a long time. i think this is an equal challenge for the intelligence community today. they have some tremendous tools as you know, to try to understand these things. by the way, i think one of the

adjusting things today is that everything available in open source. look at the things out there. and many cases adversaries are telling us what to do, if we can just figure out what twitter account they use. i don't even know what twitter is but someone told me it is important. i'm joking. , but i think there is a wash of information out there. no one really had to go collected covertly. there is a lot of information out there. how do we use it? these are big challenges for everyone in the intelligence community. i do think this need to tailor deterrence is putting a demand signal on them that requires

them to establish priorities, just like everybody else. we can do everything at once all the time unfortunately. even with the tremendous resources that the united states brings to bear on these kinds of things, it's about parties and choices. i was pretty confident that we were getting a handle on a number of these tailor deterrence ideas in various places. i thought certainly we were not starting at zero. like any military commander, i always wanted more military intelligence. always. i think we put a good command signal on them. >> i have two questions. the first one is what is china's nuclear prolixity? the other one is are there any -- there are anti-nuclear? i'm talking about some kind of

device that would neutralize the notion when it's triggered, or change the rate of dk. they usually takes 10 years or 100 years, but now we can attach a detractor for five or 10 years. gen. kehler: i'm not aware of anything to provide a defense against a nuclear armed missile for example, other than a missile defense. i'm not aware of any other -- that doesn't mean that there isn't somebody doing something somewhere. i'm not aware of anything. anything that would offer us a golden bb. china does not have a large arsenal. the arsenal that they have -- their public doctrine is that

they would use it as a second strike if they don't have first used. i'm not sure if they have said anything differently recently. i have not been paying a great deal of attention to that part of china over the last six months or so. my view is that they have a very capable force. in terms of size, it is not a huge force. they are modernizing their force. they are taking their missiles and making the mobile. that, combined with an extensive , underground system of tunnels and shelters, and things, i think makes that a very difficult problem. i think they have looked to be survivable. i think they are able to survive. i think they have taken what they believe to be steps that

they need to take. they are about to feel the ballistic missile submarine. that will be interesting to see how they operate that. will they always be at sea? how did they intend to use that platform? i think that that has opened up a lot of questions. before i retire, we were trying to work the pacific command and other engagements that were being held in the military realm to make sure that we understood that better. i would personally like to see more transparency with the chinese and their nuclear force. again, one thing that arms controlled between the united states and russia -- the soviet union was it allowed us to get a feel of their weapons, what their safeguards are. all those kinds of things that, as a m military commander, would have made me more comfortable if i knew the things about the chinese.

i think it is still their requests. they would like to know more about them so that we could share information and not have a lot of uncertainty there between us. i think that helps with stability in the long run. >> i have one question. the reason we were at odds with the soviet union was economics. [indiscernible] china, they are developing their nuclear capacity. they still have their business

if they fall, just like the soviet union, they fell because there economic interest were working. a second question, we know that nuclear weapons cost a lot to maintain. what is the minimum structural nuclear weapons? something like 14,000 in the world. what is the minimum threshold for the u.s.? to where it is still a deterrent, but is easy to maintain. prof. gavin: i would say that the u.s. competition is with the soviet union still fairly had an economic component, but was also about the future of the western

world, and an ideological competition. nuclear weapons are in this competition. i think, it would be wrong to make a direct parallel to the u.s. and soviet union. as he pointed out there is certainly interdependence. written large, you can ask a look at the u.s.-china relationship as a success to a certain extent. there is is monetization -- modernization going on, but if you were to have predicted china's capabilities based on their economic and technological base and assume they were rivals, one could imagine a world where they had built far more than they have.

you haven't seen the kind of action-reaction that you saw with the soviets. your second question. lots of people working on this question. what is the minimal amount is a big debate. i would say, how you answer this question depends on how you answer some of the questions that are laid out in my remarks. there are various views in this. there are some people that think we've reduced quite significantly over the last 24 years. and that we are getting to a point where going much lower might be problematic. there are some who think we can go further. it is a debate. gen. kehler: it is that pure let me push back on something you said. two things you said. when you said that the contest

between united states and soviet union was about economics, if what you mean by that is the ideological struggle that was inherent in c communism, then i agree with you. if that's not what you meant then i don't agree with you. that's the context. the second thing you said is that nuclear weapons are sensitive. action, throughh their history, they have not been expensive. that is one of the reasons why early on in the cold war, they were chosen as the offset for conventional comparison. as it turns out what the problem here is with investment is we find ourselves having to invest in a lot of different things. once you feel these weapons their action not -- they are actually nice pensive.

