>> do we have? >> good morning and welcome to another of the series of briefings of the national council on u.s.-arab relations on issues of vital importance to the united states and the nations in the middle east.

thank you for coming this morning on such short notice. we have such a distinguished group of panelists will follow these matters. this morning i am honored to be your moderator. john: i joined the national council on u.s.-arab relations after spending 35 years in the arabian gulf in the energy field. i am well aware of the importance of the iran nuclear deals for the people of the region's. i would like to thank c-span for covering this event live today and for covering our briefing last thursday on yemen, held in this room. the ambassador spoke at the conclusion of that session. coverage of last week's briefing is available on our website.

a quick word about the national council on u.s.-arab relations. established 33 years ago as a nonprofit organization. the guiding vision is one of education and seeks to educate about the islamic world and place relations between our allies and partners across the region on his firm a foundation as possible and continues to expand the relationship through a variety of programs. students academics, and our armed forces. it organizes an annual -- conducts study abroad, youth leadership development programs, such as the ones that will be held this weekend in houston and washington.

over 400 young americans will represent 22 countries to debate pressing issues of the day with over 38,000 alumni. the next generation of americans will be better prepared to conduct economic and commercial relations in a region so vital to the united states. today our possible -- our panel will assess the nuclear deal. this is a preliminary agreement, a framework with many technical issues to be sorted out in the coming months. as has been said, the devil is basically in the details. the public debate will be intense. is this a good thing or a bad thing?

what do our regional partners and allies think? will this define the legacy of a president in the home stretch of his administration? the president has described this as a once in a lifetime opportunity to see if we can take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east. let us see whether these noble objectives are achievable. just a few housekeeping details. each of the speakers will have 10 to 12 minutes for their remarks. i refer you to their bios in our announcement. this will allow full a full hour of questions and discussions. on your chairs, you will find a 3x5 card. please write your questions on

these cards and we will do our best to respond as fully as possible. to start i am pleased to introduce our first speaker dr. joh duken anthony. he is the only american observer to of attended each summit since 1981. and then the ambassador will speak. he will be followed by the executive director of the middle east policy council and a specialist on middle east affairs and will present his remarks. next we'll hear from the distinguished affairs fellow at the national councils on u.s.

our relations. dr. paul sullivan will conclude, professor of economics at the national defense university will wrap up the presentation. dr. anthony, if you would kickoff our discussion on this deal. dr. anthony: thank you, john. we came up with 14 factors windows through which someone could look at what occurred about the framework and the challenges it represents. the opportunities it also represents an we are going to be able to a dress around eight of these 14 factors.

but we will be as candid as we can. much is unknown. in my brief remarks have to do with the needs and concerns of three of irans neighbors. oman, bahrain, saudi arabia. thomas mattair will deal with the united arab ouremirates and kuwait. a few statistics with regard to saudi arabia pasta concerns. saudi arabia is the epicenter of prayer and pilgrimage, faith and spiritual devotion for some 1.5 million muslims worldwide. inasmuch as iran is the leading

country with a largely shia orientation on the theological stage, there is inherently explicitly a degree of competition so now that we are express it as i just did. iran is being perceived beyond the nuclear agreement in terms of its leaders making reference to iran's unprecedented influence in four arab capitals. it would be of concern to those in the league of arab states. of the 1.5 million muslims in the world 2 billion christians,

one billion of them being roman catholics, some 200 million muslims identify with the shia sect of islam. we're talking about 12% of the muslims being shia. this is important to keep in mind when one listens to people speak about the threat that iran poses. 12% taking on 88%. something is wrong with that picture. at the governmental level, the highest organization to which muslim countries belong is the organization of the islamic conference. it has 57 members. no more than four of those 57

would be predominately shia in the orientation of their government. so the numbers are heavily imbalanced not in favor of iran. this too, needs to be kept in perspective. these three are profoundly similar in their concerns regarding iran because they are neighbors of iran. they have similar needs and concerns and similar interests and similar foreign policy objectives. and yet there are the vertices between and amongst them. when people talk about threat analysis it is usually where they are located. people in maine are not so

concerned about jamaican and haitian boat people coming to their shores. those in florida are not obsessed with the same kinds of concern that people who live in new england are concerned with. this is another way of looking at the concerns and objectives of these countries. oman is different from all of the other gcc countries. it has the best, smooth relationship with iran. this is not new. this has been the case is the beginning of the revolution in 1979 and dates from before then. there is a body of water between them. many people have the image that most of the shipping goes

through iran's waters and exiting the gulf. this is not the case. the vast majority of the traffic goes through oman's waters. there are three lanes. one for ships coming in to the gulf. another free ships going out of the gulf. and the zone between the two that is a safety zone. the strategic and geographic challenge is far greater on the omani side than on the irani side. you can look at the map. that little piece of oman at the top of the peninsula is separated from oman like alaska is separated from the continental united states. the strategic aspect between

oman and iranian relationships. there is not going to be a conflict between them started by oman. oman's citizen base is less than 2 million. the numbers should drive your perspective, your assessment of what the issues are and the implications. but there is more. iran sent close to 30,000 soldiers to oman from 1972 through 1974 to help oman put down a guerrilla rebel marxist uprising in oman. no other country did as much as iran did to help all mean regain

its stability. there are no territorial issues between the two unlike issues that exist between some of iran's other neighbors and iran. with regard to bahrain,'s situation is also numerically fruitful for your analysis. if people made frequent reference to 60% of the population being shia and ruled by a sunni government, you have a situation that is even more imbalanced in the case of bahrain. you have the last remaining arab country with a sunni government ruling over a majority shia population.

and despite the much renowned report that came out as a result of bahrain's uprising in 2011 in which there was a statement there was no evidence of iranian involvement in those uprisings here is where perception comes in. perception is more powerful than reality. around 3000 bahrainis have been trained in oman, coming straight from secondary school, finance by the shia merchants in bahrain. they go at age 17, 16, 18. they go largely not to tehran, a seminary based shiaism and they

return to bahrain. some of those are regarded by the intelligence security services as forming sleeper cells. in other words one day they may be called upon to return the favor of the education and training and leadership development that they required as a result of iran. and so when the government speaks about iranian involvement, there is this dimension that does not come out in the media but should help one frame iranian's concern -- bahrain's concerned and the representatives of the government that bahrain should revert to iranian control and influence. this is disturbing to any bar

rainy task with security and stability issues. saudi arabia is concern the cost of a significant shia population in the eastern province. there is far less evidence than there has been in the case of bahrain's needs and concerns. saudi arabians have become open in accusing iran of being behind the inspiration of the attacks on the towers in 1996, in which large numbers of americans were killed. this is a brief overview to begin the discussion, by showing there is no unanimity of all of iran's neighbors. it differs from one to the next.

