school football game? josh: you can raise your hand or not raise your hand. senator graham: okay. how many of you believe you shouldn't be offered a prayer at a high school football game? establishing a religion is prohibited by the constitution. congress shall not establish a particular religion. the freedom to exercise your religion is guaranteed by the constitution. there's a limit on government and there's an empowerment of people. for 200 years, we'll be trying to figure this out. the one thing i will not tolerate is a national religion even though i'm a christian because that is counter to what we are as a people. and you see how religion is playing out in the mid-east? the strength of this nation has been that people can worship god on their own terms. freedom of religion and the exercise clause is part of who we are.

but we've benefitted as a society by having a wall between the government and the people. and let's keep that wall in place to make sure that nobody in the government can tell you what to do when it comes to your religious freedom. at the same time for those who believe in god you're not the enemy. we don't need to drive god out of the public square. we just need to make sure we've got the right balance. josh: thank you very much to bill ladd for that question. back to the studio audience. a different take on foreign policy. >> for more than a decade, the media's coverage of american foreign policy is focused on our military's efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. i'd like to hear your views on the world international planning policy despite popular conceptions, international aide only comprises 1% of the federal budget. do you see international aide as

an important tool in building strong communitys and allies around the world. senator graham: did y'all hear this question? 1% of your federal budget goes to foreign assistance. that includes running the state department, and our aide to israel. the american taxpayers help africa reduce motherhood child aids transmission by 75%. through programs created by the federal government partnered with the private sector, we've taken some of your tax dollars and put aids on the run in africa and saved an entire generation of children from certain death. building a schoolhouse in afghanistan does more damage to the taliban than a brigade of soldiers. foreign aide is easily demagogued. it's 1% of the budget and we're broke at home. i'm sure there's roads that need to be built in new hampshire. as a matter of fact, after last night, i can assure you there are new roads that need to be built in new hampshire. here's my view of defeating radical islam. you have to do more than kill the terrorists.

you have to build up other people in the region and if you don't, you will fail as a nation. the good news for us is most fathers in the region don't want to turn their daughters over to isil. we're talking a lot of poor and corrupt countries. the mid-east is on fire. i don't know how to defend this country without some of us being over there doing the fighting, but i can promise you this, the way to destroy radical islam over time is to create capacity in the countries where they reside to do the fighting and extinguish this hateful ideology. a small schoolhouse in afghanistan that you wouldn't send your child to for 30 minutes can do more damage to this ideology than a bomb being dropped on their heads. the way you defeat this radical ideology is you help people in the region build better and stronger societies. you allow mothers' voice to be heard. when the biggest missing pieces in the mid-east is the ability

of a mother to speak up and have a say about the future of her child. there's 6 million girls going to school in afghanistan today. on september 10, it was illegal for a child to go to school in afghanistan. we've had over 2200 soldiers die. at the end of the day, building up these countries and being their partner through thick and thin, even though many of them are corrupt, is in our national security interest. i'm known as a hawk. but here's one thing i understand after many trips to the mid-east. foreign assistance, american businesses being involved overseas, is absolutely essential to our national security. if you think you can ignore the world and it won't come back to bite you just remember 9/11. we didn't have one dollar of aide to afghanistan, we didn't have an embassy and we didn't have one soldier in afghanistan

and they attacked us anyway. the people who are trying to kill us and destroy the region are motivated by a religious ideology that has no place for anybody in this room. they're trying to purify their religion and destroy all other religions. christianity is being slaughtered as i speak in this region. so ladies and gentlemen, it is in our national security interest to take the fight to these guys. but to do something even harder than dropping the bomb. being patient and building up other people who would one day live in peace with us. it worked in germany. it worked in japan. it will work in the mid-east. but it's going to require patience and an understanding that there's no substitute for american leadership in the world. josh: have about a minute to go. time is flying so we'll wrap up the tv portion of the program with a question from twitter. all the candidates are being asked about it. what specifically would you do this comes from jean by the way, what specifically would you

do to remove the influence of big money. senator graham: well, citizens united needs to be fixed. i was for mccain finegold, supreme court ruled 5-4. the provisions of mccain finegold basically no longer apply. you're going to get sick of watching tv in new hampshire so the next president of the united states needs to get a commission of really smart people and find a way to create a constitutional amendment to limit the role of super pacs because there's going to be $100 million spent on races in new hampshire which will be good for this tv station, with and everybody apart, you don't even know who the people are supplying the money. you don't even know their agenda. eventually, we're going to destroy american politics with so much money in the political process because they're going to turn you off to wanting to vote. josh: i can promise you we're not running off commission-based salary. i appreciate that. putting your money in this. senator graham: i'm going to put every money i can into

advertising in new hampshire. josh: very good. we're out of time for just the tv portion of this. so yeah, we're going to come back to this. don't worry. coming up in our next conversation series with the canada -- candidate, former texas governor ricky perry will be on the program. while we are signing off as we alluded to for television tonight, this conversation for senator graham continues online and on our mobile app as well. you'll find a full 30 minutes more, questions from our studio audience, all of it commercial free. for now, thanks for watching and have a great night. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> more campaign 2016 coverage.

next, a conversation with former texas governor and possible presidential candidate ricky perry. from wmur manchester in new hampshire, this is 25 minutes. josh: tonight, we'll be getting to governor perry where he stands in these issues on this campaign. i'll be getting to know the candidate, quick questions, and after the break we'll go to the studio audience and let them ask their questions in the town hall format. before we get to that, let's look at the candidate's bio graphy. ricky perry was born in 1950 and grew up in paint creek, texas. where he was active in scouting and earned eagle scout. he earned a degree in animal science at texas a&m where he was a member of the core of cadets and a yell leader. he served in the u.s. air force

in europe and the middle east. he served two terms as the texas commissioner of agriculture and three terms in the house of representatives before being elected lieutenant governor in 1998. he was sworn in as the 47th governor in texas in 2000 and became the longest serving governor in history of the lone star state. perry believes in strong motor security and tough physical discipline and is also married with two children. josh: governor perry, thanks for joining us this evening. rick perry: good to be with you, sir. josh: this is the second time you're considering a run. how are you a different person and how are you a different candidate? rick perry: well, healthy for one thing. i tell people humorously, if you plan on running for the presidency of the united states, i highly recommend you don't have major back surgery six weeks before the announcement. you're probably not going to perform quite as well as you would like to. and the other side of it is, we parachuted into this thing in

august of 2011 with, frankly, no preparation. and being a governor and then being a governor for 12 years is extraordinary experience, particularly on the executive side. but the preparation in an individual who's going to stand in front of the people of this country, talk about monetary policy domestic policy, foreign policy, it takes years of study, intense focus, talking to some of the great experts around the world, and i hadn't done that, and it showed. i jokingly tell people, i went right to the top of the polls if you all remember. it was three of the most magnificent hours of my life. it didn't turn out the way we wanted, but the fact is, if you're going to run for the presidency of the united states, you better be healthy because it's a marathon. and the second part of it is you must spend a lot of time in preparation to be able to talk about this myriad of issues that you're going to be faced with and that you need to be very knowledgeable of.

josh: let's talk about a couple of those issues in this race. one of them that you have experience with is immigration down in texas, obviously, a border state. and in this debate, let me ask you. let me phrase the question this way: still have are 10,000 troops in afghanistan and a lot of people wondering why they're not back home. do you think those troops should be rather than in afghanistan, on the border? rick perry: i think we can do both. when you look at iraq, and i realize you didn't ask me about that, but when we look at iraq and see how that has deteriorated and when you see how isis has come into a very influential place, they control a larger piece of land in the middle east than the united kingdom, one of the reasons, i think the main reason you've seen isis and its ability to influence that part of the world is because america moved our troops out of iraq. i think had we left that military presence there to help manage that area, we had won the war. the peace was what needed to be

addressed, and we backed out. we moved away, and when there is a vacuum, you're going to see that vacuum filled by something, in this case we've seen isis fill that vacuum. so i think there is a role for some number of troops in afghanistan. obviously, how iraq gets dealt with now is anybody's guess, because we missed a lot of different opportunities. i think we could have stopped isis by supporting the syrian rebels and i think we've gotten rid of asad at that point in time. then we miss an opportunity when isis went out of syria into northern iraq into that kuritstan region where the fighters are weaponry, delivered to those individuals. they're great fighters fighting for their homes and families. i think we could have stopped isis there. but again, president took a step back and said -- you know, for whatever reason.

