rainy task with security and stability issues. saudi arabia is concern the cost of a significant shia population in the eastern province. there is far less evidence than there has been in the case of bahrain's needs and concerns. saudi arabians have become open in accusing iran of being behind the inspiration of the attacks on the towers in 1996, in which large numbers of americans were killed. this is a brief overview to begin the discussion, by showing there is no unanimity of all of iran's neighbors. it differs from one to the next. now we have the pleasure of

listening to ambassador seyed hossein mousavian. thank you. seyed hossein mousavian: good morning, everyone. iran -- they both consider the deals agreed in switzerland as a win-win deal. to my understanding there is five reasons why iranians would consider a win for iran. number one is that the deal contains respect for iranian nuclear technology including enrichment. number two is ultimately the sanctions would be lifted, even

graduate. number three is that ultimately the iranian nuclear would be normalized. and number four is that ultimately the nuclear would be removed from chapter seven united nations security council and all resolutions would be terminated. and number four is that iran after a period would be able to have a normal, peaceful cooperation on peaceful nuclear -- with the world powers. this is something iran has been sanctioned from day one.

the world powers consider the deal a win for themselves. i would like to give you five reasons why they believe this is a win for the world powers for the u.s. number one, iran except that the maximum level of transparency and measures within nonproliferation treaty. they have safeguarded the agreement and additional protocols and arrangement for the code. these are three arrangements for transparency. iran has accepted to all three arrangements. number two is iran would agree has agreed -- all issues which

would need to give the transparency, inspection to the ieaa. practically the world powers have the most intrusive, strong powerful system. the history of the deal with iran. no other member has ever been committed like iran on transparency measures. number four is they were looking for a break of the one year in case iran decided to go forward. and number five, confidence building measures, the u.s. and world powers needed time. there were 35 years of

hostility. this implementation for measures are about 10 to 25 years. there for the have enough time for almost a decade to a quarter of a century. to my understanding, this is the mutual win, a deal for both and i would like to give you five reasons why this is a win-win, a mutual win for both of them. through diplomatic solutions they were able to escape the devastating war in the middle east. and perhaps this is one of the rare occasions a big crisis in the middle east has been resolved or is going to be completely resolved through diplomacy. second, they have been able to

set a new mechanism for verification, for non-diversion toward -- many nuclear experts believe it is not enough. many believe even additional protocols, which is the maximum level of transparency is not enough. and the measures, a new mechanism of verification and transparency, assuring non-diversion toward -- for the first time far beyond that. if they are wise enough to embed the agreement with iran on a broader scope, regionally and internationally, this will

be a big, big game for the liberation globally. number four is that perhaps this is the first evidence engagement policy of president obama announced in 2009 has worked. iran and the u.s. have been trying for 35 years to improve relations. a lot of efforts and all have failed. this is the first time a success is found, at the highest level of negotiations between iran and the u.s., which would have implications on implications between iran and the west. number five, it opens the door to a regional dialogue between iran and the world powers, iran and the west, iran and the u.s.

tehran and washington decided not to go for broader dialogue negotiations on other issues unless they reached something on the nuclear. therefore if it is finalized by july 1, can open the door for iran and the u.s. to cooperate and to have a regional dialogue, to cooperate on common interests, common threats. it is obvious extremism, isis, they are threats to the region to even u.s. alliance, to iran to international community. there is a consensus that the

threat today is other versions of isis. there is indirect cooperation between iran and the u.s. americans are leaving the airstrike against isis. a key force on the ground battle against isis. they have common interests for peace and stability in iran and afghanistan and many other issues like security and energy. therefore this is step one toward if they want and now they can open a dialogue to cooperate on common threats. giving five reasons why iranians are happy, five reasons why the p5plus one are happy.

i believe everything is not over yet. they have a lot to do until july 1. many technical issues have remained unresolved. therefore we cannot say the deal is 100% done. second, with a nuclear deal, 35 years of this doll these is not going to be over. there is a huge mistrust between iran and the u.s., iran and the west. and some u.s. allies in the region, the israelis are worried after the deal americans and iranians would go to bed. i would assure them they are not going to bed soon. it takes time and this would

only be the first that. thank you. i now ask thomas mattair to address the next issues. thomas mattair: thank you. 10 minutes is not a lot of time. what i want to say is that there is -- there are positive developments in this nuclear framework agreement and enough progress to go forward with more months of negotiations over technical details and find out whether it can be implemented. the gcc states are making cautious statements about willingness to see what the

details are and to see whether more progress can be made and whether something airtight can be developed and implemented. i say it is cautious, because there is a lot of skepticism in these states. and is not just skepticism about the nuclear deal itself. the other concern, which is perhaps even greater, is that the united states in exchange for this agreement is going to acquiesce in the expansion of iranian influence in the arab world. they are looking at iran's influence in iraq after the toppling of that whole system. iran's relationship with the assad regime and its help for the assad regime. me.

its influence over hezbollah. its influence over shia communities and now yemen. that concern about what the united states is going to do is great on their part. in fact, they are concerned that the united states might even consent to a rainy and agenda many -- hegemony in the region. when we talk about isis and exhortations that united states deal with it, they are also asking the united states to pay equal attention to the rainy -- iranian backed shia militias. if we are not doing that and concentrating only on sunni jihadists, it concerns them gravely. about the uae in particular.

they have a special reason for being skeptical about iran. i was specifically asked to address this issue. concerns three islands in the approaches to the shipping line -- shipping lanes, inside the gulf. if you can told -- control them you control the shipping lanes. iran wanted those islands and took them just before the united arab emirates became independent in early december, 1971. he explained that he wanted them for strategic reasons. he was concerned that radicals might take them and might be able to interfere with shipping. john was talking about the do far revolution and he was

concerned those people might take them, for example. it is also very much the case that the prime minister's of iran telling the british that they were also interested in potential oil deposits and cash deposits. they did take them although, the uae has a strong historical and legal claim to the islands and has ever since tried to press that claim in the international arena. it has had the support of other gcc states and the arab league. this support has continued after the revolution, in 1979. one could see during that period of time that those islands can be useful. during the tanker war, when iran

was interfering with shipping coming out of kuwait and other states in the gulf, it did use those islands and it did use its military assets on those islands to interfere with shipping and united states eventually got involved in escorting convoys out of the gulf. it demonstrated the military utility of those islands. even when there was a thaw, in the early 1990's, after the iran-iraq war was over the gcc stats, the oae qatar, were concerned enough about iran's general military capabilities in the region on its coast and on the islands and the modernization of its military

