llary clinton represents the worst of the washington machine. the arrogance of power corruption, and cover-up conflicts of interest, and failed leadership with tragic consequences. the washington machine is destroying the american dream. for a new leader and a new way. rand paul. rand paul plans to defeat the washington machine, they budget by law require congress to read legislation before they vote on it. >> i have a message. a message that is loud and clear and does not mince words. we have come to take our country back. >> unleash the american dream. >> i am rand paul and approved this message. host: i was from rand paul who officially entered the race in louisville, kentucky was fast week. there is a tweet from the washington post.

in america cl -- s&l imagines hillary clinton's presidential announcement. let's go to mike in tucson north carolina. good afternoon. guest:caller: i never know what to say , i want to say so many things. i do not understand, in a country as rich with history of being blessed by god, and all the brainpower, and i'm not talking democrat or republican, why we're saddled with a bush or a clinton. salary is going to say she is for the middle class to , the children, the poor.

why would the country settle for the same old stuff? host: who do you like in this race so far? caller: i am really looking at rand paul. he is interesting. i just don't know yet. host: thank you for your call. no well, from irvine california. caller: hello. really exciting that she announced that she is going to ruin forn for the white house. i really like her. i think the white house needs a democrats there. the rich get rich, the poor gets poor, we keep needing to run this country. i am thoroughly supporting

hillary clinton to be there. i know we need somebody like that there. i want to make sure that everything will hispanic -- everybody in the hispanic community will back her up. we live in the country of freedom, and it has given us so many opportunities. the spanish community is growing and growing. we need somebody there to hear our voices. host: dakota from salem, oregon. republican line. caller: i listen to the past few callers, and one thing stands out in my mind. it is experience. i normally do not support democrats, but when it comes to

the clintons i do. i looked at this race closely. the republican field has senators governors. hillary was the first lady during the clinton years she saw the working behind the scenes. as secretary of state she has the best ability to say i go out and support america and i believe i know what they want. host: current secretary of state john kerry among those weighing in on hillary clinton. we carry the program on c-span radio. here is mitt romney who made an appearance this morning, followed by secretary kerry, and the mary new york, bill de blasio. romney: you have seen in: falls and discussions across the country that feeling that

hillary clinton is just not trustworthy. you hear this story about how she has erased or e-mail. with the clintons is always something. kerry: secretary of state clinton did a great job of rebuilding alliances that been shredded over the previous years. she spent a lot of time working on a lot of different issues including the gaza cease-fire and other things. she will defend her own record for herself, it is not my don't to do it. i wish her well in this race. >> re: for her -- are you for her? >> like a lot of people in this country i want to see a vision. it is time to see a clear, bold

vision. bill:>> you are not technically endorsing her? bill: she is thoroughly vetted, but we need to see the substance. >> that is how it played out on the sunday morning programs with fox news sunday and nbc's meet the press. all of the erring on c-span radio on new andoon eastern time. as you can see, no new tweet today, no new video, but that is expected. if you want to keep track, it is clinton2016.og.

rg. caller: i have a solution to america's problem sprayed we need to get the bible, the 10 commandments back in america. we need to bible and prayer back in public schools. we need to stop the abortions. that is how we get america back to god, that is how we get america back to god and back to prosperity. no democrats, no republicans just the bible in america. that is how we america -- get america back to god. host: kathleen, from lawrence kansas. caller: i am excited about a woman in the white house, and i generally vote democrat. i do vote for republicans that i like. i realize that it seems that whoever spends the most money gets a lot did, and i know that the republicans can't outspend the democrats. so we have to get behind hillary, because we need to

conserve our resources aass democrats. i wish there were more selection. the thing i holding its hillary clinton is that she voted for the war in iraq. i like what president clinton did for the country, and president obama did for the country. i think there are other qualified women candidates. host: when lincoln chafee was announcing his own exploratory committee said that that vote that she cast is called for for running for the white house, do you agree with that sentiment? caller: i did not hear that quote, but in general i was against getting into the iraq war. i thought if i could see the error of the ways, i did not think there were weapons of mass s destruction because we had inspectors over there.

i don't follow politics enough to know that, but i know obama voted against it. that is why voted for him. kathleen sebelius might be a good candidate. hillary clinton does have a lot of experience, and she is carried out obama's -- what he wanted. host: barack obama did not vote against the war, but he did give a speech and oppose the war. he was not in the u.s. senate when that book to face after 9/11. republican line, we awake the announcement of hillary clinton. caller: thank you for taking my call. as a christian i am for the independent man.

i believe god put man hear to be leaders in their homes. as a 77-year-old woman i do not feel this is a right time for hillary, especially with all the things going on in the middle east. we know how middle east men think toward women. i think the timing is all wrong for a woman to be president. host: our last call is from fort lauderdale, florida. democrat line. caller: hello. i am amazed at my former governor bush getting into the race by criticizing hillary clinton. on her role with the obama foreign-policy.

bush had no policy as the governor of florida. she has no policy as a candidate for president. host: if you get through any time, we ask that you turn down your volume down that would eliminate? you hear -- the echo you hear. the sketch from saturday night live last night included this. >> tomorrow is the big day mrs. clinton. you're finally going to announce that you're running for president. >> i don't know i have at put it in me. i'm scared. i'm kidding let's do this. >> you put the hell and hilarious -- hill and hilarious. we thought it would be fun if

you felt the video on yourself on your own phone. we thought it would be more personal and intimate. >> and i should take off this jacket. >> that is much better. should we do vocal warm-ups? >> hilarylary's a granny with a twinkle in her eyes. ♪ >> look natural. >> ok. [laughter] >> soften a little. a little more. a lot more. great. >> citizens. you will let me. i will be your leader.

