biological agents and their affect on people. the hazmat teams and other specialized contractors to be in charge of decontaminating the scene. we absolutely would be reliant on local law enforcement to play a huge role in seen security and begin the investigative activity associated with the event once the incident is identified as a terrorist attack. during the response, depending on the nature and complexity of it, the local joint terrorism task force and others say federal authorities including national guard units would be alerted and brought in to assist. if the attack involved a chemical weapon support teams may be required to help with the response. it would also be very important in this type of incident to prevent further panic in the area. emergency responders would have to be very cognizant of vigilant about the threat of a secondary device. an important difference between an

accidental hazard material and chemical terrorist attack is the necessity of working with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to preserve evidence and maintain seen security for the criminal investigation. a little bit more complex situation might involve an infectious disease such as smallpox and in that event, the public health community would play a larger role in working with us to manage that incident. it would be important to track down who was exposed to the disease and who came in contact with these patients in this type of event this is where you see symptoms they not be present or may not arise immediately, but in the doing days. although each of these agents are chemical involved, might have their own intricacies. there are some

commonalities within response to a chemical or biological attack. firstly accurate information is one of the most aspect of that. one of the goals of a terrorist attack is to cause public panic. it is important accurate information about the incident he related to the public in responding agencies to eliminate as much panic and eliminate as much confusion as possible. obviously in the age of social media and initially there will be a rush of inaccurate information and it will be a comment on authorities make sure they track that process that properly for the reason of trying to get as much accurate information as possible so we can keep panic down to a minimum. during the recent ebola situation here in the country, fire fighters depended on their leadership to provide

accurate information about ebola symptoms, what precautions you take when teaching possible ebola victims and what steps they should take to prevent them from exposing the families at home. another response to the chemical or biological attack would be a coordinated incident command structure be put in place. fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, emergency management would coordinate after including public health as they mentioned and possibly military national guard unit. the national incident management system is designed to provide the capability for federal, state and local partners to work and operate together. again, during the recent ebola scare us, there were questions of which organizations would serve as commander in some cases decisions were made outside the command system and not just tends to cause a little more

confusion than is necessary. another component â >> nims has been designed across the board to be deployed regionally and nationally, i hate to interrupt here, but you've got a jurisdiction to deal with response and recovery effort continues to perplex me. what was the harper? >> again, when you bring in the public health community that ordinarily might not be involved in an emergency especially the media stage is of an emergency type of incident. again, when you deal with something such as ebola if they haven't been used to it used to it and you haven't been exercising the saturday program in a training environment, every component of that or

everybody that might begin to manage the incident by not be used to operating that type of structure. >> appreciate that. i won't interrupt again. >> another important component of the responses training. it is absolutely essential that local firsters ponders trading for acts of terrorism including chemical or biological incident, regular basis. these events are low-frequency, but very high risk, which means there will be a few actual veterans of these types of responses. again, from the ebola situation we learn firefighters have a better confidence and responsive leadership they have adequate information, high-quality training and protective equipment. as an example, there a number of youtube videos about how to remove the equipment after an ebola patient which would be

dangerously incorrect and misleading. obviously, availability and having the necessary equipment as they lead into what is essential with first responders of adequate amounts to respond to these types of attacks. the national association of fire chiefs recommend fire department theo to stabilize the situation for 72 hours before federal assistance arrives. one of our concerns from recent events as we found there was a six to eight week backorder of the personal protective equipment necessary for ebola responses. in terms of preparedness for a chemical or biological attack, a few recommendations for ensuring effectiveness would be one that the federal government must provide accurate in town the threat information to local first responders considering the multitude of potential threat and certainly we still

see budgetary constraints of local government, local first responders need to know which drives they should prepare for. if groups promote violent extremism and publishing training materials on the internet or social media, the federal government should provide information about what tactics and techniques are being taught in order for the local entities and agencies to be prepared. the local joint terrorism task force or fusion centers are working to build strong relationships with local law enforcement to help local fire to obtain the information. >> chief, i will tell you why. i know you've got lengthy testimony. i would like you to submit it as part of the record in who would be pleased to review it. i think your colleagues have statements to review as well. we would like is submitted as

part of the record. if you would be kind enough to conclude and if there's anything you want to add, this is an important panel and i would like to give the advisory board a chance to interact with you. >> i will just wrap up by saying is important for federal local agencies to plan exercise using chemical or biological agents. the private her has a big role to play with the governmental agencies both a local, state and federal level and a vital component. the apartment again, some agencies that exist out there to provide them with the training. i can't stress enough the collaboration that needs to take place from all levels of government from the local level

on up to be prepared for these type of incidents. thank you for allowing me to be here. but it got to answer the questions. >> we are grateful for your participation. i've got a couple questions for my colleagues. >> again, i am the senior adviser for engineering extension service at texas a&m university. i also have a private-sector practice of occupational and environmental medicine and that may be germane to some of the comments i have. i have been asked to speak specifically. i am going to speak more specifically to the health care system that may be associated with that. the first thing i will say most of the settings the first request is actually advocacy for additional

funding. i will focus away from that although i would say they can use the resources. i will also offer the absent come adequate and appropriate strategies for those resources money that is missed and to the point of folly and it's very important that we look at the issues taking place are chemically in the health care system and how that might affect what we do with the strategies. on that point, i will give a quick address to send issues we know. health care systems are in general competition. they are businesses and we expect them to somehow uniform and seamlessly integrate during an adverse event. this will be especially arduous but things like them pictures of these scenarios are bio defense issues. coalescence of health care is important to understand how it came to be. health care systems are corporations and in that capacity they grow like other corporations either organically by having practices unaccomplished in the

marketplace or by acquisition in which case the acquisition may be a bit distressed company that is vulnerable to assimilate procedures and policies or they acquire a successful entity that is doing things well and thus resistant to taking new policies. in any case we see the situations allow for some integration between platforms and software those become vulnerabilities when we talk about events such as the fire disaster. when we say why did the electronic medical record transition are wider than the fact is, that may be why. that is to be understood in advance of the preparedness activities. in her a resource has done more to adjust platform. that is different than what we regard as massive stockpiling and warehousing capabilities. good for business, not so good for disasters. many government programs have addressed this with regard to resourcing of strategic stockpiles and things of that

nature. the chief illustrate about what we talked about the pb issue that about the pb issue that there is no doubt some vulnerabilities when you to talk about with these things. i want to talk about the human resource issue because that's important as well. one of the major breakdowns of human error or human issue is to be understood and anticipated sometimes. understanding the way that health care workers are going to integrate in the system now and how it is changing its instrumental in preparing appropriately. one can think as recently as 10 to 15 years ago that the position of the health care system is there an independent contractor. they were an advocate for the patient, but then they had a different leveraging position with the health care system. nurses traditionally were employees of the health care system. the paradigm is inverted now where we see in many cases nurses are part of a group that practices embarks on an agency basis. physicians more and more status out of the labor statistics analysis where the anticipation

