i do want to talk about some of the things i have considered among the important barriers. it is all in my mind an important factor. about finding, and want to make one point -- funding come i want to make one point. we cannot define what we mean by prepared. how could we fund something that we cannot define? what do we mean by a prepared city or a prepared statement even a prepared hospital? we simply do not know the answer to that. in fact, i would dare say i do

this -- i won't do it here. normally, i would ask you to raise your hands. do feel that with respect to yourself, your family, your pets, your community? how many of you -- raise your hand -- how many of you feel prepared for a major disaster in your community? how many? i've spoken to all kinds of audiences you if i get more than two or three hands -- i test them. who is taking care of your mom in the nursing home? what are you doing with important papers? what is happening? yes, you could follow the guidelines with food and water. >> nice job.

[laughter] >> if you cannot define it, how can you fund it? >> let's put that aside. let's say it is lingering out there. the first is, the federal system we live under. in many ways that serves our country and our people very well. the point is that decision is decentralized. by design, the government decision is made by levels of government as close as possible to the people being served. it is a fundamental tenet of our society. the problem is it doesn't work

for disaster planning. federalism doesn't allow us to create a coordinated master plan. why does the state of alabama require every's rule that a safe shelter for incoming tourney does for kids and staff in oklahoma does it? why question right is a tornado less likely to kill schoolchildren and on a home a -- in oklahoma than alabama? why is there no city in that united states? no city prepared for such an event even though people say that new york city, chicago,

washington, houston, san francisco, l.a., are all potential targets? yes, it is improbable, but it is something that is on somebody's book of business to think about. why did the mayor decide it is a priority? maybe they are correct and the decision. maybe they are not. this is part and parcel of the reality in which we live. the second problem is a denominator problem. i think this is rampant. here is what it means. let's say experts in the state say that 100 million or 200 million are needed in the event of a major pandemic. the government -- governor proudly announces they have emergent stock. we patting ourselves on the back that we have a big stop pile except it talking about the

numerator. what they have. i want to know the denominator. what do they need? it is rampant at every level of government. here is what we are doing to prepare for this disaster. but what do we need? how far along that path do we need to be? what more will it take? we can be satisfied with a numerator answer to a denominator question. the third problem is what i referred to with authority conundrum. the problem we have with managing disaster decision-making from the medications plan to implementation of an effect if response. the bp gulf oil spill became one of the greatest disasters in history. who is in charge of the deep water well? the president assigned

officials. was a governor in charge? how about bp itself? a lot of people had a lot to say . it wasn't apparent to me. that is a problem. a year later after the disaster of the tsunami, who was in charge? the governor of japan? again, that is a problem. the messaging for the strategy to stop the damage, these are questions that were never properly answered. if there were answers or if someone -- some entity was in charge come it was clearly a closely held secret.

it there was a large-scale emergency that required all help them public hands on deck in new york city, who would call the shots? a command center? etc. who makes a final decision? the mayor? the governor? a ceo of one of the largest health systems in new york city said to me in terms of what i what youth here because -- let me paraphrase what he said. [laughter] his point was come i don't care who tells me to evacuate. i'm in charge. i'm responsible for the life and safety of the patients in here. i was told -- i do not report to the mayor of the governor or the president for that matter unless it was a major national emergency declared. i will decide when i will evacuate my patience.

i will decide to which hospitals i will send them and when i will send them and how i will send them. he perceives himself as being the sole responsible party. as always, our system says you are right. we do not control them. when we do the planning, we have a potpourri of people and things end entities and basically pleading with people to get together and have a meeting at the what to do to prepare for a big disaster. as we saw these hospitals that are controlled by whatever entities are going to want reimbursements or expenses that they incurred getting ready for that disaster or as a result of the disaster. the bills that came in were out of control. millions of dollars for

hospitals that said, we had to spend this amount of money and now we have lost revenue. things are slightly out of control here. i will give you three quick examples. there is a disconnect between the silos of public health and personal health services. between disasters, the daily function of state and local health departments are fairly routine most of the time providing all types of community , services and surveillance, creating policies towards the goal of improving public health. sometimes responsible for special programs like childhood vaccinations to restaurant inspections and the like. many have disaster planning as well and they are for the health department. in new york city, the health department does not plan for the

75 private-sector hospitals. it talks to them and interact with them, but does not plan for them. on the other side, on the other silo is the massive direct health services system from the doctor's offices and clinics to enormous academic medical centers and systems, caring for patients, teaching new generations of health professionals into supporting medical research and all that's fine. it's fine except when it comes to planning or responding to disasters. in circumstances of crisis, they must function as integrated coordinated systems of assessment direct care public safety and prevention. decisions about hospital allocation of scarce resources and a myriad of functions blur the line between the public's well-being and the health of individual patients. right now we lack the resources and in most places the planning authority to integrate these two systems when it counts and in a

big disaster that is a major problem. second disconnect, military and civil and civilian assets. take the example of an evacuation. let's say a hypothetical elected mayor of a town of 65,000 people, previously a prominent business leader, and with great campaign, he is elected. he appoints a number of commissioners with a wide range of experiences, some relevant others not so much. now comes a disaster. state resources but now the city was caught in the publishing of 60 to 70,000 people need to evacuate quickly. the emergency plan is put together and here we go, greenlight. wait, how is this going to work?

who has the food supply, the water, the medical care, not only because they have chronic medical conditions but somebody will have a heart attack were seizure en route. who is dealing with that in organizing the traffic patterns and making sure there are diapers because the babies to -- because traffic will be slow? where is the fuel coming from and who will deal with motor vehicle accident and where are these people going by the way? is the national guard being deployed and who decides what they are doing and how they are coordinating with local resources? shouldn't they be coordinating with local resources? we didn't see that after sandy. think about this. shouldn't the regular military forces of the united states be in charge of large operations like this? because, who are one knows logistics and people moving better than the u.s. military? why are they not running the show on the circumstances i just described? where were they in the planning

process so they were known and fully coordinated assets while we are planning and not ad hoc while it is happening? we need to fix this. that is a big barrier but it needs to be rethought in the age of the mega disasters, completely rethought. the final example is the private sector which is deeply unsettling for people. 85% of the infrastructure in the u.s. is owned by companies and individuals in the private sector. but the government is in control of the regional planning disasters. i talk about a couple of examples where confusion in the gulf and japan was very apparent. when the new york state ready commission was convened by governor andrew cuomo in the aftermath of hurricane sandy, we were charged to examine what happened and asked to recommend what should happen in future disasters to avoid or mitigate some of the more vexing problems created by the storm. for instance, the prolonged electrical problems or gas shortage crisis.

