today, if i said write a law that in some period of time, simply ignoring it again. any reasonable amount of time, without a stick. i don't want the fines, but how do i do it any other way? >> i think it was brought up in many occasions today, i think from the onset of the 2008 safety act, the date that was agreed upon, once we got into the significant challenges. >> i understand is not a deadline that will be met. we need to extend the deadline. i hope the congress deadline. i hope the congress can come together and do this. at the same time once we do it, how do we avoid a bad actor from simply ignoring it again. any reasonable amount of time, without a stick. i don't want the fines, but how do i do it any other way? >> i think it was brought up in many occasions today, i think from the onset of the 2008 safety act, the date that was agreed upon, once we got into the significant challenges. >> i understand where we are today, if i said write a law that in some period of time, some reasonable amount of time we will have this done. hattaway then enforce that if i don't have funds or fines? >> i think we have to look at it at that time that the key issue is were not going to meet the deadline. it's not from lack of deadline. it's not from lack of effort. >> i respect that but i don't

know any other way to enforce it among bad actors. good actors don't need it but bad actors do. i imagine you have fines for your partners that don't meet their deadlines. i do think the federal government should be participating and supporting this. i need 17 other i need 17 other members to agree with that. in the meantime, we can't do anything. i think it's pretty clear to me that we have to do something, but to pretend we do nothing or pretend that goodness will simply overcome the lack of goodness is ridiculous and unenforceable. we need to come up with a reasonable timeframe and allow ms. find feinstein to enforce the law. i don't want to find anyone. we can dance around and point angers and show what happened five years ago, seven years ago, ten years ago, but since 1969 according to the end tsb, preventable accidents have killed 246 people and have injured 4263. i don't know how many funds have been lost because no one's put that together. if it's a 200 million-dollar cap, it's hard to tell but it seems to me just rough numbers but it looks like

the cap would've been about $20 billion. this is a doable action. it is an action that pays for itself and has been proof positive by metrolink. help us work with you to get it done. by the way, mr. mathias you had 800 polls but that doesn't count the 11,000 you 11000 you did earlier. you million-dollar cap, it's hard have posted 20000 across the country that have been approved. so we very got two thirds of the locations approved and ready to go. is that right? >> correct. >> thank you for your indulgence. >> safety is my first priority and there's no question. positive train control is

enough necessary tool to improve safety. the fact of the safety. the fact of the matter is most railroads will not have the technology installed by december 31, 2015 deadline. today i'm wondering what happens on january 1, 2016 if the deadline remains? today ms. feinberg committed to holding the railroads accountable if they do not meet the deadline including potential fines and restrictions of service. if the deadline is not extended what actions will the railroads likely take? i want to know what's going to happen on january we certainly worry about that. it is it is an untenable situation klaxon your testimony you mentioned

concerns with the main rail conference about the ability of commuter rail property past the deadline as it relates to a reliability and coverage. can you further describe what issues would prevent commuter rail that does not meet the deadline for operating? clicks well, when we were at the conference the question was raised on whether we could operate or individual agencies can operate past the deadline because you are operating outside the confines of the

law. all the commuter railroads are going with their risk andall the commuter railroads legal teams to take a look and see if that is the case clicks metro won't make the december 312015 deadline. will not make the deadline. if the worst worst-case scenario occurs and commuter rail does not receive

flexibility how would commuters who rely upon metro or other rail except the impact that operation changes? >> that would depend on the degree of what actually happens. if rail awards were forced to cut down that would put 300,000 passengers on the roads that are already congested which would not be a good solution. >> in pennsylvania the onboard vehicle locomotive system installations and you cited in your testimony one of the biggest challenges is onboard software, and that final election date is not yet known. can you tell known. can you tell us why this is such a challenge? >> i do not have that knowledge. >> in the very beginning it was somewhat theoretical and the

way that the regulation was published in terms of what it had to accomplish. and and so we took a system that was much smaller, much less complicated and much less mature through the last seven years and worked to the.where it can comply with all the regulations and functionality that has been required. i tell you from a software perspective they're getting closer and he arguably the end of the year we can have a piece of software that is very close. the same close. the same time we have committed to not implement software that has any critical defects or severe defects but we are willing to deploy software with median or modern defects. not really trying to get to perfect, we are making sure that it can provide the functionality and does not create a situation where there and a safety problem introduced. just in the

last month or so we have found a safety critical defect in the onboard software which must be corrected, retested, taken to corrected, retested, taken to the field, and the same holds true. these are people, this is their business, what they do for living. if they're unable to tackle the technical challenge has been put in front of us, that gives you understanding of the complexity of the challenge that we have because it is just one piece of the puzzle. just one piece of the puzzle. clicks thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. clicks thank you, and i would like to recognize ms. brown. brown. i will turn it over to mr. akita. one piece of information for the record. this is from

california high-speed rail their june 2009 request for funding. on there. on their request the request 230 million from the investment strategy from those funds that have been allocated to california. the the map where it shows exactly where those improvements would be. can you zoom that in? clearly move it up. this court or right here, positive train control, $230 million. california high-speed rail thinks that they can do it. this is this is in california. we want to safety improvement there. >> mr. chairman, understood. passed me a note in the hearing that states that high-speed rail funding is in $328 million. we will $320 million. we will follow up and

look at those numbers together. >> thank you. we continue this ongoing exchange and i would like to recognize ms. brown for our second round of questioning. >> thank you. indulge me for a moment. amtrak had not implemented positive train control from new haven to boston. not not only did they implement but it was the first in the country, and i want to submit that for the record. metro fly visited with several times, i just want to mention that you have the support of the state and local recovery money. budget is an issue for all of those. let's those.

