and it took a lot of time and oftentimes the result was quite messy when it came time to go into the plenary session and say okay, u.s. team, now, what have you come up with as far as the policy? that was one of our great challenges. and i will be -- turn to my colleague, chris leigh who will talk a little bit about what he saw while observing the russian team. >> thanks jim. i was an analyst or an observer. we must note that none of us here were participants during the war game. we facilitated and observed. we took notes. which a lot of it is a unique vantage point, i would dare say, and without any of our sort of predispositions since we've done doing this since october. i'll just start with a couple of general comments and if we can speak with a little bit more

fidelity or granularity during the q&a period. during the war game, russia was able to operate with more flexibility and options. the russian team had a lot more options. they were less constrained by international norms, laws, alliances. for instance, during one of our turns, russia was able to delay armor and troops along the border, and this was cast as a defensive move or posture, and what it was was an overly aggressive move. which leads me to the second point. russia operates with a far more robust informational operations campaign. their io was remarked by one of the participants as they more or less recognized propaganda. oftentimes, russia was able to spin a particular narrative that the west could not easily counter, or if they did attempt to counter, it took a bit of lead time in order to gather the

facts and figures in order to put forth more of a truthful message. again, alluding to the first point, the russian team was more flexible in how they reacted to most of the scenarios. lastly, it was interesting to note that russia had no desire in expanding the conflict in ukraine. they desired a frozen conflict over the two-day war game that they could escalate and deescalate at will. it's provided a good bit of leveraging in the west, to reduce economic situations or moving troops or forces around as they willed. again, we can speak a little bit more fidelity during our q&a period but with that, i'll pass it over to karen who can offer more insights. >> i was on the red team with chris, and i observed two key themes throughout the war game, the first being the competitive attitude of russian decision making towards u.s. and nato policies and within the region.

the russian team sought strategic flexibility, if you will, not through the development of clear long-term policies but instead through the creation of what they called tools, designed to seize opportunities as they arrived. the russian team saw a long term strategy as ineffective and as a complex strategic environment they're operating in, why spend time developing this strategy that we may never those tools were frozen conflicts, bilateral agreements, back door economic deals and the development of proxy forces which we've seen in use recently. as one player summed it up one player summed up russian's intentions succinctly. we used this quote quite often. he said the russia team played to win while the u.s. played not to lose. so diplomatic posturing had , little impact on russian

behavior throughout the game. as they tried to determine the best way to characterize president putin, is he a long-term strategist, tactician, what is he? they decided putin more a chess player. he studies the board and improvises as needed. hence the need for tools long-term strategy. the second observation was russian team decision-making process was driven mostly by the desire to maintain power. second, the return of russian preimminence. in every discussion, decision made desire to maintain , perpetuate, and presented the system was evident. while the team is confident that putin would be in power or as president for years to come, they always considered that position when making decisions.

they didn't want to jeopardize elections. that came up in their discussions. we had this election cycle coming up in sync with u.s. elections. let's not do anything that would put president putin at risk. finally the team made sure win destiny that team use russian propaganda to make sure that the perception within the russian population was one that makes you are russian greatness was on the rise. putin machine was returning russia to its rightful place on the global landscape. also, of course, to undermine u.s. and nato actions in the region. with that i'll turn it back over to you. >> thank you, karen. during the war game i the facilitator for team white. we could see them come back from small rooms and presenting new policy or reactions.

partly repeating what has already been said but some key takeaways i took from there and my team as well. my team consisted of western and eastern umean fellows. -- western and eastern european international fellows. sometimes european, how you say that, look on the situation. so partly repeating, u.s. team came back. they were kind of struggling with how to deal with a situation, because they were always reactive and defensive. they wanted to play within the international rules. they were always waiting for the other side, what would happen and struggling with their position all the time. whereas the russians could play more savvy and cunning and more proactive and on the offensive. they would say we'll try something new and look what happens. so that was a big difference between the two sides. we all agree where it comes from.

but it's just an observation. second takeaway, everybody talks about nato all the time. not everybody. but we should have a united nato on this, have consensus. the question is when we're ever going to get that. that's 28 countries on one line. that's what we saw in the game. maybe it is more -- it is wiser to just address a couple of countries within nato and create a coalition of the willing. those willing probably depending on the subject 22, 24 of the 28 countries. that's maybe all you need. that's one of the takeaway as well from the war game looking from team white. >> really interesting exercise. we would love to know more about your net assessment something

that needs to be widely done about russia. personally over the last three weeks i've spent more than half of the time in various scenario exercises. four of them actually. one of them conducted by joint force looking out to changes in human geography, engineering technology, and world order looking out to 2035, looking at implications for joint force. i see steve out there. he was there four days with me a few weeks ago. i've also spent a couple of exercises for the national intelligence council global trends publication looking out again to year 2035. and then last friday, over at the german marshall fund, in a

more neutral exercise, thinking about russia. and part of the fun for me is i always get to play russia. [laughter] i think some of the notes that we concur on is there's greater flexibility in the means and mechanisms, the timing in which russian can act. there is constantly number one concern is regime preservation. it starts there. i think it's important to think about ukrainian conflict. today in those terms as well there is a big domestic political aspect to them. one area there has been a lot of disagreement about looking in the near term is whether russia is looking to expand the conflict in ukraine. i'm interested to hear in your game, russia is not.

that is my personal conclusion , but i think it is a pretty contentious issue. and we might talk about it more. i did have an opportunity to read through your report that's come out. we will have a link and copy of this on our website. the report about what the presentation is based upon. a couple of things i'd like to hear a little bit more from you before we turn the floor over to the audience. in the executive summary notice that u.s. and russia systems are inherently competitive especially regarding russia's near and abroad nato and arctic. , probably contest the term inherently competitive. we were inherently competitive during the cold war. i'm more skeptical we're inherently competitive today.

i'm not sure what that means. to me, what the ukrainian conflict is mainly have -- mainly about, it is about the failure over the last 25 years to come to an agreed european security framework. certainly the contestation and , competition in russia and abroad no question. i look at different theaters i think it gets a lot more complicated. in some places, overlapping interests. two of them to some extent would be the arctic and asia, or at least northeast asia. you can point to others as well. joe, you've pointed out, of course, that in this exercise there was the desire to maintain a certain degree of cooperation with the russians on issues that we size extremely important. the iranian new year program or

is one -- program was one. for the most part we've been able to walk and to come for the most part of 14 months or so since the conflict began. point to others, for example decommissioning of the declared, decommissioning, removal of declared syrian chemical weaponsms in the first half of 2014. the second question i had came to the point and i struggle with this question all the time. you raise the question, does putin have a grand strategy. well, i would argue certainly has strategic goals. whether that adds up to grand strategy or what is the relationship between a grand strategy and strategic goals i'm not sure.

does the united states have strategic goals? absolutely. do we have a grand strategy? i wouldn't call what we publish to be a grand strategy. so if you can kind of elaborate a little on what you see as the differences. it is often said that putin is a great tactician, which i absolutely agree with, but he's not a great strategist. on that i'm not sure i do agree with that. on the third, and kind of related to this, on an earlier point, it is pointed out that the united states should seek areas of cooperation with russia on a range of regional and local issues. nonetheless, return to business as usual perhaps through another reset with russia is not possible in the short-term. i guess -- you know, the

terminal reset, of course, is attached to the specific historical moment of the obama administration when they came to power in january of 2009. but i would argue that, but i would argue bill clinton, george w. bush administration as well, maybe not from day one, had a strategy for a --we don't need to call it a reset, but a major effort to set the u.s.-russian relationship on a constructive path and to work together on many, many issues toll toll. -- together. i don't necessarily exclude the possibility that when the next administration comes to power in january 2017, they are going to look at the panoply of issues and challenges to u.s. national security and foreign policy, and they are going to make a judgment about to the degree

they want you, for lack of a better term, have a reset with russia. of course, it depends and awful lot on what happens between now and i would postulate what would january 2017. have to happen i think, is the to cease-fire accords would be judged to be not in complete violation, still be in effect, per se. from that i think we would already be -- already have seen significant efforts between europe and moscow. if we take the point that moscow is not seeking a wider conflict in ukraine, then the tactic to me would seem to be stable

