it's amazing that senator tim scott would launch a seventh annual prayer breakfast concerning prayer about our nation, our families, our communities and truly today, it's about our churches. and as a pastor that's from charleston, back home, i hear of such a tragedy to the families and the bereaving ones at this time. and so today, it is my desire as i stand here and i plead to our nation especially back home in charleston today that we will come together as a family that's full with compassion and unity

and strength. so on behalf of senator pastor pinckney and emanuel a.m.e., it's heart felt today to see and hear the tragedy. so we desire to do a short prayer. but i would like to say this. this is not the time to back off, to slack up concerning our convictions as the body of christ, but to move and to push thoroughly, relentlessly forward with grace, with compassion,

tenacity and unity. may we just bow our heads in a moment of prayer. today, father, we stand as your people, your call, your chosen and your elect. and father, we thank you and we ask you that your grace will bring peace to the families and to charleston and that your love would usher in a flood of hope of joy again and restoration. and father, we thank you today that as we stand together, as we pray together, we shall see your glorious hands together. and we pray, father, that charleston would never be the same because of the love, the

commitment of the communities may now come together and stand in our convictions. in jesus' name. amen. >> thank you all so much for coming. i think i know almost everyone here so thank you so much. the senator is really humbled by how many of you guys came out today. and so many of his good friends are here. i thank you so much. the south carolina delegation is awed by how many of you are here today. but since i can't possibly go after two amazing pastors, i would really love if someone else come up and offer their thoughts and prayers.

again, i see so many amazing people that can do a much better job than i can. senator lankford, you are actually probably one of the best to come up here. senator lankford: not in this circle. there are multiple others. let me just say this one word and pray together. scripture says god is near to the broken hearted. that would match south carolina and all of us today. we need to stop and say god is near and let us knowledge -- acknowledge that he is here. the work he is do across the nation and across the charleston area. let's pray together. father, our nation is in need of you. our families are broken and people are just angry. god, i pray that you would allow us as believers in you to be able to speak peace to places that need peace.

that you would sweep righteousness in the places that desperately need it. god, our hearts cannot believe a man would be so angry and venomous that he would sit in a church prayer circle and murder people. i can't even process that, father. god, i pray that you bring righteousness and justice where it's needed. but i pray that you would help us as a community to reach out to people that are that angry and be able to speak your love to people that desperately need it. god, i'd pray that you wrap around families that don't understand this day, don't want to understand this day, that you'd raise up pastors and leaders and individuals around them. god, we look to you to that. tell us what is our part. in that role. god, i pray for the south carolina delegation, leaders in their state house, state senate, governor, leaders within the communities and city that you give them instinctive wisdom.

and for the churches, especially and the pastors that will have unique responsibility in the days ahead to lead well. give them words to say and pray they will be overcome with the love that you can provide and that you roll off their lips and out of their hearts. god, heal us as a nation. we need your help. pray wisdom for this day and your joy and in the name of jesus i ask. amen. >> our father who art in heaven, hallow be thy name. thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our trespass as we forgive those who trespass against you and lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil. for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever and ever. amen.

>> members of house and senate leadership also spoke about the church at shooting in charleston, south carolina. house speaker boehner, mrs. pelosi, mitch mcconnell, and harry reid.

the speaker: on behalf of the whole house, how shocked and heart broken i am about the murder of innocent church goers in charleston. the depth of our grief reveals the department of our love and our resolve and our prayers go out to all the victims' families and thoughts go to the law enforcement officers working to bring this perpetrator to justice. anyone who would do something so unspeakable is pure evil. we are committed to promoting both trade authority and assistance to pass the house and senate and go to the president for his signature.

getting this work done is critical. providing opportunities for american workers and american-made goods. another authority is the health care cost. despite the many promises obamacare has not delivered. to repealing the medical device text. in addition, the supreme court could soon make a ruling that leads to millions of americans losing their health care subsidies. our goal is to provide peace of mind, to families who have coverage disrupted through no fault of their own. obamacare is fundamentally broken. increasing costs for millions of american families. the plan we are working on will focus on protecting the american people offer new choices for quality, affordable health care

and not protecting this failed law. we had a constructive meeting with our members yesterday and we received good feedback that will help inform us as we continue to develop our plan. lastly, there may be no priority that americans take more seriously than supporting our military. later today, senate democrats plan to block a pay raise for our troops. democrats intend to hold up the troop funding in order to extract more money for the irs and the epa and all of their other priorities. my hope is that the democrats who vote to make promises to our troops will not turn around and vote against their funding. our military does not get to have it both ways. their job is to win. and our job is to make sure it that they have the resources to win and come back home safely. it is our privilege to give these men and women arrays that they have earned.

some democrats need to think long and hard before going through with this. it will be a grave mistake to stand in the way of funding for our troops. >> senate democrats say they want to start new negotiations next week. what --why would that be a good idea? >> the house has passed the appropriations bill. and it is time for the senate to do the thing. people have ideas and they should put those ideas on the table. i have not seen any of those ideas at this point. >> could you comment on the posts encyclical on climate change. >> this hope is not afraid to challenge everyone's thinking on issues, one way or the other. i admire his dedication and his

work to protect the sanctity of life. i've respect -- i respect his right to speak out on these important issues. >> it will mess on any action by congress? >> there are a lot of bills out there. >> on the potential obamacare bridge replacement, you mentioned protecting people who will lose coverage through no fault of their own. why coalesce around a policy here that is going to cause a political fight, repealing the individual mandate. why not extend subsidies and get some concessions on other things that republicans want instead of doing something that is going to be vetoed and have a clash over obamacare and potentially and subsidies for people? >> we are interested in protecting those millions of people that could lose their subsidies.

we are not interested in protecting a fundamentally broken law. we are doing everything we can to increase choices for americans, lower costs, and increase the quality of health care that they get. which is all being undermined by obamacare. >> knowing that the president feels exactly opposite about that and can never signed a repeal of the individual mandate. if the subsidies are repealed in the states, and americans with health insurance --, doesn't it make sense to get concessions were you can? >> we have an obligation to do what our constituents ask of us. our position on obamacare has been clear for years and frankly has not changed. i would point out that the more we learn about obamacare, the more we learn just how fundamentally broken it really is. >> mr. speaker do you feel

doublecrossed? >> when we were talking about trade promotion authority and trade adjustment systems of the last few weeks, i worked with leader pelosi. i also worked with republican members that had concerns about the process and the pay force. i think i will keep my comments to myself regarding to how i feel about the leaders'actions. >> she said she has not seen a path tortilla a. she right or wrong? and you -- >> we will have trade promotion authority vote pretty soon. i'm confident we are in a pretty good place. i am also confident that the senate considers both, it

hopefully will be back here sooner -- as soon as next week so we can move both of these to the president. >> you expect a vote next week? >> i hope the senate would move it back. the preferences bill back here late next week so we can move it onto the president. >> has mcconnell indicated that he will do one or the other first and does it matter? >> you'll have to talk to senator mcconnell. >> have you and president obama learned anything about this process regarding how your negotiation skills work that can be applied to something like the next budget deal? >> i would describe what has gone on in the last few weeks as bizarre. i have not learned anything from it.

>> you have not been very close to the president in the last six or seven years. >> woe. really? >> in recent weeks. >> that is not fair. the president and i, while we may have disagreements on policy issues, the president and i have enjoyed a very good working relationship. there has never been any challenge. >> have you thought of another issue that you have worked closely with him compared to trade? >> if you give me enough time, i am sure that i could. there are a number of issues that we worked with the president on. trade is another one. where we find common ground, we are able to work together and get things accomplished on behalf of the american people. thank you everyone.

speaker pelosi: it is such an attacking -- such a shocking attack that was made in charleston. my collie, congressman clyburn has already returned home. our collie, mr. sanford will have a moment of silence on the floor. when the news came forward, i thought they were reporting on an anniversary that happened a long time ago. what is this that is in the news? why is it in the news today? it was not that, of course. it was a new fresh reality. a new challenge to our country in terms of respect for one another, and the use of violence to express that. or lack thereof. words are inadequate.

they become less and less adequate the more this happens. i am pleased that the justice department will be treating it for what it is -- a crime. -- a hate crime. >> i want to save something about the terrible news out of charleston. this is a true tragedy. that something like this could occur at a house of worship makes it even worse. it is always awful when these things happen but for it to happen at a house of worship, it worse. church should be a place of refuge. a place where people feel safe and secure. a place of mercy, a place of compassion. the depth that these families

must be feeling is someplace awful. i want the american people to know that the senate is thinking of them today and the victims that they loved. we are also thinking of the entire congregation at this historic church who continue to do so -- will continue to do so is more about this tragedy is learned in the hours and days to come. our hearts go out to the families who have been affected eye this awful tragedy. -- why this awful tragedy. >> i don't know how to describe what i heard this morning in my morning briefing. these accounts of this sickening revelation of what took place in

south carolina last night. think about this. in the sanctity of a house of worship, it was violated as a gunman opened fire. this historically black emmanuel ame church in charleston, south carolina. we know now that at least nine people are dead. others are her. -- others are hurt. i don't know how else to describe it. this individual was like a sheep in will's clothing. he sat among the congregation for a substantial amount of time before he pulled out a weapon and started firing at people. the thought of people who are in a house of worship, being gunned down as they gathered to pray is heart wrenching devastating

and an ultimate act of cowardice and hatred. as our good chaplin said, our hearts go out to the families and the friends, of the people who were gunned down in that church. it is hard to comprehend anything so awful. on behalf of the senate family, we send our support, our sympathy, to charleston law enforcement as they tried to capture this murderer. i hope he will be captured swiftly and brought to justice.