[laughter] host: part of a five minute openings get on snl last night. twitter announcement will come either later today or tonight. then she is in iowa and new hampshire for a low-key event. a slow rollout. you can check it all out on c-span.org. >> this sunday and q&a, senior editor for the weekly standard edward ferguson on his writing career, the gop residential candidates for 2016, and what voters are looking for in a candidate. >> they want somebody who looks

like he has stood up for them. i am amazed now at the degree to which primary voters on both sides are motivated by resentment the sense of being put upon. those people really do not understand this. here's a guy who will stick it to them. that happens with both sides. hillary will give her own version. i do not think that was actually true 30 years ago. resentment has always been a part of politics, but the degree to which it is almost exclusively the motivating factor. >> tonight on c-span q&a. >> on wednesday the national

council on u.s. air relations held a discussion on the iran nuclear framework agreement. they talked about the specifics of the agreement, and the chances it will be finalized i the end of june. speakers include a former nuclear negotiator for iran. this is just over two hours. >> good morning and welcome to another of the series of briefings of the national council on u.s.-arab relations on issues of vital importance to the united states and the nations in the middle east. thank you for coming this morning on such short notice. we have such a distinguished group of panelists who follow these matters. this morning i am honored to be your moderator. my name is john.

i joined the national council on u.s.-arab relations after spending 35 years in the arabian gulf in the energy field. i am well aware of the impact, implications and importance of the iran nuclear deals for the people of the regions. i would like to thank c-span for covering this event live today and for covering our briefing last thursday on yemen, held in this room. the ambassador spoke at the conclusion of that session. c-span coverage of last week's briefing is available on our website. a quick word about the national council on u.s.-arab relations. established 33 years ago as a nonprofit organization. the guiding vision is one of education and seeks to educate

americans about the islamic world and place relations between our allies and partners across the region on his firm a -- as firm a foundation as possible and continues to expand the relationship through a mutual benefit through a variety of programs. students, academics, and our armed forces. it organizes an annual policy makers conference, conducts a study abroad, youth leadership development programs, such as the ones that will be held this weekend in houston and washington. beginning tomorrow over 400 , young americans will represent arab 22 countries to debate pressing issues of the day with over 38,000 alumni. this program ensures that the next generation of americans will be better prepared to

plan, predict, and conduct economic and commercial relations in a region so vital to the united states. today our panel will assess the iran nuclear deal. it's issues and its implications. this is a preliminary agreement, a framework with many technical so-called issues to be sorted out in the coming months. as has been said, the devil is basically in the details. in the meantime the public , debate will be intense. is this a good thing or a bad thing? what do our regional partners and allies think? will this define the legacy of a president in the home stretch of his administration? the president has described this as a once in a lifetime opportunity to see if we can take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional

stability to the middle east. let us today and coming months see whether these noble objectives are achievable. just a few housekeeping details. each of the speakers will have 10 to 12 minutes for their remarks. in the interest of time, i refer you to their bios in our announcement. this will allow full a full hour of questions and discussions. on your chairs, you will find a 3x5 card. please write your questions on these cards and we will do our best to respond as fully as possible. we will wrap up promptly at noon. to start i am pleased to introduce our first speaker, dr. john duke anthony.

dr. anthony is well respected in the region and in washington. he is the only american observer to have attended each summit since 1981. after dr. anthony, the ambassador will speak. he will be followed by the executive director of the middle east policy council and a specialist on middle east affairs will present his remarks. next we'll hear from the distinguished affairs fellow at the national councils on u.s. our relations. dr. paul sullivan will conclude, professor of economics at the national defense university, will wrap up the presentation. dr. anthony, if you would come to the podium and kickoff our discussion on this deal.

dr. anthony: thank you, john. when we were putting together this seminar we came up with 14 factors, windows through which someone could look at what occurred about the framework and the challenges it represents. the opportunities it also represents and we are going to only be able to address around eight of these 14 factors. but we will be as candid as we can. much is unknown. in my brief remarks here, they have to do with the fears, the needs, and concerns of three of iran's neighbors -- oman bahrain, saudi arabia.

thomas mattair will deal with the united arab emirates and kuwait. that is the division of labor here. a few statistics to keep things in perspective in regard to so saudi arabia concerns. saudi arabia is the epicenter of prayer and pilgrimage, faith and spiritual devotion for some 1.5 million muslims worldwide. inasmuch as iran is the leading country with a largely shia orientation on the theological stage, there is inherently explicitly a degree of competition so now that we are

express it as i just did. iran is perceived as being on a run, beyond the nuclear agreement in terms of its leaders making reference to iran's unprecedented influence in four arab capitals. this itself would be of concern to a country such as saudi arabia and those in the league of arab states. of the 1.5 million muslims in the world, 2 billion christians, one billion of them being roman catholics, some 200 million muslims identify with the shia sect of islam. overall we're talking about 12% , of the muslims being shia.

this is important to keep in mind when one listens to people speak about the threat that iran poses. 12% taking on 88%. something is wrong with that picture. at the governmental level, the highest organization to which muslim countries belong is the organization of the islamic conference. it has 57 members. no more than four of those 57 would be predominately shia in the orientation of their government. so the numbers are heavily imbalanced not in favor of iran. this, too, needs to be kept in perspective.

with regard to oman, saudi arabia, and bahrain these three are profoundly similar in their concerns regarding iran, because they are neighbors of iran. they had issues with laureniran, and have similar needs and concerns and similar interests and similar foreign policy objectives. and yet there are different agencies between and amongst them. when people talk about threat analysis, it is usually where they are located. people in maine are not so concerned about jamaican and haitian boat people coming to their shores. those in florida are not obsessed with the same kinds of concern that people who live in new england are concerned with.

this is another way of looking at the concerns and objectives of these countries. oman is different from all of the other gcc countries. it has the best, smooth relationship with iran. this is not new. this has been the case is the beginning of the revolution in 1979 and dates from before then. there is a body of water between them. many people have the image that most of the shipping goes through iran's waters and exiting the gulf. this is not the case. the vast majority of the traffic goes through oman's waters. there are three lanes. 12 mile wide lane -- one two

mile wide lane for ships coming in to the gulf. another for ships going out of the gulf. and the zone between the two that is a safety zone. the strategic and geographic challenge is far greater on the omani side than on the irani an side. you can look at the map. that little piece of oman at the top of the peninsula is separated from oman like alaska is separated from the continental united states. the strategic aspect between this drives -- this drives continental united states. the strategic aspect between oman and iranian relationships. there is not going to be a conflict between them started by oman. oman's citizen base is less than 2 million.

iran has 80 million. the numbers should drive your perspective, your assessment of what the issues are and the implications. but there is more. iran sent close to 30,000 soldiers to oman from 1972 through 1974 to help oman put down a guerrilla rebel marxist uprising in oman. no other country did as much as iran did to help all mean regain -- oman regain its stability. there are no territorial issues between the two, unlike issues that exist between some of iran's other neighbors and iran. with regard to bahrain's

situation, it is also numerically fruitful for your analysis. if people made frequent reference to 60% of the population being shia and ruled by a sunni government, you have a situation that is even more imbalanced in the case of bahrain. you have the last remaining arab country with a sunni government ruling over a majority shia population. and despite the much renowned report that came out as a result of bahrain's uprising in 2011 in which there was a statement there was no evidence of iranian involvement in those uprisings here is where perception comes in.

