bomber dzhokhar tsarnaev was found guilty on all 30 counts wednesday. after the decision, governor charlie baker said he supports the death penalty, even though that decision belongs to the jury. governor baker: good afternoon. i heard the news and my first reaction was thinking back over the course of the trial, the images and stories about what actually happened. i could not help but imagine what it would have been like to be one of those family members reliving in graphic detail one of the most horrible moments of their lives. because of that, those are the

primary people i was thinking about. i'm glad the verdict is in. based on everything i saw, i have no problem with it. at this point it is up to the jury to make the decision about what happens next. >> [inaudible] governor baker: i sure do. to this day, i continue to be amazed that somebody could stand there for four minutes in front of martin richard and place that device right next to him. i remember going to the memorial day parade at the cedar gross cemetery. visiting martin richard's grave and thinking, i cannot believe somebody would do this. >> do you believe the death penalty is appropriate? governor baker: i said last year, for a crime like this i

would support the death penalty and i continue to. >> were you watching the reports as they were coming in life? -- live? governor baker: i found out the same way a lot of people did through word-of-mouth. >> [inaudible] governor baker: all the way through. every single day, you watch these men and women standing tall in many cases. with artificial limbs, in and out of the courthouse, a family members in and out. you see the reports from the media of what was discussed and shown and i have to believe that was incredibly hard. they showed up every single day and did it. many of them sat there in a chair in the front of the courtroom and testified staring

right at the person who had significantly changed their lives. i thought it took incredible guts. >> the you have any intention of calling any of the family members? governor baker: i have had conversations with several of the family members over the course of the past year. i'm sure that i will run into some of them. independently, seeing them in the normal course. >> [inaudible] governor baker: i think the most amazing thing about the marathon the year after was the incredible amount of effort and technology and ingenuity that went into the security issues. it is a tough event to secure and i was really impressed with

how all the security folks went about creating a secure route. i thought it was amazing that so many people came out and ran to make a statement that they were not going to be intimidated by that act of terrorism. the marathon has always been a big event but it became a global event as a result. i certainly expect, in a good way, all eyes will be on boston and i am looking forward to it. for the first time ever i have an official role. i get to hand somebody a wreath. >> [inaudible] governor baker: i think -- my view is, whatever the pace needs to be, the pace needs to be. it is important for the families involved here to have their day in court and i believe they have

been having their day in court. whatever process needs to be pursued to get to the final is fine. >> what do you think about the fact that it only took 1.5 days? governor baker: i have a friend who is only an attorney to never -- who says to never judge the decision of a jury unless i am in the room myself, but in this case following and reading the stories in which the defense said we will not argue guilt or innocence, we will argue larger issues, i am not surprised by the verdict or that it came back quickly. >> [inaudible] governor baker: oh yeah. >> [inaudible] governor baker: federal decision. federal law. federal courtroom. they get to make the call on that.

my own perspective was covered well enough, as a citizen, i had no trouble understanding what was going on. >> [inaudible] governor baker: i wasn't expecting to be. >> you want more questions? [laughter] governor baker: have a nice day. >> coming up on c-span, a conversation on the iran nuclear framework agreement. then, and interview with congressman will hurt. then a look at entrepreneurship programs with convicted felons. >> the national press club will hold a discussion looking at the policy implications regarding hillary clinton's use of personal e-mail regarding -- during per tenure as secretary of state. on c-span 2 senator rand paul

will give a foreign-policy speech near the uss yorktown. watch live coverage from mount pleasant, south carolina. next, a look at the iran nuclear framework agreement. this panel which -- the specifics of the agreement and the possible implications. the national council on u.s. arab relations hosted this event.

>> good morning and welcome to another of the series of briefings of the national council on u.s.-arab relations on issues of vital importance to the united states and the nations in the middle east. thank you for coming this morning on such short notice. we have such a distinguished group of panelists will follow these matters. this morning i am honored to be your moderator. john: i joined the national council on u.s.-arab relations after spending 35 years in the arabian gulf in the energy field. i am well aware of the importance of the iran nuclear deals for the people of the regions. i would like to thank c-span for covering this event live today and for covering our briefing last thursday on yemen, held in this room. the saudi ambassador to washington spoke at the conclusion of that session. coverage of last week's briefing is available on our website. a quick word about the national council on u.s.-arab relations.

established 33 years ago as a nonprofit organization. the guiding vision is one of education and seeks to educate about the islamic world and place relations between our allies and partners across the region on his firm a foundation as possible and continues to expand the relationship through a variety of programs. students, academics, and our armed forces. it organizes an annual -- conducts a study abroad, youth leadership development programs, such as the ones that will be held this weekend in houston and washington. over 400 young americans will represent 22 countries to debate

pressing issues of the day with over 38,000 alumni. the next generation of americans will be better prepared to conduct economic and commercial relations in a region so vital to the united states. today our panel will assess the nuclear deal. this is a preliminary agreement, a framework with many technical issues to be sorted out in the coming months. as has been said, the devil is basically in the details. the public debate will be intense. is this a good thing or a bad thing? what do our regional partners and allies think? will this define the legacy of a president in the home stretch of his administration?

the president has described this as a once in a lifetime opportunity to see if we can take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east. let us see whether these noble objectives are achievable. just a few housekeeping details. each of the speakers will have 10 to 12 minutes for their remarks. i refer you to their bios in our announcement. this will allow full a full hour of questions and discussions. on your chairs, you will find a 3x5 card. please write your questions on these cards and we will do our best to respond as fully as possible.

to start i am pleased to introduce our first speaker, dr. john duke anthony. he is the only american observer to have attended each summit since 1981. and then the ambassador will speak. he will be followed by the executive director of the middle east policy council and a specialist on middle east affairs and will present his remarks. next we'll hear from the distinguished affairs fellow at the national councils on u.s. our relations. dr. paul sullivan will conclude, professor of economics at the national defense university, will wrap up the presentation.

dr. anthony, if you would kickoff our discussion on this deal. dr. anthony: thank you, john. we came up with 14 factors windows through which someone could look at what occurred about the framework and the challenges it represents. the opportunities it also represents an we are going to be able to a dress around eight of these 14 factors. but we will be as candid as we can. much is unknown. in my brief remarks have to do with the needs and concerns of

three of iran's neighbors -- oman, bahrain, saudi arabia. thomas mattair will deal with the united arab emirates and kuwait. a few statistics with regard to saudi arabia pasta concerns. -- saudia arabia's concerns. saudi arabia is the epicenter of prayer and pilgrimage, faith and spiritual devotion for some 1.5 million muslims worldwide. inasmuch as iran is the leading country with a largely shia orientation on the theological

stage, there is inherently explicitly a degree of competition so now that we are express it as i just did. iran is being perceived beyond the nuclear agreement in terms of its leaders making reference to iran's unprecedented influence in four arab capitals. it would be of concern to those in the league of arab states. of the 1.5 million muslims in the world, 2 billion christians, one billion of them being roman catholics, some 200 million

muslims identify with the shia sect of islam. we're talking about 12% of the muslims being shia. this is important to keep in mind when one listens to people speak about the threat that iran poses. 12% taking on 88%. something is wrong with that picture. at the governmental level, the highest organization to which muslim countries belong is the organization of the islamic conference. it has 57 members. no more than four of those 57 would be predominately shia in the orientation of their

government. so the numbers are heavily imbalanced, not in favor of iran. this, too, needs to be kept in perspective. with regard to oman, saudi arabia and bahrain, these three are profoundly similar in their concerns regarding iran, because they are neighbors of iran. they have similar needs and concerns and similar interests and similar foreign policy objectives. and yet there are the vertices between and amongst them. when people talk about threat analysis, it is usually where they are located. people in maine are not so concerned about jamaican and haitian boat people coming to their shores.

