waiver authority on the u.s. sanctions on the foreign companies that have been effective. after some period of compliance, i personally think a year, don't quote me necessarily on that, the administration plans to then asked congress to enact legislation that would change, modify, or repeal or revoke the u.s. sanctions that have been put in place by statute. then it would be a congressional decision at then it would be a congressional decision at that point. the u.n. sanctions apparently will be relieved, so if congress did not act those sanctions would stay in force. that will be a deal between the

united states senate and u.s. allies. the plan would be to have a period of iranian compliance and then ask congress to enact sanctions relief under the agreements and i will stop there. thank you. [applause] imad harb: i was asked to speak about iran and lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence.

the negotiations themselves, as far as we know did not discuss anything outside the negotiations of the nuclear program. so there are supposedly no specific connection between iran's other issues in this foreign policy and the region, or the world for that matter. everybody knows the nuclear program is only a part of iranian foreign policy, it is also the negotiations of a nuclear program, but no matter how much we denied, there is a connection to iranian influence in other places and that specific negotiation had its impact on other things. basically, two perspectives, that iran actually used its role in lebanon and syria to try to get a better deal on the nuclear program.

the other one is that it didn't. the way it is seen in these two countries with a influence in both countries through the support of the syrian regime and the support of hezbollah in lebanon, everybody there thinks that has to be some sort of an outcome that may reflect on political positions or political conditions in both countries. in other words, if iran resolves the issue on the nuclear file like the ambassador mentioned, will there be outcomes related to other foreign-policy issues in which iran is involved? in lebanon, the country is almost on the verge of collapse. the state is slowly almost imploding.

there is a condition where it is almost like ken said earlier i suspended animation. there is no president or presidential elections that have been held to elect a new president since last may. hezbollah and its ally on the christian side are the ones holding up the process. why that is going on is beyond any rational interpretation. if it is really the person of the president that is important, everybody is thinking about the future of the country. what about the fate of that country? without a president, there is no constitutional continuity so to speak.

today, the executive authority is in the hands of the prime minister, who at any time can be sent home by hezbollah and its allies in the lebanese political system to withdraw from that process. that is a very important consideration. there are other issues. sectarian polarization in the country where unfortunately some sunnis are still able to maintain control over its community. there are those people out there who are basically starting to voice the issue of with the sunnis, we are not getting what we wants and the shia are controlling the country. hezbollah is worried about a very important develop in ment in lebanon over the last

three or four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. unfortunately, these refugees are not expected to return to syria anytime soon. syria is destroyed. these people, if they were to be repatriated to syria, they will have an infrastructure that would receive them. most people in lebanon are not happy with the situation going on in syria. the imposition of the syrian civil war in the lebanese political system is really a serious issue. what is interesting is that hezbollah has not -- while it has criticized hard the operation decisive storm in

yemen, they haven't said much about the nuclear deal itself. it was very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good deal. we want to get out of sanctions and all that, and hezbollah say -- hezbollah did not say much. they are probably waiting to see how things shape up for the next few weeks or months until the technical issues are resolved. it is very interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any specific statement on the negotiations. the syrian situation of the regime over the last two weeks or months has really experienced a lot of setbacks. specifically on the ground in the south and north, the regime has suffered military defeats.

despite the fact that hezbollah has thrown its full weight behind the regime and is fighting on many fronts in syria, despite the fact there are shia militias being imported from iraq and afghanistan and south asia, and despite the fact of russia's open military spigot to syria, things are not going well for the syrian regime. if you look at this brief overview of all of this, we can imagine, ok, what now? would there be some sort of change? the situation in lebanon and syria. this is quite important to answer because if iran were to go back to the two perspectives on whether iran was using lebanon and syria as a bargaining chip in its nuclear

program negotiations or whether it was not, it is very important to try to answer this. nuclear negotiations are done. iran does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political developments or other developments in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation? this is something everybody is speculating on. the arab governments are now very busy with the war in yemen. gcc countries are very busy there. at the same time, they are looking at nuclear negotiations as how it might reflect on their interests in those two countries.

if we talk about lebanon and syria, we also need to talk about gcc's situation and how it deals with this. there is a wildcard here. this is something we really don't know how it is going to shape up over the next three months until the end of june. the wildcard is specifically will anybody within the iranian political system, the nature of their political system its domestic politics are fragmented. it is a fractional political system. obviously ayatollah khomeini has the final say and will definitely try to reign everybody in for whatever decision the iranian political decision should have.

at the same time, there are different factions within the system who may not be necessarily very open and accepting of the nuclear deal. only yesterday, something positive came out of the leader of the revolutionary guard. he said our negotiators really worked very hard to get a very good deal. in other words, this was some sort of a way of saying you did ok. it was all right. this might reflect on how hezbollah looks at this issue. there are other people within the political system that described the political system in suspended equilibrium. all the different factions have their own interest.

all of them are trying to pull to their own position. not much happens on the domestic scene. are these different factions? will they do something in the foreign policy arena? will there be somebody who might think it is possible to activate for instance the lebanese-syrian front with israel? a couple of rockets here or there, something might happen like that. israel is in no mood to let things go. it might respond. if it does respond, there goes the deal because hezbollah would have to respond and things will fall apart. i would be happy to answer your questions if you like.

i give you dr. sullivan. thank you. [applause] dr. sullivan: good morning. thank you for the invite, john. they asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions can affect energy systems not just in iran but regionally and globally. to put this into perspective iran is an energy giant. it has either the number one or number two conventional natural gas reserves in the world. trade that off between russia and iran depending on what you are looking at. number four in conventional oil reserves in the world. not talking about shale gas or oil, this is conventional. when this is opened up, if it opens up, this will definitely

change energy markets globally. oil markets are global markets. it will not just affect crude oil but also refined products and petrochemicals. opening up iran, if it does open up, will also change natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets, rather than regional ones. and if iran hops into this, it will change things considerably. one of the reasons they have not been involved is because they cannot get at the right technologies. iran and qatar could come to a joint agreement.

all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole issue is pipelines and other export menus going into central asia. and the caspian. don't just look south. don't just a look at asia. look right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. you have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran, but if the prophet is right, you can build a pipeline, and could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into europe and beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil. the hedge funds will have a great time on this one. they are all guessing what will happen to the price of oil tomorrow. it is like a parlor game. what is the price going to be tomorrow?