perception is more powerful than reality. around 3000 bahrainis have been trained in oman, coming straight from secondary school, finance by the shia merchants in bahrain. they go at age 17, 16, 18. they go largely not to tehran, a seminary based shiaism and they return to bahrain. some of those are regarded by the intelligence security services as forming sleeper cells. in other words, one day they may be called upon to return the favor of the education and

training and leadership development that they required as a result of iran. and so when the government speaks about iranian involvement, there is this dimension that does not come out in the media but should help one frame iranian's concern -- bahrain's concerned and the representatives of the government that bahrain should revert to iranian control and influence. this is disturbing to any bar rainy task with security and stability issues. saudi arabia is concern the cost of a significant shia population in the eastern province. there is far less evidence than there has been in the case of bahrain's needs and concerns. saudi arabians have become open

in accusing iran of being behind the inspiration of the attacks on the towers in 1996, in which large numbers of americans were killed. this is a brief overview to begin the discussion, by showing there is no unanimity of all of iran's neighbors. it differs from one to the next. now we have the pleasure of listening to ambassador seyed hossein mousavian. thank you. [applause] seyed hossein mousavian: good

morning, everyone. iran -- they both consider the deals agreed in switzerland as a win-win deal. to my understanding there is five reasons why iranians would consider a win for iran. number one is that the deal contains respect for iranian nuclear technology including enrichment. number two is ultimately the sanctions would be lifted, even graduate. number three is that ultimately the iranian nuclear would be

normalized. and number four is that ultimately the nuclear would be removed from chapter seven united nations security council and all resolutions would be terminated. and number four is that iran after a period would be able to have a normal, peaceful cooperation on peaceful nuclear -- with the world powers. this is something iran has been

sanctioned from day one. the world powers consider the deal a win for themselves. i would like to give you five reasons why they believe this is a win for the world powers for the u.s. number one, iran except that the maximum level of transparency and measures within nonproliferation treaty. they have safeguarded the agreement and additional protocols and arrangement for the code. these are three arrangements for transparency. iran has accepted to all three arrangements. number two is iran would agree has agreed -- all issues which would need to give the transparency, inspection to the ieaa. practically the world powers have the most intrusive, strong powerful system. the history of the deal with iran. no other member has ever been committed like iran on transparency measures.

number four is they were looking for a break of the one year in case iran decided to go forward. and number five, confidence building measures, the u.s. and world powers needed time. there were 35 years of hostility. this implementation for measures are about 10 to 25 years. there for the have enough time for almost a decade to a quarter of a century. to my understanding, this is the

mutual win, a deal for both and i would like to give you five reasons why this is a win-win, a mutual win for both of them. through diplomatic solutions they were able to escape the devastating war in the middle east. and perhaps this is one of the rare occasions a big crisis in the middle east has been resolved or is going to be completely resolved through diplomacy. second, they have been able to set a new mechanism for verification, for non-diversion toward -- many nuclear experts believe it is not enough. many believe even additional protocols, which is the maximum level of transparency is not

enough. and the measures, a new mechanism of verification and transparency, assuring non-diversion toward -- for the first time far beyond that. if they are wise enough to embed the agreement with iran on a broader scope, regionally and internationally, this will be a big, big game for the liberation globally. number four is that perhaps this is the first evidence, engagement policy of president obama announced in 2009 has worked. iran and the u.s. have been trying for 35 years to improve relations. a lot of efforts and all have

failed. this is the first time a success is found, at the highest level of negotiations between iran and the u.s., which would have implications on implications between iran and the west. number five, it opens the door to a regional dialogue between iran and the world powers, iran and the west, iran and the u.s. tehran and washington decided not to go for broader dialogue negotiations on other issues unless they reached something on the nuclear. therefore if it is finalized by july 1, can open the door for iran and the u.s. to cooperate and to have a regional dialogue, to cooperate on common interests, common threats. it is obvious extremism, isis, they are threats to the region to even u.s. alliance, to iran to international community. there is a consensus that the threat today is other versions

of isis. there is indirect cooperation between iran and the u.s. americans are leaving the airstrike against isis. a key force on the ground battle against isis. they have common interests for peace and stability in iran and afghanistan and many other issues like security and energy. therefore this is step one toward if they want and now they can open a dialogue to cooperate on common threats. giving five reasons why iranians are happy, five reasons why the p5plus one are happy. i believe everything is not over yet. they have a lot to do until july 1. many technical issues have remained unresolved. therefore we cannot say the deal is 100% done. second, with a nuclear deal, 35 years of this doll these is not

going to be over. there is a huge mistrust between iran and the u.s., iran and the west. and some u.s. allies in the region, the israelis are worried after the deal, americans and iranians would go to bed. i would assure them they are not going to bed soon. it takes time and this would only be the first that. thank you. i now ask thomas mattair to address the next issues. [applause] thomas mattair: thank you. 10 minutes is not a lot of time.

what i want to say is that there is -- there are positive developments in this nuclear framework agreement and enough progress to go forward with more months of negotiations over technical details and find out whether it can be implemented. the gcc states are making cautious statements about willingness to see what the details are and to see whether more progress can be made and whether something airtight can be developed and implemented. i say it is cautious, because there is a lot of skepticism in these states.

and is not just skepticism about the nuclear deal itself. the other concern, which is perhaps even greater, is that the united states in exchange for this agreement is going to acquiesce in the expansion of iranian influence in the arab world. they are looking at iran's influence in iraq after the toppling of that whole system. iran's relationship with the assad regime and its help for the assad regime.

because oil markets are global markets. the concern about with the united states is going to do is really great on their part.

in fact they are concerned that the united states might even consent to a iranian tyrants in the region. when we talk about isis or al qaeda and the repercussions, we ask that they pay equal amount of attention to shia militias in iraq and syria and elsewhere. if we are not doing that and are concentrating only on the city, and concerns them pretty gravely. about the uae in particular they have every a skeptical reason -- a special reason for being skeptical about iran. the first are the three isl

ands in the shipping lanes. if you control them, you control the shipping lanes for a brief time. the shaw of iran wanted those islands, and took them just before the united arab emirates became independent in early december 1971. he explained that he wanted them for strategic reasons, because he was concerned that radicals in the region might take them might be able to interfere with shipping. they were interested in potential oil and guest posits of those islands.

