are you on? that is it for our program today. another program comes at 7:00 tomorrow. an event that is just about to take place at the atlantic council that takes a look at the topic of the iran nuclear deal. it also takes a look at how european nations have to deal with what will eventually come out of this deal. this is in washington by the atlantic council. [indiscernible]

>> we are live on this tuesday morning at the atlantic council here in washington, where the french, british, and german ambassadors will talk about europe's role in the iran nuclear negotiations. atlantic council senior fellow barbara slavin will monitor the session. it should get underway in just a moment live on c-span.

>> good morning, everyone. i am the executive vice president or i he atlantic council and it is my pleasure to welcome our dismissed speakers. french ambassadors gerard araud, british ambassador sir peter westmacott, and german ambassador peter wittig. it is a pleasure to host all of the other same time about the iran nuclear deal. i would like to welcome all of you on -- in the room and everyone joining us online and through the tv broadcast. we want to encourage everyone to join the conversation using the hashtag #ac iran.

the iran task force was established to explore peaceful release -- peaceful solutions with iran. the iran task force looks at -- it has published on this issues more than one dozen issued briefs and reports. in 2013, the task force released recommendations for u.s.-iran policy to foreshadow the current path of negotiations, which we will discuss today. we are and what could be the final stages of nuclear negotiations with iran. negotiators from the u.s., britain, french, -- france germany, india russia -- the p5+1, are working on terms that would place long-term curbs on

nuclear armament from iran in return for relief on a number sanctions. this showcases the clickable of the transatlantic partnership in addressing the most prominent global challenges. we are especially delighted to be joined by the ambassadors from the e3 nations france, germany, and the united kingdom to discuss this herculean demotic effort which in large part began with their nations over a decade ago. i would like to invite up barbara slavin it -- a senior fellow here. she has largely guided the work on iran at the council and it -- and can be credited for bringing together this discussion today.

ms. slavin: thank you for coming. i am delighted that everyone has returned from the holiday with an interest in the subject. we have been trying out the atlantic council to bring the three e-3 ambassadors here for some time. i think the role of the countries has not been properly -- properly recognized in the iran negotiation. it is fair to say it you three invented iran nuclear diplomacy in 2003. the u.s. administration at the time the george w. bush administration, had a policy of of no acknowledged the o-matic contacts with your on. there were some, but they were secret and not substantive. it was written, france, and germany that to get upon themselves to deal with the issue of iran's nuclear program after various facilities were

revealed in 2002. it could know before i turn to our excellent speakers and introduce them. the bush administration policy toward iran at the time according to phil gordon, an official in the clinton and obama administrations, was one of malevolent neglect -- "malevolent neglect." when i was doing research on a book for you the u.s. and iran, i was told that john bolton once fell asleep or pretended to while he was hosting members of the e-3, who were giving him a raving on the negotiations. he was the under secretary of state in charge of nonproliferation -- nonproliferation at the time but not interested in talking with iran. the policy changed towards the end. we will hear about it and about where we are today.

it is fair to say without the e-3, there would be no process with huron and they would not have been the progress we see today. with that introduction, let me introduce our wonderful guest. speaking first will be the ambassador of france, gerard araud, who has held numerous positions and the ministry of foreign affairs including director for strategic affairs security and disarmament. investor to israel. permanent representative to u.n.. ambassador araud has specialized knowledge of the middle east and strategic and security issues. her name for our purposes, he was the french negotiator on the iranian nuclear issue from 2006 to 2009. is peter wittig, ambassador of germany. he also served as permanent representative to the u.n. he served in spain as private

secretary to the foreign minister. director-general for the united nations and global issues at the foreign office in berlin. sir peter westmacott has been britain's ambassador here since 2002. he previously served as counselor for the political and public affairs in the mid-1990's. he has been the ambassador to france and turkey and have postings in tehran and brussels as well as serving as foreign and commonwealth office's directors for the america. i would ask each ambassadors speak briefly. i know there are a lot of questions and expertise. ambassador araud will start with a history of the talks, as he lived through it. he will talk about how we went from malevolent neglect to active participation on the part of the obama administration and then ambassador wittig will talk about the understanding --

lowe's on understanding of april -- lausanne understanding of april 2. ambassador westmacott will look at the regional understandings of this. ambassador araud: one i was told i was to talk about history, i was going to stop by cyrus the great, but i was told that may be too long. in 2002, when a major iranian nuclear, clandestine i'm program was revealed, which we did not have any identifiable civilian significance, -- my motto was not speak saying "i,", but i is the director directed the letter of the ministers, the european ministers. our goal, i have to say that at

that time, we had the choice between having the signature of u.k. or of russia. if we put in the text that we were asking the suspension of enrichment, we had russia but not the u.k.. if we had put in stopping the enrichment, we had the u.k. but not russia. france and germany -- it was not easy. it was spring of 2003, after the iraqi invasion, we decided that we wanted to have the u.k. because we knew it would not be an agreement if at some moments, we could not have the trust, confidence of the united states. at the time, john bolton was under secretary at strategic affairs, came to paris. we present of the letter that

was also with the israelis. we had sent consultation. we got from both of them a yellow light. under the condition that we will be totally transparent to both. and we were. as ambassador to israel, i was the channel to inform the israeli authorities of where we were, what we wanted. i think it was extremely productive. the negotiations started between the three countries and huron and fall of 2003. the iranians really suspended the enrichment activities. some people said that the opportunity was missed at this point. that would be for historians to say. but everything stopped in 2005 when mahmoud ahmadinejad was

elected. between 2005 and 2012, there was no negotiation whatsoever. as the french negotiator between 2006 and 2009, -- we went, the five of us. the american negotiator went with us. we want to tehran in 2008 with a letter signed by the six ministers. we made a lot of different proposals to try and avoid the question of suspending everything. at no moment between 2005 and 2012, the iranians even cared about the negotiation. there was no negotiation. the first hour was about cyrus the great, the second was about -- the third hour was about the rights of the iranian people.

that is the reality. in 2006, the americans, the russians, and the chinese joined us, which led to the first resolution. july, 2006. it was to suspend the enrichment of -- to your aunt. they did not do it. they were the different resolutions of sanctions after. 1803, 1835, 1929. the russians and the chinese, it was important they were with us. we reached the point of 2012. that is the first conclusion that we true. in 2012, iran took the decision of negotiating. negotiations started, or restarted in 2012. i stopped here.

ms. slavin: maybe a tad more. you say 2012. mahmood, jim dowd was not elected until 2013. what changed? ambassador araud: no, i meant 2013. sorry. ms. slavin: obviously, we will go more into this in the q&a. ambassador wittig, 2013, hossein rest money comes in, a new team that speaks english, does not insist on dredging through past iranian grievances. interim agreement? ambassador westmacott: -- ambassador wittig: they spoke english in 2006 also. [laughter] ms. slavin: you've got the interim agreement november 2013 and then the lausanne understanding. tell us what you can about that

and where we are now in negotiations. we have about four weeks to go. ambassador wittig: thank you for having me here. it is great to be here at the atlantic council. april 2, we concluded after lots of months of intense negotiations, a political agreement on the parameters of a potential deal, final deal, with iran. the framework is a potentially hopeful that -- step forward. i have to add a notion of caution at the beginning. the most difficult task may lay ahead of us in the coming weeks. are we sure that we will get this rental deal no.

