we are talking in ukraine about a sovereign country that is being menaced. their sovereignty is being violated by their larger neighbor. iraq is dealing with a different kind of threat from a terrorist organization. what is true in iraq is also, i guess one thing minister in iraq also true the ukraine is that the united states is standing by our ukrainian partners as they confront this threat to their own security. the states is not prepared to go to war over ukraine, we have made that clear. at the same time there may be an opportunity for the united states and our nato partners to help them confront the threat they are facing from russia who so flagrantly violated their sovereignty and territorial integrity. this is something the president will talk about quite a bit next week when he travels to europe for the g-7 meeting.

>> could you talk about events in the south china sea. had the president been briefed on china's alleged island building. is he aware of some of the back-and-forth of the u.s. military reconnaissance and aircraft? josh earnest: the president has often talked about how critically important it is. it is critical to the global economy as well. the free flow of commerce may south china sea is something that needs to be maintained. the united states is committed to working with other countries in the region to protected. the cousin of the priority, yes you can expect the president has been briefed on the latest in a situation and will continue to be. >> about the approaching deadline, june 1 is when the taliban five are alleged to be released.

they were swapped in the exchange. i read that general crystal knew immediately that bergdahl had walked away. he suggested that the admiral knew immediately. i'm curious, did the president know immediately that bergdahl head walked away? josh earnest: there is a process of the united states military that is described as -- code of military justice. that is being conducted right now. there are army investigators in charge of interviewing sergeant bergdahl and others who may have had information. i am not going away and on this particular situation until that justice process has run its course.

kevin: you are unwilling to state whether or not the president knew and walked away. that was common knowledge question mark josh earnest: there is a justice process described in the code of military justice and that is a process under way right now and when you're talking to the commander and chief i will be sensitive about the need to make sure anything i say on his behalf is procured as interfering with the process. kevin: i am wondering if that would've mattered? would that have mattered? josh earnest: principle at stake in the mind of the president, is the principal we not leave anyone in the united states military uniform behind. in this case as the commander-in-chief he has a special responsibility to live up to that value. that is the value that the president applied in this case.

at the same time, the president also believes every man and woman serving in our military is also subject to the u.s. code of military justice. that is a process that is working its way through as well. kevin: on nato, anything more they can do to support the iraqi people? josh earnest: we have a coalition of more than 60 countries. we continue to be in regular touch with their partners about states -- steps they can take to support our ongoing strategy to destroy isil. whether that is a training contribution or a contribution to counter isil training online. we certainly welcome the contributions we have received from members of the coalition. richard.

richard: first, -- i want to go back to isil. is the president satisfied with the airstrikes results? josh earnest: we have seen the airstrikes have had an important impact on the battlefield. where iraqis security forces struggled to displace isil fromtikrit. when we started, they were more effective on the battlefield area there are a number of examples where the effective deployment of military airstrikes had degraded isil. >> didn't have that impact on ramadi? josh earnest: know it did not.

there is trip -- strategy we will employ and ramadi, making sure we have a security force under the control of the iraqi government. when they get training and when they are backed with air power we believe they can be effective on the battlefield. >> when the iraqi forces leave they leave millions of dollars of u.s. equivalent on the ground. josh earnest: this highlights one of the things from earlier military forces did not have the benefit of u.s. military training. they did not have the benefit of u.s. military training. it is why we would like to greater capability and better training so they can operate more effectively on the battlefield. christ does the president share the frustration of

secretary-general with cuts and the defense budget? josh earnest: we have expectations about the kind of contributions made by our nato allies. that requires a substantial financial commitment on the part of each of our allies. the united states has lived up to the responsibilities that we have. we are counting on our alliance partners to do the same. >> reaching leaders next week in germany. josh earnest: i don't have anything to preview at this point. this continues to be a priority. we hope our allies live up to the funding to provide for every nato ally. >> [indiscernible]

josh earnest: we have seen that russia has engaged in military exercise in the past. it is not a secret or surprise. it is something we closely monitor for any impact it might have on the safety and security of nato allies. we know there is a tendency in some situations where russia had engaged in those kinds of military exercises near some the baltic members of our alliance. sometimes these operations take place in the north the. we are certainly mindful of these exercises we have seen in the past, and we certainly monitor them for any impact they may have on the security and safety of our nato allies. >> this has nothing to do with

the current situation in the ukraine? josh earnest: i'm not sure that the latest military exercises are all that close to the ukraine. we have seen other instances were military exercises around ukraine have had an impact on ukraine's security. given the frequency with which the russian military movement of weapons and personnel across the border, those kinds of movements are a source of concern. that is why we monitor the situation closely. last one. >> does the president holds -- hold him solely responsible? josh earnest: the situation in syria is one that is the responsibility of the assad government.

they contributed to the chaos and instability that allowed isil to both organize but also expand their footprint. ultimately it is that failed leadership that has destabilized the situation in syria and contributed to violence. we continue to believe that the assad -- president assad must go. i political transition in syria needs to occur for that we can try to bring some stability to area -- to syria. thank you everyone. announcer: the summer book tv will cover book festivals from across the country and top nonfiction books. this weekend we are live in new york city for the publishing

industry to showcase books. in the beginning of june we are live from chicago for our three hour in-depth program with lawrence wright. new the end of june, watch for the roosevelt reading festival. in the middle of july, we are live at the harlem book fair in nation's flagship african-american literary event. in the beginning of september, live from the nation's capital from the national book festival. that's a few of the events this summer on c-span twos book tv. announcer: the united states currently has the highest number of people in prison in the world. a recent report looked at some of the causes for the high and parts duration rates.

>> good afternoon. can you will hear us just fine up here? welcome. i am very honored to join you here today as we are about to present to you the findings of a report we think are very important and one we hope you'll find interesting. my name is heather thompson and i was privileged to serve as a number of this panel convened by the national academy research council to address some of the most pressing issues facing our nation. how do we explain the more than fourfold increase rates of incarceration and the last four decades. i am joined to my right by glenn lowry, and very need from new york university.

our panel was convened, so you get some background, by the national academy. it was acting through the national research council. the national academy of sciences was charted in 1863 under the administration of lincoln. the intent was for it to serve as an independent research for society. the committee on law and justice was cut -- created as a standing committee to provide expert advice on issues pertaining to crime, law, and justice for it in early 2012, the national institute of justice and the macarthur foundation offered to the committee on law and justice for an independent review on a research and causes and consequences of high rates of incarceration. deliberations of the committee

on law and justice into the national academy there is a strong sense to say a very important time to look at this issue. it is particularly an important time to reinvestigate the literature that have been developed on these topics. a broader community of scholars and experts join our sponsors in the belief that the voice of the national academy is the voice of science speaking on critical issues facing the nation. the national research council then convened a group of 20 scholars, we were all part of that group. you can see the list of the rest of the members also listed on the book. our panel was charged with answering for crucial questions. first, what changes in u.s. society drove the rise of incarceration? what consequences have these

changes had to crime rate? what effect does incarceration have on those in confinement? on families and children, on neighborhoods and communities, and on the economy, politics, and culture of u.s. society? what are the implications for public policy evidence? our report addressing this question was subject to anonymous external review by a group of policy experts following the rigorous, and i mean rigorous review procedures. following revisions made in response to the review the report is now ready for you to view. we do have copies along with issue briefs. the committee focuses attention on incarceration in state and federal prison and to a lesser extent the nation's jails. in carrying out the process we did not undertake cover him to

refuse on the effectiveness of programs for alternatives to incarceration. by concentrating on state and federal resins we were able to focus squarely on the decision on the state to punish individuals convicted of serious crimes by depriving them of liberty. it is this a decision that is central to the rise of incarcerations in the last four decades. when we conclude? our bottom-line conclusion and recommendations will be summarized. our panel found that the incarceration rate in the united states had more than quadrupled in the last four decades. a phenomenon unprecedented in the history. current rates of incarceration placed the u.s. far outside other western democracies. this is most directly the results of policy changes, not rising crime rate.