those in florida are not obsessed with the same kinds of concerns that people who live in new england are concerned with. this is another way of looking at the concerns and objectives of these countries. oman is different from all of the other gcc countries. it has the best, smooth relationship with iran. this is not new. this has been the case is the beginning of the revolution in 1979 and dates from before then. part of it has to do with the body of water between them. many people have the image that most of the shipping goes through iran's waters and exiting the gulf. this is not the case.

the vast majority of the traffic goes through oman's waters. there are three lanes. one two-mile wide lane for ships coming in to the gulf. another two-mile wide zone for ships going out of the gulf. and the zone between the two that is a safety zone. the strategic and geographic challenge is far greater on the omani side than on the irani side. you can look at the map. that little piece of oman at the top of the peninsula is separated from oman like alaska is separated from the continental united states. the strategic aspect between oman and iranian relationships. there is not going to be a conflict between them started by oman.

oman's citizen base is less than 2 million. the numbers should drive your perspective, your assessment of what the issues are and the implications. but there is more. iran sent close to 30,000 soldiers to oman from 1972 through 1974 to help oman put down a guerrilla rebel marxist uprising in oman. no other country did as much as

iran to help oman regain its stability. there are no territorial issues between the two, unlike issues that exist between some of iran's other neighbors and iran. with regard to bahrain's situation, it is also numerically fruitful for your analysis. if people made frequent reference to 60% of the population being shia and ruled by a sunni government, you have a situation that is even more imbalanced in the case of bahrain. you have the last remaining arab country with a sunni government ruling over a majority shia population. and despite the much renowned report that came out as a result

of bahrain's uprising in 2011 in which there was a statement there was no evidence of iranian involvement in those uprisings here is where perception comes in. perception is more powerful than reality. around 3000 bahrainis have been trained in oman, coming straight from secondary school, finance by the shia merchants in bahrain. they go at age 17, 16, 18. they go largely not to tehran, a seminary based shiaism and they return to bahrain. some of those are regarded by the intelligence security

services as forming sleeper cells. in other words, one day they may be called upon to return the favor of the education and training and leadership development that they required as a result of iran. and so when the government speaks about iranian involvement, there is this dimension that does not come out in the media but should help one frame iranian's concern -- bahrain's concerned and the representatives of the government that bahrain should revert to iranian control and influence. this is disturbing to any bar -- bahraini task with security

and stability issues. saudi arabia is concern the cost of a significant shia population in the eastern province. there is far less evidence than there has been in the case of bahrain's needs and concerns. saudi arabians have become open in accusing iran of being behind the inspiration of the attacks on the towers in 1996, in which large numbers of americans were killed. this is a brief overview to begin the discussion, by showing there is no unanimity of all of iran's neighbors. it differs from one to the next. now we have the pleasure of listening to ambassador seyed hossein mousavian. thank you.

[applause] seyed hossein mousavian: good morning, everyone. iran -- they both consider the deals agreed in switzerland as a win-win deal. to my understanding there is five reasons why iranians would consider a win for iran. number one is that the deal contains respect for iranian nuclear technology including enrichment. number two is ultimately the sanctions would be lifted, even graduate.

number three is that ultimately the iranian nuclear would be normalized. and number four is that ultimately the nuclear would be removed from chapter seven united nations security council and all resolutions would be terminated. and number four is that iran after a period would be able to have a normal, peaceful cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology with the world powers. this is something iran has been sanctioned from day one. the world powers consider the

deal a win for themselves. i would like to give you five reasons why they believe this is a win for the world powers for the u.s. number one, iran except that the -- accepted the maximum level of transparency and measures within nonproliferation treaty. they have safeguarded the agreement and additional protocols and arrangement for the code. . these are three arrangements for transparency. iran has accepted to all three arrangements.

number two is iran would agree has agreed to address all possible military dimension issues which would need to give the transparency, inspection to the ieaa. practically the world powers have the most intrusive, strong powerful system. no other member has ever been committed like iran on transparency measures. number four is they were looking for a break of the one year in case iran decided to go forward. and number five, confidence building measures, the u.s. and world powers needed time.

due to 35 years of hostility. this implementation for measures are about 10 to 25 years. therefore the have enough time for almost a decade to a quarter of a century. to my understanding, this is the mutual win, a deal for both and i would like to give you five reasons why this is a win-win, a mutual win for both of them. through diplomatic solutions they were able to escape the devastating war in the middle east. and perhaps this is one of the rare occasions a big crisis in the middle east has been resolved or is going to be completely resolved through diplomacy. second, they have been able to

set a new mechanism for verification, for non-diversion toward weaponization. many nuclear experts believe it is not enough. many believe even additional protocols, which is the maximum level of transparency is not enough. and the sets of measures is practically a new mechanism of verification and transparency, assuring non-diversion toward -- weaponization for the first time far beyond that. if they are wise enough to embed the agreement with iran on a broader scope, regionally and internationally, this will be a big, big game for the liberation globally.

number four is that perhaps this is the first evidence, engagement policy of president obama announced in 2009 has worked. iran and the u.s. have been trying for 35 years to improve relations. a lot of efforts and all have failed. this is the first time a success is stamped, at the highest level of negotiations between iran and the u.s., which would have implications on implications between iran and the west. number five, it opens the door to a regional dialogue between iran and the world powers, iran and the west, iran and the u.s.

tehran and washington decided not to go for broader dialogue negotiations on other issues unless they reached something on the nuclear. therefore, if it is finalized by july 1, can open the door for iran and the u.s. to cooperate and to have a regional dialogue, to cooperate on common interests, common threats. it is obvious extremism, isis, they are threats to the region to even u.s. alliance, to iran to international community. there is a consensus that the threat today is other versions of isis. there is indirect cooperation between iran and the u.s.

americans are leaving the airstrike against isis. a key force on the ground battle against isis. they have common interests for peace and stability in iran and afghanistan and many other issues like security and energy. therefore this is step one toward if they want and now they can open a dialogue to cooperate on common threats. giving five reasons why iranians are happy, five reasons why the p5plus one are happy.

i believe everything is not over yet. they have a lot to do until july 1. many technical issues have remained unresolved. therefore, we cannot say the deal is 100% done. second, with a nuclear deal, 35 years of hostilities between iran and the u.s. is not going to be over. there is a huge mistrust between iran and the u.s., iran and the west. and some u.s. allies in the region, the israelis are worried after the deal, americans and iranians would go to bed. i would assure them they are not going to bed soon. it takes time and this would only be the first that.

thank you. i now ask thomas mattair to address the next issues. [applause] thomas mattair: thank you. 10 minutes is not a lot of time. what i want to say is that there are positive developments in this nuclear framework agreement and enough progress to go forward with more months of negotiations over technical details and find out whether it can be implemented. the gcc states are making cautious statements about willingness to see what the

details are and to see whether more progress can be made and whether something airtight can be developed and implemented. i say it is cautious, because there is a lot of skepticism in these states. and is not just skepticism about the nuclear deal itself. the other concern, which is perhaps even greater, is that the united states in exchange for this agreement is going to acquiesce in the expansion of iranian influence in the arab world. they are looking at iran's influence in iraq after the toppling of that whole system. iran's relationship with the assad regime and its help for the assad regime.