-- stay below the radar, a violation of cease-fire accords there is no big offensive or any place for that matter. with that pressure relieving sanctions in europe will grow significantly. you'll see some of that probably this summer if that condition holds. more of it at the end of the year, the timing for the sooir -- the midst to cease-fire accords and even more in 2016. in which case, holding together alliance unity may be considerably harder as we go along. let me say to other things quickly, and taking up too much time. but it's a quite good document in the report you produced. you state that ukraine, this is a quote, would likely be the best place to confront russia and send a clear message of

intent, capability, and will. and here i just have, why. [laughter] ukraine is not a nato member. so it is a much harder place to send a clear message of intent and capability and will. i think this is at the crux of the dilemma for the obama administration, as well as our european allies because we are , in kind of a gray zone with ukraine. i guess i would ask you what do you mean to confront russia? what does that mean exactly? why is it the best place? it sounds like, i don't want to put words in your mouth, your operating under a domino theory

process behind this, that with success in ukraine, then the russians moved out of the layer -- move elsewhere. they look at the chessboard and say, what is the latest vulnerability. i would argue there is a awfully large difference between undertaking some kind of hybrid or other military action against ukraine versus a baltic state or nato member. i think and i hope that is a bridge too far. i was very interested by your point of the coalition of the willing. but that would require a very, well, i guess to what extent would it require a different rule making framework within nato. what would that mean for nato.

if we are more explicitly drawing coalitions of the willing from nato. i think i'll stop there and give the panel time to respond and then we will open up for discussion with everybody. thank you. >> i think we're struggling, taking a lot of notes there, andy. that was very good. so your first question -- [laughter] you are counting on that. in terms of inherently competitive, and i think you asked the question, is it really

competitive in the fact that there are other areas where we can cooperate or where we should cooperate, i think the challenge is that currently, the distraction of the ukraine prevents cooperation. and so once that crisis is solved, then we can go back into a cooperate mode. -- cooperative mode. that conflict or that competition overshadows a lot of those areas where we can cooperate. look at the meeting two weeks ago between secretary kerry and putin. we walked away saying it was good we talked. but there were no agreements, substantive agreements that came out of that meeting. because of this competitive environment we are in, we have to solve this one major competitive issue before we see the fruits and other areas of cooperation. >> if i may address the u.s. side of that, the systems sort

of an emerging view within context of the wargame, was on the u.s. side that the russian system was fundamentally different from the u.s. system. russians as we've already mentioned, proceeded to have -- we perceived it have much greater freedom of action. but there's a degree of cronyism and corruption that was a great worry to u.s. players. there was a sense that, you know, we didn't want to go back to the cold war. we kind of had historical memory of the cold war. we were glad that we got that, beyond that, so then we thought ok if it is not cold war, we are moving to normal relations. but that didn't work either conceptually. so we are kind of stuff between the two. and we keep coming back, the u.s. team kept coming back to the fact russian regime operating by a different set of behaviors.

that's what we meant by comparatively competitive. -- inherently competitive. it wasn't that we had a dispute over a particular issue, but there was something fundamental in the russian system that just had a consistently at odds with the u.s. and the west. >> so from the russian team perspective you mentioned expansion conflict in the ukraine. there was much debate on the russian team whether or not they wanted to continue to film opposition to western actions. of course, the narrative they spun was ukrainian crisis and regional maladies subsequent to that are all, of course, u.s. machinations in the area. but desire to expand the conflict, there was no appetite. specifically russian team said they will not let separatists fail. however, the desire to create a

long strategic flank on the russian army in the ukraine wasn't a desired outcome. you mentioned whether or not putin is a strategic thinker versus a tactical chess player. often we saw the russian team was able to craft this particular narrative that they had. as i mentioned in general comments, during one of my turns, i think it was a protest in latvia we had and a small eruption of conflict there in terms of protests. russia was able to amass their armor, move ships to bhorder and spin a defensive posture. so this was an opportunity we were able to observe that russia operated tactically. was there a strategic desire?

to unmask troops there? -- to amass troops there? we didn't observe that. reacting to appear opportunity that arose. that being said at no point did russia ever want to i guess enter into any conflict with the west. economic sanctions at this point , according to the russian team were livable. while the ruble has been plummeting, they found ways to operate within the context of the sanctions that were there. so it was a concerted fear of increasing any opportunity of the rest to impose more -- for the west to impose more sanctions that oftentimes kind . of constraints to some extent the russian team's actions. but oftentimes, again, it was this tactical improvisation rather than sort of a mass strategy of the team operated under the two days. >> i just add that the team chose to go that route because they felt like it helped divide

nato decision making. it created this tension within nato. so it was the tool of choice, if you will. >> i'd like to briefly go to one of your last points about why ukraine, it was a sense at least on the u.s. side, we were hearing some very distressed messages from our east european nato allies in the context of the wargame, from the estonia latvia, lithuania, poland and some other nato allies. but the u.s. team did not feel that russia was ready to cross that clear, bright shining line of triggering nato's article five.

though we wanted to reassure our allies, particularly in the baltic and particularly to encourage them to head off any possible protests or mass mobilization of authorities, that might give an entree to russia to meddle in politics, we felt the real challenge was happening on the doorstep of nato. that means ukraine. obviously some other countries like moldova and georgia we were concerned about, but we felt that if the u.s. simply encouraged nato to build a wall around the current nato members and say we are not going to take any cognizance of what happens jan -- beyond the borders of today's members, that would be a big mistake. that is why we came back to the very thorny problem of how to stabilize the situation in

ukraine, and reinforce the new government there to where it can settle its difference with no outside interference. at least from the perspective of the u.s. team, that's why they were interested in essentially making a stand in ukraine even though it's not a nato member. >> i think that ties a little bit into the last question about nato, and we drew it out there so i think i have to answer that a little bit. you mentioned that putin uses attention in nato as well. we all can see that. so it ties into korean part as well. as long as we stay strong, there's a lot of agreements that have been broken in the past already. so the baltic states, if you're going to leave there, we're going to be next. whether it's going to happen or not, it's probably yellow or red line it will never cross.

it's a message you sent to the countries. that was the most important part of it. we all like the united consensus within nato. but we did not see it happen in the game. every time that the u.s. came up with a policy and thought, we got, villages this approach, and then some countries say we don't agree, so we move somewhere else. giving back to putin, he can use that. even after putin he away as nato and say it's not a problem, but we're going to solve it with mostly nato countries. so with that you don't give him the opportunity to use the leverage. so that's kind of where we came from. >> well, it is a bear of a policy problem. there's no question of that. i didn't mean to make a bad pun. it just happened.