i think it has more to do with the iranian negotiations than it did with us being able to stop isis. again, the bottom line is, we're going to have to have a presence in the middle east with our personnel to be able to maintain. i think the middle east is in chaos. i mean, you look at libya, egypt, isis and we've got some real challenges. josh: sure, looking forward, if you're commander in chief in the united states, what's the first order of business when it comes to isis? rick perry: you put a coalition together. that's what i don't see happening. obviously, the king of jordan, a person who really understands when we saw his pilot being burned alive on television, we realized this isn't just about isis going after christians. this is isis going after jews, it's going after christians, it's going after muslims that don't agree with their radical islamic approach here. you put a coalitioning it with the saudis, the jordanians, the

turks, that would be the first order of business from the time you get the election over with, you talk and create those relationships. obviously, i've been into israel a lot of times. we've got a relationship with the king of jordan. we've got relationships with people, the young man who runs saudi aramco, went to school at texas a&m. i have personal relationships with these people and it's creating that trust and creating that will of working together to stop this radical islamic movement that's creating great havoc in the middle east. josh: we have about a minute to go before a break. you talk about coalition building. that takes time obviously. what's your first approach when it comes to an enemy? it appears to be bigger planning, whatever. rick perry: i don't think it does take that much time, because the relationships have been built over there. i think today, we have a

president of the united states who's more interested in getting a deal with iran, and quite frankly, getting a deal with cuba, two regimes that don't have the united states' best interest in mind and has really taken this step back, if you will. so a forward-leaning position. but to go back in and immediately create those personal relationships and those trusting relationships, i mean, israel doesn't know where the united states is going to be on any given day when it comes to their security. i'm not sure that the king of jordan would tell you, i know where america is going to be on any given day with this leadership. so clearly knowing these people and having personal relationships and them trusting us and knowing that we're going to be there, and on the other side of that is the individuals who don't have america's best interest in line, when you draw a red line and somebody crosses that red line, there is a consequence, and we haven't seen that. josh: governor, we'll take a quick break and get to the studio audience from their

questions. stay with us. >> now, conversation with the candidate continues. josh: welcome back, everybody, to our conversation with the candidate. tonight's guest, former texas governor republican ricky perry. but it's time to bring in our questions from the audience. i will jump in if a follow-up is needed. right now, let's get to it with our first question coming from joel mitchell. good to see you. >> good morning, governor. thank you for being with us. many political observers think that the primary focus of the next chief executive needs to be international relations. given that hillary clinton, the former secretary of state, will be the democrat candidate, why do you think you'd be better at dealing with foreign affairs than her? rick perry: well, i think when you look at -- you look at people's records, and you look at the results of those records. so when i think about secretary clinton, the first thing that

comes to mind for me, i was a former pilot in the united states air force. i flew in that area, and i'm talking about northern africa and libya and what happened at benghazi. i think there's some great concerns about that. her testimony, her saying what difference does it make that these young americans lost their lives, that that ambassador lost their life, it makes a lot of difference, and i think she's got a lot of explaining to do. and as my friend carle free arina says, just because you have a frequent flyer card on federal airplanes doesn't mean you've been a successful secretary of state. so i think it's very important for us to realize, this isn't just about whether somebody's been in a position. what have you done while you're in that position? 14 years as the governor of the stavks, and we've got a real record, whether the record iste of

texas, and we've got a real record, whether the record is 1.5 million people added to the job population the number of jobs created, 5.6 million people came into our state. and then having a philosophy, is america -- i happen to look at -- if hillary clinton is going to be the nominee, i think it's -- this is just the third term of barack obama from my perspective. you're seeing the same type of approach. i happen to think america has a role in the world. i don't think we back away from our responsibilities. i think we have a clear role in the middle east. i think we have a clear role in europe. for instance, i would have been sending american liquefied natural gas into the european theaters to send mr. putin a real powerful message. but this administration has taken a step back time after time, except in two places, with iran and cuba, negotiating with two regimes that frankly don't

have america's best interest in mind. so if hillary clinton is the nominee, i think she's got a lot of explaining to do. josh: joel, thank you very much for your question. a question from mary lou bieber and take it away. >> thank you for taking my question, governor. if you're president and are going to replace the affordable care act with something else, what would that look like, and how would you ensure that low income children and their parents here in new hampshire don't lose access to the care they currently receive? rick perry: and i would repeal obama care because i think it's going to make access to health care substantially limited in the future. we already know it's going to be driving up health care costs, and i think more young men and women are not going to go into health care because of this one-size-fits-all approach. so with all that said, what do you replace it with? having been a governor for 14 years, and knowing the strings that always get attached with

programs like medicaid that comes back into the states, we need senators and congressmans, and presidents of the united states, where we have the states coming up with the best ideas of how to deliver health care, and i think allowing those dollars to flow back to the states, without all the strings attached, i trust your governor and your legislature right here in new hampshire just as i trust a governor and a legislature in any other state, to come up with a menu of ideas, you know, is it health savings accounts? is it being able to buy insurance across state lines? there's a host of ways to make our health care more affordable, more accessible, and i'll suggest to you at the top of that is tort reform. being able to protect against privulous lawsuits. we were just talking earlier with one of the participants in

the audiencefrivolous lawsuits. we were just talking earlier with one of the participants in the audience who lived in corpus christi, texas, that our tort reform has saved billions of dollars in costs of the state of texas but more importantly, it expanded access to health care. we've got 35,000 more doctors licensed to practice medicine in texas. they've gone into counties where there wasn't health care before. so if you want to see affordability, you want to see access to health care, let the states be the laboratories of innovation. don't do it from washington d.c. and have this one-size-fits-all, because access to health care, whether it's our elderly, whether it's a young person who can't afford insurance, i don't think the way you judge whether or not health care is going to be accessible is how many people you force to buy insurance. i think the states will come up with the best way to deliver

health care for their citizens. as the president of the united states, if i decide to run, i trust the states. i trust the governs and their legislatures and their people to come up with the best ways. the current resident of the white house doesn't trust the states. josh: thank you very much. mary lou for the question. let's go on to dan bergeron. >> i have two siblings that have called the dallas area home for several years. both i and my son who is a freshman in college, we both have student debt. so given that between 2007 and 2012 the government is on track to profit 69 or $66 billion off student loans, so my question to you is, would you offer a plan that would help my family and several other families across the country with student debt? rick perry: and i think the student debt story is one of the really powerful stories that needs to be told, and people need to really understand this.

what are we getting from a college education today? i happen to be one of the first people, if not the first people that came up with a $10,000 degree plan. i'm not talking about $10,000 a year. i'm talking about a total $10,000 degree in the state of texas. now, they laughed at me, originally, when i said that in my state of the state address. but subsequently there are 19 different institutions in texas that are offering a $10,000 degree. so i think you have to have some innovation, but powerfully, the message needs to be sent to all of these institutions of learning, that you cannot just have free will to raise this tuition. when the federal government took over the federal loan programs, you saw the universities have basically a free shot to raise tuition, and that's exactly what they did. i think you move it

back into the private sector and let the private sector run the loan programs, but also, there needs to be some clear controls on these universities, from the standpoint of just having them willy-nilly being able to raise tuition. so kids' futures are being destroyed because they're getting out of college, can't get a job. we've got some of the highest number of people out of work in this country. so getting the economy back going, and i've got a real plan to be able to do that, intertwined directly to our energy industry and driving down the cost of electricity, bringing back manufacturing in this country. so you have an economy that's booming in this country. for kids when they get out of college, and get a job and also to have some thoughtful processes in place and some protections so that we don't see

these massive students' debts that are being created. josh: governor, thank you. dan thank you for the question. let's take one from facebook. claude snyder asking, would you support term limits for congress? rick perry: i'm not a big fan of term limits and let me tell you why. i think the key to our democracy is having an engaged constituency out there. and if you have a really great ceo that's running your country, running your company, running your state why would you want to limit them? if you've got somebody that's not doing a good job, you go out there and fire them, and you do it through the ballot box. here's my great concern. if you put term limits into place, here's who you are empowering. i think it's kind of an easy way to go and say let's just term

limit them or we'll keep mary and keep bill only in congress for six years, and then they're gone, we'll get a new one. that way they can't foul this up. if we do that, then what we have done is we have put the bureaucrats in charge, and the bureaucrats, i was in government long enough to understand the bureaucrats when they know that there's term limits. they'll go oh, yes, sir, we'll get right to that, and they wink and nod, and then you're gone, and then they'll start winking and nodding to the next person. now, if somebody wants to come up with a way that says bureaucrats are going to get term limit as well let's have that conversation. but until there's a level playing field out there, just to limit the elected officials that we have in the state with term limits, i think we're doing nothing more than handing over the keys to the truck, so to speak, to the bureaucrats. josh: so claude, there's your answer. governor, thank you. let's move on to one from the audience from steven graphing.