is that 75% of physicians may well be employees. that changes the concept and the compensation reward mechanisms with the groups. this is important. this is an economic organic reality that needs to be understood. similarly speaking. i like the background music. that's wonderful. >> sorry. >> no, that's perfectly fine. there was an issue of ebola and then are seen involved, the numbers stood out when they asked nurses for familiarity are having read the disaster for the contingency plan for the hospital, 8% of knowledge they had. that is a disturbing number. that was reported to the media. whether that's accurate or not. but it does belie an issue. some of those

things with the way they integrate speak to that. i have been trained and have been taught almost to a punitive extreme than not supposed to bring problems to the table without offering solutions, so i will try and do that now. what you really need to do is think about what we do in terms of training with regard to the personnel. the way to do that, i believe, and there's been discussion to look at this in terms of an old military cause further duties explained. if you are on the ship in the peel potatoes, you also have a battle station during a good time the health care cohort might well be served by.and there are mechanisms to have been for paramedics or mps. they were stirred -- state certifying agencies that go out and do the job they are going to do. they're a state boards of medical examiners or state medical boards and nursing boards similarly. where those

are different if you live from the organization to board certifications as we talk about license issues and that is instrumental to people being able to function. those are excellent mechanisms. in many states, there've been analyses done. university of maryland did some analyses with the nurse practitioner provisions in their statutes. it was interesting but cannot because there are dissimilarities, but a greater number of similarities. to understand how a compulsion if you will terms of renewal might include some preparedness mechanism may be valuable in that hasn't been fully explored. similarly with physicians, we see more and more specific cme is called and i think that what not. this might also be a piece taken on and i would engage the community to advise on matt and get a better return on the absurd. i mention the board. i would also offer hospitals and

health care systems proper there's been a great deal of discussion of how we would engage in a chair and health care coalitions of sars approaches are concerned should be undertaken. i do support that. health care coalitions are large, monstrous animals in terms of what they entail. many different equities come in many supervisory mechanisms. you are talking about an entire community with the health care system. it's valuable, the most successful in the broadest taking. so it will add new challenges. hospitals and health care entities, we saw during ebola and understudy state considerations with a variety of types of pathologies, trauma, burns heart attacks, cardiac care and strokes, we see stratification within health care systems at different hospitals being

leveled this versus level data and how patients are transferred or handled. it doesn't make sense but apart from that with bio defense or something like that. ebola illustrated guide and we ended up ultimately the centers for ebola care within understanding hospitals would then feed those patients if someone presented to the emergency department. this is where some organization like the joint commission would be valuable. they've undertaken this with other specific types of health care considerations or specialties. i think i would be a great area for additional consideration to take place. the joint commission is wonderful way they execute this. they could be a valuable service in helping to bolster the insensible aspects of the health care system. i am out of breath and i think i've exhausted attention. i will

yield the floor to my colleague at this point. >> thank you. >> good morning and thank you for the opportunity to address the panel. i would like to focus the remarks by recent example of one of the more typical scenarios, the wide area release. this scenario illustrates many challenges we face in preparing for and responding to violent threats. white area anthrax poses complexities generally not seen in a typical hazardous materials believes. clearly definable contaminated areas would not be known, may be spread over a large area. because contamination levels throughout the affected area cannot be known with precision i've run across a broad geographical area must be assumed at risk and as a result responders need to assume all people in the area in the order 7 million most major college in areas the antimicrobial postexposure plexus. i would like to have a few issues for consideration. although we tend to focus on the public health and medical consequences of a

large-scale biological attack, it would be much more than a public health emergency. it'd be a national security crisis. by definition this would not be a naturally occurring disease outbreak and would not behave as such. this is the work of thinking, plotting and reacting enemy and the enemy would combine multiple violations, engineer the violation to be resistant to countermeasures for you to use conventional weapons to attack secondary targets of opportunity such as large crowds of people gathered together a point of dispensing. due to the delay of more than 24 hours to recognize a covert attack with our bio detection capabilities, consider the domestic and international travel into and out of our major u.s. cities in that 24 hour period from the moment of attack to the moment of recognition. by the time an attack is recognized and individuals who may have been exposed to be scattered across the country and in fact across the globe. moreover, attack

anywhere with heightened concerns for major metro areas everywhere due to the concern of reloaded secondary attacks. an event may be international in scope by the time it's even recognize. second, immediate response of dispensing countermeasures to the population of the major metro area in the opening hours is critical to prevent loss of life. challenges associated with the times associated with the times and contest are significant. in the event of an anthrax attack, oral animatics need to be started in 40 hours of exposure to minimize illness and end of prophylactic antibiotics are effective only if given before illness or symptoms occur. because there's an inherent delay with existing detection systems, responders like we have far less than 48 hours to complete the task. third, little can be done after the initial period to make up

or recover from a failure to provide a postexposure prophylaxis. the response including federal government assistance must be immediate and cannot fail. that is why preparedness and response efforts have been so frontloaded focusing on this immediate mission, the rapid distribution and dispensing of countermeasures. the challenge they face is how to assist cities within the narrow time window and if i response is not fast enough, life hangs in the balance. they're not the most pressing challenges we face. one, rapid detection identification of the bio threat appeared to come immediate coordination of an olive government, all of nation respond. immediate access to life-saving medications and vaccines and maintenance of public safety and security without which the distribution of dispensing of life-saving medications would be impossible. given these challenges, the expectation in local jurisdiction is on a sound for the first 48 hours during a disaster does not

apply. the immediate challenges have been described as the four d's to simplify the challenge we face. detect comedy side, distribute and defend. improving detection comment form in an accelerating decision-making that would be chaotic and confusing are critical to mobilize a timely and effective response to minimize the loss of life. this all presumes that capability to detect an attack. by detection and bio surveillance activities enemies to activities enemies according to mobilize an olive government response to help maintain public safety and security and assist at the distribution of countermeasures and three, the adequate supplies of countermeasures

available to the first place. i will focus on the second and third and fourth. others have addressed the issues of surveillance and buyer protection in the importance of recognizing a bio attack. in terms of the second e., decision-making, the federal government has protocols for coordinating all of government response and other rapidly evolving threats such as maritime and aviation threats. in 2011 the federal government established an analogous protocol for wanting to bio threats. the biological assessment and response for batter. the purpose was to respond to it by a thread by enhancing a situational enhancement and more effectively direct the resources of federal government with immediate response. as important a process -- i understand the acronym has changed over time. it's regularly exercise and import triggers for activating the process include scenarios for uncertainty and ambiguity and indecision might delay recognition and response to a bio threat. the last two distribute and offense are the most daunting. we face the challenge bounded by the physics of reality. how quickly

can we mobilize and distribute and dispense antibiotics. how can we mobilize federal personnel and asset to assist with maintaining public safety and security as well as countermeasure distribution and unseen. i will quickly mention what strategy. one strategy for mobilizing federal personnel and assets is to make a difference to leverage the assets in place working in or near the impacted cities. what agency with expertise in distribution is the postal service. the postal service is the second-largest federal agency in the federal government with approximately 600,000 employees. one out of every four employees were for the u.s. postal service. and they are present in all communities across the united states. six days each week they