i don't think it would be appropriate for me to make comments and talk about things that i feel are inappropriate with this pall hanging over our country. >> attorney general loretta lynch confirmed there is a suspect in custody in the church shooting that happened wednesday interesting, south carolina. she explained why the department of justice opened a hate crime investigation. she made the remarks during a briefing on medicare fraud. the director of health and human services, sylvia burrell is also present.

attorney general lynch: good morning all. thank you for assembling here today. before we begin today's announcement i want to take a moment to address the heartbreaking and deeply tragic events that occurred at emmanuel ame church in charleston, south carolina last evening. this is a crime that has reached into the heart of that community. the department of justice has opened a hate crime investigation into the shooting incident. the fbi, atf, u.s. marshal service, civil rights division and the u.s. attorney's office are working closely with our state and local partners and we stand ready to offer every resource, every means, and every tool that we possess in order to locate, and apprehend the perpetrator of this barbaric

crime. acts like this one have no place in our country, and no place in a civilized society. i want to be clear. the individual who committed these acts will be found and will face justice. as we move forward in this matter, i thoughts and prayers and those up our entire law enforcement community here at the department of justice and around the country are with the family and loved ones of the victims and trust in. even as we struggle to comprehend this heartbreaking event, i want everyone in charleston and everywhere who has been affected by this tragedy to know that we will do everything in our power to help heal this community and make a whole again. i encourage the people of charleston, south carolina, and the wider area to continue circulating the photo of the alleged arbitrator and report any tip, no matter how small matter how minor to the tip line which can be reached at one 800 call fbi.

today's announcement. today, i am joined by secretary burwell from the department of health and human services, director jim komi of the fbi inspector general dan of the hhs inspector general's office, and the doctor from medicaid services. we are here today to announce a major advance in the federal government's fight against fraud in our nation's health care system. over the last three days, as part of a coordinated nationwide take them, the medicaid strikeforce, a joint initiative of the departments of justice and health and human services, comprising federal state, and local investigators and law-enforcement officials from across the country, joined with seven additional u.s. attorney general's office is

against 243 defendants and 17 federal districts for their alleged participation in medicare fraud schemes involving approximately $712 million. this is the largest takedown in the strikeforce's eight year history. it is the largest criminal health care fraud takedown and hit her he -- in the history of the his -- in the history of the department. the defendants charged over the last few days include doctors, patient recruiters, home health care providers, pharmacy owners and others. they are accused of an array of serious crimes ranging from conspiracy to commit health care fraud, wire fraud, to money laundering. they filed for equipment that was not provided and for care that was not needed for services that were not rendered. in one of the more egregious allegations, of exploitation of both the medicare system and vulnerable patients, the owners

of a mental health facility in miami filled for intensive psychotherapy sessions that resulted in tens of millions of dollars in reimbursement to the doctors. based on treatment that was nothing more than moving patients to different locations. several of these patients suffered from illnesses like alzheimer's and dementia and were unable to even communicate with their supposed caregivers or therapists. further, nearly 50 of the defendants in this takedown are charged with fraud related to the medicare prescription drug benefit program known as part d which is the fastest-growing component of the medicare program overall. one owner, in the southern district of florida, received $1.6 million from medicare for prescription drugs that the provider never purchased and never dispensed. another defendant, a doctor in the eastern district of michigan is alleged to have prescribed

unnecessary narcotic pain medication to patients in exchange for the use of their identification information to generate false billings. patients who attempted to withdraw from the scheme were threatened with a law suit access to their prescription narcotics. having deepened these patients of addiction, the doctor used these addictions to keep patients down to their scheme. taken a toll, today's action represents the first large-scale effort to focus on medicare fraud. and demonstrates an expanded federal focus on this important issue. the charges that we are announcing today are the culmination of a truly national effort involving approximately 900 law-enforcement personnel acting in concert to execute a plan of highly coordinated law-enforcement activity stretching across the country from florida to alaska. this takedown, like those before

it, would not have been possible without the key partnerships forged by the strikeforce over the last eight years among federal, state, and local officials and the cooperation spurred by the joint initiative known as the health care fraud prevention and enforcement action team. that was as a result of strike force operations since 2007, we have filed charges against more than 2300 individuals accounting for over $7 billion in medicare losses. this is a crucial part of the department of justice healthcare fraud enforcement efforts, which include the recovery of a total of $15.3 billion through false claims act cases, in cases involving fraud against federal healthcare programs since 2009. these are truly extraordinary figures and they reflect our nationwide commitment to safeguard precious public

resources, to rid our healthcare systems of fraud and abuse and to sustain the integrity of programs that are essential to the public welfare. in the days ahead we will continue our focus on preventing wrongdoing and prosecuting those whose criminal activity drives up medical costs and jeopardizes the system that our citizens trust with their lives. the department of justice is prepared and i am personally determined to continue working with our federal, state, and local partners to bring about the vital progress that all americans deserve. i want to thank all of the law enforcement officials who are part of the team that made this sweeping takedown possible. their tireless efforts enabled us to move quickly and aggressively and their inspiring collaboration will be a model for us going forward. now, at this time i'd like to turn the podium over to secretary sylvia burwell, who's been a

dedicated leader and a truly indispensable partner in this important work and who will provide additional details on today's announcement. thank you so much and now secretary burwell. secretary burwell: thank you attorney general lynch. thanks to everyone for being here today. medicare is the cornerstone of the social compact that we have with our citizens. there is no greater responsibility than ensuring its integrity. that is why eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse is a top priority for the administration and the department of health and human services. we are deeply committed to protecting the medicare and medicaid programs and will not tolerate theft from taxpayers. today's development is a victory for those taxpayers and each of us who will depend on the stability of medicare in the years to come. as attorney general lynch mentioned, this is the largest arrest in the strike force's history both in terms of the number of individuals as well as the dollar amounts. the investigation stretched

across the nation. in fact, this is the first action we've taken to pursue cases in nonstrike force districts. this followed the data. we followed it where it led. it exposed more than 240 suspects and, specifically, we targeted medicare part d. as we identified allegations of fraud like these today, the affordable care act increased medicare's flexibility to suspend payments, to providers pending investigations. and we are using that authority today, stopping payments to certain individuals and entities that are associated with these cases. through excellent investigative work, which included data analytics combined with real time field intelligence, as well as meticulous planning and strategic execution, this team has made real gains in our ongoing fight against fraud. these arrests add to the approximately 2300 people charged as a

result of these operations and the strike force has a conviction rate of 95%. these efforts enhanced by the affordable care act add to the hundreds of millions we have saved through fraud prevention since the law was passed. with new tools like enhanced screening and enrollment requirements, tough new rules and sentences for criminals, an advanced predictive modeling, we have managed to better find and fight fraud as well as stop it before it starts. this administration is committed to working across agencies to better serve our taxpayers. and fighting fraud is a key part of our efforts to build a healthcare system that delivers better care, spends our dollars more wisely, and puts empowered, educated, and engaged consumers at its centers. i applaud the work of the strikeforce. with their help we will continue to be diligent in our fight against waste, fraud, and abuse and in protecting the integrity of these programs.