let's don't sit here and act like it is not. a a lot of local resources are not available. with that i want to go on. i want to say great things,, but you are the one here representing platform railroads. positive players. we need an extension, the idea that we're going to start fining people. i i want the money to go and the system. >> there are no bad actors. they use the major us class once. the challenge. the canadian railroads of a slightly smaller footprint. they don't run as much as the united states and there is no band aid income of 25 in canada. at least in the

class one world there are no bad actors. >> that is not what i have heard. are i have heard. are you working with the commuter lines? >> we are. we have commuters in and around dc, chicago, and a full spectrum of commuters and amtrak that run from baltimore to boston. active discussions with them all the time. the committee etcher. did our best to try to help educate folks so they would not have to face the same challenges as they deployed on their railroads. we had we had a good dialogue. we had a good dialogue and have

kept it. another meeting planned for later this year we can reengage and reassess where we are. >> what is the dropdead amount of time that you need? >> as an industry hardware complete by 2018 we want to make sure everyone understands by the end of 2018 we will have an 87 percent of the ptc footprint installed and implemented based upon current plans, plans that were in place shortly before the tragedy and the remaining 13 percent is what comes from those last two years. literally we are starting to deploy operational modes right now. it ramps up from here through the end of

2012. >> how long will it take you to inspect? you have work to do. >> they would submit a plan which we would turn around to them and then they complete implementation and things would move quite quickly. the issue is that you would be three years past the deadline. >> everybody understand that. it is not realistic and we have concerns. i have a real concern. we talked a lot about it. even it. even when implemented what about the local responders? we need to be able to talk to each other. and then katrina. even even though there implement a something and amtrak is

implementing, you have those local responders. how come we do not have a dedicated line for emergency in this country. >> working hard to create an infrastructure for national interoperable public safety communication system. i think i think that is being addressed in that way in a separate spectrum band and being handled in a separate process. >> we really need to get this done. thank you. clicks i think the generally appreciate everyone's testimony. and i laster she's on a panel with several union members and done. thank you. clicks i think the generally appreciate others. wonder what your thoughts on the statement. we will look for the opportunity. >> last hearing ms. miss

feinberg ms. feinberg said they are looking at having a two-person crew situation as an internal solution along with some additional backstops as well. until ptc is implemented for deadline after deadline. would you would you be supportive? >> well, i think it is not necessary. commuter side of the house. we have crewmembers in the train itself.

>> operate with 1% in 1 percent in the cabin 2 percent of the money. we don't support that initiative clicks you currently have two people. clicks is already being done. what industry-leading support of having two-person crews as an interim solution? is just not necessary with respect to give him where we are in the stuff you would have

to go through to remove one member clicks okay. thank you. the only thing i would ask the record is in addition to the other things ms. feinberg may or may not, she now has apparently sent him to the hospital. which obble gates me have to go

visit him. add that to the stack. with that my questions are done. i don't see any more questions from members. so on behalf of the chairman let me thank you each for coming today. we thank members of the audience. we move forward. hearing no other business before the committee this hearing is adjourned.

the committee will come to order. scuke that my complete opening statement be made part of the record.

record. i am afraid we will have posted a few minutes. let me say, in my view our nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of all of our defense efforts as well as a source of stability around the world, and in my opinion for too long we have taken it for granted neglecting the systems, infrastructure, and people involved in making all of those complex machines safe, reliable, and effective. unfortunately, the investment that we have made in delivery systems and weapons in the past are all aging at about the same time which presents us with a substantial challenge, especially when we emerge that with what other nations are doing. the committee has had a series of events over the course of the past week or so,, classified and unclassified, looking at various aspects of this problem. i understand the oversight investigations subcommittee will have a further hearing on this matter this afternoon. so i think it is appropriate that we have our witnesses with us today to examine these issues. i look

forward to introducing them in a moment mr. smith has been detained for a brief time. in his absence i yield to the distinguished in woman from rhode for comments. >> thank you. on behalf of the committee i welcome my witnesses today. i look forward to your testimony. mr. smith is at a physical therapy appointment and will be here shortly. he welcomes you and in the interest of time, mr. chairman, without objection i submit the full statement for the record and yield back clicks i thank the gentleman and without objection, so ordered. let me welcome our distinguished witnesses. your presence is evidence of the seriousness with which the administration takes this issue. we. we're pleased to welcome the deputy secretary of defense, deputy secretary of energy, and the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

let me also say, adm., the odds are this may be your last hearing in front of the house armed services committee, and my memory is something like 37 years. thank you for all of those years, not only in your current job or we have been able to work with you on a number of issues but an incredible history of service. thank you and congratulations. mr. sec., you mr. secretary, you are recognized for any comment you would like to make. without objection your written statements will be made part of the record. you may have to punch the button to get the microphone >> i want to thank you and the members of the committee for the support you continue to show. i and everyone in the department greatly appreciated

and simply cannot maintain the finest fighting force in the world without your help and everything that you have provided. provided. i am delighted to be here with the dr. from the department of energy. as you said, the vice-chairman to talk about this important subject. i would like to touch briefly on three topics, the critical role our nuclear forces continue to play, the continuing importance of the nuclear deterrence and the action the program is taking to maintain a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear force. the survival of our nation is our most important national security interest. the interest. the fundamental role

of the us nuclear force is to deter attack on the united states which is the only existential threat. extended deterrence. well we seek a world without nuclear weapons we face the harsh reality that they are modifying their already capable nuclear arsenals and they are being developed. a strong nuclear deterrent force will remain critical to our national security for the foreseeable future. i would like to address russia's provocations as members of this committee will know. senior russian officials continue to make irresponsible statements regarding the nuclear forces and reassess that they have been doing it to

intimidate our allies and us. these have failed. if anything they have really strengthened the nato alliance solidarity. in our estimation our goal is to return the viability of that treaty. under any circumstances we will not allow them to gain significant military advantage through imf violations and are developing and analyzing response options with the president and consulting with allies. let let me just say this about russian military doctrine sometimes described as escalated the escalate. anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire. .. >> >>

we have developed a plan to transition in our aging system there are reaching the time while they will age out to carry out this plan will be a very expensive proposition and weeks -- recognize that it will cost dod in average of $18 billion per year through 2035 with bfi