the governor wanted to know what the state should do to avoid similar crisis in the next storm. we concluded their first up steps could be taken for instance the fuel reserve stockpile in the strategic locations around the state. millions and millions of gallons are used every day, so there is a limit to that. that would not be enough to really have a functioning system to make sure we didn't have that crisis. but it's the private sector that owns the oil wells and refineries and the delivery trucks, and those are the key factors in making the supply chain during the disaster. like it or not, they are part of the solution. it's not just because they own

the assets, they also have the experience and expertise in a lot of brainpower not just lipservice but we need them at the planning tables every single time we do serious disaster planning. we need wal-mart and ups and fedex helping us in the distribution systems. there is much more we could talk about about this but i want to wrap this up, and i do want to say, i could have talked to you now and at some point i would like to about other issues for example the issues of the vulnerable populations which have been marginalized in essence the most disaster planning. the administrator of fema actually is in the camp that i applaud, which he understands all understands vulnerable populations have to be part of the central planning as we are

going if we are going to have an effective plan. it's necessary. i don't think people understand how many of vulnerable people there are. let's say we have 310 million people, 75 million are children, 45 million are senior citizens. 22 million have some kind of disability. 44 million are poor. a million in nursing homes. they are not just out there ready to be taped onto a generic disaster plan. they are the disaster plan. if we can't take care of those people, the plan is useless. it's dysfunctional. it is not even moral. we have to focus on this and we haven't been today. i want to end with a thought

and i would say, i get the fact that as wealthy as the united it, and we have unprecedented wealth even now then any other point compared to other countries, but our resources are not unlimited. and the possibilities for the devastating disasters that could affect us are literally staggering to the imagination. and we have many other priorities. so i am not saying, spend a bank. we have all kinds of disparities in the country. we have $3.5 trillion in infrastructure repairs that need to get done. we have cancer and alzheimer's disease did here, and many of the schools are in big trouble. while my plane was canceled this morning, i got to read the entire "usa today," 61,000 bridges in the united states called in bad shape. 61,000 bridges. it's not the tunnels or the levy.

it's just the bridges, ladies and gentlemen. so, here's the final point i'm making here that i understand we have to make decisions and establish priorities. but what really troubles me is how those decisions are made. they are made passively, and inactively, they are made by default. we don't have the grown up dialogue that we need to conduct a mature society should have examined the need, about how and when and where we will spend our treasure. because if we did that and went through that process and then we all decided that we simply are not going to prepare for every capacity that we are going to spend the next decade fixing the schools and education systems or fix the infrastructure to make sure every kid has appropriate access to quality healthcare fine.

we've made a decision in the best interest of the country by everybody joining in and arriving at that decision. the problem is that the process for the decision-making is a mess. it's not proactive, it's chaotic. it ineffective, decision by default and bad knowledge experience and as such it has predictable outcomes. it's literally random-access preparedness as we have across the united states. and in my opinion, the situation is not something any of us should tolerate or be proud of. that's all i have to say. [laughter] >> next time that you appear you could be more provocative, ok. [laughter] i wouldn't expect any less of you. thank you very much. i think i will turn to the advisory panel. ladies first. >> i would like to ask you to reflect on one particular vulnerable population.

that is children. especially children and bio defense. could you talk a little bit about the special populations, the vulnerable populations in particular children in consideration. dr. redlener: children represent a particular poignant challenge for us. i'm a pediatrician by background. i have five grandchildren. i'm very tuned into children and have been for my whole career. when it came to face challenges associated with disasters, it was apparent. that no thought had been given to the special needs of children .

i was at a briefing with federal, state, local officials. it was q&a. i said, what is being done around the planning for children who might get caught up in the disaster and literally the panel looked at each other and one of them said, nothing. that is when i went back to my own institution and made calls into the american pediatrics and a process was begun by probably 20 or 30 pediatricians from different places and different places for children then began to really look at this and eventually the national

commission on children was born. from that, a bunch of recommendations have come from that. i would say that most of the relevant federal agencies have been really looking at what the needs of children are. the problem is, we don't know a lot of the answers. we don't know that those -- what it is for kids who are exposed to anthrax, we do not know it. so, we bring in the experts at consensus conferences, and we ask what is your consensus about getting a call in the middle of an eye, if there is a situation, what are you going to say? so, there are things happening. but we are far from a place that i am comfortable with. newark city schools with a million schoolchildren, i am

very worried about the level of fairness in the schools, very worried. -- level of preparedness in the schools, very worried. we have a lot of work to do, but i would say in this case that the process has started. >> can i ask you -- >> alexander and then dr. parker. >> with the questions that you have raised, and they are legitimate. i am looking at history, what worked and it were, for example the experience of noah and the ark, in other words in the face of the coming flood, what did noah do? no time for hesitation, time for a decision, that is the story. what is the moral? how can we learn from that kind of experience? representative rogers: i think the big point, dr. alexander, is that we went from no to bind disability insurance.

it is a mindset that i think adults generally come to, that if we can just kind of way around and not do anything for the future, invest in retirement, or by insurance, we can keep rolling along and something happens, then we are really sorry that we didn't do anything. i guess the building an ark. it is a mindset that i think adults generally come to, that if we can just kind of way around and not do anything for the future, invest in retirement, or by insurance, we can keep rolling along and something happens, then we are really sorry that we didn't do anything. i guess the building an ark.

or what you do with your personal life, that is another example. and that is a decision, and especially for individuals and companies where there are economic decisions to be made, we need to come to a process that allows us to say, we are going to build an ark, we are going to prepare these cities for the event of a nuclear detonation. it is a decision that we get to buy discussion, discussing science and the facts and discussing what we want to take risks around and make sure that we are invested to reduce risk. i get where you are coming from. that is what i would say about it. >> dr. parker. >> yes, i want to thank you, because you have galvanized the preparedness community and officials, helping vulnerable populations, particularly children. thank you for that. the question i have is along the lines of the unique challenges

with the defense and particularly the medical countermeasures, antibiotics in the step out vaccines that are licensed or in development. and you would know that the community has taken a serious grapple with the challenge of how do we really make progress now and how we collect the data that is needed -- so how do we make progress that we have the right and a biotics and stockpile and the dosages for children, how do we get these vaccines that can be available for children? representative rogers: i am glad that you brought this up. i think particularly around the farm industry and public health, we are a little bit the drift. the farmers are operating under the business model that isn't necessarily compatible with what the country needs from a public health point of view. the country is missing -- i wrote about it in my book, the

surgeon general told me that the country is missing a public health czar. i think you get the point, somebody or something that could lead the development of ideas. these ideas that would be level to take the reality of trying to have a functional business where again the ceo does not report to the secretary, that person -- wait a minute, or anytime actually. the problem is that we have different worldviews of what needs to happen and unless somebody is going to put up the money and a substantial -- and a substantial way that there is an understandable business model, we are dealing with incompatible systems right now and we do need some way of finding a common table that smart people from the industry and the public health committee can say listen, we have tried different things, but now we really do have to solve this. the policy for example, with

-- unless so on puts of the money in a substantial way so there isn't understood this this model, we are dealing with incompatible systems right now. we need some way of finding a common table that smart people from the industry and smart people from the public health committee can say, we have tried different rings, but we really have to solve this. superbugs, for example, who is going to develop those antibiotics and that what cost? you cannot use those. we are saving them or the when the resistant superbugs appear. what is that model exactly? i do not know what the answer is, i am just agreeing with you that this is an important point. i would love to your other people's comments. -- hear other people's comments.