let today's events be a message to others across the nation. we will not stop here. we will work tirelessly to prevent these programs from becoming targets and fight fraud wherever we find it. that is how we will keep medicare accountable, reliable and strong. and now i'm happy to introduce my colleague f.b.i. director jim coen. f.b.i. director coen: good morning. i want to join the attorney general and secretary burwell in thanking the folks who did the hard work to make these cases possible. i especially want to thank the men and women of the f.b.i. it is their toil and their tenacity that makes possible the work that i get to stand here and talk about in washington. that work every day across this country makes an enormous difference for incredibly vulnerable populations. as both the attorney general and

secretary burwell noted, healthcare fraud is an enormous problem in this country. healthcare spending is 1/6 of our economy. those of you who follow criminal work know that if you want to find criminals you follow the money. there is a lot of money there and so we find a lot of crime there. we have over 2,700 open healthcare fraud cases across the country because that's where the money is. in these cases, we followed the money and found criminals who were attracted to doctors' offices, to clinics, to hospitals, to nursing homes in search of what they viewed as an a.t.m. an a.t.m. that was a freebie to them but was actually filled with taxpayers' money. we see these cases running the gamut from corporate fraud type cases to enterprise type cases to one off rip offs. these crimes take money directly

away from vulnerable populations, people who need this care, old folks, poor folks, people with disabilities. there are no victimless crimes when it comes to healthcare fraud. these offenses harm every single person who pays for their health carry premiums. it harms every business that supports healthcare for their employees. it harms every single taxpayer in the united states. one dollar stolen from our healthcare programs is one dollar too many. how do we make these cases? using the tools we use in our most sophisticated endeavors. we use intelligence to try and understand what are the trends where are the bad guys going next so we can get there before they get there. we use technology to analyze and check huge amounts of electronic information. we use forensic accounting and analysts, extraordinarily smart and talented people to plow through this information to decipher it. we use rapid response teams to surge to where the bad guys are going and we use our bread and butter investigative techniques,

wiretaps, under cover, sources interviews, surveillance. all of the stuff we do to make our most difficult cases. and, last, we rely upon effective partnerships. we do nothing alone especially when it comes to battling healthcare fraud. the partnerships we have forged especially with the h.h.s. inspector general, are vital to this effort. we need help, though, in a different way. we need help from the public. we are doing lots of hard work every day, but there are things that the good folks of this country can do for us and actually i'll name three. the first thing is, if you see something that seems weird to you, or too good to be true, freebies or benefits or prizes or gifts, in connection with healthcare, tell us. if it feels too good to be true it is almost always too good to be true. please let us know when you see such a thing. second, read those forms that come in the mail, your explanation of benefits. i know they seem boring. and i hope they're boring. but they may contain indications that something is going on that we ought to check out. and, last, protect your benefit cards. protect your i.d. numbers as you would protect the vital parts of your identity.

if you see something that makes you feel strange, that makes you think something might be going on, call the f.b.i. or call the h.h.s. inspector general. you're not going to get somebody in trouble unless there is trouble. we investigate things all day every day and some of them turn out not to be something and nobody is harmed. but if you don't tell us about it, we can't check it out. so working together we are going to continue to try to find where the bad guys are going and send a very powerful message that there are significant costs in jail time to this kind of conduct so we can change behavior. with that i'd like to introduce my colleague leslie caldwell assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division. leslie caldwell: thank you director comey. today's takedown is really a prime example of 21st century, data driven policing.

every day the criminal division grows more strategic in our approach to healthcare fraud, to prosecuting medicare fraud. we're analyzing billing data in real time, working with our colleagues at h.h.s., we're targeting hot spots around the country where the data shows that medicare fraud is pervasive, and we are focusing on the types of healthcare services where the data is showing there is a high potential for abuse. we're also using the data and other techniques we've learned over the years to speed up our investigations. and by doing this, we're increasingly able to stop these schemes at the developmental stage before they grow, before they spread, and before they move to other parts of the country. and we're focusing in particular on medical professionals specifically doctors. but also other medical professionals. and so far in today's takedown 19 doctors have been arrested and a total of 44 medical professionals. this approach that we're taking has led to great results like the ones we're seeing today. i also want to just note that our approach to healthcare

fraud, working with our colleagues at h.h.s. and our colleagues in the civil division, is really more than paying for itself. during the period from 2012 to 2014 the average return on investment for the healthcare fraud abuse and control act program was nearly $8 for every dollar that we spent. so in other words, the american public is getting an almost 800% return on its investment in our efforts against medicare fraud. and that includes only the money that we've actually recovered. it doesn't include the decrease in payments that's very significant as a result of the deterrent effect of our efforts. so i want to thank the criminal division lawyers and other employees. i want to thank the u.s. attorneys offices around the country who assisted in the effort. the f.b.i., h.h.s., and many state and local partners on this very successful takedown. i'd like to turn things over to my colleague dan levinson the inspector general of h.h.s./o.i.g.

dan levinson: thank you, leslie, and good morning. as you've heard, today's action marked the nation's largest criminal healthcare fraud takedown effort in history. this week the office of inspector general deplayed more than 300 special agents and forensic specialists alongside hundreds of other law enforcement personnel to execute arrests and search warrants across the country. i want to extend my deepest gratitude to these individuals particularly our nation's law enforcement personnel, who worked over many months to achieve in unprecedented action. the medicare and medicaid programs are critical to the health of millions of americans. those arrested today are suspected of defrauding these programs of more than $700 million, thereby placing greed above patient care. while this operation is almost twice the size of previous takedowns, it does not solve the problem of healthcare fraud. we all have more work to do. for its part in this effort

o.i.g. has focused on and will continue to focus on fraud and medicare prescription drugs, medicare home health services, and medicaid personal care services. fraud in these three areas is especially damaging and undermines our healthcare system. of particular note is fraud and medicare part d in which costs have risen 136% since 2006 to $121 billion last year. our focus on medicare part d continues because more than 41 million americans depend upon that program and its integrity must be protected. investigating and arresting those who threaten the health of our most vulnerable citizens is a top priority for o.i.g. today's efforts represent our commitment to protecting beneficiaries and the vital healthcare programs upon which they rely. thank you. i'd now like to turn the

conference over to the centers for medicare and medicaid services. >> thank you. the collaboration between the strike force and the centers for medicare and medicaid services is having a real impact on protecting medicare and medicaid beneficiaries and preserving these programs. since 2009 there has been a dramatic decline in both durable medical equipment and home health spending by medicare. areas of significant service for c.m.s. and its law enforcement partners. and a national decline in spending on community mental health centers. the strike force has charged thousands of defendants for millions in fraudulent billings and c.m.f. has changed its policies to limit incentives for gaming in this area. the cases and charges announced today are significant. such inappropriate treatment can inflict real harm on patients including those that have endured the risks and trauma of unnecessary treatment and services. this makes our shift to prevention a critical task strengthened by the affordable care act and c.m.s. is working to keep bad

actors out of the program. c.m.s. has paused provider enrollment in high risk areas of the country including five of the strike force cities. this pause allows c.m.s. to work with law enforcement on actions such as these to clean up the base of existing providers. we are also working to suspend medicare payments to providers pending investigations today by stopping payments to certain individuals associated with the cases announced here. finally, c.m.s. is using risk based screening, advanced analytic technology and data sharing with state and private partners to root out ineligible providers in federal programs. these efforts have resulted in the removal of nearly 575,000 enrollments since passage of the affordable care act. c.m.s. is developing additional safeguards such as expanding provider oversight to the part d program to continue to strengthen the medicare program in the future. c.m.s. will continue to work with our law enforcement colleagues, states, and other plans to safeguard patients and the integrity of our programs.

thank you. >> thank you all. any questions? >> attorney general, has there been a change in the status of the search? you were both notified of something while on the stage. just curious if there is any change in the status. attorney general lynch: i can confirm there is a suspect in custody in relation to the shootings in charleston from last evening and of course this moves us into a different phase of the investigation which will be pursued as vigorously and with as complete cooperation as the apprehension of this individual. >> what is it about the facts of this case that prompted you to open a hate crime investigation? attorney general lynch: with respect to the hate crime

investigation, i'm not going to go into the specifics of it particularly because we do have someone in custody. we want to make sure to preserve the integrity of the investigation. but, certainly, some of the elements that came out, that were reported to us, led us to conclude that was a possibility. so we opened it as a hates crimes investigation. now that we have someone in custody we will be exploring all of the motives that might have been in play there. >> will this be prosecuted by the state? attorney general lynch: you know, when we have a case like this we look at where the facts take us. certainly this is an egregious crime. certainly this is a homicide investigation. and we understand that there are families who are grieving incredibly for the loss of their loved ones. but again, we will now be looking at all of the facts, all of the motivations, all of the things that led this individual if he is in fact the shooter to commit this crime and we will determine which are the best ways in which to prosecute the case. >> since the state can pursue the death penalty, what would be the better -- what would be the factors that would lead you to have it be a federal prosecution? attorney general lynch: at this point it's really premature to determine which is

the best venue either state or federal to pursue this matter. first we must confirm this individual is involved in it. we must confirm the nature of his involvement. we must confirm his motivation his intentions. it is really premature at this point to say what would determine that. we do look at a number of factors. >> next question to director comey please. first of all, great graduation speech that you gave the other day. it was very inspiring. and so this is not really an example of effective communication but i have a multi part question on the same topic. is there anything that you can tell us that you've learned about the motivation of this individual, where he obtained a firearm, whether there was any threat to the church ahead of time, and whether there have been any threats to any other churches? anything at all you can tell us on those points? director comey: i'll not walk all the way over there to give

you a nonanswer. i'll let the boss give you the same answer. [laughter] attorney general lynch: no. we're not going to be discussing details of the investigation at this time. certainly and as i mentioned before now that we do have someone in custody we will be conducting as full and thorough an investigation rising out of that circumstance, building on the cooperative work that we have with our state and local partners in south carolina. >> director comey, on the related topic is there any guidance you're giving field offices in terms of outreach to faith communities after this? director comey: as a result of the shooting last night? >> yeah. director comey: the answer is not yet. the attorney general can answer this better than i can as well.