will it go up three dollars? will go down three dollars? we are talking about trillions of dollars trading regularly. people trading regularly. another thing that is not talked about too much is the pipeline going to pakistan and india, which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions have taken off. although there is a bit of a problem in one place, which iran and pakistan share. some border guards got killed there recently. there is a great deal of instability, but i think money may talk in that situation. another part of the energy system is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, would be part of a power pool of electricity production, consumption, and sharing going into central asia,

the caspian, possibly across to iraq and to many other places, afghanistan and so forth. this could be a huge change. but there are big if's. some consider dual use could also enter iran. they could be more efficient with their use of energy. i think i can hear the investor salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow into these things that no one is even talking about? energy efficiency. what about renewables, geothermal, solar, wind? this is not happening. now think about the idea of the snapback of sanctions. which i think is an absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of dollars flowing into iran, oil going here, oil going there, pipelines being built, and then

someone says they haven't followed the game, we are going to snapback on sanctions? money will talk. snapping back the sanctions are not as easy as that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that, either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclearzation of the gulf. but also in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. because of the threat that they feel. all right. all of my opinions are mine alone, do not represent those of the u.s. government, the national defense university, or

any other organization i am a part of. i am not talking for them. what i am about to say will be clear that i am not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. it is a framework for discussion of a deal. if you are about to buy a house or a small business, and the person you are buying it from says, here is the framework for discussion, you wouldn't be asking when can i move in. this two and half page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green grocers in cairo. it is too simple, too vague. the terms are not clear.

what we are seeing right now is another version of groupthink. we saw groupthink before the iraq war. now we are seeing groupthink on this deal. everyone is hopping on board. read the documents. read the terms. for example, the complex is to be converted into an atomic research center. ok, has anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how could you prove it is an atomic research center? i am seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish, and in what time period? oh, by the way, it could take

years to develop an atomic research center. years. any deal, a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details. otherwise, the sanctions are not going to be taken off. and all these things i am talking about oil and gas and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up, pun intended, will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1. anyone done negotiating on simple business deals? july 1 is pretty tough. now we are trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1. could we please get real? all right. it is going to be very difficult to turn the sanctions off, and it will be very difficult to turn them back on again.

ken alluded to something about the waivers. some of them have waivers, some of them don't. some of them are law. you have un sanctions, you have eu sanctions, you have combination sanctions. it is not the same thing as putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir one centrifuge within 10 years? 10 years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years, everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concerned is the one year breakout time. wow. why is everybody saying that is a good thing? how about a no-year breakout time? am i being outrageous enough? am i shattering illusions here?

this essentially says is that the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years, either. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside. and the use of different centrifuges, the complex, just about everything else goes right back on line the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, all changes. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist, when i hear that pouring into a country, i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership does not not still follow that economics is for donkeys because economics works. and inflation and unemployment and a hyperventilated economy drove iran to its revolution in

1979. what is the meaning of the term "significant amount of time"? you will have to excuse me. i worked at a law officers for years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words. how to tear them apart. how to figure out the real meaning that is stated here. and if there is enough vagueness, change it. who controls the inspection? the security council? the russians? who does that? that is a little bit vague. and some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. it is the nature of the process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant.

one minute. ok. in one minute, what can i tell you? i am concerned about how this is worded. and i am concerned once the door is open and the horses are out of the barn, how difficult it will be to get the horses back into the barn. i am concerned with this will do to the region. i can see the whole. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language. strict timetables. and no illusions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you all very much. now comes to the most

interesting part. your questions. i think for the next 40 plus minutes, we will just go ahead and run through the questions we received from the audience. i will read them as we go. and i appreciate very much if you have any more, just pass them on and we'll try to respond the best we can. the investment and u.s. oil companies, other u.s. companies like boeing, be held up until congress acts? dr. katzman: the fact sheet distributed by the administration makes it clear that sanctions that bar u.s. companies from doing business with iran will not be lifted under this arrangement. so the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily referred to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-us companies. it is very clear from the u.s. statement that there will not, as a consequence of this

particular arrangement if it is finalized, and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran clearing up there differences on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. mr. pratt: the next question might hezbollah's hesitation on the deal raise concern? dr. harb: well, i think this is -- i don't think that the iranians are combining their thinking of what hezbollah represents to them.

the only thing is that maybe iran will tell hezbollah indicate to hezbollah that it is time for hezbollah to assist in putting the lebanese state back on track. just a phone call from tehran would really set things very very much straight in beirut. mr. pratt: anybody else have any comment to make on that one? ok. another question that is looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel. now that iran's nuclear power in the region is being analyzed, is there a growing concern with the relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on because of the significance of the discussion particularly recently.

dr. anthony: here, i think context is important. the relationship between iran and israel was intimate, it was strategic, it was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep, in terms of the stories pertaining to esther, a persian who helped to free the jews from captivity from babylon. so the degree of trust over the centuries between jews and persians is deep. at times, it has been massive.

at times, it has been pervasive. and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel thousands went by way of iran. and during the 1950's and 1960's, the heyday of arab nationalism, iran and israel danced in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has been concerned about an intimate u.s. arab relationship because there are 22 arab countries, only one iran, only one israel. so that was also part of the adhesive. and many in israel regard these last years since 1979 as an

aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal, mutually beneficial reciprocally rewarding relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interests. a similarity of interests. and that now may begin to come back into focus, but it will be quite a stretch. in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings and briefings by the head of israel's foreign ministry, an answer to a question of where do of 10 your energy, your oil? the answer was 90% we get from

iran. dr. mousavian: the impact of a nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be censored sincere to each other's about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is a member of the treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to give them their treaty. iran does not have a nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently, the pentagon accepted the israelis have a nuclear bomb. just in a decade, iran has given

more than 700,000 mandated inspections. no other member, during the history of iaea, has given such an amount of inspections that the iranians gave. israel has never given even one inspection. iran has initiated negotiations in 1970. israel is declining, rejecting objecting the nuclear treaty. in 1990's, egypt proposed a

weapons of mass destruction freezone. iran and was the second country to support it. in over 20 years, israelis deal opposing weapons of mass destruction free zone in the middle east. therefore, we are talking about two very, very, very different policy on proliferation. and as an iranian, i am really shocked that everybody is about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb. and all pressures and sanctions are on iran. and nobody is talking about israel. this is a very clear double standard in washington, in the west about proliferation in the middle east. however, this deal has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any proliferation risk in the middle east.