the higher rates of incarceration may have reduced crime rate, but the evidence is highly uncertain, most studies indicate it is small at best. we also found that the growth in the incarceration rate may have had significant negative consequences for the individuals incarcerated, communities and families, and broader society. finally we found that the effects of harsh penal policies have fallen most heavily on blacks and hispanics, especially the poorest concentrated already in neighborhoods experiencing significant social disadvantage. given the indoor miss amount of resources and uncertain public safety benefit the panel recommends the policymakers take steps to reduce the nation's reliance on incarceration.

in prove prison conditions for those who are incarcerated, and strengthen the community's most directly impacted by the high rates of incarceration over the past four decades. now i want to step back and walk-through conclusions so we can turn it over to my colleagues and to your questions. the first slide underscores an important finding. you'll notice the rate of incarceration in the united states remained stable for five decades from 1925 until 1972. which is to say the way in which crime was addressed with relatively stable. beginning in 1973, as is shown in the next light, the rate of incarceration began to rise steadily until 2009 when it slightly declined. over the four decade. the rise in rates of incarceration more than

quadrupled but the nation state and federal prisons rose from 200,000 in 1973 to 1.5 million in 2009 is sevenfold an increase. the report focuses mainly on people in prison, it is important to remember people held in jails as well. we had 700,000 held in the u.s. jails. a current levels, nearly one out of 100 adults is currently housed in prison or jail. as the next slide illustrate, this rate places is firmly outside the experience of other western nations. most of them have incarceration rate in the range of 72 150 per 100,000. our rate was 700 and seven per 100,000. .

these are the facts that led to our first conclusion. the growth in incarceration rates in the last 40 years is historically unprecedented and internationally unique a. this provides a starting point for the first questions we were asked to address. what explains this unprecedented rise in the number and prisons? we looked at this as a historical question. i review of the evidence to us back to a time before the increasing rate. by the time this rates are to increase, the nation had experienced intense change. crime rates had begun to increase significantly in the 60's and continue to rise through the mid-80's, but there was a lot else going on. the civil rights movement, urban rebellions political protests

also provide context for the political campaign or missing to restore law and order. change in the economy of poor neighborhoods also contribute to concentrated drug use and violence in those communities. which were also and simultaneously experiencing increasing racial segregation. this combination of rising crime, social change, urban unrest, created an environment in which leaders began in more punitive responses to crime. because -- because for more severe sponsors to crime were often not to sutley put in racial terms. they emphasized -- other

policies emphasize rehabilitation. this volatile political environment provided fertile ground for the rapid changes of sentencing policies around the country. i can refer you to the document we outlined, the ways in which the lengthening of sentencing happened across all 50 states as well as the federal government. some of you may be familiar with three strike laws, prison sentencing laws, mandatory minimum. we reviewed research to determine how much the increase in incarceration rates can be explained by these conflicting factors. we determined that the growth in state prison populations is almost equally claimed by two factors, about half of the increase is attributed to the

increase incarceration for arrest. the remaining half can be explained by the longer sentences. they both share a common feature, results of policy decisions. in the first instance, legislatures have determined that prison sentences are required for crimes that previously would not have been sentenced. any second instance, policymakers determined longer prison sentences were appropriate for individuals already sentenced. this finding that our current state is a result of policymaking decision will be discussed later. our panel did not find the increase in numbers was not as a result of crime rates. we did note rising crime rates

in the 60's did create an environment, but the longer view demonstrates that longer rates of incarceration cannot be explained by crime rate. while incarceration rates rose steadily for four decades, i rates have fluctuated. as noted before, crime rate rose from the late 1960's to the early 1980's, but then they fell. the rose again in the 1990's and fell sharply until the early years of this century. for the. from 1973 until 2009 incarceration rate increased steadily year after year. in short, our panel concluded that raising incarceration rate, again mostly reflect policy choices. the third question posed to our committee, what are the consequences of high rates of incarceration, i will turn to my panel.

needless to say, these high rates have not been equally distributed across the population. as a footprint of the penal system expands, correctional supervision became a regular presence in poor minority communities. in african-american communities it is about 4.5% more than whites. incarceration rate for hispanics have been 2-3% more than whites. the committee also found that it is stratified largely by education. racial and education and disparities combined to create high level of incarceration. in 2010, men aged 20-39, the incarceration rate for black high school dropouts is estimated 30% -- 35%. for white men, .3 of 1%.

the incarceration rate for black men with little schooling is 100 times higher than white men who have been to college. we also calculate the chance of that percentage of people who have ever been to prison at some point in their lives. for a cohort of men born in the late 1940's one in seven men who dropped out of high school served time in prison. in the following slide, it shows for men in the late 70's, african-american men who dropped out of high school, two thirds dropped out and were in prison by their mid-30's. for young black men with little schooling, prison time has become a regular life event. surprisingly -- unsurprisingly prisons have become over routed. what can we say about specific policies?

first in terms of effect on crime and then on people? this suggests there is also impact on the incarcerated communities. the committee found that although high rates of incarceration have been driven by long sentences particularly in the 1990's, there is little evidence of a strong deterrent effect. long sentences also have low incapacitated effect. long sentences have the effect of incarcerating older people who tend to be less criminally active. with long sentences, penal severity has focused on people who no longer poses a threat. there is evidence indicating long sentences in particular do little to reduce crime either through deterrent or through incapacitation. in addition to the effect of incarceration on crime, the committee also can are the

effects on the social and economic life of the family and communities of the incarcerated. research shows that men and women released from prison have lower earnings and high rates of unemployment. experimental evidence points to the extreme reluctance of employers to hire people with criminal records. the negative effects of a criminal record have been twice as large for african-americans as whites. large numbers of people incarcerated also means people with parents that are incarcerated by 2007 1.7 million children in america had a parent incarcerated. perhaps unsurprisingly, the research bears this out, incarceration is associated with weaker family bonds, lower levels of child well-being. incarceration is also associated with economic insecurity for the family and housing instability. at the level of communities,

prison releases come mostly from neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. concentrated incarceration has had a tire impact on these communities. to be sure it is difficult to isolate the community level affects of incarceration and isolation -- in isolation. i just incarceration itself has a negative impact on this countries already most vulnerable communities. the high incarceration rate is now characteristic of living in a civic neighborhood already battling bad schools and joblessness. we considered the wider consequences of high rates of incarceration for the society at large and we noted it has an impact on access to opportunity.