exercise a capability for every household and business in the united states. the potential advantages of leveraging the postal service capability to deliver animatics are readily apparent. in 2009, the president signed executive order 12357 for establishing capability for the countermeasures following a biological attack. the postal model was singled out and mentioned in the executive order. postal service and five other federal agencies, dod, ba, homeland security, department of justice and health and human services account for three fourths of the civilian federal work force and encompass key capabilities needed including security and public safety, logistics and delivery and public health and medical care. work still needs to be done to integrate up in a capability until local response plan to mobilize assets to take time during event to minimize delays, potential responders want to have immediate access to countermeasures for themselves and families. the executive order called for establishing a mechanism for the provision of countermeasures to ensure

functions of federal agencies could continue. the key component of a postal model could be achieved for the responders for workplace for the issuance of home assistance. this all underscores the importance of reducing time to detect an attack to mobilize response and distribute and dispense countermeasures. it also highlights to be flexible and prepared for surprise because the incident and was once may not unfold as expected. given how difficult it is to quantify a bio attack and quantifies investment in the face of many competing priorities facing federal, state and local governments as well as budget realities, we must look for the most efficient, cost-effective and sustainable threat that will protect americans and safeguard our nation against the threat. thank you again for this opportunity. >> thank you both very, very much. let me start if i could. chief one of the areas that emergency responders have depending on

the state are the mutual aid capabilities, what they don't necessarily build up the capability within every fire station or community to respond to every conceivable challenge but within that region is talked about regionalization. doc tears minson, you talked about regionalization. as you take a look at the resources and the jurisdictions of the chief, how effective is the mutual aid concept in terms of gaining support nationally to respond to the variety of challenges at either the physical act of terrorism or the biological chemical attack. we know everybody likes to have all the equipment, all the toys, albeit crude treatments they need to be specialists. how effective is the tool and

how embracing is the broader fire chief community in accepting the fact that they can't have it all, but they better regionalized their ability to respond and recover? .. and again, if there is an incident, they are all brought to bear in a collective manner. beyond that, you mentioned the mutual aid. i think that's something that has been a big part of the fire service community throughout the towns cities and so forth would hold

resources that time. and oklahoma we are no stranger to natural disasters so to be part of our response and the two are mutually partners are, and we exercise of those things on a regular basis. and again we've had a lot of experience in dealing with that. so i see that as a fire chief as something that's improved over time. again, some of the programs of the federal government post-9/11 has established particularly the program has been very instrumental in bringing, and pulling those resources we don't have to have each community equipped with the exact same things but the resources are there in the

region and we know where they are and we know how to pool those when necessary. >> dr. mecher, to your point you talked about centers for ebola care and once again is are similar to mutual aid kind of idea but you do create a center of excellence. what is the, is very compelling authority, what is the initiative needed for the broader health care community which as you point out is very very competitive, very competitive, so that individual hospitals and health care delivery systems will give up to a certain extent surrender their autonomy to a particular hospital or health care system to develop that level of expertise because often that means there will be funding it going to that center of expertise which every hospital ceo would like to have in his or her jurisdiction. is there enforcing mechanism that could require that, or who decided to

basically, these would be the centers for ebola care? >> so i put their the carrot -- i prefer the carrot to the stick in a situation like that. i think compulsion of behavior is probably going to be less effective. i mentioned when we did stratification of health care under joint commission considerations. there are advantages. there's marketplace competitive edge. there's sometimes deeming mechanisms that helps with things like medicare presentation. it enhances the competence in the committee that you have a hospital or health care facility that's capable of rendering a certain type of care. i think that those are the elements that will actually help. i think eventually i would say that if there were priorities or a funding stream or cooperative agreement, that it was a designation that facilities that have demonstrated that had a certain type of capability would have

an advantage to some of those funding initiatives. that sort would be an inducement. i think it would be useful. not every hospital is going to be able to do the same thing. that's just reasonable and that's to be expected. as i said, we recognize this and a lot of different pathologies and disease processes. stroke, a classic example. we have the joint commission where they have sort of descriptors for a primary stroke center versus a comprehensive stroke center. they require both some equipment, some training, some exercising, all the things one would want with a biodefense initiative they have that for stroke capability. and so i think the templates are out there. i think the mechanisms that make those things successful in a steady state of the same mechanisms we will want to follow if we were going to design this for biodefense initiative. i won't delve into i could be are all the talk about the particulars of it but i think there are some pieces to that we want to exploit ever if we wanted this to be successful if that makes sense.

>> it does. >> just for the occasion and help illustrate this, my background actually pretty does he was as a local preparedness director, state director prepared in maryland and it strategic medical officer health and human services. in the portfolio were countermeasures, first responder protection asia and the national security strategy. what the chief was taught but as far as, i think other princely several public health agreement also see what we see with regard to hospital prepared as fun as well. i think patterns are there. i think they're successful. i do want to point out vulnerable is not be there has been success because it is important to acknowledge that they are there. but i think one thing that comes to mind for me is urban search and rescue. nativities able to do that. we have these regional collectives that often are called it a point either by states or by

the federal government if there's been a disaster. that's the notion of a good example of what might work. >> chief, 20 years ago oklahoma city had a terrible tragedy, the bombing of the federal office building. what have you learned since then and what kind of trade, if that had a bioterrorism aspect would come into didn't know at the time what it was, what's the difference between the training of your people now and what happened 20 years ago? >> i think anytime you have an event like that, and again not only the bombing of 20 years ago but as i pointed out, we have very regular natural disasters. you learn lessons and learn what works well and what don't. i was in terms of the bombing before the was in nam smart national management system that was in every case a

nims event. because of the agencies involved in the federal building obviously. as the doctor mentioned that was our first experience using the urban search and rescue teams that are sponsored by thematic throughout the country. we just 13 that were deployed during that event. -- enough. we recognize in a coma city that we weren't as skilled and has equipped an urban search and rescue as far as building collapse, those types of tactical risks, comes to that event that we need to be. that is certainly, since then and since we've developed our own program in oklahoma city that we collectively work with tulsa, tulsa metro area for urban search and rescue in the state, that we become more proficient at that which has help us again, some of the ensuing natural disasters that

we've had to respond to overtime. so i think just with every event is lessons learned from lessons to be shared. had the oklahoma city bombing had a bio, i think i'm a little bit scared to think about at that time because just doesn't mention terms of tactical russia i don't know that we would've been as prepared for such components as a bio agent. >> you brought a few new people and for search and rescue. i like a lot of employees. i was at hhs at the time. >> yes, ma'am. >> dr. mecher speed i'm dr. minson. this is dr. mecher. >> dr. minson, almost every hospital in this country has to do with infectious diseases. so you really, if we're talking about certain centers and we're talking about highly infectious diseases like ebola. because we can't afford a health system in which we don't have a reporting

system, state health departments and to the cdc so we can follow patterns this congestion with infectious diseases every day. could you talk a little about that infrastructure? i want to be careful that we are not thinking that all infectious diseases go to these small numbers of centers because we are really, we are doing with this every day without knowing whether it's a bioterrorism outbreak, but with a system that looks at patterns. >> thank you. that's a very good point. so to elaborate on that i think you're stating absolute correctly. what we are not suggesting in this discussion is that anything different would be created. simply what we are saying is sort of what happened during the ebola response in this country was that we had facilities that have both