$16. >> we appreciate the priority that places the nuclear matters given the significance to national security to insure the safety this modernization we have delayed and we cannot do further any delays without

putting the safety security and effectiveness of our forces at risk. the choices we are facing is that keeping the existing force or modernizing the force the choice is modernizing or losing deterrent capabilities. we appreciate that this committee has recognized this problem including legislation to establish a strategic deterrent fund. we believe we have to decide how to resource the fund and talk about how to solve this because it is a very pressing issue. i look forward to discussing this issue with you and the other committees and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, sir. the floor is yours. >> thank you, chairman, ranking member smith and members of the committee. mr. rogers as well who i had the privilege of traveling with. i appreciate this opportunity to discuss the department of

energy's role in supporting nuclear deterrence. secretary of energy and i appreciate the priority that this committee places on nuclear matters. given their significantance and the emphasis president obama has placed on safety security and effectivenessglobal nuclear dangers. today's hearing is set aboard a step in the ongoing effort with the nuclear deterrence of united states i am honored to testify along my colleague from the department of defense the department of energy and defense share a solemn responsibility to you deliver the nuclear deterrent to work in this with deterrent to provide the delivery systems. our to agencies collaborate

through the nuclear weapons council to approve communication and increase coordination and the cooperation is strong and deliberate as you will hear today. the cooperation depends upon the leadership of experienced members of the military as the chairman noted will be retiring after the voice -- but its chairman of joint chiefs it is up privileged to work with the admiral to join forces i would like to take this opportunity to thank cd4 his years of dedicated service to our nation. we're already united states and our allies and partners have growing nuclear dangers assets in the speech from prague the threat of nuclear war has gone down but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up. the obama administration set forth the

strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and we must maintain a nuclear deterrent to charge to implement both elements of the nuclear strategy. this is a no failed mission in which we must provide a safe secure deterrent without explosive nuclear testing to respond to terrorism around the world. indeed as to reduce is the arsenal that safety and security effectiveness becomes all the more important. infrastructure modernization with the ongoing stockpile from sound science and advanced technology are

necessary to enjoy the 21st century threats. the storage chip program is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past two decades and every year it has enabled the secretaries of defense and energy with fellow salamis nuclear laboratories said commander of the strategic command to certify to the president the stockpile is safe and secure and reliable and the scientific and technological expertise has achieved this without nuclear testing and in fact, our labs know more about the inner working of the stockpile than they ever did during the days of explosive nuclear testing alterations refurbishing and reuse nuclear components to

extend the life span of the arsenal to ensure the continued safety and effectiveness. to maintain confidence we must continue to invest in a uniquely skilled work force as well as the science and infrastructure essentials to stockpile stewardship. the national security administration is responsible for the nuclear enterprise necessary to sustain the stockpile to execute all nuclear missions. the infrastructure dates back to the manhattan project as many of you have seen with your own eyes and has exceeded the useful life and made a substantial maintenance or replacement and equally important to more than 50 percent of the federal work force will be eligible to retire in the next five or

seven years. this wave of retiree requires us to recapitalize our work force with a generation of standing talent to carry forward our nuclear mission for this century. building a responsive infrastructure requires investing in people as well as our new facility with high explosives, nonnuclear components with office work space. secretary rodis - - moniz and i seek your support over new construction that we need. your recognition of your support to the life extension program are critical to american national security and security of our allies and partners around the world. more broadly reseed the implementation of a congressional advisory panel on the august the report as a top

priority that will enhance efforts:00 -- along the enterprise undersecretary moniz leadership we have taken steps to improve the operation and management of the nuclear security enterprise. one of the records set to begin fighting was to rebuild national leadership with an emphasis on strengthening regular communication with congressional leaders on policy elements to make up the nuclear security mission along with the team added been straighter will feed the implementation group to look for to working with you on this important issue your report will be critical to our success as they already observed delete -- deal he plays a central role to implement the threat reduction activity and our portfolio of

work aimed at preventing and responding to global nuclear threats is rooted in our capabilities to sustain the nuclear stockpile to enable us to implement a dimension of the prague agenda. these activities are a defense by other means. when retake material off the playing field or work discreetly to keep that fissile material those who share values from those who would do less harm. for example, nnsa has safely and securely removed or confirms the disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium around the over all that is enough material for 200 nuclear weapons. with challenges including the expansion of the russian and chinese nuclear program with

this clause certainty we cannot afford to delay the investments wavey to make another nuclear security enterprise. with your support we can sustain nuclear deterrence in the 21st century. think for the opportunity to testify before - - day on the national security issue and of the forge your questions. >> members of the committee i just missed ranking member smith but i figure for the opportunity to share my perspective chairman jesse and i with the use of force resource allocation and assignment of risk it goes about saying that work long -- that goes to the catastrophic

attack on tarnation. additionally our deterrence commitments cover our interest to ensure our non-nuclear allies that they will be protected without developing their own nuclear capabilities. with that force to be the most important that was the only way to deter an essential attack with zero lesser state we accomplish this through the long proven triad and the combination of deployed weapons and platforms in europe with the ability to rapidly do the