incarceration and the criminal record that follows it can limit access to jobs, occupational licenses, student loans veterans benefits, other governmental benefits, and in many states, for the right to vote. previous collateral consequences of incarceration has created a type of second-class citizenship focused disproportionately on african americans and hispanics from the poor segments of society to high rates of incarceration and have also shifted fiscal priorities. $53 billion on corrections in 2012, up from $6.7 billion in 1985. and more data to that affected is in our report. in short, after nearly 40 years of growth, the penal system has such a large footprint in american society, with little clear evidence of the growth in incarceration produced reductions in crime and yet, indicates significant social and economic costs. the final question facing us, as i wrap up -- what are the

implications of all of this for public policy? after assessing the evidence on rising incarceration, our consensus came to the overarching recommendation -- policy makers at the state and federal level should take the necessary steps to significantly reduce the rates of incarceration in the united states. in our view, the policies leading to high rates of incarceration are not serving the country well, and we're well past the point where the numbers of people in prison can be justified for the social benefit. a criminal justice system has made less use of incarceration can better achieve aims in a harsher, more punitive system. there are commonsense practical steps that we can move in this direction. arriving at this policy recommendation, our committee was guided both by our assessment of empirical evidence and by reference to long-standing principles governing the roles of prisons

in democratic societies. in our report, we trace the scholarly lineage of four principles for providing useful framework for our deliberations. we suggest that these principles should guide the national conversation we hope to spur, as well. the principle of proportionality requires that criminals should be sentenced in proportion to severity of their offense. the principle of parsimony requires the confinement should not be greater than necessary to achieve a legitimate social purpose. the committee observed that many of the statues enacted over the past four decades failed to observe these long-standing jurisprudential principles. the principle of citizenship which would require humane treatment of those in prison and has been embraced by associations of correction professionals, international standards, and federal court decisions, has been strained by the current correction policies and practices. finally, the committee reaffirmed the principle of

social justice, which would require that prisons should be viewed as important institutions that promote, not undermine, the well-being of members of society. this would require greater attention, oversight, and transparency regarding the role of prisons and society. these guiding principles are from empirical findings and strengthened our overarching recommendations that the u.s. it reversed course and reduce the level of incarceration. we arrived at more specific recommendations for policymakers in three domains. sentencing policy, prison policy, and social policy. i believe those up there, those recommendations. again, we have issued briefs and have the reports themselves. we can look it is in more detail. i have time to turn this over to my colleagues. thank you. and now we will turn it over to

glenn loury, who will tell us a little more detail on this. glenn: heather has given a very good overview of the work we did in this panel and the significant findings of the report. i was charged with underscoring some of what we did in this work having to do with racial differences and implications for communities. let me do that briefly in the interest of allowing time for some back-and-forth here. you have the issued briefs and the report in hand. i will not try to comprehensively summarize the statistics. but heather has already pointed out the fact that the disparity and incidence of incarceration i by race is quite large. 6.5 times the rate per 100,000 is the population for men. for poorly educated african-american men born in the late 1970's and coming to maturity during the period in a

time of rising incarceration rates, two-thirds will spend a year or more in a state or federal penitentiary before reaching the age of 35. these are very large numbers. and they raise questions, some of which we pursue in the report and some of which i think are not so readily amenable to scientific analysis, even though they are very important questions for us to take on board. the racial disparity takes place against a backdrop of racial inequality and racial discrimination. to some degree, it reflects the consequences of that history. it has huge impacts on the communities from which the persons who are incarcerated come, and to which they will inevitably, return. roughly one million african-american children with

an incarcerated parent. in some communities, the rates of incarceration in terms of the proportion of the young male population are a quarter, 30% in some well-defined urban enclaves. the circulating populations of inmates in and out of the institution causes the nature of social life in the institution and community to be in some kind of symbiotic relationship to one another. the kinds of behavior, ways of carrying one cells that are necessary in an institution, in the broader community. the variability of the communities to employ informal means of social control that are crime-reducing to discipline young people, for example, and

maintain order through informal relations are undermined by the high level of imprisonment characteristic of those populations. of men coming in and out of prison in large numbers makes it harder to sustain an environment in which it is possible to socialize young people into a more law-abiding pattern of behavior. the implications last beyond the time the racial inequality -- the inequality implications, i am talking about, last beyond the time of a person being confined. again, heather made reference to the studies that assess the impact on wages and employment after release confinement. the data is good. audit studies have been carried on by social scientist who sent confederates to employers to apply for jobs with either being

black, white, latino, having a criminal record or not, and the findings are consistent to the effect that a criminal record suppresses employment opportunities, particularly for people of color who come with criminal records. it has also been mentioned the extent to which collateral sanctions of one kind or another , these are impediments upon full citizenship participation that follow a person after they have been released from prison, have a deleterious effect, and negative effect on the people subject to these voting prohibitions or licensure, or residency in public housing, or availability for educational pell grants and other such work support being limited to people. -- being limited to people with criminal records. the negative consequences that i've been calling attention to for children, families communities, and individual

persons, will also be significantly disparate by race. so, the system of social control that relies so heavily upon incarceration has the effect indirectly, of exacerbating and extending the extent of racial inequality more broadly. i think in closing here i should address the question of the extent to which incarceration differences by race are a reflection of criminal participation racerates by race. it does account for some of the differences, but not close to accounting for all of them. one example would be in the area of anti-drug enforcement, where the data from surveys are that african-americans are on the whole no more likely to be the

users of, or the sellers of, drugs, yet african-americans are substantially more likely documented in a report to be arrested and confined for participation in illegal drug trafficking. these can be explained to some degree by reference to discriminatory behavior in policing and various kinds of subtle bias, and to some degree by differences in the social ecology in the case of drug markets, urban and open-air markets being easier to detect people violating the law in markets that might be more private and less susceptible to public observation and so on. i would like to close by observing that whereas we think about justice and we think about law enforcement having to do with individual offenders, once we construct a system as robust and as profligate, i can say, as

the one we have come to construct, the consequences can spill well beyond dealing with individual offenses in holding people accountable for what they have done. you can be punishing entire communities through the net effect of what you do, notwithstanding the fact that many of the people in those communities will have done nothing wrong. thank you. heather: thank you, glenn lowery. i will turn it over to larry mead from new york university. he will share information on one particular chapter, chapter four, that we direct your attention to because it is a historical roots chapter that we found to be really important for understanding the breaking the pattern of incarceration to see what had come before. larry: thank you very much. i was honored to serve in this committee and i wanted to describe some of the thinking behind chapter four and draw some brief conclusions from that. chapter four is about the political forces behind the

prison boom, the reason why we have the sudden break in previous rates of incarceration, why we see a sudden increase in incarceration. our analysis shows that the crime issue emerged as an important national question in the 1960's, intertwined with earlier issues that were related, particularly civil rights. i do not mean that there were earlier discussions of crime in american history. at various intervals, it was an issue. it became an issue again in a somewhat new way in the 1960's. whereas civil rights had been a liberal issue that was oriented to assuring equal rights for blacks, crime became a much more conservative issue. the reason for this is one crime -- the reason for this is when crime began to increase in the late 1960's, a number of factors conspired toward a reliance on prison as a main response.

one of them was, at the time there was not much alternative to prison, at least not in the minds of those involved in criminal justice. it was a period when rehabilitation programs were in disrepute. it was thought they were not effective. our view is somewhat more positive today. it looked like the only response you could make, really, was to lock people up. imprisonment begins to increase as well. this is what you see in the 1970's. crime rates are rising and prison rates go up. the problem was that in that period, a political reflex got established where the public is alarmed about crime, particularly at the local level, and the politicians respond with hard-line policies on incarceration, and a dynamic gets entrenched. it became politically convenient and ordinary for politicians of both parties to stress hard-line

attitude towards crime. after 1980, we see a break in the pattern where crime rates start to fall, go up and down, not consistently rising any longer, but in part because of this reflex that has been established, incarceration rates go on rising, even though crime is not going up consistently. after 1990, crime rates begin to fall, yet the incarceration rate continues to climb. so, it is obvious, just from this, that the social advantage of locking up more people was clearly no longer served by this, and the prison boom overshot. it is a good way to think of it. there was a reason at the outset, but it overshot any possible social rationale. another reason for this development is that in american politics, compared to european countries, those involved in criminal justice, the prosecutors, and often the judges, are more exposed to popular opinion than is the case

in any other countries. they are exposed to public fears and they respond with what seems like an immediate necessity, mainly to lock people up, and they do not have the same discretion to consider other alternatives. there are two conclusions i draw from this history. one i would call the perils of populism. the upsurge in crime along with other disorders in the late 1960's produced a panic among the public and that was the initial impetus for the run-up in the prisons, but it produced this overshooting where the prison boom goes on beyond any possible social rationale. so, this is what happens, it seems to me, when leaders advocate, when they allow public leaders to take charge and refuse to apply perspective. collective leaders should hear and respond to public fears, not avoid them, but also give the public the best judgment of what a real solution requires.