-- in this final deal, no. but we conduct negotiations with a lot of determination yet without naivete and a clear eye. the task is to negotiate a comprehensive solution. the challenge is to transform political statements, basically, into reliable -- i would also say waterproof -- provisions that leave no doubt about the duties of the parties involved. as you know, in this kind of endeavor, the devil is in the details. therefore, details matter. we have to with a comprehensive agreement with a lot of annexes.

it is not only a political but also a technical negotiation. so far since the second of april, negotiations have been preceding at a rather slow pace on an expert level. there are a lot of gaps and brackets. gaps to be filled in rockets to be removed in the document. not surprising to you it two issues are in the particular focus. first, the timing of the sanctions relief for iran. the details of the verification and monitoring mechanisms. those are our major topics. lausanne laid the groundwork for three major goals vis-a-vis iran.

first, strict limitations on and richmond for the first 10 years -- on and richmond -- enrichment for 10 years. a reduction from 19 thousand to -- they agreed to not enrich the young 3.67%. and -- for 15 years. and reduce the stockpile of low enriched uranium two 300 kilograms for the next 15 years. on top of that, iran would have no other or no new enrichment facility for the duration of the agreement. the second goal is the modernization of iraq. it would seal the plutonium

packed. -- pact. lausanne provides the possibility to modernize the existing heavywater facility in iraq rebuild, redesign it, so there could be no production of weapons grade plutonium. the third goal, and key to an agreement, is iran would be submitted and subjected to an unprecedented transparency and monitoring regime to make sure that any covert program that iran might the engaging in what be detected and strong procedures for intrusive inspections and accordance with the additional protocol of the nonproliferation treaty and beyond would ensure the international community knows

what is going on in iran. old be the duties for us in this agreement, if it happens -- in return for iran's compliance there would be shanks and relief of the un's sanctions -- there would be sanctions relief of the u.n. eu, and the u.s. gradually. that is important. that would be in a economy trade, and finance. iran needs some time to start the implementation of this agreement. in the best case, sanctions relief would not happen before the end of this year. in addition, this agreement would provide guarantees that sanctions could be put back in place if iran violates the agreement -- the so-called snap act agreement -- provision.

what are the prospects we see for this deal? for iran, this would be a significant shift. it would be deprived of the possibility to produce a nuclear weapon and at the same time, it would give iran the opportunity to adjust its relations to the international community. we believe it could also prevent a nuclear arms race in the region. a note of caution again. do we think that we can trust iran with an agreement? i think the answer is no. our motto would be distrust but verify. trust has been broken and needs to be restored. that is why we can only accept a regime with a long-lasting

monitoring mechanism. do we condone iran's behavior in the region? absolutely not. we maintain sanctions that are not immediately related to this agreement. the arms embargo is an example. and we would continue to urge iran to play a very constructive role on its regional conflicts. in our mind, syria lebanon yemen. in concluding, we believe that the alternatives to our diplomatic approach are on attractive. if diplomacy fails then the sanctions regime may unravel. the universal sanctions regime.

we would probably see iran again enriching as it has done before negotiations started. it is clear the problems we have with iran will not go away immediately the deal. it has the potential to engage in a phase of constructive conflict resolution with iran. we believe it serves our security interest in europe, the u.s. security interests, the regional security interests. and believe me, israel's security is always on our mind. in a nutshell, a negotiated jury deal -- a negotiated satisfactory deal is our best thing. ms. slavin: i was a little

surprised when you said sanctions relief would not, until the end of the year. is that because it will take iran that long to implement the key steps or is this something being negotiated? the iranians say sanctions relief will be immediate upon this implementation. ambassador westmacott: thank you for giving us this opportunity to sit on stage. i would not say like three monkeys, but we are three colleagues. gerard mentions the way the iranians go back to cyrus the great. when you talk to iranians, history is always important. but it was cyrus the great who liberated -- a story we reminded ourselves when we went to visit major cities a year ago.

it is worth as being conscious of it as well. the regional dimension and the point at which barbara picked up, i would like to echo what ambassador wittig says on where we are now. the importance of the framework we have. the quality of that deal. i would add between now and the end of june, there are a great deal of details to be completed. it is not yet in the bag. we are clear that if we cannot get the right deal, there will not be one. this is significantly better. the framework we have now. in the judgment of our governments that of any alternatives out there diplomacy is extremely important. it will just take -- it has taken a long time to get this far. the regional dimension -- this was a big part of the g-7 summit arrangement which president obama posted just the other day

not least because it is clear that a number of this sunni-arab regional governments are concerned about the implications of this deal, if it is finalized. i would say none of us are doing this on blind trust. we will distrust and verify. this is the best of the options out there and represents the best framework we have been able to come up with to ensure that for at least a decade, there will not be any iranian breakout to nuclear weapons. iran would therefore be subject to the provisions of the protocol iran will sign. this is something which gives us a chance for minimizing the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and introducing a degree of regional stability. we need to reassure the regionals, others around there,

concerned that other aspects of bad behavior by iran, which are separate from the nuclear issue we are negotiating on. it will not be a carte blanche for the iranians to continue to destabilize the region through proxies or other activity. it is our hope, we are not naive on this, that we can finalize the deal with the iranians that will be a spinoff in terms of other areas of regional concern. we would like to see iran doing less in terms of supporting groups which destabilize governments. that would be a significant prize. the fact we are working on the nuclear thing does not mean we are closing our eyes to the other aspects of what is going on in the region and which concerns us.

regional reassurance on security issues and full implementation of the deal, if there is one, which we conclude by the end of june. on your question of what about implementation, i think it is clear that sanctions list will take place when there is implementation of the agreement. that depends on how long it takes for there to be the understanding that iran has full compliance. we do not know what day that will be. each side is busy explaining why what it agreed to so far is a good thing for its own public opinion. that is what negotiations are about. everyone has to return with something there are proud of. no one will return home and say -- the important thing is to focus

on what is going on in the negotiations themselves, which have to remain largely confidential for the moment to ensure we get the right deal and ensure there is full compliance and as a result of that, you can move to suspension of sanctions and so on. there are different elements of sanctions. there is a u.s. one, european ones the a u.n. one. we need to keep in mind, the reason we have come so far is because there has been transatlantic unity on application of the sanctions. had there -- we had gone this far on that, we now need to make diplomacy successful. ms. slavin: let me ask more about unity, not just with the united states but also among the e3.