it is said iran would be committed. ok, this is first iranian goodwill. as long as you do not have reprocessing, you cannot make nuclear weapons from heavywater facilities. israeli has reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regionalize the measures agreed to with iran for all countries? no country would have enrichment above 5%. as long as there is no enrichment above 5%, they would be no nuclear bomb from nuclear facilities. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavywater facilities. it can have major positive

impact if israelis also would be ready to follow the same nuclear policy iran has followed for 40, 50 years. and if other regional countries would be ready to accept such a measure as iran has accepted far beyond mpt. mr. pratt: do you have any comments on it? >> i don't think israel will ever give up its nuclear weapons or agree to restrictions. i expect them to continue to oppose this deal, no matter what. and to lobby for more actions against iran. that is because of the nature of

the two governments. john was talking about how, in the past, israel viewed iran as a partner in a sense because both of them had concerns about the arab world. and american relations with the arab world. but i can't see that entering into their minds anytime in the near or midterm. and in fact, their concern about iran is so great that they are -- you know -- in a sense, reversing that trend in trying to forge relations with arab states that also view iran as a threat. it is very tactical on their part. it is only because they both have a concern about iran. when netanyahu was in front of congress a month or so ago and warned that iran was a country

that committed aggression against the arab world, i think he -- i don't think that is his primary concern. dr. katzman: i think i would say that there has been a consensus to sort of allow this deterrent. to raise the fact that they are not in the mpt, maybe it is intellectually precise, but it is probably not going to go very far. that would be my response. dr. sullivan: the israeli

military institutions don't start the day by saying, death to america. maybe changing that would go a long ways. right now, we have a strong personalities involved in the iranian-israeli dialogue to call it that. it is more like two monologues that never meet. also, there are other issues involved here. let me get it straight. i am not saying i am against the deal, i'm not saying i am fort i am just saying get better specificity and make it a real deal. not this thing floating in the air. i am not for war with iran. if anybody has that impression i have been through wargames. looking at the cost of that war, it is astonishing what could happen. it would make iraq look like a picnic. iran is a bigger country, bigger

military, more organized hierarchical, a long culture and as soon as the boots hit the ground, welcome to hell. for all sides involved. we don't need that. what we need is some kind of a diplomatic, economic informational, and other change to bring this about. and my sense is this document is not it because we have other issues to deal with. what is happening in bahrain what is happening in lebanon what is happening in iraq, what is happening in yemen. ballistic missiles are not part of the deal. this is a very narrow document. this solves a very narrow question. and again, i am for improving relations, but it has to be done in the right way. excuse me.

dr. harb: i just urge you to read a recent piece on why we are talking about iran, what are the reasons basically behind this push towards iran, iran iran. i urge you to read the report on that. mr. pratt: there is a fundamental question here with regards to getting a copy of the deal. somebody asked where can we get a copy of the framework between u.s. and iran? >> the white house website. >> the middle eastern policy -- has it on its website. dr. sullivan: you can also find different interpretations, which is part of the problem here. there are cultural differences linguistic differences, and also political differences across the country which is changing the

way this is interpreted. it is far from clear. maybe it was important to make it unclear to see what happens. mr. pratt: do we have any idea on who the leads are -- returning back to the discussion -- secretary kerry going to be engaged? dr. sullivan: if they haven't started this yet, the clock is ticking. july 1 is not so far away. that is almost meanterm for a college. in this kind of deal with all these complicated issues probably there are a bunch of

sherpas on all sides doing the heavy lifting. when they do the heavy lifting then the big players go in -- cnn, fox, iranian tv -- and they say, well, we we made the deal. dr. harb: in the "daily star" he basically summed it up, if i may, basically the deal -- or the framework for the deal -- slightly over 5000 centrifuges for the next 10 years that iran would maintain -- would be allowed to work only. enrichment for 15 years will be banned at the facility, the mountain facility. and iran can enrich some uranium, and not tons, at the heavy water reactor. i'm sorry, that is -- at 3.67% purity. and that is kept at 300 kilograms for 15 years.

1000 ir-2 centrifuges, the newer version, will be removed. and the iraq heavywater reactor would be reconfigured to prevent the production of bomb fuel, basically plutonium. the iaea inspections with less for 25 years. of all facilities, all imports that have to do with all of this. the iaea would have full access to everything. in return, iran will get the gradual removal of sanctions as soon as iaea provides clarification. then the sanctions will begin to be lifted. dr. sullivan: to put this into perspective, this is the white house document. this is it.

mr. pratt: even if iran's intent is to build nuclear for energy, what language should be insisted upon in the final agreement to safeguard and avoid nuclear accidents like fukushima? dr. anthony: this is an issue of real concern, in terms of one of the sites. the one nearest to the gulf and the other gulf countries. because of the sanctions because of the nonexistent relations between tehran and washington, diplomatically and formally, there could be such an accident. iran has had a history of earthquakes. so has turkey. they are part of a different

tectonic plate than those of arabia. so there is a legitimate fear, what if there is an earthquake in that region? their fear is that there would be spillage and linkage, and that this would be contaminating and pose an immediate, direct threat to the water desalination plants in kuwait, bahrain, qatar, and elsewhere. and ships may refuse to come into the gulf until this is dealt with and cleaned up. that is more than a nightmare. that has catastrophic implications.

the russians were involved in building that reactor. and they are also the so-called inspectors of it, until now. but this is like putting the fox in the coop with the chickens. there needs to be a more technologically professional efficient, and renowned inspector of that particular facility. and because it is the one that could be catastrophic, were there to be any accident there like the chernobyl and kuwait, the one that are most concerned and involved with this -- in the chernobyl disaster, some 200,000 people had to be relocated. that was costly. the united nations asked for a lot of donor countries to subsidize and finance it. and kuwait was the leading one. so, kuwait has been involved in this kind of an issue longer

than any of the other gcc countries on that side, which relates directly to inspections and relates to one particular nuclear facility, the one that is closest to the gulf. and could affect them all. dr. mousavian: from day one, it has been under iaea supervision. and the iaea has fully confirmed all safety measures already there. second, join plan of action also

-- i mean, on the framework, they agreed. they have also agreed the world powers to have more cooperation with iran on the safety issues. third, fukushima was in japan. japan never lowered its nuclear activities after fukushima. they continued the same nuclear activities. chernobyl was in russia. russia increased its nuclear activities after chernobyl. emirates is going to have four nuclear power plants, so arabia will have power plants. turkey is going to have power plants. therefore, we really do not need to create more artificial fears about uranium and nuclear programs. dr. sullivan: the japanese shut down all of their nuclear power plants. i was there two weeks ago visiting the plant just west of tokyo. and they are spending billions of dollars to set up safety

devices in the event of another earthquake or tsunami. the japanese have been through a very difficult energy time since they had to shut down 30% of their electricity. which is what they have done. and there is a huge debate in japan right now whether to turn his back on again. the father away from tokyo you are, the more likely one of those plants is to be started up again. it is a very emotional issue. and this fukushima problem was not just an earthquake, it was a water flow problem. and when i think water in the middle east, i wonder what some people are thinking. the jordanians are building a plant in the desert of northwestern jordan using a water treatment plant as a source of water to cool the spent fuel and the nuclear plant.