in the case of crime, a more measured response involving a wider range of options than just imprisonment would have been better for all concerned. our leaders should have explained the need for this to the voters. that is still what they need to do today. the political scientist theo key once wrote those that shook the responsibilities are misfits that cannot understand the responsibilities of their job. some have taken a lead in calling for a reassessment of incarceration. that is great. they are doing this. it is a little late in the game. it should have been done 10 or 20 years ago. the second point what do we do after we turned the prisons around? downsize incarceration is not enough. we have to have alternatives

that are less damaging. which are still effective? there are some developments in that direction, which are encouraging. build up social services and reentry programs. many will be living in the community rather than behind bars. we need fewer prisons but we also need alternatives to prison. it is not enough to liberate people and set them free. we have to have ways to help reiterate them into the community. -- re-integrate them into the community. developing programs for these men is going to be difficult. it will take a wild. -- it will take a while. these programs are not yet ready for prime time. stay tuned. heather: one thing i should have said at the outset, to give you a bit of background on the

process by which these conclusions were arrived, i mentioned the word literature. i wanted to clarify, when we made these policy recommendations, this was the end product of two years of intense deliberations to arrive at the consensus conclusions and to do that, we had to comb through and take a very serious look at multiple literatures and studies. we feel confident the conclusions are based on the top and best literatures and that this report has been vetted. many people in washington are seeking guidance as to how they might propose bills or do something legislatively. we hope this is a tool, not

necessarily weighing in on what those decisions would be, but to say this is ammunition, information. i was part of the chapter for -- with larry, when we say that this was a decision we made, it was not necessary, in that chapter, you will find evidence for that. the murder rate was higher during the great depression than it was when we embark on this massive war on crime. this gives us pause and information we can use as we imagine new policy solutions. announcer: white house economic council director will talk about retirement savings projections today. that is live at 10:00 a.m. eastern from the high partisan policy center on c-span. joe biden on the ukraine-russia

conflict and impact on european security. our coverage begins at 12:15 eastern. announcer: the congressional directory is a handy guide to the congress. also, district maps, a foldout map of capitol hill, the president's cabinet, federal agencies and state governors. order your copy today. it is $13.95 plus shipping and handling. next, the french, british, and a german ambassadors to the u.s. discussed europe's role in the iran nuclear negotiations. topics include how they will handle future sanctions with iran.

this is 90 minutes. >> i would like to welcome all of you in the room and everyone joining us online and through the tv broadcast. we want to encourage everyone to join the conversation using the hashtag #aciran. the iran task force was established to explore peaceful solutions with iran. the task force has published on these issues more than one dozen issued briefs and reports. in 2013, the task force released recommendations for u.s.-iran policy to foreshadow the current

path of negotiations, which we will discuss today. we are entering what could be the final stages of nuclear negotiations with iran. negotiators from the u.s., britain, france, germany, india, russia -- the p5+1, are working on terms that would place long-term curbs on nuclear armament from iran in return for relief on a number sanctions. this showcases the critical role of the transatlantic partnership in addressing the most prominent global challenges. we are especially delighted to be joined by the ambassadors from the e3 nations, france, germany, and the united kingdom, to discuss this herculean diplomatic effort, which in large part, began with their nations over a decade ago. i would like to invite up

barbara slavin, a senior fellow here. she has largely guided the work on iran at the council and can be credited for bringing together this discussion today. let me invite barbara and our guests to the stage please. >> thank you very much and thank ms. slavin: thank you for coming. i am delighted that everyone has returned from the holiday with an interest in the subject. we have been trying out the atlantic council to bring the three e-3 ambassadors here for some time. i think thereeir role has not been

properly recognized in the iran negotiation. it is fair to say it you three invented iran nuclear diplomacy in 2003. the u.s. administration at the time, the george w. bush administration, had a policy of of no acknowledged diplomatic contacts with iran. there were some, but they were secret and not substantive. it was britain, france, and germany that took it upon themselves to try to deal with the issue of iran's nuclear program after various facilities were revealed in 2002. a qwik note -- a quick note before i turn to our excellent speakers and introduce them. the bush administration policy toward iran at the time, according to phil gordon, an official in the clinton and obama administrations, was one of "malevolent neglect." when i was doing research for a

book for the u.s. and iran, i was told that john bolton once fell asleep or pretended to while he was hosting members of the e-3, who were giving him a raving on the negotiations. -- who were giving him a briefing on the negotiations. he was the under secretary of state in charge of nonproliferation at the time but not interested in talking with iran. the policy changed towards the end. we will hear about it and about where we are today. it is fair to say without the e-3, there would be no process with iran and that there would not be the progress we have seen today. with that introduction, let me introduce our wonderful guest. speaking first will be the ambassador of france, gerard araud, who has held numerous positions within the ministry of foreign affairs, including director for strategic affairs security and disarmament. ambassador to israel. permanent representative to u.n.

ambassador araud has specialized knowledge of the middle east and strategic and security issues. pertinent for our purposes, he was the french negotiator on the iranian nuclear issue from 2006 to 2009. seated next to him is peter wittig, ambassador of germany. he also served as permanent representative to the u.n. he served in spain as private secretary to the foreign minister. director-general for the united nations and global issues at the foreign office in berlin. finally, sir peter westmacott has been britain's ambassador here since 2002. this is his second posting in washington. he previously served as counselor for the political and public affairs in the mid-1990's. he has been britain's ambassador to france and turkey and have postings in tehran and brussels as well as serving as foreign and commonwealth office's directors for the america.

i would ask each ambassadors speak briefly. i know there are a lot of questions and expertise. ambassador araud will start with a history of the talks, as he lived through it. he will talk about how we went from malevolent neglect to active participation on the part of the obama administration and then ambassador wittig will talk about the lausanne understanding of april 2. ambassador westmacott will look at the regional understandings -- the regional dimensions of this nuclear agreement in the making. ambassador araud: when i was told i was to talk about history, i was going to start with cyrus the great, but i was told that may be too long. in 2002, when a major iranian

nuclear program, a claim the stein program -- a clandestine nine program was revealed, which we did not have any identifiable civilian significance, -- my motto was not speak saying "i,", but i is the director, directed the letter of the ministers, the european ministers. our goal, i have to say that at that time, we had the choice between having the signature of u.k. or of russia. if we put in the text that we were asking the suspension of enrichment, we had russia but not the u.k. if we had put in stopping the enrichment, we had the u.k. but not russia. france and germany -- it was not easy. it was spring of 2003, after the

iraqi invasion, we decided that we wanted to have the u.k. because we knew it would not be an agreement if at some moments, we could not have the trust, confidence of the united states. at the time, john bolton was under secretary for strategic affairs, came to paris. we presented the letter. we got a sense from both of them, we got a yellow light. but under the condition that we , will be totally transparent to both. and we were. as ambassador to israel, i was the channel to inform the israeli authorities of where we were, what we wanted. i think it was extremely productive. the negotiations started between

the three countries and irani ans in the fall of 2003. the iranians really suspended the enrichment activities. some people said that the opportunity was missed at this point. that would be for historians to say. but everything stopped in 2005 when mahmoud ahmadinejad was elected. basically, the negotiations stopped there. between 2005 and 2012, there was no negotiation whatsoever. as the french negotiator between 2006 and 2009, we went the five of us, because the american negotiator could not come with us. we want to tehran in 2008 with a letter signed by the six ministers. we made a lot of different

proposals to try and avoid the question of suspending everything. at no moment between 2005 and 2012, the iranians even cared about the negotiation. there was no negotiation. the first hour was about cyrus the great, the second was about -- the third hour was about the rights of the iranian people. that is the reality. in 2006, the americans, the russians, and the chinese joined us, which led to the first resolution. july, 2006. it was to suspend the enrichment. they did not do it. there were the different reductions of sanctions after.