ambassador araud, your prime minister has a certain tension for reviewing details of the negotiations at certain times that perhaps have not always been helpful. the other day, he said iranians are insisting on a 24 day waiting. -- on a four day waiting period before allegations of cheating can be investigated. is this helpful to reveal these little bits and are you always on the same page in terms of the negotiations? ambassador araud: of course it is helpful because it is my minister. [laughter] ambassador araud: i think in any country, and especially this country, one's country takes an initiative. it is supposed to be based on a good analysis of the situation. when one country says a mistake it is out of good intention. one another country commits a

mistake, it is out of cynicism or for reckless reasons. to your utter disbelief, i will tell you a secret. the french foreign policy is neither more or less -- it means that what we are doing is very technical and political issue, is based on our own analysis. in the negotiation, even our technical experience -- experts disagree from time to time. you have the ministers and the mamas and the nuclear experts discussing the issues. the ministers and thomas do not understand a word of what is exchanged, of course. but basically, there is a disagreement. the negotiations are extremely collocated technically. they are also complicated because you have a lot of different issues lee. the number of types of

centrifuges are linked to the stockpile you will announce. i could multiply the examples of that. it means it is likely we will not have an agreement before the end of june or even after june. the iranians are obviously not negotiating to get an agreement shortly. they want to push the issues to the ministers the way they did previously. we agreed to have a drama at the end of june. doors slammed i am leaving to iran, no way, and so on, to try and get the best deal. even if we get the best deal, after words, you have to translate into the technical aspect. maybe we could have a sort of "the end" to the negotiation. >> can add something to the

unity. it is hard to exaggerate the cohesion we as europeans have on every level. our experts meet on a weekly basis or on a phone, sometimes on a daily basis. our leaders need on iran. as you said, the three europeans were at the genesis, the inception, of this whole process. i think it also deserves mention that russia and china were very constructive partners over the last however many months it was. since the beginning of negotiations in november of 2013. that may be came to the surprise of some, because you could have feared that the ukraine crisis would have contaminated those

negotiations around iran. that did not happen. there was unity among the five plus. another element in the genesis that deserves mention is that it was -- there was a courageous step by the american administration to engage directly with iran. that was a catalyst. it was not self-evident that after those long years of a vacuum in relations with iran, the administration would engage directly. i think those elements helped forge that unity and make that progress. ms. slavin: any thoughts on the unity of the three? ambassador westmacott: i agree. ms. slavin: one other and then i will open to the audience. the impact of the sanctions on european economies. as you pointed out, ambassador westmacott, it is a fact that

the europeans agreed to stop buying iranian oil, by and large, stop investing in iran, cut act trade massively, that got us to where we are in many respects. how much of an impact has that had on your economies? if for some reason there is no deal, can you hold the line on sanctions? can they persist in the eu given the eagerness of many of your companies to go back. >> the u.s. companies as well. ms. slavin: they have other problems. ambassador araud: not more or less than the european companies. ambassador westmacott: i think iran is a country with immense potential, and lots of areas. people say to me, i cannot

understand why you guys are negotiating with those iranians. that you do not seen many iranian shiites that she has stepping onto planes and blowing them up. but your onions want to come with a green card and make $1 million. i think there is a great deal of potential of that sort. if you go to iran today, you find that there is an appetite for a lot of western products. they have to pay a high price because of the rates. things come across seven borders. it is not surprising that a lot of companies would like to do business in iran. it has great potential resources, and natural wealth. at the right moment, companies will start looking again at that. it is hard to be clear about what happens to sanctions in the

event of no deal. if there is no deal because the iranians simply will not live up to or implement the broad parameters we agreed to in the framework, then i think we carry on with the sanctions regime and in certain areas it may be right to raise the level the sanctions. at the same time, if we were to walk away or if congress were to make it impossible for the agreement to be implemented or whatever, the international community would be reluctant to contemplate a ratcheting up further of the sanctions against iran. my senses we are not far away from the higher watermark of sanctions against the iranian economy. what happens next depends on what happens. it is -- if it is clear that this was done on bad faith and the iranians were not appear to have the transparency and inspection of sites and so on we are in one territory.

it becomes much more, located if it is the other where we say we do not want to do this. we have seen countries that do not respect the embargo. but russia, china, turkey and so on for buying certain things from iran, we will probably see more sanctions breaches, unless it was clearly iran's responsibility. ms. slavin: the impact on germany has been significant. ambassador wittig: yes, we have long traditional relations with iran pre-khamenei. we had strong economic ties. the sanctions regime was hurting our businesses a lot. especially the big companies just pulled out of iran, like the automakers. so it did hurt.

that is a fact i echo what peter has said. the potential for an agreement is also the potential for all of our economies. it would benefit our economies -- not that we would rush back into iran. we would be cautious. the government advises our companies actively to hold back. but it could carry a huge potential, and only for us, but also for the young iranian generation. they are looking to the west. it might entice or trigger some internal change in iran. ms. slavin: it is my understanding that what comes off from the u.s. side are the secondary sanctions that inhibit foreign companies from investing in iran.

using american companies are eager but they will be largely shut out? ambassador araud: like in dubai. the automakers, we were providing 50% of the iran in market. all of the gears were made in one small city in france. the city was devastated by the sanctions. a small city in the east of france. also, our oil company had made the strategy choice of investing in iran. this company was, of course, lost its investments. it hurt, but we held firm the last 10 years. there is no reason we will not do it in the coming years. i will open. please wait for the microphone.

state your name. we start here. ask a question. >> thank you for putting on this excellent event and thank you to the three ambassadors for being here. i am from the national in running counsel. it has been mentioned there was unity and they e-3 and with the u.s. that is difficult to doubt. i want to ask you about a hypothetical. assume there is a deal late june. the president has to reported in two asked to the senate in five days. the senate has 30 days to review and cast a vote. say there is a really sick -- a risk -- say there is a resolution to reject the deal and it passes. the president has the obligation to veto it. what will be e-3 do between the

resolution of rejection passing and the president putting in his veto and facing a challenge to that? ms. slavin: who would like to take that? ambassador westmacott: i will make a brief comment. you're getting ahead of the game. what we focus on now is trying to get this deal. we are not there yet. when we get there, we will see what the different elements are to follow. my government has not yet worked out what the answer to your hypothetical would be, but we have to take this in stages. the important point is to bear in mind the long journey we embarked upon. can we now get this over the finishing line at the end of june? we hope so, but it depends on different elements. the president's commitment has been clear to sending this to the dnc's congress and the

people and so on. we take of us in one stage at a time. it may well be that at the state we get a deal, there is something the rest of us can do to help explain this is not just a u.s.-iran deal, but something the international community in general and the p5+1 in particular, the three representatives here, our party to, fully involved, and what it to be made a success. but i cannot go further into the area of hypothesis you want to lead us at this stage. ms. slavin: did you have a question? >> i am -- pleasured to be on the iranian task force. i want to ask about the -- ms. slavin: bring the other one

over, if you would. >> is this better? i can -- will ask a question which will give you the opportunity to get in trouble with your governments. we have to think what if's. assuming the deal does not go through and blame can be laid legitimately in iran's door what do you see as viable options? you know in israel and the congress there are going to be loud voices calling for some sort of military action. is the deal can go through and be verified, what opportunities do you see traded in the middle east, much of which is in ks but could benefit from this agreement -- which is in chaos but could benefit from this agreement? >> in a sense, the sanctions would remain enforced. the questions would be to

increase the role of sanctions even as, it -- even if, as peter said we are close to the high mark of the sanctions. as for what would happen after an agreement in a very hypothetical way, looking at the crystal ball, my personal bet is that the iranians will one to prove that it does not mean this changes in their policy. we could have an outburst of anti-american rhetoric a few months after the agreement. the second element is we have been careful to disassociate the nuclear negotiation from other issues. it is very important. if you start to make a big deal -- it starts to be very dangerous. the nuclear issue, as such.