they did take them, although the uae has a strong historical and legal claim to the islands. and it has ever since tryied to press that claim in the international arena. it has had the support of other gcc states and the arab league. and this support has continued during the ninth -- after the revolution in 1979. one can see during that time that those islands can be useful because during the tanker war when ron was -- iran was interfering with shipping coming out of kuwait, it did use those islands and those military assets on those islands as well as its offshore oil insulation to interfere with shipping.

the united states got involved in escalating -- escorting convoys out of the gulf. it's demonstrated the military utility of those islands. even when there was a t haw in the early 1990's, the gcc states and others were considerat -- were thinking about military capabilities in the region and the military modernization. they were concerned enough to sign security packs of the united states. that concern from ron greatly and may have complained about that greatly during this time.

iran has conducted naval exercises in the region. some of those have involved attempts to block passage through the straight. uae and kuwait and others are participating in yougcc exercises to counter that. they're using a great amount of u.s. military equipment. although it is impossible to tell what their intentions are there'll get a -- they are looking at iran's capabilities. conservation missiles, and so many other acquisitions that they have made over the past decades. they believe the need the

ability to deter that and are getting it from the united states. however, they are not just concerns -- concerned about the nuclear agreement, they're concerned about the trustworthiness of the united states. an official said there was a time when the united states was a force to be reckoned with, and now it is a problem to be dwelt with -- dealt with. the united states says they have your back when it comes to external aggression, but they are looking at her hesitation and syria, they are looking at our repeated failure to help the palestinians liberate themselves from the israelis, and they are asking what kind of political judgment does the united states have? this is all part of the concern about the nuclear agreement and why they want assurances from

the united they that we are going to do something abouti iran's presence in the arab world. they are concerned that we will go back to the policy that we had in the early 1970's. the twin fellow policy, where we supported both iran and saudi arabia but more sport went to saudi arabia because it was more developed. they are also concerned, as i said before, that we would tilt toward iran, and recognize iran's power and population and industry and technological base and think that they should be -- that their aspirations of the region should be accepted.

while these countries will say that they have a cautious willingness to consider this agreement, i would say that there is substantial concern there. i would even say in the case of qatar, that although it is often said that their relations with iran are almost as cordial as oman's, they did vote in favor of security council resolution 1737 voted to impose sanctions on iran because it was a nuclear program. they identify people who should be sanctioned and banks who

should be sanctioned. they are on record as being concerned about that program. i would even say that in these capitals there are people who if this agreement fails to satisfy them, if they feel that they are in danger because of the potentially additional boldness of roniran, they will be allowed to escape from the inspections and 10 or 20 or 30 years, these are states that might think about other options. they reluctantly but they are countries that have talked about how we need to keep all options on the table if this agreement is not workout. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you very much for inviting me. i will probably not talk for 10 minutes as my medicine is supposed to wear off and eight minutes, and that is my limit. i am in a crs capacity today. i will be in crs style today, which is subjective nonpartisan. if there is congressional staff in the room, i work for you, so ask away. i will be glad to see afterwards to clear up anything that is unclear. i will confine most of my comments today to the sanctions part of the deal. the issue. it is clear from both the iranian and u.s. faction that basically all of the sanctions that have been imposed by the u.s. and the eu other than human

rights related sanctions that have been imposed since 2012 are going to be relieved as a consequence of this agreement. the international banking system would come to an end. sanctions on the sale of oil and the shipping oil and sanctions on insurance of iranian oil tankers, sanctions on fine petrochemicals, sanctions on automotive gear, sanctions for supplying iran with oil drilling exploration equipment all of these would presumably

come to a conclusion of this deal is finalized and when the iaea certifies that iran has complied. this is a little bit that has to be clarified. the iaea is going to be the arbiter. they're going to certify that iran has reduced its stockpile to the agreement. 15,000 centrifuges, putting them away. things that are certified, that is when the sanctions would be released. that is my interpretation. even though the fact sheets differ little bit. iran, by these measures, would gain access to --

these are hard currency payments that were made for oil, that iran is made -- unable to move back to. no government has impounded this money, it is a ron's mind. these are in bank accounts under a ron's name. but because of the banking sanctions, no bank is cooperating with helping them move this act and central-bank. but a idea that these are firms and assets, that is incorrect. some loyal people in the audience here. one of the big things in this is that iran would be able to really export oil again. what does that mean? there are five countries currently that have active

acceptance to avoid u.s. sanctions and buy oil again. these countries could conceivably, as soon as the sanctions are relieved, they could increase their rate orders for iranian oil. the eu, which was buying a recorder of a ron's oil, they enacted a ban on purchases of iranian oil. it is going to take longer for them to start writing again. it is going to have to take a political decision to lift that band. the other five could conceivably -- let's say there is a deal in june, the iea gives the go-ahead.

those five could hard by a lot more money oil when you go away. the economy, in my estimation is likely to rebound fairly quickly. this 150, 100 $30 billion that i mentioned that this $150 billion 130 billion dollars is one entire budget year that they would have a popping currency. the value of iran's currency would rise, inflation windfall, employment would increase, people who shops are shattered edward reopened, people would go back to work. some people go to work, but right now they are going to work but they basically drink tea all day. they may get paid three months late, and the boss might give

them a quarter of what they are owed. this is what is going on now. basically the entire iranian economy is in a state of suspension, suspended animation. the entire economy is waiting for this deal to get done and the sanctionsand the sanctions relief to occur. that is when everybody goes back to work, starts buying clothes again, starts buying electronics. this is where the economy fires up again. just to close, i talked with crs . the administration if this deal is finalized, there would be the use of presidential waiver authority on the u.s. sanctions on the foreign companies that have been so effective. and after some time of iranian compliance, no one has specified

how much. i think about a year -- the administration plans to ask congress to enact legislation that would change, modify, repeal, or revoke the u.s. sanctions put in place by u.s. statute area than it would be a congressional decision at that point. the un's sanctions at that point under the deal, apparently will be relieved and if congress did not act obviously those sanctions would stay in force and there could be debate between the united states and the u.s. allies as far as the sanctions relief. it would be to have a time of a rainy and compliance and then relieve the sanctions under the

agreement. i will stop there. [applause] speaker: good morning everybody. thank you for being here on such an april shower morning. i was asked to speak about the agreement as it applies or does not apply to what is going on in lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence. basically, the negotiations themselves, as far as we know, did not discuss anything outside the negotiations on the nuclear program. so there were supposedly -- there was no connection specifically to action between iran's other issues in its foreign-policy and the region or the world for that matter.