that has been one of their virtues. the question about -- i'm not minimizing, by the way, the expense involved in modernization or life extension of the warheads -- unfortunately, the effects are there that these systems are going to wear out and we are going to need to invest. the question is about how many we need. clearly, a vigorous debate. what i would tell you is there a lot of factors that go into the answer. one of the factors is is what objectives does the president want to achieve if deterrence fail? that is a military question. if the deterrent fails, i went to to do the following things. here is how many weapons that takes. that is one of the factors that goes into this.

it was always the starting point for me. here's how many it takes to achieve these objectives. like any other military plan that becomes a military planning problem. in this case, you also factor in arms control. there is an arms control shell around this conversation as well. both the neustar, which is the treaty in force, and the question about what a further negotiation might look like. there are a lot of factors that go into this answer of how may do we need. if not just a question that some would like to pose about whether a middle minimal deterrence. -- anybody would be deterred by x number here it may be, maybe not. i think that gets back to a lot

of factors. sizing was based on military defense and not the military objectives we were asked to achieve. >> unfortunate we are running short on time. there are many hands up, but we won't be able to get everybody. it is a fascinating discussion and topic. the nuclear balance is not just a mechanical question. the issue of nuclear crises and deterrence is wrapped up in broader geopolitical issues. as you think about it, it may be important to not just look at the military balance, but the political issues at stake. i was also struck by something you said general about the

harming that can happen. nuclear weapons are different. there's nothing like them in history. there nuclear magnitudes greater than anything. they are weapons. setting aside conversations of budgets, it is important to keep the conversation going about weapons. they deserve important scrutiny. i would like to thank you for helping me in this conversation and think the guests. [applause] >> reuters reports the latest in the nuclear negotiations with iran. with the deadline just hours

away, they and of the pace today. well officials cautioned that any agreement would likely be fragile and incomplete, for nearly one week, germany france, and china are trying to break an impasse in exchange for easing sanctions. disagreements on enrichment research and the pace could and a 12 year standoff and reduce the risk of another middle east war. we talked but the situation this morning on washington journal. gen. kehler:host: just hours before a deadline that has been set. of course, some reports coming up this morning that the deadline could be extended for a couple hours on some of these sticking points. for the next hour or so here on "washington journal cl" we will

be talking about this. is ideal does come together here in the next couple of hours, whatever may be, why should the west trust iran to keep their word here? guest: i don't think the west should trust iran or anyone. i don't think that is how constructive relationships happen between states. as ronald reagan said, it is trust, but verify. this is the enormity of what has been put on the table. the opportunity for the west and the united states to have intrusive verification mechanisms that are negotiated and iran has interest in our abiding by. it is their agreement. i think that is the only thing that will work. a negotiated agreement which they buy into. the only other thing is what we did in iraq. we know how that went.

disastrously wrong. it went badly not because of the negotiation, but we weren't forced to trust people here in washington that had an agenda of manufactured evidence. i would be the same thing. if we don't have verifiable mechanisms, we have to trust those in washington with an agenda. host: on trust, but verify, here is a piece from the front page of " -- washington times" when even trust but verify won't do. that is the headline. guest: that's right, john. "this trust but verify" -- "distrust but verify" is better. they have engaged in activities

and have refused to, and clean. i think the entire international community, all of our allies do not believe that this is an agreement they can trust. they want to build a deal with certain const constraints and diminish the possibility that they can build a nuclear weapon. host: as i said, hours to go. it may be extended a few hours but if a deal does not come together, the consequences for the u.s. and iran? guest: again, you after member that this deadline was an artificial deadline, and really imposed by the negotiators. the action have until june 30th. they have a couple more months. this has been a long process. this has been a 12 year process that the europeans have been engaged in. we have spent a lot of time negotiating with the iranians. we still haven't gotten them to make the compromises that they