after the iran-iraq war. they were concerned enough about that to start citing security packs with united states, to open up their space for american airfields and that concerned iran greatly and iran has complained about that greatly. iran has conducted naval exercises in the region, some of those have involved attempts to block passage through the strait. uae, qatar and kuwait are participating and naval exercises to counter that. they're purchasing a great deal of american military equipment to modernize those forces. any potential iranian aggression. though it is impossible to tell what their intentions are they

are looking at their capabilities. it's fast attack craft. it's antiship missiles. so many other acquisitions they have made over the past decades. they believe they need at least the ability to deter that. they are getting it from the united states. as i said when i began, they are not just concerned about the nuclear agreement, they are concerned about the trustworthiness of the united states. i heard one of the official saying, there was a time when the united states was a problem -- force to be reckoned with and now they are a problem to be guilt with. which means they are not sure -- to be dealt with. which means they are not sure they can trust the united states. they're looking at our intervention in iraq, our hesitation in syria and a

repeated failure decade after decade, to help the palestinians liberate themselves and their asking what kind of political judgment does the united states have? this is all part of their concern about the nuclear agreement and why they want assurances from the united states that we are going to do something about iran's presence in the arab world. they are concerned that we might go back to the concept that we had when the british withdrew from the gulf in the early 1970's. which was the twin pillar policy where we supported both iran and saudi arabia against the soviet union. but more of the support went to iran because it was more highly developed. they are concerned about that. they are even more concerned that we would tilt toward iran and recognize iran's power and

population and industry and technological base and think that they should be -- that their aspirations should be accepted. so while these countries will say that they have a cautious willingness to consider this agreement, i would say that there is a substantial concern there, you can even say in the case of qatar that while it is often said their relations with iran are cordial, i would point out that they did vote in favor, when they had a rotating seat on the security council, they did vote in favor of the security council resolution in december

2006, and voted in favor of security council resolution 1747 in march, 2007. both of those resolutions imposed sanctions on iran because of the ballistic missile of ram and identify people who should be sanctioned and institutions and banks that should be sentient. they are on record as being concerned about that program. i would even say that in these capitals, there are people who -- if this agreement fails to satisfy them, if they feel they are in danger because of the potential additional boldness that iran might think, if it were allowed eventually to escape from these inspections and restrictions in 20 or 30 years, these are states that might think about other options. very reluctantly, they are

countries that have talked about how we need to keep all options on the table if the agreement doesn't work out. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much john for inviting me. i will probably not talk in 10 minutes because my medicine wears off in eight minutes. i am in a crs capacity today and i will be in crs style which is objective, nonpartisan. it ask away. i will confine most of my

comments to the sanctions part of the deal, of the issue. it is clear from both the iranian and u.s. fact sheet that basically all of the sanctions that have been imposed by the u.s. and the eu, other than human rights related sanctions that have been imposed since 2010, u.n. resolution 1929 of june 2010, are going to be relieved as a consequence of this agreement. that means, iran is being shut out of the international taking system would come to an and and being shut out of the swift electronic payment to section would come to an and the sanctions on their sale of oil and the shipping of oil sanctions on insurance of iranian oil tankers, sanctions

on buying iranian petrochemicals sanctions on providing iran with automotive gear sanctions on supplying iran with oil drilling, exploration equipment, all of these would presumably come to a conclusion if this deal is finalized and when the iaee certifies that iran has complied. this has to be clarified a little bit more when the deal is finalized, but apparently the iaea is going to be the arbiter and they will certify that iran has reduced its stockpile to what the agreement says, that iran has dismantled 15,000 centrifuges and put them away, when these things are certify that is when the sanctions would be relieved, is what i am seeing.

even though the two fact sheets differ a little bit. iran would by these measures gain access to 130 billion to 150 billion in hard currency reserves in various banks overseas. much of which is in south korea, some of which is in japan and other countries. these hard currency payments made for oil that iran is unable to move back to the central bank. no government has impounded this money or taken title to this money, it is iran's money. they are in bank accounts under iran's names, but because of the sanctions, no bank will cooperate in helping iran move this money back to the central bank. that is why it is overseas and iran has not been able to get to it. the idea that these are frozen assets or impounded assets is incorrect.

i see some oil people in the audience. as i said, one of the big things in this is that iran would be able to freely export oil again. what does that mean? there are five countries currently that have active exemptions to avoid u.s. sanctions to buy oil, japan, south korea china, turkey and india. these countries could, conceivably, increase their orders for iranian oil and iran could start supplying those five with more oil. the eu, which was buying a quarter of the iran's oil, they enacted a ban on purchases of iranian oil, so it will take longer for the eu to buy again because they would have to meet, get a consensus, and there has

to be a political decision to lift that band. that could be early 2016. the other five that i mentioned -- let's say there is a deal in june and let's say the iaea gives the go-ahead in september, they could conceivably start buying more iranian oil right away. the iranian economy in my estimation is likely to rebound quickly. this $150 billion that i mentioned that iran would get access to that is equal to iran's entire budget year that they would instantly have hard currency. the value of iran real would rise instantly, inflation would fall employment would increase, the people whose shops and factories are shuttered would

reopen. some people would go to work but right now under the sanctions regime, they are going to work but basically drink tea all day. they may get paid three months late and the boss might give them maybe a quarter of what they are owed, this is what is going on now. basically, the entire iranian economy is in a state of suspension. suspended animation. the entire economy is waiting for this deal to get done and the sanctions relief to occur. that is when everybody goes back to work and starts getting paid again and buying clothes again and buying electronics. this is when the economy fires up again.

there will be a use of presidential waiver authority on the u.s. sanctions on foreign companies that have been so effective. after some period of iranian compliance, no one has specified how much, i personally think it is about a year, but don't quote me necessarily, the administration plans to ask congress to enact legislation that would change, modify, repeal or revoke the u.s. sanctions put in place by sanctions. then it would be a congressional decision at that point. the u.n. sanctions apparently will be relieved, so if congress did not act those sanctions would stay in force. that will be a deal between the united states senate and u.s. allies during -- allies.