>> the lack of cooperation in washington seems to be a real point of frustration with america today. as president, how would you increase the productivity between congress and the oval office? rick perry: i agree with you. when i look at washington d.c. and i see, you know, whether it's on the house floor, the senate floor, people giving up, giving big speechs and walk off the senate floor and they don't have to address the issues, governs don't have that privilege. it's not a privilege. governors don't have that option. governs have to find ways to make their states work. and i think that's a -- i happen to think that's one of the reasons that we're going to choose a governor who has substantial executive experience to be the next president of the united states. but reaching across the aisle, i've had to do that for, i mean, 30 years as the house member

agaccumulateural commissioner as the governor of the state of texas, i found the things that we can work on and i think it starts at the top. i don't see him reaching across the aisle and saying, hey, mitch mcconnell, let's work on the thing we can work on together. having a photo op or a beer, that's one thing. i'll be happy to have a beer with somebody and talk. the real key find the places we can work together. the most liberal democrat in texas texas, an african-american lawyer in downtown houston. i grew up on a farm. we're at opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum. we found things we can work on. we passed a piece of legislation together to punish and to try to stop the sexual trafficking that was going on in the state of texas coming out of mexico. find those things we can work

on. i believe with all my heart, democrats and republicans have a lot of the same end goals. we want to live in a country where people have access to good jobs. we want to live in safe communities. we want to have a strong military so that we're not going to be attacked from outside this country. how you get there is where often the rub is. but we can find ways to work together. i believe in all my heart, but it starts at the top and i'll be a president if i decide to run, that reaches out and finds those places where democrats can work with me on issues we believe in. but also, let me wrap up with this, i'm also a big believer, that i'd rather have a half a loaf than no loaf. so compromise is not necessarily a bad thing. josh: thanks for the question. let's get to the next one. mary from rumney.

>> good evening. you've counted an impressive record of job creation in texas and used those jobs to recruit people to move to your state. can you tell us about your record in preparing texas citizens to fill those jobs? i'm interested in knowing more about investments your state made in its educational system, in particular around early childhood intervention such as preschool? rick perry: yes, ma'am. i'm not a big believer that you judge how well your workforce is going to be developed., strictly by how much money you spend. because if that's the case, you know, california and probably washington d.c. would have the best records when it comes to their education. in 2003, texas was 27th in the nation in high school graduation rates. about in the middle of the pack. last year, we got the numbers

in. texas is now second highest graduation rates in america. we're the highest african-american graduation rates. we're the highest hispanic graduation rates. we had a 118% increase in hispanic participation in higher education while i was governor. if you want to have a better indicator of how a young person is -- or whether they're going to be successful in life, the first thing that you need to do is graduate them from high school. and we did that by putting accountability in our public schools. we increased the funding but we didn't become the -- the second highest spending state in the nation. we did it with incentives, and i think there's some good examples of how people can pick and choose. and again, i go back to this whole 10th amendment concept of states picking and choosing from other successes. rick scott over in florida.

i can promise you, rick gets up every day and figures out way to make his state more competitive. bobby ginnedjindal. bobby gets up every day trying to figure out how to recruit businesses from texas to florida. i have to look at my regulation policies to keep texas more competitive. but that's how you do it with competitive programs, and it's worked. josh: we're just about out of time this half hour. very quickly, for those wondering tonight in the audience, when will they know whether ricky perry is running again? rick perry: end of may, first of june. 2015. josh: you came in late last time. that is all the time we have for the television portion of this program right now. coming up next on our conversation with the candidate series. we have former erer hewlett packard ceo carly fiorina.

and this conversation continues online and the mobile app. you'll find a full 30 minutes more, all of it, commercial free. for now, thanks for watching, have a great night. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> presidential candidates release books to voters. here's recent books by declared and potential presidents for candidate. hillary clinton looks back on her time serving in the obama administration in "hard choices." in "american dreams," florida senator marco rubio outlines his

plan. mike hucka bee gives his in "god, guns, grits and gravy" and in "blue collar conservatives" rick santor umargues that the republican party must focus on the working class in order to retake the white house. in a fighting chance massachusetts senator elizabeth warren recounts events in her life as an educator and politician. scott walker argues that republicans must offer bold solutions in "unintimidated" and kentucky senator rand paul who recently declared his candidacy calls for smaller government and more bipartisanship in "taking a stand". more presidential candidates with recent books include former governor jeb bush with "immigration wars" arguing for new immigration policies.

in "stand for something" ohio governor john kasich calls for a return to traditional american values. james webb looks back on his time in the military and the senate in "i heard my country calling". bernie sanders announced his intention to seek nomination for president. his book "the speech" is a printing of his eight-hour long filibuster on tax cuts. in "promises to keep" vice president joe biden looks back on his career in politics and explains his guiding principles. neurosurgeon ben carlsson calls for greater individual responsibility to preserve america's future in "one nation." in "fed up" former texas governor ricky perry explains questionnaire has become too intrusive and must get out of the way. another politician who has expressed interest in running for president is former rhode island governor lincoln chafee

in "against the tide". he recounts his time serving as republican in the senate. carly fiorina, former ceo of hewlet packard. bobby jindal explains why conservatives are needed in washington in "leadership in crisis" and finally, in "a time for truth" texas senator ted cruz recounts his journey from a cuban immigrant son to the u.s. senate. look for his book in june. >> up next on cspan, a discussion on u.s.-russia relations and the ongoing conflicts in ukraine and syria. former cia deputy director mike morell discusses intelligence and n.s.a. surveillance programs. later, hillary clinton campaigns in mason city, iowa.

>> the head of the f.a.a. and the president of the national air traffic controllers association will talk about efforts to modernize the air traffic control system. that's part of a reauthorization hearing on federal aviation administration programs. watch live coverage from the senate commerce science and transportation committee tomorrow beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern on cspan 3. later in the day also on cspan 3, civil rights and law enforcement officials will testify about the use of police body cameras. that's live from a senate judiciary subcommittee on crime and terrorism at 2:30 eastern. up next, army and air force officials talk about u.s.-russia relations, and look at the current tensions russia is having with the west over the situation in ukraine. the center for strategic and international studies hosted this hour and 50 minute event.

>> good morning. welcome to csis the center for strategic and international studies. my name is andy kutchins. i'm director of the euasia program at csis and here to present the scholars program, to talk about from cooperation to competition, the future of u.s.-russian relations. russian aggression in 2014 caught a lot of us off guard forcing reactive measures and reevaluation of u.s. policy towards russia. russia has used nonlinear approaches and operated just beneath additional thresholds of conflicts take full advantage of u.s. and nato policy limitations. in light of the strategic challenge, members of the carlyle scholars program at the u.s. army war college conducted a war game last month in the middle of april. unfortunately, i was not able to

participate myself as i was in moscow at a conference organized by the russian ministry of defense. and in the war game, they revealed four key considerations for the future policy and strategy. this panel of presentation will present the findings from that war game and also from the assessment study that the scholars program conducted in preparation for the exercise. the views presented by the panelists are their own and should not be implied to be those of their sponsoring service, the u.s. army u.s. army war college. i will briefly introduce our panelists in -- today, and in your materials, you have a fuller fuller fuller bio graphy. but directly to my right is colonel gevjon coy from the royal edmonds army and is currently a fellow at the u.s.