after that, you have the other geopolitical issues. i am not sure if those are linked to the nuclear issue. they are linked to the fact all of the region has been geopolitically distraught, first by the invasion of iraq. iraq has played a major hold for saddam for -- the crisis in the sunni world. it means that basically nature abhors a vacuum. iran is moving forward because there is nothing to stop it. i do not think there is a linkage between the nuclear issues and the geopolitical crisis of the middle east. but that is personal. >> elise with cnn. i would like to follow up a little and tie in what you talk

about the unity of the p5+1. obviously, you have gone to great lengths to keep a lot of the geopolitical issues out of the discussion, but i wonder if you could talk to the extent that this long baggage between the united states and iran, whether it plays into it at all. at the beginning of the process, the u.s. was really, even before your current governments, the u.s. was the one being so tough. i heard double mats from one or more of your country speak privately about how the u.s. is the one that once -- wants the deal the most. given all that, given that president obama definitely wants a deal with this government, the trial of washington post journalist jason -- how does that play into the negotiations and tone of the room? ms. slavin: does the u.s. one it

more than you -- want it more than you? >> we all want it, but not at a huge price. if we do not get a satisfactory deal, there will not be ideal. we are focusing on the four or five weeks ahead of us. and then all the hypotheticals, afterwards. i want to elaborate a little on the connection to other issues. you can kill this deal if you link it to extraneous issues. what iran does in yemen, does it ceased to support hezbollah, etc. if you link it to these issues this is what will kill it. no linkage, but there is a

potential and a successful deal to improve relations with iran and to encourage iran to be a more responsible stakeholder in the region. that potential we want to explore once the deal is done. ms. slavin: i am going to go to the back and then come up front. wait for the mike. >> thank you. dale kimball. ambassador araud, i am glad you went into the history. i want to ask about that too clarify the purpose of the resolutions that were passed at the security council regarding the suspension of enrichment. there is a perception that those resolutions were designed or intended to wired iran to stop, forever, uranium enrichment. as i understand, the purpose was to facilitate a long-term

solution that respects a peaceful program. could you elaborate about the purpose of the resolutions which is something many in washington i do not think understand. this is an issue for the future of negotiations -- updating the resolutions. could you give us an update on whether that continues to be an issue? are you confident that will be resolved in time to facilitate a solution? ambassador araud: when we started the resolutions or sanctions, the first in 1737, what we were doing was to change the calculation of the regime. really, basically, to convince the regime, for its own survival in a sense, that the program was becoming too costly. the iranians have spent billions of dollars on these programs.

on the program which does not make any -- does not have any civilian meaning. when we went to tehran in 2008, the five political directors, we met a lot of ukrainians. -- a lot of ukrainians. -- iranians. the sanctions were only starting to work, but the economic situation was so inept that the situation was serious. it has only worsened. of course, there is no evidence that the sanctions have changed effectively the cancellation of the regime. from the beginning, i have always been convinced that, at the end of the day, we would have to keep some enrichment capability in iran. in negotiation each side has to

be able to come back home saying i am the winner. considering the investment of the iranians into the enrichment financially and symbolically the challenge is to make it in oculus in terms of -- is to make it in oculus -- in oculus -- innocuous in terms of weapons grade. >> good morning. i'm a friend senator. i have a question regarding the amount of mistrust between iran and the international community, howard do you think the international community would be able to reset the missionary? -- in the machinery? reset the position.

>> one key element of this possible deal is a very intrusive mechanism. a regime of transparency and verification. that is key to the whole deal. we will have eyes. international atomic energy organization. it will have eyes on what iran is doing. we are confident a regime can be devised that would detect any covert operation that iran is or would be engaging in. the regime of verification monitoring is key to any agreement we conclude. >> lower from the monitor. ambassador wittig, you mentioned it is going slowly post-lausanne

and i best a said you anticipate a certain degree of late nights to the end of june and the on. can you talk about why you think it is going so slowly? related to that, do you think -- are they trying to dominate the process -- are the iranians waiting for the u.s. to send the secretary? ambassador wittig: it is going slow because the substance of the issues are difficult. they are technical. the second point is there is a dynamic in negotiations. you need the pressure of timelines in order to facilitate the heavy lifting of issues. both factors are at work here. but i am not particularly worried.

i think this is fairly normal. we have a difficult path to walk on. we have tremendously complicated technical issues to clarify. so small wonder we are not making a lot of fast progress now. but it is not a prediction on what will happen by the end of june. it is a feeling of the pulse now. i am still confident we can overcome those divergences of views that we have now. ms. slavin: i am going to go here, but before we take the next question, i neglected to mention at the beginning that i wanted to thank the ploughshares fund for their generous support of the iran task force.

also our breasts that stuart eizenstat, ambassador to the eu and chairman of our task wars was not able to be here today because he is in europe. >> jonathan nine-day with mcclatchy newspapers. we heard new statements from iran that senior scientists would not be allowed to be interviewed. that military facilities will not be open to inspections. that links back to an issue way have not talked about, which is the possible military dimensions of iran's program and the iaea aspect which seems to have gotten no process whatsoever during the negotiations going on separately. there is concern among some that that issue, whether or not the iranians were, in fact designing a missile-borne

nuclear warhead will be papered over. that some kind of speculation would be made that will allow them not to have to make the admission about what they were doing in order to set a baseline for the inspection program you are talking about. can you talk about the possible military dimensions aspect of this and how it feeds into the talks? because there is no progress on that now. ms. slavin: i will add to that -- the deputy negotiator said something about managed access to nuclear facilities, indirect contradiction to what the supreme leader and other iranian officials said. >> after all of these negotiations, if you're writing

an article about what is the negotiation, really. there is chest banging in the negotiation. each side says i am not going to cave in and that is my demands my absolute demands. after that, the compromise their absolute demands. i do not think we have to attach much importance to the declarations. at the beginning, the iranians say we demand an absolute lifting of the sanctions. it will not happen. and there will be an agreement. even if there is not an immediate lifting of the sanctions. of the pnd, i cannot tell you. the french are keen of happening -- of having -- we're not going to let the pnd issue interrupt. the negotiations, for the

moment, obviously they will -- they are not moving forward quickly. it means that -- i guess the iranians make the calculation that it could be easier to get concessions from the ministers with some composition. negotiation there is also a theater. there are some theatricals in the negotiations. i'm not bad at that. so really, don't listen to the outside decorations. there will be something on pmd the sanctions will be lifted is there is an implementation -- if there is an implementation on a conditional way. each side will have to be able to tell its public of its public opinion that you have today.