generally speaking, everybody knew, everybody knows that the program was only part of the irani and foreign policy, but also the negotiations on the nuclear program, but also no matter how much they deny it is a connection. it is also a specific negotiation. lebanon used its role in lebanon and syria to try to get a better deal on the nuclear program. the way that it is seen in these two countries, the irani and influence in both countries.

everybody there, i think that this has to be something of an outcome that maybe they reflect on political positions or indicated positions of both countries. if iran resolves this like the ambassador mentioned, will there be basically outcomes as related to other foreign-policy issues in which iran is involved. in lebanon the country is actually -- almost on the verge of collapse. the state is almost imploding. it is a condition where it is almost like, you know, jim said earlier, suspended -- john said

earlier, suspended animation. there have been no elections since last may and basically has the law -- hezzbollah and its allies on the christian side are holding up the process. why that is going on, i think there is no rational interpretation. because if it is really the person of the president that is important, everyone is influencing this thinking saying, what about the future of the country, the fate of that country? with other presidents, there is no constitutional continuity, so to speak and today, executive authority is in the hands of the prime minister who at any time can be sent home basically by specifically hezbollah and its allies.

they just withdraw from that process. that's a very important consideration. there are also other issues. where unfortunately, some sunnis , not a lot, because the leaderships of the sunnis in lebanon are still able to maintain control over its community, but there are those people out there who are basically starting to push the issue of well, we, the sunnis are not getting what we are supposed to be getting. on the other hand, the shia are also worried about a very important development over the last four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. and unfortunately these refugees are not expected to

return to syria anytime soon because syria is destroyed and these people would have, if they were to be repatriated to syria, there would be some sort of an infrastructure that would receive them. so both people in lebanon are not happy with the situation in syria. the syrian civil war and the political system -- it is really a very serious issue. what is interesting also -- hezbollah, while it is criticized really harshly -- the operation decisive storm in yemen, they have not necessarily said much about the nuclear deal it self. it was very, very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good

deal, we want to get out the sanctions on that. hezbollah did not say very much. they are probably waiting to see how things shape up over the next couple of weeks or months until the technical issues are resolved. it's interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any statement on the negotiations. and the syrian situation, the regime over the last probably two weeks to a month has really received a lot of setbacks on the ground specifically on the -- in the south and the north, the regime has suffered military defeats. so, despite the fact that hezbollah has thrown its full weight behind the regime and is

fighting on many fronts in syria , it is being reported in iraqi and afghanistan and south asia, and the fact that russia has open the military spaghetti, so to speak, to syria -- if you look at this very, very brief overview, we can imagine ok would there be some sort of change? this is something that is quite important to answer, because if iran were to go back to the two perspectives on whether iran was using syria as a bargaining chip in its programs or whether it was not, it is very important to try to answer this, ok? the nuclear negotiations are done.

israel does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political development or development in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation? this is something that obviously everyone is speculating on. the arab governments are very busy with the war in yemen. the gcc countries are very busy there. but at the same time they are looking at the nuclear negotiation as to how it might reflect on their interest in those two countries. if we talk about lebanon and syria, we also need to talk about that situation. also, there is a wildcard here.

and this is something we do not really know how it is going to shape up over the next few months until the end of june and the wildcard is specifically -- will anybody within the irani and political system -- when we look at iran, we are looking at a rational actor, but at the same time the nature of the irani and political -- the iranian political system, it is very dogmatic. obviously the ayatollah khomeini has the ultimate saying he will try to rein everybody in with whatever program or decision the irani and -- iranian political leadership has. but there are factions within the system that will not

necessarily be open and accepting of the political deal. just yesterday something came out from the revolutionary guard, the general where he said our negotiators worked very, very hard to get a good deal. in other words, this was some way of saying, well, ok, you did ok. it was all right. and this might reflect on how they look at this issue. yet at the same time, there are other people within the political system -- they described the political system as being in suspended it will debris him. all of the different factions have their own interest. all of them are trying to pull their own position, so not much really happens on the domestic scene. are these different factions,

will they do something in the foreign policy arena? in other words will there be somebody who thinks it is possible to activate the lebanese-syrian front with israel? a couple rockets here, a couple rockets there? something might happen. israel is in no mood to let things go. it might respond. if it does respond, there goes the deal, the nuclear deal itself. his he would have to respond. i will be happy to answer your questions if you would like, and i will give you to dr. paul sullivan. thank you. [applause] dr. sullivan: good morning. thank you for the invite, john

duke. they asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions, which ever may be happening can affect energy systems, not just in a wrong but regionally and globally. to put this in perspective, iran is an energy giants. it has either the number one or number two natural gas reserves in the world. you trade that off between russia and iran, depending on what you're looking at. number four is conventional oil reserves. i'm not talking about conventional gas or shale. this is conventional. if this is opened up, and that is a big if then i will get to that, that will change the market. because oil markets are global markets. it won't affect just crude oil, but also refined products and petrochemicals.

opening up iran, if it does open up, will also change national -- natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets, rather than regional ones. and if iran hops into this, it will change things considerably. one of the reasons they have not been involved is because they cannot get at the right technologies. the cannot develop the field into -- a giant field they share with qatar. which gives me the impression if this opens up too much, it could be iran and qatar come to some joint agreement, even to its use as an export facility. all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole issue is pipelines and other export

menus going into central asia. and the caspian. just don't look south. just a look at asia. look right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. we have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran, but at the prophet is right, you can build -- if the profit is right, you can build a pipeline, and could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into russia, central asia europe and , beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil. the hedge funds will have a great time on this one. they are all guessing what will happen to the price of oil tomorrow. how many in this room get that question? it is like a parlor game. what is the price going to be tomorrow? will the price go down three dollars? will it go up three dollars? we talking about trillions of dollars trading regularly. people trading regularly. trying to figure out what is going to be going on.

another thing that is not talked about too much is the pipeline going to pakistan and india, which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions have taken off. although, there is a bit of a problem in one place, which iran and pakistan share. some border guards got killed there recently. there is a great deal of instability, but i think money may talk in that situation,. another part of the energy system is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, would be part of a power pole of electricity production, consumption, and sherry -- sharing going into central asia, the caspian, possibly across to iraq and to many other places, afghanistan and so forth. this could be a heated change. -- huge change. but there are big if's.