for me i think over the last 15 months and then turn out over to , questions, there's sort of three baskets of policy. one area, and it's the hardest area, is the one that deserves the most attention is how you help ukraine. how you help ukraine survive. and it's not just military. it's financial. it's governance. it's everything. and we're fighting difficult odds. ukrainian management has been suboptimal, to put it mildly. but the focus of the intent in -- of intention in washington is often to punish russia. in ways it's the easier part to do, at least with the economic sanctions. and the middle part where i've been surprised that the united states has been so ready to kind of outsource is the diplomacy. and i think that at some point and i've written about this several times over the last six

months, that we need to play a larger role. but let me open it up to questions, comments, and right here. yes, hank? for the panelists and the audience. >> i'm hank gafney, long time follower of russia, deep experience in nato, and still following all this in retirement after 20 years in osd and 20 years at the center for naval analyses. and the 16 seminars iran with them. what the discussion reveals to me right now is the real big obsession is ukraine. and i want to come back to what putin in his paranoia saw and remember, as we decided in some

discussions here, it's all putin. i can't wait to see the discussion of how he's going to be overthrown, but he thinks that we want ukraine and nato so we can move u.s. forces and their nuclear weapons up on his border. and therefore do what from that, i have no idea. but of course, we have no intention of doing that. but he thinks so. he thinks we wanted a naval base and we're going to move our ships there. he thinks we're going to put nuclear weapons in crimea, et cetera. and how do we really overcome that in our process of trying to stabilize ukraine? >> who wants to take that first easy question? [laughter] >> for our group and net assessment i studied putin, and

before this project, i was not a europe analyst nor a russian follower. putin is a hard man to understand, first of all. and i agree with you he's a paranoid man. he is an intel analyst, he thinks everyone is watching him in some corner, somewhere. i'm not sure that we have the answer to that exactly. i mean, we have -- i've struggled with this a bit, but i think putin has hit his own reset button. and that reset button, i'm not sure has any corporation with -- cooperation with the west at this so i'm not sure we can get point. past that. and we may not be able to do that diplomatically ourselves. we might have to work with that coalition of the willing. and that was the recurrent theme in our war game. is that we have these two perceptions. we have the russian perception

of the u.s., that actually sees the u.s. as this declining power. we have the u.s. perception of russia, and we see it as a power and decline, and we tend to not -- in decline and we tend to not give russia the do due it believes it deserves and now we see putin snubbing the west more and more often because of that, i think. >> if i can add, listening to the discussions of the u.s. team during the war game, everyone was very hesitant to do anything to feed the russian narrative. so you know, to what extent to we provide support to the government of ukraine, to what extent do beprovide support to the nato members in the baltic?

we were second guessing ourselves to the point of paralysis. the consensus was over the course of two days that we had to break out of that paralysis and not sit on our hands out of a fear of feeding someone's paranoia. we had to take concrete measures that everyone would understand. some would perhaps misunderstood or twist them for their own purposes, but the u.s. team felt the greater risk was to do nothinging. there was acknowledgment that there was greater risk of making it look like the u.s. wanted to put troops into ukraine, but i think if we could just get the message across clearly in a straight forward objective manner that we are providing trainers to the ukrainian government, the people who really want to -- understand what is going on and will not misinterpret. >> i will just make a quick comment about that question, because it's one we all struggle

with, but there was one moment where if i were in the white house advising our president, it would have been on february 21st of 2014. and this is, you know, this is the day there was the political agreement signed between european foreign ministers, mr. yanukovych and the opposition that would call for earlier elections ten months later. and a number of other provisions. and i recall reading that hear in my office and realizing that there's no way this agreement was going to hold because the people would not agree to it. an in october when i was at the discussion club and heard putin talk about a bit of the chronology in his decision making, because i had had one

question, which i wanted to ask him, and i'll tell you in a second. but he said that when the agreement was signed, president obama called and they talked about it, and everything was ok. my question to him was, did you receive another phone call when the agreement fell apart because it was the time when the agreement fell apart that it was absolutely necessary to try to reassure mr. putin that in fact we did not want this agreement to fall apart. that it was not measures we were taking or supporting that led to this agreement falling apart. when the agreement fell apart

and mr. yanukovych fled kiev, to me that reflected the complete dis destruction of mr. putin's ukraine policy. and he had to react to that, and he did. in the we that he did. whether we could have prevented that, i don't know, but what i fear is that north side our government at the time there was probably a little bit of a feeling of we won. when yanukovych fled. rather than thinking of, you know what, we've got a big problem, and we need to work together. try to work together with mr. putin and our european allies to try to resolve the problem from ukraine, because it's very dangerous but i'm afraid, af fear that the sense of -- a little bit, yeah, we got him. ok, steve. >> steven blank, american foreign policy council. having just emerged from the same bunker as andy a couple of weeks ago, i have a suggestion

that might help alleviate some of the problems andy pointed out. first of all, with regard to the objectives, we in the united states tend to separate the objectives of regime preservation, the alpha of putin's policies for the restoration of a great power and one seen as a grout power globally. i would suggest to you that those are the same objectives, that the latter, the restoration of a russia seen at home and abroad as a great power is a precondition for the survival of the regime. as andy suggested, if ukraine went west, putin would come under enormous domestic pressure, if not, may even be unhinged in power. so there is no difference here. the conditions of regime survival and preservation into the future is the strategic goal and the condition of that goal

being met, one of the conditions, is this restoration of the great russia. the second point here is that we can therefore overcome the distinctions between strategy and tactics. i think he is strategist in that he has creatively taken and used all the elements of russian power, the dime concept i think we're all familiar with as an acronym, in order to bring about that restoration and preservation of his power, and the point of this whole operation, therefore is not to achieve some final state, but to develop these tools, as you have called them, instruments of power, others would say. in order to keep the game going, because that is how russia sees the world as being in any case. and second, this is the the only way that it can maximize what is

the condition of its great power and the regime at home that is a fully independent, sovereign great power, which is what it says it is and wants to be recognized as. but that doesn't have to answer to anybody either at home or abroad. and that's the strategic objective. i think that things thus become much more clear to the analysts, and i think they'll become clearer to you and you can overcome the dilemma of whether he's a tactician or a strategist. the tactics serve the objective, and there is no gap here. the final objective is not whether or not ukraine or some specific territory in ukraine belongs to russia, but whether russia is accepted as a great power. the specific territory or parameters of ukraine are beside the point, but now everybody understands you have to deal

with russia on its terms. >> yes, good morning. i'm tracy wilson. i'm a consultant here in washington, d.c. thanks for your comments this morning. this war game looked like it was very interesting, very enjoyable time, and i applaud you taking a structure to look into the future and helping us to understand these issues. three quick questions of clarification, if i might, you mentioned one area of cooperation that you saw iran, and you mentioned syria, of course, as well. in your discussion, in your

work, did the topic of threat reduction, nuclear security in russia come up? obviously that's an area on hold right now, and we have some concerns about that. so just curious your thoughts on that. and then a couple of reactions if you might, in recent days there have been two high-level state department visits to sochi and moscow now. are these positive signs indicators of a thawing of relations? if not, what should we be looking for in a future as a positive sign? and then finally, russia will hold the chair of the security council in september, is this a concern, possible areas of mischief that could be introduced into the agenda at that time? and so i welcome your thoughts.