i told a reporter a few days ago, i wouldn't live near that thing because if the water treatment plant goes down, the water flow goes down, the thing overheat, and you have a fukushima in jordan right near the iraq border. the middle east is water short. if you're going to be putting a plant on the ocean, that makes sense. if you're putting it in the desert, that makes no sense. if you are putting it on a fault line, this makes no sense. near the ocean, maybe you keep the cooling going. but at the same time, it will shut down automatically if there is an earthquake. it has before. the one in san diego shutdown. nuclear facilities need a lot of water and a lot of water flow. people are just not thinking this through. mr. pratt: anybody else want to comment on -- a question for kenneth katzman please compare and contrast libyan sanctions versus iranian sanctions, and when will iran be removed from the terrorism list? dr. katzman: quite some questions.

i know c-span is here so i want to say hi, mom. [laughter] iran's removal from the u.s. terrorist list, well, there are some young people in the audience, so maybe by the time they are my age that could happen. iran is nowhere close to being removed from the terrorist list. there is no consideration in the u.s. government for removing iran from that list. i would just be categorical on that question. the other -- what was the rest of the question? sorry. comparing libya? well, you know, we could conceivably have two similar situations. libya gave up its nuclear program and actually gave -- dismantled the whole thing.

obviously, there was not the same level of debate over lifting some of the sanctions on libya because they had been so you know, basically dismantled the entire program. iran is not doing that obviously. this deal leaves them with substantial infrastructure. and we had more than an hour of discussion about the continuing concerns. obviously, it is not quite as easy. but, you know, again, just looking at authorities, the president does have, you know, quite a bit of authority in terms of suspending sanctions. but if you're talking about lifting sanctions outright, or congressional action is needed then of course it becomes much more involved.

and most of the main sanctions that would be released under this deal are enforced by congressionally passed statutes. and therefore, congress, to lift the sanctions outright would have to pass new legislation to do that. mr. pratt: there is a follow-up question, if i could. regarding the banking system. and contemplated full access. would a final agreement contemplate full access of iran to the banking system? and the u.s. payment system? dr. katzman: again, anything involving the u.s. is not really part of the sanctions relief. iran would be able to access again, the european, asian financial system. and the secondary sanctions on those banks that are doing business with iranian banks, they would not be penalized by doing business with the u.s. financial system. but direct iran-u.s. financial transactions would still -- that

is not contemplated as part of the relief package. mr. pratt: thank you. a question for the ambassador. the russian foreign minister said he would recommend iran joining the shanghai cooperation organization if the nuclear deal is successful. what would the implications of this be and how would iran partners benefit? dr. mousavian: iran is already participating on all shanghai's high-level meetings. and if iran is member, it would create more opportunities for asian cooperation between iran and china, iran and south asia and even iran and india. this would have more impact on

iran economical relations with asia. mr. pratt: just as a general for the panel, we have about 16, 17 minutes to go. it is a broad one. it is, what will the u.s. congress to? which is going to sort of the filling a lot of air, but if anybody would like to comment on that. [laughter] dr. sullivan: well, the u.s. congress will do what the u.s. congress does. which is debate this issue and try to work it through. there is an election year coming up. there is always an election year coming up. and it is going to be hardball. that is pretty much the way it is going to work out.

and the house and the senate are now run by the republicans which, for those of you don't know, means they run who gets invited to the committee. and run the questions in the committee -- and the committee assignments. it will be a very rough road. dr. mousavian: i agree with him, but to my understanding, not only because of the next election, it has a lot to do with benjamin netanyahu, aipac and more, i believe, it take a big misunderstanding not only in the u.s. congress between a lot of u.s. politicians -- you hear from many u.s. congressman that we should keep the sanctions

pressure iran. iran only came to nuclear negotiation deal or framework because of sanctions pressures. still, they keep the same narrative. in all debate, you read the same narrative. but a very simple fact, before sanctions, iran had a few hundred centrifuges. after sanctions, iran increased to 22,000 centrifuges. before sanctions, iran was enriching below 5%. after sanctions, iran increased to 20%. before sanctions, iran had just a few hundred kilograms of stockpiles. after sections, the have several thousand kilograms of stockpiles. this was really the impact of sanctions.

as president obama said, suddenly the p5 plus one -- the only thing that made the framework possible was first the u.s. agreed to iran to have in enrichment for its domestic, practical needs. that is why iran accepted to every transparency measures. and iran was ready to give every confidence building measures that iran would never diapered -- divert its nuclear program. because practically they had the same red line. these narratives have not been

corrected in the u.s. congress. there is a big misunderstanding, and they are repeating the same mistakes. today, more concerns about issues beyond nuclear. you heard our panelists that they discuss about all the threats, israel, regional the reason netanyahu and even some arab allies are pushing administration to continue the coercion strategy, this is the reality. as long as they really -- what is the fact? i believe for 35 years, the u.s., europe, the world powers

they did everything they could on coercion strategies against iraq. unilateral sanctions. multilateral sanctions. u.n. sanctions. the war against iran. they millions of iranians that were either killed or injured. even using chemical weapons against iranians. they all supported the use of weapons of mass destruction's against iranians. 100,000 uranium and -- 100,000 iranians were killed or injured. no other country, and the past 35 years, has been under so much pressure and sanctions orchestrated by the u.s. however, after 35 years, everybody today is crying and complaining, why is iran so stable? white ironic so powerful -- why iran is so powerful? iran is everywhere. this is evidence and fact that

