their interest and the interest of the region. the question then will be is iran repaired to do what is required for the international community that they are not developing a nuclear weapon and that we have set up the kind of regimes that allow such confidence to be maintained, not just next year but out into the future. what we did was we had secretary kerry, secretary ernie moneys, to walk through why it was we were confident that if the framework we arrived at were to be solidified that in fact, we could verify they didn't have a nuclear weapon and that was important to them and i think gave them additional confidence. there was a concern, a concern i

share, that even if we deal effectively with the nuclear issue, that we will still have a problem with some of iran's destabilizing activities, and a number of them did express concern that with additional resources through the reduction in sanctions, that was it possible that iran would siphon off a lot of these resources into more destabilizing activities. secretary lu was there to explain that first of all there would be no relief until in nuclear deal. secondly, we gave them our best analysis of the enormous needs iran has internally, and the commitment that iran has made to its people in terms of improving

economic growth. and as i pointed out, most of the destabilizing activity iran engages in, is low-tech, low-cost activity. so, part of my emphasis to them was that if we are focusing more effectively on the things we need to do, to ensure defensive, improve intelligence, improve the capacity for maritime monitoring of what is taking place in the gulf, if we are working in concert to address the terrorist activity and countering terrorist messages coming not just from state sponsors like iran, but more broadly from organizations like isil, then we will be able to fortify ourselves and deal with many of the challenges more

effectively from a position of strength and confidence. it is not to deny concerns there about what happens when sanctions are reduced, but it was to emphasize that what matters more is the things we can do now to ensure that some of this destabilizing activity is no longer taking place and of course, when you look at a place like yemen, the issue there is that the state itself was crumbling and that if we can do a better job in places like syria, yemen, libya, and building up punching political -- functioning political structures it is less likely , that anybody, including iran can exploit the divisions that exist there. michael.

michael: on syria, one of the reasons we are here is that we are upset more than two years ago, when they deployed chemical weapons there was no military , response, not retaliation on the part of the u.s. now there is a threat that assad has once again used chemical weapons. what did you tell these leaders who were disappointed last time and will you use a military response if it is confirmed he did use chemical weapons? and if i could asked a domestic question as well, this one is about the environment and the drilling recently approved in the arctic. this nation is now a net exporter for the first time in years in fossil fuels, partly due to fracking. something it you regard as a energy strategy. the oil company shell has had a net record of drilling in that region. many environmentalists ask if it

is worth the risk to drill in such a delicate ecosystem. thank you. president obama: the reason i am here is not because of what happened in syria couple years ago. the reason i am here is because we have extraordinary challenges throughout the region, not just in syria but in yemen and libya. our interest is making sure we don't have a nuclear weapon in iran. with respect to syria, my commitment was to make sure that syria was not using chemical weapons and mobilizing the international community to ensure that would not happen. in fact, we positioned ourselves to be willing to take military action. the reason we did not was because assad gave up his chemical weapons.

that is not speculation on our part, that has been confirmed by the organization charged with a -- eliminating chemical weapons and i don't think there are a lot of folks in the region who are disappointed that assad is no longer in possession of one of the biggest stockpiles of chemical weapons of any country on earth. those have been eliminated. it is true we have seen reports about the use of chlorine in bombs that have the effect of chemical weapons. chlorine itself historically has not been listed as a chemical weapon but when it is used in this fashion, can be considered a prohibited use of that particular chemical and we are working with the international community to investigate that

and if we have the kinds of confirmation we need, we will once again, work with the international community and the organization charged with monitoring compliance by the syrian government and we will reach out to patrons like russia to put a stop to it. with respect to the situation in the arctic, it is fair to say that i know a little something about the risks of offshore drilling given what happened in the gulf early in my presidency. nobody is more mindful of the risks and dangers involved. that is why, despite the fact shell put in an application for exploration in this region several years ago, we delayed it for a lengthy time until they could provide us with the kinds of assurances that we have not seen before, taking account of

the extraordinary challenges if in fact there was a leak that far north and in that kind of environment. which would be more difficult to deal with than in the gulf. based on those very high standards, shell had to go back to the drawing board revamp its approach, and the experts at this point have concluded that they have met those standards. but keep in mind that my approach when it comes to fracking, drilling, u.s. energy production of oil or natural gas, has remained consistent throughout. i believe we will have to transition office fossil fuels as a planet in order to prevent climate change. i am working internationally to reduce our carbon emissions and to replace, overtime, fossil fuels with clean energy.

we start at home with the work we have done to for example double the use of clean energy. i think that it is important to recognize that will be a transition process. in the meantime, we will continue using fossil fuels and when it can be done safely and appropriately, u.s. production of oil and natural gas is important. i would rather us, with all of the safeguards and standards that we have, be producing oil and gas rather than importing it, which is bad for our people and potentially purchased from places that have much lower environmental standards than we do. reporter: thank you. i would like to ask you about trade.

the senate moved forward on a bill today to approve your trade legislation and move forward with a proposal to punish countries like china for what they do in terms of manipulating their currency. could you potentially see your self accepting senator schumer's language on currency manipulation? or would you have to veto that? your relationship with senator warren? do you regret the fact things have become so personal? president obama: that was the second question, wasn't it? reporter: you mentioned a tuesday solution to israel, i wondered if you would give your reaction to what the pope is moving forward with in terms of recognizing the palestinian states. do you think that is a good idea, do think it is a mistake or do you think it would help or hinder the solution you

mentioned earlier? president obama: i want to congratulate the senate on moving forward with providing me the authority to strike a smart, progressive growth promoting trade deal with some of the countries in the pacific region. potential europe as well. but also to give me the tools to enforce those agreements. which is not always happen in the past. i want to thank all of the senators who voted to provide that authority. or at least to begin the debate on moving that process forward. those who did not vote for it, i want to keep on trying to make the case and provide them the information they need to feel confident that despite the fact there have been very genuine problems with some trade deals in the past, the approach we are taking here, i think, is the

right one not just for big u.s. businesses, but also for small u.s. businesses and medium-sized u.s. businesses and most importantly, american workers. i would not be promoting any agreement that i didn't think at the end of the day was going to be creating jobs and giving us more of an opportunity to create ladders of success, higher incomes and wages for the american people. that is my primary focus and it has been since i came into office. the issue with respect to myself and elizabeth has never been personal. i think it is fun for the press to see if we can poke around at it when you see two close allies have a disagreement on policy

issue. some of my best friends are in the senate and the house. some of my earliest supporters who disagree with me on this. i understand because like me they came up through the ranks watching plants close, jobs being shipped overseas. like me, they have concerns about whether labor agreements or environmental agreements with other countries are properly enforced. like me, they have concerns about whether in fact trade ends up being fair and not just free. and like me, they have a deep concern about some of the global trends we have seen and trends in our own countries in terms of increased inequality and what appears to be the effects of

automation and globalization in allowing people at the top to do really well but creating stagnation in terms of incomes and wages for middle-class families and people working to get their way into the middle class. so, these are folks whose values are completely aligned with mine. i noticed there was a progressive statement of principles about what it means to be a progressive by some of these friends of mine and i noted that it was basically my agenda except for trade. that was the one area where there was a significant difference. this just comes down to a policy difference and an analysis in terms of what we think is best for our people, our constituents. it is my firm belief that

despite the problems of previous trade deals, that we are better off writing high standard rules with strong, enforceable provisions on things like child labor or deforestation or environmental degradation or wildlife trafficking or intellectual property. we are better off writing those rules for what will be the largest, fastest-growing market in the world. if we don't, china will and other countries will and our businesses will be disadvantaged and our workers will ultimately suffer. in terms of some of the fears of outsourcing of jobs, it is my belief based on the analysis that at this point, if there was a company in the united states looking for low-cost labor, they have no problem outsourcing it under the current regime. what we do have the opportunity