army war college. lieutenant joe hilbert is just to colonel coy's right, and he is a career army field artillery officer and has experience supporting light airborn armored, and special operations forces. and directly to joe's right is dr. james mcnauten who earned his ph.d. in history from johns hopkins university. i presume we are co hv-co-alumni. oh, the home campus. from the mother ship. he served as staff historian from several joint and army headquarters. directly to dr. mcnauten's right, is lieutenant colonel christopher lai. he is a c 130 master navigator and u.s. weapons school graduate. he graduated from the u.s. air

force academy -- excuse me, christopher. i know these mix-ups in services can be a little touchy with a b.s. in u.s. history and earned an m.a. in history from the university of central arkansas. finally, to my far right, last and hardly least, is lieutenant colonel karen briggaman. she is a strategic officer with military experience ranging from the tactical to the strategic level. so with that, let me turn the floor over to colonel floy who will introduce the program. >> thank you very much for hosting us today here. good morning to everybody. i'll explain a little bit about where we come from and why we're sitting on this table, so what led to this. first of all, we have five of six students from the u.s. army war college. the six students was already moving to his new assignment in europe, so he couldn't be here, so we're actually five of six.

he was on the war college. but we're in the special program called the collis program. the idea behind that is that we do the curriculum in four months instead of eight to nine months, just condense it a little bit. so we have got more time to do research, to do engagementes with think tanks or state department within there as well. and to do more research. and we want to do our own, that we are really motivated to do. so that's part of the program. we started in october 2014, and i won't go through all the steps in this slide. we started in russia and the russia-asia relationship actually. it was programs we were already doing at the u.s. army war

college and over time we had meetings from many respected experts from think tanks, from universities, dod, state department as well. and and those meetings were to confirm, improve or help our understanding of the systems. that's what we did over time. the war game was actually a month ago, but prior to that we had many meetings in washington on think tanks to discuss our view on what we thought the russian system was like. we used what we call operational design. it's a way to frame the environment, frame the problem and the approach to the system. we started with first understanding the problem. we looked into putting in

scramsochi, to find that out. and looked for problems within the current system and fractures that are in the system as well. for that environment, we used visualization of the russian are bear. and russian bear with his own dna, and he is moving through a forest, and he used keys that control the bear or used keys that moved counter to the bear. so that's what we used to frame the environment, so to say. and then we framed some approaches, and those approaches are approaches on how to influence the russian system and those approaches led to the war games that we did in april. >> so as gert-jon mentioned once we completed the process of design and collaboration of the

different organizations you saw on the chart, we thought we would take it and get close as we could to a random field experiment, and in this case would be a war game. what you see on the slide in front of you is how we laid that out. our first problem statement, when we looked at the national security strategy and a lot of other strategic documents, we talk a great deal about strengthening and enduring alliance with europe. the question was then well, given that how should the u.s. consider its policy towards russia? how should that impact it? so the purpose of the event was to come up with policy considerations, and then you see some of the other objectives that you see there, with really the final research question being what kind of insights can we gain that we could then use to inform policymakers? this was the methodology. so as gert-jun mentioned, we met with several folks along the way in building that assessment.

and then we took those engagementes and invited people with whom we engaged others to come to the barracks and participate in this war game. we divided into three games, a russia team, u.s. team, and a white celled or controlled group. then the way the war game would work, we started out in a large group plenary session. we presented our assessment of the russian system. we presented what we currently understood u.s. policy toward russia to be and we let the russia team and the u.s. team go to their break-out rooms and either refine or confirm what had just been presented to build what would be their base line in going forward. in each case we told the u.s. team if you're an advisor to the president and the same thing to the russian, consider yourselves advisors to president putin. we brought them back into the plenary session. each side had an opportunity to brief the other and then they had a chance for questions of clarification from one side to

the other, and that was as well with the white cell of the control group. once they had baselined their policy going into the game, we then provided what we call a strategic insert or scenario that each side would have to deal with. what we found was, there was not a lot of movement from the way we had designed the russian system or the way we had presented u.s. policy, so we felt like we had a pretty good base line going in and after they'd come into the plenary session, a pretty good refinement. so we started with the first scenario, the two teams would then go to the break-out rooms, the russia team and the u.s. team. they would confirm the policy they had was it still valid? if it wasn't valid, what changethey need to make and what was going to be their strategic approach going forward given this new environment or given this scenario? they then came back into the larger group, briefed each other, and it was kind of a courtroom type setting. they'd brief -- one side would brief, the other side would

brief, and they'd be allowed to provide a counter argument back and forth and then the white cell again would ask questions for clarification. once that term was complete, we shoot the next inject. as the russians and the u.s. teams went away, the white cell went through a debriefing process. what did they hear that was feasible? what did they hear that was not feasible. how did they understand what they heard, and that's how we gathered the data. we repeated that process through five different injects. these were the -- it should say scenarios. these are the scenarios that we went through, with the strategic end state of the game being we really want to see a secure stable and prosperous europe. we met the alliance with the national security strategy and the alliance of what we think would be our view, and russia that acts responsibly and honors territorial sovereignty. these are the five different scenarios. the first one you see is a rapid movement toward energy independence in europe. we had to suspend a little reality and say if you could be completely independent from

russia, what would that look like and how would both sides react? the second one, probably more plausible, and maybe even more urgent, is expansion of the ukrainian conflict. if it were to go beyond the line of control if there was an expansion in other regions of interest, and then they strategic miscalculation of sorts. the third move was uncontrollable uncontrollable naturalism. we characterized naturism as a weapon of nationalism. what happens when he loses control of the nationalism. talking about falling off the bear or the bear takes off on its own. how do both sides react. the fourth one you see the power turning against putin. this was not meant to be a coo of sorts. these powerly advisors, what would they advise to now as far

as what is left and how to go forward with it. the final turn, getting beyond crisis, was less than a strategic scenario as much as it was, what does each side want to see from the other, both from a russian side and then from the u.s. side? in the end these were the considerations after distilling the data we got from both sides or from each of the terms, these were the four key considerations we saw. the first one, compete with russia it maintain an international order. it sounds counter-intuitive. we talk about cooperating where we can. what we found is each turn on the u.s. side would come in the russian side would come in competitively. at one point, a participant said we're in an environment where we're competitive and compete. compete when you can compete and cooperate when you can cooperate. while you would think that order would come through cooperation in this case, the competition

has got to be resolved first. the second one was clearly articulating a position towards russia, eastern europe and the ukraine. the u.s. team would come in and debrief, and we often found that there was a little bit of ambiyou goity that came out. the policy had to be clear with regard to each. the third challenge, russia and the competition of ideas and influence. that was a consistent comment from the white cell, the u.s. teams lack of a good information policy or information strategy. and the last bullet, the blinding flash would be obvious, but with two election cycles coming up, both in the u.s. and with russia in 2018, clearly, that timeline needs to be leveraged. we felt like from president putin to maintaining the power. one of the comments was we need to look for what is going to be

crime crimea in 2017. by no means is it an attempt to influence the u.s. national election but whatever policy is built, it's going to have to survive both our own national election and be implemented by a new administration going forward toward and stepping right into an election cycle on the russian side. with that, i'll pass that off to dr. jim mcnau10 who was one of the observers of the u.s. team. >> thank you, joe. i had the opportunity to be a note taker sitting in and listening to the u.s. team's discussions over two days of the war game. and i want to start with two general observations and i look forward to questions and discussions after our introductory remarks here, and my observations really are on point 1 and 2 that you see on the screen here after watching a mix of people trying to come up with the u.s. policy or what the

policy would be with some of these hypothetical situations, it was very interesting to find out that really, they were confronting a c change in u.s. policy, and it was clear to them that something had changed in the international environment. the tough part was figuring out what to do about that. they realized for the past two decades at least, our relations with russia in general have been based on the concept that we would encourage russia to become a normal country within the european security architecture and the european community and that russia would be encouraged to play by the rules and the u.s. could treat them as they treat any other regional power around the world. after the seizure of crimea and when the conflict erupted in eastern ukraine, it became very clear that that set of assumptions was no longer valid.

and so everyone could see that c change. but the hard part among the players who were trying to formulate in this academic environment, what should u.s. policy be, was to figure out how to compete with russia. it's very difficult to jettison those set of assumptions and long-range policies that the u.s. had worked with for many, many years. but we considered alternative features within the war game and it became clear that at least for the next several years, the u.s. would have to be -- would have to manage strategic competition with russia, rather than simply treat russia as another normal country in the environment. the second general observation i would like to start with is that it's easy to say that the united states needs to artechulate a more clear position towards russia and eastern europe and ukraine, but there are some

severe challenges we discovered and joe is absolutely correct that the u.s. team ended up being more reactive than proactive, as it struggled to balance several major sets of considerations. the united states policy is not developed simply in washington d.c. we must take into account our nato allies and other partners and countries in the region, which means a great deal of consensus building and discussions before a policy can be, in fact, clearly stated by our leaders. a secondary of where we have challenges to developing that policy consensus is the lack of clarity on how russia is going to respond. as we work through hypotheticals and we can do this, we could put troops in the baltics. we could send armaments, lethal equipment to the ukrainians. we could tighten sanctions.