35 years of sanctions and pressures and the most powerful coercion and policy against iran not only has failed, but has strengthened iran. stability and power in the region. and look at the u.s. in the region. they got old weapons, money, support. and you can see the collapse of u.s. allies in the region. and others won't understand therefore -- and one would say look, if you are right, then release the sanctions. here is another misunderstanding about iranian culture between our regional arab allies and even the west and even in washington. i have been 30 years within the iranian administration. i am iranian and there is a

culture. they need to understand iranian culture. more pressure, more sanctions would make iran more aggressive. therefore, as long as the congress follows the strategy, iran, like the last 35 years will be more aggressive. and you will try more, you will be feared more about the role of your own. if there is more opening to iran, more cooperation iranians, they would make a deal like you on other the disputed issues like it did on the nuclear. therefore, as long as these narrative continue in u.s. you congress, i am optimistic even about the future of iran us on relations. i am pessimistic, sorry. you must will [laughter]

mr. pratt: dr. sullivan? dr. sullivan: one country we haven't mentioned here is china. and they are very much involved in the situation, including developing two of the largest oil field in iran under sanctions. i don't think the issue isn't application of two tough sanctions. it is an issue of not applying the sanctions we already have. the chinese imports 60% of iran's oil exports. they built a real system. they built roads. they were very much involved in iran. the russians are very much involved. that is another country we have maybe mentioned once or twice in here. it is not just the u.s.. we have lost leverage. some people in the city think we can do some ink and the world jumps. this is a different world. china is a powerful country. russia is not as powerful in its economy. it is degraded, and its leaders or something else. but the chinese are a powerful country that wants more influence in the middle east and

they are moving into every single country. it is one of few countries that helped saudi arabia and iran at the same time. they support the palestinians and the israelis at the same time. they are playing a double game and they are playing it brilliantly. and our leverage in the region is not what it was, even five years ago. so to think that we can say sanctions and close the door and everyone jumps, that is not the way it is anymore. it is a different iran, it is a different china. china, when this whole thing started, was a poor country back in 1979. the iranian revolution. china was of poor country. it had no real clout in the region. and it didn't start importing oil until 1983. this is a totally different world. we have to get up to speed on this one.

dr. harb: the unfortunate fact is that i believe the only thing that might come related to congress as the white house would have some sort of a ability to break the proof kind of thing. unfortunately, the situation is such that congressman are not necessarily listening to these arguments. dr. anthony: -- i come at it from a slightly different perspective, but i and a but the same point. and that is the pressure of lobby groups, neoconservatives and those who are interested in advancing the israeli narrative,

or is really objectives, or israeli interests. and iran has become quite convenient as a distraction from israel's actions. israel's policies. israel's positions. israel's -- and it will continue. to serve this tactical role, to deflect attention away from the eastern mediterranean, specifically israel and its building of settlements. by focusing on iran as the whipping boy, the bad boy, this -- the scapegoat, the fear mongering there. this is because it has been a successful tactic by israel and its friends. in 1982, the u.s. was on a roll,

having cap david under its belt and captain the israelis to withdraw from the saana. the next items on the agenda were to be jerusalem and the west in gaza. in the israeli push back was over our dead bodies. and this will not be your agenda. and we thought that this was hubris run amok, but it wasn't. i sat in on meetings and generally of 1982 where state department said that between april 15 and june 15, israel will invade lebanon. and we said, why would they do that? because there is a cease-fire. and that is already seven months, has been negotiated with the plo and the cia.

by the end, it will be lebanon's. why would they do that? and the answer was because they want to change the agenda completely. and, indeed, they did i invading lebanon. and they remain there directly or indirectly for the next 19 years. during which time, with the attention deflected, the settlements doubled, quadrupled, quintupled. on the settlements all remain. so this is quite tempting. even with united states invasion of iraq in a march, 2003. since then, israel has built a so-called separation barrier the security wall. this has cut into what was to be the territory for an interdependent state of palestine. 22% remaining. so territorial expansion has occurred in the shadow of

deflecting american detention -- attention. and we have done nothing to prevent those events that i just described. that has put a comprehensive peace even further from the reach of those who have cried in the last year with the secretary of state carry, and before him mitchell, and before him: powell, and before him, etc. we have been ineffectual. so i share the pessimism of the ambassador, but i arrive at it differently. iran will continue to be in object of all scorn and left in isolation if those are lobby them are successful. mr. pratt: thank you. i think we have probably less than three or four minutes left, so what i would like to do is just one final question. and i will post it to the panel.

we'll just go right on the row. what would be the regional implications -- repercussions for a failure to arrive at an acceptable march 30 deadline? what is the next step if there is no agreement on the technical details over the next 90 days? we will start with dr. sullivan and move this way. dr. sullivan: probably a delay because i don't think it will be a reachable goal. it is going to be an extremely complicated situation. after just give up until your hands up on july 1, that would probably bring a great deal of political resentment and anger within iran, within the iranian leadership, and the implications

of that could be significant for whatever is happening between the united states and iran on other issues. if it breaks down entirely, then we are back to step one. and to get these folks back into the table, even if it is that wonderful 10 star hotel, it is going to be very difficult. the proxies for iran and others may also react in a connected way -- in a kinetic way, if this happens, making my far more complicated in the region. the game has started. and i don't mean a fun game. i mean a very complicated and dangerous game. and it may not be a retrievable one if this thing breaks down. but the agreement, if there is to be an agreement, has to be a proper one. and very long-lasting. at has to be a step to go to do with the other issues that are

involved with this. otherwise, we will have an agreement on something narrow and nothing else. dr. harb: i agree with paul that maybe -- maybe the resort would be to postpone the negotiations, the technical details, but at the same time, if we resort -- if we postpone those, then it is likely that elements within the regime will try to start things up regionally so it can have a little bit more of a marketing chip in those extended negotiations. dr. katzman: i think given the reaction in iran to the tentative deal, i think it will

be extremely difficult for iran not to go forward and have the final deal. i think the repercussions in iran would be tremendous if there were a collapse at the end of this. i think president -- the president could probably not finish. he would certainly not be able to continue. i think you would see a major, major of people -- upheaval. >> i would fully expect when june 30 comes, on continuing the talks and continuing. i think that would suit a number of the gulf arab states because they would like to see a tighter agreement negotiated, and they don't want sanctions lifted yet

until the agreement is better. because they have recently, i think, realized that they need to lead in dealing with geopolitical threats, rather than wait for the united states to lead them. but not only that, but they are also seeing that the united states is responding to their lead in the united states is gradually getting more involved helping more interior than before. i think it would suit a number of those states for the negotiations to continue until a better deal is agreed upon. >> i believe already the negotiations have reached the no return point. they have already decided to

strike a deal. the u.s. cannot leave the negotiation table, the war powers cannot leave the negotiate -- negotiation table because of two reasons. from the beginning, the agreed criteria would be -- they have signed. there's nothing left -- everything is already agreed in details. second, iran is the only country with measures on verification, no breakout and 30's the realities in the region. this really dictates to them to