it is something we think about and do quite often. attorney general lynch: well, i can say that with respect to this particular case as with all cases that involve a faith based institution be they a church or a mosque we do have outreach efforts. we do coordinate at the local level to reach out to members of the faith based community who may be either directly affected by this or certainly would have concerns about a matter like this. the type and nature of that outreach would depend upon the nature of the case or the crime and also the -- you know, where people are located. but, certainly, there is outreach going on that will continue. i can also let you know that the department of justice, the civil rights division is on the ground in charleston and the community relations service or c.r.s. division is also on the ground in charleston. they work with all aspects of the community when there's been an event like this. >> do you have any plan -- attorney general, could you provide an update on your investigation -- attorney general lynch: you know, at this point that is still a matter also under active investigation so i am not able to provide any specifics about that. i'm sorry. >> director comey, as long as we're off the topic here may i ask you about a different concern these days and that is the increasing number of arrests we're seeing in isis cases. it does appear a lot of these

cases are isis inspired by social media. do you feel that you have the capability to monitor all the communications you need to, or is a lot of this happening in a space you can't go? director comey: i want to stay away from this mike. i'm too tall for it. we do not have the capability that we need in this respect. isil has spent about a year investing in trying to reach troubled minds in the united states through social me their so-called caliphate to fight or to kill where they stand. increasingly over the last year they have moved those troubled minds to apps that are encrypted and so are dark to us. our job is to find needles in a nationwide hay stack, needles that are increasingly invisible because of end-to-end encryption. this is the going dark problem in high definition. this is what we've been talking about that increasingly there

is significant public safety aspects to the universal strong encryption that we encounter in criminal cases and in national security cases. there are lots of important issues at stake here. privacy is something we all care a lot about. but this is in living high def the going dark problem merging with our counterterrorism problem and so we work every single day to try and find other ways to find those invisible needles but i do not have all the tools i need because of that encryption. >> what's the solution? >> i think the solution is complicated. and i can't stand here and tell you clearly what it is. there is a lot of work going on that the president has directed to try and develop solutions that will surely involve consideration of legislation regulation, cooperation. the companies that are providing communication services don't want folks killed by people using their platforms. so we're having good conversations with them. i'm sure a big part of it is going to be international cooperation. it is a really, really hard problem. but the collision that's going on between important privacy concerns and public safety is significant enough that we have

to figure out a way to solve it. >> there are a number of racialy motivated cases being looked at by your division. is there something larger going on in this country in terms of race relations? attorney general lynch: well, you know, i can't speculate as to the motivations behind every single case and certainly we would want to take a look at that and see whether or not we're seeing any patterns or trends. we do take every issue very seriously. we take every incident very seriously. we investigate it to the fullest extent of the law. we also do that in great cooperation and collaboration with our local counterparts as has been pointed out. sometimes state or local charges might fit a case more appropriately than federal civil rights charges. sometimes the federal civil rights charges are in fact the appropriate ones to bring. so we are finding every case is really unique so we're moving along those lines. >> will you be going to south carolina yourself to look at the

community there? attorney general lynch: you know, i don't know at this point. we certainly will be reaching out to that community. as i indicated earlier, there's already a strong connection there. we have our local u.s. attorney's office and very much involved in this matter as well as state, local, and our civil rights division and our community relations services will be there on the ground. but this certainly is just an unspeakable tragedy. it is a tremendous loss of life. it is a tremendous loss to the community. it's a tremendous loss to the faith community. i believe the pastor was one of the individuals whose life was taken in this event and so we will be looking to provide every support that we can. >> secretary burwell -- i have a healthcare question here. are you satisfied that you've done all you can, the government has done all it can to make this crime more difficult to carry out? is it too easy to commit healthcare fraud? >> i would start with, we

engaged and are using more and more tools. we talked a little bit about those tools. we were given authority as part of the affordable care act to help us with some of those tools. some of the tools we have now that we didn't have before that are very helpful are things like the fact that today we are starting to use the tools that for a broader group we stop payment. another one of those tools that i think is very important is we now do checking at the front end. for anyone who reaches a certain threshold before you can come in and be a registered person to be or provider to get medicare payments you may have to pass through certain other tests in terms of making sure you're able to provide. the other thing we're doing other data and analytics that have been mentioned, to explain what that means is, and that's moving from a pay-and-chase model to a prevention model where what we're able to do is take those data and analytics and when we see things that aren't consistent with a normal pattern we can go at them. the final thing that is important that we're doing now that we

haven't done as much before is the information sharing. we're now getting that information to the state. the state's run was programs. with all that said, we can, and always will, try to do better. we are using them aggressively but want to use them more. >> do you have all the tools and he to respond to a supreme court decision, no matter which way goes? >> with regard to the king versus burwell case, as i have said before, we believe that we hold the correct position with the interpretation of the law. whether that is the comments we have seen, we believe we are and a strong position. if there is an adverse decision --

>> are you ready if there is an adverse decision? >> we need to look at what would happen. it is very important to understand the consequences of the decision. the first is that what will happen and states that do not have a state-based marketplace if the court decides, those subsidies will go away. to give you a sense of the magnitude of that, that is about 6.4 million people in those states. about 85%, those individuals on average receive a subsidy around $260 per mob. they lose that subsidy, so the premium cost goes up. when that happens, it is probable they cannot afford it.

sometimes it is referred to as a death spiral. in the individual market, previously prices were extremely high because only the sickest would go in. now, i can give you the perfect example in charlotte, north carolina, i met the woman who got coverage. her husband had ms, they had covered for him, but she cannot afford coverage for her. when she loses subsidy, what happens is no coverage or ham second person in the mark -- coverage for gher, what that means in the individual market, when more people are going to the emergency room, what that means overall cost. that is what will happen. with regard to us, the question is how does one take care of that problem? we will do everything, and do our best to work with providers

insurers, consumers, and estates on the parts that we can do. as i have said, the critical decision with regards to the subsidies will be provided will sit with governors states, and the congress. >> that convert much. -- thank you very much. >> here are some of our featured program this weekend. on saturday night, ruth bader ginsburg on national issues like gay rights, race relations. sunday that, a profile texas senator ted cruz. on book tv on c-span2, saturday

morning, we are live for the roosevelt meeting festival. authors include christopher o'sullivan, harry hopkins sheila collins and on how books help morale. on sunday night the need of a sexual revolution in the middle east. this weekend we are live from the gettysburg college civil war institute. saturday morning, beginning at 8:30 eastern a discussion on general grant, and mathematics. sunday morning, we continue our live coverage with city college of new york professor on the

consequences of the civil war. later, a discussion on treason. get our complete schedule at c-span.org. >> of johnson was 54 years old which was thrust into the role of first lady. reconstruction in the south, and his own impeachment the life of johnson this sunday night on c-span's original series first ladies. examining the public, and private lives of the woman who filled that role.

>> a recent government report found problems with the tsa's employee vetting process. the house homeland security subcommittee held a hearing on the issue. >> and now recognize myself board opening statement. ability welcome everyone to this hearing. says the start of the congress my subcommittee has actively engaged in number of alarming aspects related to its operations, policies, and procedures. through hearings, oversight inquiries, and legislation, we have been working to get to the bottom of this issue.

recent revelations that individuals with dental terrorists ties demonstrate the need to improve tsa. the findings released by the robert fulner security are indeed alarming. in may, the inspector general released a report saying that psa not have appropriate controls in place. >> tsa did not have appropriate controls in place. news outlets reported test results showing screeners failed to detect hidden threat items 96% of the time. just last week, we learned that 73 airport employees with potential ties to terrorism were issued credentials. these more recent findings come out on the heels of findings of security breaches by employees at major airports.

more recently, we learned of a drug trafficking ring operating out of the airport in oakland. all of these findings are concerning. they shake the public's confidence. they only for the demonstrate the need for leadership to work through the many issues that plague this agency. this committee will continue to lead efforts to close security loopholes, and ensure continuing safety. the purpose of today's hearing is to thoroughly examine the security gaps highlighted in the most recent worker vetting, to ensure these vulnerabilities are addressed. aviation workers are supposed to be thoroughly vetted, due to the

access to sensitive airports, and affected they hold the position of trust in the transportation system. however, there are significant shortfalls of the vetting policies. for example they found it does not have access to all the data as may need to thoroughly check potential ties to terrorism. however, what is even more alarming is that a memo was sent last year noting the need for additional information, and tsa has still yet to resolve this gap. the report also found airports do not match the expiration date . again, while tsa stated they are working to resolve these issues by the end of the calendar year, it raises serious concerns. therefore, i have sponsored the

improved security vetting act of 2015. i introduced last week. along with chairman mccall, and ranking member rice. it will ensure the safety, and security of the transportation network. the reality is, in this post-9/11 world that the terrorist threat is metastasizing, we as a nation must remain responsive to any holes in the security of our transportation systems and ensure the protocols keep pace with the landscape can help close another backdoor of vulnerability at our nation's airports. we have representatives from the t.s.a., d.h.s. inspector general himself, and g.a.o. to address how the recommendations highlighted in the report can be implemented and what tools are needed to improve the security at our nation's airports. i look forward to hearing their

testimony and having a meaningful dialogue and how we can better protect this vital transportation mode and keep aviation safe and secure for the american people. the chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from new york, miss rice, for any statement she may have. miss rice: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for convening this hearing. we have an important question to answer today. how can we do a better job vetting aviation workers? how can we do a better job ensuring that criminals and terrorist can not get a job in one of our airports and gain access to secure areas? clearly if the terrorists were to penetrate an airport in that way, the results could be catastrophic. we have to assume that right now someone is trying to do just that. we have to assume that we can prevent it. we have to keep working together aggressively and proactively to strengthen our security, and stay one step ahead. t.s.a. is responsible for vetting diverse groups of people from the credential program to prechecks to aviation worker programs.