>> ctr, the u.n. security council and department of state trips? >> i'll start briefly -- >> james, excuse me. >> with the areas of cooperation. the u.s. team was very concerned about the safety and stability of the russian nuclear enterprise. we didn't go into great details, but in some of the scenarios, several team members, you know, were concerned about that, and even to the extent t we might want to provide at least reassurances directly to the russian forces that are responsible for those sort of cooperative threat reduction, but we didn't go into detail. but there was some nervous nousness about, obviously.

particularly if the russian government became less stable due to economic crisis or regime change or something like that. so, yeah, there was great concern. and this is tied also to your next point about how do we read the most recent contacts. during the cold war as the years went on, as you know. we developed a pretty robust series of ways to communicate and coordinate with the soviet union, their leadership and their armed forces. it was never perfect. but there was there was channels. everything from incidents at sea to aircraft and air space to yeah, different kinds of signaling, the hot line. and there was sort of a sickening realization on the part of the u.s. team that perhaps some of that eroded or no longer exists. we've talked quite a bit as we've gone out to various think tanks. we've found that the generation of soviet experts are now in

retirement or -- and the next generation is not nearly as extensive, they're just as eager and just as smart, i'm sure, but there aren't as many of them on the ground as there were 25 years ago. so there was a concern on the u.s. side that perhaps there's value simply in strengthening the mechanisms. that's how i would read, just me as a citizen reading what was happening with secretary of state kerry's visit recently auz a good thing of in general. not because of any agreements that may or may not have been sign d at that time. but it's certainly reassuring that we can talk. and i would home there's some back channel communication going on as well, which i think is where the real work can get done. >> certainly i would agree, jim.

i will say from the russian team perspective, looking out in the future, most notably the election cycles drove a good bit of the team's analysis. it was interesting to note and came up in off conversation. we'll have a new administration new u.s. administration in 2016. the russian team is looking for a political win, or a win of some sort in 2017 in order for putin to be reelected in 2018. so russian team discussed numerous times of what that political win or international win might be. and it was notable they surmised it will be a new u.s. administration facing those challenges. and again, the team would hold the strategic cards, i guess, if you will. so while there might be conversations now and certainly they're worthwhile, i think the most telling point, at least from the russian team's

perspective, what's going to happen next year when it's a new administration and russia is look looking for that win, whatever that win might be. >> hi. i teach part time at catholic university about religion and international politics. in my previous hierarchy, i was in the state department and was enabled at one time to participate in a program at the -- college. and we did a mini version of what you all have been participating in. and having to do with the middle east. and thinking back, it strikes me very much that in all our discussions, we paid very little, if any attention to the role of religion, which in

recent years has proven to be much more important. certainly in our involvement in iraq. and syria. but i'm kind of surprised that in looking at the russian bear with everything else in there, there's nothing about religion and it strikes me that the certainly important role of the russian orthodox church, which is kind of come back more into popularity, also with mr. putin, should be considered here, not just because of its relationship with western orthodoxy, if you will, the christian church in the west, but also, you know islam, and i wonder, to any

extent, did religion play in i role in the considerations either on the u.s. or on the russian side? >> ok. next i'll direct the gentleman right in front of steve. >> thank you very much. i am with the national defense university fellow pakistan. my question is that you mentioned that ukraine is the perfect place to confront russia. but in this war game, were they factored out in this war game as well? for example, if the confrontation, the inclusion of conflict, both parties don't have to agree to expand it. if one expands unilaterally, then how do you deal with that. number two, u.s. air got allies,

was it also considered what allies they have? and number three is that when you say putin, do you mean russia? that is also another important factor. and last but not least was the china factor, do you think china has any real threat, and if they have, from where? thank you. >> thank you, reporter from voice america. a follow-up question about china factor. actually i'm looking at this russia figure, too, at the far corner of the figure, talking about the chinese assurance, could you elaborate on that?

second is about a consulate in china. the growing relationship between china and russia, they're talking about. so who poses greater threat to u.s., china or russia? thank you. >> back to the panelists. >> so, sir, in regards to your question on religion, it did come up in the initial testament, mainly in relationship to the orthodox church. while you don't see it on the diagram, we characterized it pretty much as a tool of russian nationalism, frankly, we didn't see it as a driving factor as much as a resource that could be used to continue to push forward on russian nationalism.

>> on the question about russian allies, i don't -- we didn't consider that as a major factor within the artificial construct of war game. we know that russia has reached out to particularly central asia and some of the countries there. but we didn't see that as those partnerships as really contributing much either to russian policy or to the russian impact in the situations we were trying to look at specifically. russia will never be able to recreate the warsaw pact. and even the warsaw pact was an alliance of unequals, much more so than nato, i would argue. but no, we didn't take those allies into account.

and i think that's an opportunity for the west actually, to make a very, very telling point through the international media, frankly that, you know, anyone who understands the world situation today with any degree of clarity can see that you have a group of 28 democracies at different stages of development who are cooperating and trying to create a security architecture for europe, and then you have one power that is throwing its weight around and violating some of the norms of the international environment in reaching out to, frankly some of the countries they have reached out to are more in line with the russians' idea of how a government in an economy should run than western europe. so i think that's something that the west could use to its advantage to make sure that that message is loud and clear. you have 28 democracies confronting countries that have fought into -- controlled by a very different system.

[laughter] >> actually, i was going to pile onto jim's comments on the alliances. what we didn't see was -- and i'll let the russian team speak to this clearly, but as they would come into each of the preliminary sessions, we saw continually reaching out of bilateral relationships that facilitated a purpose, as any nation would do. and that's what we saw in the chinese relationship, frankly. as far as where the assessment was as russia would turn towards china, they they really have the lower end of the bargaining relationship. china had the upper hand and russia needed china, but not russia needed china. that's why the chinese

relationship was one of risk for the russians. they could play to it, but they were coming into it having to negotiate less than their optimal deal, if you will. >> just a quick comment. the u.s. needs to be aware of its own seams and weaknesses. and i think one of those is now we tend to view the world regionally. there is some broad transnational threats. we get that. we have functional combats and commands. but in general terms, we have -- this of course goes back to the cold war. one combatant command focused on europe and russia and one focused on the asia-pacific region and china. so we tend to want to put our

problems into those bins and assign our military commander to deal with it. that said, there's a huge amount of cooperation that goes on with other u.s. government agencies as well, and we're finding more and more that perhaps that regional structure for the defense commands is not as helpful in places like the arctic, where you have several u.s. four-star commands that have some involvement. so that is something we need to be aware of on the u.s. side. and think about perhaps ways we can overcome that in the future. >> you would have enjoyed it last week. i proposed there be a new senior directorship from asia. from europe to asia to russia to india, it's a large continent, eurasia, so you overcome some of the stove piping.

ok. paul? >> thanks, paul schwartz from csis. i had a question about the the disparity in the way the two contestants in the crisis view how they are and how that actually played itself out in the the exercise. in addition, i tend to agree with the findings on that currently the likelihood is that russia will pursue a frozen conflict in ukraine, given that there's little to gain from seizing -- and much to lose. but that will hold up only unless and until russia starts to see that perhaps as ukraine policy is headed for a second

collapse as dr. kutchison described the first one. i'm curious how that played out in the scope of the exercise. thank you. >> thank you. kyle scott. i want to turn to your policy consideration to clear the articulating a policy towards russia, eastern europe and ukraine. i'm sure my colleagues in the state department would argue that we in fact do have the clearly articulated position. but i'm going to say that you're correct and then challenge you. what -- you all did all the studying -- what would you articulate as what the policy should be? and after i hear that, ask colonel if he could state whether the europeans agree with that policy. thank you.