>> to your hints of the decoration, i think correcting --ambassador wittig: he was mindful of the protocols. it contains provisions that provide for access to military sites. i think he is mindful of the obligations of that additional protocol. ambassador westmacott: there's the additional protocol of the npt. there's also going to be agreement on a joint commission which insures that there is not for inspections under our own agreement with the iranians separate from additional protocols. this is hugely important to all of us. there has to be a proper inspection for the regime so we can come if we have reason to believe or legitimate corrects

-- requests to visit that site, we will be able to do so. it still being discussed in some detail. we are not going to let this issue disappear. it will be an important part of the final stage of the negotiation. ms. slavin: gentlemen in the middle. >> speaking of the art of diplomacy, the lock back on the allowance of managed inspections -- does this dispel the notion that has been perpetuated for a while that the iranian negotiators are perpetually boxed in by everything that the supreme leader tweets or says? is there clearly some give their? -- there? ambassador araud: i don't know what the inner momentum of the negotiation is in iran. the iranian negotiators are negotiating. they are under instructions, they have their own public

opinion with their own divisions of the public opinion. the same way that you have in the u.s.. in our free countries. they have to take into account the settlement the same way the u.s. has to take in to accounts the opinion of the congress. no negotiation is really simply a technical or even political without the public opinion which is in a sense the background of the situation. ms. slavin: the gentleman here and then -- >> thank you. i'm with her to sense 24 hour news agency. i have a question about the potential impacts of a nuclear deal on the situation of human

rights in iran. particularly for the minorities such as the kurdish people. do you expect the situation to improve or will the world basically turn a blind eye for strategic interests? thank you. ms. slavin: who wants to take up the human rights question? -i think --ambassador westmacott: i think all of our governments remain concerned. there are things that worry is for all sorts of different reasons, sometimes as the the way different individuals or minorities are treated. there are elements of the jewish community for example in a run which thrive. there are baha'i youth who are regarded as heretics and have no level of tolerance. there are a number of respects

in which iran has a long way to go in terms of meeting international standards on human rights. i'm not expert on the situation regarding the kurdish minority in solid iran. -- inside iran. it's an area, and the broader human rights area, that we would look to iran to be moving very much more in the direction of international standards of behavior then we witness at the moment. ms. slavin: iran could start by letting our collie go. that would be a good step. -- our colleague go. cox ambassador -- >> ambassador wittig, how helpful has russia actually been in light of their decision to resume the air defense ballistic missile shipments to iran? one would have thought this

would have been held out as a caret if negotiations were successful, and yet they have gone ahead and done this. i don't know if there are rumblings in the russian press about that, in fact it may be a nuclear deal wouldn't be such a great thing for russia, but it means that relations with the west improve. and also rumblings that if the west is an understanding on ukraine, russia can be less helpful on iran. from the older generation, that sees what happens in the russian press. it's not accidental. i'm wondering if anyone would care to comment on russia's motives and on how helpful it is, i would appreciate it. ambassador wittig: without the decision to deliver those kind of weapons were not helpful at all. it was a deplorable decision. but also, let me remind you this was not a decision that violated

the arms embargo. it was not something that violated international law. but we believe it was a decision that was not helpful for the process. ambassador araud: it has always been important for the chinese and others on board that it's the west being against iran. and the russians and chinese have been really perfect normal negotiators in these. they are still, really doing their part of the job working with us. as for the system of weapons we share with peter has said, the russians and taken the advice of the system couldn't be operational for one or two years. they told us -- which means they didn't want simply to break to

china about these negotiations. ms. slavin: i saw something in the paper saying these weapons will probably not go. until there's an agreement. it's more of a carrot. let's say. the gentleman back there. >> peter von bush, i'm a lawyer in washington. the question is -- is the position of the west credible? the position of the west seems to be if you don't do this deal we will continue the sanctions or enhance the sanctions. i've heard today how this may be the high water mark of sanctions, our own businesses don't like the sanctions. the we have a credible threat in negotiations? ms. slavin: i think with the ambassador has said is it depends on how negotiations break down, if they break down.

if it's perceived to be the fault of the u.s. congress or others on this side of the negotiating, then the sanctions will unravel operably pretty quickly. if it's perceived to be the iranians walking away from a good deal, presumably there would still be some sanctions discipline, at least in europe. is that true for the russians or chinese? with the p5 plus one then split? ambassador wittig: it depends on who is to blame if there is no deal. i think we should not harbor any illusions about the international sanctions regime. i think many of the emerging things would consider congress blocking the steel as a trigger to at least question the present sanctions regime.

i would see a certain danger if the blame game in the international community comes to the conclusion that it's not iran that is to blame, then the international solidarity that has been quite strong in the recent years would most probably road. that's the scenario. but in legal terms, no. the sanctions could be lifted only because of a vote. really. so the sanctions and the vote of the u.s. and they will remain in place. the usa sanctions will remain in place. and eu sanctions to be lifted also, you need a unanimous vote. so the sanctions will remain in any case. but the implementation. that's the thing.

ambassador araud: the most effective sanctions are u.s. sanctions. so i guess that a lot of corporations are putting in sanctions because they were afraid of the u.s. sections. ms. slavin: have they started drafting a new security council resolution, or not yet? mr. wilson: i think --ambassador araud: i think there is a draft. one of the questions was about the sanctions, the snapback. the way sanctions will be reimposed if the iranians were not respecting their commitments. so aren't -- there are some threats floating around.

course my question to his excellency, the french ambassador. the president has been saudi arabia and the gulf and they haven't relationship. have you been able to print -- persuade them that this will enhance their security rather than undermine security? ambassador araud: i think you should ask more the question to the u.s. of administration sense as you know, there was the summit organized by president obama. i think it was the american administration, think it a very useful initiative because it's true that we have to give the assurances to them about security. and if they need security assurances, it's not only because of the nuclear deal it's because of the geopolitical situation.

which, as given to iran, you know the initiatives, they basically saw it in iraq and we are seeing and also in yemen. i think the message which was summarized by the statements after the summit meeting, i think it was a very useful one. it's basically also what we told our friends from the gulf countries, that we consider their security requirements serious and that we want to play a role in it. as you may know, we have opened -- the french of open military bases since 2009. we have security agreements with the states of the region since the 90's. we have had a long commitment towards the countries and

administration. frankly, i think our concerns are going well beyond the nuclear issue. in a sense it's a situation where, for us, a source of concern. they think the money that they think iran will get if the sanctions are partially or totally lifted could be used by iran for pursuing its adventures in their part of the world. i think they need a particular arrangement because of that. >> jim lobe, ips. given there is so much concern over recruitment by the islamic state in europe, and given that iran is playing probably the leading role in fighting irs

external role that is in iraq an independent -- and indirectly in syria, i know the nuclear talks are separate. at the same time, does it contribute at all to the urgency or eagerness on the part of the e3 with respect to wanting to establish a better relationship with iran to deal with this question? ambassador westmacott: not sure that i would agree that the iranians are being that affected. -- effective. i think the iranians have got their good reasons for pushing back against isil. remembering that a decade ago the iranians were potentially allies of hours against al qaeda. partly because our diplomacy did not succeed back in those days. we found ourselves seeing ids

made in iran killing american and british soldiers in afghanistan. the reality is that the sunni extremist groups, it was al qaeda, isil, whatever you want to call it, there were other fringe groups, they are passionately anti-shia anti-iran, and therefore the iranians and got their own reasons for fighting back against what they believe to be groups which are dedicated to the destruction of their religion. if not of their country. but i think it would be wrong to see the commitment that we are all giving to these negotiating as part of parcel of our desire to see isil put out of business and stopped committing atrocities that we see on a daily basis. as others is that before, as i was saying earlier, this iran negotiation is worth doing in its own right. it is specifically linked to the question of stopping iran getting nuclear weapons and stopping proliferation of weapons of mass instruction in