now we have the pleasure of listening to ambassador seyed hossein mousavian. thank you. [applause] seyed hossein mousavian: good morning, everyone. iran -- they both consider the deals agreed in switzerland as a win-win deal. to my understanding there is five reasons why iranians would consider a win for iran. number one is that the deal contains respect for iranian nuclear technology including in richmond -- enrichment. number two is ultimately the

sanctions would be lifted, even graduate. number three is that ultimately the iranian nuclear would be normalized. and number four is that ultimately the nuclear would be removed from chapter seven united nations security council and all resolutions would be terminated. and number four is that iran after a perio would be able to haved a normal, peaceful cooperation, on peaceful nuclear -- with the world powers. this is something iran has been

sanctioned from day day. the world powers consider the deal a win for themselves. i would like to give you five reasons why they believe this is a win for the world powers for the u.s. number one, iran except that the maximum level of transparency and measures within nonproliferation treaty. they have safeguarded the agreement and additional protocols and arrangement for the code. these are three arrangements for transparency. iran has accepted to all three arrangements. number two is iran would agree

has agreed -- all issues which would need to give the transparency, inspection to the ieaa. practically the world powers have the most intrusive strong powerful system. the history of the deal with iran. no other member has ever been committed like iran on transparency measures. number four is they were looking for a break of the one year in case iran decided to go forward. and number five, confidence building measures, the u.s. and world powers needed time.

there were 35 years of hostility. this implementation for measures are about 10 to 25 years. there for the have enough time for almost a decade to a quarter of a century. to my understanding this is the mutual win, a deal for both and i would like to give you five reasons why this is a win-win, a mutual win for both of them. through diplomatic solutions they were able to escape the devastating war in the middle east. and perhaps this is one of the rare occasions a big crisis in the middle east has been resolved or is going to be

completely resolved through diplomacy. second, they have been able to set a new mechanism for verification for non-diversion toward -- many nuclear experts believe it is not enough. many believe even additional protocols, which is the maximum level of transparency is not enough. and the measures, a new mechanism of verification and transparency assuring non-diversion toward -- fo the first timer far beyond that. if they are wise enough to embed the agreement with iran on a

broader scope, regionally and internationally, this will be a big, big game for the liberation globally. number four is that perhaps this is the first evidence, engagement policy of president obama announced in 2009 has worked. iran and the u.s. have been trying for 35 years to improve relations. a lot of efforts and all have failed. this is the first time a success is found, at the highest level of negotiations between iran and the u.s., which would have implications on implications between iran and the west. number five, it opens the door to a regional dialogue between iran and the world powers, iran

and the west, iran and the u.s. tehran and washington decided not to go for broader dialogue, negotiations on other issues unless they reached something on the nuclear. therefore if it is finalized by july 1 can open the door for iran and the u.s. to cooperate and to have a regional dialogue, to cooperate on common interests, common threats. it is obvious extremism isis they are threats to the region, to even u.s. alliance, to iran to international community.

there is a consensus that the threat today is other versions of isis. there is indirect cooperation between iran and the u.s. americans are leaving the airstrike against isis. a key force on the ground battle against isis. they have common interests for peace and stability in iran and afghanistan and many other issues like security and energy. therefore this is step one toward if they want and now they can open a dialogue to cooperate on common threats. giving five reasons why iranians are happy, five reasons why the

p5plus one are happy. i believe everything is not over yet. they have a lot to do until july 1. many technical issues have remained unresolved. therefore we cannot say the deal is 100% done. second with a nuclear deal, 35 years of this doll these is not going to be over. there is a huge mistrust between iran and the u.s., iran and the west. and some u.s. allies in the region, the israelis are worried after the deal, americans and

iranians would go to bed. i would assure them they are not going to bed soon. it takes time and this would only be the first that. thank you. i now ask thomas mattair to address the next issues. [applause] thomas mattair: thank you. 10 minutes is not a lot of time. what i want to say is that there is -- there are positive developments in this nuclear framework agreement and enough progress to go forward with more months of negotiations over technical details and find out whether it can be implemented. the gcc states are making

cautious statements about willingness to see what the details are and to see whether more progress can be made and whether something airtight can be developed and implemented. i say it is cautious, because there is a lot of skepticism in these states. and is not just skepticism about the nuclear deal itself. the other concern, which is perhaps even greater, is that the united states in exchange for this agreement is going to acquiesce in the expansion of iranian influence in the arab world. they are looking at iran's influence in iraq after the toppling of that whole system. iran's relationship with the

its influence over she immunities in bahrain and yemen now, there is a concern about what the united states will do and that is great on their part. they are concerned the u.s. might even consent to irani an -- in the region. when we talk about al qaeda, the states are asking that the u.s. equal amount of attention to iranian backed militia in syria and iraq and elsewhere. if we do not do that, we are only concentrating on city jihadists. it concerns them greatly. about the uae in particular

they have a special reason for being skeptical about iran. i was specifically asked to address this issue, so i will. it concerns the three islands in the approaches to the shipping lanes inside the gulf to the west of the strait. by line-up on the shipping lanes. if you control them, you control the shipping lanes for a period of time. the shaw of iran wanted those islands and took them just before the uae became independent in early december 1971. he explained he wanted them for strategic reasons because he is concerned radicals in the region white take them -- might take them, might interfere with shipping.