expertise, materiel, equipment and, frankly, the wherewithal to take care of the disease as it went through the arc of the disease. with an expectation that any hospital should be able to recognize it, report it, to stabilization procedures, control it and ultimately been if the issue was something that had specialization requirements, that there might be referred on to a center of excellence or send a special, however you want to describe it. i do want to use the trauma analogy but i'm going to. the truth is host hospitals in the united states you can't control who comes through the door. we have laws that prevent that, rightly so. but if an individual were to present at a certain type of traumatic problem at the hospital didn't have too, say a search or the anesthesiology support or critical care support, that individual

because of our arrangements and relationships that already established would be able to transfer that individual after â >> after they stabilize them. >> absolutely. that works very well. that's what i'm saying is we should not create something different. they still have the same requirement for reporting of the trauma, statistics and whatnot. it's the same thing. it's just looking at it in terms of our defenses specifically some of these more esoteric type responses. >> i wanted to ask a question about the post office department to an extent of the post office department. last time i remember that implementing anything it was medicare. i don't remember them having refrigerators and other than to keep the lunches in. wouldn't we be better off using the pharmacy network in the united states for the ditch addition of vaccines or anything else. we've got a system, private sector but it's pretty well organized and i would think that if i wanted to get some things out fast

bringing in -- the contract if remember, the federal government contract are not with the post office department but a with fedex and ups to bring in pallets of drugs. i would dispute them to an existing network of pharmacies. and i assume that was looked at as well. there are more pharmacies in this country than the our post offices. these days. so i would think we would use an existing system that has a control mechanism rather than rebuilding one for a distribution system. >> i would agree. i think we want use any and all capabilities to be able to rapidly distribute countermeasures. there may be particular scenarios where that may be more attractive. for example, pandemics. pandemic influenza, where you want, perhaps you want to be a district antiviral medication very quickly. that's not a bio

attack scenario, and you leverage your pharmacies to be able to distribute those medications. if we're talking about a bio attack, one of the challenges you have a when you look at distribution points is making security and all those challenges. it's slightly different. in terms of distribute countermeasures come if you think about what order of magnitude challenge you would have, if you need to distribute to 5 million people in 24 hour period, you try to count to 1 million, takes you about 12 days. 1 million seconds equals 12 days. 5 million seconds equals two months. that's a big 5 million is. you could have multiple channels that you can distribute it to but it underscores really a challenge you face in a very short period of time. very rapidly distribute countermeasures to a population where you don't know what's happening next. this isn't a naturally occurring disease, and it's reminiscent. i put into washington, d.c. on

the morning of 9/11 right around 8:15 p.m. came into reagan and headed to the headquarters for a meeting. what struck me about 9/11 which i will never forget was uncertainty was going to happen next. during that initial 12 hour period it was very uncertain. so i could put myself in a setting of a bio attack come and in the midst of that event very early on and not knowing what's coming next. and what of the second to attacks might there be. and i would think security would be a critical issue. so the challenge is, is being able to balance the you said all those other dissertation point that you potential have yet also maintain safety and security for the public. >> thank you. thanks very much for your remarks, gentlemen. carter, great to see again. chief, other like to direct this to you. i know your comments about the amount of intelligence briefing that you

received from the federal government, you and others in the first responder community, and that's been a challenge just concerned about getting what is generally classified information out to the first responders so you can make use of it. and, obviously, particularly critical for use, it can inform how you're going to prepare for an attack, it looks like it's more likely that our adversaries could use chemical, use a chemical threat, prepare one way. if it's a bio threat, a particular bio threat, to prepare another way. it's critical that happen. i know with the police, local police, they have more regularized intelligence briefing processed in part because they are part of the infrastructure that's going out and doing the investigating on the front end. my question to you is from the perspective of somebody who's a non-police forces talk to me become in terms of you all and the public officials, are you getting the intelligence briefing that you think you need about what our adversaries are looking at so that you can actually sort of

position yourself and be poised, respond to what is the threat of the day as opposed to what might've been the threat of the briefing he got a year before? >> i think it's both. in some places that happens in a better way and more often than in other places, to be very frank. i think a lot of it depends on the area you are in. as a nation, if there's a joint terrorism task force in your area, the non-law-enforcement first responder community may be more of us involved in that. if you have a fusion center that gathers and disseminates intelligence information, in my case one of my deputy chiefs sits in a fusion center, and so he is briefed regularly. i think there are gaps though. in other places we don't have a good relationship that there

may not have been relationships established between the fire service emergency medical service and those law enforcement agencies that they don't get as regular and as in depth briefings as they should. so there's some work to be done there, but i think overall we see some improvement. i think it's somewhat incumbent upon us in the fire service to keep pushing in that regard to make sure that we do get the information that we need sometimes that what it's takes. -- that's what it takes. it boils down to communication issue, boils down to a trust issue. i know in some cases when you're talking in terms of the federal government and those federal agencies, that collect and disseminate intelligence, you know, there's a security cleared issues that come into play. i don't know that we need to know the detailed information on my side of the fence, but we at least know there's a threat out there, the potential of the threat, the credibility of the threat so that we can be prepared. so over all i see some improvement in that regard but still some work to be done.

>> not surprised at all maybe it's uneven around the country. it's based on relationships, based on a sort of what tradition you have any particular region, et cetera of coordination among the different agencies and first responders. but looks like you are well-positioned as chairman of the national association of fire chiefs. maybe the polls of your colleagues to stand with the weaknesses and strengths are and push for it. and also to let us know because that intelligence process indication that intelligence gets out deal to prepare for, that's part of our few. so any input you have on that would be helpful. thank you. >> we've heard several others

talk about go from i need to know basis to any to share basis, and we just need you and the chiefs and the others not in law enforcement to keep pushing and developing that need to share culture. and relying simply on relationships within regions is a good start but it's not where we need to be. it's not the finish line that we want to see developed if, indeed, there is to be an integration of the federal, state and local levels. we appreciate your candor on the. advisory board, questions? multiple questions. go ahead. >> first of all other like to endorse secretary shall and his comments about using the private sector for distribution because i think it's a good idea and i know there's been some companies of this tradition networks have talked about and have been, they've received some assistance from within hhs i think it's something we should look at in the report. for dr. mecher you're one of the few people who serve on homeland security council and then into the new incarnation when it became the national security staff. i was one if you talk but whether the lead to any diminution of capabilities or was it a seamless transition to homeland security responsibilities within the security staff? and also you see this home and sigir function within the white house getting in within the four d's view discussed? >> when i was at in windows homeland security council under

president bush, dr. robert cadillac was the senior director of biodefense and asserted within during his tenure at hse. i had the opportunity to see a senior director in place the primary responsibilities for deal with biodefense. it was an identified individual who had primary responsibility to lead the biodefense effort. following the transition and the reorganization of homeland security council into the national security staff, that office was subsumed into a directory of resiliency. so that senior director position was removed at all of the portfolios that were social with those individuals and biodefense removed under resiliency. if you recall the early in the administration we were hit with h1n1. the work that i was involved in an