aviation workers themselves are a diverse group of people who play many different and important roles within the commercial airport environment. from the person who works the news stand beyond the security checkpoints to the mechanic who has to access to the plane itself to perform his or her duties. what these two people have in common is they both go to work every day beyond the checkpoints in the secure area of the airport. we have to do everything within our power to ensure people who go to work in these secure areas are exhaustively vetted both before employment and on a recurring basis and prove themselves to be trustworthy. last week the inspector general issued a report that detailed how 73 individuals with links to terrorism were able to get jobs with airlines and vendors and were cleared to access secure areas. that is unacceptable. first we should all be grateful to the inspector general for bringing this to our attention and to know that this threat was

out there to think about what could have happened should be all the motivation we need to work together, act swiftly earnings do what needs to be done to make sure this doesn't happen again. that's why we are here today not to create a spectacle or cast blame. we are here to figure out how this happened what, we need to learn from it and what we need to do to close this gap in our security. i also want to point out that inspector general roth himself noted that t.s.a.'s vetting process was, quote, generally effective. that's not the problem here. as far as i understand there seem to be two main factors that allow this to happen. number one, because the current interagency watch list policy, t.s.a. doesn't have access to database that is would capture the individuals in question and alerted t.s.a. to their terrorism indicators. that, too, is simply unacceptable and has to change. t.s.a. should have had access to all information about these individuals. t.s.a. should have access to any and all information that will make their vetting process as exhaustive as possible.

number two, the report also made it clear that t.s.a.'s only databases are a mess. 87,000 employee files without social security numbers, many with no passport number or proof of citizenship. 300 files with no full name for the employee. there is no excuse for that. it strikes me as i'm sure everyone as sloppy and there is no place for sloppiness when we are dealing with the security of our nation's aviation system. we strive for a security system that's airtight and precise and in order to achieve that, our information must be airtight. everything we do must be precise. the inspector general's office has issued six recommendations all of which help to address these issues. i appreciate the fact that t.s.a. has concurred with these recommendations and taking steps to implement them. i look forward to hearing more about these issues and corrective action today and after this hearing i look forward to taking up legislation authored by myself and chairman katko that will codify recommendations from this report and from another o.i.g. report that details the need for t.s.a. to properly manage its airport screening equipment maintenance

program. i want to thank each one of our witnesses for being here today. i'm eager to hear all of your testimony and have a productive conversation how we can do a better job vetting aviation workers, keeping airports secure and primarily keeping passengers safe. mr. chairman, i thank you again for convening this hearing. i yield back the balance of my time. mr. katko: thank you, miss rice. i know at least the chairman of the homeland security full committee, mr. mccaul, plans on coming here, making a statement. when he comes we'll give him an opportunity to do so. he's at another hearing. i'll extend the same courtesy to mr. thompson if he shows up. with respect to other members of the committee, i want to remind you that opening statements may be submitted for the record. we are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. let me remind the witness that is their entire written statements will appear in our record.

somebody well familiar to this committee and homeland security as a whole mr. roth, welcome back. thank you for your continuing good work, sir. ms. fitzmaurice from the homeland security -- t.s.a., thank you for being here. and ms. grover, thank you for being here as well. i'd like to hear from mr. roth with respect to his opening statement. mr. roth: chairman katko ranking member rice, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the results of our most recent t.s.a. audit. federal regulations that individuals who work in secure areas of commercial airports undergo background checks. t.s.a. and the airports are required to perform these checks before granting individuals badges that allow them unescorted access to secure areas. each background check includes a security threat assessment from t.s.a., including a terrorism check. a fingerprint based criminal history records check. and evidence the applicants authorization to work in the united states. the airports themselves collect this information used for vetting and submit it to t.s.a.

through a contractor. once t.s.a. receives biographic data, it electronically matches it against an extract against the terror screening database to identify individuals with potential links to terrorism. t.s.a. also currently vets airport workers every time it receives a watch list update. based on this review, t.s.a. may direct the airport to grant, deny, or revoke a credential after coordination with other government entities. we found that t.s.a. was generally effective in identifying individuals with links to terrorism. however, we did uncover significant weakness. at our request the national counterterrorism center performed a data match over -- of over 900,000 airport workers who have access to secure areas against the national counterterrorism centers database. as a result of this match, we identified 73 individuals with terrorism related category codes within the database who also had active airport credentials.

according to t.s.a. official current interagency policy prevents t.s.a. from receiving all terrorism related codes during vetting. this lack of access to complete records resulted in t.s.a. not discovering the issue with these 73 individuals. t.s.a. officials candidly recognize not receiving these codes representation a weakness in its program and informs us that t.s.a. cannot guarantee it can consistently identify all questionable individuals without receiving those categories. in 2014 the t.s.a. administrator authorized the staff to dismiss some of the missing category codes for vetting. according to an office of d.h.s. policy, t.s.a. and d.h.s. has yet to formalize the request of the senior agency policy committee in order to receive additional categories of terrorism related records. additionally, we found an issue

with which airport workers are checked for criminal histories. the airports themselves maintain the ultimate authority to review and determine whether an individual's criminal history contains disqualifying crimes under federal law. however, t.s.a. did not have adequate processes in place to ensure that airport operators properly adjudicated these criminal histories. t.s.a. officials informed us that airport officials rarely or almost never documented the results of their criminal history reviews electronically. without sufficient documentation, t.s.a. cannot systematically determine whether individuals with access to secure areas of the airport are free of disqualifying criminal convictions. moreover, under current law and f.b.i. policy, t.s.a. and the airports are not legally authorized to conduct recurrent vetting -- policy, t.s.a. and airports are not legally authorized to conduct current vetting. and individuals authorization to work in the united states, as with criminal histories, it is the airport operators who are required to ensure that aviation

workers are authorized to work before sending their information to t.s.a. for review. t.s.a. then verifies that aviation workers have lawful status. however, our review of t.s.a. data show that t.s.a. has had to deny credentials for over 4,800 applicants because t.s.a. determined they did not prove their lawful status in the united states even after appeal. now, this occurred despite the fact that these individuals had previously been cleared to work by the airports as being legally authorized to work. finally, we looked at the quality of the data involved in worker vetting. t.s.a. relies on airports to submit complete and accurate aviation worker data. however we identified thousands of aviation workers records that appeared to have incomplete or inaccurate biographic information. we made six recommendations in our report. t.s.a. agreed to all the recommendations and provided target completion dates for

corrective actions. we will follow up on the implementation of these corrective actions. mr. chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. i look forward to any questions you or other members of the committee may have. mr. katko: thank you, mr. roth. we appreciate you being here today and our second witness ms. fitzmaurice, the deputy assistant administrator for the t.s.a.'s office of intelligence and analysis. prior to her current role, she served as division director for checkpoint solutions and integrity division within t.s.a.'s office of security capabilities. she's led t.s.a.'s efforts to identify, acquire, and manage state-of-the art technologies and capability that screen passengers at u.s. airports. prior to beginning her federal career, she held management positions with airlines, reporting corporation, u.s. airways, and transstate airlines. the chair now recognizes ms. fitzmaurice to testify.

ms. fitzmaurice: good morning distinguished members of the subcommittee. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify about t.s.a.'s aviation worker investigate program. t.s.a. conducts security threat assessments for more than two million workers requiring badged access to airports. these individuals undergo terrorist watch list checks as well as immigration status and criminal history records checks. t.s.a. checks against the terrorist screening databases are constant and give us real time notification of any changes to the list of known or suspected terrorists so that we can take appropriate action. both the i.g. and independent review of d.h.s.'s vetting processes deem t.s.a.'s vetting to be effective. t.s.a. has made key enhancement to aviation worker vetting through projects that began in 2012. these include the ability for airports to upload immigration and identity documents to

conduct more bust identity verification and immigration checks, and implementing system logic to inject inaccurate information. we'll continue to work on improvements in this area. airport operators are responsible for reviewing f.b.i. criminal history records and ultimately making a determination about granting badges to workers that provide secure access to our nation's airports. according to t.s.a.'s requirements. an airport operator may not issue a badge if t.s.a. deems the individual to be ineligible. airports represent a critical layer of security by making risk based decisions using t.s.a. provided information and locally derived information for the final decision. t.s.a. recognizes the value of conducting more frequent or recurrent criminal checks on workers to identify cases where there has been subsequent criminal activity. t.s.a.'s use of criminal history records checks is considered by the f.b.i. to be for noncriminal justice purposes, according to pre-9/11 law and regulation.