the region. if we start linking other things, that will not help. as peter was saying, could spell the end of that negotiation. we are doing this because it's the right thing to do in its own right, and the alternatives are worse. it would be a very useful spinoff if as a result of achieving that kind of negotiation successful negotiation with the iranians, other aspects of iranian behavior improved. and indeed, who knows? if there are common enemies were we are making common cause, that is sending to be looked at in the future. but the one is not linked to the other. ms. slavin: the lady in the middle. >> thank you, i'm a recent graduate from the school of foreign service. i wanted to ask about the snapback and how this mechanism would exactly work, especially because i can imagine six years down the line, some of the sanctions have been lifted

there is increased business, for example in germany is benefiting from it. how does the snapback work if we have slight violations that not everyone agrees with is a violation? will the snapback mechanism be tied to certain behaviors that iran commits? i want to understand what this would look like. ms. slavin: material breach and how you define it? we have two x u.n. ambassadors. ambassador araud: for the moment the real problem was that we didn't want to give veto rights to some members for bringing back the sanctions. the french have invented a

system which is the opposite, which means that actually the sanctions, the step back is automatic. if there is really a vote in the opposite direction. which changes the veto from one side to the other side. it has not yet been agreed. by definition, you can't define it. it will be deferred to the commission which will be created to discuss this issue. and after that it will be brought back to the level -- the political level. there's something which is getting on my nerves, this way

that americans always say all the russians want to make money, they're ready to rush to iran. basically we cannot not you, make the sacrifice of the sanctions. really, we lost a lot of money because of the sanctions. not the americans, because you have not any more the iranian market. so stop taking the high moral ground. [laughter] ambassador araud: i know it's the american way, but we have nothing to receive from anyone. we have done a good job in a very loyal way. so there's really, european businessmen are not more greedy of the in the american ones, not less either way. if the iranians are not going to abide by their commitments the

audience will be very strong and tina we work with the other members not to reimpose sanctions. we are trying to fix this which allows us to do it as quickly and as effectively as is possible. we have not yet reached an agreement. it's very technical, there are very different elements for an agreement. >> france is always against this -- how can you have snapback? ambassador araud: what we want to try is to avoid the russians and the chinese saying we are against it so we don't really. that's we want. we want a system which will be the opposite, in a sense. it will be reinstated

automatically. really but if the p5 agreed not to. it's a mechanism which is really not submitted to the veto of our friends and colleagues. ms. slavin: it's a majority rule, three against two. ambassador araud: in the security council, there are no germans. speaking of the p5, the security council. the u.s. sanctions, the u.s. may reimpose them without asking anybody, the same way the eu may do it. ambassador wittig: in the eu, we can organize the snapback are easily.

yours is more difficult. ms. slavin: good point. the lady right here in the middle. >> sharon, voice of the moderate. a quick question. when i was here before for a panel, think barbara slaven was on it, she was saying that 70% of the iranian people wanted a peace deal. but the person who did the poll ended up in jail. ms. slavin: 70% of iranians wanted normal relationship with the u.s.. >> now we have the nuclear deal, and the american mindset is more open-minded, maybe because of isis, i don't know. i'm wondering with each of your countries, what are your average people, and never can -- average american, the first time is open that these could be possible with cuba. what about you and your countries? ms. slavin: i would think yes --

this diplomacy is popular. ambassador westmacott: all of our countries and governments have their own baggage, and that part of the world, sometimes with iran, sometimes with turkey. different countries where we have a history we don't have a history. i think you take the case of iran, public opinion in this country has been seared by the experience of the hostages blindfolded for 444 days. that was an appalling moment. in the case of the united kingdom, public opinion was appalled is only couple of years ago that a bunch of government thugs broke into our embassy trash the place, destroyed it, made a filthy mess and so on. iranians have their own memories, some accurate, some not, of what foreign powers of done to their authority over the last few years. we all have a degree of baggage. i was in the case of the united kingdom, public opinion is not at a stage of being deeply

worried about the concepts of a normalized relationship with iran. we go back a very long way. others have talked about the historic links in their own companies, the iran oil industry was set up by british companies. we have deep roots in that sector. we have had our own political and business links. united kingdom was the dominant power in the persian gulf for a very long time. we go back a long way with all the countries in that region. i think public opinion -- is asked to support the kind of deal that our government is determined to negotiate, as long as it's a good deal and not a bad deal will not have a problem with the normalization of relations with iran. however, that said, i would think all of us, governments or public citizens will want to be seen iran behaving in different ways in the years to come thereafter. but you are not linked, but iranian bad behavior -- in my be human rights in my be regional

destabilization, it might be support of terrorist groups. we are looking for progress in those areas as well. ms. slavin: the gentleman right there. >> i'm a fellow with the plowshares fund. my question is in regards to the middle east which ambassador wittig briefly talked upon. saudi arabia said that anything iran had they wanted to have two. that seems like an opportunity with a negative thing. if this deal shapes up and gives us confidence that iran will never develop a nuclear weapon, why shouldn't we say saudi arabia, you are more than welcome to sign on to this. why not use it as a model for arms control in the middle east? ambassador araud: for me, it's

the most worrying aspect of the agreement. that we have created a new status of the one your breakout state. in the npt we had so far only the non-weapon state and the weapon states. now we have a one-year wake-up time state. it's a new status. when you make a negotiation, you have to think of several things. one is what precedent are you setting for other countries. here, i think was emphasized by politicians here in a hearing in the u.s. senate. i think that's one of the concerns that we have to address after the agreements, that you don't have -- not only saudi arabia, and not only in this part of the world, simply countries rushing to be one your breakout states. they said iran got it, and

again, it's not civilian. so when on us -- why not us? for me, i should say that it is in a sense one of the major weak points of the agreements that we are negotiating. let's be frank. the agreement is not perfect. as a compromise. any agreement is a compromise. it's not a perfect agreement that france would have wanted. but i think it's the same thing for germany and the u.k.. it's what's possible. i think what we reached was what was possible. but it doesn't mean that it doesn't have some consequences that we will have to address. ms. slavin: the question are also meant verification measures that will be included. it's not just a question of a one-year break out, but they would have to accept additional protocol and all of the other transparency measures that are going to be put on iran. ambassador araud: even with

verification systems to other one your breakout states, i guess is not positive. not positive for the future of the proliferation system. ambassador wittig: let's not forget the opg envisions the right of countries to enrich for civilian purposes. that is something that all the states have. that are members of the npt. i might add, we're the only country in that five plus one configuration that is a nonnuclear country. so we know what obligations come with it, and what rights. it might also have contributed to show the iranians that we are not imposing so that the new countries are not imposing something on them that deprives them of rights that others have. i think the question of whether there will be a nuclear arms race hinges very much upon the

kind of verification regime and how that is designed to, and how this works in practice. if we can create a real inclusive inclusive credible viable inspection and verification regime that would i think, takeaway a lot of ground for engaging in an arms race. ambassador westmacott: if we get to that point, hopefully the other programs in the region will not be looking for exact parity. it should be about whether they have confidence that the rod is not going to have a nuclear weapon. if that is the case, there is no reason why others in the region could not be talking about buying one off-the-shelf. the arrangements we have reached with iran, we are negotiating

with iran take the council of wheree the nuclear program has got to. why would you do that, unless you felt genuinely threatened? it is not in the interest of regional stability. i think that we have to make sure there is proper verification. but the iranians have an interest in showing the are serious in and lamenting their side of the deal if they want to create the regional stability. everyone has a responsibility. it does not need to be about parity, and does have to be about stopping more nuclear weapons in the region. ms. slavin: there are other countries that are at the one year or less breakout that could make nuclear weapons, but choose not to. it could be an entirely

different category and that. hourly on time? >> time is up. [laughter] ms. slavin: thank you all for coming. thank you for your generous support and come back. hopefully july 2, july 6 that is when we think we will have an agreement. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, wiich is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015]