the plan would be to have a period of iranian compliance and then ask congress to enact sanctions relief under the agreements and i will stop there. thank you. [applause] imad harb: i was asked to speak about iran and lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence. the negotiations themselves, as far as we know did not discuss

anything outside the negotiations of the nuclear program. so there are supposedly no specific connection between iran's other issues in this foreign policy and the region, or the world for that matter. everybody knows the nuclear program is only a part of iranian foreign policy, it is also the negotiations of a nuclear program, but no matter much we denied there is a connection to iranian influence in other places and that specific negotiation had its impact on other things. basically two perspectives that iran used the issue of his role in lebanon and syria to try to

get a better deal on the nuclear program. the other one is that it didn't. the way it is seen in these two countries with a influence in both countries through the support of the syrian regime and the support of hezbollah in lebanon, everybody there thinks that has to be some sort of an outcome that may reflect on political positions or political conditions in both countries. in other words, if iran resolves the issue on the nuclear file like the ambassador mentioned, will there be outcomes related to other foreign-policy issues in which iran is involved? in lebanon, the country is almost on the verge of collapse. the state is slowly almost imploding.

there is a condition where it is almost like ken said earlier i suspended animation. there is no president or presidential elections that have been held to elect a new president since last may. hezbollah and its ally on the christian side are the ones holding up the process. why that is going on is beyond any rational interpretation. if it is really the person of the president that is important, everybody is thinking about the future of the country. what about the fate of that country? without a president, there is no constitutional continuity so to speak.

today, the executive authority is in the hands of the prime minister, who at any time can be sent home by hezbollah and its allies in the lebanese political system to withdraw from that process. that is a very important consideration. there are other issues. sectarian polarization in the country where unfortunately some sunnis are still able to maintain control over its community. there are those people out there who are basically starting to voice the issue of with the sunni; are not getting what we wants and the shia are controlling the country. hezbollah is worried about a very important develop in

ment in lebanon over the last three or four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. unfortunately, these refugees are not expected to return to syria anytime soon. syria is destroyed. these people if they were to be repatriated to syria, they will have an infrastructure that would receive them. most people in lebanon are not happy with the situation going on in syria. the imposition of the syrian civil war in the lebanese political system is really a serious issue. what is interesting is that hezbollah has not -- while it has criticized hard the

operation decisive storm in yemen, they haven't said much about the nuclear deal itself. it was very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good deal. we want to get out of sanctions and all that, and hezbollah say -- hezbollah did not say much. they are probably waiting to see how things shape up for the next few weeks or months until the technical issues are resolved. it is very interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any specific statement on the negotiations. the syrian situation of the regime over the last two weeks or months has really experienced a lot of setbacks. specifically on the ground in

the south and north, the regime has suffered military defeats. despite the fact that hezbollah has thrown its full weight behind the regime and is fighting on many fronts in syria, despite the fact there are shia militias being imported from iraq and afghanistan and south asia, and despite the fact of russia's open military spigot to syria, things are not going well for the syrian regime. if you look at this brief overview of all of this, we can imagine what now? would there be some sort of change? the situation in lebanon and syria. this is quite important to answer because if iran were to

go back to the two perspectives on whether iran was using lebanon and syria as a bargaining chip in its nuclear program negotiations or whether it was not, it is very important to try to answer this. nuclear negotiations are done. iran does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political developments or other developments in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation? this is something everybody is speculating on. the arab governments are now very busy with the war in yemen. gcc countries are very busy there. at the same time, they are looking at nuclear negotiations as how it might reflect on their interests in those two countries.

if we talk about lebanon and syria, we also need to talk about gcc's situation and how it deals with this. there is a wildcard here. this is something we really don't know how it is going to shape up over the next three months until the end of june. the wildcard is specifically will anybody within the iranian political system, the nature of their political system its domestic politics are fragmented. it is a fractional political system. obviously ayatollah khomeini has the final say and will definitely try to reign everybody in for whatever decision the iranian political

decision should have. at the same time, there are different factions within the system who may not be necessarily very open and accepting of the nuclear deal. only yesterday, something positive came out of the leader of the revolutionary guard. he said our negotiators really worked very hard to get a very good deal. in other words, this was some sort of a way of saying you did ok. it was all right. this might reflect on how hezbollah looks at this issue. there are other people within the political system that described the political system in suspended equilibrium. all the different factions have

their own interest. all of them are trying to pull to their own position. not much happens on the domestic scene. are these different factions? will they do something in the foreign policy arena? will there be somebody who might think it is possible to activate for instance the lebanese-syrian front with israel? a couple of rockets here or there, something might happen like that. israel is in no mood to let things go. it might respond. if it does respond, there goes the deal because hezbollah would have to respond and things will fall apart. i would be happy to answer your questions if you like. i give you the doctor sullivan.

thank you. [applause] dr. sullivan: good morning. thank you for the invite, john. they asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions can affect energy systems not just in iran but regionally and globally. to put this into perspective iran is an energy giant. it has either the number one or number two conventional natural gas reserves in the world. trade that off between russia and iran depending on what you are looking at. number four in conventional oil reserves in the world. not talking about shale gas or oil, this is conventional. when this is opened up, if it opens up, this will definitely

change energy markets globally. oil markets are global markets. it will not just affect crude oil but also refined products and petrochemicals. opening up iran, if it does open up, will also change natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets, rather than regional ones. and if iran hops into this, it will change things considerably. one of the reasons they have not been involved is because they cannot get at the right technologies. iran and qatar could come to a

joint agreement. all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole issue is pipelines and other export menus going into central asia. and the caspian. just don't look south. just a look at asia. look right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. you have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran, but if the prophet is right, you can build a pipeline, and could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into europe and beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil. the hedge funds will have a great time on this one. they are all guessing what will happen to the price of oil tomorrow. it is like a parlor game. what is the price going to be tomorrow?

will it go up three dollars? will go down three dollars? we talking about trillions of dollars trading regularly. people trading regularly. another thing that is not talked about too much is the pipeline going to pakistan and india, which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions have taken off. although there is a bit of a problem in one place, which iran and pakistan share. some border guards got killed there recently. there is a great deal of instability, but i think money may talk in that situation. another part of the energy system is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, would be part of a power pool of electricity

production, consumption, and sharing going into central asia, the caspian, possibly across to iraq and to many other places, afghanistan and so forth. this could be a huge change. but there are big if's. some consider dual use could also enter iran. they could be more efficient with their use of energy. i think i can hear the investor salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow into these things that no one is even talking about? energy efficiency. what about renewables, geothermal, solar, wind? this is not happening. now think about the idea of the snapback of sanctions. which i think is an absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of

dollars flowing into iran, oil going here, oil going there, pipelines being built, and then someone says they don't have -- they haven't followed the game, we are going to snapback on sanctions? money will talk. snapping back the sanctions are not as easy as that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that, either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclearzation of the gulf. but also in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. because of the threat that they feel. all right. all of my opinions are mine alone, do not represent those of the u.s. government, the

national defense university, or any other organization i am a part of. i am not talking for them. what i am about to say will be clear that i am not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. it is a framework for discussion of a deal. if you are about to buy a house or a small business, and the person you are buying it from says, here is the framework for discussion, you wouldn't be asking when can i move in. this two and half page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green groceries in cairo. it is too simple, too vague.