others and biodefense was in pandemic prepared as an pandemic planning development of the national pandemic plan, and so when h1n1 began in april, or late april of 2009 it was early and just settlements into the administration. and so we did not have a senior director in biodefense and what was organized was a response with leadership within the office of resiliency to lead the effort or organize interagency effort for h1n1 which is really a major buyout effort. the number of us were really involved. what it did see was the difference between having a leadership that was identifiable for biodefense and then not having a single individual who really you could identify as biodefense. i think there are some advantages. i saw them firsthand in the past administration of that

individual and leading the effort which bob cadillac certainly did. >> do you think we should return to the did having a separate council? >> i was talking about the advantages of having someone identifiable, senior individual to lead the effort in biodefense. i think the homeland security effort still could be certainly lead from within a national security staff. it still was come homeland efforts were still identified within the national security staff. what was missing was an identified senior official for biodefense. >> so i'd like to ask the panelists about their respective committees responses to the ebola outbreak over the last six months or so. we have wrote of the few proxies for biotech in the sketch. darpa distinction between people and the kinds of things that quarter was just discussing, but do you think we did better

or worse than you would've anticipated? is there anything that surprise you we can learn from that we can think about in terms of preparing for biological threats? >> would you like to go first? >> who wants to go first? >> this speaks to the coordination problem. >> i will give an anecdote from the corporate sector. we are a multinational. we have people that were in western africa at the time performing things for infrastructure support. we worked with government partners. we initiated a quick indication campaign. we do look at how we're going to move summit if we had someone that was ill, which is not a private concern. it's one that has to the coordination between the private sector and the government accepting the

individual coming back for care. what i would say is i think it was regional to say that across the board what we saw was mixed results. and that's there. i think if i were going to say if there's anything i would look at in terms of changing because i think that was the root of your question, i think i've already offered it. that is, this idea of having, if you will, some sort of system for identification and and communication and the and communication and the need to build the referral of the individual to the proper facility that can take care of them, their bradley. bradley. i think we are better conditioned to do that now because we been through this and we made some mistakes and we've done some things well. what happened like to see is that rather than do this every single time, disease specific us up like to start to do this with an idea of infectious disease or biodefense rather than wait to got to go to the reiteration with the peculiarities or esoteric nature of each of the different agents. i think

that's the safest, smartest way to do this. that may not be in place right now and i think that's something we can start to attend. that's my thought. >> two comments. one, being able to convey the risk, and i think a reaction to a highly infectious disease with a high consequence infectious disease with a high rate communicated itself to i think we did see the spike in fear. the challenge i saw was really to be able to conceptualize what that risk truly is in terms of trying to quantify that risk. but that risk is always viewed through the lens of other, the outrage factor that the public views that risk within. so i think risky communication, it's always a challenge any kind of event. to get to the issue that i think matt was mentioning, i think we focus a lot on where

to treat these individuals and what really was needed was the assessment capability. does anyone really need to have the capability to treat ebola are managed ebola patient, or do they need the ability or the capability to be able to quickly recognize it, recognize simple things that they can do to protect themselves and other staff and other patients and very quickly get the patient to a specific center rather than try to set up centers and where potentially to take care of these patients? that i saw was there's tension between development is capable of across the country versus focusing the capability and the relatively small number of centers and expanding the capability, just like the infectious disease. you have that capability edward to take your patience with infectious disease but you have a concert at capability to actually manage the high consequence infectious disease as. so i

think that is a distinctive between assessment and where we would provide the treatment in the city where we can protect our step it the other thing that i think that we can realize is that the patients are their most infectious when they are the most bill when they are critically ill. we put these patients in intensive care units which we staff with are very intensive in terms of personnel. so in terms of controlling the disease outbreak were almost doing the opposite thing. we are exposing potential large numbers of people who are highly lethal infectious disease at the very moment when those patients are probably the most infectious and have the highest viral loads. i think what the event also underscored was thinking about icu medicine to my background is in critical care so thinking a icu medicine and the special need you have in icu care which we tend to throw lots of resources and lots of people, yet when you think about ebola, these diseases, you're almost were in the

opposite direction. you are trying to constrain the number of people of contact, limit the staff or having contact with the patient. somewhat opposite of a we normally do in critical care medicine. >> that's what isolating the space is important. >> a question for carter and perhaps met. similar to the previous question, but carter, your testimony really highlighted the need, we forward talked about how novel bio threat is a low probability high consequences and its demands to novel approaches. and it requires people thinking outside of their box and outside of their comfort zone, and it requires cultural change. and the postal model home stockpiles and yet the private sector needs to be incorporated in this in novel approaches. but it's really

speaks to leadership. so it comes back to leadership and it is also maybe not -- having the secretary and deputy sectors also engaged is very, very important as well. and that leadership we've are because you believe having a bobcat like and that leadership in the white house is important. what are the lessons learned since you're in either hurting so to speak in the white house, in addition to just having that position what other attributes need to be attached to the position to be most effective? >> there's a consensus you would like to call him bob kadlec. we can't do that. put him in their spots in the administration. would be truly coordinated but absent that we're looking for other alternatives. >> in terms of leadership i

think one of the things the leadership provides is, i had the good fortune or the opportunity to be able to watch transition and administrations to see what happens as administrations change. i also was able to see firsthand h1n1 deepwater horizon, the haiti earthquake, fukushima. and got to see firsthand how, what it feels like when a disaster unfolds. and you watch it, stutter, and unfolded while it was unfolding we would have conversations, some of us in biodefense and say, it's 24 hours past the point which is thing, we first heard about this event. has this been a pirated event? we would've been pretty much antibiotic distribution and the specific do you think we could've done it within 24 hours? then we look at the information that we had at the moment that we heard about the event and the first 24 hours, 48 hours and you watched how the information

changed and you saw that most of the time the initial information was not 100% correct. and evolves over time. so you are dealing with this evolving situation uncertainty, ambiguity, yet you still need act. and i think the importance of leadership is in that type of an environment where the information is never going to be complete but it's going to be inexact. is going to be a lot of ambiguity. you will be looking through the fog. you are going to need to be able to give advice, or someone is going to need to be able to give advice to leadership in terms of options of actions. that needs to be as informed as it can be. so i think having someone like a bobcat like who's been in biodefense for a long time uzbek bob kadlec, or an individual like they been able

to offer that kind of advice. i think it's important. >> is there anything that the person needs in regards to budgetary authority? >> it's hard to get things done without the ability to control dollars. and so i think having some influence in some way of being able to move resources to direct them towards the problem but if you identify nation which can't swing resources, it's probably not going to get done. >> can you say but what you deserved -- which observed at the department level and prepared as an particular medical measures dispensing that might be helpful? >> i want to touch on anthrax and countermeasure delivery. there are two theories taking place, and that's what we're talking about when we talk about the postal h.h.s. consideration.