>> it is interesting to hear you talk about a denominator problem. you said that your cup is half full. [laughter] >> it is not. i actually don't even have a cup. [laughter] >> seriously, though, i have two questions really. how do you prepare for an improvised nuclear device attack and to what extent, if at all, is washington dc and its environment, has there been any planning? >> this is an interesting question, this is an improbable event with the enormous cost glances. what researchers have shown us is that it is a very interesting reality, that if the public knew some very simple things about sheltering and places from 30-48 hours and then leaving upon getting the right instruction from public officials, hundreds of thousands of lives could be

saved in a place like new york city. if we only did that -- but if you are the mayor of new york city, are you feeling like you want to go warn people about when hiroshima occurs in time square. there are communication issues but what is frustrating, that fact alone, if every citizen new it, it could be beneficial in saving lives. secondly, there is mythology about ind's. a lot of people would be killed, there would be horrible destruction, but not everybody would die. we would have maybe 75,000 deaths in a city of millions, it

would be a tragedy, but it would need for people to be organized and taken care of. if we are putting our head in the sand and not talking about it at all, then it we are guaranteed that if it did happen, we would have the worst possible outcome as opposed to a better outcome. >> has any such planning occurred in the washington environment? >> i am not the national security council, the secretary, there are things that are being discussed on a high level that are complex and top-secret. so, if it is being discussed in washington, dc, behind closed doors, and it does not get to the cities and to the citizens we have a problem. nobody -- where does the message

get connected from the people that are interested in the continuity of government, for example, how many people in your office building? i asked -- on the seventh floor, asked him where his staff was? he said, she is out to lunch. there are things happening obviously, there are smart people at the highest reaches of government discussing these things, but if you do not let us know in the cities and states and counties, something else unbelievable to me, that if you model evacuation patterns out of a large city where people are going to go, let's say we had a meltdown in the power plant, 18.7 million people that live within 50 miles.

so millions of people are not coming back, where they going to go? people in the communities that are not coming back in their lifetimes, there is a single town, village, county of united states of america that hasn't been appropriately planning for receiving evacuees, because it isn't just bottles of water, health care, schools etc. i am not aware of any planning for destination communities for large-scale evacuations. or for persistent displacements. a lot of areas that require a lot of work. a issues. not for the faint of heart. >> what are you doing in homeland security?

[laughter] >> if you have trouble going into washington dc going in on a sunny day, how will you get out if it is a bad day, it is not going to happen. you can't take that notion and say ok to your point. you will have huge panic anxiety, you have to have something in place. you need duct tape. [laughter] i think you raise a very important question, the environment, the urban environment poses complex problems because it is there rare we would see a massive evacuation. you can get out of the outer banks when the weather channel says it is coming your way. technically, i don't know why you leave buses in the parking lot when hurricane katrina is coming, but with an unexpected

event, i don't think you are evacuating big cities. i think you have to accept that as part of the planning procedure. so the answer is, nothing about evacuation -- it ain't going to happen. [laughter] >> doctor, i am intrigued about your comments about the decision-making process for preparedness and allocation of resources. according to, you find a disjointed and one response to that is that this is a messy process and things are allocated by criteria that may not always be rational. that is the reality of democracy. that is the reality of vesting of the responsibility of political executive branches. you mentioned in terms of how to fix it, and rationalizing the democracy.

you suggested a public health czar or official, any other specific ideas on the federal level on how we can make that process a bit more rational going forward? mr. redlener: i would start at the top. i think the president and his staff, the cabinet, have to come to some agreement about a structure for the decision-making that becomes increasingly more inclusive and gets down to the government. it gets down to real decision-making. i know that there are meetings for example, the deputy secretaries of various issues, they go back to their agencies and you know something happens or doesn't happen. but, even the attempts to bring people together right now tend to dissipate rapidly. so i think that sustained leadership from the top is key.

secondly, right now the reason i am talking about this public health czar, is that there is no particular venue within government as it is currently structured and there could be. it is not incompatible with democracy to have a forum that has authority and the ability to change things, to be the place where these things are discussed. i do not think that it is beyond humans to figure out how to reconcile the needs of our very vibrant, important industry of farmers with the public health needs of the country. we needed someone to convene that and guide that. i know a lot of people in the farm industry, because for a lot of reasons, and i don't think that anyone would refuse to participate in those discussions. we need to have somebody leading it, where they come to the table and knowing what they are saying

and concluding will have impact and consequence, as opposed to another meeting where you come in and talk and go back to business as usual. that is the cycle that needs to be broken. i really would not be distressed if the decision was taken. you know what, i am just using this as an example, we're not going to deal with ind's now, because it is important for new york city. the new york city average in schools for third graders, at a reading level, is around 15%. i mean we have extraordinary problems. so somebody said we are going to take our chances from al qaeda and we are going to fix the schools, you know, i might not agree with it, but there would be some rationale for us leading to that conclusion. but there would be -- you would know more than me about how to make that really operational.

>> if i could follow up on that, that person, who would that be? mr. redlener: somebody in the white house. reporting to the president. it seems to me, the president needs to say, we need to solve this. we -- it is in america's interest that we transcend the political differences and figure out how to make a public health infrastructure that will help the whole country. i don't know that anyone can say

that with enough force or power other than the president of the united states. >> i think it is more complex than that. i guess having a public health czar, that would just drive me crazy. another czar without any staff. the problem here is you are talking about different decision-making structures for different incidences. in fact, the fema director commands the public health service in an emergency. the fema director takes over in an emergency, they have the authority to do that. hhs relinquishes authority to the director and the public health officers in fact work under the director, particularly in an incident kind of situation. so, there are structures within

the federal government to deal with that kind of thing. bioterrorism, particularly since it is going to be ongoing, it requires a different kind of decision-making structure. start out by talking about the challenge of federalism. assuming that we cannot get rid of federalism. the question is how do you design a decision-making system with enough authority in an emergency to be able to run the course and be able to manage the various levels of government and the expertise of the united states, and how do you train them well enough as they go through exercises? if you ask me what happens in my community, i can answer all of your questions. i can answer about the university of miami, the county, but in general, because of someone like craig, florida is organized for hurricanes.

not particularly for bioterrorism. but we are organized for hurricanes. we have seven days of food, and all sorts of structures, because we are in a coastal region and we know exactly what we are going to do with 10,000 students if we have to evacuate them. but with bioterrorism and the kind of thing that we are talking about, it requires a different structure because you have to have a public health infrastructure, but more than a public health infrastructure the private sector must be wielded together with the public sector. so, what we need to do is think about how you glued the system together and then let it through a series of exercises, so it actually works. so that everybody knows what they are doing. the fact that nurses we heard have not read the disaster plan, is a disaster in itself.

the challenge it seems, for high officials, is to figure out how to put federalism together in a way in which it works to be able to manage our way through what are much more complicated crises in my judgment than the kind of bombing or terrorism assaults on buildings, as horrible as they are. i don't think that that is a czar, i think it requires a more infrastructure than that, in terms of who has authority to make decisions. mr. rebut right now i think -- i am using the idea of a czar to symbolically express -- >> there is this management at the hhs. mr. redlener: right. my understanding is in new york, 2012, the city was flooded with people.