to do is attract companies to -- back companies to manufacture here in the u.s.. i understand that nike has been manufacturing shoes with low-cost labor and many of these areas in the asia-pacific region and that hurt the american footwear industry in terms of jobs. that happened over the course of the last 30 years. and now, for nike to announce because of new technology, they are potentially bringing 10,000 jobs here because we had gone up the value chain and are manufacturing in different ways, that is an opportunity but we have to take full advantage of those opportunities. which is why my argument with my progressive friends is what we really need to be focusing on to meet the same objectives, the shared objectives, is the kind s of other issues we all agree on -- strong minimum wage,

strong job training programs. infrastructures to put people back to work. stronger laws to protect collective-bargaining and the capability of workers do have a voice, strong enforcement of rules around things like overtime pay. making sure we have paid sick leave. making sure we have an honest conversation about our budgets that we are not slashing investments in the future. simply to make sure the loopholes for corporate -- corporations that do not provide an economic benefit. those of the things that will help us address the very problems we are concerned about. blocking a trade deal will not. particularly since they are the first one to knowledge they exist, trade rules are a bad deal for u.s. workers. they're not working now it

doesn't make sense. i am all for enforcement and provisions assigned. i have expressed concerns about how the language was drafted. i've talked to stanley schumer and sherrod brown and others about how we can work on language that does not end up having a blowback effect on our ability to maintain a monetary policy. i don't on -- remember what your question was? rather than speak for others, i will reiterate what i said previously, i do believe the two state solution is vital for not only peace between israelis and palestinians but for the

long-term security of israel as a democratic and jewish state. i know that the government has been formed and contains folks who do not necessarily believe in the premise. that continues to be my premise since we are at kent david i think it is important to remind ourselves the degree to which a very hard peace deal that required an incredible vision encourage and tough choices resulted in what has now been a lasting peace between countries that used to be sworn enemies. israel is better off for it. the same would be true is this we got a peace deal between israelis and palestinians. i think it is important for us

to keep in mind what is right and what is possible. last question. scott. scott: thank you. you mentioned the need for a world-class infrastructure and we are coming up on a deadline for the highway trust fund. with gas prices where they are why is this not a good time to consider a hike in the federal gas tax? since you mentioned overtime rules, it has been 14 months into asked the labor department how soon might we see those? president obama: in respect to transportation, you are right, now is the time to get something done. i am practical. in order to us -- in order for

us to get a transportation bill i have to get it from a republican-controlled congress. i am in discussions with the majority and minority leaders in both chambers as well as the committee chairperson's, we want to hear their ideas and find out what is possible. i think that will be something that we need to explore but this is not an area where either side should be looking for political points. this is not used to being a partisan issue. building roads, bridges, airports, sewer lines, dams ports, this is how we grow. this is how america became an economic superpower, investing our people infrastructure, doing it better, faster, and

bigger than anyone else. we should do the same thing now. the first republican president a proud native of my home state mr. lincoln, even in the midst of civil war was looking at how we join the countries together to railways and canals. we should not be thinking smaller, today we need to be thinking bigger in this global economy. my hope is, is that we have a chance to have a serious discussion and look at all potential revenue sources. the highway trust fund has consistently gotten smaller and smaller and inadequate for the needs. what is also true is patchwork approaches of three months, six months at a time don't make sense. we need some sort of long-term solution.

no one foresaw -- we saw the long-term problem on how we are managing medicare for doctors, who knows? we might see some intelligent bipartisan outbreaks over the next two months. i think everyone recognizes this as important. thank you ray much, everyone. -- thank you very much everyone. announcer: president obama will pay treaty to law enforcement officers who lost their lives in a line of duty. in 1962 president kennedy proclaimed may 15 as national peace officers memorial day. it coincides with national police week. live coverage today at 11:00 a.m. eastern on c-span two. on c-span3, e-house veterans

affairs meeting on staffing mva facilities. live coverage begins at 9:45 a.m. eastern. according to a government report, two senior secret service agents were likely impaired with alcohol when they drove through a secured area at the white house earlier this year. the inspector general for the homeland security apartment testified before the house oversight committee. congressman jason chaffetz chairs the committee.

rep. chaffetz: committee on oversight and government reform will come to order without objection of the chair as authorized to declare a recess at anytime. we are meeting to talk about the united states secret service and the accountability for the march 14, 2015 incident. on march 14, 2 senior secret service special agents -- one has the title of deputy special agent in charge, a presidential protective detail, mr. conley. the other had the title of assistant to the special agent in charge, mr. george ogilvie. the allegation and concern was that they drove through a criminal investigation of a potential bomb at the white house. following the incident, there were allegations that the agents were intoxicated after being at a bar downtown for a retirement party. nor were the agents reprimanded in any way. part of the concern was what happened in this potential bomb scene and what did they do about it. what did the supervisors know? how did they report it up the chain of command.

instead, everyone involved was told to go home and pretend like nothing happened. to get a better sense of what happened march 4, ranking member cummings and i met with director clancy. director clancy could not answer our questions. clancy said he could not answer the questions. instead, he deferred to the department of homeland security office of the inspector general, who was investigating the matter. that investigation is now complete. we are pleased to have mr. rob here with us today to talk about the conclusions of that investigation. now that the facts are in it is , time for accountability. the inspector general determined it was more likely than not that both agents judgments were impaired by alcohol. since a sobriety test was not given, the inspector general came to the conclusion based on the facts. these included both spent five hours in a bar running up a bar

tab that included 14 drinks after two hours of an open bar. and the objective behavior of the experience secret service agents who should have known better. the impaired judgment resulted in them driving and i quote into a crime scene inches from what rest of the secret service was treating as a potential explosive device and which under different circumstances could have -- let me read that again. sorry for the disruption. "the agents'impaired judgment resulted in them driving into a crime scene inches from what the rest of the secret service was treating as a potential explosive device and which under different circumstances, could have endangered their own lives and those of the officers responding." ". if it had been a real bomb

these agents would have been lucky to be alive. they were endangering the lives of too many people by doing what they had done. following the incident, the story began making its way up the chain of command, where it eventually reached mr. connolly himself. he is in the chain of command. though required to report what happened he chose not to. , he was required to meet with his boss. on march 6, he talked about a suspicious package incident but made no mention of being involved with the instant -- incident himself. mr. ogilvie, likewise, had a duty to self-report and chose not to. as the inspector general found their failure to report reflects either poor judgment or an affirmative desire to hide their activities. relying on the honor system for reporting this type of egregious misconduct does not work when agents do not act honorably. senior uniformed division

leaders also violated their duty to report by failing to inform mr. connolly's boss, the head of the presidential protective division. perhaps the situation would have been dealt with earlier if the agents were given breathalyzer tests that night. an officer on the scene told the inspector general they decided not to administer a breathalyzer because he was worried to do so would be a quote, career killer". the watch commander was probably right. his decision was likely influenced by "secret service's reputation for punishing or ignoring those who would report violations," such as drunk driving. that is why the problems that led to this incident extends well beyond march 4, 2015. it is one of the ongoing concerns of the deep-seated

problem within the secret service and they continue. we have thousands of good men and women who serve this country honorably and patriotically. we appreciate them, but they are not above the law. the secret service has to abide by the law as well. we have heard over and over again the source of morel -- morale problems within the secret service is that senior personnel are treated differently. we have little doubt because of this treatment that that because of this treatment, connolly and ogilvie believed they could act in a way where they would be able to get away with it. the culture of special treatment forcing your agents must stop. it is an embarrassing and highly concerning pattern of misconduct and security incidents that need to end. the secret service mission is to o important. i want to commend mr. roth and his team for their good work on this report. they acted quickly and put a lot of work into it and it has produced a very worthwhile results and that is why we are