the terms are not clear. what we are seeing right now is another version of groupthink. we saw groupthink before the iraq war. now we are seeing groupthink on this deal. everyone is hopping on board. read the documents. read the terms. for example, the complex is to be converted into an atomic research center. ok, has anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how could you prove it is an atomic research center? i am seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish, and in what time period? oh, by the way, it could take

years to develop an atomic research center. years. any deal, a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details. otherwise, the sanctions are not going to be taken off. and all these things i am talking about oil and gas and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up, pun intended, will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1. anyone done negotiating on simple business deals? july 1 is pretty tough. now we are trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1. could we please get real? all right. it is going to be very difficult to turn the sanctions off, and it will be very difficult to turn them back on again.

ken alluded to something about the waivers. some of them have waivers, some of them don't. some of them are law. you have un sanctions, you have eu sanctions, you have combination sanctions. it is not the same thing as putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir one centrifuge within 10 years? 10 years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years, everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concerned is the one year breakout time. wow. why is everybody saying that is a good thing?

how about a no-year breakout time? i being outrageous enough? am i shattering illusions here? this essentially says is that the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years, either. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside. and the use of different centrifuges, the complex, just about everything else goes right back on line the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, all changes. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist, when i hear that pouring into a country, i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership does not not still follow that economics is for donkeys because economics works. and inflation and unemployment

and a hyperventilated economy drove iran to its revolution in 1979. what is the meaning of the term "significant amount of time"? you will have to excuse me. i worked at a law officers for years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words. how to tear them apart. how to figure out the real meaning that is stated here. and if there is enough vagueness, change it. who controls the inspection? the security council? the russians? who does that? that is a little bit vague. and some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. it is the nature of the process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant.

one minute. ok. in one minute, what can i tell you? i am concerned about how this is worded. and i am concerned once the door is open and the horses are out of the barn, how difficult it will be to get the horses back into the barn. i am concerned with this will do to the region. i can see the whole. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language. strict timetables. and no illusions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you all very much. now comes to the most

interesting part. your questions. i think for the next 40 plus minutes, we will just go ahead and run through the questions we received from the audience. i will read them as we go. and i appreciate very much if you have any more, just pass them on and we'll try to respond the best we can. the investment and u.s. oil companies, other u.s. companies like boeing, be held up until congress acts? dr. katzman: the fact sheet distributed by the administration makes it clear that sanctions that bar u.s. companies from doing business with iran will not be lifted under this arrangement. so the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily referred to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-us companies. it is very clear from the u.s. statement that there will not,

as a consequence of this particular arrangement if it is finalized, and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran clearing up there differences on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. mr. pratt: the next question might hezbollah's hesitation on the the deal might raise concern? dr. harb: well, i think this is -- i don't think that the iranians are combining their thinking of what hezbollah represents to them.

the only thing is that maybe iran will tell hezbollah indicate to hezbollah that it is time for hezbollah to assist in putting the lebanese state back on track. just a phone call from tehran would may be set things very very much straight in beirut. mr. pratt: anybody else have any comment to make on that one? ok. another question that is looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel. now that iran's nuclear power in the region is being analyzed, is there a growing concern with the relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on because of the significance of the discussion particularly recently.

dr. anthony: here, i think context is important. the relationship between iran and israel was intimate, it was strategic, it was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep, in terms of the stories pertaining to esther, a persian who helped to free the jews from captivity from babylon. so the degree of trust over the centuries between jews and

persians is deep. at times, it has been massive. at times, it has been pervasive. and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel thousands went by way of iran. and during the 1950's and 1960's, the heyday of arab nationalism, iran and israel the in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has been concerned about an intimate u.s. arab relationship because there are 22 arab countries, only one iran, only one israel. so that was also part of the adhesive. and many in israel regard these

last years since 1979 as an aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal, mutually beneficial reciprocally rewarding relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interests. a similarity of interests. and that now may begin to come back into focus, but it will be quite a stretch. in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings and briefings by the head of israel's foreign ministry, an answer to a question of where do of 10 your energy, your oil? the answer was 90% we get from iran.

dr. mousavian: the impact of a nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be censored sincere to each other's about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is a member of the treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to give them their treaty. iran does not have a nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently, the pentagon accepted

the israelis have a nuclear bomb. just in a decade, iran has given more than 700,000 mandated inspections. no other member, during the history of iaea, has given such an amount of inspections that the iranians gave. israel has never given even one inspection. iran has initiated negotiations in 1970. israel is declining, rejecting objecting the nuclear treaty. in 1990's, egypt proposed a weapons of mass ejection freezone. iran and was the second country to support it.

in over 20 years, israelis deal opposing weapons of mass destruction free zone in the middle east. therefore, we are talking about two very, very, very different policy on proliferation. and as an iranian, i am really shocked that everybody is about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb. and all pressures and sanctions are on iran. and nobody is talking about israel. this is a very clear double standard in washington, in the west about proliferation in the middle east. however, this deal has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any proliferation risk in the middle east.

it is said iran would be committed. ok, this is first iranian goodwill. as long as you do not have reprocessing, you cannot make nuclear weapons from heavywater facilities. israeli has reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regional -- regionalize the measures agreed to with iran for all countries? no country would have enrichment above 5%. as long as there is no enrichment above 5%, they would be no nuclear bomb from nuclear facilities. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavywater facilities.

it can have major positive impact if israelis also would be ready to follow the same nuclear policy iran has followed for 40, 50 years. and if other regional countries would be ready to accept such a measure as iran has accepted far beyond mpt. mr. pratt: do you have any comments on it? i don't think israel will ever give up its nuclear weapons or agree to restrictions. i expect them to continue to oppose this deal, no matter what.