>> hi. i'm actually based in berlin nowadays at energy international affairs and i'm actually here as a fellow at the american institute of contemporary german studies to actually interview american experts and officials and their take on energy vulnerabilities in europe. so you can imagine as i've been talking to energy and a lot of people about. it's sort of coming down to a few scenarios. i just want to -- i'm not saying this is the most likely scenario, but it goes alittle bit along with lines as schwartz pointed out and you pointed out, i don't get so much out of this as there's something else that can happen. it's not just a matter of what the u.s. wants to do, how it reacts to what russia does, mr. putin does. it's the flow of objective circumstances that gets out of hand if people don't take ahold of the situation. a lot of people -- so a lot of people, certain people i think -- well a lot of people have been telling me they have a clear feeling the european attitude is please take this

problem away. you know, they don't want to really face up to what's there, and frankly that there's a similar situation on our side, and somewhere that goes along with what you're describing and the reactive nature. and so the objective things that are developing is, if the ukrainian economy collapses in a couple years or completely collapse, major demonstrations you have huge amounts of refugees in europe. you can have all sorts of things happening to the energy passage. you don't know who did it. what about that sort of situation as things basically collapse? if there's not a major program of the west to get involved and sort of help them take control of their economy and rebuild it. fine. if people don't want to send military aid, fine, for whatever reasons, but take control and do something proactive, otherwise it degenerates and really both sides lose control and then you get a situation, and i think

it's true, as mr. kutchins said about what happened when the agreement fell apart. things get out of control on both sides. this is a question to react. i apologize if it was too -- >> please. >> if i may address the first question from a russian perspective of what the policies are and the objectives in ukraine. as i previously mentioned, the russian team had no desire to escalate the conflict. they were not planning on failing nor were they planning on giving back crimea. one of the final terms was the demise of putin, a new alternative form of government arises, what are the first actions. the russian team immediately said that we will not give back crimea. it was a political win that we do not intend to turn back on. in terms of escalating to conflict, again, they had an appetite for increasing the

conflict whatsoever. of course, come 2017 when they're looking for a political win, if that happens, it would be a target of opportunity. certainly it was one that the russian team had addressed. like wise, to return to a previous question regarding china, as we saw it play out although we didn't explore a lot of the china-russian dynamics, the russian team during one of the terms chose to undermine that as much as possible through backdoor deals sweetheart deals, if you might and primarily the reason they were so interested in doing that is to maintain an economic dependence of europe on russian energy. and that was weighed against some of the economic deals that were most recently made with china, which were not so favorable for the kremlin. so i guess from a minor

perspective, that's how i would grease the question, as we saw it play out in the game. >> and that was really the only time that china came up in the discussion, was with regards to economics and energy. the eurasian economic union was mentioned briefly, but that's not where they focused their discussions. while the russian team said theymentioned. that is not where they focused the discussions. the russian team said they would turn to china and they would rather maintain the european market they now enjoy. >> >> you reference for policy going forward and that was probably the greatest challenge frankly

that was at peace and this was the good, fast, and cheap discussion. do we want a europe that is at peace? i think that we want a democratic ukraine and we want respect for international borders. the challenge is, how do you clearly articulate it and what is the strategy link to the policy? what are the methods and mechanisms used to advance that. that gets to your point and how you encourage the democratic ukraine. that is probably where the answer is and, when the linkage

is correct, you will have a clearly articulated policy towards the areas. >> yeah, it our second consideration came from western europe and eastern european countries. they need to know where the u.s. stands on a lot of things. the baltic state, it does not matter which path is chosen and they were concerned and everybody understands, if you -- if russia takes a next step, they need the content and the clarity. we have a couple of international fellows saying russia is part of europe, whether we like it or not. it is. so, yeah.

>> good morning. i am a college grad. as a strategist, there are a couple of things and i want to ask you a couple of questions. if we take at face value about the relationship with the russians that is unavoidable and taking ukraine is problematic for the united states because of the escalation dominance the russians seem to have, and third, how the u.s. reacts playing prevent defense. how do you see the initiative? if you have it strategically competitive, what are the places where it the advantages force

the russians to react to what you are doing, rather than you reacting to them? is it the arctic? where are the places where the advantages play out in the competitive environment and cause the russians to rethink being aggressive in places where they have escalation and dominance. one of the reasons you are not acting is that you reached into a toolbox and it is not in there. what are the tools you need to develop? >> good questions. in the back of the room? >> i am an international student and i have two questions that relates to russia and the peninsula. what do you think of annexation? was this a long-term plan or

just a tangible opportunity? the first item in the slide, you say, compete with russia to maintain international order. is it possible to compete with a country that brutally breaks international rules? thank you. >> i am a consultant here. i am curious how, in preparing for this, you looked at the evolution of russian policy preceding the war game. the way i look at this, i see a lot of russian propaganda and it was intended with efforts to destabilize it.

at the end of the day, nothing happened nothing happened and the police were able to deal with the separatists and the separatists were thrown out. they ended up with a piece of that and would have been in jail, if not for the direct intervention of russia. in the context, it looks like a russian failure, because they were not able to what is your

perspective? how does the failure to ignite a mass uprising with the russian speaking population figure in to the calculus? >> >> back to the panel. >> i will start in the reverse order and the example you gave of russian policy towards eastern ukraine. i'm going to combine it with a question on crimea, whether it was an opportunity or a plan. and i think that going into it we saw that the crimea was -- was an opportunity on the back end of the sochi olympics. you have forces available.

and i think eastern ukraine, frankly, was another opportunity. the difference was the geography of crimea was fairly well set, and that was -- that's where that opportunity probably had a little more solidity, it was a little more solid than in eastern ukraine. we saw the eastern ukraine movement, going back to what we said before, it's all about maintaining the regime. and those were opportunities to create instable. that's why you didn't see the tractions in many areas, frankly. there wasn't a clearly identified geographically limited goal that was the aim of what we saw in eastern ukraine as opposed to what we saw with crimea. >> and on the second part of your question, on the -- can you compete with somebody who is so that? sorry for that. it's not a question whether you can. i think you must.

if you don't react, it's a signal of weakness. it's not a question of whether you can compete in that environment. we believe you have to compete in that environment. because that's the game he's playing. >> from the national war college, appreciate your question about capabilityies gap. let me take a stab at that. note one thing that the u.s. team wished they 01:31:33 hey hey hey no four deployed in europe itself. there was a sense that we needed to put a floor under what's

there now and perhaps move some forces back into europe. simply because it's a long way kansas, to get to somewhere in the nato area. and so that's a capability. we base those draw-down decisions on certain assumptions about the international security environment that were made several yours ago. we have to be able and willing to go back and re-examine the assumptions as far as fore structure in europe. there's another capability. there's of course a great deal of destruction about what to do and how to provide support to the the government in kiev. it doesn't always have to do with weapons. and communications systems. this is just on the military side. economic and political support. and of course, we have partners, osce and eu and the imf. and you have a joint effort from a lot of different governments and different international organizations and regional organizations trying to help kiev. it's not just about how many tank weapons we can provide them. and one that the team worried about a lot was the lack of ability to communication with the russian people and the

russian ethnic kmirnts in other parts of europe. it is true that there has been no mass uprising in other parts of eastern europe. even a year ago the terrible tragedy in odessa. somehow they've been able to keep the russian speaking population in odessa from rising up and staging, you know overthrowing the ukrainian government or the regional government there. that's a good thing. i chalk that up as a success story. in the long-term, they need to reassess and communicate the open free press, probably the best way to do it. through social media and websites, through television in particular, for the russian speaking minorities throughout europe. so that at least they have an alternative source of information to the h highly politicized information pouring out of moscow, that's very, very well funded.