here today. we look forward to hearing from director clancy on this incident and hearing whether the agency plans to take disciplinary action against individuals involved. i have a concern that just retiring and stepping aside does not solve the problem. that they do not truly have the consequences that would be associated with such egregious behavior. the job of the secret service is too important not to reprimand those who exercise shockingly poor judgment that put the president and his family at risk. one of the other things we are going to explore is how, within the department of homeland security, there are different penalties within the department

one of the things that the inspector general found is that even the most senior people do not understand what the alcohol policy was. sort of an important thing to understand. certainly an important thing to understand. we appreciate the good work of mr. roth and look forward to a good, vibrant discussion today about his findings. with that, i will now recognize the ranking member, mr. cummings. rep. cummings: thank you very much mr. chairman. i wanted to thank you general roth and your team for your hard work. you have worked with us and met with us and we took your guidance and we really appreciate all that you have done. you started immediately after receiving these allegations on march 12 and finish them in -- finished them in less than eight weeks that says a lot. in that time, they conducted

an impressive number of -- 48 interviews and obtained a wide variety of documents and other materials. the report from these findings inspector general confirms key allegations, such as the claim that both agents mr. connelly , and mr. ogilvie, had been driving a government vehicle to the white house. it also includes that there is "no evidence that the video of the incident was intentionally deleted." this was a model of how an investigation should be conducted. and a demonstration why congress and this community relies so heavily on the work. unfortunately, this report makes

clear that there is still much work to be done to improve the culture at the secret service. at a previous hearing, september 30 of last year, i expressed grave concern that the secret service punishes those who raise concerns. employees are afraid to report incidents up the chain of command. at the time, we were discussing an incident in where multiple 2011, shots were fired at the white house. one officer on the scene believed bullets had hit the white house, but she feared the consequences of disputing her superiors. as a result, it was not discovered until four days later that the white house had been struck seven times. the inspector general indicates that the cultural problem is indeed widespread.

for example the report , highlights "the secret service 's reputation for punishing or ignoring those who further investigate or report such violations." according to the report, some officers relayed that the watch commander at the scene raised concerns. according to one officer, the watch commander told his colleagues that the agents who drove into the barricade were "hammered." according to that officer, the watch commander said that ordering a sobriety test, he called it a "career killer." therefore no surprise he tests was done. both agents drove their vehicles -- no sobriety test was done.

both agents drove their vehicles home after a night of drinking. the inspector general's says "the watch commander's actions must be considered in the disparity between the watch commander and connolly who was in the chain of command." i am also concerned because just two days ago, we conducted a key interview that further corroborates this view. they interviewed alfonso dison the deputy chief of the uniform division, manages more than 600 officers. he admitted to our committee staff that he had two telephone calls with mr. connolly the night of the incident. one as he was at the scene and another as he was driving home later that night. in those calls mr. dyson warned

mr. conolly was going to make it a problem. mr. dyson also admitted that he told mr. connolly that the watch commander might cause trouble for him. mr. dyson stated "he was going , to spread the rumors. he was going to get the guys riled up. that is what i believe and that is what i relayed." this is simply unacceptable based on the report. the watch commander should have done more that night, not less. it is appalling that senior secret service officials would disparage junior officers from doing the right thing. the agents and officers of the secret service will never have the full trust of their colleagues while the fear of retaliation continues.

finally, let me conclude by thanking director clancy for his cooperation and quick action and the inspector general report concludes, "director clancy acted appropriately upon receiving information about the misconduct." the inspector general also informed our committee that he received "outstanding" cooperation from director clancy and the secret service during the entire investigation. although we hope to the director clancy would be available today, this is police week and he is attending several events to honor officers for acts of valor and the families of those who have fallen in the line of duty. he called personally the chairman and yours truly to express his concern and regrets that he could not be with us at his -- this hearing. i know the chairman understood that and i understood it.

i want to thank him for all he has done. he has offered to reschedule for another day. i look forward to hearing from him. with that, i yield back. rep. chaffetz: it is true that i really do believe through experience that director clancy has been more than responsive to requests from congress and his ability is very much appreciated. we may disagree on some points obviously but his accessibility has been one of the best that we have seen. i also want to highlight -- at this moment, the secret service is evidently involved and engaged in apprehending someone who was trying to fly a drone -- i am basing this solely on media reports, but every day, these men and women are dealing with very exceptionally difficult situations. something could go wrong at any given time. they do far more than we ever hear or see, and we greatly appreciate that.

it is not enough to say we appreciate it. they need to know we love and care for them and we pray for them. they have a no fail mission. that is why when something goes so terribly wrong, we have got to learn from it and make sure that we fix the problem. some of this egregious behavior is unacceptable. i would also note that, just literally happening here today the secretary award for valor was given to one of the secret service agents, william from scranton, pennsylvania. he kept duty at the station in washington, d.c. let me read the paragraph "while out to work, the u.s. secret service technician came upon a motor vehicle accident in the baltimore washington parkway and was the first to respond. after notifying 911, he went to the scene to offer assistance.

when the sergeant noticed flames originating from underneath the hood of the vehicle, he removed the occupant, who was determined to have a broken pelvis and was unable to walk. the men and women who serve as first responders people like , that, who do this great work we cannot thank them enough. cannot thank them enough. but we expect a lot. we expect that people will make mistakes, but not of such egregious consequences that it puts the mission in danger, puts others in danger. and it certainly can never put the president in danger. he is our president. i do not care, republican or democrat, how you feel about the president. he is our president and he has to stay safe. that is why it is so pivotal that we continue to investigate that. i will hold the record open for five legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. i would like to recognize the witnesses here today, who represent a large group of people who did a lot of work to come to this meeting today.

it is with pleasure that we welcome inspector general john roth. he has been inspector general of the department of homeland security. on march 10, 2014 after previously serving as director of the office of criminal investigation at the fda. before that, he had a long and distinguished career with the department of justice. welcome. pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. if you would please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you. let the record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative. mr. roth, we will now recognize you. do not even bother starting the clock. we will hear your report and after you are done, we will ask questions. mr. roth. mr. roth: thank you, chairman j chaffetz, ranking member

cummings, and all the others. our objective was to conduct a factual inquiry and assess the reasonableness of the actions of those involved. we conducted the investigation from march 12 until april 30. this inquiry was centered around the activities of two senior secret service advisors. mark connolly. his duties include all aspects of white house security. george ogilvie is the assistant to the officer in charge. he has previously worked in the presidential protection division. the report that we wrote is a summary of the investigation. it is attached to my written testimony. the materials of our investigation that we produced are reports of interviews, the physical evidence, and the documents we found, have been turned over to the secret service in accordance with our

regular procedures. the inspector general's office does not make recommendations as to whether or what personnel action should be taken, but leaves that to the secret service. our duties are purely investigative. report makes conclusions based on the evidence that we found. for example, it is more likely than not that their judgment was impaired by alcohol. the two agents displayed poor judgment and a lack of situational awareness driving into the scene. during their interviews, each denied drinking to excess. we must assess those denials in light of the uniform position officers' observations, the fact that they spent the previous five hours in the bar, and that they drove into a crime scene inches from where the rest of the secret service was treating a potential explosive device which, under different circumstances, could have

endangered their own lives and those of the uniform division officers who responded. both agents work required to report their conduct up the chain of command but failed to do so. each of us -- each told us that they did not believe that what they had done amounted to a reportable incident. their failure to report reflects either poor judgment on their part or an affirmative desire to hide their conduct. with regard to the actions of the uniformed division, we found that they reacted to the suspicious package generally in accordance with operational procedures. however, the establishment of a perimeter should have been better executed. while there is often confusion inherent in a fast-moving and factually fluid situation, a number of vehicles and pedestrians came within close proximity to the object after the uniform division had established the safety perimeter.