same in the pacific. at the end of the cold war to the point where it was obsolete recent events remind us of the necessity to maintain a capable deterrent including the triad as long as the weapons existed we still believe that any reductions must be done in concert because unilateral gestures of goodwill have little standing with authoritarian regimes all three legs of the command-and-control structure within a natural cycle that systems aged eight to be refreshed or modernized russia goes to this exact same experience but in the coming years is is over relatively

short period of time and this is all happening at a time when our resources are decreasing any remaining margarine that we have has been whittled away as repression investments further and further into the future. there is no slack left in the system made a long-term funding with this most important element of what we do we cataloger adjust priorities that absence another form of relief that you have to reach into the other things that you do to protect other national security interest to make people both inside and outside happy. for our part to to exercise the best stewardship

that we can and continue working closely with our partners to ensure the viability and affordability of the stockpile stewardship for i hope congress will do its part for your strong support for the nation's men and women did your form is my tenure as vice chairman. they give for the opportunity to appear next to my colleagues today. >> as here we have the votes on the floor so we will have to reassess the we will return as soon as those concluded. make your way into the room we will buy you a cup of coffee they will stand in recess please come back right after votes.

conversations] >> come to order and thank you for your patience. let me ask the couple things as they make their way back from the floor. to issue a message of deterrence our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role to ensure u.s. national security and it is the highest priority mission that no other capability we have is more

important. is that still the case? do you agree with that? >> absolutely. one of the issues we found in the nuclear enterprise review and with the mission that resulted in some very bad outcomes that we are working to try to overcome since 2008. that is why secretary hagel said mission. it is day mission for those who are responsible for every aspect efficiencies are great when you look for functions but this is about the

commander responsibility so i believe that is absolutely the case have the vice-chairman would agree with that also. >> let me ask you this question because part of their action is that this has got along pretty well as of nothing has changed but we haven't had nuclear testing since 1991 so there is no need to spend this money because we make it okay we have enough weapons to destroy the world several times over is you ask us to waste money to put it into the warhead for the delivery system. what is their reaction to that? >> as both the vice-chairman and i have testified and all senior leadership has said the only existential threat is a nuclear

attack the one step down with those nuclear weapons to be fired in the continental united states. anybody who looks at the way the environment the way russia has described the posture is the biggest mission it is critical we can to deter the much smaller force that is true and is reflected in the cost with the peak of the replacement is nowhere near the peak of the replacement cost of the sixties and eighties. it performs an extremely important

mission and i went gsa looked at the international environment it is not is time to say that they are useless. >> i would add to that description why it remains relevant as the capital asset. like kidney, it needs to be maintained and refurbished and modernized and as we mentioned earlier, is due at the same time. it has lasted two decades beyond that life and that is one small side - - slice of the need to do that. >> the cost of the systems aging out yesterday or day before the center for strategic and budgetary

assessment released a preliminary study entitled our u.s. nuclear forces is affordable? a kanye budget request now through 2039 is that no point with the nuclear force sheriff national defence be more than 5% of the defense budget. does that sound right based on the projections that you look at? >> we did an incredible steady but retrieve their estimates and dollars is the long-range bomber for the nuclear mission. it would take 7 percent of the budget right now spending 3% to double that level of effort to sustain the force requires about 7% it would be when we peeked out around 2826. look at

the last two times of the vice-chairman said we would recapitalize the forest and led the spread out over another period if time. but the important thing they said it is a matter of prioritization and in previous times so on the flats budget to take a hit with the defense portfolio. >> we differ a little bit of a number respect and to

modernize. >> i appreciate that how you assign a long-range bomber but regardless with the highest priority for the national security his marcion's it is not completely unreasonable. >> and we already lost 10%. and the one thing i do agree with this study is if we don't find another outside release people are happy because they will be pushed aside. >> ag for holding this hearing and is great to have such ted distinguished

panel before us to hear affirmation for the nuclear deterrence because it is the most important mission but sometimes forgotten and i appreciate you stressing it to the committee and the public at large it will take at least $355 billion with the stockpile in russia goes along with it and we're in the bad habit to not really fully fund our military or a fully funded highway bill in eight years when paul full my colleagues will hear this message not only supported it but a star of funding and now a regular will hear this message not only

schedule i congratulate the obama administration as they find these priorities i just helps -- help as he goes to the conference we can figure out the better solution for fully funding not attending for the overseas contingency operation accounts but as to deal with these issues there are tons of questions to ask it is a chairman to work with mike rogers of the subcommittee but whether the new list were the freshest or a young sailor on a nuclear sub for somebody is preparing to fly a strategic bomber in any of us on the panel the ivory have descended so much weapons that we will never use but i am appreciative of you devoting your careers to make is deterrence real and i

hope we can figure out ways to encounter the vladimir putin doctrine of dominance that is one of the main threats from the panel this comment the best way to counter a a different threat from what we have seen before. >> we have tried to deemphasized the role of nuclear weapons where strategists -- for russia tries to emphasize it arad a conventional disadvantage that language is extreme because of the implications that you would use the weapon to to escalating crisis there is no way to

foresee what would happen after that so the russians could moderate their language to talk with us with the weapons below that they give each of the witnesses we're very fortunate to have you with your analytical skills and we appreciate what you do. admiral you have a wealth of experience to this position and to avoid

just want to take a little bit of that from new. in the part of the nuclear program but what we keep others from taking from us or steal from us that china is committed to stealing our lunch every day to cybersp niosh but this is the latest example did they steal our technology and applying it to their navy and are you aware of any evidence with them stealing nuclear technology and diverting it to the navy? >> i have not personally aware of any instances of the nation's stealing nuclear technology. >> it could be happening and not just be to intelligence. and concerns from that that 80l is working hard to tie in that up one thing