as such, t.s.a. has not had access to criminal checks that are available to law enforcement agencies. however in september of 2014 the f.b.i. implemented a new automated capability called ratback that will provide this service to other agencies such as t.s.a. for a fee. t.s.a. and the f.b.i. have been working together to implement recurrent criminal checks and t.s.a. is planning for initial pilot in the aviation sector to begin later this calendar year. the i.g. recently made several key recommendations on worker vetting, including one that t.s.a. had also identified as an area for enhancement in 2014. namely, that there is additional intelligence related data that may provide value and inform t.s.a.'s vetting decisions. using this data, the i.g. identified 73 cases for additional attention.

to be clear, these individuals are not considered to be known or suspected terrorists. t.s.a. has reviewed all 73 cases and found the individuals do not pose a threat to transportation security and the additional data did not change its original determination for these cases. these additional intelligence records do not meet the reasonable suspicion standards of being considered a known or suspected terrorist by the u.s. government. that being said, t.s.a. recognizes the value of having as much relevant data as possible to make informed decisions in its vetting, and as such, former t.s.a. administrator signed a memo in 2014 for t.s.a.'s request. this information may not only be important for t.s.a. to conduct its security threat assessment but also may allow the t.s.a. to assist the intelligence and law enforcement community by identifying previously unknown associations of known or suspected terrorists.

t.s.a. and the department are aggressively pursuing automated access to the data and working to expedite the process and interagency coordination to complete the request. t.s.a. concurs with all six of the i.g. recommendations and is taking steps to address all of them. in addition to the three items i already mentioned, we will also be including a requirement for inspectors to include verifying and airport badging offices review of applicant criminal history records and legal status, guidance to all regulated airports to ensure the airport badging offices deactivate the badges promptly when an individual's temporary authorization to work in the u.s. ends, and working with airports to analyze denials based on legal status, validate the reasons for the denial, and issue guidance to airports to address any weaknesses. the i.g. findings support our efforts to improve the vetting of regulated aviation workers and complement the steps t.s.a. has taken to address the potential insider threat vulnerability at u. u.s. airports.

we recognize the value of complete and accurate information when conducting vetting, and we will continue to identify areas for improvement. t.s.a. appreciates the work of the i.g. during the course of this audit, and we will use the information to enhance our processes going forward. i look forward to answering your questions. mr. katko: thank you for your t our third witness is his jenny grover, director of the homeland security and justice team at the government accountability office. her portfolio includes g.a.o. reviews of t.s.a. and coast guard programs and operations. ms. grover joined the g.a.o. in 1991. the chair now recognizes her to testify. ms. grover: good morning chairman katko, ranking member rice, chairman mccaul, and other members and staff. i'm pleased to be here today to discuss t.s.a.'s implementation and oversight of the aviation worker program which t.s.a. and airports used to determine whether airport workers pose security threats. t.s.a. in collaboration with airport operators and the f.b.i. completes applicants' background known as security threat

assessments for airport facility workers, retail employees, and airline employees. in general, security threat assessments include checks of an applicant's criminal history immigration status, and known links to terrorism. t.s.a. and airport operators have different responsibilities within the process. airport operators collect applicant information and send it to t.s.a. for the security threat assessment. t.s.a. reviews the results of the terrorism and immigration checks to determine if the applicant meets the eligibility criteria for holding and airport credential. t.s.a. transmits the results of the f.b.i. criminal history checks which contains information from a national fingerprint and criminal history system back to the airport operator for review. based on this information, the airport operator evaluates the criminal history to identify potentially disqualifying criminal offenses and then makes a determination of eligibility.

the airport also enrolls applicants and issues a credential providing for access to secured areas of the airport. t.s.a. has faced long-time challenges obtaining the necessary criminal history information to accurately assess aviation workers. in december, 2011, we found that limitations in the criminal history checks increased the risk that agency was not detecting all applicants with potentially disqualifying criminal offenses. for the purposes of accessing f.b.i. criminal history records, t.s.a. is considered a noncriminal justice requester. similar to that of a private company conducting an employment check on a new applicant. as a result, the information that t.s.a. received on aviation worker applicants was often incomplete. for example, at the time of our report, t.s.a. did not have access to many state records with information on sentencing release date, and parole or probation violations.

we recommended that t.s.a. and the f.b.i. jointly assess the extend to which this limitation posed a security risk and consider alternatives. t.s.a. and the f.b.i. concluded that the risk of incomplete information could be mitigated through improved access to statesupplied records. expanding the criminal history information that's available to t.s.a. for these threat assessments. our remaining vulnerability as others have noted this morning is that until recently t.s.a. did not conduct periodic criminal history checks of airport workers after they had been hired. in fact, workers who maintained continuous employment with the same airport authority did not undergo any subsequent criminal history checks. in april, 2015, t.s.a. changed this policy by requiring periodic criminal history checks of all credential airport workers with unescorted access to secure areas of the airport. according to this requirement,

t.s.a. will conduct these checks until they are able to establish a system for real time recurrent criminal history checks, similar to the way that t.s.a. conducts recurrent vetting against the terrorism database for their aviation workers. in conclusion, with more complete and updated information about applicant and current worker criminal histories, t.s.a. and airports are in a better position to identify all individuals with criminal offenses. the new requirement to periodically conduct criminal history checks is a positive step while t.s.a. and the f.b.i. work toward actual implementation of the ratback service. chairman katko, ranking member rice, chairman mccaul, this concludes my statement. i look forward to your questions. mr. katko: the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. mccaul, for any statement he may have. mr. mccaul: thank you chairman katko, ranking member rice for holding this important hearing.

recent reports about the t.s.a. screening in my view are deeply disturbing and call into question some of the post 9/11 security measures we worked hard to put in place. 14 years after that horrible day, islamist terrorists are still plotting daily to kill americans. lately the threat picture has gotten worse. our aviation sector is of particular interest to the terrorists. they think that by taking down airplanes they can bring down our economy. last week we reportedly hit al qaeda's number two in a drone strike in yemen where the terror group has been focused for years on developing bonds to plant on airplanes. it was an important counterterrorism victory. but it won't stop terrorists from aiming their sights at our skies. as we stare down these threats congress and the american people need confidence. terrorists only have to be right to be once.

to defend ourselves we have to be right 100% of the time. millions of travelers pass-through our nation's airports every year, and we need to know the systems in place will protect them. but in recent weeks, t.s.a. has given us more concern than confidence. reports about t.s.a.'s performance have alarmed the american people and raised fears that bombs could pass-through airport passenger screening and terrorists might slip through t.s.a.'s employee vetting. we need to get to the bottom of these claims and do everything possible to deny terrorists an opportunity to exploit our defenses. next month i plan to hold a hearing on aviation security with the new t.s.a. administrator. once he is confirmed, i want him to outline his vision for t.s.a. and give us answers on how he will close any identified vulnerabilities. this will not be easy. but in order to win the confidence of the american

people, t.s.a. needs a good wire brushing and strong leadership. we cannot become complacent about the threat. we can and must improve our screening capabilities and we need aviation workers who are thoroughly vetted. as a first step to tackle these challenges, i'm co-sponsoring h.r. 2750, the improved security vetting for aviation workers act introduced by chairman katko. which codifies the inspector general's six recommendations to ensure there are no loopholes in the security background checks or aviation workers. i'm also strongly support h.r. 2770, the keeping our travelers safe and security act, introduced by ranking member rice. which will close additional screening gaps and strengthen our aviation security. i want to thank the d.h.s. inspector general roth for his leadership and strong oversight of t.s.a. and d.h.s. and

bringing these vulnerabilities to our attention. i also want to thank the t.s.a. and g.a.o. witnesses here and i hope they are committed to changing the agency's direction and restoring the trust of the american people. when i heard that 73 airport workers had ties to terrorism, when i got that news, -- first of all i couldn't believe it and i want additional briefings on these ties to terrorism, but that is totally unacceptable 14 years after 9/11. i think the american people deserve better. when we see the grandma, the veteran, active duty service the children being patted down at these airports and water bottles being taken out of luggages and all that's going on, yet 96% of the stuff gets through. and we can't talk about what it is because it's classified, but 96, that's a 4% success rate.