the uniform division officers made reasonable attempts while they were securing the scene to canvass the area for the suspect. an early partial description of the suspects vehicle foiled the ability to apprehend the suspect. the secret service investigative agents reacted quickly to identify the suspect and determine the nature of the threat. it was the watch commander's soul decision to allow connolly and ogilvie to pass without further inquiry into their sobriety. he made this assessment based on his observations. while it would have been preferable if he ordered a field far sobriety test or made other inquiries to establish both agents fitness to drive, it his actions must be considered in light of the vast disparity in rank between the watch commander and connolly. the bank and insufficient secret

service policy regarding the alcohol and driving government vehicles and the secret service reputation for punishing or ignoring those who would further investigate and report such violations. the watch commander reported the facts as he understood them to his superior officer. the watch commander and his subordinates should have been able to rely on their superior officers to appropriately report the situation. both uniform division deputy chief dyson and simpson were notified that night that the agents had driven into an evacuated area and that alcohol was involved. each could have reported the incident but did not. i would like to publicly a knowledge the hard work of the agents who conducted this investigation. they displayed the professionalism that does me proud and i am grateful for their efforts. i would like to express my appreciation for the outstanding cooperation we are seeing from the secret service office of

professional responsibility and from director clancy himself. that concludes my testimony. i am happy to answer any questions you have. rep. chaffetz: thank you. i recognize myself for five minutes area there was an e-mail about the incident on march 4. can you tell me more about that? mr. roth: certainly. what we found was that -- let me get to the page of the report that has that. rep. chaffetz: the version i have is page 15. mr. roth: thank you, sir. correct. there was an e-mail that was sent up the chain of command all the way to the presidential protection division that described, in very vague terms what had occurred at the

entrance. rep. chaffetz: why do you think the e-mail was forwarded by deputy chief dyson to mr. connolly himself? mr. roth: i think it was to let him know that he was getting out of the incident and he had the -- word was getting out of the incident and he had the necessity to self-report. rep. chaffetz: how did mr. connolly respond? mr. roth: during the night, when he was driving home, he called deputy chief dyson, who expressed concerns at the fact that this was getting out. rep. chaffetz: if deputy chief dyson denied he was aware of this, the e-mail was about the vehicle containing mr. connolly, would you find that credible? mr. roth: not knowing the other facts, it would raise some additional questions i would have to ask deputy chief dyson. the evidence we have indicates that they had a conversation as connolly was driving home

expressing concerns about that e-mail itself. rep. chaffetz: for him to suggest that he had no idea that connolly was in the car, that could not possibly be true could it? mr. roth: our interview with deputy chief dyson, i believe that it sounded like he was in the car as they were having that discussion. rep. chaffetz: did your investigators asked questions about the video cameras being directed away from the area where they were questioning connolly and ogilvie? that is something that our whistleblowers had concerns about, that the video cameras were moved away so they would not see that interaction. mr. roth: i was not aware of any of that. what we did find with regard to the video preservation was, as you know, there is only a 72-hour preservation of the video. unless it is somehow burned to media. what we found in the course of our investigation was the actual what i would call a barrel

incident. ogilvie driving and striking the barrel and moving the barrel out of the way was burned at the -- on removable media at the request of the uniform division folks who were on the scene. they wanted to figure out how it was that the barrel was moved. we had no other video. it was nothing else to review other than that snippet that had been burned. rep. chaffetz: that is one of our deep concerns long-term. why the policy? when you require an airport to retain video for 30 days. they retain this for hours. there were a couple of different potential crimes going on. there were people trying to detain this person from driving away. they claim to be injured and assaulted, that video is not necessarily captured from start to finish. the bumbling of how we would apprehend this person who left a potential bomb. were there any officers who

outranked braun? mr. roth: that outranked braun? there was an assistant to the sack in the presidential protection division who was there. in other words, an investigative agent, gs-14 level. i am assuming that that outranks braun, but i am not sure. rep. chaffetz: one of the concerns is that when director clancy knew. this thing was spreading like wildfire. there were people asking for videotape to be preserved because they were upset. you had former agents, retired agents, a newspaper reporter members of congress all heard about this before director clancy. is that feasible? -- possible?

mr. roth: apparently, that is what the facts show. rep. chaffetz: so who is responsible? where did it stop? where did it not continue up the chain of command? mr. roth: i think there were several points of failure. one is with connolly and ogilvie, who had a duty to report their own misconduct up the chain. the sack of the presidential protection division should have been informed by connolly and the washington field office should have been informed by ogilvie but were not. that is one point of failure. the other is with the supervisors, the leadership in the uniform division. both the chief and the deputy chief could have and should have reported it up. each of them said that the reason they did not do it is because connolly said that he would self-report, so they did not want to do it. they would rather have connolly do it. rep. chaffetz: technically, both

should have happened, right? they knew that this conduct had happened. mr. roth: correct. rep. chaffetz: so why didn't they do it? mr. roth: i think it was a failure on those individuals' parts to do what it is they are supposed to do. rep. chaffetz: anybody else who should have reported? mr. roth: those are the four individuals who i believe had primary responsibility. there were others, including the 1811 special agents supervisor who was there that evening probably should have reported it up. there are the uniform division individuals themselves who could have reported as well. rep. chaffetz: my concern is that they did not preserve all the video that was germane to both the leaving of the package, the fleeing of the person, and the incident itself. with that, i yield back.

i recognize mr. cummings. rep. cummings: picking up exactly where the chairman left off, i noticed that in the beginning of your report, you mentioned that you were deferring specific conclusions about potential systemic issues facing the secret service until you have completed your investigation into at least five or six other incidents. is that correct? mr. roth: that is correct. rep. cummings: what form is that going to take? it seems like we have a culture of secrecy, a culture of complacency, a culture of fear of retaliation. how do you -- what do you see -- where are you going with that? mr. roth: yes, i do. where we add value is having the independent fact-finding ability, to be able to go in and gather documents, interview individuals who are compelled

under the dhs rules to talk to us. what we intend to do is very similar to what we did with the bush residence alarm report that was issued a few weeks ago. we are going to find a lot of facts and see what we find. we will publish reports, report them both to the secretary, to the director of the secret service. we think that, at the end of those fact findings, some of the conclusions or some of the themes will become apparent. for example, we are in the process of doing an investigation into the 24th incident at the cdc, where the president was in close proximity to an armed security guard unknown to the secret service. we will write a factual report about exactly what happened, where there were failures within that, and publish that to this

committee as well as the other committees, the secretary, and the director. rep. cummings: picking up exactly where the chairman left off, i noticed that in the beginning of your report, you mentioned that you were deferring specific conclusions about systemic issues facing

the secret service until you have completed your investigation into at least five or six other incidents. is that correct? mr. roth: that is correct. rep. cummings: what form is that going to take? it seems like we have a culture of complacency, a culture of fear of retaliation. how do you -- what do you see -- where are you going with that? mr. roth: yes, i do. where we add value is having the independent fact-finding ability, to be able to go in and gather documents, interview individuals who are compelled under the dhs rules to talk to us. what we intend to do is very similar to what we did with the bush president's alarm report that was issued a few weeks ago. we are going to find a lot of facts and see what we find. we will publish reports, report them both to the secretary, to the director of the secret service. we think that, at the end of those fact findings, some of the conclusions or some of the themes will become apparent. for example, we are in the process of doing an investigation into the 24th incident at the cdc, where the president was in close proximity to an armed security guard unknown to the secret service. we will write a factual report about exactly what happened, where there were failures within that, and publish that to this committee as well as the other committees, the secretary, and the director. rep. cummings: when the doj comes into the police department and looks at patterns of practice, is that similar? mr. roth: i think that is a good analogy. the only difference is we are going to do this early. we are not going to wait until the end. we think it is important to get the information out as quickly as possible. rep. cummings: i want to ask you about agency policies regarding alcohol. first, let me walk through some details. according to your report, it started about 5:30 and lasted until about 7:30, an open bar. afterwards, mr. connelly and mr. ogilvie stayed at the bar. according to your report, mr. ogilvie opened a new bar tab at