the president said we will not have a repeat of katrina, so that every organization being -- even in the office of emergency management. mayor decided he is going to manage everything, so all questions went to the mayor and meanwhile we have people literally roaming the streets looking for where they are going to set up shop. i walked into a shelter in a school in staten island and they tell me there is a medical clinic. who is operating it? it is doctors without borders. what are they doing here? it was all of these random

things, and where do we go? what we went through to sort this out. we never got a satisfactory answer. >> that's what happens during most event, they tell people to stay out. the first rule is don't let a lot of people in. mr. redlener: hard to stop. >> dr. mckinney from chicago talked about coordinating activity at the local and state level and unfortunately i don't think that that is a model that has been used very effectively and other communities. at the end of the day, unless you've got everybody at the table, a small group of people at the table and then you exercise and rehearse those plans, you will end up in the same situation as you did post sandy.

we have experience with those lessons. with katrina, there were lessons, but most of those were lost and not applied with sandy. so the rudimentary notion of that after each disaster you have a debrief, what has transpired, what was effective not effective, and you maintain observations from that. >> i took your point about the decision-making process to be directed, not so much at the way we operate in a crisis, but before the crisis, the government's ability to look ahead, prioritize it one threat over another, one value over

another, you said education versus preparing for bioterrorism. that, i thought that was what you were primarily trying to address with your comments about the process and your recommendation for a public health official, as opposed to coming up with a decision-making process that operates best in the crisis. am i wrong about that? mr. redlener: not necessarily. there are multiple layers. we have problems in the decision-making process, but also way down on the totem pole. just on the planning on the local level. i have a lot of planning meetings now. you know, we have never found the private sector people there. we are lucky if we get the local red cross chief there. the idea of having those people from the private sector, we need them badly. we will call walmart to bring a truck and bring bottles of water, but the whole process of deciding what to do and how to

do it, it is just not right, from top to bottom. the last thing i was saying, what you are referring to, at a fundamental level we are not making those decisions and democracy is messy, i understand that, but you cannot have poor disaster planning and horrible schools and broken infrastructure. something is not good here because we have to figure out what we are going to -- we have idea of money, we need to figure out what we will spend it on. and we have smart people from both parties. >> last question. >> you talked about the need for military to be a part of this. and you referenced going back to 1878 or something. have you actually thought through how the congress might rewrite that statute?

i would imagine the black helicopters would go crazy if congress started -- mr. redlener: right, after hurricane andrew, the category five that really devastated south florida, i was there days later and colin powell wasn't -- was running the show. i may have overstated that, but for all intensive purposes, he was a by the president to go down there and it was phenomenal. it was a very different animal from what we saw in katrina or after sandy. it was organized, effective, it got done, people were served and it was a big mess, but it seemed to work. it was designed to keep the army from being police officers in america.

that is the essence. we cannot have the federal government becoming the local cops or state police or whatever. that fundamental principle it is good, but it needs to be extended to really an arm's length or the military when we really need them. we do not have the national guard represented at the majority of these tabletops and when the thing happens, that is a little too late. >> you know, we could keep you here a lot longer, but we have three more panels to do. thank you very much and we look for to hearing from you. [applause]

>> nomura from the blue-ribbon study panel. with former house intelligence committee, mike rogers. the difficulty with keeping congress involved in the discussion. this is 45 minutes. mr. ridge: good morning, ladies and gentlemen here it on behalf -- gentlemen. on behalf of the defense, we welcome you. related to our collaboration with the hudson institute. i think it is important to express our deep appreciation for the sponsorship of this panel. frankly, the resources they

provided to take on a critical mission as we take a look at our ability to identify and respond to the threats that has been thrown at us by mother nation -- mother nature. again we are appreciative of the hudson institute. this is the last public meeting we will conduct, there will be private meetings here. as we develop a series of recommendations to submit to the congress of the united states. short-term and long-term. recommendations relative to the ability of this country to identify those kind of threats. today we confront a troubled world that becomes more challenging every week. one of the issues -- biological and chemical threats. al qaeda, isis and other

terrorist groups have voiced desires to obtain chemical weapons. loan actors -- agents like ricin are improved daily. significant gas -- significant gaps. chemical attacks in syria prompted consideration of our abilities to respond to domestic terrorism. it is necessary to consider our ability to defend against such threats. i am privileged to cochair this panel. joseph lieberman will not join us today. we will proceed without his wisdom and counsel. he will be involved as we

develop a senate recordation. for the benefit of the audience. we are grateful to c-span who thinks enough of this panel to cover it today. i would like to outline what we could probably do to divide our efforts along four specific panels. issues that relate to our efforts. the first panel was on threat awareness. we took a look at risks associated with biological threats. it can inflict catastrophic consequences. that first panel was about the general nature of the threat awareness. the second panel -- prevention and protection. we asked a series of panelists to give an overview on everything from biological arms control to first responder

protection and agricultural defense. we took a look and assessed our ebola pandemic. capabilities to respond to future pathogens. the third, the panel was involved with experts to talk with us about surveillance and detection. understanding bio defense. we took a look at technology and its effectiveness. examined challenges associated with early detection and early diagnosis. very interesting look at the human and animal interface as it relates to our charge. today we have a lengthy group of subject matter experts to talk to us about recovery capabilities. we think we have covered the waterfront from threat awareness

to response and recovery. it will be our mission today to submit to the congress of the united states a series of recommendations. we will be in a position to be up here advocating. as we have done with every panel, we begin with a unique perspective. we have mike rogers. former congressman. given the work he has done in the international community, we think his perspective would be helpful. comes with mike rogers, thank you for joining us. the floor is yours. mr. rogers: it is a little

different being on this side. [laughter] mr. ridge: i discovered that as secretary, thank you very much. mr. rogers: i appreciate the work of the panel. the intellectual firepower there is inspiring and i have learned tremendously. you realize you have a long way to go. they are doing powerful work. i thought i would tell you our journey a little bit. how we got to the border bill. -- orderbarter bill. it is hard to get people's attention about something you

can't see or touch. you know that devastating consequences. there are many of nights -- there are many nights you do not sleep. often centered around around our threat matrix. and our ability to respond anyway that would be appropriate. we started in 2006, after a series of investigative is too strong -- inquiries into the status of terrorist attempting in their interest in it gaining -- in attaining by weapons. there was a high degree of weapon -- high degree of trust in attaining weapons. we were in the middle of a conflict in afghanistan at that point. the focus was not necessarily where it needed to be. looking at the white house at the time, the bush administration collectively

agreed we needed to have a special fund or effort to try and produce countermeasures in a market where there was no marketplace for it. there is only one single customer in reality for these countermeasures. i do not care if it is radiological exposure. i do not care if it is small parks -- smallpox. be bionic plague, which we have seen in terrorist organizations. in trying to find delivery systems. we realized we needed to have something on a larger magnitude. try to push it out to first responders. that is how this started. you can imagine with all of the other challenges, it was hard to

get people's attention. i credit my partner in this and the white house. this is something we are going to have to deal with. even given all of the other things here at the one challenge was trying to get full funding. we got plenty of authorization money set aside with these countermeasures. it was very tempting, as you know governor ridge, that money was too tempting to be moved somewhere else for bigger priorities. because the enemy was not knocking at our door, we know they were interested -- they had aspirations to use it. that aspirations to pull it together -- to put it together. it always came a backup