he was concerned that some people might take them. it is very much the case that the prime minister's of iran were telling the british in the 1950's and 1960's they were interested in potential oil deposits off the islands. they did take them. although the uae has a strong historical and legal claim to the islands and has ever since tried to press that claim in the international arena. it has had the support of other gcc states, and it has had the support of the arab league. this support continued during the 19 -- after the revolution of course in 1979. one could see during that time that the islands can be useful because during the tanker war

one iran -- when iran was interfering with shipping out of kuwait and the other gulf states, it used of those islands and the military assets on those as well as the offshore oil installations to interfere with shipping. the u.s. eventually got involved and escorted convoys of those out of the gulf. it demonstrated the military utility of the islands. even when there was a thaw in the early 1990's after the iran-iraq war was over, the gcc states were interested enough and concerned enough about iran's general military abilities in the region. the modernization of its military after the war, they

were concerned enough about that to sign security pacts with united states to open up their space for american airfields. that concern iran greatly. iran has complained greatly about that during that time. iran has conducted naval exercises in the region. some of those exercises have involved attempts to block passage through the strait of hormuz. uae, kuwait cuts are, and others -- kuwait, qatar are purchasing a great deal of american equipment to modernize their forces to contain any potential iranian aggression. it is impossible to tell what iran's intentions are but they

are looking at their capabilities. it is anti-ship missiles and other acquisitions that they have made over the past decades. they believe they need at least the ability to deter that and are getting it from the u.s. as i said when i began, they are not just concerned about the nuclear agreement. they are concerned about the trustworthiness of the u.s. there was a time i heard one of the official say there was a time when the u.s. was a force to be reckoned with, and now it is a problem to be dealt with. that means they are not sure they can trust the u.s. united states does say we have your back when it comes to an external aggression. they are looking at our intervention in a rock in our hesitation in syria. they are looking at our repeated

failure decade after decade to help the palestinians liberate themselves from the israelis. they are asking what kind of political judgment does the u.s. have? this is all part of their concern about the nuclear agreement and why they want assurances from the united states that we will do something about iran's presence in the arab world. they are concerned with michael back to the concept that we had -- concerned we might go back to the concept we had when the british withdrew from the gulf in the early 1970's which was the twin pillar policy. we supported iran and saudi arabia against the soviet union but more of the support with two iran because it was more highly developed. that concept comes up. they are concerned about that. they are also concerned as i said before that we would tilt to iran and recognized iran's

power, population industry, and technological base and think they should be accepted. while these countries will say they have a cautious willingness to consider this agreement, i would say there is a substantial concern there. you can even say in the case of qatar the although it is often said their relations with iran our core deal -- with iran are corneal,dial they did vote in favor of a resolution in december 2006 and voted in favor

of security council resolution 1747 in march 2007. both of those was revolutions imposed sanctions on iran. they are on record as being concerned about that program. i would even say that in these capitals, there are people who if this agreement fails to satisfy them, if they feel they are in danger because of the potentially additional boldness iran might think we are allowed it to eventually escape from these inspections and restrictions and 10, 20, 15, 30 years, these are states that might think about other options.

they are countries that have talked about how we need to keep all options on the table if this agreement does not work out. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much john for inviting me.. i will probably not talk for 10 minutes since my medicine will wear off and eight minutes. i am in in a crs capacity today so i will be objective and nonpartisan. if there is congressional staff in the room, i worked are you. so ask away. i would be glad to see you afterwards to clear up anything that is unclear. i will confine most of my comments today to the sanctions

part of the deal. it is clear from the iranian and u.s. fact sheet the all of the sanctions that have been imposed by the u.s. and the eu other than human rights-related sanctions imposed since 2010 are going to be relieved as a consequence of this agreement if it is finalized. that means iran is being shut out of the international banking system would come to an end. them being shut out of the swift and laconic bank -- swift and electronic bank system would end. sanctions on insurance of iranian oil tankers, sanctions on buying iranian patrol

chemicals, sanctions on them buying automotive gear sanctions on supplying iran with oil drilling exploration equipment, all of these would presumably come to a conclusion if this deal is finalized and when the iae certifies iran has complied. this is still a little bit unclear. it has to be clarified a little bit more when the deal is finalized. apparently the iae will be the arbiter. they will certify iran has reduced its stockpile to whatever they agreement says. that iran has dismantled thousands of centrifuges. when they are certified, that is when the sanctions would be relieved is what i am seeing.

even though to fact sheets differ a little bit. iran would, by these measures, gain access to approximately 130-150 billion in reserves in various banks overseas. much of which is in south korea and some of which is in ship and and other countries. these hard currency payments were made for oil that iran is unable to move back to the central bank. no government has impounded this money. no government has taken title to this money. it is iran's money. these are in bank accounts under iran's name. because of the banking sanctions, no bank will cooperate in helping iran move this money back to the central bank. that is why it is overseas and iran has not been able to get to it. the idea these are frozen assets or impounded assets, that is incorrect.

i see some oil people in the audience. as i said, one of the big things in this is that iran would be able to freely export oil again. what does that mean? there are five countries currently the have active exemptions to avoid u.s. sanctions to buy oil. they are buying iranian oil. japan, south korea, china, turkey, and india. these countries could conceivably as soon as the sanctions are relieved increase their orders for iranian oil. iran could start supplying those five with more oil. the eu which was buying a quarter of iran's oil, they enacted a ban on purchases of iranian oil. it will take longer for the eu to start buying iranian oil again because the eu would have to meet. it would have to get a

consensus. has to be a political decision to lift that van. that could perhaps be early 2016. let's say there is a deal in june and the iea gives the go-ahead september or october those five could start buying more oil right away. the iranian economy in my estimation is likely to rebound fairly quickly. this $150 billion that i mentioned that iran would get access to, that is virtually equal to iran's entire year of an entire budget year that they would instantly have currency. the value of iran's riel would rise instantly. employment would increase in the people whose shops are shuttered, their factories are shuttered would reopen.

people would go back to work. some people go to work but they don't -- right now, they are going to work but they drink tea all day. they may get paid three months late, and the boss might give them a quarter of what they are owed. this is what is going on now. basically, the entire iranian economy is in a state of suspension. suspended animation. the entire economy is waiting for this deal to get done and the sanctions relieved to occur. that is when everyone goes back to work and gets paid again starts buying clothes again buys electronics. this is when the economy fires of again. just to close, i will talk a little since i am with crs about the administration plan if this deal is finalized.

it would be use of presidential waiver authority on the u.s. sanctions on the foreign companies that have been so effective. after some period of iranian compliance, no one has specify how much, i think it is about a year but don't quote me on that, the administration plans to ask congress to in a legislation that would change modify, repeal, or revoke the usa since put in place by statute. then it will be a congressional decision at that point. if congress did not act, the sanctions would stay enforce and there could be debate between the u.s. and u.s. allies as far as the sanctions go.