energy efficiency technology. some consider dual use could also enter iran. they could be more efficient with their use of energy. i think i can hear the investor s salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow into these things that no one is even talking about? energy efficiency. what about renewables, geothermal, solar, wind? this is not happening. now think about the idea of snow -- of snapback sanctions. which i think is an absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of dollars flowing into iran, oil going here, oil going there, mostly into asia, probably the caspian pipelines being built, , and then someone says they haven't followed the game, we are going to snapback on sanctions? anyone ever hear of lobbyists?

money will talk. snapping back the sanctions are not as easy as that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that, either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclear station -- nuclearzation of the gulf. but also in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. because of the threat that they feel. all right. i should have said cobb yachts in the beginning. -- i should have said caveats in the beginning. all of my opinions are mine alone, do not represent those of the u.s. government, the national defense university, or other organization i am a part of. i am not talking for them. what i am about to say will be

clear that i am not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. or at least put quotes around it. it is a framework for discussion of a deal. if you are about to buy a house or a small business, and the person you are buying it from says, here is the framework for discussion, you wouldn't be asking, when can i move in? this two and half page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green groceries in cairo. it is too simple, too vague. it opens up for trouble. negotiating the details will be more complex than it anything anyone can imagine right now. the terms are not clear. what we are seeing right now is another version of groupthink. we saw groupthink before the iraq war. now we are seeing groupthink on

this deal. everyone is hopping on board. read the documents. read the terms. for example, the complexes to be converted into an atomic research center. ok, has anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how complicated is that? how could you prove it is an atomic research center? i am seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish, and in what time period? oh, by the way, it could take years to develop an atomic research center. years. any deal, a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details.

otherwise, the sanctions are not going to be taking off. -- are not going to be taken off. and all these things i am talking about oil and gas and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up, pun intended, will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1. anyone done negotiating on simple business deals? july 1 is pretty tough. now we are trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1. could we please get real? all right. it is going to be very difficult to turn the sanctions off, and it will be very difficult to turn them back on again. ken alluded to something about the waivers.

some of them have waivers, some of them don't. some of them are law. you have you and sanctions, you have eu sanctions, you have combination sanctions. it is not the same thing as putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir one centrifuge within 10 years? 10 years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years, everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concern is the one your -- one-year breakout time. wow. why is everybody saying that is a good thing? how about a no-year breakout time? am i being outrageous enough? and my shattering illusions here? what that essentially says is that the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years, either.

i think this should be expanded else. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside. and the use of different centrifuges, the complex, just about everything else goes right back on line the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, all changes. and by then the oil is exported, the money is pouring in. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist, when i hear that pouring into a country, i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership that is not still follow that economics is for donkeys because economics works. and inflation and unemployment and a hyperventilated economy drove iran to its revolution in 1979. we seem to be in a dream world here. what is the meaning of the term "significant amount of time"? in the banning of technologies that might be used for producing

nuclear weapons. you will have to excuse me. i worked in a law office for some years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words. how to tear them apart. how to figure out the real meaning that is stated here. and if there is enough vagueness, change it. who controls the inspection? the security council? the russians? who does that? that is a little bit vague. and some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. if -- it is the nature of the process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant. one minute. ok. in one minute, what can i tell you? i am concerned about how this is worded. and i am concerned once the door is open and the horses are out

of the barn, how difficult it will be to get the horses back into the barn. i am concerned with this will do to the region. i can see the whole. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language. strict timetables. and no illusions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you all very much. now comes to the most interesting part. your questions. i think for the next 40 plus minutes, we will just go ahead and run to the questions we received from the audience.

i will read them as we go. and i appreciate very much if you have any more, just pass them on and we'll try to response the best we can. what all the investment and u.s. oil companies, other u.s. companies like boeing, be held up until congress acts? dr. katzman: the fact sheet distributed by the administration makes it clear that sanctions that by u.s. companies from doing business with iran will not be lifted under this arrangement. so the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily referred to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-us companies. it is very clear from the u.s. statement that there will not, as a consequence of this particular arrangement if it is finalized, and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate some pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran

clearing up there differences on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. mr. pratt: the next question might hezbollah's hesitation on the the deal might raise concern? dr. harb: well, i think this is -- i don't think that the iranians are combining their thinking of what hezbollah presents to them. the only thing is that maybe iran will tell hezbollah

indicate to hezbollah that it is time for has below help assist in putting the lebanese state back on track. i just a phone call from tehran would may be set things very very much straight in beirut. mr. pratt: anybody else have any comment to make on that one? ok. another question that is looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel. now that iran's nuclear power in the region is being analyzed, is there a growing concern with the relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on because of the significance of the discussion particularly recently. dr. anthony: here, i think context is important. the relationship between iran and israel was instrument -- intimate, it was strategic, it

was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep, in terms of the stories pertaining to esther, a persian who helped to free the jews from captivity from babylon. so the degree of trust over the centuries between jews and persians is deep. at times, it has been massive. at times, it has been pervasive. and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel

thousands went by way of iran. and during the 1950's and 1960's, the heyday of our nationalism, iran and israel danced in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has been concerned about an intimate u.s. arab relationship because there are 22 arab countries, only one iran, only one israel. so that was also part of the adhesive. and many in israel regard these last years since 1979 as an aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal, mutually beneficial

reciprocally rewarding , relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interests. a similarity of interests. complementary interests between the two. and that now may begin to come back into focus, but it will be quite a stretch. in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings and briefings by the head of israel's foreign ministry, an answer to a question of where do of 10 your energy, your oil? the answer was 90% we get from iran. dr. mousavian: the impact of a

nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be censored to each other's about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is a member of the treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to give them their treaty. iran does not have a nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently, the pentagon accepted that the israelis have nuclear bombs. just in a decade, iran has given more than 700,000 mandated inspections. no other member, during the history of iaea, has given such an amount of inspections that the iranians game.