at each step, we just lacked an understanding of the russian system to where we felt comfortable that if we do this, we're pretty sure russia will do that. so that really muddied the policy waters as well, made it difficult to achieve a consensus. and finally, there are clearly areas that everyone agreed on that we really -- we very strongly want to continue to cooperate with russia, in areas such as the discussions over the iranian nuclear program. this is something quite important for very valid reasons that we need russian cooperation to continue. so how do we change to a situation where we're managing strategic competition while maintaining these areas of cooperation with russia and it took a lot of time and oftentimes the result was quite messy when it came time to go into the plenary session and say okay, u.s. team, now, what have you come up with as far as the

policy? that was one of our great challenges. and i will be -- turn to my colleague, chris leigh who will talk a little bit about what he saw while observing the russian team. >> thanks jim. i was an analyst or an observer. we must note that none of us here were participants during the war game. we facilitated and observed. we took notes. which a lot of it is a unique vantage point, i would dare say, and without any of our sort of predispositions since we've done doing this since october. i'll just start with a couple of general comments and if we can speak with a little bit more fidelity or granularity during the q&a period. during the war game, russia was

able to operate with more flexibility and options. the russian team had a lot more options. they were less constrained by international norms, laws, alliances. for instance, during one of our turns, russia was able to delay armor and troops along the border, and this was cast as a defensive move or posture, and what it was was an overly aggressive move. which leads me to the second point. russia operates with a far more robust informational operations campaign. their io was remarked by one of the participants as they more or less recognized propaganda. oftentimes, russia was able to spin a particular narrative that the west could not easily counter, or if they did attempt to counter, it took a bit of lead time in order to gather the facts and figures in order to put forth more of a truthful message. again, alluding to the first point, the russian team was more flexible in how they reacted to

most of the scenarios. lastly, it was interesting to note that russia had no desire in expanding the conflict in ukraine. they desired a frozen conflict over the two-day war game that they could escalate and deescalate at will. it's provided a good bit of leveraging in the west, to reduce economic situations or moving troops or forces around as they willed. again, we can speak a little bit more fidelity during our q&a period but with that, i'll pass it over to karen who can offer more insights. >> i was on the red team with chris, and i observed two key themes throughout the war game, the first being the competitive attitude of russian decision making towards u.s. and nato policies and within the region. the russian team sought strategic flexibility, if you will, not through the development of clear long-term policies but instead through the creation of what they called tools, designed to seize

opportunities as they arrived. the russian team saw a long term strategy as ineffective and as a complex strategic environment they're operating in, why spend time developing this strategy that we may never those tools were frozen conflicts, bilateral agreements, back door economic deals and the development of proxy forces which we've seen in use recently. as one player summed it up one player summed up russian's intentions succinctly. we used this quote quite often. he said the russia team played to win while the u.s. played not to lose. so diplomatic posturing had , little impact on russian behavior throughout the game. as they tried to determine the best way to characterize president putin, is he a long-term strategist, tactician, what is he?

they decided putin more a chess player. he studies the board and improvises as needed. hence the need for tools long-term strategy. the second observation was russian team decision-making process was driven mostly by the desire to maintain power. second, the return of russian preimminence. in every discussion, decision made desire to maintain , perpetuate, and presented the system was evident. while the team is confident that putin would be in power or as president for years to come, they always considered that position when making decisions. they didn't want to jeopardize elections. that came up in their discussions. we had this election cycle coming up in sync with u.s.

elections. let's not do anything that would put president putin at risk. finally the team made sure win destiny that team use russian propaganda to make sure that the perception within the russian population was one that makes you are russian greatness was on the rise. putin machine was returning russia to its rightful place on the global landscape. also, of course, to undermine u.s. and nato actions in the region. with that i'll turn it back over to you. >> thank you, karen. during the war game i the facilitator for team white. we could see them come back from small rooms and presenting new policy or reactions. partly repeating what has already been said but some key takeaways i took from there and my team as well. my team consisted of western and eastern umean fellows.

-- western and eastern european international fellows. sometimes european, how you say that, look on the situation. so partly repeating, u.s. team came back. they were kind of struggling with how to deal with a situation, because they were always reactive and defensive. they wanted to play within the international rules. they were always waiting for the other side, what would happen and struggling with their position all the time. whereas the russians could play more savvy and cunning and more proactive and on the offensive. they would say we'll try something new and look what happens. so that was a big difference between the two sides. we all agree where it comes from. but it's just an observation. second takeaway, everybody talks about nato all the time. not everybody. but we should have a united nato on this, have consensus.

the question is when we're ever going to get that. that's 28 countries on one line. that's what we saw in the game. maybe it is more -- it is wiser to just address a couple of countries within nato and create a coalition of the willing. those willing probably depending on the subject 22, 24 of the 28 countries. that's maybe all you need. that's one of the takeaway as well from the war game looking from team white. >> really interesting exercise. we would love to know more about your net assessment something that needs to be widely done about russia. personally over the last three weeks i've spent more than half of the time in various scenario exercises.

four of them actually. one of them conducted by joint force looking out to changes in human geography, engineering technology, and world order looking out to 2035, looking at implications for joint force. i see steve out there. he was there four days with me a few weeks ago. i've also spent a couple of exercises for the national intelligence council global trends publication looking out again to year 2035. and then last friday, over at the german marshall fund, in a more neutral exercise, thinking about russia. and part of the fun for me is i always get to play russia. [laughter] i think some of the notes that

we concur on is there's greater flexibility in the means and mechanisms, the timing in which russian can act. there is constantly number one concern is regime preservation. it starts there. i think it's important to think about ukrainian conflict. today in those terms as well there is a big domestic political aspect to them. one area there has been a lot of disagreement about looking in the near term is whether russia is looking to expand the conflict in ukraine. i'm interested to hear in your game, russia is not. that is my personal conclusion , but i think it is a pretty contentious issue. and we might talk about it more. i did have an opportunity to

read through your report that's come out. we will have a link and copy of this on our website. the report about what the presentation is based upon. a couple of things i'd like to hear a little bit more from you before we turn the floor over to the audience. in the executive summary notice that u.s. and russia systems are inherently competitive especially regarding russia's near and abroad nato and arctic. , probably contest the term inherently competitive. we were inherently competitive during the cold war. i'm more skeptical we're inherently competitive today. i'm not sure what that means. to me, what the ukrainian conflict is mainly have --

mainly about, it is about the failure over the last 25 years to come to an agreed european security framework. certainly the contestation and , competition in russia and abroad no question. i look at different theaters i think it gets a lot more complicated. in some places, overlapping interests. two of them to some extent would be the arctic and asia, or at least northeast asia. you can point to others as well. joe, you've pointed out, of course, that in this exercise there was the desire to maintain a certain degree of cooperation with the russians on issues that we size extremely important. the iranian new year program or is one -- program was one. for the most part we've been able to walk and to come for the most part of 14 months or so

since the conflict began. point to others, for example decommissioning of the declared, decommissioning, removal of declared syrian chemical weaponsms in the first half of 2014. the second question i had came to the point and i struggle with this question all the time. you raise the question, does putin have a grand strategy. well, i would argue certainly has strategic goals. whether that adds up to grand strategy or what is the relationship between a grand strategy and strategic goals i'm not sure. does the united states have strategic goals? absolutely. do we have a grand strategy? i wouldn't call what we publish to be a grand strategy.

so if you can kind of elaborate a little on what you see as the differences. it is often said that putin is a great tactician, which i absolutely agree with, but he's not a great strategist. on that i'm not sure i do agree with that. on the third, and kind of related to this, on an earlier point, it is pointed out that the united states should seek areas of cooperation with russia on a range of regional and local issues. nonetheless, return to business as usual perhaps through another reset with russia is not possible in the short-term. i guess -- you know, the terminal reset, of course, is attached to the specific historical moment of the obama administration when they came to power in january of 2009. but i would argue that, but i

would argue bill clinton, george w. bush administration as well, maybe not from day one, had a strategy for a --we don't need to call it a reset, but a major effort to set the u.s.-russian relationship on a constructive path and to work together on many, many issues toll toll. -- together. i don't necessarily exclude the possibility that when the next administration comes to power in january 2017, they are going to look at the panoply of issues and challenges to u.s. national security and foreign policy, and they are going to make a judgment about to the degree they want you, for lack of a better term, have a reset with russia. of course, it depends and awful lot on what happens between now and i would postulate what would january 2017.