the american people deserve better. and they deserve to feel safe when they travel on airplanes. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. mr. katko: thank you very much mr. chairman mccaul. i now recognize myself for five minutes to ask questions. i'll start with mr. roth. briefly summarizing your -- the findings in your report and the recommendations, you recommend basically four broad categories of recommendations. i just want to make sure i got them right. number one, t.s.a. should request and review additional watch list data, is that correct? mr. roth: correct. mr. katko: they require that airports approve verification of applicants' rights to work correct? mr. roth: correct. mr. katko: they revoke credentialings when the right to work expires? mr. roth: correct. mr. katko: to improve the quality of investigate. does t.s.a. agree? ms. fitzmaurice: yes, they do.

mr. katko: mr. roth, could you tell me -- you mentioned during your testimony 900,000 individuals, employees nationwide, run through that national counterterrorism centers database is that correct? mr. roth: yes, sir. mr. katko: how onerous was it? mr. roth: the actual task of running it and actually nctc did it for us. the legal authorization for it took some time. we had to get a memorandum of understanding between t.s.a. and nctc to do it. it took 18 months to get the legal authorizations that we needed to do it. because of the requiring of the data matching act. legally and bureaucratically it was a huge list. but actually to do the match was easy. mr. katko: so the mechanical checking against the database,

once those hurdles are cleared is relatively easy. mr. roth: the size of the data not that large. it was not that big of a task to match one set of data against the other set of data. mr. katko: if we can fix these hurdles, it should be relatively easy task to have this vetting going to the database on a regular basis. mr. roth: yes, sir. mr. katko: i'd like to know when t.s.a. first became aware of this problem with respect to not getting appropriate codes to run names through database. and i know from at least may of 2014 there was a memo to administrator pistole advising they needed additional codes for employee screening, correct? ms. fitzmaurice: correct. mr. katko: is that when the administrator first became aware of the problem? so may of 2014, at least, the head of t.s.a. was aware of the fact they were getting incomplete data regarding employees and that may affect whether individuals are working across the country with

terrorist ties. ms. fitzmaurice: yes. t.s.a. receives watch list information that is maintained by the f.b.i.'s terror screening center. that information is the information we primarily use in our vetting process that. is who the federal government has deemed to be known or suspected terrorists and meets the reasonable suspicion standard which is why that has been shared with us for the watch listing purposes. what we are seeking access to is additional intelligence related information that is contained in the nctc's tide database. it's important to understand that the information that is in -- that the information on the watch list but not everyone in tide is a terrorist and meets that reasonable suspicion standards to be put on the watch list.

mr. katko: the fact remains there is at least 73 individuals that have -- had potential ties to terrorism that were not identified because you did not have the appropriate information, correct? ms. fitzmaurice: that's correct. we are seeking access. we did review all of the cases t. those 73 individuals, and have determined that they do not pose a threat to transportation security. mr. katko: who made that determination? ms. fitzmaurice: t.s.a. mr. katko: anybody outside of t.s.a. make that determination? ms. fitzmaurice: when we look at individuals who may have nexus to terrorism, we oftentimes consult with various law enforcement and intelligence community partners. mr. katko: did do you that? ms. fitzmaurice: as part of our regular process. mr. katko: according to the tide database, t.s.a. made their own

independent determination that they don't pose a threat? ms. fitzmaurice: t.s.a. reviewed all of the records on these individuals and determined they did not pose a threat to transportation. that is part of t.s.a.'s day in and day out process. but every time we understand that someone may have a potential nexus, they may not be designated as a known or suspected terrorist, we do do that consultation with the i.c. and other law enforcement. mr. katko: i want to make sure you're answering the question. brief yes or no. did you conduct with people outside of t.s.a. before you made the determination that these 73 individuals who were on the database don't pose threats to t.s.a.? ms. fitzmaurice: yes. mr. katko: that's something we can see in a secure setting? ms. fitzmaurice: yes, in a secure setting. mr. katko: the biggest concern i have is the amount of time it takes and what the concern -- when it's raised until t.s.a. acts upon it.

from a guideline standpoint we have may of 2014 is when the information was brought to inspector -- administrator pistole, correct? ms. fitzmaurice: yes, sir. mr. katko: what did t.s.a. do after that? as of a year later the problem has not been fixed. tell us what you have been doing. ms. fitzmaurice: the administrator signed a letter regarding information to receive access to information. we have been engaged in ongoing discussions in the interagency to receive access to this information. i just recently came back to the office of intelligence and analysis in march. since my return to the office have had numerous interagency discussions on this topic. and we are working to expedite this process and our request to gain access to this information.

mr. katko: with all due respect, requesting to expedite this process. it's been a year. right? it's been a year and you realize what could be a potentially serious security gap, obvious, it's been a year. that doesn't sound like it's being expedited. ms. fitzmaurice: i understand your point. we are working very hard to gain access to this information. mr. katko: when you say very hard what does that mean? quite frankly, with respect to employee screening at airports we have had this problem since 2011. we are still talking about problems with employee screening at airports four years later. we hear the same thing from t.s.a. all time. we are working on it. with all due respect, i know you're just the person here filling in for someone who is unavailable, that's not acceptable. you have the nation's security in your hands. this agency does. and to sit there and give us a bureaucratic response we are working on it in a expedited manner, you are talking about a gap in terrorist watch lists and you're saying you're working on it? ms. fitzmaurice: we are working

ms. fitzmaurice: we are working on it what's important to understand is that we do receive the terror screening database, and those are the individuals that are deemed to be threats to transportation security. we do vet all of the aviation workers against those and we have taken action on those. what we are seeking to do now is gain access to additional information that will assist us in providing fuller contact of who these individuals are and potentially identify unknown associations. mr. katko: the point is, i ask you to take it back to your supervisors and make the point crystal clear to him, mr. rogers and i have made it clear to him, the fact remains t.s.a. is not responding in a timely manner to seemingly very important issues. as it stands right now, were it not for the i.g. report, i highly doubt we would be any closer to getting access to the tide database. the tide database identified 73 people you didn't know about that may have had ties to terrorism.

your determination whether or not they have ties to terrorism is an internal thing that we'll take look at. bottom line is it needs to be more quickly done. we cannot have a bureaucratic morass in charge of guarding our airports. just can't. with that i yield my questioning to the ranking member, miss rice. miss rice: thank you, mr. chairman. miss glover, you mentioned something in your testimony that the t.s.a. is not qualified as a law enforcement agency which limits the ability for them to get relevant information regarding someone's background. is that a change that needs to be made to expand the databases that t.s.a. would have access to to ensure that the vetting can be as thorough and complete as possible? ms. glover: this has been a topic of discussion for many

years. the compact act from 1998 is what set the requirements for requesters that were considered to be having criminal justice access versus noncriminal justice access. when we did our work several years ago, t.s.a.'s position was that they didn't really fit neatly into either one of those categories. it was their position that the noncriminal justice access records wasn't meeting their needs, which it clearly was not, because at the time they only had access to information from about 15 states. and really didn't have information that they needed to make a complete determination of eligibility. they have worked with the f.b.i. in the past f.b.i. has determined that they are not eligible for the different status as a criminal justice requester and has expanded the database. so i believe now they have access to information from about 41 states and that certainly

comes much closer to meeting their needs. miss rice: but that's not going to be complete until they have access to all 50. they are treated for all intents and purposes like a law enforcement agency. we have to deal with that change. you answered the second question. ms. fitzmaurice one of the first things you said in your testimony was that the vetting process by the t.s.a. has been found to be effective whether it's mr. roth our your finding. sitting here, how is that a conclusion when we are talking about all of threes deficiencies. let me provide context. the inspector general as part of his report did say they found our vetting processes to be generally effective. additionally, several years back, the department sponsored a review of d.h.s.'s vetting programs and we participated in that and the review of that

found that t.s.a. system was actually one of the best performing and effective systems that d.h.s. has in the vetting enterprise. i think one of the key things we have to keep in mind is the information we have access to. we have very sophisticated vetting system that takes millions of records and vets that against the databases of known and suspected terrorists. but we are absolutely dependent on having access to the right information about individuals who pose a threat to transportation security and who also may have some value from an intelligence standpoint. additionally, as has been highlighted, the other piece is important on the information that we receive on the applicants who are seeking to work in our transportation system.

so we are focused on those areas right now. but what my comment was specifically referencing was the effectiveness of the system we have built is very complex. miss rice: i think it's clear after today and clear much earlier. we can't use that word effective. in my opinion. mr. roth, i just want to ask you, you said that t.s.a. denied credential to 4,300 applicants. who had previously been found to be ok. can you just elaborate on that? you know what i'm making reference to. mr. roth: with regard to immigration status. miss rice: how did that happen? mr. roth: how could this happen? the airports are legally responsible for ensuring immigration status that these folks have lawful authority to work. they do that. by the time they send it to t.s.a. they are basically certifying -- miss rice: they being who? mr. roth: the airport operators. with the certification that these folks are legally able to work. miss rice: this is a deficiency on the part of the airport operator.