and to lobby for more actions against iran. that is because of the nature of the two governments. john was talking about how, in the past, israel viewed iran as a partner in a sense because both of them had concerns about the arab world. and american relations with the arab world. but i can't see that entering into their minds anytime in the near or midterm. and in fact, their concern about iran is so great that they are -- you know -- in a sense, reversing that trend in trying to forge relations with arab states that also view iran as a threat. it is very tactical on their part. it is only because they both have a concern about iran. when netanyahu was in front of congress a month or so ago and

warned that iran was a country that committed aggression against the arab world, i think he -- i don't think that is his primary concern. dr. katzman: i think i would say that there has been a consensus to sort of allow this deterrent. to raise the fact that they are not in the mpt, maybe it is intellectually precise, but it is probably not going to go very far. that would be my response.

dr. sullivan: the israeli institutions don't start the day by saying, death to america. maybe changing that would go a long ways. right now, we have a strong personalities involved in the iranian-israeli dialogue to call it that. it is more like two monologues that never meet. also, there are other issues involved here. let me get it straight. i am not saying i am against the deal, i'm not saying i am fort i am just saying get better specificity and make it a real deal. not this thing floating in the air. i am not for war with iran. if anybody has that impression i have been through wargames. looking at the cost of that war, it is astonishing what could happen. it would make iraq look like a picnic.

iran is a bigger country, bigger military, more organized hierarchical, a long culture and as soon as the boots hit the ground, welcome to hell. for all sides involved. we don't need that. what we need is some kind of a diplomatic, economic informational, and other change to bring this about. and my sense is this document is not it because we have other issues to deal with. what is happening in bahrain what is happening in lebanon what is happening in iraq, what is happening in yemen. ballistic missiles are not part of the deal. this is a very narrow document. this solves a very narrow question. and again, i am for improving relations, but it has to be done in the right way. excuse me.

dr. harb: i just urge you to read his recent piece on why we are talking about iran, what are the reasons basically behind this push towards iran, iran iran. i urge you to read the report on that. mr. pratt: there is a fundamental question here with regards to getting a copy of the deal. somebody asked where can we get a copy of the framework between u.s. and iran? >> the white house website. >> the middle eastern policy -- has it on its website. dr. sullivan: you can also find different interpretations, which is part of the problem here. there are cultural differences linguistic differences, and also political differences across the

country which is changing the way this is interpreted. it is far from clear. maybe it was important to make it unclear to see what happens. mr. pratt: do we have any idea on who the leads are -- returning back to the discussion -- secretary kerry going to be engaged? dr. sullivan: if they haven't started this yet, the clock is ticking. july 1 is not so far away. that is almost meanterm for a college. in this kind of deal with all this complicated issues, probably there are a bunch of sherpas of their on all side during the heavy lifting. when they do the heavy lifting then the big players go in -- cnn, fox, iranian tv -- and they

say, well, we we made the deal. dr. harb: in the "daily star" he basically summed it up, if i may, basically the deal -- or the framework for the deal -- slightly over 5000 centrifuges for the next 10 years that iran would maintain -- would be allowed to work only. enrichment for 15 years will be banned at the facility, the mountain facility. and iran can enrich some uranium, and not tons, at the heavy water reactor. i'm sorry, that is -- at 3.67% purity. and that is kept at 300

kilograms for 15 years. 1000 ir-2 centrifuges, the newer version, will be removed. and the iraq heavywater reactor would be reconfigured to prevent the production of bomb fuel, basically plutonium. the iaea inspections with less for 25 years. of all facilities, all imports that have to do with all of this. the iaea would have full access to everything. in return, iran will get the gradual removal of sanctions as soon as iaea provides clarification. then the sections will begin to be lifted. dr. sullivan: to put this into perspective, this is the white house document. this is it.

mr. pratt: -- even if iran's intent is to build nuclear energy, what language should be insisted upon in the final agreement to safeguard and avoid nuclear actions like tokushima? dr. anthony: this is an issue of real concern, in terms of one of the sites. the one it nearest to the gulf and the other gulf countries. because of the sanctions because of the nonexistent relations between tehran and washington, diplomatically and formally, there could be such an accident. iran has had a history of earthquakes. so has turkey.

they are part of a different tectonic plate than those of arabia. so there is a legitimate fear, what if there is an earthquake in that region? their fear is that there would be spillage and linkage, and that this would be contaminating and pose an immediate, direct threat to the water desalination plants in kuwait, bahrain, qatar, and elsewhere. and ships may refuse to come into the gulf until this is dealt with and cleaned up. that is more than a nightmare. that has catastrophic implications. the russians were involved in building that reactor.

and they are also the so-called inspectors of it, until now. but this is like putting the fox in the coop with the chickens. there needs to be a more technologically professional efficient, and renowned inspector of that particular facility. and because it is the one that could be catastrophic, were there to be any accident there like the chernobyl and kuwait, the one that are most concerned and involved with this -- in the chernobyl disaster, some 200,000 people had to be relocated. that was costly. united nations asked for a lot of donor countries to subsidize and finance it. and kuwait was the leading one. so, kuwait has been involved in this kind of an issue longer

than any of the other gcc countries on that side, which relates directly to inspections and relates to one particular nuclear facility, the one that is closest to the gulf. and could affect them all. yes, yes. dr. mousavian: from day one, it has been under iaea supervision. and the iaea has fully confirmed all safety measures already there.

second, join plan of action also -- i mean come on the framer they agreed. they have also agreed the world powers to have more cooperation with iran on the safety issues. third, fukushima was in japan. japan never lowered its nuclear activities after fukushima. they continued the same nuclear activities. chernobyl was in russia. russia increased its nuclear activities after chernobyl. emirates is going to have four nuclear power plants, so arabia will have power plants. turkey is going to have power plants. therefore, we really do not need to create more artificial fears about uranium and nuclear programs. dr. sullivan: the japanese shut down all of their nuclear power plants. i was there two weeks ago visiting the plant just west of tokyo. and they are spending billions

of dollars to set up safety devices in the event of another earthquake or tsunami. the japanese have been through a very difficult energy time since they had to shut down 30% of their electricity. which is what they have done. and there is a huge debate in japan right now whether to turn his back on again. the father away from tokyo you are, the more likely one of those plants is to be started up again. it is a very emotional issue. and this fukushima problem was not just an earthquake, it was a water flow problem. and when i think water in the middle east, i wonder what some people are thinking. the jordanians are building a plant in the desert of northwestern jordan using a water treatment plant as a source of water to cool the spent fuel and the nuclear plant. as i told a reporter a few years -- days ago, i wouldn't live

near that thing because if the water treatment plant goes down, the water flow goes down, the thing overheat, and you have a fukushima in jordan right near the iraq border. the middle east is water short. if you're going to be putting a plant on the ocean, that makes sense. if you're putting it in the desert, that makes no sense. if you are putting it on a fault line, this makes no sense. near the ocean, maybe you keep the cooling going. but at the same time, it will shut down automatically if there is an earthquake. it has before. the one in san diego shutdown. nuclear facilities need a lot of water and a lot of water flow. people are just not thinking this through. mr. pratt: anybody else want to comment on -- a question for kenneth katzman please compare and contrast libyan sanctions versus iranian sanctions, and when will iran be removed from the terrorism list? dr. katzman: quite some questions.