have to happen i think, is the to cease-fire accords would be judged to be not in complete violation, still be in effect, per se. from that i think we would already be -- already have seen significant efforts between europe and moscow. if we take the point that moscow is not seeking a wider conflict in ukraine, then the tactic to me would seem to be stable -- stay below the radar, a violation of cease-fire accords there is no big offensive or any

place for that matter. with that pressure relieving sanctions in europe will grow significantly. you'll see some of that probably this summer if that condition holds. more of it at the end of the year, the timing for the sooir -- the midst to cease-fire accords and even more in 2016. in which case, holding together alliance unity may be considerably harder as we go along. let me say to other things quickly, and taking up too much time. but it's a quite good document in the report you produced. you state that ukraine, this is a quote, would likely be the best place to confront russia and send a clear message of intent, capability, and will. and here i just have, why. [laughter]

ukraine is not a nato member. so it is a much harder place to send a clear message of intent and capability and will. i think this is at the crux of the dilemma for the obama administration, as well as our european allies because we are , in kind of a gray zone with ukraine. i guess i would ask you what do you mean to confront russia? what does that mean exactly? why is it the best place? it sounds like, i don't want to put words in your mouth, your operating under a domino theory process behind this, that with success in ukraine, then the russians moved out of the layer -- move elsewhere.

they look at the chessboard and say, what is the latest vulnerability. i would argue there is a awfully large difference between undertaking some kind of hybrid or other military action against ukraine versus a baltic state or nato member. i think and i hope that is a bridge too far. i was very interested by your point of the coalition of the willing. but that would require a very, well, i guess to what extent would it require a different rule making framework within nato. what would that mean for nato. if we are more explicitly drawing coalitions of the willing from nato. i think i'll stop there and give the panel time to respond and

then we will open up for discussion with everybody. thank you. >> i think we're struggling, taking a lot of notes there, andy. that was very good. so your first question -- [laughter] you are counting on that. in terms of inherently competitive, and i think you asked the question, is it really competitive in the fact that there are other areas where we can cooperate or where we should cooperate, i think the challenge is that currently, the

distraction of the ukraine prevents cooperation. and so once that crisis is solved, then we can go back into a cooperate mode. -- cooperative mode. that conflict or that competition overshadows a lot of those areas where we can cooperate. look at the meeting two weeks ago between secretary kerry and putin. we walked away saying it was good we talked. but there were no agreements, substantive agreements that came out of that meeting. because of this competitive environment we are in, we have to solve this one major competitive issue before we see the fruits and other areas of cooperation. >> if i may address the u.s. side of that, the systems sort of an emerging view within context of the wargame, was on the u.s. side that the russian system was fundamentally

different from the u.s. system. russians as we've already mentioned, proceeded to have -- we perceived it have much greater freedom of action. but there's a degree of cronyism and corruption that was a great worry to u.s. players. there was a sense that, you know, we didn't want to go back to the cold war. we kind of had historical memory of the cold war. we were glad that we got that, beyond that, so then we thought ok if it is not cold war, we are moving to normal relations. but that didn't work either conceptually. so we are kind of stuff between the two. and we keep coming back, the u.s. team kept coming back to the fact russian regime operating by a different set of behaviors. that's what we meant by comparatively competitive. -- inherently competitive. it wasn't that we had a dispute over a particular issue, but

there was something fundamental in the russian system that just had a consistently at odds with the u.s. and the west. >> so from the russian team perspective you mentioned expansion conflict in the ukraine. there was much debate on the russian team whether or not they wanted to continue to film opposition to western actions. of course, the narrative they spun was ukrainian crisis and regional maladies subsequent to that are all, of course, u.s. machinations in the area. but desire to expand the conflict, there was no appetite. specifically russian team said they will not let separatists fail. however, the desire to create a long strategic flank on the russian army in the ukraine wasn't a desired outcome.

you mentioned whether or not putin is a strategic thinker versus a tactical chess player. often we saw the russian team was able to craft this particular narrative that they had. as i mentioned in general comments, during one of my turns, i think it was a protest in latvia we had and a small eruption of conflict there in terms of protests. russia was able to amass their armor, move ships to bhorder and spin a defensive posture. so this was an opportunity we were able to observe that russia operated tactically. was there a strategic desire? to unmask troops there? -- to amass troops there? we didn't observe that. reacting to appear opportunity

that arose. that being said at no point did russia ever want to i guess enter into any conflict with the west. economic sanctions at this point , according to the russian team were livable. while the ruble has been plummeting, they found ways to operate within the context of the sanctions that were there. so it was a concerted fear of increasing any opportunity of the rest to impose more -- for the west to impose more sanctions that oftentimes kind . of constraints to some extent the russian team's actions. but oftentimes, again, it was this tactical improvisation rather than sort of a mass strategy of the team operated under the two days. >> i just add that the team chose to go that route because they felt like it helped divide nato decision making. it created this tension within nato. so it was the tool of choice, if you will. >> i'd like to briefly go to one

of your last points about why ukraine, it was a sense at least on the u.s. side, we were hearing some very distressed messages from our east european nato allies in the context of the wargame, from the estonia latvia, lithuania, poland and some other nato allies. but the u.s. team did not feel that russia was ready to cross that clear, bright shining line of triggering nato's article five. though we wanted to reassure our allies, particularly in the baltic and particularly to encourage them to head off any possible protests or mass mobilization of authorities,

that might give an entree to russia to meddle in politics, we felt the real challenge was happening on the doorstep of nato. that means ukraine. obviously some other countries like moldova and georgia we were concerned about, but we felt that if the u.s. simply encouraged nato to build a wall around the current nato members and say we are not going to take any cognizance of what happens jan -- beyond the borders of today's members, that would be a big mistake. that is why we came back to the very thorny problem of how to stabilize the situation in ukraine, and reinforce the new government there to where it can settle its difference with no outside interference. at least from the perspective of the u.s. team, that's why they were interested in essentially

making a stand in ukraine even though it's not a nato member. >> i think that ties a little bit into the last question about nato, and we drew it out there so i think i have to answer that a little bit. you mentioned that putin uses attention in nato as well. we all can see that. so it ties into korean part as well. as long as we stay strong, there's a lot of agreements that have been broken in the past already. so the baltic states, if you're going to leave there, we're going to be next. whether it's going to happen or not, it's probably yellow or red line it will never cross. it's a message you sent to the countries. that was the most important part of it. we all like the united consensus

within nato. but we did not see it happen in the game. every time that the u.s. came up with a policy and thought, we got, villages this approach, and then some countries say we don't agree, so we move somewhere else. giving back to putin, he can use that. even after putin he away as nato and say it's not a problem, but we're going to solve it with mostly nato countries. so with that you don't give him the opportunity to use the leverage. so that's kind of where we came from. >> well, it is a bear of a policy problem. there's no question of that. i didn't mean to make a bad pun. it just happened. for me i think over the last 15 months and then turn out over to , questions, there's sort of three baskets of policy.

one area, and it's the hardest area, is the one that deserves the most attention is how you help ukraine. how you help ukraine survive. and it's not just military. it's financial. it's governance. it's everything. and we're fighting difficult odds. ukrainian management has been suboptimal, to put it mildly. but the focus of the intent in -- of intention in washington is often to punish russia. in ways it's the easier part to do, at least with the economic sanctions. and the middle part where i've been surprised that the united states has been so ready to kind of outsource is the diplomacy. and i think that at some point and i've written about this several times over the last six months, that we need to play a larger role. but let me open it up to questions, comments, and right here. yes, hank?

for the panelists and the audience. >> i'm hank gafney, long time follower of russia, deep experience in nato, and still following all this in retirement after 20 years in osd and 20 years at the center for naval analyses. and the 16 seminars iran with them. what the discussion reveals to me right now is the real big obsession is ukraine. and i want to come back to what putin in his paranoia saw and remember, as we decided in some discussions here, it's all putin. i can't wait to see the discussion of how he's going to be overthrown, but he thinks

that we want ukraine and nato so we can move u.s. forces and their nuclear weapons up on his border. and therefore do what from that, i have no idea. but of course, we have no intention of doing that. but he thinks so. he thinks we wanted a naval base and we're going to move our ships there. he thinks we're going to put nuclear weapons in crimea, et cetera. and how do we really overcome that in our process of trying to stabilize ukraine? >> who wants to take that first easy question? [laughter] >> for our group and net assessment i studied putin, and before this project, i was not a europe analyst nor a russian follower. putin is a hard man to understand, first of all. and i agree with you he's a paranoid man.