that has intrigued me that he comes into the people it is applicable to protect ourselves in the cyberworld and reinvestigate how to put those principles into our work force with the user experience. >> deal times we shed take to upgrade the ballistic missile submarines for the nuclear reactor

technology. >> you are referring to the chain no one tier ii but any agreement we have with this regard is not used to have a quieter place of no tidies the. should with this aspect with the tide now 123? is there anything? >> as the projects are interest it provides opportunity for our industry to have markets to have those performance standards we want

to see other countries adopt fake you for your service for i yield back. >> want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. is the chairman noted this could be the last appearance before the committee and thank you for your service you have made great contributions international security. madam secretary if i could start a a a question but in that category that our adversaries are modernizing their nuclear program program, average you assess our program is that adequate a half? and with those features the we

could build with how far technology has advanced or is that with just refurbishing? >> we together with the department of defense set the requirements for modernization of the stockpile and it is our judgment that what we have been doing with the 3 + 2 strategy that we will return that dietrich capability for our allies and partners around the world will be used with the 3 + 2 strategy will deter any oversight -- adversaries therefore we judge this is the

right strategy it is hard to implement it can you describe the importance of radiation designed to vent additional actors? vitter faq for giving me the opportunity to answer it is part of a reprieve this league called a second line of defense that is a critical part of the efforts to ensure the movement of fissile material does not go undetected because the most important part of a

country or a group's ability is to get access to that fissile material to be sure there is detection in capabilities to allow us to know in realtime when something maybe moving so we can be secured against acquisition from those you would do less harm -- do was harm. >> how would you characterize the security measures in place? and how resilient is it? >> of the threat of the systems with the nuclear issues with some of the most important mission and we have. with shovels it'll pop platform whether cyberfolder abilities to look at it closely

right now i judge it to be satisfactory. >> rebate to continue to pay attention to that. admiral the is the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty remains in the national interest? and then i have other questions. >> we monitor continuously that russia is a hearing to the new start - - s.t.a.r.t. treaty and with love to have complete transparency that we believe that verification measures are adequate to have a better understanding so yes we do believe the new s.t.a.r.t. tree is within our interest. >> with the issue of verification

how did they detect cheating? that much work remains to be done with the interagency cooperation that when you might have to do for the record. >> if you don't mind i will is a for the record we will try to keep moving with our limited time. >> as we look back but there is no good news. we have dangerous and aggressive threats directed at the united states the allies and its neighbors and putin

conducting exercises with international criticism that russia will use nuclear weapons tour day escalate that somebody would think it is 80 escalation is an escalation to brazen violate the imf treaty without a response without the invasion were annexation of crimea that they take for the eastern

ukraine. what message would you like to send with that danger is past russia is taking? thank you for the question. i would say it is very important to the russians understand the first use of nuclear weapons risks uncontrolled escalation. this is almost impossible to predict what the outcome would be however small. but we're not falling for this. to protect and defend allies as deputy secretary is destined to fail. >> those are strong words. when you look at russia's actions and to opt -- occupy cry react to threats and then they doted -- missions if they participate in nato or missile defense with

the buzzing of the ships then the aircraft to save data as t.s. qatari foreign that conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange. >> mr. magwood crisply assess the risk and it certainly is not smaller based on the rhetoric that putin in russia

has taken to frustrate any moves but at the end of the day there will take that very seriously the cannot let down our guard with that initiative with the european command that is very active to reassure allies to take the right steps that in the rhetoric is undertaking its aggressiveness with the deployment of the new and a threatening systems they need to hear those words with the obligations to the allies.

>> they give to those witnesses for your testimony with the replacement program so that there will be a relatively short period to capsize the normal lovell's to have that testimony over and over the many times that i sympathize with the administration because that is our job to fix that but in this side with the ohio is a mechanism to have a positive solution to set up the account

last year to talk about activating the account through the navy to give the tools with a challenging cost issue with the highest priority and if we don't we will trade the other force and a large portion of his remarks about the fact to have a surface combat in tearing the conversation only is migrates to this issue. and mr. ford's who is not here and others on a bipartisan basis

led the charge to protect the upgrade with a 74% in the house republican caucus so people are starting to get to the point that we are past that. we are ready to act if you don't like the sea bass to deterrence fund, find. then come back but with the impression with the budget platters purchase spectators to come up with a fix with the negative fallout to decide very powerfully. can you share your thoughts and then some point you can embrace

it and to have president with a ground-based missile defense >> that we will pay for it matter what purpose in the past congress has added money during periods when restart to recapitalize and we hope that will happen again and the theory of the case to help us through. up until this time it has been theoretical and in 20201 if we paid for in a single year to add to the navy to be enormously destructive to fit in the topline. we want to work with you and we're anxious to

work with you but to a foot stomp what the vice-chairman said it is one thing to be affixed topline that would have been remiss disruption across all services and we're anxious to work with you. >> but again we created a a mechanism with the incremental authority and i hope the some point and that we can use this fund and to move forward we

hope the administration will help us out. >> fakes to although witnesses for your service and congratulations on retirement that is a coming. to weeks ago we received a second straight noncompliance report about russia's violation of the imf treaty and with these reports we had evidence of noncompliance. so the committee learned the joint staff was conducting an assessment of

military responses to russia's noncompliance and minor understanding is that you briefed us on that assessment but chairman has proposed -- proposed response is purdue have the time frame they you can get some direction from the white house? >> anbar have the specific time line. it is what the interagency policy committees are looking at. but we don't want to rush into to bring russia back into the treaty but we have options at hand that i cannot discuss in the unclassified hearing but they are available for use and some are expensive but none of them contribute to russia