finish the job by july 1. if it fails, i believe you would have of people in tehran and in washington. iranians will be able to continue another decade like to have been able to resist and be a stable power like the last few decades. but even if we do not agree with the world problems, why iran and the regional powers like saudi arabia, egypt, and turkey cannot sit together and agree on the same measures we have seen beyond npt for nuclear weapon free zone in that region. why? this is already achievement for the regional countries, regional powers to sit together to agree

for a regional mechanism. finally, regardless of the nuclear issue, the problems in the region definitely is far beyond the iranian nuclear issue. as long as we don't have regional cooperation between regional powers, turkey egypt were not going to get to anywhere, even if a deal is done on the nuclear. >> it is 12:00, it's time to move on, close the proceedings here. on behalf of the national council and u.s.-arab relations i want to thank our distinguished panel for coming today on short notice to share their insight, wisdom,

knowledge, and projections for the future. let's hope the next three months our event. i just wanted to point out that the president's legacy is on the line on this, so it is serious discussion and debate and moving forward the next three or four months if we can take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east, these are noble objectives which i think in the days ahead come as a result of our insights here, will give us a better understanding of whether or not these are achievable and and noble goals that can be pursued with success. thank you again for coming. you've been a great audience, and wonderful questions. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its

caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> all this week on c-span we been showing our profiles of congressional freshmen members. continuing tonight with california democrat norma torres. you can watch the conversation at 9:00 p.m. eastern, right here on c-span. then a panel discussion about stereotyping and american indians, talking about the use of their culture in sports and elsewhere. speakers will include a former nfl player, the lead plaintiff to lawsuit against the washington redskins, and an american indian rights advocate is fighting to eliminate thousands of sports mascots containing native american

imagery. that conversation tonight at 9:30 p.m. eastern. then an author who wrote about the cheating scandal involving student athletes. starting at 8:00 eastern, we will have that honor companion network, c-span2. on c-span3, american history tv, on the anniversary of the surrender of appomattox. part of programs that get underway at 8:00 eastern. next we will look at one of c-span student cam competition winners. >> c-span is pleased to present the winning entries in this year student cam video documentary competition. student cam's c-span's annual competition that encourages middle and high school students to think critically about issues that affect the nation. students were asked to create their documentaries based on the team, the three branches and you .

to demonstrate how a to -- policy, action, and law by one of the three branches of government has affected them or their community. matthew eastmo, travis mills and ashley peterson are one of the second prize winners. their entry focused on the keystone xl pipeline. >> we owed transcanada absolutely nothing. for the sake of all-america, i ask you to respectfully president obama, deny this permit. >> keystone xl will impact the entire nation. however, the people that call the great plains region home will be the ones to experience the risks and rewards to the fullest extent. it will be an underground pipe that will bring crude oil from the tar sands in alberta to the u.s. states of montana, south

dakota, nebraska, kansas, and oklahoma. two oil refineries in texas. unfortunately, many people from our region fear the pipes environmental impact. >> i don't believe that people would understand or comprehend how devastating it would be to the ogallala aquifer if it was contaminated by the keystone xl pipeline if it was leaking and >> we feel are legitimate concerns are about the sand hills and are great ogallala aquifer have gone unrecognized. >> were going to do everything within our powers to protect our homelands, our people, and our children and grandchildren. most of all, people don't understand the ogallala aquifer is the second biggest water aquifer in the world. >> is a genocide for first

nations people. the american people should not have to choose between jobs and raking the environment forever for our seven coming generations. >> concerns -- dave emrick, president and ceo of black hills corporation, think she will have a very minimal impact. >> the way they do it today, the risks are relatively small. as i said, when they construct the lines, they are very picky about how they build those lines. they literally x-ray every well to make sure it doesn't have holes in it and doesn't even have stressed actors around the well. when you strike an arc with a welding rod on a piece of pipe it actually causes some spider cranks microscopic ones. if they even see those on it x-ray, they will cut out that piece of pipe and re-weld it. so they are really careful when they build it.

they externally coat all the joints so they cannot corrode from the outside. then they put protection on the pipe itself, so if the pipe goes through a wet area and it starts to corrode, it actually can form an electrical current from the groundwater and cause it to corrode faster. it's kind of hard to explain, but literally there's a chemical reaction that induces an electrical current. they actually put a current in the pipe while its operating to prevent that from happening. >> the keystone pipeline is the safest way of transporting the oil. it is safer than rail or trucks. it's important to remember that canada will be extracting and transporting its oil regardless. the only question, matter president, is whether we want it to come here to the united states, along with that

thousands of jobs it would bring, or whether we want to let canada should that oil overseas. >> advocates of the pipeline seem to have legitimate answers to environmental concerns, but legal issues of eminent domain and native american treaty territories have created other obstacles. >> imminent domain is really the taking of private property for public use with just compensation. >> the whole concept of imminent domain was created to make sure that an individual is able to stop something that was for the greater public good, whether it's a highway, powerline, or a pipeline or whatever. if it's deemed in the public's best interest, as long as you compensate the individual fairly for the taking, you can do that.

now, transcanada is no different than anybody else. it's a last resort to go to the court and asked to condemn someone's property. x>> we have treaty lands. in the state of south dakota the great sioux nation is in south dakota with multiple tribes. >> we do not want this pipeline and are 1868 fort laramie treaty territories that was ratified by the united states congress, legal, binding document by law. >> the whole state of south dakota is treaty lands. you have to realize, we are treaty tribes. these are our lands. >> we did not give prior informed consent for transcanada to bring this pipeline through

our beloved mother earth in our area of this country. >> you can build around them if you want to, which is terribly difficult, but the south dakota supreme court ruled on reservation countries, like they ruled on the black hills. the tribes obviously don't agree with that but if the courts have spoken and basically said anything inside the contiguous borders of a reservation as it's known today is under the jurisdiction of the reservation. anything outside of that is not the request despite environmental concerns voiced by farmers and native americans the keystone xl pipeline will have a mostly positive impact on the great plains region and the people who live there. we believe the executive branch should pass this bill. >> to learn more about the competition and see all the winning videos, go to www.c-span.org and click on

student camp. tell us what you think about the issue the students addressed in their documentary on facebook and twitter. >> yesterday a delegate from morocco's foreign affairs ministry discussed efforts to combat violent extremism. following her remarks, the panel focused on the influence of social media, counter narrative efforts, and stopping the flow of foreign fighters in funding to extremist groups. this is about an hour and 40 minutes. >> good morning. i am the director of the african center here at the atlantic council. on behalf of the atlantic council's chairman, governor jon huntsman, and its president fred camp and my colleague, director of the atlantic council center for the middle east, it's my pleasure to welcome all of you to this discussion, morocco's contribution to countering