>> wrapping up here. if you missed any of this discussion you will be able to watch it again later today on our website. go to c-span.org. also there have other hearings and events concerning the red nuclear agreement. the national academy of sciences will release a report today on the growth of incarcerations and its effects. live coverage of that starts at 3:00 p.m. eastern. we will have it here for you on c-span. that he'll has a story this morning about 2015 presidential candidate bernie sanders of

r. vermont. he concedes he comes in as the underdog. he will be very heavily outspent. he said this in an interview with cnbc, do not underestimate me, we will do better than people think. many democrats do not believe he has even an outside shot of defeating her. and senator sanders will be holding a rally for his presidential campaign today. he is in burlington vermont and c-span's planning live coverage of that. it gets underway at 6:00 p.m. eastern. we also take your phone calls and comments after that event. tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern, a discussion on the freedom of each hosted by the national constitution center. a senior official from koch

industries will talk about campaign finance. >> one of the questions about him of speech is is a value in and of itself, or is it there because it is designed to promote democratic decision-making? depending on how you come out on that that will depend on what you think about campaign finance. it is something wrong with the system where you ask them for -- the first thing about a candidate how much money can they raisede. that is troublesome. you have a deep conflict going on there, but it is not an easy result of either side. the first thing i tell my first amendment did is that if you think this is an easy decision on either site, rethink it.

>> my point of view is that people should be able to give money either autonomously or on the record. it is for them to decide, not government to decide. basically, the bill of rights the framers did not layout out what our rights were, they made sure that government could not infringe upon those rights because they were presumed to be pre-existing. to the extent that people want to disclose if charles koch and david cokekoch are to be -- there is a cost to disclosure.

from a cost-benefit analysis in light it, i do not quite who really pays attention to this other than activists on either side will to harass intimidate, create lists. i know they do it on our side and there have been a number of debt threats -- death threats. who really benefits from the disclosure? >> all of the comments of william marshall and more cold and on freedom of speech will air tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. now, war policy during presidency of george w. bush. journalists discuss the reasons for going to war in iraq after 9/11.

host: good evening. whi welcome. i am an associate professor here at hofstra and i am pleased to be serving as moderator for this distinguished forum. a wars in iraq and afghanistan are arguably the most controversial and consequential decisions of the bush administration. the decision to go to war, how to get out of the wars, and related issues have not only dominated the bulk of president bush's time in office, but have also shaped current u.s. foreign-policy options in and around the regions. they will continue to do so into the foreseeable future.

there is very little doubt that the wars in afghanistan and iraq will continue to be measures by which the legacy of the george w. bush foreign policy will be measured. with that in mind, the conference organizers have brought together this outstanding panel of public servants, journalists, and scholars to examine the way the bush administration waged wars and the consequences of them. each of our panelists is extremely accomplished and i will try to keep the introductions relatively brief although that is hard with a group like this. as i go through, i would ask that you please hold your applause until i have introduced everyone and we can welcome them all together. giving us perspectives from the administration, we first have thomas basilay, appearing on

forms such as sirius xm radio. for the bush administration in 2003 through 2004, he was a senior press advisor to the authority in iraq. he was a consultant for the republican national committee, presidential campaign, and prior to this service he was director of communications for the u.s. environmental protections agency in 2001 through 2003, and was part of the bush-cheney campaign. he is a hofstra alum as well graduating with a degree in political science and he was named the 2007 hofstra young alumnus. ambassador james nicholson is currently senior counsel at brownstein hyatt farber schreck, counseling clients in health

care, regulatory law international relations, oil and gas, and alternative energy. from 2005 to 2009 before this appointment he was u.s. ambassador to the holy seat during which he was knighted by john paul ii for his human rights. ambassador nichols has been the director of the new community development corporation, commissioner and the commissioner on the defense advisory on women services. he was the chairman of the national committee from 1997 to 2001. lawrence wilkerson is

distinguished adjunct professor at the college of limb and mary. he served in the u.s. army from 1966 until 1997, excuse me. while in uniform. he was a member of the faculty of the u.s. naval war college, special assistant to general colin powell when colonel powell was chiefs of staff. from 2001 until 2002 he was associate director of the state department policy planning staff. colonel wilkerson's last position was chief of staff for u.s. secretary of state colin powell from 2002 to 2005. so the journalists and scholars that we have present. first, he was a journalist that served as an afghanistan correspondent for "the wall street journal," for "the christian science monitor" and

reported in asia and middle east for several other publication. mr. napol has extensively interviewed both sides of the afghanistan conflict. this is cited in his critically acclaimed book "no good men among the living: america, the taliban and the war through afghanistan eyes" which was a finalist in the national book award and the helen bernlstein award and recipient of the ridnour prize. he was an inside fellow at the new america foundation. peter baker is the chief white house correspondent for the "new york times" and the contributing writer for "new york times"

magazine. he's covered three presidential times in his previous boggs "the washington post." he won a prize in the beckman memorial award for white house coverage. he was the bureau chief for "the washington post" during the rise of vladimir putin. he's the author of "days of fire" which provides a comprehensive look in the bush administration from the election to the iraq war to the bush and chaney white house. he's serving as a distinguished conference scholar for this conference. and phyllis bennett is a director of the new internationalism project at the institute for policy studies in washington, d.c. and is a fellow of the trans national institute in amsterdam.

she's been an activist in u.s. issues and speaks widely as part of the global peace movement. she continues to serve as an advisory for several top advisories in the middle east. she's the author of eight books including the 2003 book, before and after: u.s. war on on terror. and the 2005 book challenging empire how people governments and the u.n. define u.s. power. so please join me in welcoming this distinguished panel. [applause] so the format, we're going to have 10 to 12 minutes for each of our guests here. and then there will be a question and answer session and possibly in between a moderated discussion depending on how much time we have.