the sanctions on the foreign companies would still be enforced. the plan would be to have a period of iranian compliance and then ask the congress to enact sections relief under the agreement. i will stop there. thank you. [applause] >> good morning everybody. thanks for being here on such an april shower morning. i was asked to speak about the agreement as it applies or does not apply to what is going on lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence. basically, the negotiations as far as we know did not discuss anything outside of the

negotiations on the nuclear program. there were supposedly no connection specifically between iran's other issues in this foreign policy and the region or the world for that matter. generally speaking, everybody knew and everybody knows the nuclear program was only a part of iranian foreign policy. it itself the matter how much we deny there is a connection, there is a connection to iranian influence in other places. that specific negotiation had its impact on other things. basically two perspectives that iran used the issue of his role in lebanon and syria to try to

get a better deal on the nuclear program. the other one is that it didn't. the way it is seen in these two countries would with a influence in both countries through the support of the syrian regime and the support of hezbollah in lebanon, everybody there thinks that has to be some sort of an outcome that may reflect on political positions or political conditions in both countries. in other words, if iran resolves the issue on the nuclear file like the ambassador mentioned will there be outcomes related to other foreign-policy issues in which iran is involved? in lebanon, the country is

almost on the verge of collapse. the state is slowly almost imploding. there is a condition where it is almost like ken said earlier i suspended animation. there is no president or presidential elections that have been held to elect a new president since last may. hezbollah and its ally on the christian side are the ones holding up the process. why that is going on is beyond any rational interpretation. if it is really the person of the president that is important everybody is thinking about the future of the country. what about the fate of that country?

without a president, there is no constitutional continuity so to speak. today, the executive authority is in the hands of the prime minister, who at any time can be sent home by hezbollah and its allies in the lebanese political system to withdraw from that process. that is a very important consideration. there are other issues. sectarian polarization in the country where unfortunately some sundni's still able to can maintain control over its community. there are those people out there who are basically starting to voice the issue of with this in e sunni'; are not getting what we wants and the shia are controlling the country.

hezbollah is worried about a very important develop in lebanon over the last three or four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. unfortunately, these refugees are not expected to return to syria anytime soon. syria is destroyed. these people if they were to be repatriated to syria, they will have an infrastructure that would receive them. most people in lebanon are not happy with the situation going on in syria. imposition of the syrian civil war and the lebanese political system is really a serious issue. what is interesting is that hezbollah has not -- while it has criticized hard the

operation decisive storm in hyemen, they haven't said much about the nuclear deal itself. it was very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good deal. we want to get out of sanctions and all that, and hezbollah say much -- hezbollah did not say much. they are probably waiting to see how things in for the next few weeks or months until the technical issues are resolved. it is very interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any specific statement on the negotiations. the syrian situation of the regime over the last two weeks or months has really experienced a lot of setbacks.

specifically underground in the south and north, the regime has suffered military defeats. despite the fact that hezbollah has thrown its full weight behind the regime and is fighting on many fronts in syria , despite the fact there are shia militias being imported from iraq and afghanistan and south asia, and despite the fact the russia's open military spigot to syria, things are not going well for the syrian regime. if you look at this brief overview of all of this, we can imagine what now? would there be some sort of change? the situation in lebanon and syria. this is quite important to answer because if iran were to go back to the two perspectives

on whether iran was using lebanon and syria as a bargaining chip in its nuclear program negotiations or whether it was not, it is very important to try to answer this. nuclear negotiations are done. iran does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political developments or other developments in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation? this is something everybody is speculating on. the arab governments are now very busy with the war in yemen. gcc countries are very busy there. at the same time, they are looking at nuclear negotiations as how it might reflect on their

interests in those two countries. if we talk about lebanon and syria, we also need to talk about gcc's situation and how it deals with this. there is a wildcard here. this is something we really don't know how it is going to shape up over the next three months until the end of june. the wildcard is specifically will anybody within the iranian lyrical system -- political system, the nature of their political system its domestic politics are fragmented. it is a fractional political system. obviously ayatollah khomeini has the final say and will definitely try to reign

everybody in for whatever decision the iranian political decision should have. at the same time, there are different factions within the system who may not be necessarily very open and accepting of the nuclear deal. only yesterday, something positive came out of the leader of the revolutionary guard. he said our negotiators really worked very hard to get a very good deal. in other words, this was some sort of a way of saying you did ok. it was all right. this might reflect on how hezbollah looks at this issue. there are other people within the political system that described the political system

in suspended equilibrium. all the different factions have their own interest. all of them are trying to pull to their own position. not much happens on the domestic scene. are these different factions? will they do something in the foreign policy arena? will there be somebody who might think it is possible to activate for instance the lebanese-syrian front with israel? a couple of rockets here or there, something might happen like that. israel is in no mood to let things go. it might respond. if it does respond, there goes the deal because hezbollah would have to respond and things will follow part -- will fall apart. i will be happy to answer your questions if you like. i give you the doctor sullivan.

thank you. [applause] dr. sullivan: good morning. thank you for the invite john. they asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions can affect energy systems not just in iran but regionally and globally. to put this into perspective iran is an energy giant. it has either the number one or number two conventional natural gas reserves in the world. try that off between russia and iran depending on what you are looking at. number four in conventional oil reserves in the world. not talking about shale gas oil this is conventional. when this is opened up, if it

opens up, this will definitely change energy markets globally. oil markets are global markets. it will not just affect crude it won't affect just crude oil, but also refined products and petrochemicals. opening up iran, if it does open up, will also change national -- natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets, rather than regional ones. and if iran hops into this, it will change things considerably. one of the reasons they have not been involved is because they cannot get at the right technologies. the cannot develop the field into -- a giant field they share with kotter -- quatar.