security and safety to understand that. he has is played along if we are letting him and said understand why it continues to go on for quite know the you are not the president but but what they is me to my next question. but you talk about the provocative statements with the russian of military statement has made for the nato allies for their resolve. i am worried about them fracturing nato so what is the u.s. doing to other our allies to the seriousness of

the russian of violation and what do we do to reassure them we will be there and everything is okay? >> they are well aware and to a the ministerial i am sure he discusses this with them with the major forums with the various leaders with the command structure either very well aware of this with the greater threat i had the very twice with the full committee chairman there are very concerned that to be

muscular enough i would challenge the concerns there one of the few nations with that too% investment obligation secretary carter is over there and that is the topic of discussion with the gdp funding they should be well aware of the insurance initiative and all the actions we met with defense ministers with the allies but anyway my time is expired for ago figure of. >> i will take this in a

different direction. so explain the rationale behind the engaged for the capacity with the costs associated so then let's do another question after that. >> and will begin by noting the question is that recently have then asked by richard rodgers me understand the need for were a

nuclear infrastructure given to the dynamic threat environment one aspect of that with a nuclear weapons cancel is the plutonium strategy which requires us to meet certain targets over the coming decades. that strategy will enable us to move out of an old facility by 2019 at lowe's alamos that would be necessary to ensure we can continue the extension and programs to construct and operate

additional capabilities to produce 50 or 80 giving us the flexibility should we need it with that environment. >> ashley costs associated with that strategy. >> but it saved she would want to know that at the outset that there seems to be a shortage of money for all of this? what does it cost. >> we have strict challenges on this front. as the committee considered updating the existing facility? >> in the scrutiny that the secretary and i that the leadership has applied the planning for a major infrastructure projects is significant and we have said apple whole new process to examine the kind of buildings we need to bill to recapitalize the infrastructure in the most effective way. >> receives the starting point is the capacity

but now it is 80 hits per year the value back into a facility but you have not told the why you need 50 new ones per year. >> thank you for seeking clarification the objective is to give us the flexibility to produce additional plutonium. >> wide to read that flexibility? we cannot predict the threat environment we will face as a nation in 20 or 30 years from now we want to make sure we have the infrastructure necessary to respond to the president of the future need to pursue the modernization of our nuclear capabilities. >> some day we might wanted so we will bill the now but we don't have the

money to do so. >> we cannot snap our fingers to produce the infrastructure for. >> would is the capacity of the current hit? >> . >> it is between 10 and 20. >> and i want to confirm that. >> multiple chefs upgrade at the existing facility could produce more than the 10 of today. check it out and get back to me please. >> i will do that. >> cry about of time but i have a series of questions specifically on this report is said of mine are moving forward and can we expect to see it? >> would you like to me to get back to you on the record? >> i'm sorry i thought you said you were out of time. 22 seconds. >> they have asked us to do

additional review of the cost of the facility we will have a red team review with the director of the national lab to evaluate the findings and other findings about the costs associated with the facility to determine the best way forward. >> that is to in september. >> correct. >> i would get them to you. >> mr. chairman never like to talk about the treaty we had a hearing on february february 3rd that the lieutenant general stuart the director was asked about the treaty. the general said the open skies construct was designed for a different era i am very concerned how it

is applied today and i would try a in a closed hearing mr. rogers to send a request to the commander of stress, with the open skies construct was designed for a different era that the application today that the united states said concert with allies continues to address these concerns. i am concerned the treaty has become a critical component of russia intelligence collection capability directed at the united states. in addition to flying over installations it can overfly and collect on national critical

infrastructure and dod. are you aware the most recent compliance report from the department of state indicates russia is not in compliance with the treaty? >> i am. this is something we would like to talk about in a closed hearing but we are concerned what russia is doing as well was the other activities and nuclear missions to reach you have any reason to believe they are using it for reasons beyond what it was ratified for? direct we are concerned the way they're operating as the admiral said beyond the original intent of the treaty and we continue to look at this very, very closely. >> so the russians have requested we

continue the treaty and they're able to use even more danced sensors. is it prudent to accept that proposal to fly increasingly advanced sensors over the united states? >> that is a discussion right now. >> you don't have an opinion? arachnoid to overlook cattle different aspects. >> okay. this is an issue that will continue to be of high interest to the and the chairman of the strategic forces subcommittee whose committee i am honored to serve on. . . remember, they

are advancing beyond where they currently are command we are staying stagnant, is that

correct? i understand we're modernizing what we currently have but are not creating new technologies. >> again, they are replacing old systems with new systems. that is correct, congressman , but they are staying within the new start so not increasing the size of the force. >> i only have a few seconds left. left. i heard you mention that there was defiant defiantly we will take it off-line and ask questions later. >> appreciate that the gentleman wishes to ask questions and writing. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to be here to thank the admiral for a service. we have joked with general

dempsey. you may be back in the nose. i i want to thank you for great working relationship. follow up on the last topic, russia may be modernizing barbara's, not like the russians are building something that gives them some new technical advantage. >> a greater shift our mobile missiles, the ballistic missile force with improvements is not

as good as ours. not as good as ours, but i think that mobile missiles is probably a credit. >> the advantage of the mobile thing is that you would be hard for us to hit it in a first strike. but before that we could hit them hard even if we cannot necessarily hit them with nuclear missiles. this strategy because if it comes to it, bad, all bad. we have plenty of firepower under just about any scenario basically destroy the planet in conversation with what the russians do. we must