7:44 p.m. and closed it three hours later. as part of your investigation, you obtained the actual bar tab. i would like to put it up on the screen. your report says they purchased "eight glasses of scott, two vodka drinks, one glass of wine, and three glasses of beer." they were on a roll. looking at this tab -- the first three items are beers, then a glass of wine, then eight johnny walker reds, then two vodka drinks. investigators said that some were given away to others, but he could not remember to whom. at a minimum, mr. ogilvie admitted to drinking two scotches and one beer. mr. connelly admitted to drinking two beers. they also admitted that they drove the government vehicle that same evening on their way home. is that right? mr. roth: that is correct. rep. cummings: they had a policy that prohibits operating government vehicles while under the influence. your report says that this policy applies only to uniform division officers, not to agents right mr. connelly or mr. ogilvie. this seems a bit ridiculous to me. do you know why? mr. roth: we do not. what we found with a lot of these policies is that they were put in in kind of a piecemeal fashion. we do not have a good explanation as to why it only applied to the uniform division but not the special agents. rep. cummings: the secret service is also part of the

homeland security -- department of homeland security, which has its own policy which prevents all employees from drinking alcohol within eight hours of operating a government vehicle. even if we take the statements at their word in terms of how much they drank that night, it seems they violated these listings dhs policy. your report says you found "no evidence that anyone in the secret service was aware of this policy." that is a problem. i do not see how we can have the elite of the elite and they do not even know what their own rules are. after the incident, secret ciphers -- secret service issued a new rule. this new rule is even more strict than the dhs offering. is that correct? mr. roth: that is correct. rep. cummings: do you know if the secret service is taking

steps to educate their employees and conducting training in that regard? mr. roth: we did not look at that in this investigation, but it is something we are certainly interested in. rep. cummings: there are significant problems relating to alcohol at the agency. we have seen that in past incidents as well. but also, the vague policies just make worse the problem. i hope today's hearing is part of a broader effort to reform the agency's policies and make absolutely clear to employees what is expected of them and to revitalize the agency so it can perform its vertical mission and once again become the elite of the elite. with that, i yield back. >> mr. connelly is not related to me, nor do i like scotch. thank you. rep. chaffetz: duly noted. we will now recognize the gentleman from florida.

>> thank you. in your report, you said that the findings should be considered in light of the secret service reputation for punishing or ignoring those who would further investigate or report such dilation. that interests me the cousin before your tenure, the dhs released a 2013 report which did not find evidence that the secret service had this conduct for the leadership had fostered an environment that fostered inappropriate conduct. given your tenure giving this report, what are your thoughts about the 2013 dhs report? is that an accurate reflection of what is going on in the culture of the secret service right now is to mark -- right now? mr. roth: right now, it is not. one of the things that you reference, there are fascinating findings within it.

for example, they did a survey and electronic survey -- an electronic survey where 86% indicated that they did not report such behavior. the report also indicated that of the 2500-some electronic survey respondents, 44% felt they could not report misconduct without fear of retaliation if they reported that. within that report itself, there are some very disturbing trends. i think, given the nature of what it is we have seen since then, i believe that there is a serious problem within the secret service. rep. desantis: the report also found that 36% of respondents did not believe that senior managers are held accountable within the agency. do you think that that is still the case today? mr. roth: we have not done any work on that, but it would not

surprise me if it is still the case. rep. desantis: is there any indication that the process for discipline has improved since the 2013 report? mr. roth: it certainly has improved. the secret service has taken steps -- that is the one that imposes discipline. our 2013 inspection, we made a number of different recommendations, including policies which they now have adopted. i think the secret service is moving in the right direction in this area. rep. desantis: it is safe to say, though, that the conclusions reached in the 2013 report -- there is a conflict between the conclusions reached in your report. mr. roth: i would agree with that. rep. desantis: the question is how to correct the cultural problems that your report identifies. i think underlying the 2013

report, you saw evidence of that from the people who responded to the survey. as people are given oversight, what do we need to be doing in your judgment? mr. roth: candidly, i think director can think -- clancy is moving in the right direction. they put together a table of penalties. they have an office of integrity. i think they are increasing training on this. i think they have treated violations of this very seriously. for example, the auto accident in florida involving some of the uniform division that was alcohol-related. the discipline that was imposed their was -- there was appropriate. i will not expect that a problem that took years to create will be fixed overnight but i do think they are moving in the right direction. rep. desantis: your experience with the other components of the dhs, do they all have similar issues with alcohol or is secret service unique in that regard?

mr. roth: we have not taken a specific look at other law enforcement agencies to the degree that we have had with the secret service. rep. desantis: you have not had a lot of alcohol-related incidences brought to your attention that you have had to investigate. is that fair? mr. roth: that is fair. rep. desantis: do other organizations have the reputation were someone trying to do the right thing would be punished or marginalized? mr. roth: we have not looked at that, so it is difficult for me to comment on that. rep. desantis: but you could say that not a lot has been brought to your attention during your tenure. mr. roth: that is correct. rep. desantis: thank you for your report. i think it was timely and had a lot of good information. some of the other incidents, we are looking forward to those results as well. rep. chaffetz: i will recognize ms. orton from the district of columbia.

>> we appreciate your report. i suppose this committee is paid to be impatient. particularly in light of the recredited -- the repetitive incidents. i will try to put this in perspective, because iran an agency that was a whole lot more troubled, at the time then the secret service. someone said to me, within a couple of months, yet it in order -- get it in order -- i am trying to keep in mind what mr. clancy has found and what he has done. i asked when he was appointed exactly and he is actually a

longtime employee of the secret service. he was acting from october -- the march 4 incident occurred -- i consider his acting time. he was official as of february 19. as of the march 4 incident director clancy apparently had not issued the order that was issued after that incident involving the two agents. my concern is whether or not this indicates -- in light of his having been with the agency during the time when there was no reporting of the bullets

that penetrated the white house, i was concerned that the first thing he did was not to say, look, let me know before the press knows and anybody knows. it bothered me that, as short a time as that may seem, that he certainly was aware. my question goes to whether or not, in light of this order, after the march 4 incident, you believe there is sufficient clarity as to what is required. for example, i don't know and do agents know about drinking off duty? does there need to be greater clarification beyond reporting up the chain of command?

these agents have been under huge duress, according to the special panel. "years of service has taken on additional missions in both protective and investigative roles, but has not matched its request for additional resources of those expended." they reported that they had been on 12-hour days with fewer days off. you can step back and look at it. they had been subject to the sequester and the rest of that. the panel said that they needed, at best, 200 officers and 85 agents. and said that they were down 500. essentially, you had overworked, overburdened

agents. you can imagine that if those people were overworked, they might go out and drink too much. was there any clarification of if you were an officer of the secret service and you are off duty, bearing in mind that everybody is entitled to a private life, is there enough clarification about what is required on and off duty so that we can be assured that there will not be another incident like this? mr. roth: i think you raise a good point and a good concern. it is certainly one that we wrestled with with regard to what does it mean to be on duty? most of these agents are subject to recall at any time. does that mean that they can never consume alcohol? it would seem to be an irrational policy if that is

the case. i agree that there is room for clarification regarding that. rep. norton: thank you very much. i would ask that -- because i think this is a very murky area. i would ask that we ask director clancy to bring some clarification. for example, the number of hours before being required to report for duty. some clarification might be fair. rep. chaffetz: i wholeheartedly agree. what you see at homeland security issued by secretary johnson is different than what the individual agencies within his department have in front of them. there should be a uniform standard across the board and there is not. that is one of the things we need to work with. rep. norton: maybe even a higher standard for secret service agents. rep. chaffetz: amen.