and it's not just u.s. instruments. it's not just the radio for europe. it could be the bbc. there's any number of avenues that the west can reach. and communicate the truth to russian speaking populations. >> and very quickly on this initiative. that was one of the larger challenges throughout the exercises. ironically if you look at the shocks that she designed, they were all targeting the 01:34:49 russian systems. there were no shocks to the u.s. system. yet at each turn when we came back in the preliminary session,

the russian team was very proactive in each of their moves. we concur with your assessment that we don't think there will be any type of hybrid type attack if you will on any nato member. yeah, exactly. yeah, granted. that's a fair knock on wood. but that was really the assessment, that line was so well known and pronounced there would not be a provocation. and in the baltic states, the thing they have going for them is they have the eu membership. life is frankly much better in the baltic states than across the border, even if you're a russian speaking nationalist. we see that on the diplomatic fronts, frankly, on other contested spaces or what could be contested spaces. and part of that is how we deal with our own allies and how we

have areas of disagreements. we have to show this despite the fact we may not agree on different issues, whether they're house we use forces or we we build forces. >> let me make a comment on the successor failure question. it's a very interesting one. it was a brilliant success. and it was a great head fake too. you put 40,000 or 50,000 troops on the border, and you come in through the back door into crimea. and what we should be expected at this. i don't plan to be nostrodomus or anything, but over the weekend of february 21, 22, 23 jeff manchov and i were writing

a piece for csis, and of course it was about the implications of the february 21st accord, which then of course the accord fell apart so we had to rewrite it over the weekend. and one of the things inserted will is you have to think about a possible asymmetrical reaction. and the most likely place for such a reaction would be crimea. it's the least ukrainian part of ukraine. but yet, we do still seem to -- i mean, seem quite surprised. quite surprised by it. and also the fact that the ukrainian military forces in crimea completely backed down. my concern at that point was that created an impression for putin that the environment was way too permissive. there's no reaction from the west. probably will not be much reaction from the military forces if there were further incursions into ukraine, which is what i was immediately afraid about on february 28th.

that was when my hair was on fair and saying we need to mobilize the strongest reaction possible, including sending military assistance to ukraine. trying to alter it at that moment. the next step don't do it. don't do it. it's almost impossible for our political system to command a strong response and more difficult for our european allies at that time. now, was it a success? well, i think you miscalculated the degree to which the russian supported insurgents would be welcomed in eastern ukraine. putin came out on april 17th with the line -- and with that policy, got a very tough defeat in odessa a few weeks later. and the aspirations modulated. to what extent, how broad were the aspirations in the beginning?

it's impossible for me to say. there's a phrase the appetite grows with eating. but so we'll leave it. will this be judged as success or failure? i think it's too early to tell, frankly. if we get back to steve's point, which i agree with, in the that foreign and domestic policy are so intertwined, how long is mr. putin going to continue enjoying a 25% increase in his popular support? mainly because of activities in ukraine. there are differing views about that. we had a very good presentation here at csis on april 28th that's up on our website. one of the things he argued is if you look in the past at when economic downturns have occurred, there's usually a time lag between the the impact of economic downturn on the support for the president.

so it will be interesting to see how, to what extent the political opinion polls up hold at the level where they are and for how long. ok. we have time for one more round. i saw the gentleman in the gray shirt shirt. yes. >> thank you. u.s. european command. question to you about the information, the russian propaganda. it's clearly an effort we're not winning, and a lot of this is due to one, the unified nature of the russian information warfare, state run media. but also the fact that their propaganda isn't so much convincing, but making them doubt everything. even doubting the truth. besides pure capables. capabilities, do you think our

approach of countering their propaganda is working when frankly the pop lus isulous is trying to influence the truth, or do you think we need a new approach? >> ok, i want to exercise two options. first, the russian invasion, for example. and second, russian massive cyber attack. for example, against 01:41:28 estonia, where a government is strongly relying on internet and israeli government. in fact, all for example, very important financial in eastern europe. is this the case for article five? >> back to the panel. and you can conclude as well. >> yeah, i'll take the last

question about the cyber attack. yeah, i wasn't -- we don't have one -- we don't have consensus about everything. when we said that he will never go into the the baltic states, i'm not quite sure about that. he won't do that with tanks, i'm pretty sure about that. actually in our war game, we -- one of the the injects was 2 conflict, and there was a combination with smaller attacks, cyber attacks in the other places. so yeah, we considered that. >> and that brought us to the idea that putin is not sor much, that's our belief, looking for a gain of terrain, and he's looking for a great russia, but 01:42:56 needs some sort of conflict going onto keep the momentum

that we can have if 2018. so as long as the conflict stays, that will be the main interest, and as soon as that dies out, he might try and cyber will be one of the ways he could try that in other places as well. yeahious i think taurking about article five, and there's a big red line everybody says in article five. i agree to that. but i think it's a very thick line as well. so whether he crosses it, i think he's too smart for that. but he will stay just into the line. and with cyber, that's really hard to tell. and it's really hard to make one clear stand on this is article five and this is not.

>> yeah, that was the debate that happened inside the u.s. team was what is going to institute an article five attack? was the cyber attack in estonia an article five situation? was about other smaller violations of sovereignty? what are we going to consider article five? there was some talk of does it need to be rewritten. and frankly i think the consensus going out was no. because it's written -- it's written -- the way it's currently written is fine. what might need to happen is a discussion about what does it mean in a new environment? it was clearly written in the washington treaty in a different environment, where some of these other challenges simply didn't have a way to materialize. but now that's the next step. we've got to determine what does that mean, and as he said, it's probably a thick line, and then that's up for the council to decide. when is the line going to be

thick, and when is it going to be very thin? >> the broad interpretation of article five for the red team allowed them to hedge their bets, to use their tool kit, to push up to the line and then stop, and create that tension with nato. that's what we saw as a goal of the red team quite often. >> if i might also add to karen's remarks. and the question is really what can we see as the initiative. the russian team was very concerned over the economic dependence and inner dependence of europe. i think if if u.s. were to go forward that might be some avenues of an initiative that certainly the west can concede upon, precluding that ability of russia in the near abroad to

control the economic dependency, if you might. often times the russian team, as karen made mention of, would go right up to that red line, that very thick red line. they acknowledged the fact that they can spin a narrative far faster than the west could. and so i think you mentioned the question about is there a way to change our info ops? i think certainly being faster would probably -- would probably -- certainly help the united states in the future. while, obviously i'm an air force guy, and we prefer our safety reports and our after accident reports to be clear and concise, certainly getting a message out quickly after airliner is shot down may have actually improved u.s. flexibility, rather than waiting until all of the truth is done. that's my small insight. >> and just as a concluding comment, i agree with chris.

sometimes getting, you know, your best information out quickly better then waiting for weeks and having a thorough, complete report. that's an aspect of the competition. we have to understand it's competition. though it doesn't have to be u.s. government sources of information. and i think it -- we, in the west, should not be hung up on just responding to distortions and lies and pointing them out. i think we have to provide a the russian-speaking population about what is happening in the west. how do the people live, how do their governments treat them? and that's a long-term strategy. but that's i think the one that we have to approach. and then finally, i want to draw your attention again to the point four up there. there is a concern that we have two election cycles rolling up in the next two or three years that have the potential to have some negative interference with each other.

we're -- we hope that the u.s./russia -- policy towards russia does not become highly politicized during the 2016 campaign which has already begun and you hear, you know foreshadowing of that in some politicians making statements or asking rude questions. but the new administration and the new president whoever he or she may be coming in to office in january of 2017 will be coming smack into a period of priority need on the part of russia to do something to make an impact for their own election cycle a year or so later. we have to be aware of the potential for a dangerous situation in 2017. >> well, i think it's time to wrap up and i'd like to make a concluding comment. first of all, thank you.

coming here to csis today and sharing the fruits of their labors so to speak from the work of the net assessment of russia and then the subsequent war game that was carried out last month. and one thought occurred to me that -- it was in response to the question about the importance of secretary kerry's trip to sochi and other state department and other u.s. government engagement with russia. and the issue with mutual communication is so important right now. never in the -- i started traveling to the soviet union in 1979 and never have i seen in 36 years a wider disparity between the narratives that are being told in our two capitals. and, you know, certainly not everything about our narrative

is right and not everything about the russian narrative is wrong. there are different perceptions of the same events. and the fact that we're not talking to each other about them as much as we should be doing, in some ways we're talking less than during soviet times i think is a real detriment and increases the bad policy frankly. so maybe one small effort that i would suggest is that i think it would be interesting to exercise exercise, to do a scenario like this that included russians, europeans and americans, but on mixed teams. and i think we would learn a lot from each other about how we see different phenomena through a different lens, but how that different lens may not necessarily be right or wrong, but we need to understand really to i think make better policy towards each other. so thank you very much for sharing your thoughts and wisdom with us today and thank you all for coming.