its influence over hezbollah. its influence over shia communities and now yemen. that concern about what the united states is going to do is great on their part. in fact, they are concerned that the united states might even consent to a rainy and agenda many -- hegemony in the region. when we talk about isis and exhortations that united states deal with it, they are also asking the united states to pay equal attention to the rainy -- iranian backed shia militias. if we are not doing that and concentrating only on sunni jihadists, it concerns them gravely. about the uae in particular. they have a special reason for

being skeptical about iran. i was specifically asked to address this issue. concerns three islands in the approaches to the shipping line -- shipping lanes, inside the gulf. if you can told -- control them you control the shipping lanes. iran wanted those islands and took them just before the united arab emirates became independent in early december, 1971. he explained that he wanted them for strategic reasons. he was concerned that radicals might take them and might be able to interfere with shipping. john was talking about the do far revolution and he was concerned those people might take them, for example.

it is also very much the case that the prime minister's of iran telling the british that they were also interested in potential oil deposits and cash deposits. they did take them although, the uae has a strong historical and legal claim to the islands and has ever since tried to press that claim in the international arena. it has had the support of other gcc states and the arab league. this support has continued after the revolution, in 1979. one could see during that period of time that those islands can be useful. during the tanker war, when iran was interfering with shipping

coming out of kuwait and other states in the gulf, it did use those islands and it did use its military assets on those islands to interfere with shipping and united states eventually got involved in escorting convoys out of the gulf. it demonstrated the military utility of those islands. even when there was a thaw, in the early 1990's, after the iran-iraq war was over the gcc stats, the oae qatar, were concerned enough about iran's general military capabilities in the region on its coast and on the islands and the modernization of its military after the iran-iraq war. they were concerned enough about

that to start citing security packs with united states, to open up their space for american airfields and that concerned iran greatly and iran has complained about that greatly. iran has conducted naval exercises in the region, some of those have involved attempts to block passage through the strait. uae, qatar and kuwait are participating and naval exercises to counter that. they're purchasing a great deal of american military equipment to modernize those forces. any potential iranian aggression. though it is impossible to tell what their intentions are they are looking at their capabilities.

it's fast attack craft. it's antiship missiles. so many other acquisitions they have made over the past decades. they believe they need at least the ability to deter that. they are getting it from the united states. as i said when i began, they are not just concerned about the nuclear agreement, they are concerned about the trustworthiness of the united states. i heard one of the official saying, there was a time when the united states was a problem -- force to be reckoned with and now they are a problem to be guilt with. which means they are not sure -- to be dealt with. which means they are not sure they can trust the united states. they're looking at our intervention in iraq, our hesitation in syria and a repeated failure decade after decade, to help the palestinians

liberate themselves and their asking what kind of political judgment does the united states have? this is all part of their concern about the nuclear agreement and why they want assurances from the united states that we are going to do something about iran's presence in the arab world. they are concerned that we might go back to the concept that we had when the british withdrew from the gulf in the early 1970's. which was the twin pillar policy where we supported both iran and saudi arabia against the soviet union. but more of the support went to iran because it was more highly developed. they are concerned about that. they are even more concerned that we would tilt toward iran and recognize iran's power and population and industry and

technological base and think that they should be -- that their aspirations should be accepted. so while these countries will say that they have a cautious willingness to consider this agreement, i would say that there is a substantial concern there, you can even say in the case of qatar that while it is often said their relations with iran are cordial, i would point out that they did vote in favor, when they had a rotating seat on the security council, they did vote in favor of the security council resolution in december 2006, and voted in favor of security council resolution 1747

in march, 2007. both of those resolutions imposed sanctions on iran because of the ballistic missile of ram and identify people who should be sanctioned and institutions and banks that should be sentient. they are on record as being concerned about that program. i would even say that in these capitals, there are people who -- if this agreement fails to satisfy them, if they feel they are in danger because of the potential additional boldness that iran might think, if it were allowed eventually to escape from these inspections and restrictions in 20 or 30 years, these are states that might think about other options. very reluctantly, they are countries that have talked about

how we need to keep all options on the table if the agreement doesn't work out. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much john for inviting me. i will probably not talk in 10 minutes because my medicine wears off in eight minutes. i am in a crs capacity today and i will be in crs style which is objective, nonpartisan. it ask away. i will confine most of my comments to the sanctions part of the deal, of the issue.

it is clear from both the iranian and u.s. fact sheet that basically all of the sanctions that have been imposed by the u.s. and the eu, other than human rights related sanctions that have been imposed since 2010, u.n. resolution 1929 of june 2010, are going to be relieved as a consequence of this agreement. that means, iran is being shut out of the international taking system would come to an and and being shut out of the swift electronic payment to section would come to an and the sanctions on their sale of oil and the shipping of oil sanctions on insurance of iranian oil tankers, sanctions on buying iranian petrochemicals sanctions on providing iran with automotive

gear sanctions on supplying iran with oil drilling, exploration equipment, all of these would presumably come to a conclusion if this deal is finalized and when the iaee certifies that iran has complied. this has to be clarified a little bit more when the deal is finalized, but apparently the iaea is going to be the arbiter and they will certify that iran has reduced its stockpile to what the agreement says, that iran has dismantled 15,000 centrifuges and put them away, when these things are certify that is when the sanctions would be relieved, is what i am seeing. even though the two fact sheets differ a little bit. iran would

by these measures gain access to 130 billion to 150 billion in hard currency reserves in various banks overseas. much of which is in south korea, some of which is in japan and other countries. these hard currency payments made for oil that iran is unable to move back to the central bank. no government has impounded this money or taken title to this money, it is iran's money. they are in bank accounts under iran's names, but because of the sanctions, no bank will cooperate in helping iran move this money back to the central bank. that is why it is overseas and iran has not been able to get to it. the idea that these are frozen assets or impounded assets is incorrect. i see some oil people in the

audience. as i said, one of the big things in this is that iran would be able to freely export oil again. what does that mean? there are five countries currently that have active exemptions to avoid u.s. sanctions to buy oil, japan, south korea china, turkey and india. these countries could, conceivably, increase their orders for iranian oil and iran could start supplying those five with more oil. the eu, which was buying a quarter of the iran's oil, they enacted a ban on purchases of iranian oil, so it will take longer for the eu to buy again because they would have to meet, get a consensus, and there has to be a political decision to lift that band.

that could be early 2016. the other five that i mentioned -- let's say there is a deal in june and let's say the iaea gives the go-ahead in september, they could conceivably start buying more iranian oil right away. the iranian economy in my estimation is likely to rebound quickly. this $150 billion that i mentioned that iran would get access to that is equal to iran's entire budget year that they would instantly have hard currency. the value of iran real would rise instantly, inflation would fall employment would increase, the people whose shops and factories are shuttered would reopen. some people would go to work

but right now under the sanctions regime, they are going to work but basically drink tea all day. they may get paid three months late and the boss might give them maybe a quarter of what they are owed, this is what is going on now. basically, the entire iranian economy is in a state of suspension. suspended animation. the entire economy is waiting for this deal to get done and the sanctions relief to occur. that is when everybody goes back to work and starts getting paid again and buying clothes again and buying electronics. this is when the economy fires up again. there will be a use of presidential waiver authority on

the u.s. sanctions on foreign companies that have been so effective. after some period of iranian compliance, no one has specified how much, i personally think it is about a year, but don't quote me necessarily, the administration plans to ask congress to enact legislation that would change, modify, repeal or revoke the u.s. sanctions put in place by sanctions. then it would be a congressional decision at that point. the u.n. sanctions apparently will be relieved, so if congress did not act those sanctions would stay in force. that will be a deal between the united states senate and u.s. allies during -- allies.

the plan would be to have a period of iranian compliance and then ask congress to enact sanctions relief under the agreements and i will stop there. thank you. [applause] imad harb: i was asked to speak about iran and lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence. the negotiations themselves, as far as we know did not discuss anything outside the negotiations of the nuclear program.