maintain and upgrade systems that are failing, falling off-line, but i think obsessing over, you know, my gosh, they are more mobile, nuclear weapon with jeffrey at the number the thousands of times more powerful than the bombs were dropped on japan during world war ii. it is a pretty significant deterrent. what is our deterrence policy and how well do we understand that within the pentagon? you know, we have a change of policy during the cold war which was basically we felt that the soviets had us outmanned in europe conventionally. part of that deterrence policy was you go too far in western europe and we will nuclear. and it worked. in czechoslovakia, three, they push the envelope if they go into a nato whatever

my differences may be on a wide range of other subjects a robust communication to make sure that those differences don't lead trust is trying to planet is something that i i think should be a huge part of our deterrence strategy which is why i don't have a problem with a joint military exercise. working with russia on afghanistan, working with russia during the p5 +1 negotiations, plus one negotiations, anything that makes sure we communicate and do not inadvertently start armageddon because of lack of

communications should be a huge part of the deterrence policy. what is our deterrence policy and terms of use of nuclear weapons and our understanding of russia's deterrence policy? >> right now our policy is to achieve nuclear parity with russia established under the new start treaty. we do not assess china as trying to achieve parity with either. the primary role of our nuclear forces is to deter an attack on the country of the united states, our allies, or our partners. we say we say clearly that the use of nuclear weapons will cross and escalate were red line. we have the full force of our nuclear arsenal to respond as needed. a policy is to deter an attack of the united states and try to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our normal national security strategy around the world works

russia now has the conventional disadvantage that we have received ourselves to have. one of the concerns is that if they feel they are conventionally outgunned they might go the nuclear route and communicate clearly that will receive a proportional response. that is part of our deterrence strategy. if you use a nuke you have at least one going back to you. >> you tend to rely on one of the other. and they rely more on their nuclear weapons as a deterrent. we believe that is

extremely problematic and something we need to be talking about the leaders of russia to say we we do not want this later miscalculation. >> thank you for your thoughtful remarks today. today. my question is related to north korea and iran. they have built a nuclear warhead strong enough to be mounted on a long-range missile allow the production of nuclear fuel to continue these are threats that continue to

protect our national security and allies. just this allies. just this week the admiral reaffirmed his commitment to strong deterrent. what do you think this says about our priorities? >> we believe as we have said over and over nuclear deterrence is our number one mission. we are absolutely confident we can stay ahead of the capabilities of north koreans, and as the president said we are absolutely

committed to preventing them from acquiring a nuclear weapon. >> thank you. my next question, i wanted to ask about the president's decision to reach out to us icbm forces. president obama's nuclear employment guidance rejects the notion while continuing to examine options to reduce the role of launch under attack in us planning. can you can you explain why the president made his decision? >> it is simple. when everyone d alerts it becomes esculin touring and provides incentives to try to preempt before you can raise your alert level and therefore it was decided a deal alert posture with actually raise the possibility of a miscalculation, and we decided against that.conversations] lex

and the benefits of deal learning learning in terms of preventing presenting to preventing an actual accidental launch a small where the drawbacks are substantial. >> we do open ocean targeting and have de- alerted our bombers. we believe we believe we have taken prudent steps to make sure we

are deemphasizing a hairtrigger response. we thought that de- alerting icbms would cause more problems than it would solve >> thank you and i yield back. >> mr. davis. >> admiral, thank you for your service and contributions. the idea back to my colleagues question about verification and detection of the importance of that. much work remains to be done in interagency cooperation. not working with our allies at this time. do you agree with that? what are the specific gaps that we need to be sure we are doing so we are picking up the problems that exist in

technology and sensors and all that we are using and verification? >> ma'am, i will have to review the study. we are confident our verification measures are quite good. as you know, as we are dealing with iran being transparent and verifiable, i am not certain of what was said that i would be happy to review and get back with you. >> and now we have talked a lot about the modernizing the recapitalization. people have different thoughts about that, but one that, but one of the concerns on the surface would be that the nsa submits a 25 year plan for how to deal with these issues. we have the department of defense

that does not. i think how is the department of defense planning beyond 2025? what is it we are doing to think about reducing cost? in many situations we have costs that go far out of the realm of what initially was planned. how will we manage peak spending? we may see programs converging. where are we in that? is that criticism? justified in terms of the department of defense and not doing planning that far out knowing we are looking at an awful lot of money here? >> congresswoman, we have a good understanding of what we need to do. ohio replacement program starts first. start replacing trident boats first and then we will come the lrs so, and then we

will come by ground-based strategic deterrent which we have to age out in 2030. 2030. we also have a nuclear cap only for the f3 five planned for future flight. we flight. we understand the general cost, how they will unfold. twenty year cost estimates are uncertain, but we can provide you with an estimate we are quite confidently understandable behalf to do in the rough cost it will require. >> do you think in terms of working along the same lines that you are meeting those requirements? >> ma'am, we have a good discussion through the avenue of nuclear weapons

council and do a good job of trying to synchronize programs. lrs so is a classic example of trying to make sure the life extension program would be synchronized well with the introduction of that new weapon system. we submit a five year future years defense plan which is a detailed program but plan well beyond that. program managers, services, and the like have detailed understandings of how those programs propagate out through the decades to include lifecycle costs. would be happy to brief you on that if you would like. >> thank you and thank you for your service. >> i had a handful of follow-ups. editorial comments. saying something is a redline does not have the punch at once did which is part of mr. rogers.about allies who are

concerned about. on the question obviously at one time the subject of nuclear deterrence received a tremendous amount of attention intellectual energy, planning, and then it did not. and while and while understandably we haven't focused on terrorism now we are having to kind of not reinvent, but develop skills again to put that emphasis, i think, on nuclear deterrence and its credibility which is the key characteristic in all of this. i am interested in your view. are we where we