condition. we all -- we have had some successes. the hhs just signed a contract. it was about $31 million for the new and improved anthrax countermeasure. a lot of attention paid to it. there was a reason. we watched terrorist pay a lot of attention to it. we want to make sure we had stockpiles of countermeasures around the country. survivability rate in those cases would go astronomical. that money would be used to test the prophylactic capability of anthrax countermeasures. that can be a response treatment to anthrax. if someone gets exposed, there is an opportunity we can have a vaccine that could save that

person's life. all of that -- it has been a slaughter. it has been -- it has been a slog. it has been a work in progress. the new republican from indiana signed a letter to the chairman, requesting $400 million in additional money. if they can get anywhere near it, it would be a success story. we are going to have to continue to do this. the last thing we want to do is have a successful biological attack in the united states and not be in a position to respond. we saw the panic across europe across the united states, across asia and africa about ebola. we knew there was a possibility could happen, but would not prepare ourselves for the

eventuality. there was a lot of chasing our talil. the problem is there was a lot of catching up to do. this was a bipartisan problem. it started in the bush administration. money got taken away. it continued into this admin station. it is hard to get people's -- people's attention. with that, mr. chairman, i would be willing to take any questions. mr. ridge: surrounded by a lawyers. i think we all have questions. i would like to dig a little deeper in regard to the observation you made. on the appropriations side. as chairman, you obviously were

far more familiar with the intent -- the aspirations and capability of terrorist organizations, because of your role. i'm sure multiple briefings you requested. you learned a great deal from each. i guess our challenge is in a democracy, we talked this morning -- we are much more reactive than preemptive. it is a challenge that people understand, but since it is not immediate or visual, rallying support around an issue or an organization that is critical to countermeasures is very difficult. do you have any recommendations in that regard, and how this panel can take recommendations and approach the kernel of the united states?

their willingness to take some of these recommendations -- take them seriously and change relationships between entities? any thoughts? mr. rogers: anytime a member is educated, that is a good day for an outcome of trying to get ahead of the curve. the report will be important to that end. i would use the opportunity to get senior staffers clued in on the aspirational nature of terrorist intent. in some cases, it has gone beyond aspirational. we know people are committed to using it. we have seen the cure meant from isis individuals in the east. obtaining chemical weapons -- if not gaining what research may have been done on biological weapons.

so that is a dangerous combination. in addition, radiological material. people are afraid of the nuclear bomb. a radiological dirty bomb is much more within the capability of a terrorist organization. that is concerning. if members get clued in as to what the threat level really is it is easier for them to start making decisions. we have been robbing maintenance programs on carrier groups. to pay for other things in the military. the pressure will be on the defense side. we have to make this a public health issue. try to get it out of the defense stream as best we can. think of a radiological bomb that had the impact of eight square blocks. a small amount of material --

and how come they desire. most of the impact is fear and chaos. it is not actually damaged. this is the problem we confront. can we sustain psychologically in the united states? or economically? or a small magnitude biological attack of smallpox? try to weaponize -- which is to -- which is difficult to do be bionic plague? that kind of conversation with members outside of national security committee space would be valuable. if you're in agriculture, you're worried about agriculture. we have to draw them in into this notion that this is a american public health problem that we are going to have to

deal with. ms. shalala: we met when you were in michigan. mr. rogers: i think i had a mustache then. ms. shalala: the states have a role. if the governors and legislators recognize that and made some demands it seems to me that would help. we have been talking about the infrastructure that is needed. could you give us insight on how you think the states can -- we can mobilize the states to see themselves as a part of this infrastructure? mr. rogers: thank you, madam secretary. it is shocking you remember that. this is a great idea. most states have gone to

counterterrorist position. they realize they have issues they are going to have to address. coordinating an effort with first responders and hospital systems. even down in michigan. county government was having folks committed. there are firefighters here. that is a great place to start. they will be the first ones to show up. those are the ones you want to engage with state legislators. they can be engaged with members of congress. it is a joint effort. the states can be expected to bear the cost. you need to bring federal resources. the only way you're going to get the message told is to have them

engaged. all of them have different titles. the positions be engaged in this conversation. actively working to talk to their delegation. what their needs are. it cannot be i need another fire truck. it has to be we need to be prepared when emts show up to a scene, where there may have been a biological weapons discharge. it is a conversation that needs to be had. ms. shalala: our recommendations should include the role of the states. mr. rogers: absolutely. ms. shalala: it is a different coalition when you start adding states. mr. rogers: they're not going to have the resources that the federal government is going to have.

you are going to want to do this anyway -- one of the things we found after 9/11, everybody wanted everything all at the same time. it is not possible. you have to put a matrix together that says -- maybe it does not rise to the level of getting the first 10 -- of money. i can say that now. i probably could not say that some months ago. i would like to correct the record if i may. this is the challenge that you all have as well as legislators. making sure that when there is a good idea -- if we're not doing new york city, los angeles and places we know are on the immediate list -- they should be pretty high on the priority list. those are targets.

it does not mean the others aren't. that is the challenge. that is how you engage the legislators. the all want to be a part. mr. ridge: that is a great statement you make. we have been privileged to have substantial careers. you can't do it from a physical point of view. you can't do it from the issues we're talking about. you need to develop those relationships. you can't secure the country from inside the beltway. why not reach out to engage governors and big-city mayors? i think it is critical across the board. cap, do you have a question. -- ken, do you have a question. mr. rogers: i do them all.

ms. shalala: the state legislators. mr. rogers that is great for the panel's release. try to draw people and would be affected. mr. wainstein: thank you. one of the panels will focus on leadership. sort of assess what leadership has been in place over the years. you talked about there is a lack of focus. concern about what is a serious threat. it is the executive branch that has got to carry that ball. it has to maintain the focus on a threat like that, that may not be on the front page every day. you have a front row seat watching the executive branch. the function and dysfunction as

it relates to this issue. there have been a number of proposals. different positions at the white house to try and raise the profile of this issue. do you have any thoughts about where there might be thoughts right now in terms of leadership in the executive ranch? -- executive branch? mr. rogers: when we first decided we would be engaged early on, based on the threats we were seeing coming across our desks. we said why don't we get the bio defense with the executive branch.

that was the same look that we got. well, we know people who are experts. we found those folks. there was no court needing effort. this is what i found in sting -- this is what i found interesting. now you're asking people who are engaged every single day in a very serious matter of public health to deal with something that has to do with terrorism. obviously, they understand the consequences. it was a little out of their lane. they are worried about keeping their emergency rooms open. why am i worried about this? and was not in their lane. i think there is some value in finding a place where you can coordinate all of the information of threat, and integrated with the public health side of it. there is always going to be a

difference of opinion. or a different attitude. if you are in the intelligence business, and your as to stop threats, you see this as your job to worry about this. if you are a public health person worrying about all the other things on your desk, it is probably pretty low. how do you reconcile that? i think there is cross pollination. to have some of the ability for hhs folks to have the exposure to classified information. having the opportunity to be over there. every time we do this, a whole organization comes with it. secretary ridge would not know anything about that. i get a little nervous about saying let us do that. i think you can push in a different way.