so there are supposedly no specific connection between iran's other issues in this foreign policy and the region, or the world for that matter. everybody knows the nuclear program is only a part of iranian foreign policy, it is also the negotiations of a nuclear program, but no matter much we denied there is a connection to iranian influence in other places and that specific negotiation had its impact on other things. basically two perspectives that iran used the issue of his role in lebanon and syria to try to get a better deal on the nuclear program.

the other one is that it didn't. the way it is seen in these two countries with a influence in both countries through the support of the syrian regime and the support of hezbollah in lebanon, everybody there thinks that has to be some sort of an outcome that may reflect on political positions or political conditions in both countries. in other words, if iran resolves the issue on the nuclear file like the ambassador mentioned, will there be outcomes related to other foreign-policy issues in which iran is involved? in lebanon, the country is almost on the verge of collapse. the state is slowly almost imploding.

there is a condition where it is almost like ken said earlier i suspended animation. there is no president or presidential elections that have been held to elect a new president since last may. hezbollah and its ally on the christian side are the ones holding up the process. why that is going on is beyond any rational interpretation. if it is really the person of the president that is important, everybody is thinking about the future of the country. what about the fate of that country? without a president, there is no constitutional continuity so to speak. today, the executive authority is in the hands of the prime

minister, who at any time can be sent home by hezbollah and its allies in the lebanese political system to withdraw from that process. that is a very important consideration. there are other issues. sectarian polarization in the country where unfortunately some sunnis are still able to maintain control over its community. there are those people out there who are basically starting to voice the issue of with the sunni; are not getting what we wants and the shia are controlling the country. hezbollah is worried about a very important develop in ment in lebanon over the last

three or four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. unfortunately, these refugees are not expected to return to syria anytime soon. syria is destroyed. these people if they were to be repatriated to syria, they will have an infrastructure that would receive them. most people in lebanon are not happy with the situation going on in syria. the imposition of the syrian civil war in the lebanese political system is really a serious issue. what is interesting is that hezbollah has not -- while it has criticized hard the operation decisive storm in yemen, they haven't said much

about the nuclear deal itself. it was very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good deal. we want to get out of sanctions and all that, and hezbollah say -- hezbollah did not say much. they are probably waiting to see how things shape up for the next few weeks or months until the technical issues are resolved. it is very interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any specific statement on the negotiations. the syrian situation of the regime over the last two weeks or months has really experienced a lot of setbacks. specifically on the ground in the south and north, the regime has suffered military defeats.

despite the fact that hezbollah has thrown its full weight behind the regime and is fighting on many fronts in syria, despite the fact there are shia militias being imported from iraq and afghanistan and south asia, and despite the fact of russia's open military spigot to syria, things are not going well for the syrian regime. if you look at this brief overview of all of this, we can imagine what now? would there be some sort of change? the situation in lebanon and syria. this is quite important to answer because if iran were to go back to the two perspectives on whether iran was using

lebanon and syria as a bargaining chip in its nuclear program negotiations or whether it was not, it is very important to try to answer this. nuclear negotiations are done. iran does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political developments or other developments in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation? this is something everybody is speculating on. the arab governments are now very busy with the war in yemen. gcc countries are very busy there. at the same time, they are looking at nuclear negotiations as how it might reflect on their interests in those two countries. if we talk about lebanon and

syria, we also need to talk about gcc's situation and how it deals with this. there is a wildcard here. this is something we really don't know how it is going to shape up over the next three months until the end of june. the wildcard is specifically will anybody within the iranian political system, the nature of their political system its domestic politics are fragmented. it is a fractional political system. obviously ayatollah khomeini has the final say and will definitely try to reign everybody in for whatever decision the iranian political

decision should have. at the same time, there are different factions within the system who may not be necessarily very open and accepting of the nuclear deal. only yesterday, something positive came out of the leader of the revolutionary guard. he said our negotiators really worked very hard to get a very good deal. in other words, this was some sort of a way of saying you did ok. it was all right. this might reflect on how hezbollah looks at this issue. there are other people within the political system that described the political system in suspended equilibrium. all the different factions have their own interest. all of them are trying to pull

to their own position. not much happens on the domestic scene. are these different factions? will they do something in the foreign policy arena? will there be somebody who might think it is possible to activate for instance the lebanese-syrian front with israel? a couple of rockets here or there, something might happen like that. israel is in no mood to let things go. it might respond. if it does respond, there goes the deal because hezbollah would have to respond and things will fall apart. i would be happy to answer your questions if you like. i give you the doctor sullivan. thank you. [applause]

dr. sullivan: good morning. thank you for the invite, john. they asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions can affect energy systems not just in iran but regionally and globally. to put this into perspective iran is an energy giant. it has either the number one or number two conventional natural gas reserves in the world. trade that off between russia and iran depending on what you are looking at. number four in conventional oil reserves in the world. not talking about shale gas or oil, this is conventional. when this is opened up, if it opens up, this will definitely change energy markets globally.

oil markets are global markets. it will not just affect crude oil but also refined products and petrochemicals. opening up iran, if it does open up, will also change natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets, rather than regional ones. and if iran hops into this, it will change things considerably. one of the reasons they have not been involved is because they cannot get at the right technologies. iran and qatar could come to a

joint agreement. all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole issue is pipelines and other export menus going into central asia. and the caspian. just don't look south. just a look at asia. look right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. you have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran, but if the prophet is right, you can build a pipeline, and could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into europe and beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil. the hedge funds will have a great time on this one. they are all guessing what will happen to the price of oil tomorrow. it is like a parlor game. what is the price going to be tomorrow? will it go up three dollars? will go down three dollars? we talking about trillions of

dollars trading regularly. people trading regularly. another thing that is not talked about too much is the pipeline going to pakistan and india, which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions have taken off. although there is a bit of a problem in one place, which iran and pakistan share. some border guards got killed there recently. there is a great deal of instability, but i think money may talk in that situation. another part of the energy system is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, would be part of a power pool of electricity

production, consumption, and sharing going into central asia, the caspian, possibly across to iraq and to many other places, afghanistan and so forth. this could be a huge change. but there are big if's. some consider dual use could also enter iran. they could be more efficient with their use of energy. i think i can hear the investor salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow into these things that no one is even talking about? energy efficiency. what about renewables, geothermal, solar, wind? this is not happening. now think about the idea of the snapback of sanctions. which i think is an absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of dollars flowing into iran, oil going here, oil going there, pipelines being built, and then

someone says they don't have -- they haven't followed the game, we are going to snapback on sanctions? money will talk. snapping back the sanctions are not as easy as that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that, either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclearzation of the gulf. but also in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. because of the threat that they feel. all right. all of my opinions are mine alone, do not represent those of the u.s. government, the national defense university, or

any other organization i am a part of. i am not talking for them. what i am about to say will be clear that i am not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. it is a framework for discussion of a deal. if you are about to buy a house or a small business, and the person you are buying it from says, here is the framework for discussion, you wouldn't be asking when can i move in. this two and half page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green groceries in cairo. it is too simple, too vague.

the terms are not clear. what we are seeing right now is another version of groupthink. we saw groupthink before the iraq war. now we are seeing groupthink on this deal. everyone is hopping on board. read the documents. read the terms. for example, the complex is to be converted into an atomic research center. ok, has anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how could you prove it is an atomic research center? i am seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish, and in what time period? oh, by the way, it could take years to develop an atomic research center.

years. any deal, a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details. otherwise, the sanctions are not going to be taken off. and all these things i am talking about oil and gas and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up, pun intended, will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1. anyone done negotiating on simple business deals? july 1 is pretty tough. now we are trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1. could we please get real? all right. it is going to be very difficult to turn the sanctions off, and it will be very difficult to turn them back on again. ken alluded to something about the waivers.