there's the issue of actual patient care of individuals who actually contracted the disease. that's obviously difficult in hospital based. and there's this other concept, which is classically preventive medicine. the idea is there potentially be an expo sure. you want to get the individual to prevent it. by doing so, you eliminate a lot of morbidity mortality. we've already mentioned healthcare coalitions. they're actually communities, so you're tauking about everybody that it applies to and supports the healthcare system. so it's actually based initiatives and folks that do the logistics requirements and support all of that enterprise. that's a big animal. i think what you want to do is bring as many of those support capabilities to the table. carter mentioned the collaboration between the united states postal service and health and human services. i want to point out that was not something that was federally driven.

it was actually identified by a local jurisdiction that this was part of, not in lieu of, using pharmacies or points of dispensing or any of those other initiatives. it was actually an adjunct to them based on the tactical considerations of the local general or public health director as far as their overall countermeasure delivery platform. the thought was that perhaps there would be a population because of mobility issues or logistics or traffic arteries or something, might want this delivery to instead of a pull out of and go to location. the jurisdiction that subscribe to this and implement it, they were very successful and had a good working model and agree, it looked pretty good. dr. parker mentions the idea of culture change. this is what we're talking about. i talked about the idea of pulling in some sort of training requirement or some sort of credential element

necessary with these boards to actually provide that nugget, full of biodefense as part of the other duty assigned. we're talking about a 21st century, civil defense construct within the healthcare community. it's not a bad idea. from a state department and from a local department standpoint, i think what you have to do is allow enough latitude for a local contact cal decisions that will work so you can support me on this. i think states then become the funneling capability. it's easier for the issuance of funds and initiatives and requirements to go out that way. but i think that at the federal level, it's very important to make sure we allow the latitude for the execution of those duties so that they're effective, because this is a very diverse country in terms of both its requirements and,

frankly, its resources, depending where you are. i think keeping that in mind will probably help. >> how constraining are the practice rules of a state? one of the things -- what you're suggesting works as long as there are not narrow scope of practice rules for what health professionals can do. for m.d., generally speaking, there's a great deal of latitude. the this is determined in the civil courts, and then quite frankly by either criminal behavior or some sort of evaluation by state board on a case-by-case basis. states set those limits. when i mentioned the study that was done at the university of maryland about the advanced nurse practitioner latitudes they were very -- depending where you were, they were very,

very different. when i talk about practice, that's one group. individuals that function in must the same way, but either have some sort of supervisory agreement or some sort of arrangement, that's changing to some degree in the united states. it depends on the state. that's why i'm offering so much qualification. you then get into certification levels or technical trainings, and that's a very different kind of construct. that requires symptom-driven supervision. the answer is how do you do that? it's the issues that issue it. if it's a piece of the requirement c.m.e.'s for the license to renew or if it's for new graduates to have that as a part of the curriculum, that might be the best way to do it.

donna shall al a: the autonomy, they're part of larger practices or a.c.a.'s or their employees. dr. minson: they can't do what they do unless they have their license, and so that's why i'm saying rather than making it part of a social organization a guild or something of that nature or that i think the licensing board that allows them to have the employment and process is probably the most effective way to do it, although there are many. >> we're going to move on to the second panel. they come forward, we thank you for your participation and your contribution. thank you very much. thank you. >> today the council hosts a discussion examining the iran

nuclear framework deal. former deputy of state for iran will be among the panelists. and you can see it live starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern following "washington journal." >> next week it's the seventh summit of the americas. today, assistant secretary of state, roberta jackson, will talk about the summit and what it means for u.s. foreign policy. we'll have it live at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. >> this weekend we've partnered with cox communication to learn about the history and lit air life of tulsa, oklahoma. >> woody guthrie is most famous for "this land is your land," but he was very much more than that. he was born in in 1912 in

oklahoma, so we are very proud to have his work back in oklahoma, where we think it belongs. he was an advocate for people who were disenfranchised, for those people who were migrant workers, from oklahoma, kansas, texas, during the dust bowl era, who found themselves in california, literally starving. he saw this vast difference between those who were the haves and have nots and became their spokesman through his music. woody recorded very few songs of his own. we have a listening station that features 46 of his songs in his own voice. that's what makes the recordings that he did make so significant and so important to us. >> ♪ this land is your land this land is my land from california to the new york islands ♪ >> watch all of our events from tulsa saturday at noon eastern on c-span2's book tv, and sunday afternoon at 2:00 on

american history tv on c-span3. >> the most memorable moment this week was hearing senator cory gardner at our lunch yesterday saying you need to be firm in your principles, but flexible in the details, because i think it really reflects like the solution, the harsh polarization we're seeing and a methodology that if all the senators if all the congressmen and women and all the legislatures can adopt, we can really come together as a country and solve many of our issues. >> my favorite quote came from julie adams, the secretary of the senate. she said, remember to be humble and have a strong work ethic be kind to the people you meet on the way up, you'll meet them again on the way back down. >> i think in particular, in congress itself, we have a lack of true statesmen. senator john mccain did have something very impressive last year. he committed to the veterans

affairs reform bill and reading senate torture report and maintaining how staying away from torture is essential to the character of our democracy. i think at the point where we have people who are willing to cross the aisle, who are willing to make these decisions with people they may not agree with that's essential what will we need to maintain the security, the integrity of our nation as we go on. >> high school students who generally rank academically in the top 1% of their states were in washington, d.c. as part of the united states senate youth program, sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span"q&a." >> next, remarks at the iran talks. federica mogherini spoke for about five minutes.

>> we met in switzerland. as agreed in november 2013, we gather here to find solutions towards reaching a comprehensive resolution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the iranian nuclear program and the comprehensive list lifting of all sanctions. today we have taken a decisive step. we have reached solutions on key parameters of a joint comprehensive plan of action. the political determination, the goodwill and the hard work of all parties made it possible , and let us thank all delegations for their timeless dedication.

this is a crucial decision laying the agreement basis for the final text of the joint comprehensive plan of action. we can now restart drafting the text of the joint comprehensive plan of action guided by the solutions developed in this state. as iran has a program iran's enrichment policy and stockpile will be limited for specific durations, and there will be no other enrichment facility. iran's research and development will be carried out on a scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed. it will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear physics and technology center. international collaboration will be encouraged in areas of

research. there will not be any material. an international joint venture will assist iran in redesigning and rebuilding a modernized heavy water research reactor in iraq. there will be no fuel. including implementation of the modified code 3.1 and provisional application of the additional protocol. the international atomic energy agency will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have access to agreed procedures, including to clarify past and present issues. iran will take part in the

field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors. another important area of cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security. european union will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and united states will seize the application of all nuclear-related sanctions. simultaneously with the i.a.e. of its key nuclear commitments. a new security council resolution will endorse to terminate all previously related, nuclear resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time. we will now work to write the text of a joint comprehensive

plan of action, including a case in the coming weeks and months. we are committed to complete our efforts by june 30. we would like to thank the swiss government for its general support in hosting this negotiation. and let me personally and on behalf of everybody also, thank you all, journalists and media from around the world, for having followed our work and somehow worked with us over this difficult but intense and positive week. thank you. >> secretary of state john kerry also spoke to reporters thursday after the negotiations on iran's nuclear program. it's been 18 months since the start of the negotiations. and the parties have until june 30 to come up with a final deal. his remarks are 15 minutes.