ask your secretaries to find out who they want to appoint as the point person on these issues. that is a management function that works in the private sector. as long as someone knows they have been pointed they will do it. the problem is they always like that bit of authority. saying that you're going to work with this person in this position. until will work with this position -- until will work with this position. i think you can get much more out of it. have those briefings come back to congress. forcing them to go through the managing process. make sure relationships work. a lot cheaper. mr. ridge: we continue to deal with that issue.

one of the ways that it would affect change, is control purse strings. whether or not this person -- if they go out and do it with towers. that interagency collaboration is critically important. so much duress -- so much jurisdictional overlap. very dramatically. mr. rogers: a problem coming to a comment -- they are designed to solve the sets of problems. none of these problems exactly fit. ms. shalala: a committee structure does not lend itself to integrating funding. mr. rogers: does not lend itself to much productivity. i think even the dni has 22

different committees. he has to show up and testify in front of. congress needs to get itself together. we are good at telling others to get themselves together. you may suggest not to fix the whole thing. to try and limit a reasonable number of cross committee reports. how much staff time do we spend in these departments trying to get ready for those briefings? 22 briefings. anything that happens, we lose the dni were a. of one month. -- dni for a period of a month. you kind of scratch ahead and go why is he testifying? what are we getting out of that? that may be a whole new blue-ribbon panel.

mr. ridge: dni only had 22. homeland security has over 100. i thought maybe we should take a look at the restructuring. not a bad idea. mr. rogers: you could use a section here. if you want to streamline how this gets done, it forces that management structure of that relationship. you can do it. you have to do it with a smaller number of committees, so you're not spending all of your time, creating -- your time, briefing 100 committees. you cannot get any focus because it is so broad. you're going to spend your time on the hill talking to 100, not that is not delightful. >> you mentioned the challenge

of being one customer. can you talk about how barta is working. i'm not interested in the funding question percent. mr. rogers: is great to see you again. that is a difficult question. in the beginning, we had countermeasures that existed that were looking for outlets. now you have this new funding stream. try to plug in as fast as you can. it is all good. developing of those products. to your point, is that the most efficient way to get a countermeasure that is sophisticated? if you recall, there was a big debate on anthrax. the next generation of anthrax that did not require the number of shots -- i think it was 13.

very long process. it was pretty difficult to convince first responders to go through this regime. the military did not have a choice. you get it. first responders were thinking thanks but no thanks very did that process slow down the next generation. i am not sure. i would have to look at all of the information. i think we got over that hurdle. i think the last problem with urgent showed they got the hint. it is a more efficient prophylactic measure that they can apply. it may be down to 3. i should not say the numbers because i do not know them well enough. that is something we are going to have to watch. the value of that money.

challenging the next generation of countermeasures. much like the market would do on its own. without that market push, it is not going to happen. i think the fund is going to have to operate anyway that takes money and says we are willing to bet on the next generation. you are going to have to improve your product but we may go in a different direction. without market pressure, i worry the outcome will be mediocre countermeasures. >> what percent would you assign? mr. rogers: i would have to think about that. it is one of the things we do not have -- any stockpiles for countermeasures. it was getting lower. we had two problems facing us. congress and the administration -- you do not want it -- you do not want to have the

inappropriate amount of countermeasures. terrorists were interested in this particular type of anthrax. it was something they could produce here in the united states. they do not have to import it. that one you have to take by individual case. we have to stockpile anthrax vaccines. when we look at that, if we do not do this yesterday, we are making a mistake. which is what we ended up doing. this new generation of vaccines -- fill in the blank here it -- blank. at that time, you could free up more percentage for the next generation. that five-year contract may not be yours. you're going to have to work on the next generation. we're going to take this money and invest it. basic on what the threat is. i am nervous about this demonic lake -- this bubonic plague.

if you're thinking about it, we have to think about how to react to it. things we work. that was really good work. dr. libby -- mr. ridge: dr. libby? dr. libby: i think you said terrorists have open space to pursue this area. what did you mean by that? roscoe if you look at isis, they occupy land about the size of indiana. when you have that much space and they did take government facilities -- an opportunity for them to be more engaged in research that i feel comfortable with. by owning that much space, it is

not going well. they continue to hold ground. they continue to push back here it they continue to frustrate opportunities to disrupt their ability to have research and development centers. right now they have centers. i argue that is a dangerous combination for us and our european allies. dr. libby: they have that ability today? mr. rogers: i would say this is worse than 2001. in afghanistan, they had freedom of operation there. now they have capabilities to -- for research and development parts. the capability to do that in tribal areas of both pakistan and afghanistan did not lend

itself -- you could do rudimentary stuff. they use that to plan physical attacks. here, you have the ability to do both. you have electricity on the four hours a day. you have access to engineering material and chemistry. lab space. all the things that make you cringe a little bit, if you are thinking about what comes out of there. the longer they have freedom of operation in any space, i think that is dangerous to the net states and our allies. -- dangerous to the united states and our allies. >> we have heard before that members of congress that are interested sometimes have trouble getting the full picture of biological threats. sometimes a get different

readings from different -- sometimes they get different readings from different parts of the government. do you have suggestions on how to get more copperheads of picture of the problem before members of cotton -- get more comprehensive pictures of the problem the four members of congress? mr. rogers: the big briefings i find not valuable. they are trying to hold back as much as they can, and not answer questions. they are really hard to do. some people are interested in the issues. some people walk up to the microphone and ask you about the bridge and fill in the blank. why have you not protected that? some of these things you scratch her head at. you have to find a venue that is focused. we used to do this when i was

chairman. we try to do this the nsa leak or issue. to try and get members who are not in the national security space to get connected to the facts about what happened. what does the government do to protect sensitive permission. i found that to be valuable. we cross pollinate it. -- we cross pollinated. we need people who can answer really detailed questions. a lot of cases it will be well below any politically appointed position in the government. working operators doing this work for a living. we found by putting them in a room they felt comfortable and asking questions.

if i do not know anything about by a defense, i do not want to look like an idiot. which is why you do not see me asking very difficult questions about agriculture. i leave that to someone who knows. you can open that aperture and understand why folks worry. you can also do it through the hudson institute, think tanks. he will not have declassified portions. you can give a strong historical look based on what we do know today on what this aspirational threat is for staff, we should not ignore that.