>> president obama spoke about the relationship between police officers and community residents in the city of camden, new jersey, yesterday c-span. on this morning's "washington journal," transportation funding with congressman david jolly of florida. later a conversation with gerald nadler about whether congress should renew nsa surveillance. the houses in at 10:00 eastern and will vote on the sex trafficking measure today. live house coverage on c-span today. >> the head of the faa and the president of the national air

traffic controllers association will talk about efforts to modernize the air traffic control system as part of a reauthorization hearing on federal aviation administration programs. watch live coverage from the senate transportation committee this morning at 10:00 eastern on c-span 3. later, also on c-span 3 civil rights and law enforcement officials testify about the use of police body cameras. live from the senate judiciary subcommittee on crime and terrorism at 2:30 eastern. >> here are a few of the book festivals we will be covering the spring on book tv. we were close out may at book e xpo america where the publishing industry showcases their upcoming books. in june, we are live for the chicago tribune printers row including our program with lawrence wright and your phone calls. that is this spring on c-span 2's book tv.

>> president obama was in camden, new jersey, yesterday talking about community policing programs. in the past three years, violent crime in camden has dropped 40%. the president speech came after the white house announced it is prohibiting the federal government from providing certain military style equipment to local police departments. >> ladies and gentlemen, the president of the united states. ["hail to the chief" playing] ♪ president obama: thank you. thank you. [applause] thank you so much.

thank you, everybody. have a seat. thank you so much. it is good to be in camden. i want to thank your lieutenant governor your congressman donald norcross, and your mayor for being here. give them all a big round of applause. i want to thank our hosts. the salvation army is doing great work. it is a wonderful building. we are proud of them. i want to thank camden county police chief scott thompson for his outstanding work. where's the chief? there he is.

so, i've come here to camden to do something that might have been unthinkable a few years ago. and that's to hold you up as a symbol of promise for the nation. [applause] i don't want to overstate it. obviously camden, you know, has gone through tough times and there's still tough times for a lot of folks here in camden. but just a few years ago this city was written off as dangerous beyond redemption. a city trapped in a downward spiral. parents were afraid to let their children play outside. drug dealers operated in broad daylight. there weren't enough cops to patrol the streets. so two years ago, the police department was overhauled to implement a new model of community policing. they doubled the size of the

force, while keeping it unionized, they cut desk jobs in favor of get manager officers out into the streets. not just to walk the beat but to actually get to know the residents. to set up basketball games. to volunteer in schools. to participate in reading programs. to get to know small businesses in the area. to be a police officer takes a special kind of courage and i talked about this on friday at a memorial for 131 officers who gave their lives to protect communities like this one. takes a special kind of courage to run toward danger. to be a person that residents turn to when they're most desperate. and when you match courage with compassion, with care and understanding of the community like we've seen here in camden some really outstanding things

can begin to happen. violent crime in camden is down 24%. [applause] murder is down 47%. [applause] open air drug markets have been cut by 65%. [applause] the response time for 911 calls is down from one hour to just five minutes and when i was in the center, it was 1.3 minutes right when i was there. and perhaps most significant is that the police and residents are building trust. building trust. nobody is suggesting that the job is done. this is still a work in

progress. the police chief would be the first to say it, so would the mayor. camden and its people still face some very big challenges. but this city is onto something. you've made real progress in just two years. and that's why i'm here today. i want to focus on the fact that other cities across america can make similar progress. everything we've done over the past six years, whether rescuing the economy or reforming our schools or retooling our job training programs has been in pursuit of one goal. that's creating opportunity for all of us. all our kids. we know that some communities have the odds stacked against them and have had the odds stacked against them for a very long time. in some cases for decades. you've got rural communities that have chronic poverty, you have manufacturing communities that got hit hard.

there are not only cities but also suburbs where jobs can be tougher to find and tougher to get to because of development patterns and lack of transportation options. and folks who do work, are working harder than ever but don't feel they can get ahead. in some communities that sense of unfairness and powerlessness has contributed to dysfunction in those communities. communities are like bodies and if the immunity system is down they can get sick. and when communities aren't vibrant, when people don't feel a sense of hope and opportunity, then a lot of times that can fuel crime and that can fuel unrest. we've seen it in places like baltimore and ferguson and new york. it has many causes, from a basic lack of opportunity to some

groups feeling unfairly targeted by their police forces. that means there's no single solution. there has to be a lot of different solutions, different approaches that we try. so within of the things we did to address these issues was to create a task force on the future of community policing and this task force was outstanding because it was made up of all the different stake holdsers. we had law enforcement. we had community activists. we had young people. they held public meetings across the country. they developed concrete proposals that every community in america can implement to rebuild trust and help law enforcement. the recommendations were released in march, they were finalized today, they include everything from enhanced officer training to improving the use of body come rahs and other

technologies to make sure that police departments are being smart about crime and that there's enough data for them to be accountable as well. and we're trying to support the great work that's happening at the local level where cities are already responding to these recommendations. before i go further i want the members of our task force to stand because they've done some outstanding work and they deserve to be acknowledged. thank you. [applause] now, we've launched a police data initiative that's helping camden and other innovative cities use data to strengthen their work and hold themselves accountable by sharing it with the public. departments might track things like incidents of force so they can identify and handle programs that could otherwise escalate. here in camden, officers deal with some 41 different data systems which means they have to enter the same information

multiple times. so today we brought a volunteer elite tech team to help, a group of tai ta scientists and engineers, they're going to work with the police department here to troubleshoot some of the technical challenges so it's easier for police departments to do the things they want to do in helping to track what's going on in communities and then also helping to make sure that that data is used effect i -- effectively to identify where are their trouble spots? where are the problems? are there particular officers that need additional help, additional training? all that can be obtained in a really effective, efficient way. today we're also releasing new policies on the military style equipment that the federal government has in the past provided the state and local law enforcement agencies. we have seen how militarized gear can sometimes give people a feeling like there's an

occupying force as opposed to a force that's part of the community that's protecting them an serving them. can alien ate and intimidate local residents and send the wrong message. so we're going to prohibit some equipment that's made for the battlefield that's not appropriate for local police departments. there is other equipment that may be needed in certain cases but only with proper training. so we're going to ensure that departments have what they need but also that they have the training to use it. we're doing these things because we're listening to what law enforcement is telling us. the overwhelming majority of police officers are good and honest and fair. they care deeply about their communities, they put their lives on the line every day to keep them safe. their loved ones wait and worry until they come through the door at the end of their shift. so we should do everything in our power to make sure they are safe and help them do the job