need to make to make sure that they will not build a nuclear weapon, which would be disastrous for the western community. host: do you want to talk about the failure from the iranian perspective? guest: from the iranian perspective, but more so from the united states perspective it would be catastrophic. we are in freefall in the middle east. the only way we can recover is to stop setting ourselves up to achieve strategic quagmire. just like nixon understood getting out of vietnam. that is what needs to be done here. if it is not, we will continue to see american policy flight deeper and deeper into freefall in the middle east. we will see our economic political, and perhaps military position fall across the world. the repercussions of not taking this moment and minimizing it

into some sort of scientific back and forth like carter did -- which he lost in congress -- that would be a disaster for the united states. i think i ran would muddle through, but it would also be difficult for them. host: is this the argument for accepting the iranian republic. guest: and the title of "going to tehran" is from going to beijing, making that strategic choice of recovering the u.s. is positioned in asia. it works. we are not thus buddies with china, but we were able to allow economic integration in asia for a much more stable political and economic environment there. that is what is necessary in the bilious. -- middle east. if we keep all of our eggs tied to being in the saudi basket or the saudi-israeli basket, we

will see disaster. the united states needs a deal with iran. that is not what president obama is seeing or doing. you see that in the opinion polls. most americans want to deal with iran, but does not trust that iran will come through on the nuclear issue. that is the problem that obama is sinking into. if he argues it on the nuclear issue, on the science, no one will go for as they did with carter. the islamic republic will never be trustworthy enough to not have weapons. we will never take them another. we will never like china enough. it is not about liking systems it is about facing reality. the u.s. is freefall in the middle east, and how to recover. host: the guesswork at the national security council.

and mark, explain the group you work for four people who are unfamiliar. guest: we are a think tank on middle east erie i would like to respond to some points. sometimes there is no lesson. sometimes you can exit distort and get yourself diluted by false historical analogies. someone has written a lot about china and mouse china. the fact of the matter is that iran supreme leader is not chairman mao. the reason that mao was so interesting is because he's all the soviet union as the greatest threat to his country. that is why he was willing to do a deal with united states. the supreme leader of iran sees the united states as his greatest enemy. that has not changed. as he said in a speech several years ago they will make

technical changes and show for its ability on the nuclear site in order to gain regionally. i think there administration has been rightfully obsessed with iran's breakout capacity. they have engaged in a regional breakout. they're engaging all over the middle east. they are supporting a tssad. they're taking over yemen. they're working with the shiite militias in iraq. obama's policy is in freefall. i do not think the solution to that is an gauge with a man who thinks we are the great satan and that death to america is not just a political slogan, it essentially his dominant ideological creed. host: we want to know what our viewers think about this topic. we will be having this debate for about 45 minutes or so. democrats can call in, (202) 748-8000. republicans, (202) 748-8001.

independents, (202) 745-8002. if you're watching from outside of the country you can also call in, (202) 748-0003. thomas. caller: thank you for taking my call. can you hear me? host: go ahead. caller: thank you for taking my call. i have been 45 years in this country. i see our country has declined. if mr. mark over there, i don't know what his agenda is. all these radicals have won their war, another war with iran is not the answer. mr. netanyahu needs to step back. isil, all these nuclear bombs -- why do we want to attack israel? what we are supporting right now is the sunnis.

saddam hussein was a sunni, and now we are supporting these sunnis. we are now supporting kuwait, qatar, all the criminals. all these people supporting whoever they want. host: i want to let the guests respond. do you want more? guest: no, absolutely not. i ask supported president obama's iran policy and his engagement with iran since 2009. he is a strong supporter of having a tell viewers posture and a nuclear deal that will constrain iran's nuclear weapons breakout. i think that is what most americans won. most americans, according to opinion polls, i shall he do not trust the iranian regime, but do support negotiations. that is where i am. i give important to go in with eyes wide open.

the fact the matter is this is a harsh enemy. it is an enemy of the united states and of liberal democracy. we have to engage them. we have no choice. we can't pretend that they will go away. we have to reach a nuclear compromise with this regime that action constrains their program. for that, i support the policy. guest: sanctions, what his organization has pursued is as a weapon of war. we saw them first use against iraq, killing mostly children. it was a disastrous program. with one million iraqis killed it still did not change saddam hussein's calculus. that took an all-out attack from the united states. when stations were pushed on iran in 2003, they had around 100 centrifuges. today, they have 20,000. we know where his recipe gives us. we know what sanctions gives us.