1803, 1835, 1929. it is very important, the russians and the chinese, were with us. we reached the point of 2012. that is the first conclusion that we true. in 2012, iran took the decision of negotiating. negotiations started, or restarted, in 2012. i stop here. ms. slavin: maybe a tad more. you say 2012. the president was not elected until 2013. what changed? ambassador araud: no, i meant 2013. sorry. ms. slavin: obviously, we will go more into this in the q&a. ambassador wittig, 2013, a new team that speaks english, does

not insist on dredging through past iranian grievances. interim agreement? ambassador wittig: they spoke english in 2006, also. they spoke very good english. [laughter] ms. slavin: you've got the interim agreement november 2013 and then the lausanne understanding. tell us what you can about that and where we are now in negotiations. we have about four weeks to go. ambassador wittig: thank you for having me here. it is great to be here at the atlantic council. april 2, we concluded, after lots of months of intense negotiations, a political agreement on the parameters of a potential deal, final deal, with

iran. the framework is a potentially hopeful step forward. i have to add a notion of caution here. the most difficult task may lay ahead of us in the coming weeks. are we sure that we will get in this final deal, no. but we conduct negotiations with a lot of determination yet without naivete and a clear eye. the task is to negotiate a comprehensive solution. the challenge is to transform basically political statements into reliable, i also would say watertight waterproof

provisions that leave no doubt about the duties of the parties involved. as you know, in this kind of endeavor, the devil is in the details. therefore, details matter. we have to come up with a comprehensive agreement with a lot of annexes. it is also not only a political but also a technical negotiation. , so far, since the second of april, negotiations have been preceding at a rather slow pace on an expert level. there are a lot of gaps and brackets. gaps to be filled, brackets to be removed in the document. not surprising to you, two issues are in the particular

focus. first, the timing of the sanctions relief for iran. the details of the verification and monitoring mechanisms. those are our major topics. lausanne laid the groundwork for three major goals vis-a-vis iran. first, strict limitations on in richmond for the first 10 years. -- strict limitations on enrichment for the first 10 years. they agreed to not enrich the beyond 3.67%. and reduce -- 415 years.

-- beyond 3.67% for 15 years. and reduce the stockpile of low enriched uranium to 300 kilograms for the next 15 years. on top of that, iran would have no other or no new enrichment facility for the duration of the agreement. the second goal is the modernization of iraq. it would seal the plutonium pact. lausanne provides the possibility to modernize the existing heavywater facility in iraq, rebuild, redesign it, so there could be no production of weapons grade plutonium. the third goal, and key to an agreement, is iran would be submitted and subjected to an unprecedented transparency and

monitoring regime to make sure that any covert program that iran might the engaging in what -- iran might be engaging in what be detected and strong procedures for intrusive inspections and accordance with the additional protocol of the nonproliferation treaty and beyond would ensure the international community knows what is going on in iran. what would be the duties for us in this agreement, if it happens -- in return for iran's compliance, there would be sanctions relief of the u.n. eu, and the u.s. gradually. that is important. it would happen gradually in the fields of economy, trade, and finance. iran needs some time to start

the implementation of this agreement. in the best case, sanctions relief would not happen before the end of this year. in addition, this agreement would provide guarantees that sanctions could be put back in place if iran violates the agreement -- the so-called snap -back mechanism. what are the prospects we see for this deal? for iran, this would be a significant shift. iran would be deprived of the possibility to produce a nuclear weapon and at the same time, it would give iran the opportunity to adjust its relations to the international community. we believe it could also prevent a nuclear arms race in the

region. here again, a note of caution. do we think that we can trust iran with an agreement? i think the answer is no. our motto would be distrust but verify. trust has been broken and needs to be restored. that is why we can only accept a regime with a long-lasting monitoring mechanism. do we condone iran's behavior in the region? absolutely not. we maintain sanctions that are not immediately related to this agreement. let's give an example, the arms embargo. and we would continue to urge iran to play a very constructive role on its regional conflicts. in our mind, syria, lebanon,

yemen. in concluding, we believe that the alternatives to our diplomatic approach are on not very attractive. if diplomacy fails, then the sanctions regime may unravel. the universal sanctions regime. we would probably see iran again enriching as it has done before negotiations started. it is clear the problems we have with iran will not go away immediately with a deal, but it has the potential to engage in a phase of constructive conflict resolution with iran. we believe it serves our

security interest in europe, the u.s. security interests, the regional security interests. and believe me, israel's security is always on our mind. in a nutshell, a negotiated, satisfactory deal is our best thing. ms. slavin: i was a little surprised when you said sanctions relief would not come until the end of the year. is that because it will take iran that long to implement the key steps or is this something being negotiated? the iranians say sanctions relief will be immediate upon this implementation. do you want to pick up? ambassador westmacott: thank you for giving us this opportunity to sit on stage. i would not say like three monkeys, but we are three colleagues.

we are pleased to be together. gerard mentions the way the iranians go back to cyrus the great. when you talk to iranians, history is always important. but there is an irony that it was cyrus the great who was the persian king who liberated the jews from king nebuchadnezzar. a story we reminded ourselves when we went to visit major cities a year ago. it is worth us being conscious of it. the regional dimension and the point at which barbara picked up, i would like to echo what ambassador wittig says on where we are now. the importance of the framework we have. the quality of that deal. i would add between now and the and of june, there is a great deal of details to be completed. it is not yet in the bag. we are clear that if we cannot get the right deal, there will

not be a deal. this is significantly better. the framework we have now. in the judgment of our governments that of any alternatives out there diplomacy is extremely important. it has taken a long time to get this far. the regional dimension -- this was a big part of the g-7 summit arrangement which president obama hosted just the other day, not least because it is clear that a number of this sunni-arab regional governments are concerned about the implications of this deal, if it is finalized. i would say none of us are doing this on blind trust. we will distrust and verify. this is the best of the options out there and represents the best framework we have been able to come up with to ensure that for at least a decade, there will not be any iranian breakout

to nuclear weapons. iran would therefore be subject to the provisions of the npt and the additional protocol iran will be signing. this is something which gives us a chance for minimizing the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and introducing a degree of regional stability. we need to reassure the regionals, others around there who are concerned by other aspects of bad behavior by iran, which are separate from the nuclear issue we are negotiating on. it will not be a carte blanche for the iranians to continue to destabilize the region through proxies or other activity. it is our hope, we are not naive on this, that we can finalize the deal with the iranians that there will be a spinoff in terms of other areas of regional concern.