he is an intel analyst, he thinks everyone is watching him in some corner, somewhere. i'm not sure that we have the answer to that exactly. i mean, we have -- i've struggled with this a bit, but i think putin has hit his own reset button. and that reset button, i'm not sure has any corporation with -- cooperation with the west at this so i'm not sure we can get point. past that. and we may not be able to do that diplomatically ourselves. we might have to work with that coalition of the willing. and that was the recurrent theme in our war game. is that we have these two perceptions. we have the russian perception of the u.s., that actually sees the u.s. as this declining power. we have the u.s. perception of russia, and we see it as a power and decline, and we tend to not

-- in decline and we tend to not give russia the do due it believes it deserves and now we see putin snubbing the west more and more often because of that, i think. >> if i can add, listening to the discussions of the u.s. team during the war game, everyone was very hesitant to do anything to feed the russian narrative. so you know, to what extent to we provide support to the government of ukraine, to what extent do beprovide support to the nato members in the baltic? we were second guessing ourselves to the point of paralysis. the consensus was over the course of two days that we had to break out of that paralysis

and not sit on our hands out of a fear of feeding someone's paranoia. we had to take concrete measures that everyone would understand. some would perhaps misunderstood or twist them for their own purposes, but the u.s. team felt the greater risk was to do nothinging. there was acknowledgment that there was greater risk of making it look like the u.s. wanted to put troops into ukraine, but i think if we could just get the message across clearly in a straight forward objective manner that we are providing trainers to the ukrainian government, the people who really want to -- understand what is going on and will not misinterpret. >> i will just make a quick comment about that question, because it's one we all struggle with, but there was one moment where if i were in the white house advising our president, it would have been on february 21st of 2014.

and this is, you know, this is the day there was the political agreement signed between european foreign ministers, mr. yanukovych and the opposition that would call for earlier elections ten months later. and a number of other provisions. and i recall reading that hear in my office and realizing that there's no way this agreement was going to hold because the people would not agree to it. an in october when i was at the discussion club and heard putin talk about a bit of the chronology in his decision making, because i had had one question, which i wanted to ask him, and i'll tell you in a second. but he said that when the

agreement was signed, president obama called and they talked about it, and everything was ok. my question to him was, did you receive another phone call when the agreement fell apart because it was the time when the agreement fell apart that it was absolutely necessary to try to reassure mr. putin that in fact we did not want this agreement to fall apart. that it was not measures we were taking or supporting that led to this agreement falling apart. when the agreement fell apart and mr. yanukovych fled kiev, to me that reflected the complete dis destruction of mr. putin's ukraine policy. and he had to react to that, and

he did. in the we that he did. whether we could have prevented that, i don't know, but what i fear is that north side our government at the time there was probably a little bit of a feeling of we won. when yanukovych fled. rather than thinking of, you know what, we've got a big problem, and we need to work together. try to work together with mr. putin and our european allies to try to resolve the problem from ukraine, because it's very dangerous but i'm afraid, af fear that the sense of -- a little bit, yeah, we got him. ok, steve. >> steven blank, american foreign policy council. having just emerged from the same bunker as andy a couple of weeks ago, i have a suggestion that might help alleviate some of the problems andy pointed out. first of all, with regard to the objectives, we in the united states tend to separate the objectives of regime preservation, the alpha of putin's policies for the

restoration of a great power and one seen as a grout power globally. i would suggest to you that those are the same objectives, that the latter, the restoration of a russia seen at home and abroad as a great power is a precondition for the survival of the regime. as andy suggested, if ukraine went west, putin would come under enormous domestic pressure, if not, may even be unhinged in power. so there is no difference here. the conditions of regime survival and preservation into the future is the strategic goal and the condition of that goal being met, one of the conditions, is this restoration of the great russia. the second point here is that we can therefore overcome the

distinctions between strategy and tactics. i think he is strategist in that he has creatively taken and used all the elements of russian power, the dime concept i think we're all familiar with as an acronym, in order to bring about that restoration and preservation of his power, and the point of this whole operation, therefore is not to achieve some final state, but to develop these tools, as you have called them, instruments of power, others would say. in order to keep the game going, because that is how russia sees the world as being in any case. and second, this is the the only way that it can maximize what is the condition of its great power and the regime at home that is a fully independent, sovereign great power, which is what it

says it is and wants to be recognized as. but that doesn't have to answer to anybody either at home or abroad. and that's the strategic objective. i think that things thus become much more clear to the analysts, and i think they'll become clearer to you and you can overcome the dilemma of whether he's a tactician or a strategist. the tactics serve the objective, and there is no gap here. the final objective is not whether or not ukraine or some specific territory in ukraine belongs to russia, but whether russia is accepted as a great power. the specific territory or parameters of ukraine are beside the point, but now everybody understands you have to deal with russia on its terms.

>> yes, good morning. i'm tracy wilson. i'm a consultant here in washington, d.c. thanks for your comments this morning. this war game looked like it was very interesting, very enjoyable time, and i applaud you taking a structure to look into the future and helping us to understand these issues. three quick questions of clarification, if i might, you mentioned one area of cooperation that you saw iran, and you mentioned syria, of course, as well. in your discussion, in your work, did the topic of threat reduction, nuclear security in russia come up? obviously that's an area on hold right now, and we have some concerns about that. so just curious your thoughts on that.

and then a couple of reactions if you might, in recent days there have been two high-level state department visits to sochi and moscow now. are these positive signs indicators of a thawing of relations? if not, what should we be looking for in a future as a positive sign? and then finally, russia will hold the chair of the security council in september, is this a concern, possible areas of mischief that could be introduced into the agenda at that time? and so i welcome your thoughts. >> ctr, the u.n. security council and department of state trips? >> i'll start briefly -- >> james, excuse me.

>> with the areas of cooperation. the u.s. team was very concerned about the safety and stability of the russian nuclear enterprise. we didn't go into great details, but in some of the scenarios, several team members, you know, were concerned about that, and even to the extent t we might want to provide at least reassurances directly to the russian forces that are responsible for those sort of cooperative threat reduction, but we didn't go into detail. but there was some nervous nousness about, obviously. particularly if the russian government became less stable due to economic crisis or regime change or something like that. so, yeah, there was great concern.

and this is tied also to your next point about how do we read the most recent contacts. during the cold war as the years went on, as you know. we developed a pretty robust series of ways to communicate and coordinate with the soviet union, their leadership and their armed forces. it was never perfect. but there was there was channels. everything from incidents at sea to aircraft and air space to yeah, different kinds of signaling, the hot line. and there was sort of a sickening realization on the part of the u.s. team that perhaps some of that eroded or no longer exists. we've talked quite a bit as we've gone out to various think tanks. we've found that the generation of soviet experts are now in retirement or -- and the next generation is not nearly as

extensive, they're just as eager and just as smart, i'm sure, but there aren't as many of them on the ground as there were 25 years ago. so there was a concern on the u.s. side that perhaps there's value simply in strengthening the mechanisms. that's how i would read, just me as a citizen reading what was happening with secretary of state kerry's visit recently auz a good thing of in general. not because of any agreements that may or may not have been sign d at that time. but it's certainly reassuring that we can talk. and i would home there's some back channel communication going on as well, which i think is where the real work can get done. >> certainly i would agree, jim. i will say from the russian team perspective, looking out in the future, most notably the election cycles drove a good bit of the team's analysis.

it was interesting to note and came up in off conversation. we'll have a new administration new u.s. administration in 2016. the russian team is looking for a political win, or a win of some sort in 2017 in order for putin to be reelected in 2018. so russian team discussed numerous times of what that political win or international win might be. and it was notable they surmised it will be a new u.s. administration facing those challenges. and again, the team would hold the strategic cards, i guess, if you will. so while there might be conversations now and certainly they're worthwhile, i think the most telling point, at least from the russian team's perspective, what's going to happen next year when it's a new administration and russia is look looking for that win, whatever that win might be.