let's recognize the gentleman from north carolina for a few moments. >> let me pick up what we were discussing when it comes to off duty and on duty and it comes to government vehicles. did you determine whether any other entities drove government vehicles after consuming the alcohol? mr. roth: we did not. we interviewed some of the individuals at the farewell party. some of them had alcohol and then went back to the office to continue to work. my point with regard to that is that the dhs policy, really unknown to the secret service. no one within the secret service understood it. we did not see any attempts by the department to promote this policy. the policy was in the manual for maintenance of government cars. it is not a place in which one would nationally -- naturally look to see a policy like that. it is difficult for us to blame somebody for violating a policy

that they did not know about and no one made an effort to tell them about. rep. walker: i understand there are certain aspects and ethics but let me ask this. were any of the party attendees of the secret service part of the executive staff westmark if so, should not they be held liable to understand what the rules are? mr. roth: i agree with that. subsequent to this, it has been noted that the secret service put a new policy in place, a very bright line policy that says you cannot step into or operate a government vehicle if, in the last 10 hours, you have had any alcohol whatsoever. certainly, the behavior that took place at the party is now prohibited. rep. walker: there is no ambiguity. you proved the fact that they did know at least that part of it. if you have been drinking, probably not a good idea to get

back into your vehicle. mr. roth: we found there was a lot of uncertainty as to what the policy was. the question of when you are impaired -- in other words, is it ok to have a drink and drive? at a previous hearing, director clancy talked about that. if you are not able to control your actions, you may not be intoxicated by a legal limit but some could say you do not have the proper abilities. some sort of imperative. that is such a vague standard that it is functionally unenforceable. rep. walker: you mentioned that some employees returned to work after consuming the alcoholic beverages. is that correct? mr. roth: correct. rep. walker: what has been done or said or recommended? mr. roth: our policy is that we find the facts, conduct the

investigation, and then we give everything that we have to the secret service. we are not in the discipline business. rep. walker: i understand that. are you aware of anything who has been done to those employees who were drinking and have come back to work? mr. roth: no. we transmitted our information last week, so we have not heard anything back. typically, we will not. rep. walker: we talk about the culture of the secret service and i appreciate some words that you talked about. there has been an expectation that has raised the bar a little bit. this kind of contradicts that mindset that they are still a frat party mentality, what applies to everyone else does not apply to us. i do not want to speculate, but is that a fair statement? is there still work that needs to be done within the secret service to get the bar raised

>> you always do exemplarry work. i think americans preash your thoroughness. i yield back. >> i now recognize mr. clayment . >> mr. roth, i want to ask about an email exchange that your investigators obtained twean the two agents who had been drinking in the bar plfment connelly and mr. obblevive. first let me walk through some facts. the incident happened on the night of march 4. your report found that they should have reported this incident but neither did. is that right? >> that's correct. >> based on their failure to report it seems like they were

hoping this whole thing would just blow over. two days later on march 6 mr. connelly had this chance -- had his chance to come clean. he had a meeting with his superior the special agent this charge. but according to your report he never mentioned anything involving the incident. your report says thr. connelly met with his supervisor saic buster on march 6 and discussed the ud officer's handling of the confrontation with the suspect and the suspicious package incident. connelly did not mention the incident involving him and ogle vive. so on this meeting mr. connelly decided basically decided to keep his mouth shut and not tell his supervisor what happened. is that right? >> that's correct. >> and he also would have learned at that meeting that

nobody oles had reported the incident either. so here is what i want to ask you i-about. the very next day on march 7, they both had an email exchange. i would like to put it up on the screen. there we go. this is an emp mail exchange. he said all good. muy, bueno. then you are an angel. mr. roth, i don't know what was in their heads but certainly one interpretation of this exchange is that he was asking hey, are we going to get in trouble for this? or are we all good?

then mr. connelly who just met with his boss the day before and determined that nobody else had reported the incident assured him that everything would be fine. mr. roth, your investigators interviewed. according to their notes hi admitted that the context of this email was to check in with mr. connelly about the march 4th incident. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> in contrast, mr. connelly told your investigators that this email had nothing to do with the march 4th incident. he claimed that he had no idea what this email was about no clue. he told your investigators, he did not know what the intent was behind it. it was open ended and he did not know if it was in reference to march 4 or the busy day that

he was having. mr. roth, i have one last question for you. do you buy that? >> no, i don't. i believe that this was communication between the two to make sure or see whether or not the word had leaked out with regard to the incident that had happened two days prior. >> what usually happens when a witness like that is being so dishonest? are there any follow up to persons dishonest? i guess this was a deposition or just a question. >> it was an interview that took place that as part of an investigation that we were doing. he has the obligation obviously to tell the truth. and i think there are penalties as a result of not telling the truth. >> all right. well thank you so much for your responses.

and mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you now recognize the gentleman from georgia for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. you've already stated plfment roth that it was a failure on the part of dyson and simpson not to report the incident. and their excuse was that they thought this would be self-reported. do you believe that allowing individuals to self-report is acceptable? >> no, i do not. i think every particularly in the supervisery chain that they had an intnt duty to report this either to me or to the secret service office of professional responsibility or up the chain. i would note that the ine form division chief said he didn't think it was his job.

>> you sate that -- an acceptable prack tits and yet it's policy. >> i think that's a question that you should direct to the secret service. >> do you believe that dyson and simpson should be punished? >> we are not in the business of determining what the appropriate punishment should

be. >> i'm asking do you believe they should be? >> i think their behavior was troubling. >> do you believe they should be punished? >> i think there should be consequence. >> do you believe that any person nel should be able to retire in order to avoid misconduct? >> that gets into personnel laws. >> i'm asking your opinion. >> personally i've been in the government for 29 years. i have a pension. it's vested. that is my property. i would like to think that i can rely on that. >> but in order to avoid punishment for misconduct we're seeing a lot of that. it's a way of dodging consequences for personal behavior. it enables people to behave any way they want to. when they get caught they just retire and there's no consequences and you believe that's ok?

>> i certainly understand the frustration with this. the maximum consequence that could be faced here would be termination from the service. leaving the service. >> without punishment though for misconduct. somewhere along the way we've got to deal with the problem of misconduct. at this point there seems to be nothing. if anyone is caught they just retire and there's no consequences. that's an entirely unacceptable policy when all is said and done. at some point misconduct has to be dealt with because we are seeing it seems like on a regular basis secret service high profile cases of misconduct and there is a root cause somewhere for this culture that allows for misconduct. what do you believe the root cause is? >> i think it is a lack of accountability. >> ok. so how do we correct it? >> well, again i think what

the secret service has done and again this is probably better addressed to the secret service is institute a series of reforms, a more uniform way of administering discipline. better communication. those kinds of things. >> there's actually a reputation. and i know you know this. from the report that there's punishment for those who report misconduct. have you ever considered reword -- rewarding people for mis reporting this conduct? >> financially? >> any any way. would that help bring accountability? >> i think that's something that's worthy of some discussion. certainly certainly one of the thing that is we try to do, for example, what i did when we came -- when i came on board is i sent an email to all 7,000 email addresses in the secret service indicating that we were interested in sort of finding

misconduct waste, fraud within the secret service reminding them of the protections they have within the whistleblower protections act. as a result of that we have gotten some work, some reports. the report on the bush residence that had an alarm that had been out for 13 months was as a result of the whistleblower. somebody came forward and said this is ub acceptable. you should see what's happened here. and we were able to investigate it. we were able to write a report. we brought it to light and we fixed the problem. so what i am hopeful of is that as we move down the road people will understand that in fact they do have some redress that reporting something up the chain won't simply be ignored but they will actually fix the problem. but it is going to take some time. >> now recognize the gentleman from massachusetts for five minutes.