israel has never given even one inspection. iran has initiated negotiations in 1970. they have insisted for -- israel is declining, rejecting objecting the nuclear treason -- treaty. in 1990's, the proposed a weapons of mass ejection freezone. iran and was the second country to support it. israelis deal opposing weapons of mass distraction in the middle east. therefore, we are talking about two very, very, very different

policies on proliferation. and as an iranian, i am really shocked that everybody is about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb. and all pressures and sanctions are on iran. while iran doesn't have a nuclear bomb. and nobody is talking about israel. this is a very peculiar double standard in washington, in the west about proliferation in the middle east. however, these deals has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any proliferation risk in the middle east. it is said iran would be committed. ok, this is first iranian goodwill. as long as you do not have reprocessing, you cannot make nuclear weapons from heavywater facilities. israeli has reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regional allies -- regional allies --

regionalize the measures agreed to with iran for all countries? no country would have enrichment above 5%. as long as there is no enrichment above 5%, they would be no nuclear bomb from nuclear facilities. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavywater facilities. it can have major positive impact if israelis also would be ready to follow the same nuclear policy iran has followed for 40, 50 years. and if other regional countries

would be ready to accept such a measure as iran has accepted far beyond mpt. mr. pratt: do you have any comments on it? >> -- dr. mattair: i don't think israel will ever give up its nuclear weapons or agree to restrictions. i expect them to continue to oppose this deal, a matter what. and to lobby for more actions against iran. that is because of the nature of the two governments. john was talking about how, in the past, israel view iran as a

partner in a sense because both of them had concerns about the arab world. and american relations with the arab world. but i can't see that entering into their minds anytime in the near or midterm. and in fact, their concern about iran is so great that they are -- you know -- in a sense, reversing that trend in trying to forge relations with arab states that also view iran as a threat. it is very tactical on their part. it is only because they both have a concern about iran. when netanyahu was in front of congress a month or so ago and warned that iran was a country that committed aggression against the arab world, i think he -- i don't think that is his primary concern.

dr. katzman: i think i would say that there has been a consensus in the international community that the way israel was formed, the fact that its neighbors rejected it immediately, there has been a consensus to allow it to have this deterrent. to raise the fact that they are not in the mpt, maybe it is intellectually precise, but it is probably not going to go very far. that would be my response. dr. sullivan: the israeli institutions don't start the day by saying -- death to america. may changing that could help go a long way.

also personalities the fine relationships. right now, we have a strong personalities involved in the iranian-israeli dialogue if we want to call it that. it is more like two monologues that never meet. also, there are other issues involved here. let me get it straight. i am not saying i am against the deal. i am just saying get better specificity and make it a real deal. not this thing floating in the air. i am not for war with iran. if anybody has that impression i have been through wargames. looking at the cost of that war, it is astonishing what could happen. it would make iraq look like a picnic. iran is a bigger country, bigger military, more organized hierarchical, a long culture and as soon as the boots hit the ground, welcome to hell. for all sides involved. we don't need that.

what we need of some kind of a diplomatic, economic informational, and other change to bring this about. and my sense is this too and have page document is not it because we have other issues to deal with. what is happening in bahrain what is happening in lebanon what is happening in iraq, what is happening in yemen. ballistic missiles are not part of the deal. this is a very narrow document. this solves a very narrow question. and again, i am for improving relations, but it has to be done in the right way. excuse me. dr. harb: i just urge you to read his recent piece on why we are talking about iran, what are

the reasons basically behind this push towards iran, iran iran. i urge you to read the report on that. mr. pratt: there is a fundamental question here with regards to ask a getting a copy of the deal. somebody asked where can we get a copy of the framework between u.s. and iran? where is it published? >> the white house website. >> the middle eastern policy -- has it on its website. dr. sullivan: you can also find different interpretations, which is part of the problem here. there are cultural differences linguistic differences, and also political differences across the country which is changing the way this is interpreted. it is far from clear. maybe it was important to make it on clear to see what happens. mr. pratt: do we have any idea

on who the leads are -- returning back to the discussion -- secretary kerry going to be engaged? dr. sullivan: if they haven't started this yet, the clock is ticking. july 1 is not so far away. that is almost midterm time for a college. in this kind of deal with all this complicated issues, probably there are a bunch of sherpas out there on all side during the heavy lifting. when they do the heavy lifting then the big players go in -- cnn, fox, iranian tv -- and they say, well, waste -- we we made the deal. the real work happens at a different level. dr. harb: in the "daily star" he basically summed it up, if i may, basically the deal -- or

the framework for the deal -- slightly over 5000 centrifuges for the next 10 years that iran would maintain -- would be allowed to work only. enrichment for 15 years will be banned at the facility, the mountain facility. and iran can enrich some uranium, and not tons, at the heavy water reactor. i'm sorry, that is -- at 3.67% purity. and that is kept at 300 kilograms for 15 years. 1000 ir-2 centrifuges, the newer version, will be removed. and the iraq heavywater reactor would be reconfigured to prevent the production of bomb fuel,

basically plutonium. the iaea inspections with less for 25 years. of all facilities, all imports that have to do with all of this. the iaea would have full access to everything. in return, iran will get the gradual removal of sanctions as soon as iaea provides clarification. then the sections will begin to be lifted. dr. sullivan: to put this into perspective, this is the white house document. this is it. mr. pratt: -- even if iran's intent is to build nuclear energy, what language should be insisted upon in the final agreement to safeguard and avoid nuclear actions like tokushima? -- fukushima.

dr. anthony: this is an issue of real concern, in terms of one of the sites. the one it nearest to the gulf and the other gulf countries. because of the sanctions because of the nonexistent relations between tehran and washington, diplomatically and formally, there could be such an accident. iran has had a history of earthquakes. so has turkey. they are part of a different tectonic plate than those of arabia. so there is a legitimate fear, what if there is an earthquake in that region?

they -- their fear is that there would be spillage and linkage, and that this would be contaminating and pose an immediate, direct threat to the water desalination plants in kuwait, bahrain, qatar, and elsewhere. and ships may refuse to come into the gulf until this is dealt with and cleaned up. that is more than a nightmare. that has catastrophic implications. the russians were involved in building that reactor. and they are also the so-called inspectors of it, until now. but this is like putting the fox in the coop with the chickens. there needs to be a more

technologically professional efficient, and renowned inspector of that particular facility. and because it is the one that could be catastrophic, were there to be any accident there like the chernobyl and kuwait, the one that are most concerned and involved with this -- in the chernobyl disaster, some 200,000 people had to be relocated. that was costly. united nations asked for a lot of donor countries to subsidize and finance it. and kuwait was the leading one. so, kuwait has been involved in this kind of an issue longer than any of the other gcc countries on that side, which relates directly to inspections and relate strictly to one particular nuclear facility, the one that is closest to the gulf. and i could affect them all.

yes. yes, yes. and bush year -- dr. mousavian: from day one, it has been under iaea supervision. and the iaea has fully confirmed all safety measures already there. second joint plan of action, also, i mean on the framework they agreed. they have also agreed the world powers to have more cooperation with iran on the safety issues. third, fukushima was in japan. japan never lowered its nuclear activities after fukushima.

they continued the same nuclear activities. chernobyl was in russia. chernobyl increased its nuclear activities after chernobyl. emirates is going to have four nuclear power plants, so arabia -- saudi arabia is going to have power plants. turkey is going to have power plants. therefore, we really do not need to create more artificial fears about uranium and nuclear programs. dr. sullivan: the japanese shut down all of their nuclear power plants. i was there two weeks ago visiting the plant just west of tokyo. and they are spending billions

of dollars to set up safety devices in the event of another earthquake or tsunami. the japanese have been through a very difficult energy time since they had to shut down 30% of their electricity. which is what they have done. and there is a huge debate in japan right now whether to turn his back on again. the father away from tokyo you are, the more likely one of those plants is to be started up again. it is a very emotional issue. and this fukushima problem was not just an earthquake, it was a water flow problem. and when i think water in the middle east, i wonder what some people are thinking. the jordanians are building a plant in the desert of northwestern jordan using a water treatment plant as a source of water to cool the spent fuel and the nuclear plant. as i told a reporter a few years ago -- days ago, i wouldn't live near that thing because of the water treatment plant goes down, the water flow goes down, the thing overheat, and you have a fukushima in jordan right near the iraq border. the middle east is water short. if you're going to be putting a plant on the ocean, that makes sense. if you're putting it in the desert, that makes no sense. if you are putting it on a fault line, this makes no sense.

near the ocean, maybe you keep the cooling going. but at the same time, it will shut down automatically if there is an earthquake. it has before. the one in san diego shutdown. nuclear facilities are breakup ligety beasts, and they need a lot of water and a lot of water flow. people are just not thinking this through. mr. pratt: anybody else want to comment on -- a question for kenneth katzman please compare and contrast libyan sanctions versus iranian sanctions, and when will iran be removed from the terrorism list? dr. katzman: hmm. quite some questions. i know c-span is here so i want to say hi, mom. [laughter] >> let's take that opportunity. dr. katzman: about iran's

removal from the u.s. terrorist list, well, there are some their -- young people in the audience, so maybe by the time they are my age that could happen. iran is nowhere close to being removed from the terrorist list. there is no consideration in the u.s. government for removing iran from that list. i would just be categorical on that question. the other -- what was the rest of the question? sorry. comparing libya? well, you know, we could conceivably have two similar situations. libya gave up its nuclear program and actually gave -- dismantle the whole thing. obviously, there was not the same level of debate over lifting some of the sanctions on libya because they had been so you know, basically dismantle the entire program.

iran is not doing that obviously. this deal leaves them with substantial infrastructure. and we had more than an hour of discussion about the continuing concerns. obviously, it is not quite as easy. but, you know, again, just looking at authorities, the president does have, you know, quite a bit of authority in terms of suspending sanctions. but if you're talking about lifting sanctions outright, or congressional action is needed then of course it becomes much more involved. and most of the main sanctions that would be released under this deal are enforced by congressionally passed statutes. and therefore, congress, to lift the sanctions outright would have to pass new legislation to do that. mr. pratt: there is a follow-up question, if i could. regarding the banking system. and contemplate for access. when a final agreement contemplate full access of iran

to the banking system? and the u.s. payment system? dr. katzman: again, anything involving the u.s. is not really part of the sanctions relief. iran would be able to access again, the european, asian financial system. and the secondary sanctions on those banks that are doing business with iranian banks, they were not be penalized by doing business with the u.s. financial system. but direct iran-u.s. financial transactions would still -- that is not contemplated as part of the relief package. mr. pratt: thank you. a question for the ambassador.

he said he would recommend iran -- lauren -- russian foreign minister sergei lavrov said he would recommend iran during the shanghai cooperation organization if the nuclear deal is successful. what would the implications of this be and how would iran and the fco partners benefit? dr. mousavian: iran is already participating on all shanghai's high-level meetings. and if iran is members, it would create more opportunities for asian cooperation between iran and china, iran and south asia -- iran and central asia, iran and calcutta, and even iran and india. this would have more impact on iran economical relations with asia. mr. pratt: just as a general for

the panel, we have about 16, 17 minutes to go. it is a broad one. it is, what will the u.s. congress do? which is us going to sort of the filling a lot of air, but if anybody would like to comment on that. [laughter] over the next three months. >> hi. mom. dr. sullivan: well, the u.s. congress will do what the u.s. congress does. which is debate this issue and take partisan viewpoints and try to work it through. there is an election year coming up. there is always an election year coming up. and it is going to be hardball. that is pretty much the way it is going to work out. and the house and the senate are now run by the republicans which, for those of you don't know, means they run who gets invited to the committee. and run the questions in the committee -- and the committee assignments.

it will be a very rough road. dr. mousavian: i agree with him, but to my understanding, not only because of the next election and the -- it has a lot to do with benjamin netanyahu, aipac, and more, i believe, it take, big misunderstanding not only in the u.s. congress between a lot of u.s. politicians -- you hear from many u.s. congressman that we should keep the sanctions, pressure iran. iran only came to nuclear negotiation deal or framework because of sanctions pressures. still, they keep the same narrative.

in all debate, you read the same narrative. but a very simple fact, before sanctions, iran had a few hundred centrifuges. after sanctions, iran increased to 22,000 centrifuges. before sanctions, iran was enriching below 5%. after sanctions, iran increase to 20%. before sanctions, iran had just a few hundred kilograms of stockpiles. after sections, the have several thousand kilograms of stockpiles. this was really the impact of sanctions. as president obama said, suddenly the p5 plus one -- the -- they opened their eyes and they recognize that iran has just three minutes -- three

months to break out. the only thing that made the framework possible was first the u.s. agreed to iran to have in -- enrichment for its domestic practical needs. that is why iran accepted to every transparency measures. and iran was ready to give every confidence building measures that iran would never diapered -- divers same line. i do not know how many was nuclear bomb. and obama said -- nuclear bomb. these narratives, it is still not in corrected in the u.s. congress. there is a big misunderstanding and they are repeat the same mistakes today. more concerns