secretary kerry: well, good evening and -- excuse me -- thank you all very, very much for your patience. and i want to start by expressing an enormous thank you, merci, danke, to the people and the government of switzerland for their incredible generosity. the way in which they have welcomed us and the amount of effort is really extraordinary and we're very, very grateful to them. and throughout this entire process, certainly over the past week, the people of switzerland have gone above and beyond in order to facilitate these negotiations, and i don't think anybody could imagine a much more peaceful setting in order to pursue a peaceful path forward. i also want to thank the very many other nations that have provided a home for these negotiations over the past couple of years -- people

forget that, it's been going on that long -- and that includes austria, which was incredibly generous in hosting our delegation in vienna for a long period of time, oman, which has not only hosted a number of important meetings, but also played a critical role in getting these talks off the ground in the first place, and then, of course, we say thank you to turkey, russia, kazakhstan, iraq, and my home country, the united states. i particularly want to thank president obama. he has been courageous and determined in his pursuit of a diplomatic path. and from the day that he took office, president obama has been crystal-clear that a nuclear-armed iran would pose a threat to our security and the security of our allies in the region, including israel. he has been just as clear that the best and most effective way to prevent that threat is

through diplomacy. the journey towards a diplomatic solution began years ago. and i can tell you that i've personally been involved for about four years, beginning from the time that i was serving in the united states senate. others have been on this journey, and some of the others in our team, for even longer than that. but as foreign minister zarif and high representative mogherini announced moments ago, today we have reached a critical milestone in that quest. we, our p5+1, eu partners, and

iran have arrived at a consensus on the key parameters of an arrangement that, once implemented, will give the international community confidence that iran's nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. and over the coming weeks, with all of the conditions of the 2013 joint plan of action still in effect from this moment forward, our experts will continue to work hard to build on the parameters that we have arrived at today and finalize a comprehensive deal by the end of june. now we have said from the beginning -- i think you've heard me say it again and again -- that we will not accept just any deal, that we will only accept a good deal. and today, i can tell you that the political understanding with details that we have reached is a solid foundation for the good deal that we are seeking.

it is the foundation for a deal that will see iran reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for 15 years. it is a deal in which iran will cut its installed centrifuges by more than two-thirds for 10 years. it is a deal that will increase iran's breakout time, which was confirmed publicly today to be two to three months, and that is the time that it would take iran to speed up its enrichment in order to produce enough fissile material for one potential nuclear weapon. and that will be expanded now, under this deal, to one year from those two to three months. that is obviously as much as six times what it is today, and

what it has been for the past three years. i'd like also to make one more point very, very clear because it has been misinterpreted and misstated, misrepresented for much of this discussion. there will be no sunset to the deal that we are working to finalize -- no sunset, none. the parameters of this agreement will be implemented in phases. some provisions will be in place for 10 years, others will be in place for 15 years others still will be in place for 25 years. but certain provisions including many transparency measures, will be in place indefinitely into the future. they will never expire. and the bottom line is that, under this arrangement, the international community will have confidence that iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, providing, of course

that the provisions are adhered to. and if they aren't, we have provisions that empower us to deal with that. ultimately, the parameters that we have agreed to will do exactly what we set out to do -- make certain that all pathways to make enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon have been cut off, including the uranium pathway at natanz and fordow, and the plutonium pathway at arak, and, of course, the covert pathway. now we, our partners, and iran have agreed that the only uranium-enrichment facility iran will operate moving forward will be the facility at natanz. and even that one will undergo dramatic changes.

the vast majority of the centrifuges and their infrastructure will be removed. and for at least the next 15 years, the stockpile will remain at 300 kilograms. and any uranium that is enriched at natanz will be capped at 3.67 percent, which is a typical level of enrichment for civilian nuclear power, but doesn't even begin to approach the enrichment level necessary for a weapon. we have agreed that the facility at fordow will halt all uranium enrichment, period -- all uranium enrichment, and in fact, there will not even be any fissile material present at the site and no enrichment r&d. instead, the facility will be converted into a nuclear

physics and technology center. we have also agreed that iran will redesign and rebuild its heavy-water reactor at arak so that it will no longer produce any weapons-grade plutonium. and the united states will be able to sign off, certify, the reactor's final design redesign. and through international cooperation, it will be transformed into a reactor supporting only peaceful nuclear research and nuclear medicine. and the calandria, as you heard earlier, will be taken out and destroyed. we have agreed that iran will ship all of its spent fuel from

the arak reactor out of the country for the reactor's lifetime. and iran has agreed to refrain from building any additional heavy-water reactors for the next 15 years at least -- "at least" means still open for beyond that period in the course of the next three months. and we have agreed that iran will face regular and comprehensive inspections, which is the best possible way to detect any attempt to covertly produce a weapon. not only will inspectors have regular access to all of iran's declared facilities indefinitely, but they will also be able to monitor the facilities that produce the centrifuges themselves and the uranium that supports the nuclear program. and they will be able to do that for at least 20 years. this critical step will help to guard against diversion of those materials to any clandestine location or plant.

in addition, iran has agreed to allow iaea to investigate any suspicious site or any allegations of covert nuclear activities anywhere. so these are just a few of the key -- and i mean a few -- of the key measures that will make up an extraordinarily comprehensive monitoring and transparency regime when and if it is finally signed and completed over the course of the next months. now we have been very clear, both publicly and privately, a final agreement will not rely on promises. it will rely on proof. it is important to note that iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the joint plan of action that we agreed to in 2013. and i ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.

and in return for iran's future cooperation, we and our international partners will provide relief in phases from the sanctions that have impacted iran's economy. and if we find at any point that iran is not complying with this agreement, the sanctions can snap back into place. so together these parameters outline a reasonable standard that iran can readily meet, and it is the standard that iran has now agreed to meet. throughout history, diplomacy has been necessary to prevent wars and to define international boundaries, to design institutions, and to develop global norms. simply demanding that iran capitulate makes a nice soundbite, but it's not a policy.

it is not a realistic plan. so the true measure of this understanding is not whether it meets all the desires of one side at the expense of the other. the test is whether or not it will leave the world safer or more secure than it would be without this agreement. and there can be no question that the comprehensive plan that we are moving toward will more than pass that test. this isn't just my assessment. it isn't just the assessment of the united states delegation and our experts. it is the assessment of every one of our p5+1 partners who stood up here a little while ago in front of the flags of their nations. it is the assessment of our negotiating partners -- germany, the uk, china, france and russia -- and all of our experts who have analyzed every aspect of this issue also join

in that assessment. from the beginning, we have negotiated as a team, and we are all agreed that this is the best outcome achievable. no viable alternatives -- not one -- would be nearly as effective at preventing iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon than -- over a period of time than the parameters, providing they get completed and are signed. our political understanding arrived at today opens the door for a long-term resolution to the international community's concerns about iran's nuclear program. now, we have no illusions about the fact that we still have a ways to travel before we'll arrive at the destination that we seek. we still have many technical details to work out on both sides and still some other issues that we acknowledge still have to be resolved, for

example, the duration of the un arms and ballistic missile restrictions on iran and the precise timing of and mechanism for the conversion of the arak reactor and fordow site. and of course, once we're able to finalize a comprehensive deal, the process of implementation then remains in front of us as well.