i know c-span is here so i want to say hi, mom. [laughter] iran's removal from the u.s. terrorist list, well, there are some young people in the audience, so maybe by the time they are my age that could happen. iran is nowhere close to being removed from the terrorist list. there is no consideration in the u.s. government for removing iran from that list. i would just be categorical on that question. the other -- what was the rest of the question? sorry. comparing libya? well, you know, we could conceivably have two similar situations. libya gave up its nuclear program and actually gave --

dismantled the whole thing. obviously, there was not the same level of debate over lifting some of the sanctions on libya because they had been so you know, basically dismantled the entire program. iran is not doing that obviously. this deal leaves them with substantial infrastructure. and we had more than an hour of discussion about the continuing concerns. obviously, it is not quite as easy. but, you know, again, just looking at authorities, the president does have, you know, quite a bit of authority in terms of suspending sanctions. but if you're talking about lifting sanctions outright, or congressional action is needed then of course it becomes much more involved. and most of the main sanctions that would be released under this deal are enforced by

congressionally passed statutes. and therefore, congress, to lift the sanctions outright would have to pass new legislation to do that. mr. pratt: there is a follow-up question, if i could. regarding the banking system. and contemplate for access. would a final agreement contemplate full access of iran to the banking system? and the u.s. payment system? dr. katzman: again, anything involving the u.s. is not really part of the sanctions relief. iran would be able to access again, the european, asian financial system. and the secondary sanctions on those banks that are doing business with iranian banks, they would not be penalized by doing business with the u.s. financial system. but direct iran-u.s. financial

transactions would still -- that is not contemplated as part of the relief package. mr. pratt: thank you. a question for the ambassador. the russian foreign minister said he would recommend iran during the shanghai cooperation organization if the nuclear deal is successful. what would the implications of this be and how would iran partners benefit? dr. mousavian: iran is already participating on all shanghai's high-level meetings. and if iran is member, it would create more opportunities for asian cooperation between iran and china, iran and south asia and even iran and india.

this would have more impact on iran economical relations with asia. mr. pratt: just as a general for the panel, we have about 16, 17 minutes to go. it is a broad one. it is, what will the u.s. congress to? which is going to sort of the filling a lot of air, but if anybody would like to comment on that. [laughter] dr. sullivan: well, the u.s. congress will do what the u.s. congress does. which is debate this issue and try to work it through. and whatever matter, they will. there is an election year coming up. there is always an election year coming up. and it is going to be hardball. that is pretty much the way it is going to work out.

and the house and the senate are now run by the republicans which, for those of you don't know, means they run who gets invited to the committee. and run the questions in the committee -- and the committee assignments. it will be a very rough road. dr. mousavian: i agree with him, but to my understanding, not only because of the next election, it has a lot to do with benjamin netanyahu, aipac and more, i believe, it take big misunderstanding not only in the u.s. congress between a lot of u.s. politicians -- you hear from many u.s. congressman that

we should keep the sanctions pressure iran. iran only came to nuclear negotiation deal or framework because of sanctions pressures. still, they keep the same narrative. in all debate, you read the same narrative. but a very simple fact, before sanctions, iran had a few hundred centrifuges. after sanctions, iran increased to 22,000 centrifuges. before sanctions, iran was enriching below 5%. after sanctions, iran increase d to 20%. before sanctions, iran had just a few hundred kilograms of stockpiles. after sections, the have several thousand kilograms of stockpiles. this was really the impact of sanctions.

as president obama said, suddenly the p5 plus one -- the only thing that made the framework possible was first the u.s. agreed to iran to have in enrichment for its domestic, practical needs. that is why iran accepted to every transparency measures. and iran was ready to give every confidence building measures that iran would never diapered vert its nuclear program. because practically they had the same red line. and obama said -- these narratives have not been

corrected in the u.s. congress. there is a big misunderstanding, and they are repeating the same mistakes. today, more concerns about issues beyond nuclear. you heard our panelists that they discuss about all the threats, israel, regional influences, so the region ason netanyahu and even some arab allies and in washington, they're pushing their administration to continue their strategy is to contain influence and power. this is the reality.

but as long as they really do not recognize the fact, what is the fact? i believe, for 35 years, the u.s., europe, the world powers they did everything they could and strategies against iran. unilateral sanctions. multilateral sanctions. u.n. sanctions. the war against iran. they millions of iranians that were either killed or injured. even using chemical weapons against iranians. they all supported the use of weapons of mass destruction against iranians. 100,000 iranians were killed or injured. no other country, and the past 35 years, has been under so much pressure and sanctions orchestrated by the u.s. however, after 35 years, everybody today is crying and complaining, why is iran so stable? why iran is so powerful? iran is everywhere.

this is evidence and fact that 35 years of sanctions and pressures and the most powerful coercion policy against iran not only has failed, but has strengthened iran. stability and power in the region. and look at the u.s. in the region. they got old weapons, money, support. and you can see the collapse of u.s. allies in the region. and others won't understand therefore -- and one would say look, if you are right, then release the sanctions. here is another misunderstanding about iranian culture between our regional arab allies and even the west and even in washington. i have been 30 years within the iranian administration. i am iranian and there is a

culture. they need to understand iranian culture. more pressure, more sanctions would make iran more aggressive. therefore, as long as the congress follows the strategy, iran, like the last 35 years will be more aggressive. you would fear more about the role of iran. more cooperation iranians would make a deal, on all other disputed issues. therefore, as long as this narrative continues in the u.s. congress, i am optimistic of the future of iran-u.s. relations -- i am pessimistic, i'm sorry.