they did not tell director

clancey for five days. but the time they hold tim the tapes most of the tapes had already been -- taped over. they retape over. that's every 72 hours. we also had an incident back in november of 2011 where we had an individual i believe his name was ortagea hernedezz who took a semi-automatic rifle and shot up the white house and yet the secret service completely missed it. the capitol police missed it. a house keeper happened to find some shell fragments reported it and then the f.b.i. did an investigation. but meanwhile those tapes were destroyed. and but for the fact that this fellow after he left had a car accident down by the 14th street bridge, we would not have known about that. we would not have been able to connect that incident to the

shots fired at the white house. so what i am getting at is, the airports everybody uses a 30-day cycle on these tapes. the technology today allows us to do that. and i know you had some inquiry into the reasons why they collapsed that time. why would the secret service want to tape over the tapes when we had these repeated incidents where a longer preservation of those tapes say for 30 days would help us to make the white house more secure and the second example i gave the president's mother in-law and his two daughters were in washington at the time one of the daughters was home. we're talking about pretty severe consequences here in where sort of whistling through

the graveyard here and allowing this practice to go on. so what i would like to try to do is to change the protocol, the security protocol at the white house to start doing things in a way that makes the president and his family safer. you've got people jumping over the fence, running through the white house, helicopters landing and drones. people shooting up the white house. i'm starting to lose faith in the secret service. and the level of seriousness that we have in protecting our president and his family. this is pretty basic stuff. so after having inquired about the taping practices at the white house can you tell us me if you have any recommendations that they might adopt to accomplish our goal here of protecting the president? >> what we found was actually even worse than what you described, because for the longest time it was only a 24 hour retention of the policy

and they only changed that after the incident in which there were these great crashers at the state dinner in 2011. then they moved it to 72 hours. the system as i am sure you know is a combination of digital and analog. it was stood up in 2007. really in some ways this is very similar to what we saw in the bush residence where they had installed an alarm system after this was the senior bush left office and they never replaced it. so it was a 20-year-old alarm system that was protecting a former president. they didn't have a system in place to be able to update these kinds of things. there was not, for example, even like a ticket system where if you needed something repaired there would be a record that in fact you requested these kinds of repairs. so a lot of their fundamental business practices simply have not kept up with the 21st century. i think the good news is that

with regard to the white house video system that there are updates that are going to occur in the near future. >> ok. any time line on that? >> i do. i am not sure it is public information. >> fair enough. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. we're getting close to votes here. we're going to rec night the gentleman from georgia. >> mr. carter. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. roth thank you for being here. i want to get at something that is bothering me throughout the series of hearings that we've had on this. it seemed to be the culture if you will, of the secret service about reporting. we have been told it's been alleged that the watch commander actually said that he did not want to report this. he didn't want to ask for a field sobe bright test because it would have been a career killer. is that true? >> that is what one of the

uniformed division officers told us. yes. that the watch commander said. the watch commander subsequently denied that. >> when he says a career killer is he referring to his career for reporting it or is he referring to their career if they had been found guilty? i'm not sure. >> the sense we got was that that was one of the mote vasions for the watch commander not to do any further inquiries because he thought there may be retaliation against him. in other words, it would be a career killer for him. certainly consistent to some of the things we found in the 2013 report with regard to a high percentage of people failing to report misconduct believing that either nobody would listen or you would be retaliated against. >> tell me what the policy is. what is the policy of the secret service when someone does recognize this or when someone is faced with this situation.

are they -- >> you're required to report or you had better keep it quiet? >> well, it's certainly not the latter. in fact, it's d.h.s. wide that the required to report up to either the secret office professional of responsibility or to the inspector general. >> if you don't report it what's the punishment? >> i'm not aware at this point what that is. >> it would appear to me that that's an important component. >> correct. correct. as i said, the inspector general's office isn't involved in specific discipline cases that's the secret service's responsibility. so what we do is we engage in the fact finding and hand it over to the secret service to do exactly what you suggest. >> ok. i am still a little disappointed not in you but just in that -- it would appear to me that that would be cut and dry. >> sure. >> let me ask you about the two agents who were involved.

when they arrived the officers stopped them. asked them where are you coming from? and their answer was? >> secret service headquarters. >> and that turns out to be a lie. >> that is not in fact true. >> then what's the consequences of that? look, we teach our children, there are consequences to actions. this was an action. what is the consequence? >> sure. there is a secret service table of penalties that talks about the range of consequences for specific things. and i can go through the specific ones with regard to -- >> i appreciate that. and i understand what you are trying to do. but let me ask you this. what is going to happen to them? >> there is a process that is in place that the office of integrity for secret service runs which is the deputy of the office of integrity will write up i assume take a look at our report and supporting materials that we have produced and

determine whether or not discipline is warranted. if he does he will write up what's a charging letter and give that to the individuals who are involved here. they have due process rights under the law. they have the ability to appeal it to the integrity officer as well as if the consequences are severe enough to the merits systems protection board. >> within those written laws is one of the options to go ahead and retire? >> i'm not sure. i mean, certainly you can only discipline people who are federal employees. if somebody leaves the federal service then there is no discipline to impose because the most discipline you can impose is to throw them out of the federal service. >> does it go in their permanent record? >> yes it would. >> is that shared with the perspective employer in the future? if one of them goes in the private sect dor you tell them ok this is what happened? >> i'm not -- >> or you tell them they were

employed here? >> i'm not 100% sure. in the instance of these two individuals i think a google search is going to take care of that. >> obviously in this. >> right. but i'm not sure. that's an area of employment law that i don't know. >> i understand. but my point is that the concern that i have is just with the general culture that exists. >> i certainly share that concern. >> thank you, mr. champlete i yield back. >> we now recognize the gentleman from pennsylvania. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank you particularly for mentioning the valor that is rue tinely shone by agents of this secret service. in particular a young man from pennsylvania in my district. today the u.s. secret service is proud to note that its own

sergeant technician william euer was presented by jay johnson the secretary's award for valor which is awarded for displays of exceptional courage of course as the chairman mentioned young mr. euer actually pulled an accident victim from the baltimore washington parkway, pulled a victim from a burning vehicle and it was later determined that that victim would have been unable to extra kate himself without william's help. so we are exceptionally proud of him in pennsylvania today. we are also proud of him for coming in 30st in the scranton half marathon last month covering 13.1 miles in less than an hour-and-a-half. i wish i could do that. mr. rots we are here to talk about -- roth we are here to

talk about failures of the secret service though. and it's a dour duty that you have to talk about some of the joud sides of some of the things we have seen. your report concludes both had a duty to report the incident to their superiors but did not do so. is there a policy requiring them to self-report? >> yes, there is. >> can you explain the policy? >> sure. and i'm simply reading from the manual that the secret service has. any incident in which an employee of the secret service is involved which may be the cause of publicity or inquiry must be meadly reported. the range of incidents are so great it is not possible to enumb rate them.

and it goes on. but that gives the gist. >> you now that other officials within the agency knew about the incident and failed to alert senior leadership in particular you found and i quote both uniformed division deputy chief dyson and uniform chief kevin simpson were notified that night that two agents had been drinking and had driven into an evacuated area and each could have reported the incident. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> why didn't they report the incident? >> we asked them that question. their answer were that he had spoken to connelly twice and connelly said that he would self-report. dyson pleaved that it was better for connelly to self-report than for him to report. with regard to the chief he said one that he believed connelly would report and two he said it was not his job to report misconduct on the behalf

of agents but rather just misconduct on the behalf of uniformed officers. >> who should they have reported to? >> the special agent in charge of the presidential protection division. or the office of professional responsibility or the inspector general. >> all right. now, according to your report chief simpson is the most senior secret service official who was aware that mr. connelly had been drinking when he and mr. oglevie drove into the ewatwutted area. what his explanation for failing to report? again what he said was he did not report the incident because he did not believe it was his job to do so and assumed that connelly was going to self-report. >> i don't think there's any acceptable reason for failing to report a clear incident of misconduct of this nature. the secret service has to make

it clear that reporting misconduct is not optional employees are required to report potential misconduct right up the chain of command.