-- qutar. all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole issue is pipelines and other export menus going into central asia. and the caspian. just don't look south. just a look at asia. look right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. we have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran, but at the prophet is right, you can build a pipeline, and could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into europe and beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil. the hedge funds will have a great time on this one. they are all guessing what will

happen to the price of oil tomorrow. it is like a parlor game. what is the price going to be tomorrow? will it go up three dollars? will go down three dollars? we talking about trillions of dollars trading regularly. people trading regularly. another thing that is not talked about too much is the pipeline going to pakistan and india which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions have taken off. although, there is a bit of a problem in one place, which iran and pakistan share. some border guards got killed there recently. there is a great deal of instability, but i think money may talk in that situation,. another part of the energy system is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, would be part of a power pole of electricity

production, consumption, and sherry -- sharing going into central asia, the caspian possibly across to iraq and to many other places, afghanistan and so forth. this could be a heated change. -- huge change. but there are big if's. some consider dual use could also enter iran. they could be more efficient with their use of energy. i think i can hear the investor salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow into these things that no one is even talking about? energy efficiency. what about renewables, geothermal, solar, wind? this is not happening. now think about the idea of snow -- of snapback sanctions. which i think is an absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of

dollars flowing into iran, oil going here, oil going there pipelines being built, and then someone says they don't have -- they haven't followed the game we are going to snapback on sanctions? money will talk. snapping back the sanctions are not as easy as that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that, either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclear station -- nuclearzation of the gulf. but also in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. because of the threat that they feel. all right. all of my opinions are mine

alone, do not represent those of the u.s. government, the national defense university, or other any other position -- organization i am a part of. i am not talking for them. what i am about to say will be clear that i am not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. it is a framework for discussion of a deal. if you are about to buy a house or a small business, and the person you are buying it from says, here is the framework for discussion, you wouldn't be asking when can i move in. this two and half page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green groceries in cairo. it is too simple, to bag, and it opens -- top vague -- too

vague. the terms are not clear. what we are seeing right now is another version of groupthink. we saw groupthink before the iraq war. now we are seeing groupthink on this deal. everyone is hopping on board. read the documents. read the terms. for example, the complexes to be converted into an atomic research center. ok, has anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how could you prove it is an atomic research center? i am seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish, and in

what time. period? oh, by the way, it could take years to develop an atomic research center. years. any deal, a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details. otherwise, the sanctions are not going to be taking off. and all these things i am talking about oil and gas and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up, pun intended, will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1. anyone done negotiating and simple business deals? july 1 is pretty tough. now we are trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1. could we please get real? all right. it is going to be very difficult

to turn the sanctions off, and it will be very difficult to turn them back on again. ken alluded to something about the waivers. some of them have waivers, some of them don't. some of them are law. you have you and sanctions, you have eu sanctions, you have combination sanctions. it is not the same thing as putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir one centrifuge within 10 years? 10 years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years, everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concern is the one your breakout time. while -- wow. why is everybody saying that is a good thing? how about a know your breakout time? at my being outrageous enough?

and my shattering illusions here? went that essentially says is that the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years, either. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside. and the use of different centrifuges, the complex, just about everything else goes right back on line the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, all changes. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist, when i hear that pouring into a country, i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership that is not still follow that economics is for donkeys because economics works. and inflation and unemployment and a hyperventilated connie --

economy drove iran to its revolution in 1979. what is the meaning of the term "significant amount of time"? you will have to excuse me. i worked in the law officers of years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words. how to tear them apart. how to figure out the real meaning that is stated here. and if there is enough agnes change it. who controls the inspection? the security council? the russians? who does that echo -- that? that is a little bit bag. and some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. if -- it is the nature of the

process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant. one minute. ok. in one minute, what can i tell you? i am concerned about how this is worded. and i am concerned once the door is open and the horses are out of the barn, how difficult it will be to get the horses back into the barn. i am concerned with this will do to the region. i can see the whole. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language. strict timetables. and no illusions. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you all very much. now comes to the most interesting part. your questions. i think for the next 40 plus minutes, we will just go ahead and run to the questions we received from the audience. i will read them as we go. and i appreciate very much if you have any more, just pass them on and we'll try to response the best we can. what all the investment and u.s. oil companies, other u.s. companies like boeing, be held up until congress acts? dr. katzman: the fact sheet distributed by the administration makes it clear that sanctions that by u.s. companies from doing business with iran will not be lifted under this arrangement. so the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily referred to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-us companies.

it is very clear from the u.s. statement that there will not as a consequence of this particular arrangement if it is finalized, and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate some pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran clearing up there differences on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. mr. pratt: the next question might hezbollah's hesitation on the the deal might raise concern ? dr. harb: well, i think this is -- i don't think that the iranians are combining their

thinking of what hezbollah presents to them. the only thing is that maybe iran will tell hezbollah indicate to hezbollah that it is time for has below help assist in putting the lebanese state back on track. i just a phone call from tehran would may be set things very very much straight in beirut. mr. pratt: anybody else have any comment to make on that one? ok. another question that is looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel. now that iran's nuclear power in the region is being analyzed, is there a growing concern with the relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on because of the

significance of the discussion particularly recently. dr. anthony: here, i think context is important. the relationship between iran and israel was instrument -- intimate, it was strategic, it was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep, in terms of the stories pertaining to esther, a persian who helped to free the jews from captivity from babylon. so the degree of trust over the centuries between jews and

persians is deep. at times, it has been massive. at times, it has been pervasive. and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel, thousands went by way of iran. and during the 1950's and 1960's, the heyday of our nationalism, iran and israel the in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has been concerned about an intimate u.s. arab relationship because there are 22 arab countries, only one iran, only one israel. so that was also part of the adhesive. and many in israel regard these

last years since 1979 as an aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal, mutually beneficial reciprocally rewarding relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interests. a similarity of interests. and that now may begin to come back into focus, but it will be quite a stretch. in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings and briefings by the head of israel's foreign ministry, an answer to a question of where do of 10 your

energy, your oil? the answer was 90% we get from iran. mr. pratt: -- dr. mousavian: the impact of a nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be censored to each other's about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is a member of the treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to give them their treaty. iran does not have a nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently, the pentagon accepted

on israelis behalf, a nuclear bomb. just in a decade, iran has given more than 700,000 mandated inspections. no other member, during the history of iaea, has given such an amount of inspections that the iranians game. israel has never given even one inspection. iran has initiated negotiations in 1970. they have insisted for -- israel is declining, rejecting, objecting the nuclear treason -- treaty. in 1990's, the proposed a weapons of mass ejection freezone.

iran and was the second country to support it. in over 20 is, israelis deal opposing weapons of mass distraction in the middle east. therefore, we are talking about two very, very, very different policy on proliferation. and as an iranian, i am really shocked that everybody is about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb. and all pressures and sanctions are on iran. and nobody is talking about israel. this is a very peculiar double standard in washington, in the west about proliferation in the middle east. however, these deals has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any

proliferation risk in the middle east. it is said iran would be committed. ok, this is first iranian goodwill. as long as you do not have reprocessing, you cannot make nuclear weapons from heavywater facilities. israeli has reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regional allies -- regional allies -- reg ionalize the measures agreed to with iran for all countries? no country would have enrichment above 5%. as long as there is no enrichment above 5%, they would be no nuclear bomb from nuclear facilities. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavywater facilities.