we would like to see iran doing less in terms of supporting groups which destabilize governments. or indirectly supporting terrorist activity. that would be a significant prize. the fact we are working on the nuclear thing does not mean we are closing our eyes to the other aspects of what is going on in the region and which concerns us. that is going to be importance. -- that is going to be important. regional reassurance on security issues and full implementation of the deal, if there is one which we conclude by the end of june. barbara, on your question of what about implementation, i think it is clear that sanctions lift will take place when there is implementation of the agreement. that depends on how long it takes them to be satisfied that

iran has full compliance. we do not know what day that will be. each side is busy explaining why what it agreed to so far is a good thing for its own public opinion. that is what negotiations are about. everyone has to return with something there are proud of. no one is going to go home and say we capitulated on everything, this is a lousy deal for my constituents. the important thing is to focus on what is going on in the negotiations themselves, which have to remain largely confidential for the moment to ensure we get the right deal and then we ensure there is full compliance and as a result of that, you can move to suspension of sanctions and so on. there are different elements of sanctions. there is a u.s. one, european ones, a u.n. one. we need to keep in mind, the reason we have come so far is because there has been

transatlantic unity on application of the sanctions. we have gotten this far on the basis of that. we now need to make diplomacy successful. ms. slavin: let me ask more about unity, not just with the united states but also among the e3. ambassador araud, your prime minister has a certain pension for reviewing details of the negotiations at certain times that perhaps have not always been helpful. just the other day, he said iranians are insisting on a 24 day waiting period before allegations of cheating can be investigated. is this helpful to the negotiations to reveal these little bits and are you always on the same page in terms of the negotiations? ambassador araud: of course it is helpful because it is my

minister. [laughter] ambassador araud: i think in any country, and especially this country, one's country takes an initiative. it is supposed to be based on a good analysis of the situation. when one country says a mistake, it is out of good intention. when another country commits a mistake, it is out of cynicism or for reckless reasons. i am going to tell you, to your utter disbelief, a secret. the french foreign policy is neither more or less moral than the u.s. was. it means that what we are doing is a very technical and political issue, based on our own analysis. in the negotiation, even our technical experts disagree from time to time.

you have the ministers and the diplomats and the nuclear experts discussing the issues. the ministers and diplomats do not understand a word of what is exchanged, of course. but basically, there is a disagreement. the negotiations are extremely complicated technically. they are also complicated because you have a lot of different issues which are leaked. the number of types of centrifuges are linked to the stockpile you will allow. i could multiply the examples of that. it means it is likely we will not have an agreement before the end of june or even after june. the iranians are obviously not negotiating to get an agreement shortly. they want to push the issues to the ministers the way they did previously. we are going to have drama at the end of june.

doors slammed, i am leaving to tehran, no way, and so on, to try to get the best deal. even if we get the best deal afterwards, you have to translate into the technical aspect. maybe we could have a sort of "the end" to the negotiation. >> can i add something to the unity? it is hard to exaggerate the cohesion we as europeans have on every level. our experts meet on a weekly basis or on a phone, sometimes on a daily basis. our leaders meet on iran. as you said, the three europeans were at the genesis, the inception, of this whole process. i want to add two things. i think it also deserves mention that russia and china were very

constructive partners over the last 17 months or however many months it was. since the beginning of negotiations in november of 2013. that maybe came to the surprise of some, because you could have said that the ukraine crisis would have contaminated those negotiations around iran. that did not happen. there was unity among the five plus. another element in the genesis that deserves mention is that there was a courageous step by the american administration to engage directly with iran. that was a catalyst. it was not self-evident that after those long years of a vacuum in relations with iran, the administration would engage directly.

i think those elements helped forge that unity and make that progress. ms. slavin: any thoughts on the unity of the three? ambassador westmacott: i agree. ms. slavin: one other and then i will open to the audience. the impact of the sanctions on european economies. as you pointed out, ambassador westmacott, it is a fact that the europeans agreed to stop buying iranian oil, by and large, stop investing in iran, to cut back trade massively, to impose sanctions on banks, that got us to where we are in many respects. how much of an impact has that had on your economies? if for some reason, there is no deal, can you hold the line on sanctions? can they persist in the eu given the eagerness of many of your companies to go back?

>> the u.s. companies as well. they are very eager to go. ms. slavin: they have other problems. ambassador araud: not more or less than the european companies. ambassador westmacott: i think iran is a country with immense potential, commercial, political, and in lots of areas. people say to me, i cannot understand why you guys are negotiating with those iranians. that you do not seen many iranian shias that she has -- iranian shias strapping on bombs and stepping onto planes and blowing them up. but the irani ans want to come

with a green card and make $1 million. i think there is a great deal of potential of that sort. if you go to iran today, you find that there is an appetite for a lot of western products. they have to pay a high price because of the rates. things come across seven borders. it is not surprising that a lot of companies would like to do business in iran. it has great potential resources, and natural wealth. at the right moment, companies will start looking again at that. it is hard to be clear about what happens to sanctions in the event of no deal. if there is no deal because the iranians simply will not live up to or implement the broad parameters we agreed to in the framework, then i think we carry on with the sanctions regime and in certain areas it may be right to raise the level the sanctions. this is the area of hypothesis. at the same time, if we were to walk away or if congress were to make it impossible for the agreement to be implemented or whatever, the international community would be reluctant to contemplate a ratcheting up further of the sanctions against iran.

my sense is we are not far away from the higher watermark of sanctions against the iranian economy. what happens next depends on what happens. if there is clear evidence that this was done on bad faith and the iranians were not appear to have the transparency and inspection of sites and so on, we are in one territory. it becomes a much more complicated if it is the other where we say we do not want to do this. we have seen countries that do not respect the embargo. russia, china, turkey and so on for buying certain things from iran, we will probably see more sanctions and erosions, -- more sanctions erosions, unless it was clearly iran's responsibility. ms. slavin: the impact on

germany has been significant. ambassador wittig: yes, we have long, traditional relations with iran pre-khamenei. we had strong economic ties. the sanctions regime was hurting our businesses a lot. many of the big companies just pulled out of iran, like the automakers. so it did hurt. that is a fact. i think i echo what peter has said. the potential for an agreement is also the potential for all of our economies. it would benefit not all of our economies, not that we would rush back into iran. we would be cautious. the government advises our companies actively to hold back. but it could carry a huge

potential, not only for us, but also for the young iranian generation. they are looking to the west. it might entice or trigger some internal change in iran. ms. slavin: it is my understanding that what comes off from the u.s. side are the secondary sanctions that inhibit foreign companies from investing in iran. you say american companies are eager, but they will be largely shut out, won't they? ambassador araud: like in dubai. the automakers, we were providing 40% of the iran in market. all of the gears were made in one small city in france. the city was devastated by the sanctions. a small city in the east of france.

also, our oil company had made the strategy choice of investing in iran. this company was, of course, lost its investments. it hurt, but we held firm the last 10 years. there is no reason we will not do it in the coming years. barbara: i will open. please wait for the microphone. state your name. we'll start here. ask a question. >> thank you for putting on this excellent event and thank you to the three ambassadors for being here. barbara: introduce yourself. >> trita parsi from the iran-american council.