advancing its nuclear program for decades. by the time i took office iran was operating thousands of centrifuges which can produce the materials for a nuclear bomb. and iraq was concealing a covet

nuclear facility. i made clear we were prepared to resolve this issue diplomatically but only if iran came to the -- sanctions which had a profound impact on the iranian committee. sanctions alone could not stop iran's nuclear program but they did help bring iran to the negotiating table.

iran eliminated its stock pile of dangerous nuclear material. inspections of iran's program increased. and we continued negotiations to see if we could achieve a more comprehensive deal. today after months of tough principled diplomacy, we've achieved the framework for that deal and it is a good deal that meets our core objectives. this frame work would cut off every pathway iran could take to develop a nuclear weapon. iran will face strict limitations on

its program and will face the must intrusive inspection and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history. this deal is not based on trust. it's based unprecedented verification. nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed.

will last for 15 years.

third, this deal provides the best possible defense against iran creating a nuclear weapon covetly. inspectors will have access to nuclear facilities and the entire supply chain that supports iran's nuclear program. if iran cheats the world will know it. if we see something suspicious we will check it. with this deal iran will face more inspections than any other country in the world. so this will be a long-term deal that addresses each path towards a potential nuclear bomb.

there will be strict limits on iran's program for a decade. the transparency measures will last 20 years or more indeed some will be permanent. iran will never be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon. in return for iran's actions, the international community has agreed to provide iran with relief from some sanctions. this relief will be phased as iran takes steps to adhere to the deal. if violated sanctions can be snapped back into place.

if we can get this done and iran follows through on the framework that our negotiators agreed to, we'll be able to resolve one of the greatest threats to our security and to do so peacefully. i have instructed by negotiators to fully brief congress and the american people on the substance of the deal and i welcome a robust debate in the weeks and

months to come. i'm confident that we can show this deal is good for the security of the united states, our allies and for the world. the fact is we only have three options for addressing iran's nuclear program. first, we can reach a robust and verifiable deal like this one and peacefully prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. the second option is we can bomb iran's nuclear facilities thereby starting another war in the middle east and setting back iran's program by a few years. third, we can pull out of negotiations and try to get other countries to continue with sanctions and hope for the best

knowing that every time we have done so iran has advanced its program and that in very short order, the breakout timeline would be eliminated. and a nuclear arms race in the region could be triggered because of that uncertainty. in other words, the third option leads us quickly back to a decision act whether or not to take military action because we'd have no idea of what was going on inside of iran. iran is simply not going to dismantle its program just because we demand it to do so. that's not how the world works or what history shows us. iran has shown no willingness to eliminate those aspects of their program that they maintain are for peaceful purposes. but should negotiations collapse because we the united states

rejected what the majority of the world considers a fair deal what scientists and nuclear experts suggest would give us confidence that they are not developing a nuclear weapon, it's doubtful that we can even keep our current sanctions in places. is it worse than doing what we've done for almost two decades with iran moving forward with its nuclear program and with us robust inspections? i think the answer will be clear. remember, i've always insisted that i will do what is necessary to prevent iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and i will.

but i also know that a diplomatic solution is the best way to get this done and offers a more comprehensive and lasting solution. it is our best option by far. and while it is always a possibility iran may try to cheat on the deal in the future this framework of inspections and transparency makes it far more likely we'll know about it if they try to cheat and i and future presents will have preserved all the options that are currently available to deal with them. to the iranian people, we are willing to engage you on the basis of mutual interests and respect. this deal offers the prospect of relief from sanctions that were imposed because of iran's violation of international law. since iran's supreme leader has

issued a fatwah -- of course this deal alone, even if fully implemented will not end the deep divisions and mistrust between our two countries. we have a difficult history between us and our concerns will remain with respect to iranian behavior so long as iran continues its sponsorship or terrorism, its support for proxies who destabilize the united states.

so make no mistake, we'll remain vigilant in countering those actions and standing with our allies. it's no secret that the israeli prime minister and i don't agree about whether the united states and i should move forward with a peaceful resolution to the iranian issue. if in fact prime minister netanyahu is looking for the most effective way for iran not to get a nuclear weapon this is the best option. i believe our nuclear experts can confirm that. more importantly, i'll be speaking with the prime minister today to make clear that there will be no daylight when it comes to threats towards israel and iran's nuclear program.

today i spoke to the king of saudi arabia and i'm inviting the leaders of the six countries that make up the gulf cooperation council to meet me at camp david this spring to discuss how we can further strengthen our security cooperation. finally, it's worth remembering that congress has on a bipartisan basis played a critical role in our current iran policy helping to force them to the table. in the coming days and weeks, my administration will engage congress again about how it can

play a constructive overnight role. i'll begin that effort by speaking to members of the house and senate today. in those conversations, i will underscore that the issues at stake here are bigger than politics. these are matters of war and peace. they should be evaluated based on the facts and what is ultimately best for the american people and for our national security. for this is not simply a deal between my administration and iran. this is a deal between iran the united states of america, and the major powers in the world including some of our closest allies. if congress kills this deal not based on expert analysis and without offering any reasonable alternative, then it's the united states that will be blamed for the failure of diplomacy. international unity will collapse and the path to conflict will widen if the the

american people understand this which is why solid majority support a diplomatic iranian nuclear issue. president kennedy faced down the far greater threat of communism and said let us never negotiate out of fear but let us never fear to negotiate. the american people remember that at the height of the cold war, presidents like nixon and reagan struck historic arms control agreements with the soviet union. a far more dangerous adversary. despite the fact that that adversary not only threatened to destroy our country and our way of life but had the means to do so. we're not perfect. he did not end all threats. but they made our world safer.

a good deal with iran will do the same. today i'd like to express my thanks to our international partners for their steadfastness, their cooperation. i was able to speak earlier today with our close allies prime minister camron and chancellor merkel to understand that we stand shoulder to shoulder in this effort and most of all, i want to express our thanks to our tireless secretary of state john kerry and our entire negotiating team. they have worked so hard to make this progress. they represent the best tradition of american diplomacy. their work, our work is not yet done. and success is not guaranteed. but we have a historic opportunity to prevent the

spread of nuclear weapons in iran and to do so peacefully with the international community firmly behind us. we should seize that chance. thank you, god bless you, god bless the united states of america. john boehner released a statement saying in part my immediate concern is the administration signalling it will provide near-term sanctions relief. congress must be allowed to fully review the detail of any agreement before any sanctions are lifted. next week leaders from the western he mismisphere

today, the united states together with our allies and partners has reached a historic understanding with iran which, if fully implemented, will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. host: and that was the president yesterday at the white house talking about the framework reached with iran and some of the major powers in the world on nuclear issues. and that's our topic this morning in the first segment of the "washington