it can have major positive impact if israelis also would be ready to follow the same nuclear policy iran has followed for 40, 50 years. and if other regional countries would be ready to accept such a measure as iran has accepted far beyond mpt. mr. pratt: do you have any comments on it? 2 i don't think israel will ever give up its nuclear weapons or agree to restrictions. i expect them to continue to oppose this deal, a matter what. and to lobby for more actions

against iran. that is because of the nature of the two governments. john was talking about how, in the past, israel view iran as a partner in a sense because both of them had concerns about the arab world. and american relations with the arab world. but i can't see that entering into their minds anytime in the near or midterm. and in fact, their concern about iran is so great that they are -- you know -- in a sense reversing that trend in trying to forge relations with arab states that also view iran as a threat. it is very tactical on their part. it is only because they both have a concern about iran.

when netanyahu was in front of congress a month or so ago and warned that iran was a country that committed aggression against the arab world, i think he -- i don't think that is his primary concern. dr. katzman: i think i would say that there has been a consensus to sort of allow this this turned -- deterrent. to raise the fact that they are not in the mpt maybe it is intellectually precise, but it is probably not going to go very far. that would be my response.

dr. sullivan: the israeli institutions don't start the day by saying -- death to america. maybe starting -- changing the thinking on that would go a long ways. right now, we have a strong personalities involved in the iranian-israeli dialogue, everyone to call it that. it is more like two monologues that never meet. also, there are other issues involved here. let me get it straight. i am not saying i am against the deal, i'm not saying i am fort, i am just saying get better specificity and make it a real deal. not this thing floating in the air. i am not for war with iran. if anybody has that impression, i have been through wargames. looking at the cost of that work, it is astonishing what could happen. it would make iraq look like a

picnic. iran is a bigger country, bigger military, more organized hierarchical, a long culture and as soon as the boots hit the ground, welcome to hell. for all sides involved. we don't need that. what we need of some kind of a diplomatic economic, informational, and other change to bring this about. and my sense is this too and have page document is not it because we have other issues to deal with. what is happening in bahrain what is happening in lebanon what is happening in iraq, what is happening in yemen. ballistic missiles are not part of the deal. this is a very narrow document. this solves a very narrow question. and again, i am for improving relations, but it has to be done in the right way.

excuse me. dr. harb: i just urge you to read his recent piece on why we are talking about iran, what are the reasons basically behind this push towards iran, iran, iran. i urge you to read the report on that. mr. pratt: there is a fundamental question here with regards to ask a getting a copy of the deal. somebody asked where can we get a copy of the framework between u.s. and iran? >> the white house website. >> the middle eastern policy -- has it on its website. dr. sullivan: you can also find

different interpretations, which is part of the problem here. there are cultural differences linguistic differences, and also political differences across the country which is changing the way this is interpreted. it is far from clear. maybe it was important to make it on clear to see what happens. mr. pratt: do we have any idea on who the leads are -- returning back to the discussion -- secretary kerry going to be engaged? dr. sullivan: if they haven't started this yet, the clock is ticking. july 1 is not so far away. that is almost meantime term for a college. in this kind of deal with all this complicated issues probably there are a bunch of strippers out there on all -- sherpas of their on all side during the heavy lifting. when they do the heavy lifting, then the big players go in -- cnn, fox, iranian tv -- and they

say, well, waste -- we we made the deal. . dr. harb: in the "daily star" he basically summed it up, if i may, basically the deal -- or the framework for the deal -- slightly over 5000 centrifuges for the next 10 years that iran would maintain -- would be allowed to work only. enrichment for 15 years will be banned at the facility, the mountain facility. and iran can enrich some uranium, and not tons, at the heavy water reactor. i'm sorry, that is -- at 3.67%

purity. and that is kept at 300 kilograms for 15 years. 1000 ir-2 centrifuges, the newer version, will be removed. and the iraq heavywater reactor would be reconfigured to prevent the production of bomb fuel basically plutonium. the iaea inspections with less for 25 years. of all facilities, all imports that have to do with all of this. the iaea would have full access to everything. in return, iran will get the gradual removal of sanctions as soon as iaea provides clarification. then the sections will begin to be lifted.

dr. sullivan: to put this into perspective, this is the white house document. this is it. mr. pratt: -- even if iran's intent is to build nuclear energy, what language should be insisted upon in the final agreement to safeguard and avoid nuclear actions like tokushima? dr. anthony: this is an issue of real concern, in terms of one of the sites. the one it nearest to the gulf and the other gulf countries. because of the sanctions because of the nonexistent relations between tehran and washington, diplomatically and formally there could be such an accident. iran has had a history of earthquakes.

so has turkey. they are part of a different tectonic plate than those of arabia. so there is a legitimate fear what if there is an earthquake in that region? they -- their fear is that there would be spillage and linkage and that this would be contaminating and pose an immediate, direct threat to the water desalination plants in kuwait, bahrain, qatar, and elsewhere. and ships may refuse to come into the gulf until this is dealt with and cleaned up. that is more than a nightmare. that has catastrophic implications. the russians were involved in

building that reactor. and they are also the so-called inspectors of it, until now. but this is like putting the fox in the coop with the chickens. there needs to be a more technologically professional, efficient, and renowned inspector of that particular facility. and because it is the one that could be catastrophic, were there to be any accident there like the chernobyl and kuwait, the one that are most concerned and involved with this -- in the chernobyl disaster, some 200,000 people had to be relocated. that was costly. united nations asked for a lot of donor countries to subsidize and finance it. and kuwait was the leading one.

so, kuwait has been involved in this kind of an issue longer than any of the other gcc countries on that side, which relates directly to inspections and relate strictly to one particular nuclear facility, the one that is closest to the gulf. and i could affect them all. yes. yes, yes. and bush year -- dr. mousavian: from day one, it has been under iaea supervision. and the iaea has fully confirmed all safety measures already there.