mr. roth: what the t.s.a. does they take that information and bounce it off c.i.s. records and that's where we found the discrepancy. miss rice: it's clear, i think from what we are hearing here today that post 9/11, 14 years post 9/11, we still have federal agencies and some private operators who are follow relevant information in a way that could lead to a catastrophe. how do we fix that, mr. roth? mr. roth: well, certainly the airports themselves under law have the obligation to certify whether someone meets the criminal history check. in other words, they are void of any disqualifying criminal offenses. that's 450 airports across the country. t.s.a. is obligated to do a quality check on that. because these aren't electronic records, they have to do a manual review.

if they do an airport inspection, they might do a manual review in the larger airports only 1% of the applications to determine whether or not the airport workers who have the badges have disqualifying criminal offenses. miss rice: i got to tell you that's one of the most disturbing things i heard here. airport operators are not doing their due diligence to ensure people they are sending to you to get the stamp of approval they are not giving you the relevant information. that you need. mr. roth: i share your concern. it's especially concerning given the fact that there are no layers of security. once you have a badge, that means you have unescorted access to anywhere in the airport. you can load baggage, can you have access to the aircraft, you can do basically anything unescorted. that is concerning if we don't have a better understanding of who these airport workers are. miss rice: certainly the airport operators have to assume an enormous amount of accountability and responsibility. we have to figure out a better way to check to make sure that the information that they are

giving to the t.s.a. is correct. thank you, mr. roth. ms. fitzmaurice, and ms. glover. i yield back. mr. katko: the chair now recognizes mr. rogers from alabama for questions. mr. rogers: thank you, mr. chairman. mr. roth, this could be for miss fitzmaurice, both of you made statements that inferred you don't have access to database that is would give you the relevant information to make sure that the staffers don't get the badges s that what i'm hearing? you made reference a while ago you can't do your job without access to important information. you're saying that you don't have that access? ms. fitzmaurice: we do have access to the terrorist watch list data. what we are seeking is additional intelligence information on individuals. and we are working through the interagency currently to request that. mr. rogers: is that an existing

database you want access to? ms.fitzmaurice: to be able to incorporate additional data into our process. mr. rogers: heretofore you have been told you have not had access or something you thought of? ms. fitzmaurice: when we recognized the value, we worked to gain access. mr. rogers: you knew about it before now. i'm trying to figure out why at this late time you're just now saying, we probably should have access to that database. if it was a database that had -- ms. fitzmaurice: the watch list are determined to be individuals who pose threats to transportation and we receive those watch lists for purposes of our vetting.

i think what we have recognized over time through our experience and vetting individuals and understanding the additional intelligence information that's contained in tide, we believe we can supplement the value of what we do by identifying potentially individuals who may be unknown. mr. rogers: who controls that database now? ms. fitzmaurice: by the nctc. mr. rogers: are they giving you any problems about access? is it a technical issue? ms. fitzmaurice: this is a coordination discussion right now. the vetting systems are complex. we have the airports.

we have the airlines. they are submitting information to us. we have our systems that's actually doing the assessments. we are getting information from the watch listing community. it's more of a complexity of that interagency coordination process. mr. rogers: how long will it take to work through that? ms. fitzmaurice: we have had frequent and ongoing discussions on this matter and i would expect we'll be able to work through it in the very near future. mr. rogers: that's very lawyerly. ms. fitzmaurice: i'm not a lawyer. mr. rogers: you sound like one. >> that hurts me because i'm a lawyer. mr. rogers: i'm a recovering attorney, too. that's why i know one when i see one. 60 days? 90 days? ms. fitzmaurice: we are having daily conversations on this topic. even as frequent as this afternoon we'll continue those discussions on how we can seek and gain the access. mr. rogers: mr. roth, what she just described what you're making reference to? mr. roth: it's a little more complicated than that from our point of you view. there are a number codes or categories of individuals or names in the large tide database.

some of those are in fact, known or suspected terrorists that t.s.a. does not have access to. and then there are others that are out there that are simply in the large tide database that are not used for watch listing purpose, although t.s.a. would like them to be noted for watch listing purposes. so there's two categories of information. some that's already vetted information, for example, there are several of these categories that other components within d.h.s. gets, but t.s.a. doesn't get. mr. rogers: why? mr. roth: it's difficult to describe in an opening setting. we can certainly explain it later on if you wish. mr. rogers: i do. let me ask, is this the first time that you've done an i.g. report on this problem? mr. roth: we have done reports on access badges in general, control over access badges. this is the first time we have done a data run comparing the badges to the terrorist databases.

mr. rogers: do you agree with ms. fitzmaurice's characterization that the 73 people identified with terrorist ties weren't a problem? mr. roth: we don't have information as to the process the t.s.a. used once we gave them those names in november of last year. i would say that the more information that you have, the better decisions that you make. so whether or not these 73 individuals in fact do not pose a threat to terrorism doesn't mean that the system's working perfectly. mr. rogers: my time's up. i hope one of the other members will pick up on this. i would like to know if they weren't a problem, why were they on the list. i yield back. mr. katko: the chair now recognizes mr. payne from new jersey for questioning.

mr. payne: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to the ranking member of this committee. mr. roth, bit of a confusing element in your most recent report. how t.s.a.'s vetting process can be considered generally effective, yet 73 individuals with links to terrorism were not found during this process. seems a little contradictory. can you elaborate? mr. roth: thank you for that opportunity . when we talk about generally effective, what we are talking about is the operation that the vetting unit does within t.s.a. they are only as good as the information they get. so they do a very significant job, for example they have over 2.2 million recurring investigate hits they have to process every year. that's about 6,000 per day. additionally, they have to actually manually review 24,000 records a year.

that's 2,000 records a month. 500 records a week to look at potential hits off the terrorism screening database to see whether or not these are the individuals who are listed on the database itself. so they do a good job with the information that they have. but again, what we have said is that we uncovered a vulnerability which is they didn't have all the information they needed to do their job. mr. payne: basically with the volume, if it was other than an issue of terrorism, it would be considered not that bad, but the potential 73 individuals, you only need one to have ill will. against this country. mr. roth: that is the nature of the threat t.s.a. faces. it's and asymmetric threat.

all it takes is one and they have to be right every single time. mr. payne: your report acknowledges passport numbers or social security numbers being strong matching elements, yet neither is required during the application process. in your view can t.s.a. effectively identify potential risk if such elements are discounted? mr. roth: i think it makes their job more difficult. one of the things with regard for example the social security numbers, that's probably the best identifier you can use as far as an individual to be able to match an applicant off of a database, unfortunately the privacy act, which has some exemptions, does not exemption t.s.a. from requiring badge applicants to have social security number. that is something that i think would be a useful thing to have. mr. rogers: what leverage do we have with the operators if they are not complying, and giving the information.

there is a lapse with the airport operators in doing that job. what leverage do we have to make sure they are complying? ms. fitzmaurice: before we get to the compliance, what is important it is working closely with the airport operators to identify the areas for improvement. to put out guidance of how we can do that, work with them to implement that, then it sure we have a robust compliance mechanism to go back and review, to ensure they're are doing that. and take corrective action if we continue to find that they are not complying with that. mr. rogers: what do those actions consist of? we are having continued issues around them getting to where we need them to be. what leverage do we have? if they are falling short? ms. fitzmaurice: we do have

formal security programs that they are required to comply with. we have inspectors who go out and review their performance against those requirements. i am not intimately familiar with the consequences with respect to it there are issues of compliance. mr. rogers: what can we do to strengthen the relationship tsa has with the airports? ms. fitzmaurice: thank you. we continuously look at this. we can cover the recommendations that the oig has made in this area going back to 2012. we have been making improvements, putting in systems, logix, so that -- logics so that it can upload

identity documents. we have that to review. looking forward, i think there are continued opportunities. one of the things we're looking at for further automation is in the process. the way the information comes from the airport operators to us is through automated, and some manual processes. we are looking to move towards a fully manual process that will reduce the opportunity for erroneous data to be submitted. mr. rogers: i yield back. mr. katko: the chair now recognizes mr. ratcliffe from texas. mr. reckless -- ratcliffe: i have to say, it feels like the movie groundhog day. where dissenting skip happening over and over again. we have had several hearings on

this matter. most recently in april. earlier this month, we had the reports about officials being able to get banned items through security checkpoints 95% of the time. now, we have your report revealing that tsa failed to identify these 73 active workers with the links to terrorism citing lack of controls in your report. you conclude with this statement -- we at another vulnerability that tsa must now address. i agree with you. tsa does need to address these issues.

as chairman mccall noted, it is now been almost 14 years since 9/11, some of what i've seen in your report calls to mind the troubling pre-9/11 trend that we had. i know you are a former department of justice official. a former assistant to the united states attorney. as you know, we had a problem before 9/11 where law enforcement was not shipping information, or connecting the dots. we had an excuse back then -- the law did not allow it. we changed of the law. i want to ask you about your report. use a tsa did not identify these individuals because tsa isn't cleared to receive all terrorism categories under the current agency guidance. that i restate that accurately? ms. fitzmaurice: