e says -- the question is is the government collecting data on millions of -- hundreds of millions of americans? he said, no, not wittingly. that was not a truthful answer. what he should have done, i do not know. i think you have to worry about whether in the new system, the government is sufficiently candid when it testified. bob: on the issue of the cia's program, we are talking about surveillance. i think the president has admitted that that is wrong. i am an expert on the clapper case. i have written to the "new york times" and "new yorker" on this. when you say they were untruthful, that is not correct.

as a lawyer, you know the difference between an untruth and a mistake. when clapper was asked that question, it was a public hearing and director clapper said for him, he liked public hearings as much as he liked root canals or folding sheets. he had two huge notebooks to prepare for the hearing, neither which talked about surveillance. we were notified the day before that senator wyden was going to ask this question. he was hit unaware by the question. if you read his answer, it is perfectly clear that he is thinking about the 702 program when he talks about not wittingly collecting. after this hearing, i went to him and said, you know, you were

wrong. it was perfectly clear that he had absolutely forgotten the existence of the 215 program. this is not an untruth or falsehood, this was a mistake on his part. we all make mistakes. i would say i made a mistake as well thereafter because i did not think to counsel him that we should immediately send a classified letter to the committee correcting the record. i wish we had done that time. his lawyer let him down in that regard. people make mistakes all the time and that was just a mistake. sean: to get to the yes or no, yes to a new church committee or no? fritz: i think a new church committee would be useful. not to come up with more dr. king stories, i agree, i do not think that will happen, but to assess how well the programs are working, how well the congressional oversight is

working, and what is it that we do not know -- i'm sure there is quite a lot -- that the public should know. there are things that we do not know that we should know. sean: i would add, things that people may be have forgotten. mika: on the question of whether or not you need a new church committee that is separate from the standing committees -- or the existing intelligence committees, i would say that this is something the intelligence committees themselves could do if they were properly resourced to do that. i think the kinds of stuff that they have on board or the number would not be sufficient to the task. i think also the question that you are asking in this context is very different. bob is right, the numbers of committee knew the contours of what edward snowden revealed.

but, their level of knowledge was much greater than the average person. there is a separate question that is useful for inquiry. as we look at these surveillance programs, can we make an assessment about how effective they are and then make some judgment about the level of outrage that could occur if the programs were revealed or the levels of outrage that occurs based on the knowledge of the programs now against the benefit to the nation in terms of national security. i think the national security would value the programs very differently, and given to outrage, might make a different regulation on whether or not they need to keep, or whether or not they could work around whether or not there are technical solutions out there that would allow them to do the things they need to do to protect the nation, without collecting, or requiring the communications of millions of people, potentially billions of people, who are unrelated to any

national security interest. >> this gets significantly to the access of information. can you describe the difference there? do you think it is the appropriate line? mika: yes. well, the fact that most intelligence programs are overseen by a smaller group of people, i think it is right. there is significant risk to our national security if some of these programs are revealed. how we target al qaeda or groups that are trying to do the united states harm, you want to keep that to a small group of people. whether or not you can share clearly the senate made a

different calculation than the house in sharing information with its broader membership. sean: let's take a particular example. we know instances where our representatives claim to have been denied access to information, in light of these leaks. should a representative be able to get the information? the representative, him or herself? mika: in the senate, if the senator had demanded the information, the senate intelligence committee would have given an individual senator access to those things. i'm not quite sure what the rationale is in drawing a difference between the house and senate. bob: to be clear, that is based on house rules. sean: on a similar note, you

talk about staff designees. one thing that i have heard that is a problem for a number of staff is clearance. can you explain the difference between the clearance system which is necessary to ask this information -- and i could jump to the trees, but by your estimate, how many staffers outside of the house intelligence committee have clearance to use this information? ms. eoyang: not all policy is created equal. on the intelligence committee, they would have access to depending on the jurisdiction access to broader swaths of inspiration.

the committee staff, it generally has sci clearances that entitle them to deal with programs that the military needs for its war-fighting capabilities. there are a few sci cleared staff on committees, but for the most part, most members of congress do not have someone cleared at that level to assist them with doing oversight of these things. mr. vitka: does this strike you as a problem. mr. schwarz: it was not a problem for us. as i read about it, the senators and congressmen are enormously busy and they are given a limited amount of time and they cannot have a staff person who often is more broadly knowledgeable, and that is a problem.

my guess is the intelligence community ought to be able to decide if staff people are deserving of high-level clearances, and then they could get rid of this rule that seems to say to senators and representatives you got to do it all on your own and you got a limited time, but why can't they clear high-level staff people on the committee's or elsewhere in the congress? ms. eoyang: if i could say why it is important why members of congress are not left on their own, because your average member of congress comes from a walk of life where they may not necessarily have expertise in the law or in technology. without someone else to explain to them how these programs work, they may not understand what the aggregation of metadata can do in terms of a privacy infringement or understand the scope of the law in the fourth amendment when they are evaluating these programs. members of congress i think for the most part are looking at

programs and asking themselves is this to secure our nation? that is an important question, but the need for other questions where they may need help in order to frame the question appropriately and understand the answer comes back. mr. vitka: i would like to get bob's opinion quick. there is a video of a representative saying in response to a question from a town hall meeting, saying effectively that representatives could not have access as they want it, that they were potential security vulnerabilities, which seems inflammatory. i do not put that on the committee. that is a political actor with a political statement. bob, from your perspective

recognizing that there is a level of transparency, is this too far, or there could be more transparency, access to classified information for at least one person in the 435 offices in the house -- do you think that is too far? mr. litt: i do not have a particular view on that. when the church committee made its recommendations, there was a need to strike a balance between congressional oversight and secrecy of intelligence operations. the balance that was struck at that time in both houses was to set up an intelligence committee. we are required to keep the committee informed of all intelligence activities, and by and large we do that. and they have got ample staff, and not all of them are cleared into every compartment. the same is true for my office. there are programs on which i am the only person in my office and there are programs i am not on. but the essential compromise made was we would be opened with

the intelligence committees and they would serve as standards for the rest of the congress. the question is whether the congress wants to modify that and how effective the oversight is going to be when it is oversight by all 535 members. in advance of reauthorization of some of these provisions several years ago, we offered briefings to all members, and few members bothered to show up, including some members who are now complaining they were never informed about these programs. if these matters are the importance the people say they are. members of congress should be allowed to come. i do not know -- ms. eoyang: they can leave notes there and leave them there later. they cannot take them back to their office.

mr. vitka: could they talk to other representatives who did not make it about what they learned? ms. eoyang: bob and i might differ, but the speech and debate clause would protect members from talking to each other, and if they are talking do they protect speech on the floor of the house. if they were talking to each other, i do not know how the executive branch would say to a member of congress, you cannot do that. the classification limitations are an executive branch regulation system. it has never been tested as to whether or not they could actually bind members of congress in the ways they communicate inside the legislative branch. mr. vitka: that seems precarious to me, but i want to move on but you see that freedom act is going to be in front of most staff very soon, certainly in

front of a lot of staff. one of the things we have seen lost between last year and this year and the transparency provisions. these are not provisions designed to rein in or curtail surveillance. as an advocate, it is confusing and alarming to see transparency on the bargaining table. for instance, in the current version of the usa freedom there is no longer a requirement to state how many u.s. persons are affected by collection. why are we having this fight? what is transparency do you think we would be willing to give up, and i would add this into the intelligence community's credit that one of the things we lost was the top line of 702 effect, and it is reported now, that the freedom act has a lower standard for 702 searches. i could be mistaken, but i am

curious, why is it that the transparency is on the line as this moves politically? maybe this is a political question that the intelligence committee is opposing. ms. eoyang: i cannot speak to what happened on 215, and since that primarily is a law enforcement program related to title 18 authorities, it is not my expertise. patrick might have more sense of where that was in negotiations. i do not know if i have a good answer on that. mr. toomey: i can only speak what was the bill at one point what is not in the bill anymore. and what i would like to see or expect in terms of transparency. previous versions of the usa freedom put forward last session provided certain transparency figures around the number of u.s. persons who are affected by 702 surveillance and other

figures about the number of u.s. persons affected by the other authorities addressed by the bill. a number of those provisions have been stripped out, and that is concerning in my perspective because the logic behind the bill created that the there was some necessary or predictable and be doing the about the how the hill would operate on the front and in terms of structuring the specific selection terms. because of that and you do it, there were protections put into the bill that were designed to both protect the information of innocent americans when it was collected and ended up in repositories like the corporate store of 215 phone records, and to provide the public with information about the scope of collection down the line. that came by the transparency

figures. now, in the version that has been proposed this session, a number of those key figures, the figures that would tell you how many americans are ending up in the databases or subject to collection under these orders, have disappeared. not only that, but the fbi has extra exemptions. the agency engaged in law enforcement in the u.s. and that may seek to make use of this information is exempted from providing information about backdoor searches of 702 data, searches for certain types of 215 information, and in a way that makes it impossible to understand how authorities that are being justified on grounds of intelligence are being used in the course of ordinary criminal investigations. mr. vitka: to go into the fbi exemption, bob, i'm curious if you had thoughts on this. in your introduction, you said that transparency could be

improved. it could be improved right now couldn't it? mr. litt: as i also said, there is a balance that has to be struck between transparency and impact on security. i think while -- and i am not an expert in the details of the transparency provisions -- but is my understanding that some of the provisions were taken out and some of the existing provisions were strengthened. more detail was provided in more transparency in some areas. the fact is more you authorize release of information about specifically what we are doing the more you enable people to evade what we are doing and that is the balance that has to be struck in any kind of legislation like this. mr. vitka: i would think the most informative part there, for policy makers, would be the number of americans who are affected, and i do not mean the numbers who are targeted, that it would indicate a pretty broad

number that would not drive down to something that would compromise surveillance operations. bob, is that the case, or am i mistaken? mr. litt: it is difficult for me to answer that. there are other considerations that go into the issues of exactly what we can and cannot report beyond is it a good idea to report this or not and those are the kinds of things in many instances that i cannot talk about in this kind of a session. mr. vitka: would you agree it would be exculpatory for the community to say that 100,000 americans were affected versus 300 million americans? mr. litt: i am not comfortable with the word "exculpatory." people would be happier if there were smaller numbers than if there are larger numbers.

mr. schwarz: i think it is important to figure between the transparency perspective the existence of the broad program versus, which i think in general there should be more of, versus transparency with respect to how decisions are made on who to target, where i think that is something that there should not be transparency on. and to me, the founding error in the metadata program was that when president bush instituted it and president obama continued it, we did not have an open discussion about whether the country should have such a program, and actually that seems to run through a little bit of yesterday's opinion by judge lynch. even dick cheney -- this is something i discovered writing

this book and nobody had seen before -- when he wrote his dissent in the iran-contra matter, he said if you have a hard foreign policy or national security issue, a wise president first would not engage in excessive secrecy, and, second a wise president would have a full and open democratic discussion in which he would attempt to persuade the public of the need for validity of a broad program. mr. vitka: the concept delineating between the number of people affected or how targets are picked, versus the program itself, i think is valuable, and it gets to a question that i would like to hear from everybody on. there is a trust problem that now exists, for whatever series of reasons. an example of a concern that i

have was revealed through a "usa today" piece that came out last month that revealed that the dea had been conducting a metadata collection program 10 years before 9/11. one of the concerns and maybe this is pessimism, maybe paranoia, putting on who it is or who you ask, is that stopping a program like the telephone metadata collection program that is ongoing under authority, how do we know it does not show up under another authority? it is a sincere question because there's no reason to hold the community to such a paranoid standard, but how do we get to that point? ms. eoyang: i think this question is a real challenge because of the compartmentalization of the staff they do for information protection reasons, but you have

to ask the question reads what and you have to parse the answer in order to ask follow-up questions. when you ask, are you doing this under this authority or are you doing this, meaning the witness at the table in front of you that individual may only know a piece of it, and they may say, no, i do not, that does not mean it is lurking out there in other corners of the agencies, and some of the agencies are big and the witness may not know what is going on. so it is a real challenge, and one of the challenges for the intelligence committee is it is a relatively small staff, spread across a wide number of things. if that agency is doing the dollars, and has one person going through that entire agency to determine if there is a program hidden in a corner of it, it becomes a difficult

challenge without access to the kinds of audit tools easy available in other places, and without the collection challenges you have -- it resembles a litigious environment in terms of questioning. it feels like opposing counsel deposition, where i'm going to ask you this question, now i will rephrase and ask it again. i think a lot of people in the community and the agencies come with that need to know deeply ingrained attitude, and so they are looking for ways not to necessarily reveal everything. on the armed services side, what i found on a committee is when you ask questions, the answers were much more fulsome. they may say somebody else does that, but that is not my program, but let me talk to you about some of the things. the answers were much broader on the armed services side than on the intelligence side.

mr. vitka: does anybody else have any thoughts? mr. litt: a little dose of reality is useful here. remember the committees knew about these programs and about the bulk collection program and by virtue of our statutory requirement, if we do another program, they will know about that as well, whatever authority it is done under. in the last two years, the intelligence community has come to recognize the reality of leaks, and i think it would be a brave intelligence official who would say we're going to re-create a bulk collection program. it is a part to remember this program requires cooperation of telephone companies. it would be unlikely you would be able to secure the cooperation of telephone companies in a program that was re-creating this. the prospect that this program

could be re-created under this authority, willing to disregard all these outcomes, anything is possible. it is not going to happen. ms. eoyang: i would say, though, i was on the committee at a particular point in time. it is like "memento." and so it is probably true that post-snowden leaks that the committee has recognize that without a greater transparency the committees than they did at the time i was there. i was started in the bush administration, so a little more adversarial. the idea that members of congress have the confidence to say we know everything that is happening and there is nothing out there that if revealed they would be upset about, it is not

something that at least when i was there they would be confident in saying. that was not just because of a suspicion, but because they had had examples of programs that they had not previously been briefed to what had been ongoing, and as a result, on the committee, we conducted an investigation into what keeping the committee fully and completely informed actually meant, because they -- and my present committee felt like they were not fully and completely informed. mr. schwarz: i have one thought. i think today the shelf life of secret of major programs is far shorter than it was during the cold war, where you would have some program secret for 30 years. i do not think that is ever going to happen again for a variety of reasons. a, is that true, and, b, if it is true, what implications does it have for how the government and congress should relate to

each other? mr. litt: i think it is true and we are now at a position where everything that is undertaken by the intelligence community involves an assessment of what happens when this leaks out and are the benefits worth the risk. mr. toomey: if that is a change, it is a recent change. the dea program lasted 20 years and is only to like last in your area. i would also say that to the extent we are talking here about section 215, section 702, and maybe fisa's provision, we are leaving aside a huge number of programs that operate under executive order 12333, and staff

may know what level of oversight exists over those authorities, but some statements by the members of the intelligence committees have suggested that the committees were not fully informed about those programs is by the fact that they had significant indications for the indications and privacy of u.s. persons. and i think that is supported by recent reporting that the senate intelligence committee is working even now on compiling what is called an encyclopedia of executive order 12333 programs. i think there has been an uptick in oversight of those types of programs, but i do not think this historically and necessarily before 2013 that was the case. mr. vitka: what reform will convince you that that was not continuing?

mr. toomey: now we are considering a different type of congressional oversight. one possibility would be to have congress involved in assessing in a way that fritz talked about the church committee and we are talking about today, and making some of the assessments around what should be disclosed to the public, what types of high-level description of the authorities government wants to use can be usefully disclosed to the public and to the extent that the intelligence agencies want new authority and to the extent that the debate around usa freedom is whether we are confining the types of requests made to targeted grand jury like requests or usa freedom is designed to open up the door to data mining of americans' information, that is the type of

debate that we believe should be happening in the public sphere and that the opinion yesterday suggested should be happening in the public sphere. mr. vitka: could you briefly run through what was happening yesterday. mr. toomey: yesterday it was decided aclu vs. clapper. the case was decided on statutory grounds. the court concluded the plaintiffs had standing to sue that their statutory claims were not precluded, and that the bulk collection of phone records was not consistent with the authority that congress granted under section 215 when it passed that law or when it reformed 1861 in 2001. mr. vitka: the collection is ongoing? mr. toomey: it was remanded to the district court for orderly resolution of what happens next

in the case. mr. vitka: bob, i have a jurisdictional question that i do not know the answer to. the court of appeals for the second circuit, they say that this is unlawful. they have the opportunity to appeal at the supreme court. the fisa court of review is also an appeals court. does fisc have to listen to this if it stands? mr. litt: i'm not the right person to ask that. i think the answer is, no, i do not think the court of appeals has direct authority over the fisa court. it is something they would take in account, but nothing that is binding upon them. mr. vitka: does that change given that the harms that the second circuit acknowledged are felt in that jurisdiction?

mr. litt: again, i'm not a -- an expert in appellate jurisdiction. i do not think that is relevant to the question whether the second circuit has binding authority over a court that is not within the second circuit. i do not know, patrick, if you have a different view on that -- ms. eoyang: but the injunction would be. mr. litt: it would be binding on the persons who would be seen -- mr. toomey: the defendants are the agency officials said the injunction would be directed at those officials. mr. litt: but there is no injunction. i think the court made clear that was a deliberate decision on their part, not to issue an injunction, to play this out over the political process. mr. vitka: this touches usa freedom. nobody knows what is going to

happen with it. in the event there is not legislation that changes the recording requirements, would you expect to maintain this same level of transparency have now with potential to increase it? mr. litt: yes, and i expect we would continue to do that. mr. vitka: fritz, in your book you have a number of harsh words for judicial subservience -- "the courts are again undermining democracy. they undermine democracy by discounting the relationship between american democracy and citizens' access to information about what the government is doing." is this case a turning point? mr. schwarz: this is a court being more aggressive where courts have not been.

the judge you clerked for, potter stewart, back in the 1970's expressed the powerful arguments worrying about too much secrecy. in the mink case, where the supreme court held courts could not look at foia documents, but should amend the statute, which the congress did, potter stewart said the secrecy system leads to cynical, myopic, and even corrupt decisions. and then in the pentagon papers case -- i'm picking on you because you clerked for him -- complimenting you because you clerked for him -- in the pentagon papers case, potter stewart said if everything is specified, then nothing is really classified. the courts are pretty open to

challenges the government under foia and in some other areas and then they started just automatically deciding in favor of the government over the last 15 years, at least. i think they are afraid. they are afraid to could be wrong, and they are afraid to do what the courts often do and deal with subjects they are not experts in. i think the courts themselves say this. the several respected judges say we roll over in cases where the government -- foia case and state secrets case with the government raises a defense or in the foia case tries to deny information. maybe this is an era of courts being more willing to stand out,

but climate makes a difference and they are reacting to how the public and the congress reacted to snowden, and they are saying maybe it is not quite so scary as we thought to go against the government. mr. vitka: i want to move on because -- but i thought you might have the best view into how this ruling influences the politics of this, the congressional will. ms. eoyang: i think the second circuit put this back in congress' lap and say congress did not authorize this under 215 and if they want to be explicit about that, they need to ask. they made note of the timeline. there is an analysis of the 215 program that suggests they would not look kindly upon it the way it is currently constructed. i think there is politics in

this. in the house you would not get a clean reauthorization of the program through, so the real question for senator mcconnell do you take the legislation or do you let the program expire? mr. vitka: i want to highlight this was a reuters report, and it detailed and i will ask patrick to explain it and bob to comment, but to present the severe dissonance that exists in terms of what this is. nancy described it as phoning up investigations and said she'd never heard it anything like it. and senior dea officials called it decades old, a bedrock concept.

and nancy was a judge, by the way. patrick? mr. toomey: to describe what and some of the criminal cases we litigate and articles described, and articles have expounded on especially to the dea's program and recent disclosure of bulk collection of phone calls out of the u.s., parallel construction is an effort to construct a parallel source for certain evidence in investigations. it often occurs in certain senses. where we see it or wait believe it happened where investigators obtain information using one authority, which is potentially controversial or novel or legally untested in the court, and they rely on that authority to obtain information. investigations proceed with a bit of it, and on the base of

the information, and they subsequently obtained the same information using a more traditional law enforcement technique, like a rule 41 search warrant or subpoena for billing records. one example would be relying on the hemisphere program or even the 215 bulk collection phone records program to identify a person via their phone records. building an investigation, using that information, and then using a subpoena targeted at that now known person to obtain the same phone records, and when you end up in court, at the point of a prosecution, telling the defense only that the records were obtained via the second amendment, via the traditional subpoena that does not raise eyebrows, and never disclosing the fact that agents were tipped off or investigators relied on information passed by intelligence agencies that was

obtained through fisa, executive order 12333, 215, or one of these were exonerated authorities written, in our view and in the view of many of the defense lawyers and even former judges, this is a violation of the rules and the constitutional rules that entitled defendants to seek to have an opportunity to suppress the fruit of the poisonous tree, to argue before a court that the surveillance was unlawful and that the government's evidence is derived from that surveillance. mr. litt: if nancy says she had never seen anything like this, she is being disingenuous. if you take references to 215 out and substitute for them confidential informant, this is something that has existed for decades. the government does not have disclosed the identity of

informant provided that tip that started an investigation. the relevant factor in terms of discovering opportunity is, is the evidence being used at the trial against the defendant the fruit of other activities? and there is a well-developed jurisprudence about what is and what does and does not constitute the fruit of the poisonous tree, and including concepts like independent source, and this has long been the law. it is no different in the context of these programs. the fact that a government agent was alerted to the existence of the defendant by a particular source does not necessarily give the defendant the right to suppress that basis unless the evidence was derived under standard fruit of the poisonous tree rules from that -- mr. vitka: do those rules apply in the context of bulk collection? mr. litt: why wouldn't they?

mr. toomey: i would add two things, and say i strongly disagree that the identity of a confidential informant, which it is true, there are cases that talk about whether it has been through a balancing test are entitled to get the name of the details about the -- mr. litt: or the existence of the informant's tip? i was a prosecutor for six years. mr. vitka: does the judge know in that context? mr. litt: sometimes the judge knows and sometimes not. mr. toomey: sometimes prosecutors are arguing for themselves. that decision is never put before a court, ever obviously put before the defendant, and the government has an interest in reaching a determination and from what we are seeing in the

dea disclosures, structuring its investigations and the trail of what is recorded in agents' notes reports and court applications to suggest that in fact those sources were not relied upon when they were. and that is problematic. the government has an interest in making the chain from point a to point b as attenuated as possible to avoid court review of these programs, and we have seen not least in the context of 702 that the government has used an extremely narrow definition that qualifies of derived evidence. mr. vitka: to bring us to the oversight perspective, but mieke, did you ever hear about this? should you have? ms. eoyang: i would not have

on the question of parallel construction, how information is used in a court case, the committee predominantly is concerned about how programs work and how they are used in the national security context for a very long time. that was the traditional espionage. there's a lot of ground to cover. the idea you would figure out how particular pieces of information be used by agencies not under the jurisdiction of the committee is not something you would normally look at. this is also true when you talk about these old dea programs. there are two things working. one is the "memento" problem. while the dea might have briefed the committee at the time the program was initiated, members of congress and staff turn over, so over time you do that institutional knowledge and members of congress who come in a new congress will say i had no idea even the committee might have been briefed a few months

before that. and the second is that the intelligence committee is more focused on national security agencies and not a law enforcement agency. we might not have spent as much time looking at what the dea was up to, assuming that was covered by people focused on other kinds of oversight. mr. vitka: bob, it sounds like there's at least one path here where the information is collected and analyzed. if an american turns out to be a defendant, the decision about whether or not the evidence can be admitted is not reviewed by judge, not reviewed by -- perhaps by judiciary, but other entities that was just discussed. at what point does their oversight? mr. litt: it is routine in all cases that decision about what evidence is turned over the defendant are made by the prosecution. that is the way the system operates.

it is the case that when intelligence surveillance authorities are involved there tends to be more disclosure to the judge of the existence of those on a classified basis than there is in non-surveillance areas. fundamentally, this is the way to criminal justice system operates. the prosecution has a large file. it looks at rule 16 and determines what is disclosed to the defendant. mr. toomey: in terms of illustrating how deep the practice goes and what it keeps pendants and courts from considering, the dea program described in the "usa today" story is a good illustration. that is a program that has been around or was around for 20 years. it is a program that agents interviewed said they consulted

virtually every day. yet that program did not come to light in a criminal prosecution until 2015, until january of this year. it is a program that is used that widely, and i believe that program is not even classified is kept from defendants in such a wide range of cases, there is a need to reevaluate how parallel construction is used, and understand the legal rationale that underlies it within the justice department and how these government agencies are making unilateral determinations about what is derived from what. mr. vitka: i think we have to wrap up now, as much as i would like to keep discussing this. there was one last thing. this showed up yesterday.

senator burr was voicing a serious and lengthy defense of the section 215 metadata collection program. he said -- and i do not know if there has been time to clarify -- but in the statement he said that 215 provides for the collection of all phone call records and i.p. addresses. i do not know exactly if he misspoke or something else, and so i am not going to propose to bob something about whether or not this is ongoing because i said that your answer be will you cannot answer, but i want to know. mr. litt: we have been clear about what that 215 program is. it is a telephone metadata program. mr. vitka: could 215 be authorized, be used to authorize internet dragnet? mr. litt: probably not. it is not public knowledge that

they instituted an internet metadata program that used different authorities. i think there was a reason for that. mr. vitka: i think that is fair. fritz, i just want to give one more chance you for you to comment. parallel construction conversation, detailed, but what is striking is there such a profound gap between what is understood as legal or illegal. does that bring anything up for you? mr. schwarz: i believe the nsa had in addition to this program of picking up every telegram they had, they had a watch list program, and how people got on that and what happened to the data that was collected, i have

the vague memory that two attorney generals looked at that and said they did not think the way the information was getting from the nsa to prosecutors was appropriate, and he tried to put an end to nsa providing the information from the watch list to prosecutors. what theory they had, i do not remember, but if i were looking for history, one was richardson, and there was another attorney general who said we do not like the way in which nsa information is getting to prosecutors. mr. vitka: with that, i will stop the conversation portion of this and move on to questions and answers. if that is ready -- and i know that dan has a question, and i want to give him

time, but if you have questions, raise your hand and matt will come around and provide you a microphone. >> i work at the sunlight foundation. thanks for joining us today. mieke, you talk about the memento issue with congressional oversight. is there inadequate record-keeping around some of these things to make it hard to track over congresses? i would like to hear more about that. ms. eoyang: i do not know if that problem has been fixed. we had transitioned between spaces, and the challenge of finding congress' own legislative history, even the classified history so you could look at what previous congresses had done going back for the house -- was quite difficult which reinforces the memento problem.

try to go back and find information that would not be in executive branch control, but hearing records, internal documents prepared by the committee, having classified annexes, not having that history on site and readily available made it more difficult for members to be able to do historical persons. mr. litt: one of the answers to that problem, which is a real problem, is the existence of the full-time professional staff and permanent staff of the committee and it is a disadvantage to have staff members covered each member, because every time you have rotation on the committee your staff turns over. these committees have people who have been staffers were many years and have the institutional knowledge that can help them with this. ms. eoyang: they have both professional staff and the person who well help an individual member through. mr. litt: i know that leadership does not give them enough

resources. ms. eoyang: they are terribly under resourced. mr. vitka: i will quote you on that. >> bob, a question for you. i wrote earlier this week about how the nsa computers can and do extract text from voice, and is a pretty transformative technology. it makes it easier to search phone conversations in bulk. the public will not know about this, but for the snowden archives. how could we possibly have debate implications and establish limits for technologies like this, or is it none of our business? has congress been briefed on this? have they weighed in on this? mr. litt: that is example of what is wrong with a lot of media coverage, and even edward snowden said he thinks a lot of the press reporting has gone too far. that story made absolutely no

decision between technical capabilities and legal authorities. there are all sorts of technical capabilities that exist. i am not commenting on the existence or nonexistence of any such authority. the question is when are they used and what are the legal authorities under which they are used. that is something that cannot of the press reporting completely ignores, including that story you wrote. >> how would i have found out? mr. litt: you know what the legal authorities are. you know the authorities under which nsa can collect. it's not use any technical capability to do things that it is not allowed otherwise to do. mr. vitka: anyone else with a question? >> thanks for all the panelists coming out today. really appreciate it. mieke, i'm former staff, and i

do not work on the committee myself, but i have worked for one of the members, who i think, bob, you knew i had interaction with. one of the things that he always complain about was the 20-questions problem. i think we have covered that a little bit, but the thing i really want to ask today, and this is maybe my 20-question moment, has the icg either by itself or in concert with the other agency i.g.'s conducted a conference of look at all of the surveillance programs and activities carried out under these authorities that you have discussed, whether patriot act fisa, whether 12333? mr. litt: the answer is no. other outside bodies have been doing those, president's review group and so on. two, the resource implications

of that and the number of tasks -- gets from congress are such to make that impractical. so the icig -- there was a conference of look a number of years ago. we just released some documents that were declassified with a multi-i.g. look at earlier programs, and we have just released those. they're not been anything done in recent years. mr. vitka: i have a quick questions, and we have another one. fritz -- i do not know if most americans realize there's a secret court, if you will, in america. is that appropriate? should america have a secret court? mr. schwarz: it is not so new, by the way. when you have search warrants granted in an ordinary criminal

case, is done in effect by a secret court. and i think the existence of fisa among the public is fairly well known. a fair question is, shouldn't fisa do more to hear the other side, and i think they definitely should come and they would be well served. it would make them better. it would make them more believable if they did more to hear the other side in arguments and whether that is as counsel for target, which is difficult to do because they cannot really reveal that someone is a potential target, or it is a general amicus comes in, but in a way that remark of mine i think shows where fisa has been in my opinion misused recently

and where instead of it deciding particular cases, which courts have jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies and doing it in secret when you're deciding someone's records be looked at, does not trouble me. but i think they were asked over the last years and they agreed to do tasks which really are not the proper role of the courts, making judgments sort of on administrative issues. mr. vitka: what about when they reach issues of law, to put it properly? the definition of relevance, which is in context? mr. schwarz: it depends how it comes up. they should not sit around, as the second circuit in the case deciding what relevance means great i do not think they should talk about abstractly what is relevant. i think to do that without an

adversarial presentation is inappropriate and far more likely to have them take mistakes. so they would be better off in having a more adversarial process in any matter which is beyond should john jones' records be looked at? ms. eoyang: people talk about special advocates, but that is a person who is making arguments hypothetically in the abstract. what about the possibility that someone who was served with an order from the fisc could have standing to challenge that order, the adversarialness? mr. schwarz: what the usa freedom act is provides the ability for the creation of a panel of cleared lawyers who the

fisa court could appoint that presents a substantial issue of law or policy to come in and make an independent presentation that is not now made. mr. schwarz: should the fisa court be deciding policy questions, as if they are little branch of the legislature? mr. litt: that is not different from what courts do in other warrant situations. the judge has got to make that decision and the judge makes a decision in the abstract without an adversarial presentation. the difference here is that we are setting up a method because there is less other review of fisa court decisions than there is of warrant applications, we

are setting up a process, and i think the administration indicated it supports this whereby when those kinds of issues are presented to the fisa court, there's an opportunity to bring someone else into present a different view. mr. toomey: the distinction or one of the dinstictions that fritz is talking about is the differs between a particular rise to demand for a criminal suspect or a suspected foreign agent record and programatic review of the 215 program or minimization or targeting procedures that govern 702 surveillance. there is not a particular person who is the suspected foreign agent or is the target of that surveillance that ever comes before the fisc. the fisc is weighing in on whether the presents themselves, whether the government intends to apply the right for middle

and when it goes out and decides how to target people, but not any application to a particular person. and that even former judges of the fifth have commented that change for the fisa court has been a significant one from where it was started in 1978 and where it is today. mr. litt: i think it is true. what we've done is we've taken a whole category of activity that generally speaking and throughout most of the world have no judicial supervision at all, and up until recently was considered an inherited function, and we brought the courts into the system. so actually, what it has done is it has increased judicial involvement in activities that previously had no judicial supervision whatsoever. mr. vitka: this is one of the ways were parallel constructions becomes one of the odd points, because the bob's disruption of the fisc court does not translate into an adversarial setting where information has

remain classified, is not end up for the defendants, or the existence of it does not end up before the defendant. i would add for the staffers in the room that the special amicus in the usa freedom act does not have access to privileged information, which would be great if that got fixed before it got enacted. mr. litt: what kind of information do think the special advocate should have access to? mr. vitka: state secrets executive privilege. mr. litt: it is clear the amicus will have access to classified information. nothing in the amicus will have access to the internal opinions back-and-forth in the executive branch. i do not think the amicus should have access to that. mr. vitka: that it shall have access to information that is

privileged seems to be waiting for not yourself or anybody who is currently in office, but at some point it seems like there is wool to be pulled over their eyes. another question. >> i'm a frequent foia litigator, and i obtained documents that should the department of defense is developing not just speech to text, but also speaker recognition technology. two parts my question. the first is, if the government does not believe it has the legal authority or the intent to use that kind of technology, why spend taxpayer dollars on it? it seems it would pare well with what the nsa is already doing. i do not think it is an accurate corollary to liken an informant to a government program like the nsa collection program. government program triggers certain fourth amendment protections that a private

voluntary informant would not trigger, so that seems an inaccurate corollary. mr. litt: we disagree on that. on the first one, i am not saying the government is not using these technologies. i am saying they do not expand the authority of the government to do anything that he cannot legally do now. ms. eoyang: to be clear, there are private sector entities that are developing these capabilities. if you use google translate, the fact that the government pumps additional technology and spends money should not come as a surprise to anyone. the government will spend more and do it more slowly. but speech detection capability is not necessarily something that is that automatically pernicious if you are talking to google or siri. mr. vitka: but when a private company does it, it is a bid for

revenue. when a government does it, it is an expression of the will of the country. ms. eoyang: it depends. somebody who is driving a humvee down a road can talk to its navigation system without taking their hands off the wheel, that is a different reason for developing the technology than using it to do mass searching. that is an important question, where are these being used because there are benign reasons to develop some of these technologies as well. >> this is a technology specifically being designed to be used in telephone communication collection. it is being designed to be able to detect speech, then turn it into text and do keyword searches and recognize who the

speaker is, specifically for surveillance scenarios. mr. litt: tell me what you think is wrong with that. >> not necessarily that anything is wrong with it, but looking for protections in place so there's not further privacy violations. you can see how this would be paired with telephone to selection capabilities the nsa already has. mr. litt: if nsa were to use that in ways that violated its authority, it would be a problem. if they use that in furtherance of their existing authorities and within those authorities, it is not a problem. the technology is not the problem. the legal authorities are. >> i agree with you. technology is neutral. what we need our protections built around this technology and for that we need transparency. mr. vitka: i think the second circuit opinion reveals to us the critical issue of who makes that determination. this program, the metadata collection has been going on for many years.

it was not until the leaks occurred that it ended up having standing to be challenged before a court of appeals. what is the alternative, if not transparency? frankly, an adversarial system that produces an independent decision on whether or not this is lawful. mr. litt: whether or not what is lawful? mr. vitka: the policy decision to develop technology -- mr. litt: there is nothing lawful or unlawful about a technique that converts speech to text. what is lawful or unlawful is what communication the nsa collect, and under what authority. that is what we have been much more transparent about in the past. that is what is fully known to the intelligence committee, who are the authorized overseers. how it is that nsa is able to implement its lawful authority can frequently be the kind of

thing that does in fact cause damage when it gets out there. i'm not specifically acknowledging or denying any particular capability. i'm only saying that the focus needs to be on what are the authorities the nsa is using and what are protections around the execution of those authorities? >> tell the fisa court we are doing what? >> did you tell the court you were using speech to text and voice intercepts? mr. litt: i am not going to confirm or deny that that is true. the fisa court order specifically dictate what we can do and cannot do in conducting collection. you have seen those orders. you know what they say. we can do, the orders provide

what kinds of processing we can do on them. we do what those orders authorize. if the orders authorize it, we are allowed to do it. if they don't, we are not. it doesn't matter whether we use these speech to text recognition tools or 800 monkeys at typewriters. >> so there is something in those words about speech to text processing? mr. litt: the orders speak for themselves, and i'm not saying anything about speech to text processing. mr. vitka: i would point out one more thing. this highlights a distinction that exists when you have the opinion that we had. the question of whether or not an algorithm going through collected information counts as a search. that is a real question. and hypothetically speaking, i would be very interested. you may know about this as well.

if searching against a database is a search under the second circuit, but not a search under fisc, what is speech to text? is that a search? is that counted as a search? ms. eoyang: the question on that is the particular communication you are looking at that you want to convert from speech to text. the question is, how did you pick that out of your haystack? that is the question that bob is trying to get out. what is that? is it that, if it was saying look, you have both collection of something and we are doing it on everything, that is a different question. if you are processing the entire haystack, versus processing select communications, that's the question about technology. you need to know, what were the criteria for that selection? we had this debate all the time.

in order to find a needle in a haystack, first you have to find a haystack. people felt you needed a lower level of scrutiny about the haystack. but it's not like you were going back and saying, ok, what is the level of scrutiny on the selection? this is in the early days. things have evolved legally since then. there's a real question in the second circuit, at what level is there a search? at what level is there any effect? that is a question, if a country, it is not clear where people come down, the communications they are putting out there into the world. a question about the third-party and metadata and the rest of that, i think different people might feel differently about it. but not until recently did we have a national conversation about it. mr. vitka: shouldn't the arbiter be something --

that looks like the court of appeals? ms. eoyang: it depends on the context in which you are asking the question. if you are talking about the 702 program, then no, because you have a challenge within 702, a built-in oversight structure. if it is something that is in a title 18 context, then probably yes. but i don't know, in the 12333 context, i don't know if you could do judicial oversight. it is a different context, depending on what communications you are talking about. mr. schwartz: last question. >> i'm wondering if you can discuss, i know there is discussion of this in the book but attempts on the congressional oversight committee to get information

declassified. it often seems that the tools of congress for doing that are limited. congress often does not try. what are the obstacles to try to get information declassified in congress? ms. eoyang: on the intelligence committee, i would say that the desire for declassification is lower because you are dealing with everything in a classified space anyway, so you are having those conversations in a protected environment. it is only when you are having the conversation and externally that it is a challenge. for a long time before, we got through public debate starting with the 702 debate, it was difficult to get the community to break down exactly what was classified on what level, so you could actually have a public debate, a classification guide to help members have a conversation where parts of it

were classified and parts of it were unclassified, to describe that well. i think members of congress are hesitant, for a variety of reasons, to take unilateral action, which they could do under the speech and debate clause, or go to the committee to declassified things absent executive branch input, in part because they are so dependent on the executive branch for continued access to classified information, and that really is, i think, the nuclear option in terms of putting information out there. they are cognizant of the ways in which it could become very difficult if they reveal classified information in a way that could undermine security. because they take their job to secure the nation seriously, they are hesitant to do things they feel might underline that. mr. schwartz: congress has the power to declassify, but they have to go through a process. and it is not easy.

some individual senator getting up and reading a classified document and saying it is protected under speech and debate, i think, is not a desirable way to go. but the committee can declassify. they don't have to wait for the president or wait for the cia. and i think they are a little too subservient. but if you don't have a unified position, you are not going to have the power to do it. we did it, sometimes. we did reveal some things that the executive branch didn't want us to. and we were right. the shamrock program was one example. we were right to reveal those things. but we had a sort of unity. right now, it is going to be very difficult, like in the torture report, to go beyond

where they were, we would not get a congressional vote or a leader's vote to allow it to the committee. there's two or three ways it could be done. they have the power. they should be a little more willing to at least consider doing it. but you cannot do it unless you have a very solid backing for the decision. ms. eoyang: this goes to a question that really addresses the quality of congressional oversight, the commitment of the leadership of the congressional committee involved. that varies from member to member. i worked for members who pushed very aggressively for agencies to declassify information, personally getting involved in the conversation and pushing through the bureaucratic process that declassification might normally take. then there are other members who would prefer that nothing be declassified at all.

the level of a member's commitment to having the debate in public versus having the debate behind closed doors, and a member's commitment to aggressive, skeptical oversight versus a more friendly relationship really will change the quality of the ways the committees interact with the agencies. they set expectations for the agencies, when you have a long time with one kind of oversight or another. they get used to that, and when change comes it is a tough adjustment. mr. vitka: we are firmly over time. thank you especially to bob. it is critically important to have the intelligence community from the inside represented here. thank you, again. thank you all for being here. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015]

[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> attorney general loretta lynch announcing a new investigation into the baltimore police department. a british party leaders making remarks after the announcement of the recent election results. a ceremony in london marking the 70th anniversary of the ce day, the end of world war ii. --ve day, the end of world war ii. >> he discusses trade legislation in congress. his efforts to stop her a bill from passing the house and and pads of the transpacific crew if the bill passes.

"newsmakers" sunday. >> sunday night on q&a, former bloomberg reporter. >> heart are -- who are the big limits -- thicklands? >> members of the house with work there. [indiscernible] nine members of the family work there. his uncle were maitre d''s, the heather butler. he told doing my uncle ran the white house. they brought him in 1950 nine

during the eisenhower administration. he is still working there. he describes how he used to work in the kitchen. there is a great, it's incredible he remembers what the eyes and i were's -- eisenhower's rely. he remembers that. i wanted to pay tribute to these people. >> attorney general loretta lynch announced her department will investigating the baltimore police department. it follows the death of freddie gray will police custody. his death sparked a series of protests and riots in the city. this is over 20 minutes. loretta lynch: good morning, everyone.

i'm joined by the head of civil rights. as we all know, as we have all seen, we have watched as baltimore has struggled with issues that face cities across our country today. we have seen the tragic loss of a young man's life. we have seen a peaceful protest movement coalesce to express the concern of a beleaguered community. we have seen brave officers upholding the right to peaceful protests while also sustaining serious injuries themselves during the city's unfortunate foray into violence and we have watched now through the prism of one of the most challenging issues of our time, the issue of police community relations.

when i traveled to baltimore earlier this week i had an opportunity to see the significant work that the police department had done with the cops office over the last six months through a collaborative reform process but despite the progress being made it was clear that recent events including the tragic in custody death of mr. freddie gray had given rise to if -- serious erosion of public trust. i have been asked by city officials and community leaders to augment our approach to the situation with a court enforcement model. i spent the last few days considering which of the justice department's tools best meets the current means of the baltimore police department and the broader baltimore community. we are opening an investigation into whether the police department has engaged in a pattern or practice of violations of the constitution or federal law. this investigation will begin immediately and will focus on allegations that officers used excessive force including deadly force and conduct unlawful

searches, seizures, and arrests, and engage in discriminatory policing. the cops office will continue to work with the baltimore police department and the collaborative reform process will now convert to the provision of technical assistance to the baltimore police department. some may ask how this differs from our current work with baltimore police department. the answer is rather than examining whether the police department violated good policies, we will now examine whether they violated the constitution and the communities civil rights. this approach has been welcomed by the baltimore city fraternal order of police and i want to thank them for their support and their partnership as we move forward. in the coming days, civil rights attorneys and investigators conducting the investigation and the police experts who will assist them will be engaging with community members and law enforcement. we will examine policies practices, and available data and at the conclusion of our

investigation, we will issue a report of our findings. if unconstitutional policies or practices are found, we will seek a court enforceable agreement to address those issues. we will continue to move forward to improve policing in baltimore even as the investigation is underway. our goal is to work with the community, public officials, and law enforcement to create a stronger, better baltimore. the department of justice civil rights division has conducted dozens of these investigations and we have seen from our work in jurisdictions across the country that communities that have gone through this process are experiencing improved policing practices and increased trust between the police and the community. i encourage other cities to study our past recommendations and see whether they can be applied in their own communities. this process is meant to ensure

that officers are being provided with the tools that they need, including training, policy guidance, and equipment to be more effective to partner with civilians and to strengthen public safety. for many people across the country, the tragic death of mr. freddie gray and the unfortunate violence that did occur has come to personify the city as if that alone is baltimore. earlier this week i visited with members of the community who took to the streets in the days following the unrest to pick up trash, to clear away debris, and they are baltimore. i visited with elected officials who were determined to help the neighborhoods that they love come back stronger and more united and they are baltimore. i visited youth leaders who believe there is a brighter day ahead and they are baltimore too. i also visited with law enforcement officers who had worked up to 16 days without a break and they were focused not

on themselves or even their own safety but on protecting the people who live in their community. they, too, are baltimore. none of us have any illusions that reform is easy. the challenges that we face and baltimore faces now did not arise in a day and change will not come overnight. it will take time and sustained effort. the people i met in baltimore, from the protesters to the public officials, to the officers, including one who was injured, all said to me ultimately the same thing, i love my city and want to make it better. that is why i optimistic about this process and i am hopeful about the days and weeks to come. that is why i am confident that as a result of this investigation and hard work that is still ahead -- make no mistake, it is hard work -- all residents of the baltimore community, residents and law enforcement alike, will be able to create a stronger and safer

and more united city together. thank you for your time and attention. at this time i would like to open it up for a few questions. reporter: the request came from the city. what have you heard or seen from residents of baltimore that leads you to believe that the ongoing justice review needs to be augmented? are the problems deeper than you initially understood? can you talk about why cop does not work? or is not sufficient? loretta lynch: the process has helped numerous communities and police departments across the country. but for collaborative reform to ultimately be effective, we need the three-part base of support. police engagement, elected officials, and community engagement.

and the ability to have faith in the process. we have all seen events change in baltimore and become much more intense over a short period of time. the community's trust has been worse and has severed in terms of the relationship with the police department. we felt that was one factor. in viewing whether we could use it to make the changes that we need. also, as we look more to the issues facing the police department itself in terms of the needs it has and the issues residents were raising, they were more intense than when we started the collaborative process. we thought the best thing to do was to conduct an investigation to see if these issues rose to the level of civil rights violations. and if so, have the best model in which to address them. in our view, a court enforced order.

reporter: senator mikulski made reference to a fractured trust between police and communities around the country. i wonder, from your standpoint how serious that fracture is. loretta lynch: we have had a number of situations that have highlighted the fracture in various communities, in different parts of the country cities of all sizes, issues ranging from people being harmed or unfortunate deaths in custody. i think we see it when it occurs. i think the issue goes beyond just the interaction between the police and the community. we are talking about generations, not of only mistrust, but generations of communities that feel separated from government overall. you are talking about situations where there is a flashpoint occurrence that coalesces years of frustration and anger. that is what i think you saw in baltimore when there was that unfortunate night of violence and you see it in other cities

around country as well. you can't look at a city and predict what's going to happen. you can't look at a city and analyze it. and certainly we're not looking to do that. we hope that our work, through collaborative reform and investigation, other cities can look at their own environments and decide what issues they see and whether or not some of the work done in the past can be brought to bear and help as well. reporter: will the department release any findings the folks have found in the collaborative review? loretta lynch: the information is going to be folded into the pattern of practice report. typically when we to a collaborative reform effort with the police department that usually does end in a report that is made public. because we're now going to fold it into an investigation, we won't have that collaborative reform report.

there will be a report at the end of the pattern of practice investigation that will draw on that. reporter: this violence took place just as you are coming into office. as you saw this unfold, what was your reaction? what did you think? loretta lynch: i watched it, as did most people, through the prism of my television screen. i've seen similar incidents across the country and my first reaction was profound sadness. it truly was. it was profound sadness for the loss of life, the erosion of trust, the sadness and despair the community was feeling, for the frustration i know the police officers were feeling also as they tried to encourage peaceful protest but had to deal with violence. my first reaction was profound sadness. reporter: the fbi director and secretary of homeland security is having a conference with the nation's police to talk about the growing concern over isis social media. how much is the concern is that at how urgent is a concern --

how urgent of a concern is that for the doj? loretta lynch: as we look into our national security cases, we have attempted to see which tools those who seek to do america harm utilize. social media is certainly one we have seen used. in my old district we've seen social media used as a recruitment tool, as a means of distributing information. it's an area we try to stay on top of but it's part of the full pan pli of things -- panoply of things we try to stay on top of. i'm going to apologize for not knowing everyone's name right away. otherwise, i would not point to you in this manner. reporter: the fwarland police department said they didn't have enough information that they had

a threat heading their way. how are you guys working to make sure that local officials are looped into the threat that you guys identify at the federal level? loretta lynch: when information is determined to be a threat to any police department, we provide them with as much as information as we can. in the situation you saw there was an individual who was known before but had not been very active in the past. the information provided was more limited than the garland police would have liked to seen. certainly, all efforts are made to provide them with information and they were tremendously helpful in the results of the case and the results of the shooting that occurred. reporter: carrie johnson, npr. as you know, a lot of localities are looking to you and your department now to help heal the fractured trust between police and communities. that said, you only have so many resources to conduct these reviews and investigations.

do you need more attorneys and investigators? d needs a lot to be changed -- do you need a law to be changed? loretta lynch: was on the hill -- i was on the hill for my first meeting. -- appropriations meeting. we always ask for increased resources to handle the cases we have and the ones we anticipate. to the larger issue raised by your question, which is communities looking for help and resources, the department of justice is here to help and we try to be a resource. reality is, we cannot litigate our way out of this problem and and is not our intention to engage in an investigation or review of every police department across the country. it is rather our goal and profound hope that the work we have done will be a base for communities to look at and to build upon as they determine what issues exist in their communities. we now have a very solid body of

of reports, both collaborative reform and pattern of practice ngses. one of the things i most pleased about over recent years is that many of our investigations are begun very cooperatively in conjunction with law enforcement and elected officials. they reach to us for assistance. they are not in an adversarial mode. by and large, most of them have been under the environment of working very well with police and community. our hope is that other jurisdictions, cities large and small can look at these reports and say, are these the issues i face? what does the justice department see that? what is my police department doing that might look like this or be a better model of haiti or? one of the things we try to do through the cops process is pair police with their piers who have had successful -- with their peers.

our goal is to be the resource and guide, not the hand reaching into every police department. we truly believe that communities, cities, police departments, they know the cities best, they know what the issues and problems are and want to help them reach the best solutions. reporter: eric tucker, ap. much has been made about the different racial dynamics between baltimore city versus forget san. in ferguson, a police department with a very few number of minorities. baltimore is very different. to what extent based on that racial dynamic are you anticipating that the pobs in baltimore will be different and perhaps less race-based?

loretta lynch: i think that regardless of the ethnic or racial makeup of every city every city is different. they all present different issues. policing is a challenging profession, no matter where you are. the issues facing baltimore certainly do -- some people express them in racial tones. people were expecting them to me as community leaders feeling pain. community police feeling frustrated at not being able to protect their city. there was a commonality that crossed races, crossed groups. every city is different and i do not want to prejudge or put that particular prism on baltimore or any other city. reporter: senator mikulski said

that grant money should be tied to training. in racial and ethnic bias. is that something you'll actively consider? loretta lynch: we have a wide range of grant programs to assist state and local police forces. many are specifically for training purposes. many simply provide equipment and do other things. our approach has always been rather than conditioning getting a grant on a particular program, we work with the jurisdiction to really focus on the specific need they have and basically give them access to the. -- the training they need. because the training for every department really is different. their requirements and needs are different for every department. we are always considering ways to make our grant programs more efficient. reporter: what more should the federal government be doing to deal with isis using social media?

what more should the federal government be doing? loretta lynch: at this point, i can say that we are certainly using all the tools available to us to determine how social media is being used. as always, we have to balance that with the right to free speech, with privacy rights. those are very important concerns. we have to balance that with making sure that what we do does not interfere with the free flow of information for law-abiding citizens, for example. i'm not able to give you specific details on what the government is focusing on now, but we are focusing on that as an issue. it is not a new issue. we have seen social media being used in a number of cases and it is an expansion of how the internet has been used for several years now. both in recruitment and radicalization. >> one more question. loretta lynch: several hands are up now.

reporter: can you explain to people why they shouldn't be concerned that the federal government was flying surveillance planes over baltimore during the protests? loretta lynch: i did see that report and someone came to me and said, were you flying drones over baltimore and i thought well, i don't have drones. leaving that aside, it's not an uncommon practice for police helicopters to fly over to try and figure out where are people moving to or where might violence be breaking out and provide information down to the field. very to officers on the ground providing surveillance reports. i do not think it was a new occurrence and you see it in a number of cities. it was for the purpose us finding out if there were pockets of violence and what can be done about that. you will have to be the last one.

reporter: just the other day, the mayor was talking about the investigation, she touted a 40% drop in complaints about excessive force, 54% of officers being discourteous. is that evidence that it's getting better? loretta lynch: all the data that has been gathered will be factored into the investigation. it is premature to say what the data means. we've ahn seen situations where you can have numbers that look great but if you're the person involved in an unfortunate incident for you it feels like it's 100%. we'll be looking at those issues and incidents but we'll be looking at the larger issues of whether or not the police as they work to stop arrests and detain people, how they are in fact implementing their policies. we'll look at excessive force, the use and guidance that they have and the training they have already system of that will factor into our investigation.