i want to ask you to get into a hypothetical. let's assume there is a deal in late june. the president has to report it to the senate within five days. the senate has 30 days to review and cast a vote. say there is a resolution to reject the deal and it passes. the president has the option or the obligation to veto it. what will be eu three do between the resolution of rejection passing and the president putting in his veto and facing a challenge to that? ms. slavin: who would like to take that? ambassador westmacott: i will make a brief comment. forgive me for saying this, but you're getting ahead of the game. what we focus on now is trying to get this deal. we are not there yet. when we get there, we will see what the different elements are that follow. my government has not yet worked out what the answer to your

hypothetical would be, but we have to take this in stages. the important point for the moment is to bear in mind the long journey we embarked upon. can we now get this over the finishing line at the end of june? we hope so, but it depends on different elements. the president's commitment has been very clear to sending this to the united states congress, and to the american people, and so on. we take of us in one stage at a time. it may well be that at the state -- stage where we get a deal there is something the rest of us can do to help explain this is not just a u.s.-iran deal but something the international community in general and the p5+1 in particular, the three representatives here, our party -- are party to, fully involved and want to see it made into a success. but i cannot go further into the area of hypothesis you want to lead us at this stage.

ms. slavin: did you have a question? >> i want to ask about the -- [inaudible] ms. slavin: bring the other one over, if you would. >> is this better? i will ask a question which will give you the opportunity to get in trouble with your governments. obviously we have to be thinking about what if's. assuming the deal does not go through and blame can be laid legitimately in iran's door what do you see as viable options? you know in israel and the congress, there are going to be loud voices calling for some

kind of military action. and alternatively, if the deal does go through, and can be verified, what opportunities do you see created in the middle east, much of which is in chaos, but could benefit from this agreement? ambassador araud: i will not answer the first part, it is quite hypothetical. in a sense, the sanctions would remain enforced. the questions would be to increase the role of sanctions even if, as peter said, we are close to the high mark of the sanctions. as for what would happen after an agreement, in a very hypothetical way, looking at the crystal ball, my personal bet is that the iranians will want to prove their regime does not mean a change in policy.

we could have an outburst of anti-american rhetoric a few months after the agreement. the second element is we have been careful to disassociate the nuclear negotiation from other issues. it is very important. if you start to make a big deal , you start to exchange -- it starts to be very dangerous. the nuclear issue, as such. after that, you have the other geopolitical issues. i am not sure if those are linked to the nuclear issue. they are linked to the fact all of the region has been geopolitically destroyed, first by the invasion of iraq. iraq has played a major hold for -- a sort of dam against

persians for a thousand years. the crisis in the sunni world. which means that basically nature abhors a vacuum. iran is moving forward because there is nothing to stop it. i do not think there is a linkage between the nuclear issues and the geopolitical crisis of the middle east. but that is personal. >> elise with cnn. thank you, barbara. i would like to follow up a little and tie in what you talk about the unity of the p5+1. obviously, you have gone to great lengths to keep a lot of the geopolitical issues out of the discussions, but i wonder if you could talk to the extent that this long baggage between the united states and iran whether it plays into it at all. at the beginning of this process, the u.s. was really even before your current governments, the u.s. was the one being so tough. i have heard diplomats from one or more of your countries speak

privately about how the u.s. is the one that wants the deal the most. given all that, given that president obama definitely wants a deal with this government, the trial of washington post journalist jason rezaian, how does that play into the negotiations and tone of the room? ms. slavin: does the u.s. want it more than you? ambassador westmacott: we all want it, but not at any price. if we do not get a satisfactory deal, there will not be ideal. we are focusing on the four or five weeks ahead of us. and then all the hypotheticals afterwards.

i want to elaborate a little on the connection to other issues. you can kill this deal if you link it to extraneous issues. what iran does in yemen, does it cease to support hezbollah, etc. if you link it to these issues you can kill it. this is what we don't want. no linkage, but there is a potential in a successful deal to improve relations with iran and to encourage iran to be a more responsible stakeholder in the region. that potential we want to explore once the deal is done. ms. slavin: i am going to go to the back and then come up front. wait for the mic. >> thank you. darrell kimball.

ambassador araud, i am glad you went into the history. i want to ask about the history to clarify the purpose of the resolutions that were passed at the security council regarding the suspension of enrichment. there is a perception that those resolutions were designed or to require iran to stop uranium enrichment. as i understand, the purpose was to facilitate a long-term solution that respects a peaceful program. could you elaborate about the thinking and purpose of the resolutions, which is something many in washington i do not think understand. this is an issue for the future of negotiations -- updating the resolutions. could you give us an update on whether that continues to be an issue? are you confident that will be resolved in time to facilitate a comprehensive solution? ambassador araud: when we

started the resolutions of sanctions, the first -- 1737 what we were doing was to change the calculation of the regime. really, basically, to convince the regime, for its own survival in a sense, that the program was becoming too costly. you have to understand, the iranians have spent billions of dollars on these programs. on the program which does not have any civilian meaning. when we went to tehran in 2008 the five political directors, we met a lot of iranians. basically the sanctions were only starting to hurt, but the management of the economy was so inept that the situation was serious. afterwards it has only worsened.

we do think that of course there is no evidence that the sanctions have changed effectively the calculation of the regime. for the enrichment, personally from the beginning, i have always been convinced that, at the end of the day, we would have to keep some enrichment capability in iran. as peter said, in negotiation, each side has to be able to come back home saying i am the winner. considering the investment of the iranians into the enrichment financial, but also symbolic. there should be some enrichment capability in iran. after that, the challenge is to make it innocuous in terms of nuclear proliferation. that is what we are trying to do during these negotiations. ms. slavin: in front here.

>> good morning. i am a french senator. i have a question regarding the amount of mistrust between iran and the international community, how do you think the international community would be able to reset the machinery? because with such a mistrust, it is almost impossible. could you give us a hand? ms. slavin: reset the machinery? >> reset the position. ambassador wittig: i think we mentioned that one key element of this possible deal is a very intrusive mechanism. a regime of transparency and verification. that is key to the whole deal. we will have eyes. the international atomic energy organization will have eyes on what iran is doing. we are confident a regime can be

devised that would detect any covert operation that iran is engaging in. the regime of verification monitoring, is key to any agreement we conclude. >> laura rosen, from the monitor. ambassador wittig, you mentioned it is going slowly post lausanne and trying to draft the deal. you mentioned a degree of brinksmanship. why do you think it is going so slowly? do you think they are trying to dominate the process to other ministers and other nations? is kerry trying to do that? are the iranians waiting for the

u.s. to send the secretary? ambassador wittig: it is going slow because the substance of the issues are difficult. they are technical. that is the second point is one point. there is a dynamic in negotiations. you need the pressure of timelines in order to facilitate the heavy lifting of issues. both factors are at work here. but i am not particularly worried. i think this is fairly normal. as i said before, we have a difficult path to walk on. we have tremendously complicated technical issues to clarify. so small wonder we are not making a lot of fast progress now. but it is not a prediction on what will happen by the end of june. it is a feeling of the pulse

now. i am still confident we can overcome those divergences of views that we have now. ms. slavin: i am going to go here, but before we take the next question, i neglected to mention at the beginning that i wanted to thank the ploughshares fund for their generous support of the iran task force. also, our regrets that stuart eizenstat, ambassador to the eu and chairman of our task force was not able to be here today because he was in europe. >> jonathan, with mcclatchy newspapers. over the weekend we heard new statements from iran that senior scientists would not be allowed to be interviewed. we heard that military facilities will not be open to inspections.