>> hi. i teach part time at catholic university about religion and international politics. in my previous hierarchy, i was in the state department and was enabled at one time to participate in a program at the -- college. and we did a mini version of what you all have been participating in. and having to do with the middle east. and thinking back, it strikes me very much that in all our discussions, we paid very little, if any attention to the role of religion, which in recent years has proven to be much more important. certainly in our involvement in iraq. and syria.

but i'm kind of surprised that in looking at the russian bear with everything else in there, there's nothing about religion and it strikes me that the certainly important role of the russian orthodox church, which is kind of come back more into popularity, also with mr. putin, should be considered here, not just because of its relationship with western orthodoxy, if you will, the christian church in the west, but also, you know islam, and i wonder, to any extent, did religion play in i role in the considerations either on the u.s. or on the russian side?

>> ok. next i'll direct the gentleman right in front of steve. >> thank you very much. i am with the national defense university fellow pakistan. my question is that you mentioned that ukraine is the perfect place to confront russia. but in this war game, were they factored out in this war game as well? for example, if the confrontation, the inclusion of conflict, both parties don't have to agree to expand it. if one expands unilaterally, then how do you deal with that. number two, u.s. air got allies, was it also considered what allies they have? and number three is that when you say putin, do you mean

russia? that is also another important factor. and last but not least was the china factor, do you think china has any real threat, and if they have, from where? thank you. >> thank you, reporter from voice america. a follow-up question about china factor. actually i'm looking at this russia figure, too, at the far corner of the figure, talking about the chinese assurance, could you elaborate on that? second is about a consulate in china. the growing relationship between china and russia, they're talking about.

so who poses greater threat to u.s., china or russia? thank you. >> back to the panelists. >> so, sir, in regards to your question on religion, it did come up in the initial testament, mainly in relationship to the orthodox church. while you don't see it on the diagram, we characterized it pretty much as a tool of russian nationalism, frankly, we didn't see it as a driving factor as much as a resource that could be used to continue to push forward on russian nationalism. >> on the question about russian allies, i don't -- we didn't

consider that as a major factor within the artificial construct of war game. we know that russia has reached out to particularly central asia and some of the countries there. but we didn't see that as those partnerships as really contributing much either to russian policy or to the russian impact in the situations we were trying to look at specifically. russia will never be able to recreate the warsaw pact. and even the warsaw pact was an alliance of unequals, much more so than nato, i would argue. but no, we didn't take those allies into account. and i think that's an opportunity for the west actually, to make a very, very telling point through the international media, frankly that, you know, anyone who understands the world situation today with any degree of clarity can see that you have a group of

28 democracies at different stages of development who are cooperating and trying to create a security architecture for europe, and then you have one power that is throwing its weight around and violating some of the norms of the international environment in reaching out to, frankly some of the countries they have reached out to are more in line with the russians' idea of how a government in an economy should run than western europe. so i think that's something that the west could use to its advantage to make sure that that message is loud and clear. you have 28 democracies confronting countries that have fought into -- controlled by a very different system.

[laughter] >> actually, i was going to pile onto jim's comments on the alliances. what we didn't see was -- and i'll let the russian team speak to this clearly, but as they would come into each of the preliminary sessions, we saw continually reaching out of bilateral relationships that facilitated a purpose, as any nation would do. and that's what we saw in the chinese relationship, frankly. as far as where the assessment was as russia would turn towards china, they they really have the lower end of the bargaining relationship. china had the upper hand and russia needed china, but not russia needed china. that's why the chinese relationship was one of risk for the russians. they could play to it, but they were coming into it having to negotiate less than their

optimal deal, if you will. >> just a quick comment. the u.s. needs to be aware of its own seams and weaknesses. and i think one of those is now we tend to view the world regionally. there is some broad transnational threats. we get that. we have functional combats and commands. but in general terms, we have -- this of course goes back to the cold war. one combatant command focused on europe and russia and one focused on the asia-pacific region and china. so we tend to want to put our problems into those bins and assign our military commander to deal with it. that said, there's a huge amount of cooperation that goes on with other u.s. government agencies

as well, and we're finding more and more that perhaps that regional structure for the defense commands is not as helpful in places like the arctic, where you have several u.s. four-star commands that have some involvement. so that is something we need to be aware of on the u.s. side. and think about perhaps ways we can overcome that in the future. >> you would have enjoyed it last week. i proposed there be a new senior directorship from asia. from europe to asia to russia to india, it's a large continent, eurasia, so you overcome some of the stove piping. ok. paul? >> thanks, paul schwartz from csis.

i had a question about the the disparity in the way the two contestants in the crisis view how they are and how that actually played itself out in the the exercise. in addition, i tend to agree with the findings on that currently the likelihood is that russia will pursue a frozen conflict in ukraine, given that there's little to gain from seizing -- and much to lose. but that will hold up only unless and until russia starts to see that perhaps as ukraine policy is headed for a second collapse as dr. kutchison described the first one. i'm curious how that played out in the scope of the exercise. thank you.

>> thank you. kyle scott. i want to turn to your policy consideration to clear the articulating a policy towards russia, eastern europe and ukraine. i'm sure my colleagues in the state department would argue that we in fact do have the clearly articulated position. but i'm going to say that you're correct and then challenge you. what -- you all did all the studying -- what would you articulate as what the policy should be? and after i hear that, ask colonel if he could state whether the europeans agree with that policy. thank you. >> hi. i'm actually based in berlin nowadays at energy international affairs and i'm actually here as

a fellow at the american institute of contemporary german studies to actually interview american experts and officials and their take on energy vulnerabilities in europe. so you can imagine as i've been talking to energy and a lot of people about. it's sort of coming down to a few scenarios. i just want to -- i'm not saying this is the most likely scenario, but it goes alittle bit along with lines as schwartz pointed out and you pointed out, i don't get so much out of this as there's something else that can happen. it's not just a matter of what the u.s. wants to do, how it reacts to what russia does, mr. putin does. it's the flow of objective circumstances that gets out of hand if people don't take ahold of the situation. a lot of people -- so a lot of people, certain people i think -- well a lot of people have been telling me they have a clear feeling the european attitude is please take this problem away. you know, they don't want to really face up to what's there, and frankly that there's a similar situation on our side, and somewhere that goes along

with what you're describing and the reactive nature. and so the objective things that are developing is, if the ukrainian economy collapses in a couple years or completely collapse, major demonstrations you have huge amounts of refugees in europe. you can have all sorts of things happening to the energy passage. you don't know who did it. what about that sort of situation as things basically collapse? if there's not a major program of the west to get involved and sort of help them take control of their economy and rebuild it. fine. if people don't want to send military aid, fine, for whatever reasons, but take control and do something proactive, otherwise it degenerates and really both sides lose control and then you get a situation, and i think it's true, as mr. kutchins said about what happened when the agreement fell apart. things get out of control on both sides.

this is a question to react. i apologize if it was too -- >> please. >> if i may address the first question from a russian perspective of what the policies are and the objectives in ukraine. as i previously mentioned, the russian team had no desire to escalate the conflict. they were not planning on failing nor were they planning on giving back crimea. one of the final terms was the demise of putin, a new alternative form of government arises, what are the first actions. the russian team immediately said that we will not give back crimea. it was a political win that we do not intend to turn back on. in terms of escalating to conflict, again, they had an appetite for increasing the conflict whatsoever. of course, come 2017 when they're looking for a political win, if that happens, it would be a target of opportunity. certainly it was one that the russian team had addressed.

like wise, to return to a previous question regarding china, as we saw it play out although we didn't explore a lot of the china-russian dynamics, the russian team during one of the terms chose to undermine that as much as possible through backdoor deals sweetheart deals, if you might and primarily the reason they were so interested in doing that is to maintain an economic dependence of europe on russian energy. and that was weighed against some of the economic deals that were most recently made with china, which were not so favorable for the kremlin. so i guess from a minor perspective, that's how i would grease the question, as we saw it play out in the game. >> and that was really the only time that china came up in the discussion, was with regards to

economics and energy. the eurasian economic union was mentioned briefly, but that's not where they focused their discussions. while the russian team said theymentioned. that is not where they focused the discussions. the russian team said they would turn to china and they would rather maintain the european market they now enjoy. >> >> you reference for policy going forward and that was probably the greatest challenge frankly that was at peace and this was the good, fast, and cheap discussion.