>> one country we haven't mentioned here is china. they are very much involved in the situation, including developing two of the largest oilfields in iran. i don't think the issue is an application of two tough --of too tough sanctions. the chinese built a rail system they build roads. they are very much involved in iran right now. the russians are also very much involved. it is not just the united states, and we have lost leverage. some people in the city seem to think that we can do something in the world jumps. china is a powerful country. russia is not as powerful, it's economy is degraded, that is something else.

but the chinese are a powerful country that wants more influence in the middle east, and they are moving into every single country. it is one of the few countries that helps saudi arabia and iran at the same time. they support the palestinians and the israelis at the same time. they are playing a double game and playing it brilliantly. our leverage in the region is not what it was even five years ago. to think that we can say sanction and close the door and everyone jumps, that is not the way it is any more. this is a different iran and a different china. china, when this thing started was a poor country. back in 1979 it was a poor country. it had no clout in the region and it didn't start importing oil until it did from oman in 1983. this is a totally different world.

>> my only hope of anything that comes from congress is that the white house might have inability to break. unfortunately, the situation is such that congress people are not necessarily listening to reasoned arguments. >> i share the pessimism with regard to congress. i would come at it from a slightly different perspective but and up with the same point. that is the pressure of lobby groups neoconservatives, and those who are interested in

advancing the israeli narrative or israeli objectives. iran has become quite convenient as a distraction from israel's actions, israel's policies, israel's positions israel's fe at accomplii. and it will continue to serve this tactical role to deflect attention from the eastern mediterranean, specifically israel and its building of settlements. now focusing as -- focusing on iran as the whipping boy. this is because it has been a successful tactic. in 1982, the u.s. was on a roll

having camp david under its belt and getting the israelis to withdraw from the sinai peninsula. the next items on the agenda were to be jerusalem and the west bank and gaza. the israeli push back was that this will not be your agenda. we thought that this was hubris run amok. but it wasn't. i sat in on meetings in january of 1982 where state department briefers said the between april and june, israel will invade lebanon. we asked why they would do that. because there is a cease-fire. it had artie been negotiated with the plo and intelligence

said it would be lebanon. the answer was because they want to change the agenda completely and indeed they did by invading lebanon. they remained there directly or indirectly for the next 19 years, during which time, with the attention deflected, the settlements doubled tripled quadrupled quintupled. and those settlements all remain. so this is quite tempting. even with united states's invasion of iraq in 2003. in the. since then, israel has built its so-called separation barrier or security wall. this is cut into what was to be the territory for interdependent state of palestine. 22% remaining. so territorial expansion has occurred in the shadow of

deflecting american attention. and we have done nothing to prevent those events that i just described. even further from the reach of those who have tried in last year with secretary of state kerry before him mitchell, before him: powell, before them etc. we have been ineffectual. so i share the pessimism that i arrive at it differently. it will continue to be an object of scorn and isolation if people in congress and those who lobbied them are successful. >> thank you. i think we have less than three or four minutes left so what i would like to do is ask one

final question. we will just go right down the row. what would be the regional implications and repercussions for a failure to arrive at a march 30 deadline. what is the next step if there is no agreement on the technical details in the next 90 days? >> probably a delay. i don't think it is going to be a reachable goal. it will be an extremely conjugated situation. that would probably been a great deal of political resentment and anger within iran and within the iranian leadership.

the implications of that it could be significant for whatever is happening between the united states and iran on other issues. if it breaks down entirely, then we are back to step one. and to get these folks back to the table will be very difficult. the proxies for iran and others may also react in a kinetic way if this happens. the game has started, and i don't mean a fun game. i mean a very complicated and dangerous game. and it may not be a retrievable one if this thing breaks down. the agreement, if there is to be in agreement, has to be a proper

one and a long-lasting one, and has to be a step to deal with the other issues involved in this. otherwise, you will have an agreement on something narrow and nothing else. >> i agree with paul about maybe the resort would be to postpone the negotiations of the technical agreements. but at the same time, if we resort or postpone those, then it is likely that elements in the iranian regime will start to's -- will try to start things up regionally so they have a little more of a bargaining chip. >> i think, given the reaction in iran to the tentative deal, it is going to be extremely difficult for iran not to go forward and have the final deal

will stop i think the repercussions in iran would be tremendous if there were a collapse at the end of this. i think president rouhani probably could not finish. ministers a reef -- minister zharif would not be able to continue. i think you would see a major of people. -- major upheaval. i agree that the technical details are so difficult that i would fully expect when june 30 comes, some announcement about continuing the talks. i think that would suit a number of the gulf arab states because they would like to see a tighter agreement negotiated.

and they don't want sanctions lifted yet until the agreement is better. and they have recently i think realized that they need to lead in dealing with geopolitical threats rather than wait for the united states to lead them. but, they are also seeing that the united states is responding to their lead and the united states is gradually getting more involved, helping in yemen helping more in syria that before. i think it would suit a number of those states until a better deal is agreed upon. >> i believe already that the negotiations have reached the no return point. they have already decided to

strike a deal. the u.s. also cannot leave the negotiation table. they cannot leave the negotiation table because of two reasons -- three reasons. one, from the beginning, they agreed. there is nothing left to dispute with npt. everything with npt is agreed with details. iran is the only country far beyond npt. third, is the realities in the region. this really dictates to them to

finish the job by july 1. if it fails, neither would we have a people in iran or washington. iranians would be able to continue like they have been able to resist the last three or four decades. but, the implication, even if we do not agree with the world powers, why iran and the regional powers, like saudi arabia, cannot sit together and to agree on the same measures within npt and beyond npt, for nuclear weapon free zone in the region. why? this is already an achievement for the regional countries and regional powers to sit together to agree for a regional

mechanism. and finally, regardless of the nuclear issue the problems in the region definitely is far beyond the iranian nuclear issue. as long as we don't have regional cooperation between the regional powers, iran, saudi arabia gcc, turkey egypt, you are not going to get to anywhere even if the deal is done on nuclear. >> well, it is 12:00 and time to move on. on behalf of the national council on u.s.-arab relations i want to thank our distinguished panel. to share their insights, knowledge, wisdom, and projections for the future.

let's hope the next three months are eventful. and as closing, i want to point out that the president's legacy is online on this. it is serious discussion and debate. if we could take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east, these are noble objectives which i think in the days ahead as a result of our insights, will give us a better understanding about whether these are actually achievable ends or noble goals that can be pursued with success. thank you again for coming. [applause]