that links back to an issue way -- we have not talked about, which is the possible military dimensions of iran's program and the iaea aspect which seems to have gotten no progress whatsoever at all during the negotiations going on separately. there is some concern among some that that issue, whether or not the iranians were, in fact designing a missile-borne nuclear warhead will be papered over. there is some kind of calculation will be made, or equation will be made that will allow them not to have to make the admission about what they were doing in order to set a baseline for the inspection program you are talking about. can you talk about how the possible military dimensions aspect of this and how it feeds into the talks? because there is no progress on

that aspect right now. ms. slavin: i will add to that that araghchi the deputy , negotiator said something about managed access to nuclear facilities, which was in direct contradiction to what the supreme leader and other iranian officials said. ambassador araud: after all of these negotiations, if you're writing an article about what is the negotiation, really. at the beginning of the negotiation, there is chest banging in the negotiation. each side says i am not going to cave in and that is my demands my absolute demands. of course, after that they compromise their absolute demands. i do not think we have to attach much importance to the declarations. at the beginning, the iranians say we demand an absolute, immediate lifting of the sanctions. it will not happen.

and there will be an agreement. even if there is not an immediate lifting of the sanctions. on the pnd, i can tell you, the french are keen on having -- an element of the agreement, other the -- of the pnd we're not going to let the pnd issue under the carpet. the negotiations, for the moment, obviously they are not moving forward quickly. it means that the iranians make the calculation that it could be easier to get concessions from the ministers with some dramatization. a good deal of dramatization. negotiations it is also theater. , there are some theatricals in negotiation. i am not badreally, don't listen to

the outside declarations. the sanctions will be lifted in an incremental, reversible conditional way. each side will have to be able to prepare its public for the opinion. ambassador wittig: to your hand of the declaration of araghchi, he was mindful of the protocol where it contains provisions that provide for access to military sites. araghchi is mindful of the

obligations of that protocol. ambassador westmacott: there is the additional protocol but there's also agreement that ensures there is proper inspections separate from the additional protocol. this is important, there has to be proper inspections so that we can if we have reason or legitimate request to visit this or that site that we can still do so. this is still being discussed in some detail. we will not let this issue disappear. this will be an important part of the final negotiation. ms. slavin: a gentleman in the middle has been very patient. >> john with "foreign policy" magazine. ambassador araud speaking of the art of diplomacy, the sort of walk back on the allowance of managed inspections, is this

dispel the notion that has been perpetuated for a while that the iranian negotiations are perpetually boxed in by anything supreme leader tweets or says is there some give there? ambassador araud: i really don't know what the inner momentum of the negotiation in iran. the negotiators are negotiating. they have their own public opinion with their own divisions. the same way you have in the u.s. and our free countries. they have to take into account the settlement the same way the u.s. administration has to take into account the opinion of the congress. no negotiation is simply a technical or political -- without public opinion, which is

in a sense the background of the situation. ms. slavin: gentleman here, and then -- >> thank you for the great discussion. i'm with kurdistan's 24 hour news agency. i have a question about the impact of a nuclear deal on the situation of human rights in iran, particularly for the minorities such as the kurdish people. do you expect the situation to improve or will be world turn a blind eye for strategic interest? thank you. ms. slavin: who wants to take a human rights question? ambassador westmacott: i will make a general comment.

all of our governments remain concerned about the human rights situation in iran. there are things there that worry us. sometimes it is about the way individuals are treated, sometimes the way minorities are treated. sometimes surprising elements. there are elements of the jewish community in iran which are able to thrive. there are the highbahai which have no level of tolerance. there are a number of respects in which iran has a long way to go in terms of meeting international standards on human rights. i am not an expert regarding the kurdish minority. this is an area in which we would look to iran, especially if we are able to conclude the agreement, to move more in the direction of behavior then we have of the moment. ms. slavin: iran could start by

letting jason rezaian our colleague, go. >> i am from george mason university. ambassador, i was reassured when you indicated that russia and china are being helpful. in the final stages of negotiations, how helpful is russia actually being, especially in light of their decision to resume 300 air defense ballistic missiles to iran? one would have thought that to be helpful this would have been held out as a carrot they had -- yet they have gone ahead and done this. i also know there are rumblings in the russian press that in fact maybe a nuclear deal would not be such a good deal for russia. if it means iran's relationship with the west improves. also even rumblings that if the west is not understanding on the ukraine, russia can be less helpful on iran. i am from the older generation that sees what happens in the

russian press is not accidental. would anyone care to comment on russia's motives. and how helpful it is. i would appreciate it. ambassador wittig: to be straightforward, we thought a decision to deliver those kinds of weapons were not helpful at all for the process. it was a deplorable decision. also, let me remind you this was not a decision that violated the arms embargo. it was not something that violated international law, but it was we believe, not helpful for the process. ambassador araud: it has always been important to show that is not the west against iran. and the russians and chinese are being perfect, loyal negotiators in this process. that is key.

-- they are still. they are doing their part to work with us. as for the weapons, we share what peter said. also, the russians have taken the side that the system could not be operational before one or two years. they told us -- which simply means they did not want simply to blame china on these negotiations. ms. slavin: i think i saw something in the paper saying that these weapons will probably not go until there's an agreement. so it is more of a carrot. gentleman back there. >> peter, i am a lawyer in washington. the question is, is the position of the west credible? the position of the west seems to be, if you do not do this

deal, we will continue sanctions or enhance the sanctions. i have heard today how this might be the high watermark of sanctions. our own businesses don't like the sanctions. do we have a credible threat to -- in the negotiation? ms. slavin: i think what the gentleman, the ambassadors have said is it depends on how the negotiations break down. if they break down. if it is perceived to be the fault of the u.s. congress, or others on the side of negotiating, and the sanctions regime will unravel probably pretty quickly. if it is perceived to be the iranians walking away from a good deal, presumably there would still be some sanctions, at least in europe. i don't know is that true for , the russians and chinese? would the p5+1 split? ambassador wittig: i guess i

agree with you. it depends who is to blame if there is no deal. i think we should not harbor any illusions about international sanctions regime. i think many of the emerging countries would consider congress blocking this deal as a trigger to question the present sanctions regime. i would see a certain danger, if the blame game in the international community comes to the conclusion that it is not iran to blame, then the international solidarity that has been quite strong in recent years would most probably erode. that is the scenario. ambassador araud: in legal terms, no.

in legal terms, sanctions of the u.n. security council -- the sanctions remain in the vote of the u.s. the u.s. sanctions will remain in place and the eu sanctions could be lifted in a unanimous vote. so sanctions will remain in any case. it is the implementation. the most effective sanctions are usually u.s. sanctions because of their extraterritorial stretch. a lot of corporations are implementing sanctions simply because they are afraid of the u.s. sanctions. ms. slavin: have they started drafting a new it u.n. council? ambassador wittig: i think there

is a draft somewhere. yes, i think there is a draft. ambassador araud: one the questions is about sanctions. the snapback. the way sanctions will be reimposed if the iranians are not respecting their commitment. there are some texts floating around. ms. slavin: in front. >> my question is to the french ambassador. your president has been in saudi arabia and the gulf. it seems that france and the gcc have an excellent relationship. based on that have you been able , to persuade the gcc that the nuclear deal in a negotiated will enhance security, rather than undermine security? investor -- ambassador araud: i think you should ask more the american

administration. there was the summit at camp david organized by president obama. i think it was the american administration, it was a very useful initiative because it is true that we have to give assurances to the gulf countries about security. if they need security assurances, it is not only because of the nuclear deal, but it is because of the geopolitical situation i was referring to. which has given to iran the initiative. basically, we saw it in iraq, and we are seeing it also in yemen. i think the message which was summarized by the statement, after the camp david meeting, i think it was a very useful one. it is basically also what we told our friends from the gulf