second, joins land of action also -- i mean come on the framer, they agreed. they have also agreed the world powers to have more cooperation with iran on the safety issues. third, fukushima was in japan. japan never lowered its nuclear activities after fukushima. they continued the same nuclear activities. chernobyl was in russia. chernobyl increased its nuclear activities after chernobyl. emirates is going to have four nuclear power plants, so arabia will have power plants. turkey is going to have power plants. therefore, we really do not need to create more artificial fears about uranium and nuclear programs. dr. sullivan: the japanese shut

down all of their nuclear power plants. i was there two weeks ago visiting the plant just west of tokyo. and they are spending billions of dollars to set up safety devices in the event of another earthquake or tsunami. the japanese have been through a very difficult energy time since they had to shut down 30% of their electricity. which is what they have done. and there is a huge debate in japan right now whether to turn his back on again. the father away from tokyo you are, the more likely one of those plants is to be started up again. it is a very emotional issue. and this fukushima problem was not just an earthquake, it was a water flow problem. and when i think water in the middle east, i wonder what some people are thinking. the jordanians are building a plant in the desert of northwestern jordan using a water treatment plant as a source of water to cool the spent fuel and the nuclear plant. as i told a reporter a few years ago -- days ago, i wouldn't live

near that thing because of the water treatment plant goes down the water flow goes down, the thing overheat, and you have a fukushima in jordan right near the iraq border. the middle east is water shorts. if you're going to be putting a plant on the ocean, that makes sense. if you're putting it in the desert, that makes no sense. if you are putting it on a fault line, this makes no sense. near the ocean, maybe you keep the cooling going. but at the same time, it will shut down automatically if there is an earthquake. it has before. the one in san diego shutdown. nuclear facilities are breakup ligety beasts, and they need a lot of water and a lot of water flow. people are just not thinking this through. mr. pratt: anybody else want to comment on -- a question for kenneth katzman please compare and contrast libyan sanctions versus iranian sanctions, and when will iran be removed from the terrorism list?

dr. katzman: quite some questions. i know c-span is here so i want to say hi, mom. [laughter] i grandpa's remover from the u.s. -- iran's removal from the u.s. terrorist list, well, there are some their people in the audience, so maybe by the time they are my age that could happen. iran is nowhere close to being removed from the terrorist list. there is no consideration in the u.s. government for removing iran from the government -- from that list. i would just be categorical on that question. the other -- what was the rest of the question? sorry. comparing libya? well you know, we could conceivably have two similar situations.

libya gave up its nuclear program and actually gave -- dismantle the whole thing. obviously, there was not the same level of debate over lifting some of the sanctions on libya because they had been so you know, basically dismantle the entire program. iran is not doing that obviously. this deal leaves them with substantial infrastructure. and we had more than an hour of discussion about the continuing concerns. obviously, it is not quite as easy. but, you know, again, just looking at authorities, the president does have, you know, quite a bit of authority in terms of suspending sanctions. but if you're talking about lifting sanctions outright, or congressional action is needed, then of course it becomes much more involved. and most of the main sanctions that would be released under this deal are enforced by

congressionally passed statutes. and therefore congress, to lift the sanctions outright would have to pass new legislation to do that. mr. pratt: there is a follow-up question, if i could. regarding the banking system. and contemplate for access. when a final agreement contemplate full access of iran to the banking system? and the u.s. payment system? dr. katzman: again, anything involving the u.s. is not really part of the sanctions relief. iran would be able to access again, the european, asian financial system. and the secondary sanctions on those banks that are doing business with iranian banks, they were not be penalized by doing business with the u.s. financial system. but direct iran-u.s. financial

transactions would still -- that is not contemplated as part of the relief package. mr. pratt: thank you. a question for the ambassador. he said he would recommend iran during the shanghai cooperation organization if the nuclear deal is successful. what would the implications of this be and how would iran partners benefit? dr. mousavian: iran is already participating on all shanghai's high-level meetings. and if iran is members, it would create more opportunities for asian cooperation between iran and china, iran and south asia, and even iran and india.

this would have more impact on iran economical relations with asia. mr. pratt: just as a general for the panel, we have about 16, 17 minutes to go. it is a broad one. it is, what will the u.s. congress to? which is us going to sort of the filling a lot of air, but if anybody would like to comment on that. [laughter] dr. sullivan: well, the u.s. congress will do what the u.s. congress does. which is debate this issue and try to work it through. and whatever matter, they will. there is an election year coming up. there is always an election year coming up. and it is going to be hardball.

that is pretty much the way it is going to work out. and the house and the senate are now run by the republicans which, for those of you don't know, means they run who gets invited to the committee. and run the questions in the committee -- and the committee assignments. it will be a very rough road. dr. mousavian: i agree with him, but to my understanding, not only because of the next election and the -- it has a lot to do with benjamin netanyahu aipac, and more, i believe, it take, big misunderstanding not only in the u.s. congress between a lot of u.s. politicians -- you hear from

many u.s. congressman that we should keep the sanctions pressure iran. iran only came to nuclear negotiation deal or framework because of sanctions pressures. still, they keep the same narrative. in all debate, you read the same narrative. but a very simple fact, before sanctions, iran had a few hundred centrifuges. after sanctions, iran increased to 22,000 centrifuges. before sanctions iran was enriching below 5%. after sanctions, iran increase to 20%. before sanctions, iran had just a few hundred kilograms of stockpiles. after sections, the have several thousand kilograms of stockpiles.

this was really the impact of sanctions. as president obama said, suddenly the p5 plus one -- the only thing that made the framework possible was first the u.s. agreed to iran to have in richmond for its domestic, practical needs. that is why iran accepted to every transparency measures. and iran was ready to give every confidence building measures that iran would never diapered its nuclear program. because practically they had the same red line. -- [indiscernible] and obama said --

these narratives have not been corrected in the u.s. congress. there is a big misunderstanding, and they are repeating the same mistakes. today, more concerns about issues beyond nuclear. you heard our panelists that they discuss about all the threats, israel, regional influences, so the region netanyahu and even some arab allies and in washington they're pushing their administration to continue their strategy is to contain influence and power. this is the reality. but as long as they really do not recognize the fact, what is the fact? i believe, for 35 years, the u.s. europe, the world powers

they did everything they could and strategies against iran. unilateral sanctions. multilateral sanctions. u.n. sanctions. the war against iran. they millions of iranians that were either killed or injured. even using chemical weapons against iranians. they all supported the use of weapons of mass destruction's against iranians. 100,000 uranium and -- 100,000 iranians were killed or injured. no other country, and the past 35 years, has been under so much pressure and sanctions orchestrated by the u.s. however, after 35 years everybody today is crying and complaining, why is iran so stable? white ironic so powerful -- why