it's premature to say how it will impact on it. thank you all. >> next, british party leaders including prime minister david cameron making remarks after the announcement of last night's vote results. after that ceremonies marking the anniversary of v-e-day, the end of world war ii in europe. on the next "washington journal", bernard kerik offering his use in criminal justice and prison reform. then mark mazzetti on the u.s. drone policy and the controversy it caused in naming three

undercover c.i.a. officials. and high school teachers andrew keneen and daniel lar zen talk about advanced placement government exam. they go through sample questions and take calls from high school students. we will take your calls and you can join the conversation at facebook and twitter. live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> here's a look at some of our featured programs for this weekend. saturday morning at 10 eastern on c-span, we are live from greenville, south carolina for the g.o.p. freedom summit. speakers include scot walker, texas senator ted cruz, carly fiorina, and florida senator marco rubio. on mother's day, sunday, at noon eastern, members of america's first families remember first ladies featuring the daughters of jackie kennedy, lady bird johnson, betty ford and laura

bush. on c-span2. jon krakauer focusing on mizzou la, montana. and the first female four-star general talks about her life and military career. and on c-span3, 4:45 p.m., on "oral histories," remembering the liberation of nazi concentration camps with an interview with kurt cline who, as a teenager, escaped and lost his parents in auschwitz and as an interrogator for the u.s. army, questioned hitler's personal driver. and sunday afternoon at 2:00, the 70th anniversary the end of world war ii in europe with dignitaries commemorating the end of the event at the world war ii memorial in washington, d.c. get our complete schedule at c-span.org. >> after losing a majority of seats in thursday's u.k.

election, nick clegg and labour party leader ed miliband have announced their resignations. british prime minister david cameron, who won a narrow majority, also spoke to reporters briefly outside 10 downing street in london. we begin with mr. clegg's remarks. this is about 25 minutes. [cheers and applause] mr. clegg: thank you very much. thank you. i always expected the election to be exceptionally difficult for the liberal democrats, given the heavy responsibility we have

had to wear in government under the most challenging of circumstances. but clearly the results have been more crushing and unkind than i could have feared. for that, i must take responsibility and therefore i announce i will be re-signing as leader of the liberal democrats. a leadership election will take place according to the party's rules. for the last seven years, it's been a privilege, a huge privilege, unlimited honor, to lead a party of the most resilient, courageous, and remarkable people. the liberal democrats are a family and i will always be extremely proud of the warmth, good grace, and good humor which our liberal family has shown through the ups and downs of recent years. i want to thank every member, every campaigner, every counselor and every parliamentarian for the commitment you have shown to our

country and to our party. it is simply heartbreaking to see so many friends and colleagues who have served their constituents so diligently over so many years abruptly lose their seats because of forces entirely beyond their control. in 2011, after a night of disappointing election results for our party, one of our candidates in edin brogue, alocation cole hamilton, said this. he said if his the feet was past payment for the ending of it he accepted it with all his heart. those words revealed a selfless dignity which is very rare in politics but common amongst liberalle democrats. if our losses today are part payment for every family that is

more secure because of a job we helped to create, every person with depression who is treated with a compassion they deserve, every child who does a little bet for the school, every apprentice with a long and rewarding career to look fwrd to and couples who know their love is worth no less than anyone else, and a pensioner with a little more money i hope our losses can be taken with a little dignity too. we will never know how many lives we changed for the better because we had the courage to step up at the time of crisis. but we have done something that cannot be undone because there can be no doubt we leave governments with britain a far stronger fairer, greener, and more liberal country than it was five years ago. however unforgiving the judgment

has been of the liberal democrats in the ballot box, i believe the history books will judge our party kindly for the service we sought to provide to the nation at a time of great economic difficulty and for the policies and values which we brought to bear in government. opportunity, fairness, and liberty. which i believe will stand the test of time. to have served my country at a time of crisis is an honor that will stay with me forever. i hope those who are granted the opportunity to serve our country in government now and in the future will recognize the privilege and responsibility that they've been given. it's the greatest thing do. it is of course too early to give a considered account of why we have suffered the catastrophic losses we have and the party will have to reflect on these in the time ahead.

but one thing it seems to me is clear. liberalism here as well as across europe is not faring well against the politics of fear. years of remorseless economic and social hardship following the crash in 2008 and the grinding insecurities of globalization have led people to reach for new certainties. the politics of identity of nationalism, of us versus them, is now on the rise. it is clear that in constituency after constituency, north of the border the beguiling appeal of scottish nationalism has swept all before it. and south of the border, a fear about what that means for the united kingdom has strengthened english conservatism too. this now brings our country to a very perilous point in our history where grievance and fear

combine to drive our different communities apart. i hope that our leaders across the united kingdom realize the disastrous consequences for our way of life and the integrity of the united kingdom if they continue to appeal to grievance rather than generosity and fear rather than hope. it's no exaggeration to say that in the absence of strong and statesmanlike leadership, britain's place in europe and the world and the continued existence of our united kingdom itself is now in grave jeopardy. and the cruelest irony of all is that it is exactly at this time that british liberalism, that fine noble tradition, that believes that we are stronger together and weaker apart, is more needed than ever before. fear and grievance have won. liberalism has lost.

but it is more precious than ever and we must keep fighting for it. that is both the great challenge and the great cause that my successor will have to face. i will always give my unstinting support to all those who continue to keep the flame of british liberalism alive. on the morning of the most crushing blow to the liberal democrats since our party was founded, ts easy to imagine -- it is easy to imagine that there is no road back but there is. no path to a fairer greener, freer britain without british liberalism showing the way. this is a very dark hour for our party. but we cannot and will not allow decent liberal values to be extinguished overnight. our party will come back, our party will win again. it will take patience,

resilience and grit but that is what has built our party before and will rebuild it again. thank you. [cheers and applause] [cheers and applause] mr. miliband: friends, this is not the speech i wanted to give today because i believed that britain needed a labour

government. i still do but the public voted otherwise last night. earlier today, i rang david cameron to congratulate him. i take absolute and total responsibility for the results and our defeat in this election. i am so sorry for all of those colleagues who lost their seats. ed jim murphy, all the m.p.'s and indeed candidates who were defeated. they're friends, colleagues and standard bearers for our party, they always have been and they always will be. [applause]

i also want to congratulate all of our candidates who were elected yesterday and who will help take our party forward as well. [applause] i want to thank those people who ran our campaign. it was the most united, cohesive and enjoyable campaign i've ever been involved in. i want to thank douglas alexander, lucy powell, spencer livermore and most of all, all of you -- you, the incredible team of the labour party. [applause] and i also today want to thank the incredible team of labour party members activists and all those people who pounded the streets for the party. [applause]

britain needs a strong labour party. britain needs a labour party that can rebuild after this defeat so we can have a government that stands up for working people again. and now it's time for someone else to take forward the leadership of this party. so i'm tendering my resignation taking effect after this afternoon's commemoration of v.e. day. i want to do so straight away because the party needs to have an open and honest debate about the right way forward without constraint. let me say, harriet harmon is the best deputy leader anyone could hope for. i worked for her more than 20 years ago, i'm proud to have had her as my deputy for my term of

leadership. [applause] she will take over until a new leader is elected. for me i'm looking forward to reacquainting myself with justine, danielle and sam. but before i do i want to say a few things. first of all, thank you to the british people. thank you to the people who met me at train stations, colleges, workplaces and schools. thank for sharing your stories with me. i have learned so much from you. it has been an enormous privilege. thank you for the selfies, thank you for the support, and thank you for the most unlikely cult of the 21st century. real -- defandom.

-- the fandom. [applause] i want to address those who voted labour yesterday. today you all feel disappointed, even bleak. but while we may have lost the election the argument of our campaign will not go away. the issue of our unequal country will not go away. this is the challenge of our time. the fight goes on. and whoever is our new leader, i know labour will keep making the case for a country that works for working people once again. [applause]