some of them have waivers, some of them don't. some of them are law. you have un sanctions, you have eu sanctions, you have combination sanctions. it is not the same thing as putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir one centrifuge within 10 years? 10 years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years, everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concerned is the one year breakout time. wow. why is everybody saying that is a good thing? how about a no-year breakout time?

i being outrageous enough? am i shattering illusions here? this essentially says is that the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years, either. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside. and the use of different centrifuges, the complex, just about everything else goes right back on line the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, all changes. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist, when i hear that pouring into a country, i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership does not not still follow that economics is for donkeys because economics works. and inflation and unemployment and a hyperventilated economy drove iran to its revolution in

1979. what is the meaning of the term "significant amount of time"? you will have to excuse me. i worked at a law officers for years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words. how to tear them apart. how to figure out the real meaning that is stated here. and if there is enough vagueness, change it. who controls the inspection? the security council? the russians? who does that? that is a little bit vague. and some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. it is the nature of the process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant. one minute. ok.

in one minute, what can i tell you? i am concerned about how this is worded. and i am concerned once the door is open and the horses are out of the barn, how difficult it will be to get the horses back into the barn. i am concerned with this will do to the region. i can see the whole. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language. strict timetables. and no illusions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you all very much. now comes to the most interesting part. your questions.

i think for the next 40 plus minutes, we will just go ahead and run through the questions we received from the audience. i will read them as we go. and i appreciate very much if you have any more, just pass them on and we'll try to respond the best we can. the investment and u.s. oil companies, other u.s. companies like boeing, be held up until congress acts? dr. katzman: the fact sheet distributed by the administration makes it clear that sanctions that bar u.s. companies from doing business with iran will not be lifted under this arrangement. so the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily referred to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-us companies. it is very clear from the u.s. statement that there will not, as a consequence of this particular arrangement if it is

finalized, and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran clearing up there differences on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. mr. pratt: the next question might hezbollah's hesitation on the the deal might raise concern? dr. harb: well, i think this is -- i don't think that the iranians are combining their thinking of what hezbollah represents to them.

the only thing is that maybe iran will tell hezbollah indicate to hezbollah that it is time for hezbollah to assist in putting the lebanese state back on track. just a phone call from tehran would may be set things very very much straight in beirut. mr. pratt: anybody else have any comment to make on that one? ok. another question that is looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel. now that iran's nuclear power in the region is being analyzed, is there a growing concern with the relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on because of the significance of the discussion particularly recently.

dr. anthony: here, i think context is important. the relationship between iran and israel was intimate, it was strategic, it was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep, in terms of the stories pertaining to esther, a persian who helped to free the jews from captivity from babylon. so the degree of trust over the centuries between jews and persians is deep. at times, it has been massive. at times, it has been pervasive.

and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel thousands went by way of iran. and during the 1950's and 1960's, the heyday of arab nationalism, iran and israel the in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has been concerned about an intimate u.s. arab relationship because there are 22 arab countries, only one iran, only one israel. so that was also part of the adhesive. and many in israel regard these last years since 1979 as an

aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal, mutually beneficial reciprocally rewarding relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interests. a similarity of interests. and that now may begin to come back into focus, but it will be quite a stretch. in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings and briefings by the head of israel's foreign ministry, an answer to a question of where do of 10 your energy, your oil? the answer was 90% we get from iran.

dr. mousavian: the impact of a nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be censored sincere to each other's about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is a member of the treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to give them their treaty. iran does not have a nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently, the pentagon accepted

the israelis have a nuclear bomb. just in a decade, iran has given more than 700,000 mandated inspections. no other member, during the history of iaea, has given such an amount of inspections that the iranians gave. israel has never given even one inspection. iran has initiated negotiations in 1970. israel is declining, rejecting objecting the nuclear treaty. in 1990's, egypt proposed a weapons of mass ejection freezone. iran and was the second country to support it.

in over 20 years, israelis deal opposing weapons of mass destruction free zone in the middle east. therefore, we are talking about two very, very, very different policy on proliferation. and as an iranian, i am really shocked that everybody is about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb. and all pressures and sanctions are on iran. and nobody is talking about israel. this is a very clear double standard in washington, in the west about proliferation in the middle east. however, this deal has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any proliferation risk in the middle east. it is said iran would be

committed. ok, this is first iranian goodwill. as long as you do not have reprocessing, you cannot make nuclear weapons from heavywater facilities. israeli has reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regional -- regionalize the measures agreed to with iran for all countries? no country would have enrichment above 5%. as long as there is no enrichment above 5%, they would be no nuclear bomb from nuclear facilities. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavywater facilities.

it can have major positive impact if israelis also would be ready to follow the same nuclear policy iran has followed for 40, 50 years. and if other regional countries would be ready to accept such a measure as iran has accepted far beyond mpt. mr. pratt: do you have any comments on it? i don't think israel will ever give up its nuclear weapons or agree to restrictions. i expect them to continue to oppose this deal, no matter what. and to lobby for more actions against iran. that is because of the nature of

the two governments. john was talking about how, in the past, israel viewed iran as a partner in a sense because both of them had concerns about the arab world. and american relations with the arab world. but i can't see that entering into their minds anytime in the near or midterm. and in fact, their concern about iran is so great that they are -- you know -- in a sense, reversing that trend in trying to forge relations with arab states that also view iran as a threat. it is very tactical on their part. it is only because they both have a concern about iran. when netanyahu was in front of congress a month or so ago and warned that iran was a country

that committed aggression against the arab world, i think he -- i don't think that is his primary concern. dr. katzman: i think i would say that there has been a consensus to sort of allow this deterrent. to raise the fact that they are not in the mpt, maybe it is intellectually precise, but it is probably not going to go very far. that would be my response.

dr. sullivan: the israeli institutions don't start the day by saying, death to america. maybe changing that would go a long ways. right now, we have a strong personalities involved in the iranian-israeli dialogue to call it that. it is more like two monologues that never meet. also, there are other issues involved here. let me get it straight. i am not saying i am against the deal, i'm not saying i am fort i am just saying get better specificity and make it a real deal. not this thing floating in the air. i am not for war with iran. if anybody has that impression i have been through wargames. looking at the cost of that war, it is astonishing what could happen. it would make iraq look like a picnic. iran is a bigger country, bigger military, more organized

hierarchical, a long culture and as soon as the boots hit the ground, welcome to hell. for all sides involved. we don't need that. what we need is some kind of a diplomatic, economic informational, and other change to bring this about. and my sense is this document is not it because we have other issues to deal with. what is happening in bahrain what is happening in lebanon what is happening in iraq, what is happening in yemen. ballistic missiles are not part of the deal. this is a very narrow document. this solves a very narrow question. and again, i am for improving relations, but it has to be done in the right way. excuse me.

dr. harb: i just urge you to read his recent piece on why we are talking about iran, what are the reasons basically behind this push towards iran, iran iran. i urge you to read the report on that. mr. pratt: there is a fundamental question here with regards to getting a copy of the deal. somebody asked where can we get a copy of the framework between u.s. and iran? >> the white house website. >> the middle eastern policy -- has it on its website. dr. sullivan: you can also find different interpretations, which is part of the problem here. there are cultural differences linguistic differences, and also political differences across the country which is changing the way this is interpreted.

it is far from clear. maybe it was important to make it unclear to see what happens. mr. pratt: do we have any idea on who the leads are -- returning back to the discussion -- secretary kerry going to be engaged? dr. sullivan: if they haven't started this yet, the clock is ticking. july 1 is not so far away. that is almost meanterm for a college. in this kind of deal with all this complicated issues, probably there are a bunch of sherpas of their on all side during the heavy lifting. when they do the heavy lifting then the big players go in -- cnn, fox, iranian tv -- and they

say, well, we we made the deal. dr. harb: in the "daily star" he basically summed it up, if i may, basically the deal -- or the framework for the deal -- slightly over 5000 centrifuges for the next 10 years that iran would maintain -- would be allowed to work only. enrichment for 15 years will be banned at the facility, the mountain facility. and iran can enrich some uranium, and not tons, at the heavy water reactor. i'm sorry, that is -- at 3.67% purity. and that is kept at 300 kilograms for 15 years.