so we will essentially go in the order that's listed in the program. so first mr. basile. mr. basile: thank you paul, for that introduction. always great to be back at this campus. it was 18 years ago that i served on the student for the bush 41 conference and during the conversation i got to trail around john who happens to be the fastest walker i'd ever encountered. and joe is following me around. and joe, i'm sorry you got stuck with me. but i really appreciate the invitation with dr. bose and the calico center not

only as an alumbus in administration but also an alumnus of this university. it's wonderful to see how the political discourse surrounding the presidency affected so dramatically. it's good to see secretary nichols here with whom i was so fortunate to share a very wonderful and for me a very meaningful and emotional moment in american history when we were both able to attend president bush's meeting with john paul ii at the vatican in 2002. so it is good to see you, sir. andfor millennia the causes of war and the strategies associated with it were defined by particular margins involving a combination of resource and territorial acquisition therefore producing conflict population. and i suggest that for most people in paradigm continues to

drive perceptions of war and war-making. i submit that with the close of the cold war and the rise of the united states hegemony, the breakdown of certain alliances , that we witnessed in the rise of al-qaeda and the decision-making of the united states and the aftermath of 9/11 was a sharp departure from the usual war making paradigm. i believe we are still in a transitional phase as it relates to this country handling the military and diplomatic strategy to account for this shift. the administration of george w. bush was the first such administration to have to deal with this paradigm shift. during the bush presidency, the white house was faced with the challenge of handling both the traditional territorial and institutional impacts of war in the form of external forces such as terror groups embedding the governance of state actors.

the viral nature of the radical islamic terrorist movement and the exploitation of governments of state actors of the new global paradigm that had emerged after the end of the cold war. it was a historically complicated confluence of forces and circumstances that led to both afghanistan and bush -- the iraq missions. the bush administration had to cope with the conflict of trying to fight mobile terrorist groups and dozens of countries while fighting traditional territorial battles while rebuilding infrastructure and institutions in afghanistan that perhaps may not have existed. in the case of iraq projecting out the impact that state actors might have who may exploit and support the efforts of the terrorist enemy. we spent a great deal over the

last decade and a half on whether we should have gone into afghanistan or whether we should have gone into iraq. i personally apply what my boss calls the reasonable man test. it comes from the old chancellor report. the president of the united states faced with the confluence of circumstances that i just described in a general sense buttressed by specific intelligence act in a certain way. keeping in mind that saddam hussein had been declared a state sponsor of terrorism and regime change had been the poll icy the u.s. government since the clinton administration. i believe that president bush made the correct choice for military intervention in both of those circumstances. however, i believe the more relevant conversation for all of us, and our country moving forward remains once you make the decision to go to war, what is the principle purpose or desired outcome. you have several choices. you can, one, you can remove

saddam hussein and the taliban and leave, which i believe is a false choice. you can two, remove the leadership and grab some general and ex-patriot and impose them basically trading one dictator with another. that's particularly for bush the moral and political argument fails there as well. or three, you could attempt to secure the country and build institutions that could support not what some people had suggested called american-style democracy but a , pleuralistic and confluence structure. this historical gathering of maligned members in our corps went with option three, and have the responsibility to get the economy growing and establish security and a political framework that would help goal

number three. working together with an iraqi population that is more supportive that is generally accepted they tackled it with , great commitment and their efforts going unlargely unnoted as the situation worsened due to sectarian violence and a white house that as the mission went on often failed to defend its own policy in iraq. president bush understood several key points very well. one, he believed that left unchecked it was likely that hussein would develop a nuclear weapons program. two, hussein had funded external terror groups and it was believed that he would be supporting other terror groups. three, the war on terrorism was a long-term global threat that involved dozens of groups. some closely aligned, some loosely aligned not only with each other but also state actors.

and we're seeing this today as you see isis and al qaeda and boko haram and the muslim brotherhood converge as a network and a very powerful one at that. four, he believes this is a generations long fight. and it would require long-term and aggressive engagement. five, addressing the freedom deficit in the middle east and countries that serve as incubators, however long-term and complex that strategy might be was essential in sharing a more peaceful world and further to end terrorism networks. where it fell short is how to find and manage these various components simultaneously. we weren't just protecting the territorial boundaries of a

nation. we were trying to fight an insurgency while attempting to build new governments and social and political institutions. on my first day in iraq i got off at the baghdad airport and i put on my vest. i put on my helmet. and i got on the bus to go to the compound. they said by the way the road is closed. the road between the airport the compound was closed because the army was not able to secure it. they call it the road of death. people were dying on it virtually every day. from that point on and that was my first day and my hour by knew -- we knew that we were going to do have man power issues. and they plagued the iraq army

early on and were very real. the administration had a vision for a lighter, fleet footed, high-tech 21st century army. and that vision has merit. but it was incompatible with the mission that we had at that particular time. for our part nearly every civilian and military liaison that i worked with agree from the outset that we needed to maintain overwhelming foresize -- force size in order to accomplish the mission. today, at the white house, former john hopkins university professor and noted economist at gandhi the newly elected , president of afghanistan told the american people thank you for the work that have helped give them a shot to instead of being a burden to the world to actually have a shot at a free future.

but we are clearly seeing the beginning of what the president called generation of process -- a generational process of development. in iraq despite poor intel regarding infrastructure military assets, essential services, mass looting the iraq mission also realized a range of successes not sufficiently promoted by the administration and frequently ignored the media. the training of forces began within weeks of the promotion of the c.p.a. which enabled anybody by the rank of colonel to go to the army. but they were better trained better equipped. the central bank was reopened. in the currency transition to a single state barrel -- stable

currency took place within six months. it took us two years in post world war ii germany. oil production increase. dozens of schools were we built, a constitution was developed which shiah, sunnis and kurds and turkman's on the table to create an election in a degrading security environment. and let's not forget that more than eight million people voted in iraq's first election. perhaps most importantly al-qaeda and iraq had been decimated due one of the boldest foreign policy decisions in my opinion of the last half century made by george w. bush. delayed admittedly but necessary surge. by the time bush left office the economy had increased in size several times over under its time under hughes sane. -- under hussein. life expectancy had risen. and security forces had secured most of the forces due the training and ongoing assistance from the united states. despite the consequences of a

precipitous withdraw of troops administered by the current administration and the insistence of both parties via cnn which left iraq all by ut defense in the face -- defenseless in the face of isis, we also recently just saw the four peaceful transition of power between governments in iraq which is something that had never before been accomplished in the middle east with the exception of israel. none of these positives can negate the challenges that persist. but they can when added to the conversation give us a better understanding of the need and the ability to move nations toward a freer more pleuralistic construct. in my time in iraq i saw conviction of a people anxious to build a new nation. it overshadowed by a security situation that we were unprepared to address. as we look back there were many issues to be learned.

it must inform our thinking. the world has changed. the changes we face and the challenges we face rather have changed. but getting people chance to be free and to self-govern is the surest way to greater peace. i saw first half of -- firsthand the authoritarian oppression and evil that sapped the soul of people and nations in regions in a way that we cannot fully appreciate here. and you have not experienced the power of freedom until you talk to somebody who has never known it and they realize for the first time that participatory government isn't some abstract theory. it is real and it works and is achievable with great effort and sacrifice. george w. bush did not buy into the bigotry that suggests that there

are certain people in this world who do not deserve or are too unsophisticated or incapable of handling what we call freedom. i consider it an honor to havei consider it an honor to have served him, and i look over to a meaningful discussion tonight. thank you so much for your attention. [applause] >> good evening. i really appreciate being here at hofstra to participate on this panel with this distinguished people, and i appreciate what you are doing here with the george w. bush presidency conference. we will not agree here on everything that is said, i am sure, but i bet there is one thing on which we can agree, and that is whatever is said here tonight about the george