>> the fact that you can find it on your website and maybe you have to look for it a little bit. it's pretty -- so why would they not know about that? is it just willful ignorance or is it the eighth floor not stressing the policy? >> you know, it's a matter i think of both publicizing it and educating individuals about it. but, for example we interviewed his direct supervisor who didn't know what the policy was. >> there is a policy that everyone is aware of and i believe it's called the ten-hour rule. >> correct. >> and so we have this receipt that would indicate that there were a number of people that were drinking and possibly reporting. would they not have been

violating if they reported that ten-hour rule? >> we looked at that issue specifically with oglevie and connelly. the bar tab was closed out at 10:47 roughly. they entered the e street gate slightly before 11 p.m. so they had finished drinking before 11 p.m. their duty hours started at 9:00 a.m. the next day. so they -- >> what about others? obviously it was a big party. >> correct. what we found though or at least by the preponderance of the evidence that the four individuals who were there were the last to leave. so there wasn't anybody else left. >> so it sounds thorough but we need to reemphasize that. the reason i ask is on the way here i have got two calls from random agents that i couldn't name because they're afraid to dwudge who they are. but literally within an hour of this hearing letting me know of all kinds of problems of the

expectation of secret service agents to actually put liquor in the rooms of supervisors as they travel, that if they don't do that it's frowned upon. gs-15s that have been caught inappropriate with females and yet still leaving amo or guns behind. i'm hearing all kinds of things. and if i'm a member of congress hearing this are you hearing the same kinds of things or should we report them to you so you can investigate? it's troubling. we've got this culture of from the most elite protective service in the world and yet it seems like i'm getting calls almost daily from different people. mr. roth: by all means, you should encourage them to contact us. the other look backs we are doing.

i really think the only way the culture is going to change is a quick can demonstrate we are going to take these things seriously. rep. meadows: i have your commitment, if we give you potential things to look at, you will take them seriously? you are 100% committed to routing of the problems? i know we are about to have votes. i will yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you very much. the secret service division, component, it is a component of dhs. do you think it makes better sense that there are departmentwide policies

regarding such important things? as opposed to component wide policies? mr. roth: there is certainly a validity to have uniformity across all of dhs, which there is not right now. >> we hear that on the other committee i am on. according to them or memorandum of under standing, certain kinds of misconduct must be referred to you. does march 4 constitute that level? mr. roth: yes:. >> who should have reported it? what level, what titles? is it just one person's responsibility? mr. roth: the duty to report it to us, the office of inspector general is -- if they get a complaint that talks about

someone who is a gs 15 or above, they have a duty to report it to us. once they hear it, they report it to us. independent of that is the duty that all employees have, reporting suspicions of wrongdoing. >> some of it is getting confusing. this entity -- mr. roth: the internal affairs within the secret service. >> when did they know about it? march 9. you were informed of it on march 9. mr. clancy was informed of this on march 9 also? mr. roth: correct. >> he did not start an

investigation of his own when you were going to take this on? is that usual operating procedure? where if you are going to do it, the agency will not conduct it. mr. roth: once decision is taken, everybody has to step back. >> we were going to focus in on who or what level we believe -- other than the self reporting of the chain of command. mr. roth: the point of failure. the senior management was in the uniform division, they knew of it and did not report it to for example director clancy.

the watch commander reported up his chain of command. for example, the deputy chief. additionally, there was a special agent. who was aware of what went on. she certainly could have and probably did have a duty to report it as well. >> i'm going to close because we are running late. i want to associate myself with something another person said. i don't know how long the work in public service, five years or 15 or 20 years. if you are found to have done something as egregious -- there needs to be some consequences. you are not allowed to walk away and say, i retire.

thank you very much. >> now i recognize mr. russell. mr. russell: thank you for your tireless investigations. i guess might take on it is a little more simple. would driving through a potential crime scene be acceptable off duty? >> neither, sir. mr. russell: would entering the white house buzzed or inebriated be acceptable? mr. roth: no sir. mr. russell: what kind of question says that raise? mr. roth: i share your concerns.

rep roth: what sort of example the think that sets for the agents? knowing that any of them at any moment could be called upon to protect free world? mr. roth: that is something we wrestled with. that is one of the reasons they have government cars. at any moment, they could be called out. a good example is the philadelphia agents who responded to the home of the woman who had dropped the package.

it is very troubling. rep. russell: this is the highest level they can perform. what discipline have they received? mr. roth: the way the process works is, there is an investigation that is done. we transmitted all of our materials to their office of professional responsibility. which then manages that program. the deputy within the office would assess the materials and write a charging document. they have a table of penalties. i think this is serious conduct.

i think the fact that it has caused me to expend these resources, the director of the secret service to distract himself from his important business. i think it is detrimental to the effective functioning of the secret service. rep. russell: should the american public have more confidence or less in the ability to protect the president? mr. roth: i am hoping this process will create more

confidence. rep> russell: we had a similar answer after barricades, drones. we talking about the president of the united states. at what point do you see -- what is your estimation -- you have been handling investigations a long time? are they taking it serious? while they make the changes the american public demands? mr. roth: i have had a number of conversations. do i think he is making the right moves? mr. russell: my hope is the director, thank you for your testimony today.

>> you mention there were others who had been drinking. mr. roth: i am not exactly sure who that would have been. they would have a beer and a sandwich, say goodbye, and then go back to work. >> some of the people went back to work. how many people?

mr. roth: i do not have that information. >> this is not just one person making a rookie mistake. you have two people, mr. connolly with 27 years. 46 years of experience. you are telling me they did not know it is wrong to drink? mr. roth: it is not right to drink alcohol and work the french fry machine at mcdonald's. it is certainly not when you are there to protect the president and the first family. they have guns. they can blow past and say, i am your supervisor. that is what is happening here. when you did have the poor officer. they are trying to do the right thing. the senior people with badges, guns, and alcohol on their breath, said, i just came from headquarters.

they did not mention they came from the bar. was that a lie? mr. roth: it would appear to be that way. >> they are lying to themselves because they did take a government vehicle. they should know after 46 years, they are there to respond at a moment's notice. these are the senior most people they were taking advantage. they were making taxpayers pay for their little rides to the bar. the only thing that is raising the bar is the bar tab. it has to change. i appreciate the good work. how long has homeland security and secret service -- how long

have they had your draft? mr. roth: they received it may 6. they supply the underlying materials middle or late last week. rep. chaffetz: and yet there is no consequence. what discretion does he have revoking their clearance? mr. roth: i don't have that information. rep. chaffetz: he could revoke it immediately? mr. roth: i am not sure exactly what the process is. rep. chaffetz: he could be put on non-paid leave. do think this is an aggravated situation? rep. chaffetz: unfortunately you