it pushes of on the path of not only killing a lot of people but yet another war. the only way out of it is a real diplomatic negotiation. host: what about what brought iran to the table in the first place? guest: i think that is a social fact that is not a reality. back in 2003, they actually halted there in return for two years. they got nothing in return. italy recently that the united states came, and eyes because, finally the obama administration relicensing since were not only hurting iran, but they were hurting the united states. they were eroding american military power around the world, accelerating this effort to create alternative financial systems. it was hurting us, and that is why they decide to go to the table with iran. host: i want to point out the

both of you have brought of the polling on this. here's the latest from " washington post" this morning. a nearly two to one margin of americans that support the notion of striking a deal. nearly six in 10 say they are not confident that a deal will prevent iran from developing a nuclear weapon, unchanged from 15 months ago. kevin is up next, calling in from southampton, pennsylvania. line for republicans. good morning. caller: good morning. thanks for c-span. thanks for taking my call. you and your husband, i've read your material and work. i've read the other guest's work as well. first of all, it's very important to establish the fact

that he is within israeli front organization, called the national front for democracy just like these other think tanks. they are just israeli front organizations. host: let's let the guests respond. guest: i ask a don't work for the national front for democracy . you must be confusing my think tank with another one. we take no money form foreign governments, and we action committed to defending security. i want to talk about hillary's point. her position on sanctions contradicts the position, not only of the obama in administration but of the europeans, a bipartisan congress. in fact, the entire international community believes that sanctions brought iran to the table.

they believe the course coercive power of sanctions. to think that you could come to the table and just mere engagement without coercive pressure, you could give get them to give up decades of sanctions, and a program that has been put together through billions of dollars of investment and under which they have suffered because of sanctions. i think anyone engage in international diplomacy, or negotiation, whether buying a car or house, knows that there has to be a accommodation of carrots and sticks. then administration understands this, and that is why they have said repeatedly, if there is no deal by the 30th, they will work with congress on a sanctions package so that iran must make a strategic choice, just like mao and come together based on

common interest and a set of common values. once again, without a deal that constrains their nuclear weapons capacity, there will be no agreement. host: the front page of "the usa today" has be five hurdles. living thing is the number one hurdle. some discussion as to how the sanction should be lifted. should it be gradual? what would be your recommendation for these last hours of the negotiation? guest: unlike many people in washington, i have actually negotiated with the u.s. government and iranian officials over afghanistan and al qaeda. it was incredibly effective and healthy united states and honestly, to not only overthrow the taliban, but set up a government in afghanistan. i know from experience that you actually can deal with iranian

officials in a constructive way for engagement. there is no evidence whatsoever that continuing to pressure them will give us a concession. that brings us to the current round in terms of sanctions. with china, we did not say we would keep things is on china or anything to pressure them. similarly, that's not going to work with iran. they have not change their position so far. whenwhat's in it for them is having a lifting of sanctions and a dimmer order in the middle east. host: all of the sanctions upfront? that's what you would do? guest: the interim agreement -- the poor bargain there is that there would be a comprehensive listing of sanctions in exchange for meaningful constraints on the iranian government. iranians have done many of the

things, if not all of the things that the united states have put on the table, not necessarily how the united states once, but the core issues. we've had our chief experts -- a bargain with strong in november. guest: immediate sanctions relief? guest: we need to agree to lift the sanctions. as the court argument that needs redone. we do not do that, we will accelerate our loss of leadership. host: let's bring in muriel waiting in connecticut. good morning. caller: good morning. how is everybody at the table their? host: we are great. thank you for calling. caller: thank you. i said they want to say this to mr. dubowitz.

hillary, or anyone else, does not tell me how to think. i am an independent anger. i will say this about the negotiation. a face-to-face meeting about any peace is the trump card here. if anybody has had any dealings with the war, having a son or brother or father go to war and face the front lines will know that negotiations trump everything. as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, i don't know how many countries in the world now have nuclear weapons. including israel.