1000 ir-2 centrifuges, the newer version, will be removed. and the iraq heavywater reactor would be reconfigured to prevent the production of bomb fuel, basically plutonium. the iaea inspections with less for 25 years. of all facilities, all imports that have to do with all of this. the iaea would have full access to everything. in return, iran will get the gradual removal of sanctions as soon as iaea provides clarification. then the sections will begin to be lifted. dr. sullivan: to put this into perspective, this is the white house document. this is it.

mr. pratt: -- even if iran's intent is to build nuclear energy, what language should be insisted upon in the final agreement to safeguard and avoid nuclear actions like tokushima? dr. anthony: this is an issue of real concern, in terms of one of the sites. the one it nearest to the gulf and the other gulf countries. because of the sanctions because of the nonexistent relations between tehran and washington, diplomatically and formally, there could be such an accident. iran has had a history of earthquakes. so has turkey. they are part of a different tectonic plate than those of arabia.

so there is a legitimate fear, what if there is an earthquake in that region? their fear is that there would be spillage and linkage, and that this would be contaminating and pose an immediate, direct threat to the water desalination plants in kuwait, bahrain, qatar, and elsewhere. and ships may refuse to come into the gulf until this is dealt with and cleaned up. that is more than a nightmare. that has catastrophic implications. the russians were involved in building that reactor.

and they are also the so-called inspectors of it, until now. but this is like putting the fox in the coop with the chickens. there needs to be a more technologically professional efficient, and renowned inspector of that particular facility. and because it is the one that could be catastrophic, were there to be any accident there like the chernobyl and kuwait, the one that are most concerned and involved with this -- in the chernobyl disaster, some 200,000 people had to be relocated. that was costly. united nations asked for a lot of donor countries to subsidize and finance it. and kuwait was the leading one. so, kuwait has been involved in this kind of an issue longer than any of the other gcc

countries on that side, which relates directly to inspections and relates to one particular nuclear facility, the one that is closest to the gulf. and could affect them all. yes, yes. dr. mousavian: from day one, it has been under iaea supervision. and the iaea has fully confirmed all safety measures already there.

second, join plan of action also -- i mean come on the framer they agreed. they have also agreed the world powers to have more cooperation with iran on the safety issues. third, fukushima was in japan. japan never lowered its nuclear activities after fukushima. they continued the same nuclear activities. chernobyl was in russia. russia increased its nuclear activities after chernobyl. emirates is going to have four nuclear power plants, so arabia will have power plants. turkey is going to have power plants. therefore, we really do not need to create more artificial fears about uranium and nuclear programs. dr. sullivan: the japanese shut down all of their nuclear power plants. i was there two weeks ago visiting the plant just west of tokyo. and they are spending billions of dollars to set up safety

devices in the event of another earthquake or tsunami. the japanese have been through a very difficult energy time since they had to shut down 30% of their electricity. which is what they have done. and there is a huge debate in japan right now whether to turn his back on again. the father away from tokyo you are, the more likely one of those plants is to be started up again. it is a very emotional issue. and this fukushima problem was not just an earthquake, it was a water flow problem. and when i think water in the middle east, i wonder what some people are thinking. the jordanians are building a plant in the desert of northwestern jordan using a water treatment plant as a source of water to cool the spent fuel and the nuclear plant. as i told a reporter a few years -- days ago, i wouldn't live near that thing because if the

water treatment plant goes down, the water flow goes down, the thing overheat, and you have a fukushima in jordan right near the iraq border. the middle east is water short. if you're going to be putting a plant on the ocean, that makes sense. if you're putting it in the desert, that makes no sense. if you are putting it on a fault line, this makes no sense. near the ocean, maybe you keep the cooling going. but at the same time, it will shut down automatically if there is an earthquake. it has before. the one in san diego shutdown. nuclear facilities need a lot of water and a lot of water flow. people are just not thinking this through. mr. pratt: anybody else want to comment on -- a question for kenneth katzman please compare and contrast libyan sanctions versus iranian sanctions, and when will iran be removed from the terrorism list? dr. katzman: quite some questions. i know c-span is here so i want to say hi, mom. [laughter]

iran's removal from the u.s. terrorist list, well, there are some young people in the audience, so maybe by the time they are my age that could happen. iran is nowhere close to being removed from the terrorist list. there is no consideration in the u.s. government for removing iran from that list. i would just be categorical on that question. the other -- what was the rest of the question? sorry. comparing libya? well, you know, we could conceivably have two similar situations. libya gave up its nuclear program and actually gave --

dismantled the whole thing. obviously, there was not the same level of debate over lifting some of the sanctions on libya because they had been so you know, basically dismantled the entire program. iran is not doing that obviously. this deal leaves them with substantial infrastructure. and we had more than an hour of discussion about the continuing concerns. obviously, it is not quite as easy. but, you know, again, just looking at authorities, the president does have, you know, quite a bit of authority in terms of suspending sanctions. but if you're talking about lifting sanctions outright, or congressional action is needed then of course it becomes much more involved. and most of the main sanctions that would be released under this deal are enforced by congressionally passed statutes.

and therefore, congress, to lift the sanctions outright would have to pass new legislation to do that. mr. pratt: there is a follow-up question, if i could. regarding the banking system. and contemplate for access. would a final agreement contemplate full access of iran to the banking system? and the u.s. payment system? dr. katzman: again, anything involving the u.s. is not really part of the sanctions relief. iran would be able to access again, the european, asian financial system. and the secondary sanctions on those banks that are doing business with iranian banks, they would not be penalized by doing business with the u.s. financial system. but direct iran-u.s. financial transactions would still -- that is not contemplated as part of

the relief package. mr. pratt: thank you. a question for the ambassador. the russian foreign minister said he would recommend iran during the shanghai cooperation organization if the nuclear deal is successful. what would the implications of this be and how would iran partners benefit? dr. mousavian: iran is already participating on all shanghai's high-level meetings. and if iran is member, it would create more opportunities for asian cooperation between iran and china, iran and south asia and even iran and india.

this would have more impact on iran economical relations with asia. mr. pratt: just as a general for the panel, we have about 16, 17 minutes to go. it is a broad one. it is, what will the u.s. congress to? which is going to sort of the filling a lot of air, but if anybody would like to comment on that. [laughter] dr. sullivan: well, the u.s. congress will do what the u.s. congress does. which is debate this issue and try to work it through. and whatever matter, they will. there is an election year coming up. there is always an election year coming up. and it is going to be hardball. that is pretty much the way it is going to work out. and the house and the senate are

now run by the republicans which, for those of you don't know, means they run who gets invited to the committee. and run the questions in the committee -- and the committee assignments. it will be a very rough road. dr. mousavian: i agree with him, but to my understanding, not only because of the next election, it has a lot to do with benjamin netanyahu, aipac and more, i believe, it take big misunderstanding not only in the u.s. congress between a lot of u.s. politicians -- you hear from many u.s. congressman that we should keep the sanctions pressure iran.