need to be as far as especially intellectual planning and firepower on nuclear deterrent? >> that is an excellent question and.well taken. the way i approach the answer is that across the broad intellectual base of the military, especially the senior officer corps, how have we educated our broad workforce? when they attend war colleges they get a good dose of it and may hear about particular articles, but i tend to agree with you that over the last 15 years or so particularly since we have been in the post 911 era that a substantial share of our intellectual bandwidth has been shifted over to counterterrorism. they are

still doing pretty well. retained its interest and focus on this particular mission. we're doing okay, but the plan is well taken and we need to make sure we are emerging from this last 15 15 years. make sure the broad force has a robust understanding. >> they threaten to use nuclear weapons. >> and nuke is a nuke is a nuke. very different characteristics. and and my

understanding is developing new weapons in the sense adding weapons with different characteristics. the argument has been that are very large nuclear weapons that were designed for cold war exchange amount is credible as other weapons would be in a different strategic landscape. let's -- >> weapons we can call upon. vastly different weapons like a neutron weapon. in terms of

the scalability. modern in the sense of reliable. they are very advanced. we are making more than just mental but less than major changes in how we lose things. but we have the scalability where we needed to be flex i think there gets to

be confusion. we talk about modernizing. as you.out on whether we are talking delivery systems of the war has themselves, this exact same system dismayed newer we have to keep that in mind. >> a lot of what we have a new start is a lot fewer weapons that part of the agreement to assure this remains credible. we -- you would not say we have a responsive infrastructure today. >> i believe we do, but we must make

the investment i described in my statement that i submitted as well as my opening remarks. we must ensure we retain the capability that you and the admiral just had an exchange about on the delivery system side and similarly the weapons production side way to retain the work force and infrastructure to support them them, and that is the intellectual workforce, the people doing the work very people we need to invest in to ensure we haven't responsive infrastructure for decades to come. now we have a we need but have put forward an historic budget to ensure we are making the investments we need going

forward because we did suffer from a a cutback in the kind of investment that we anticipated and advancing an agreement. >> i certainly do not want to diminish the importance of the budget request the administration sent out this year because it has turned things around. it's as responsive as we need to be today. too much evidence that only of the people choosing other lines of work in a variety of problems but others of which we have not. >> we need to signal that this matters. doing doing that by virtue of holding this hearing. i look forward

to working with you to ensure we continue to send that signal >> that is an important. because whether we are talking about the intellectual bandwidth for nuclear deterrence, attracting the best scientists to work in nuclear weapons lab and plants, people need to know this is the most important element of nation's security which will continue to be. so if there is one point we hopefully agree on is that we need to continue to attract the best and brightest. facilities that can meet the unexpected. these machines age. thank you for being here. i appreciate your testimony and look forward to working with you all. with that, the hearing stands adjourned.

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nixon: a man divided." he talks about the life and -- >> this week on "q&a," our guest is evan thomas, author of "being nixon: a man divided." he talks about the life and career of richard nixon, focusing on the personal stories that help define our nation's 37th president. brian: evan thomas, your new book on richard nixon starts out in a way that i assume no other richard nixon book has started talking about virgil. why? evan: nixon was in that latin

play when he was a high schooler, and he had never kissed anybody. he was doing "dido and aeneas," and he had never kissed anybody before. he was dido, and he had to kiss aeneas. he never kissed anybody before and he lumbers across the stage to kiss her and the high school students erupted in laughter, derision, mocking him. and, it was an early case of nixon having to deal with real adversity. he was humiliated. the girl hated him for it. and yet, it interested me. afterwards, he tries to make up with the girl -- who becomes his girlfriend -- and he learns to deal with diversity and to be mocked and jeered, but come back and show people. brian: his first girlfriend, i don't know -- ola florence welch. [chuckling] where did you find this stuff about her? evan: there are hundreds of oral histories about his high school and college years at whittier college and at cal state fullerton. i mean, literally hundreds. when he became president, they went around and interviewed old friends.

ola gave a lot of interviews and she was quite touching about nixon. she thought he was kind of an odd duck. she found him to be impressive and not too normal for a high school kid. and although she first wrote in her diary, "i hate richard nixon." that was her first thought about richard nixon. but she was his girlfriend for four years. he tried to marry her, and she finally dumped him and he was sad about that, but he found pat and he was pretty happy. brian: you know, in reading your book, i came away that there is an awful lot of personal stuff in here unlike some books that only worry about the history part of it. am i accurate? if i am accurate, why did you do it that way? evan: i don't think you can do nixon without doing the personal. it's so -- you watch nixon, you wonder, "what is driving this guy, what is it like to be nixon?" i called my book "being nixon," because i was really curious about what it would be like to be richard nixon. he seemed so possessed at times. haunted at times, troubled at times, enthusiastic at times proud at times -- but such a -- his chief of staff, h.r.

haldeman, called him , "the weirdest man i ever met." that's his loyal chief of staff. he was, for better or for worse, a weird man. brian: we have a lot of video we want to show that parallels your book. first, we will go to a phone conversation between richard nixon and his chief of staff mr. haldeman, who he had just fired on april 30,1973. this is after he gave an important watergate speech. it is an audio thing. let's listen to this phone conversation. >> hello? >> hi. >> i hope i didn't let you down. >> no, sir. you got your points over and now you're -- you -- you've got it set right and move on. you're in -- right where you ought to be. >> well, it's a tough thing, bob, you lose your job and the rest. but, god damn it, i'm never going to discuss this son-of-a-bitching watergate thing again. never, never, never, never. don't you agree? >> yes, sir. you'