>> the head of the imf will talk about the global economy. that's at 10:30 eastern on c-span two. vice president joe biden will discuss u.s. policy in iraq and the threat of isis. he will be at the national defense university, live at 12:30 eastern. >> here's some of our featured programs for this weekend on the c-span networks. on c-span twos book tv, saturday at 10: p.m. eastern president

for tax reform over request -- grover norquist says people are tired of the tax system. and an author on stalin and the respective partnership be on the war. saturday night at 8:00 eastern on american history tv on c-span3, on like shares in history, university of virginia's college professor jennifer murray on how civil war veterans reunion some changed for the reconstruction era to present. and sunday afternoon at 1:00 american history tv is live from appomattox court national historical park commemorating the 150th anniversary of the confederate surrender in the end of the civil war. >> during this month, c-span is pleased to present the winning entries in this year's student cam video documentary position. it encourages middle and has

will students to think radically about issues that affect the nation. students were asked to create their documentary based on the theme the three branches and you. to demonstrate how a policy, law, or action by one of the three branches of government has affected them or their communities. these students from st. thomas more high school in rapid city south dakota are one of the second prize winners. their entry focused on the keystone xl pipeline. >> we own transcanada absolutely nothing. [applause] >> for the sake of all america i ask you respectfully president obama, to deny this permit. >> keystone xl will impact the entire nation. however, the people to call the great plains region home will be the ones to experience the risks and rewards to their full

extent. it will be an underground pipe that will leak crude oil from the tar sands in alberta with u.s. states of montana, south dakota nebraska, kansas, and oklahoma. two oil refineries in texas. many people in our region fear the python -- the pipe's impact. >> that having people would copperhead how devastating it would be to the overall aquifer if it was contaminated by the keystone xl pipeline. it was leaking. >> we feel our legitimate concerns about the sandhills and our aquifer have gone unrecognized. >> we are going to do everything within our powers to protect our homelands, our people, and our

children and grandchildren. people don't understand the aquifer is the second biggest water aquifer in the world. >> this is genocide for first nations people. the american people should not have to choose between jobs and wrecking the environment forever for our seventh coming generation. >> contrary to these views that the pipe will have a detrimental impact on the environment, dave emory, president and ceo of black hills corp. thinks he will have a very minimal impact. >> we were putting in a pipeline, the way they do it today, those risks are relatively small. as i said, with a construct the lines, they are very picky about how they build those lines. they x-ray every single welds to make sure he doesn't have any holes in it, doesn't even have stress fractures around the well. when you strike an arc with the welding rod and a piece of pipe actually causes some spider

cracks. microscopic ones. if they even see those in next ray, they will cut out that piece of pipe and re-weld it. they're really careful when they build it, they externally coat all the pipe, all the wells, all the joints so they can't corrode from the outside. and then they put what they call protection on the pipe itself if the pipe goes through a wet area and it starts to corrode it actually can form an electrical current from the groundwater and caused to corrode faster. it's hard to explain but literally there is a chemical reaction that induces analytical current. they actually put a current in the pipe while his operating to prevent that from happening. >> the keystone pipeline is the safest way of transporting the oil. it is safer than rail or truck. it is important to remember that

canada will be extracting and transporting as oil regardless. the only question, madam president, is whether we want it to come here. along with the thousands of jobs it will create. or whether we want to let candidate ship that oil overseas. >> advocates of the pipeline seem to have legitimate answers to environmental concerns. but legal issues of eminent domain and native american treaty territories have created other obstacles. >> eminent domain is really the taking of private property for public use. with just compensation. >> the whole concept of eminent domain was created to make sure that an individual wasn't able to stop something that was for the greater public good. whether that's a highway, power lines, pipelines, whatever. it is good, in the public's best

interest, as long as you compensate the individual fairly for the taking, you can do that. transcanada is no different than anybody else. it's a last resort to go to the court and ask to take the property. >> we have our own constitution and our own laws they don't pertain for outsiders. i'm talking treaty lands out of the state of south dakota, it could happen -- it could not happen through south dakota. the great sioux nation is in south dakota. there are multiple tribes. >> we do not want this pipeline in our 1868 or laramie treaty territory, treaty that ratified by the united states congress illegal, binding, international document law. >> the whole state of south dakota is treaty tribes.

this is our land. >> we did not give prior informed consent to transcanada to bring this pipeline through our beloved mother earth in our area of this country. >> you could build around them if you wanted to, which isn't terribly difficult. but the south dakota supreme court rule on the reservation boundaries, they rule on the black hills. the tribes don't agree with that. but the courts of spoken and basically said that anything inside the continuous borders of the reservation that is known today is under the jurisdiction of the reservations. anything outside that is not. >> despite environment concerns voiced by farmers and native americans, the keystone xl pipeline will have a mostly positive impacts on the great plains region and the people who live there. we believe the executive branch should pass this bill.

>> to watch all of the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to c-span.org and click on student cam. tell us what you think about the issue of the students addressed in their documentary on facebook and twitter. >> its night this weekend on a clock p.m. eastern conversations with a few new members of congress. >> as a result, i try to stay disciplined in my message. in a football sense, i try and stay between the hashmarks. i understand that are present everywhere in montana, and that's one congressman. i represent not only the republican side, but i represent the democratic side and independent side, the tea party side, the union side. i represent everyone in montana. i think if we take that value set forward, congress are present america. you truly articulate the values and needs and desires of your

district, but the purpose is to make america better. >> the five newest rivers of congress talk about their careers and purpose -- personal lives and share insights about how things work on capitol hill. join us for all their conversations eads night -- each night at 9:00 p.m. . "washington journal," is next. and then a look at the policy implications regarding hillary clinton's use of personal e-mail while serving as secretary of state. live coverage from the national press club at 10:00 a.m. eastern. later, vice president joe biden on u.s. policy in iraq and the threat of isis. he will be at the national defense university live at 12:30 eastern. >> coming up, we will be live with the daily caller and talk

with tucker carlson about the changing media landscape. and then a conversation with patrick cowley -- howley. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. ♪ host: good morning. it's thursday, april 9, 2015. we begin our program discussing the boston marathon bomber trial and a 30 guilt or -- guilty verdicts ended by the -- handed down by the jury yesterday. the jury is now set to decide whether so car tsarnaev should be put to death. and we put those questions to you in the first