violent extremism in the middle east and africa. i especially want to acknowledge the president, the ambassador, the king of morocco to the united states, a very good friend and like his predecessor, a member of the atlantic council. i also want to welcome all the distinguished guests we have amongst us, and thank you for making time to join us this morning. this event takes place on the eve of the u.s.-morocco strategic dialogue. we at the atlantic council are very gratified that the support and institutional framework or strengthening bilateral relations between our two countries is not only up and running, but now in its third year and appears to be prospering. a little over a year and a half ago, on the eve of the summit between president obama and king mohammed the sixth, the african center noted morocco's vital role in northwest africa

security and development, and having proven remarkably a detroit at managing domestic and regional challenges in recent years, the kingdom was now poised to play in even greater role in leading regional security and development rock press. and also playing an integral role in helping achieve u.s. goals on the african continent. subsequently, on the eve of the historic u.s.-africa leader summit, my colleague and i unveiled a report on morocco's emergence as a gateway to business in africa. more recently, in a report on morocco's gradual political and economic transition, author by my good friend, highlighted the unique opportunity that morocco has in carrying out simultaneously political and economic reforms. with so much of north africa and the middle east still unsettled

in the wake of the so-called arab spring, the security and cultural track of this week strategic dialogue will be of particular importance. the former will undoubtedly examine strengthen cooperation on the coalition which morocco is playing an important role. morocco participates in the newly formed joint force and efforts to counter violent extremism. the last topic also will be the subject of today's panel. we had originally planned to have his excellency, the minister of foreign affairs kick off discussion today, but the minister has been impeded by having to deal with other regional challenges and will be arriving just for the strategic dialogue. however we are fortunate and honor to have his deputy minister delegate of foreign affairs for the kingdom of morocco.

she was elected as the youngest member of the moroccan parliament in 2007. during the 2009-2010 parliamentary session, which is when i first had the pleasure of making her acquaintance, she was the chair of the committee on foreign affairs, national defense and religious affairs. having served two years previously as the vice chair of the finance and economic affairs committee. she is also -- has represented the parliamentary assembly and in june 2009, she was elected to the city council of grand casablanca. she has been a young global leader at the world economic forum in since 2011 has served as vice president of the interparliamentary forum for democracy, among other distinctions. please join me in giving a very warm welcome to her excellency,

minister of development of foreign affairs and cooperation. [applause] thank you. >> thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak today on such an important topic, as you said before. in fact, i think, ladies and gentlemen, that today we should be very careful and humble when it comes to speaking about violent extremism. unthinkable acts of violence are taking place everywhere in the world at this moment. in fact, atrocities which we

witness leave us in a powerless bystander position. like those most recently seen in kenya or in tunisia affect a majority of innocent civilians and inflict entire populations into chaos. for this reason, we cannot let the atrocities be carried out in silence and evil go on college -- go unpunished. it is our responsibility to fight as much as we can against sectarian-based violent extremist. the world has to be conscious that the responsibility is globally shared. is it enough just to be conscious? unfortunately, i don't think so.

this cannot be combated in a repressive way or through legislation alone, or through faith measures that do not take into account the regional or the international environment. what is needed and required of us is to provide considered solutions and -- an option that only benefits minority groups. morocco reiterates its total and absolute condemnation of all forms of terrorism and violence and also racial and at the stigmatization, no matter the rationale. the commitment of my country has continuously been put forward by our growing support for cooperation and solicitation for

our expertise in helping to find a collective response to strategies aimed at preventing this -- these exact crimes. we will be able to realize the magnitude has reached. in october 2012 [indiscernible] it is a plan that calls for the collective in -- engagement for the promotion of tolerance. within the framework of this action plan we will host on the 23rd and 24th of this month the first ever religious leader summit for the prevention of incitement to hostility or violence.

and the leadership of his majesty king mohammed the six the highest spiritual leader in morocco, we underwent religious reforms in response to the terror attacks that hit morocco in 2003 and 2007. this reform involves the modernization of the entire religious field and the supreme council of the only entity with the right to enact these degrees on various issues including social issues. mosques, an the other hand, remain a place of worship and fall under the supervision of the ministry of religious affairs. under the same religious reform and in full respect of the role of women in combating extremism the female court a religious figures was put in place in

2005, to carry the mission of promoting a tolerant islam. to help with these measures of peace and to reach the largest number people, religious radio and tv have been created to promote religious education. and different media programs. the objective of such reforms is to fight against radicalization and extremism in poor countries. as a result of the successful reforms, several african and european countries expressed their desire to benefit from this singular and unique training program that we have been offering for the last few years. in fact, in 2014, the mohammed six institute officially inaugurated last week commenced a training program for 500 imams .

it has been extended to countries such as mali, ivory coast, guinea tunisia, and others. it's also in this way that our -- my country is able to contribute to the fight against violent extremism. in order to do with the rising instability faced by africa and the middle east. however, as i mentioned before it is necessary to complement the strategy with the global vision that includes economic growth and human development one that is careful to preserve the culture identity of each country. in the fight against violent extremism, we cannot neglect the importance of cooperation amongst african countries and the importance for the use to benefit and enjoy positive opportunities. it is in this sense that his majesty the king mohammed six

gave a new dynamic to the relations between morocco and sectarian african countries in order to in hance, exchange economic cooperation and solidarity the health, education, a religious cooperation. nonetheless, the situation still remains preoccupying on various fronts, inciting us to creep are -- increase our cooperation for the benefit of all. morocco recently relaunched a call for the forces in mali to come together and find a compromise that would respect the territorial sovereignty of their country with no external interference of other -- from other countries. in a sense of reconciliation in compromise, my country hosts the inter-libyan dialogue with the

objective of encouraging union. [indiscernible] our only objective is to restore peace, stability, and development, not only in libya but in the region as a whole. ladies and gentlemen, allow me to highlight that all these efforts would be in vain if the human dimension is not put at the center of every strategy in public policy. democratic conditions that are taking place must continue the trend -- transition by including an involving human rights principles, as morocco has done and continues to do. the principles of human rights are no longer an option, but rather an element that implies responsibility of all of us in respect of rule of law. it is for the respect of the rule of law that several laws have been voted and implemented

in morocco to fight against terrorism. since 2003, it has strengthened the traditional framework that continues to adapt to the current context in the example of the adjustments made to deal with the return of foreign fighters to the homeland. it is necessary, as morocco authorities were able to dismantle over 12 years, ready to carry out attacks or equip other cells abroad. is this very strength that pushed us to maintain permanent vigilance, with the mounting minutes of isil in the middle east, which continues to run amok. it is also for this reason, like many other factors, that morocco is part of the international coalition against isil and contributes to fighting against the barbaric acts of this group.

last december, my country cohosted with the dutch partner and initiative on foreign fighters. we reaffirmed our total commitment to implement and respect to security resolution in this topic, the arab league resolution and of course all other relevant resolutions to counter violent extremism. without going into further detail on the multiple actions that morocco undertakes, i would like to conclude by underlining the importance of combating violent religious extremism. thank you very much.