iran is so powerful? iran is everywhere. this is evidence and fact that 35 years of sanctions and pressures and the most powerful coercion and policy against iran not only has failed, but has strengthened iran. stability and power in the region. and look at the u.s. in the region. they got old weapons, money, support. and you can see the collapse of u.s. allies in the region. and others won't understand, therefore -- and one would say, look if you are right, then release the sanctions. here is another misunderstanding about iranian culture between our regional arab allies and even the west and even in washington. i have been 30 years within the

iranian administration. i am iranian and there is a culture. they need to understand iranian culture. more pressure, more sanctions would make iran more aggressive. therefore, as long as the congress follows the strategy, iran, like the last 35 years will be more aggressive. and you will try more, you will be feared more about the role of your own. if there is more opening to iran, more cooperation iranians, they would make a deal like you on other the disputed issues like it did on the nuclear. therefore, as long as these narrative continue in u.s. congress, i am optimistic even about the future of iran us on relations. i am pessimistic, sorry. [laughter] mr. pratt: dr. sullivan?

dr. sullivan: one country we haven't mentioned here is china. and they are very much involved in the situation, including developing two of the largest oil field in iran under sanctions. i don't think the issue isn't application of two tough sanctions. it is an issue of not applying the sanctions we already have. the chinese imports 60% of iran's oil exports. they built a real system. they built roads. they were very much involved in iran. the russians are very much involved. that is another country we have maybe mentioned once or twice in here. it is not just the u.s.. we have lost leverage. some people in the city think we can do some ink and the world jumps. this is a different world. china is a powerful country. russia is not as powerful in its economy. it is degraded, and its leaders or something else.

but the chinese are a powerful country that wants more influence in the middle east and they are moving into every single country. it is one of few countries that helped saudi arabia and iran at the same time. they support the palestinians and the israelis at the same time. they are playing a double game and they are playing it brilliantly. and our leverage in the region is not what it was, even five years ago. so to think that we can say sanctions and close the door and everyone jumps, that is not the way it is anymore. it is a different iran, it is a different china. china, when this whole thing started, was a poor country back in 1979. the iranian revolution. china was of poor country. it had no real clout in the region. and it didn't start importing oil until 1983. this is a totally different world. we have to get up to speed on this one.

dr. harb: the unfortunate fact is that i believe the only thing that might come related to congress as the white house would have some sort of a ability to break the proof kind of thing. unfortunately, the situation is such that congressman are not necessarily listening to these arguments. dr. anthony: -- i come at it from a slightly different perspective, but i and a but the same point. and that is the pressure of lobby groups neoconservatives, and those who are interested in

advancing the israeli narrative or is really objectives, or israeli interests. and iran has become quite convenient as a distraction from israel's actions. israel's policies. israel's positions. israel's -- and it will continue. to serve this tactical role, to deflect attention away from the eastern mediterranean specifically israel and its building of settlements. by focusing on iran as the whipping boy, the bad boy, this gave goat, the fear mongering there. this is because it has been a successful tactic by israel and its friends.

in 1982, the u.s. was on a roll having cap david under its belt and captain the israelis to withdraw from the saana. in the israeli push back was over our dead bodies. and this will not be your agenda. and we thought that this was hubris run amok, but it wasn't. i sat in on meetings and generally of 1982 where state department said that between april 15 and june 15 israel will invade lebanon. and we said, why would they do that? because there is a cease-fire. and that is already seven months, has been negotiated with the plo and the cia.

by the end, it will be lebanon's. why would they do that? and the answer was because they want to change the agenda completely. and, indeed, they did i invading lebanon. and they remain there directly or indirectly for the next 19 years. during which time, with the attention deflected, the settlements doubled quadrupled, quintupled. on the settlements all remain. so this is quite tempting. even with united states invasion of iraq in a march, 2003. since then, israel has built a so-called separation barrier the security wall. this has cut into what was to be the territory for an interdependent state of palestine. 22% remaining.

so territorial expansion has occurred in the shadow of deflecting american detention -- attention. and we have done nothing to prevent those events that i just described. that has put a comprehensive peace even further from the reach of those who have cried in the last year with the secretary of state carry, and before him mitchell, and before him: powell, and before him etc. we have been ineffectual. so i share the pessimism of the ambassador, but i arrive at it differently. iran will continue to be in object of all scorn and left in isolation if those are lobby them are successful. mr. pratt: thank you. i think we have probably less than three or four minutes left,

so what i would like to do is just one final question. and i will post it to the panel. we'll just go right on the row. what would be the regional implications -- repercussions for a failure to arrive at an acceptable march 30 deadline? what is the next step if there is no agreement on the technical details over the next 90 days? we will start with dr. sullivan and move this way. dr. sullivan: probably a delay because i don't think it will be every trouble goal. it is going to be an extremely complicated situation. after just give up until your hands up on july 1, that would probably bring a great deal of political resentment and anger within iran, within the iranian

leadership and the implications of that could be significant for whatever is happening between the united states and iran on other issues. if it breaks down entirely, then we are back to step one. and to get these folks back into the table even if it is that wonderful 10 star hotel, it is going to be very difficult. the proxies for iran and others may also react in a connected way -- in a kinetic way, if this happens, making my far more complicated in the region. the game has started. and i don't mean a fun game. i mean a very complicated and dangerous game. and it may not be a retrievable one if this thing breaks down. but the agreement, if there is to be an agreement, has to be a proper one. and very long-lasting.

at has to be a step to go to do with the other issues that are involved with this. otherwise, we will have an agreement on something narrow and nothing else. dr. harb: i agree with paul that maybe -- maybe the resort would be to postpone the negotiations the technical details, but at the same time, if we resort -- if we postpone those then it is likely that elements within the regime will try to start things up regionally so it can have a little bit more of a marketing chip in those extended negotiations. dr. katzman: i think given the reaction in iran to the tentative deal, i think it will be extremely difficult for iran

not to go forward and have the final deal. i think the repercussions in iran would be tremendous if there were a collapse at the end of this. i think president -- the president could probably not finish. he would certainly not be able to i think you would see a major up evil if this doesn't go to completion -- upheaval if this doesn't go to completion at this point. >> i agree that the technical details are so difficult, i would fully expect when june 30 comes, some extending up the talks. that would suit a number of the gulf states because they would like to see a tighter agreement negotiated.