i found it with valuable -- it was valuable. big cattle calls to not work. >> one final question, dr. alexander. >> on your point about the role of educational institutions -- dealing with the present -- perception of the threat, not only in terms of congress, but in terms of society, my question is what is an example of the role of the media in order to live with that particular challenge. not in terms of weapon is -- weapons of mass destruction, but cyber threats and other threats and the level of priorities, in terms of what is the top

priority and what can congress do? >> if someone could tell me how the media works. i would like to know. these are really hard and kabul gated issues. it is very hard to fit into a 15 second or 32nd sound bite. unfortunately, the only way to get attention is to say remember when the cloud got violated, people had intimate pictures -- that got people's attention. mainly because they wanted to cb stars they liked naked. how do you have that conversation about what happened what allowed them to crack into the cloud, get into a secure server and steel something that was private. that was the conversation we should have had. we never had that conversation. the media never allowed us to publicly. same with bio defense, i find it

hard to get people interested because it is not in your face. it should be. the strange station attack in japan, gas, scary stuff. it took the lives of real people that commuted to work every day. the vulnerabilities that we have in our larger cities, how would you react. it is very hard because it isn't something that has happened here. think of a chemical weapon, we had a difficult time getting their attention on the impact of chemical weapons and what exactly that meant when they were starting to use these stockpiles and what was available. i thought that was a important discussion. whenever had it. it was hard to get out. that is a terrible answer, only

because i do not know the answer. you have to keep at it. the best way you can keep an impact is if you are making an impact with members of congress, then that starts to take on a weight of its own. and when people start getting interested, that is how you get there. it is a common nation of all of that. you have to get executives and legislative branch, they have to agree. that is a long process that the media could play a part in. i hate to say it, but you can't count on it. it is hard to have conversations in the media today. >> we want to thank you on behalf of the hudson institute. thank you for your extraordinary public service. thank you for your thoughtful, and candid answers. as a fellow we may be back as

we pull the report together to get the details right particularly in areas we talked about today. >> thank you for your public service. thank you for having me. when i said the media was not quite getting it right, i did not mean cnn. wink wink. [laughter] thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> on the next washington journal, we will be joined by writers from the daily beast website to discuss the key policy debates in washington. first a conversation with editor in chief john adlon. then, nancy youssef will discuss the fight against isis, the iran nuclear negotiations, and other security challenges. later senior politics editor will discuss the religious

freedom debate and what it means to the republican party. washington journal is live every morning at 7:00 in the morning. you can join the conversation with your calls and comments on faith look and twitter -- facebook and twitter. >> the national council on u.s. air of relations posted a discussion on the violence and instability in yemen and the future of that country. speakers include the ambassador to the u.s. and yemen specialist. see it live at 10:00 eastern here on c-span. >> the most memorable moment of this week for me with. senator gardner say you need to be firm and your principles, but flexible in details. i think it reflects the solution, the harsh polarization we are seeing across our country

. the methodology if all of the senators, congressmen and women legislatures can adopt we can come together as a country and solve our issues. >> my favorite quote came from julie adams, the secretary of the senate, she said remember to be humble and have a strong worth -- work ethic. the people you meet on your way up you will meet on your way down. >> congress itself has a lack of true statesman. as much as i disagree, senator john mccain did something impressive, he committed to the veterans affairs reform bill. reading the senate torture report and maintaining how staying away from torture is essential to our democracy. at the point where we have people who are willing to cross the aisle and make these decisions with people who they may not often agree with, that is what we need to maintain the secretary -- security of our nation. >> high school students who

generally rank in the top 1% of their state were in washington dc as part of the united states senate youth program. sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific. >> freelance journalist james foley was beheaded in august when a 14, becoming the first american killed by the group. next a panel on journalist hostages, including the parents of james foley who tried to save their son. and their frustrations with the federal government. and terry anderson who was held hostage for seven years and lebanon. this is 90 minutes. >> journalism has changed enormously over the last two decades, information that once moved at the speed of a printing press, now moves at the speed of light. smartphones and the internet have put the whole world in the

palm of our hands. yet, that relentless stream of news has not made the world more comprehensible, speed and technology are one thing context is something else. for me, and for my colleagues in the school of journalism serious journalism, the idea of journalism that we share with students begins with a simple idea. it is about being there. not just to get the story, but to help illuminate places. it is about people crossing frontiers and hope to bring light to stories of people who live in the world darker places. yet these days, this journalism comes at a terrible price. it is that reality that brings us together tonight. john and diane foley and terry anderson can attest firsthand to this brutal truth. we are grateful to them and my former colleague for sharing their experiences and thoughts

about this hard new world. today, journalists are seen as a target, not only by terrorist organizations and narcotics cartels, but by oppressive governments. sense the early 1990's, more than 1100 journalists have been killed, or kidnapped, or driven into exile. the total includes local reporters who lived and worked in these places. it includes a growing number of freelancers, americans and other westerners who have it been and to cover faraway conflict zones. the center for global journalism was launched to try and bring greater focus to challenges being faced by journalists everywhere as they engage in a globalized and more perilous world. working with academic departments across campus and leveraging the work of our journalism school faculty, not only a along the borders, but in the middle east and afghanistan, we hope to explore programs and initiatives to preserve and

extend the kind of the free and independent global reporting that is essential to a democratic society. what can we all do as professionals, educators advocates, to support journalists who are out there now? how can we train and equip them and keep them as safe as possible? leading this discussion tonight is my colleague more to rosenbloom, a member of the faculty in the journalism school. more to is a former correspondent for the associated press. he ran bureaus in africa asia, and europe. he is the author of several books on reporting and over his career has filed stories out of 200 different countries, and number of which he likes to point out, no longer exist. as mort knows, the essential qualities of a good correspondent has not changed over time. now as then, it is about curiosity, intelligence,

importantly it is about empathy and more than ever, these days it is about courage. >> the numbers are shocking, but tell only part of the story. behind the statistics are victims that do not know what will happen next, and families that can only hope and pray for something better than the worst. in some regions, the death toll for journalists rises with an outbreak of war. it happened in south east asia in the 1960's and 1970's. in other places, such as a nearby border, the danger is ever present.

since 1992, 32 journalists have been killed in mexico. until the 1980's, most victims were casualties of war. journalist were seen as observers, not part of the news, and were seldom targeted. then, in 1985, terry anderson, the associated press -- in beirut, was muscled into a green mercedes. seven years past the four he could meet his daughter who was born while he was chained to a wall. his captures and were on the fringes of the iranian hezbollah , when told him as if it were comfort don't worry this is , political. when anderson asked his guard gave him a new red bible. the associated press executives worked with u.s. officials to get him released. the situation changed after 9/11, journalists were targeted for what they wrote, what they represented. in 2002, wall street journal reporter daniel pearl was executed as he pursued al qaeda activity in pakistan. in the years since, the number

of journalists who have become victims has increased at an alarming rate. the threat can be seen clearly near the normandy beaches and france. in a tree shaded park, the monument to reporters 28 columns have been engraved since world war ii with more than 2000 names. men and women who have fallen on battlefields, or killed in accidents while covering the news. since 2001, many of the names have been those of journalist hired in their own societies to get stories that outsiders cannot reach. other names are those of freelancers, who ventured from the united states and other nations to cover news in the most dangerous areas, without the continuing support of a large news organization. now, with so many freelancers, in the field people such as , david mccraw are working to confront the circumstances faced by journalists and families in perilous situations. this year, a fresh name engraved

in the monument symbolizes the spirit and courage not only a , freelance journalist, but also the family and friends who support them. james foley survived imprisonment in libya. he was executed on camera. his message of the importance of news with clear. the reporter must be there to tell the story. his parents now work tirelessly to make sure that an easily distracted world hears this message. his death is no reason to turn away from the danger. on the contrary, in america and other nations, people must support journalists who choose to go into dangerous places on the public's behalf. >> thank you all for coming. we have some serious business to discuss this evening.