iran only came to nuclear negotiation deal or framework because of sanctions pressures. still, they keep the same narrative. in all debate, you read the same narrative. but a very simple fact, before sanctions, iran had a few hundred centrifuges. after sanctions, iran increased to 22,000 centrifuges. before sanctions, iran was enriching below 5%. after sanctions, iran increase d to 20%. before sanctions, iran had just a few hundred kilograms of stockpiles. after sections, the have several thousand kilograms of stockpiles. this was really the impact of sanctions.

as president obama said, suddenly the p5 plus one -- the only thing that made the framework possible was first the u.s. agreed to iran to have in enrichment for its domestic, practical needs. that is why iran accepted to every transparency measures. and iran was ready to give every confidence building measures that iran would never diapered vert its nuclear program. because practically they had the same red line. and obama said -- these narratives have not been corrected in the u.s. congress. there is a big misunderstanding,

and they are repeating the same mistakes. today, more concerns about issues beyond nuclear. you heard our panelists that they discuss about all the threats, israel, regional influences, so the region ason netanyahu and even some arab allies and in washington, they're pushing their administration to continue their strategy is to contain influence and power. this is the reality.

but as long as they really do not recognize the fact, what is the fact? i believe, for 35 years, the u.s., europe, the world powers they did everything they could and strategies against iran. unilateral sanctions. multilateral sanctions. u.n. sanctions. the war against iran. they millions of iranians that were either killed or injured. even using chemical weapons against iranians. they all supported the use of weapons of mass destruction against iranians. 100,000 iranians were killed or injured. no other country, and the past 35 years, has been under so much pressure and sanctions orchestrated by the u.s. however, after 35 years, everybody today is crying and complaining, why is iran so stable? why iran is so powerful? iran is everywhere.

this is evidence and fact that 35 years of sanctions and pressures and the most powerful coercion policy against iran not only has failed, but has strengthened iran. stability and power in the region. and look at the u.s. in the region. they got old weapons, money, support. and you can see the collapse of u.s. allies in the region. and others won't understand therefore -- and one would say look, if you are right, then release the sanctions. here is another misunderstanding about iranian culture between our regional arab allies and even the west and even in washington. i have been 30 years within the iranian administration. i am iranian and there is a culture. they need to understand iranian

culture. more pressure, more sanctions would make iran more aggressive. therefore, as long as the congress follows the strategy, iran, like the last 35 years will be more aggressive. you would fear more about the role of iran. more cooperation iranians would make a deal, on all other disputed issues. therefore, as long as this narrative continues in the u.s. congress, i am optimistic of the future of iran-u.s. relations -- i am pessimistic, i'm sorry.

>> one country we haven't mentioned here is china. they are very much involved in the situation, including developing two of the largest oilfields in iran. i don't think the issue is an application of two tough --of too tough sanctions. the chinese built a rail system they build roads. they are very much involved in iran right now. the russians are also very much involved. it is not just the united states, and we have lost leverage. some people in the city seem to think that we can do something in the world jumps. china is a powerful country. russia is not as powerful, it's economy is degraded, that is something else. but the chinese are a powerful country that wants more

influence in the middle east, and they are moving into every single country. it is one of the few countries that helps saudi arabia and iran at the same time. they support the palestinians and the israelis at the same time. they are playing a double game and playing it brilliantly. our leverage in the region is not what it was even five years ago. to think that we can say sanction and close the door and everyone jumps, that is not the way it is any more. this is a different iran and a different china. china, when this thing started was a poor country. back in 1979 it was a poor country. it had no clout in the region and it didn't start importing oil until it did from oman in 1983. this is a totally different world.

>> my only hope of anything that comes from congress is that the white house might have inability to break. unfortunately, the situation is such that congress people are not necessarily listening to reasoned arguments. >> i share the pessimism with regard to congress. i would come at it from a slightly different perspective but and up with the same point. that is the pressure of lobby groups neoconservatives, and those who are interested in advancing the israeli narrative

or israeli objectives. iran has become quite convenient as a distraction from israel's actions, israel's policies, israel's positions israel's fe at accomplii. and it will continue to serve this tactical role to deflect attention from the eastern mediterranean, specifically israel and its building of settlements. now focusing as -- focusing on iran as the whipping boy. this is because it has been a successful tactic. in 1982, the u.s. was on a roll

having camp david under its belt and getting the israelis to withdraw from the sinai peninsula. the next items on the agenda were to be jerusalem and the west bank and gaza. the israeli push back was that this will not be your agenda. we thought that this was hubris run amok. but it wasn't. i sat in on meetings in january of 1982 where state department briefers said the between april and june, israel will invade lebanon. we asked why they would do that. because there is a cease-fire. it had artie been negotiated with the plo and intelligence said it would be lebanon.

the answer was because they want to change the agenda completely and indeed they did by invading lebanon. they remained there directly or indirectly for the next 19 years, during which time, with the attention deflected, the settlements doubled tripled quadrupled quintupled. and those settlements all remain. so this is quite tempting. even with united states's invasion of iraq in 2003. in the. since then, israel has built its so-called separation barrier or security wall. this is cut into what was to be the territory for interdependent state of palestine. 22% remaining. so territorial expansion has occurred in the shadow of deflecting american attention.

and we have done nothing to prevent those events that i just described. even further from the reach of those who have tried in last year with secretary of state kerry before him mitchell, before him: powell, before them etc. we have been ineffectual. so i share the pessimism that i arrive at it differently. it will continue to be an object of scorn and isolation if people in congress and those who lobbied them are successful. >> thank you. i think we have less than three or four minutes left so what i would like to do is ask one final question.

we will just go right down the row. what would be the regional implications and repercussions for a failure to arrive at a march 30 deadline. what is the next step if there is no agreement on the technical details in the next 90 days? >> probably a delay. i don't think it is going to be a reachable goal. it will be an extremely conjugated situation. that would probably been a great deal of political resentment and anger within iran and within the iranian leadership. the implications of that it could be significant for

whatever is happening between the united states and iran on other issues. if it breaks down entirely, then we are back to step one. and to get these folks back to the table will be very difficult. the proxies for iran and others may also react in a kinetic way if this happens. the game has started, and i don't mean a fun game. i mean a very complicated and dangerous game. and it may not be a retrievable one if this thing breaks down. the agreement, if there is to be in agreement, has to be a proper one and a long-lasting one, and

has to be a step to deal with the other issues involved in this. otherwise, you will have an agreement on something narrow and nothing else. >> i agree with paul about maybe the resort would be to postpone the negotiations of the technical agreements. but at the same time, if we resort or postpone those, then it is likely that elements in the iranian regime will start to's -- will try to start things up regionally so they have a little more of a bargaining chip. >> i think, given the reaction in iran to the tentative deal, it is going to be extremely difficult for iran not to go forward and have the final deal will stop i think the

repercussions in iran would be tremendous if there were a collapse at the end of this. i think president rouhani probably could not finish. ministers a reef -- minister zharif would not be able to continue. i think you would see a major of people. -- major upheaval. i agree that the technical details are so difficult that i would fully expect when june 30 comes, some announcement about continuing the talks. i think that would suit a number of the gulf arab states because they would like to see a tighter agreement negotiated. and they don't want sanctions lifted yet until the agreement

is better. and they have recently i think realized that they need to lead in dealing with geopolitical threats rather than wait for the united states to lead them. but, they are also seeing that the united states is responding to their lead and the united states is gradually getting more involved, helping in yemen helping more in syria that before. i think it would suit a number of those states until a better deal is agreed upon. >> i believe already that the negotiations have reached the no return point. they have already decided to

strike a deal. the u.s. also cannot leave the negotiation table. they cannot leave the negotiation table because of two reasons -- three reasons. one, from the beginning, they agreed. there is nothing left to dispute with npt. everything with npt is agreed with details. iran is the only country far beyond npt. third, is the realities in the region. this really dictates to them to finish the job by july 1.