the best they can. and what's interesting about what chief thompson has done and what's happening here in camden is, these new officers who i have to confess made me feel old because they all look like they could still be in school, the approach that the chief has taken in getting them out of their squad car, into the communities, getting them familiar with the people that they're serving, they're enjoying their jobs more because they feel as if over time they can have more of an impact and they're get manager help from the community because the community has seen them and knows them. before there's a crisis. before there's an incident. so it's not just crisis response. it's not after the fact, there's a crime, there's a dead body, there's a shooting and now we're going to show up. it's, we're here all the time hopefully we can prevent those

shootings from happening in the first place. [applause] but one of the things i also want to focus on is the fact that a lot of the issues that have been raised here and in places like baltimore and ferguson and new york goes beyond policing. we can't ask the police to contain and control problems that the rest of us aren't willing to face. or do anything about. if we as a society don't do more to expand opportunity to everybody who is willing to work for it, then we'll end up seeing conflicts between law enforcement and residents. if we as a society aren't

willing to deal honestly with issues of race, then we can't just expect police departments to solve these problems. if communities are being isolated and segregated without opportunity and without investment and without jobs, if we, politicians, are simply ramping up long sentences for nonviolent drug crimes that end up devastating communities, we can't then ask the police to be the ones to solve the problem when there are no able bodied men in the community. or kids are growing up without intact households. [applause] we can't just focus on the problems when there's a

disturbance and then cable tv runs it for two or three or four days and then suddenly, we forget about it again. until the next time. communities like some poor communities in camden or my hometown in chicago, they're part of america too. the kids who grow up here, they're america's children, just like children every place else they've got hopes and dreams and potential. and if we're not investing in them, no matter how good chief thompson and the police are doing, these kids are still going to be challenged. so we've all got to step up. all got to care about what happens. chief thompson will tell you his officers read to young children in the communities not just to

build positive relationships but because it's in the interest of the community to make sure these kids can read. they can stay in school. and graduate ready for college and careers and become productive members of society. that's in his interest, not just as a police chief but also as a citizen of this country. and somebody who grew up in this area. knows this area. and that's why we partnered with cities and states to get tens of thousands more kids access to quality early childhood education. no matter who they are or where they're born. they should get a good start in life. that's why we partnered with cities including camden to create what we call promise zones, where all hands on deck efforts to change the odds for communities to start happening because we're providing job training and helping reduce violence and expanding affordable housing. that's why we're ready to work with folks from both sides of

the aisle to reform our criminal justice system. we all want safety. we all know how pernicious the drug culture can be in undermining communities. this massive trend toward incarceration even of nonviolent drug offenders and the costs of that trend are crowding out other critical investments that we can make in public safety. if we're spending a whole lot of money on prisons and we don't have computers or books or enough teachers or sports or music programs in our schools, we are being counterproductive. it's not a good strategy. [applause] and so in addition to the work we're doing directly on the criminal justice front, we're also launching something that we call my brother's keeper.

an initiative to ensure that all young people, but with a particular focus on young men of color have a chance to go as far as their dreams will take them. [applause] over the coming weeks, members of my cabinet will be traveling around the country to highlight communities doing great work to improve the lives of their residents. we know these problems are solveable. we know we're not welcoming for answers. we're just lacking political will. we have to see these problems for what they are. not something that's happening in some other city to some other people, but something that's happening in our community. the community of america. and we know that change is possible because we've seen it in maces like this. we've seen it thanks to people like officer virginia matteas.

where is virginia? there she is right there. earlier this year, vice president biden and i got to sit with officer matteas and rank and file law enforcement officers from around the country and virginia was talking about how when she was growing up in east camden, crime was so bad she wasn't allowed to go to the store alone. her mom was once robbed at gunpoint. when she was 17 her uncle was shot and killed in his own store. instead of turning away from camden, she decided she wanted to become a cop where she grew up to help the community she loved. and today she's a proud member of the camden county police department. and she's a constant presence in the community, getting to know everybody she passes on her beat, even volunteering in a kindergarten. officer matteas isn't just helping to keep her community

safe, she's a role model for young people of camden. anyone who thinks that things aren't getting better, she said i see kids playing outside riding bikes in the neighborhoods, on their porches having a conversation. that's how i measure change. that's how we should all measure change. i had a chance to meet with some young people here who participated in a round table with the officers and they're extraordinary young people. and they have got hopes and dreams just like malia and sasha. and they are overcoming bigger barriers than i ever had to go to. and they are strong and focused. but in talking to them, some of them, the reason they have been able to make it and do well is because their parents to not let them outside. you know what? children should not have to be locked indoors in order to be safe.

that's not right. some of them still have concerns about friends of theirs that have taken a wrong path and got involved in the streets and drugs. that's not the environment we need our kids to be growing up in. i challenge everybody to get to know some of these young people. they're outstanding. they are going to do great things in their lives. [apaplaplause] but the point is is that they should not have to go through superhuman efforts just to be able to stay in school and go to college and achieve their promise. that should be the norm. that should be standard. if it isn't, we're not doing something right. we as a society are not doing something right if it is not. so --

[applause] ultimately, that is how we measure change. rising prospects for our kids. rising prospects for the neighborhood. do our children feel safe on the streets? do they feel cared for by thei community? do they feel like police departments care about them? do they feel as if they, when they work hard, they can succeed? do they feel like the country is making an investment in them? do they seem role models for success? are there pathways to jobs they can identify? do they know that if they put in effort, they can make it? are they going to be treated fairly regardless of the color of their skin or what their last name is? it's pretty basic. i travel around the country.

the one thing that makes me always so optimistic is our children. and what you realize this everywhere kids are -- kids are kids. sometimes they will drive you crazy. they'll make mistakes. but there's an inherent goodness in them. they want to do the right thing. just need to be given the chance. and some of them are not going to be lucky enough to have the structures at home that they need. in which case, then we all have to pick up the slack. if we do, they will respond. they will. we have got to feel like there are -- they are our kids. we have got to see our children in them, in their eyes. we have not done enough of that. but we can.

this is a moment of great promise, a moment of great hope. if we're seeing such extraordinary improvement in camden because of the good efforts of a lot of elected officials and an outstanding police chief and some wonderful police officers and a community that is supportive and nonprofit organizations like the salvation army and others that are doing great work, if it is working here, it can work anywhere. it can work anywhere. [applause] the city hall of camden you have got an inscription by walt whitman. "in a dream i saw a city invincible. in a dream i see a country invincible if we care enough to make the effort on behalf of every child

in this kind count -- in thsiis country. camden is showing it can be done. thank you very much everybody. ♪ >> "washington journal" is next. we look at today's news and take phone calls. the houses in at 10:00 a.m. eastern this afternoon they will vote on a human trafficking bill. watch live coverage on c-span.

the new congressional directory is a handy guide to the 114th congress with color photos of every senator and house member plus bio and contact information and twitter handles. district maps. a map of capitol hill, a look at the president's cabinet, federal agencies and state governors. order your copy today. it is $13.95 plus shipping and handling to the c-span online store at c-span.org. >> transportation and infrastructure's issues including the future of amtrak are being debated in congress. coming up this hour, we will talk to congressman david jolly of florida who serves on the transportation appropriations subcommittee. then, a conversation with new york representative jerrold nadler about whether congress should renew nsa surveillance that inspire -- expire in june.

a look at the affect their western drought could have on the u.s. economy. jim tankersley joins us. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. host: with the memorial day holiday looming, senate and jordi leader mitch mcconnell -- senate majority leader mitch mcconnell said they will stay in town until certain things are considered. in the house, legislators would work on a bill that would give a two-month extension which faces a deadline may 31. president obama unveiled a series of measures designed to improve relations between the community and law enforcement.