in fact, what can be more important than our eyes and ears in the most perilous places. briefly, some background before we start. about two seconds after i met diane and john foley in france i knew this meeting had to happen. people seldom get so warm and wonderful, as you will see in a moment. but their courage and strength are beyond any words i can come up with. among those white columns, you just saw, we mourn also a young french reporter killed on the border in the central african republic. diane put aside her own grief to comfort her mother. the foley's message is wise and unwavering. we need those brave journalists out there in the ugliest parts of the world to reflect

realities that we almost understand. we have to realize what too many learned the hard way, the prices -- price is high not only for , them but friends and families at home. the foley's have started a foundation, we will talk about it tonight. the message to mind my old friend terry anderson, a colleague from the ap, for seven years, like so many others, i wore a bracelet with his name on it, awaiting his release. when he emerged from the lions den none of us could believe his , towering spirit, his strength of spirit. today, he teaches young people exactly what the foleys taught us. reporters must be out there. even today, for terry, it is still up close and intensely personal. salome, that cute little kid that we saw, she is a reporter covering stories and lebanon

like her father. i asked terry last night, if he was worried about her. duh. happily enough, some gifted people work tirelessly to help journalists in trouble. among them is david mccraw. the new york times fifth amendment lawyez looked at it and said, nice joke. they said in arizona, maybe be second amendment lawyer. but it is the first. [laughter] but i underscored the first amendment. he is also with us this evening. we are extremely grateful to have this panel. actually, the foleys are here because john got tired of shoveling snow in new hampshire.

david accepted the invitation without a second hesitation. thank you for coming. when i left tucson, from here, in the 1960's to get mixed up in faraway mayhem, you had to be pretty unlucky or unaware to get into serious trouble. my first post was the congo, covering a mercenary war, with drug crazed rebels with machetes who believed that their magic amulets. we knew who they were and we stayed out of their way. and the pentagon before they tried to limit our access, and therefore increase ager, we could go anywhere. in asia, africa, the middle east, latin america, we journalists were simply observers not part of the , stories. pretty much, across the board combatants left us alone so we could tell their side.

today, all of that has changed. we are no longer a definable press corps with correspondents that know one another and bosses back home watching our backs. freelance independent and local reporters hired at low wages operate on their own. freelance means, no wages, you get what you sell. the governments arrest them, militias and terrorist groups hold them hostage, gangs with no political purpose kidnapped and for ransom. that is our topic for tonight. what now? keep in mind, because people tend to forget this, we are talking about journalists. if we as journalists ask our government to protect us, we are asking them to control us. it is a serious conundrum, because that is not what we are, we are not representatives of

anybody's government, or anyone's anything. at the same time, u.s. citizens elect a government to do their business. and one job description is helping americans stay alive. we are not a policy pond for any administration. so let me start with terry. terry, if you could give us a brief rundown of how the u.s. government first worked with hostage families back in the early 1980's and then talk about the associated press, what changed, how do you see it evolving? terry: the american government used to look at hostage taking as a criminal enterprise. just as you do in crimes that involve hostages, what is the

first that you do, you bring in a negotiator. that doesn't mean you will give them anything or you will reward them, but you will talk. by the mid-1980's, by 1985 when i was taken, the reagan administration was insisting that they would not negotiate with terrorists. as we all know, those of us who can remember the iran contra affair they were negotiating , with terrorists as a political -- practical matter until they became public and then they stopped. up until that point, they were talking to families of hostages. my sister, peg whom many of you , may remember, she was a front person for a group of families

and it was very outspoken in her advocacy and pressure on the government to get something done. the man in the white house, the marine lieutenant colonel, and she went to him frequently. and then all of a sudden, it stopped. it got cut off. now, president reagan said we do not negotiate with terrorists and we mean it, it will not happen. but the terrorists did not believe it for quite a while. but, more importantly, the people in the government that we , our families had been going to for information and help, they took refusal to negotiate to mean, don't talk to anybody. the cut everybody off.

that has pretty much continued since then. and i think that mr. and mrs. foley can testify that that is the way that it goes. it would tell the families, keep quiet, we are doing everything we can, but in fact, it was an excuse to do nothing. which was a real problem. mort: thank you terry. that is sounding familiar. what has been your experience, you and john? mrs. foley: this was his second capture, for jim. he had been in captivity for 44 days in libya. which in retrospect was so brief, but at least they're his

-- there his capture had been witnessed by a new york times reporter, and we knew that he was held by the government, and thus the state department took the lead rather clearly in that case. we were in touch with the state department. actually, it was another person that got him out, nevertheless the state department was in touch with us. the second time was very different. we had no idea who had taken jim. he did not report back to his colleagues on thanksgiving day and we received a call from another freelancer who had been awaiting his return, that jim did not show up. that they had been stopped at gunpoint and captured. so, we did not know what to do. it was surreal that this would happen again. jim was freelance, so we had no

organization behind him to come and take care of things, take charge. so we were frantic, really. fbi eventually contacted us and told us that they would take the lead because this was a kidnap of an american citizen outside of the country. we thought that was good, we needed help. that is how it started. mr. foley: almost immediately, the fbi convinced us to go into media silence. the captors felt similarly. in hindsight, that is one of my biggest regret. media silence helped to -- two entities, the fbi and the other is the captors.

the fbi had no pressure to go forward with jim's situation and to the captors wanted silence for obvious reasons. so, this went on and after about six weeks we were hearing absolutely nothing. we were frantic. we were able to secure services of a security team through the global post and we began our search, but for one year we really didn't know where he was, whether he was alive. mrs. foley: at that time what , was most difficult, we really had it no person in the government to go to. we had no one who was accountable for jim, if you will, or any others who were kidnapped. i started a series of trips to washington, going to the state

department and the fbi, just to remind them that jim was still missing. we didn't know if he was alive or not, and such. we were very disappointed. we had no access to anyone with any power or any information. and we were not allowed to be part of the effort to get our son out. i know that we can do better, as families. we were at many points, i was appalled at the way that we were treated in some incidences. mr. foley: i think it is important, that for a year and a half, diane and i were both told that jim's situation was the highest priority, that everything possible was being done, but they could tell is nothing because it was classified.

mort: what did they tell you if you had gone ahead and started talking about ransom on your own? mr. foley: there was a senior person -- mrs. foley: from the security council. mr. foley: we got the families together, this was may of he was 2014, very blunt. he said the same thing, we are not going after him, we are not going to negotiate, and number three, we will not pay ransom, and number four, if you try to collect money you will be prosecuted or would be highly likely you would be prosecuted. at that point, we realized we were on our own. unfortunately that was two years later. we said, what the heck. i would rather be in jail here then jimmy over there. we began to raise money in terms of pledges, we do not want to

handle the money. it is very difficult to collect money from somebody, or ask for donations, who might wind up in jail. we struggled with that, but we had some fine individuals who were going to go to battle with -- go to bat with us. mort: as it turns out, there is a new public information person at the department of the state who is one of us. he was a tremendous investigator -- investigative reporter at the new york times, it in a los angeles, as it happens i worked with him just after 9/11, we were both in pakistan. we were trying to get across the border and doug is a really good reporter. going over, he was working on -- committee and now he is at the state department, so my ques