if it fails, neither would we have a people in iran or washington. iranians would be able to continue like they have been able to resist the last three or four decades. but, the implication, even if we do not agree with the world powers, why iran and the regional powers, like saudi arabia, cannot sit together and to agree on the same measures within npt and beyond npt, for nuclear weapon free zone in the region. why? this is already an achievement for the regional countries and regional powers to sit together to agree for a regional mechanism.

and finally, regardless of the nuclear issue the problems in the region definitely is far beyond the iranian nuclear issue. as long as we don't have regional cooperation between the regional powers, iran, saudi arabia gcc, turkey egypt, you are not going to get to anywhere even if the deal is done on nuclear. >> well, it is 12:00 and time to move on. on behalf of the national council on u.s.-arab relations i want to thank our distinguished panel. to share their insights, knowledge, wisdom, and projections for the future. let's hope the next three months are eventful.

and as closing, i want to point out that the president's legacy is online on this. it is serious discussion and debate. if we could take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east, these are noble objectives which i think in the days ahead as a result of our insights, will give us a better understanding about whether these are actually achievable ends or noble goals that can be pursued with success. thank you again for coming. [applause]

>> during this month, c-span is pleased to prevent -- to present the winning videos in the student can video competition. it is a competition that encourages middle and high school students to think critically about issues that affect the nation. students were asked to create documentary based on the theme "the three branches and you." joshua hamilton, tyler staby

and connor krohn are our second playas winners -- second prize winners. there are too focused on japanese internment during world war ii. >> we interrupt this program to bring you a special news bulletin. the japanese have attacked pearl harbor by air. >> the japanese attacked pearl harbor, hawaii from the air. >> hostilities at this time would naturally mean that the president would ask congress for a declaration of war. ♪ >> what this is reported no is that the united states would not only declare war on their own citizens.

for last two months, japanese americans have artie been feeling the immediate effects of the attacks in hawaii. animosity is steadily increasing and president franklin d roosevelt just issued an executive order, one authorizes the deportation of approximately 110,000 japanese americans to internment camps across the united states. >> i think that was the most difficult part. four people that were raised in the united states, thought they were american citizens, then to be told, we can't trust you. you have done nothing wrong, but just in case we are going to put you in concentration cap's. >> i think the government were of two minds. the idiots were usually the ones who control it. their thought was, if we don't run them off they are going to send messages back to japan. most of the civilian population

except on the east coast were ambivalent about the whole thing. >> my friends, my usual friends were talking to me. i went down this long hallway and i thought, i wonder what is wrong with me. students who walked with me were suspect. they were called jack-lovers --jap-lovers. >> conditions in the internment camps are indecent, to say the least. living spaces are often cramped and exposed to the elements. >> i was five years old when my family was sent away from our homes and basically put into

concentration camps. >> and this is where japanese-americans were essentially incarcerated for the remainder of world war ii. >> we had 14 barracks. they passed out bags, we found out they were body bags. but that was for our mattress. they dumped straw in the middle of each camp, each block, and we filled our own mattress. >> mostly young people and old people got very sick. the death rate in the camps was very high. these were military style accommodations so they had a

room about half the size was what they called the latrine or the bathroom. there were 16 toilets, and they were eight back-to-back. 27 inches apart. so if you sat like this, you could test the person next to you. you had to sit like that. no doors, no stalls. >> i happen to be roger's wife mary. i had a personal experience. i have three brothers in service. i had a brother who is a tailgunner and he was shot down in okinawa. and he never survived, but my mother always blamed all of the japanese. she despised them. because they took her son.

about 30 years later, we were down at the beach and my mother was with us. and i felt her very uncomfortable and i said, mom what is wrong? she said, he might be washed up on the beach. i said, do you want to go back to sunnyvale? she said yes please. it hit her in a different way than a lot of people. >> i river my mother saying that she couldn't understand why we, as loyal americans, were sent away from our homes. there was never any proof, never any indication, that he japanese-americans or even a japanese immigrant like my grandparents, had participated in any espionage. my father and my mother had be very careful when they stop to get gas or grocery stores.

in some cases they were not allowed in. >> the government is a great propaganda machine. when i was in high school, as you go upstairs you turn right or left and there is a wall. on each of those walls was a japanese with a bayonet and a baby. that was the kind of propaganda, one example. they caricatured the japanese so that they appeared less like humans. you after a member that culturally, they were pretty much the same. they came here at small children , so for all intents and purposes they were american. >> even after the interned japanese-americans were allowed to return home, they still felt

the effects of the executive order. >> you know that prejudice is there deep down. how do we change things? >> to watch all of the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to c-span.org and click on studentcam. also let us know that you think about the issues they addressed on facebook and twitter. >> up next on c-span, an interview with congressman will heard of texas -- wil hl of texas hurd. later, a congressional gold medal ceremony for golfer jack nicholas. >> the next washington journal is live from the daily caller. we will talk with the news website's founder and executive

-- and editor-in-chief type of carlson. -- tucker carlson. then we will talk with patrick howley about the 2016 presidential nominations. "washington journal," live from the daily caller on c-span. >> here are some of our featured programs for this weekend on c-span networks. on c-span2's book tv, on saturday 10:00 p.m. eastern president of americans for tax reform grover norquist says americans are tired of the irs. sunday night at 8:00, author susan butler on president frank when roosevelt and soviet leader joseph stalin and their unexpected partnership beyond the war. saturday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span3, on lectures in history, university of virginia

college at wise professor jennifer murray on changes from the reconstruction era to present. in some afternoon at 1:00, we are live from appomattox courthouse commemorating the 150th anniversary of the correct -- the confederate surrender. next, a conversation with freshman congressman will hurd of texas. the is the first african-american congressmen to represent texas since reconstruction, and previously served in cia. this is 25 minutes. congressman will hurd from the 23rd congressional district. it includes nearly 5000 square miles, a thousand miles of border along texas and mexico. how do you manage it? rep. hurd: i put a lot of miles on the car. 800 miles of border. it is gigantic.

that is one of the reasons i love the district. we have beautiful parts of the state. this is why a pretty much no name fresh face was able to win the district. because of the amount of time we spent crisscrossing it. so i burn up my shoe leather. host: with the demographics of the district, what struck you the most as you traveled? rep. hurd: san antonio is the most populous city in the district. i was born and raised. my parents still live in house i was born in on the eastern end of the district. the western end is el paso. a large city covered by two members of congress. in between, you have castro bill. alpine. it is a 67% hispanic district.

when you have such a rural part and urban centers of san antonio and el paso, at one end of the district, people have one opinion. in the middle it is a different opinion. the thing that struck me the most when i was crisscrossing counties is that people care about national security. they are worried about their future and the safety of their children and families. that was great because of my background. i spent a decade as an undercover officer in the cia. host: if you were to travel from one end of the district to the other, how long would it take? rep. hurd: about 11 hours going 80 miles per hour. speed limit in most places is 75. if you go a couple over, you are ok. host: have you ever been pulled over? rep. hurd: i have. one of the things that is

important for me is that my d.c. staff understands the district. to get out there and see it. the first time my chief of staff was driving, we got pulled over. host: what did you tell the officer? rep. hurd: he said slow it down. it was late at night. they were just saying be careful. great folks throughout the district. i do not know if he recognized me or not. but they were making sure we were being safe. host: you are the first african-american republican since reconstruction to be elected. how did that come about? rep. hurd: it was funny getting appeared to washington dc. the first question i was asked was how the black dude won in a hispanic district. my dad is originally from east texas. my mom grew up in indiana.