[applause] peter: thank you very much for your comments and for helping set the stage for not only our discussion today, but are following up the strategic dialogue between the united states and morocco over the coming days. it's now a great pleasure for me to introduce another very good and dear friend, who is the secretary-general of the mohammed and legal scholars, the senior counsel over it -- religious scholars established by his majesty, king mohammed the sixth. he also heads the working group within the strategic dialogue on education and cultural issues. he previously served as the director of islamic affairs in the ministry of islamic affairs in morocco, as well as a very successful academic career after

his doctorate in teaching at the university in marrakesh. he has studied also and taught at two universities as a fulbright scholar and resident at depaul university and the university of chicago, many years after i passed through those doors, so i didn't have the pleasure of having him in class, but it's a great pleasure to introduce a figure who really has done a great deal, not only for countering violent extremism in morocco but really throughout africa and increasingly though he's very modest about it, in the greater middle east. [applause] >> thank you. it's such an honor to meet here today to talk on this intricate subject. given the fact that the dynamics

of any given discourse after men to over the last few years. the dynamics are not anymore what they used to be. and now the most manic spread of violence and hatred we deal with is the one happening in the middle east through daesh. this movement, trying to hijack four major things. the most important hijacked matter is religion itself. the second matter, the dream of unity. the third matter was the dream of dignity, and the fourth matter was the dream of purity. the dream of purity phot in the region back in 1900 one some

strategic approaches led to the adoption of a new state in the region, which is allied with mohammed at the time. the dream was purity, which gave the impression that things would be directed toward some venues of scholarship that would save the muslim world from the issue. this was adopted by everybody in this became the dream that was then translated and also adopted in the region in egypt and other movements in the region. this dream of purity was also a

shia claim. they also were claiming the bringing back of the religious practice to purity. then there was a new arena of site. everybody was claiming that they were the ones that would realign this purity. in 1924, the ottoman empire collapsed. in many countries in the region they found themselves as orphans. decisions were taken in istanbu l. every decision was made there, and it was circulars that were received in the region and then implemented.

this dynamic disappeared all of a sudden and people in the region saw themselves in a situation, the dynamic that was triggered is looking for a father again, rebuild without thinking about the ways to rebuild [indiscernible] this was a dream of unity. this dream also was adopted by some other movements. the muslim brotherhood and 1929, more officially claimed that they will build up the unity in the region. this became also a dream in the region. the third dream was a dream of dignity.

people were wasting the resources in the region without having any part or share of that. this was what triggered many movements in the region. the dream of unity was not specifically islamist. it was a new alternative of unity through rebuilding the larger arab states in the region. this dream was then tackled in many other ways. i'm saying all this to say that daesh is now trying to read collect all those dreams and brandish them as weapons. people were left with many disappointments. those who brandished the slogans of unity did not realize it. those who brandished the slogans of dignity and purity had some

rigid interpretations of the text. this was in evidence for everybody. daesh transcended this by claiming that it is dealing with individuals. come to me, i will marry you to the most pious and beautiful lady in the world. come to me, i will make out of you a scholar, a pure one. the dreams of purity didn' dignity and unity were offered and if daesh were here, this is what

they would say. they did this by approaching the communities with very high proficiency. now the true war is going on on the psyche. we are not fighting in the true arena. we are not addressing the true issues. this starts from the constructive discourse of daesh. to understand how it has all the impact on the recipients of this discourse it is from repeated items like the rifles they used to shoot the brain of the psyche.

it's an occidental conspiracy to scatter the muslim world. we are here to overcome, to realign the unity. [indiscernible] our governors are not doing anything to fix it, so we will do it ourselves. come and help us in doing so. double standards. the iraqi, afghani, central african, name it. six, dehumanization in the movies and media and so on. seven, the draining of wells. eight, the value system infiltration. we need to do something about

that. this is why, when you witness their ways and recruiting angry, high testosterone young males in the region. all that anger is internalized in themselves. they're very prone to respond to the appeal of tyrants. there is some tangible state that pretends realizing the dreams of dignity, unity, and purity. if we do not tackled the content and deconstructed, if we do not train people to build up what will allow them to deconstruct this scourge then the battle is lost in advance. to do so, we need people who

will not be just functionaries. we need people to be hosting in them some passion to realize all the ugliness of the facts that are going on there. this is why need some specific engineering to build up curriculums and programs to train efficiently. in egypt, you have 280,000 officials on the payroll in the region. if we do measure the efficiency how high is this efficiency? in the region you will have armies, it is such a waste to not re-converse and to not

rebuild capacity among those people. but to do so we need to be anchored, both in the text knowledges and the context knowledges. if we just limit ourselves in the context, this definitely will not do. we need the shaping of some very appealing discourse that would definitely be there and present on the internet to counter this. this definitely cannot be done in an official manner only. it needs to go and dig for the roots. this is why there's a crucial need to tackled the children i mentioned. i'm talking about video games.

i'm talking about cartoons. i'm talking about some wonderful, colorful loper -- local heroes like superman and batman. with great powers come great responsibilities. those who have know how to come and help with those issues. i'm talking about colorful video games, not just with violent content in them. i'm talking also about peers education. youth need to own the initiatives, not just to be dictated what to do. youth or bored with this very ancient style that we suggest to them. they don't buy it anymore. we need to have some very

empowered icons to definitely own the initiatives and trigger some fierce dedication and fierce initiatives to be there and influence. also the curriculums and trainings of imams and academics , training in the sufi orders and other arenas that would consume a religious discourse. it needs to be oriented to fix and solve the problems, not create problems. which means the religious discourse also needs cooperated

efforts. for this we need champions. ahmed: the problem is multidimensional and looks like a puzzle. each is the puzzle has its own characteristic. we will not restrict ourselves from going as deep as we can to tackle each link of the change to give proposals and solutions for each piece of the puzzle. my experience in this regard was very humble. also very realistic. we need to take each fees on its own and reengineer it