president of government affairs corporate vice president of research. >> i am hopeful congress will take on immigration. it is very important.

frankly, i do not know the number, but when we have some of the innovators here, the researchers here, we have people all over the world that make contributions. it is for other companies, as well. there is still a need. >> the application of project premonition is to collect mosquitoes that have been people and to determine what kind of viruses might be around, what kind of diseases might be around, through taking the blood samples of the mosquitoes and the genetics code of some of the constituents of their blood. >> it was about what we would be able to do with data available

in the environment today. one thing we have noticed is there are a lot of aircraft flying around that could be considered sensors. they are providing information. it is relatively freely available. there is companies like flight aware, that use that information to provide information to the communities. we took that information to use that to help us predict a more accurate wind forecast. >> a visit to the washington d.c. office. >> next, and author.

speaking at williams college in massachusetts. >> thank you. it's great to be here, in oak park. not just being here in the library where i did do a good deal of the research for this book, but also being in the hometown of ernest hemingway for a writer cannot fail to stir some emotion. i actually live only about two blocks from the home in which ernest hemingway lived while he was in high school and did his first writing. i'm hoping that some of the karma will blow over towards my part of the block. the readers will have to be judge whether any of that succeeded. i doubt that hemingway ever found a story really that was as exciting as the one that i uncovered and tried to put together while writing this book.

it was just 50 years ago in august of 1953 that the c.i.a. overthrew a government for the first time. that was the democratically elected government of mohammed mosadek, the prime minister of iran. now, that episode was hardly noticed in the world press, and certainly the involvement of the united states, the truth of what really happened was completely unknown at that time. at the time this coup was launched it seemed like like a success for the united states. we had gotten rid of someone we didn't like and we put in someone we did like. indeed for 25 years the period that the shah was in power, we could still from the perspective of the u.s. government consider this operation to have been a success. it's only now looking back on it from the perspective of 50 years of history that we can begin to understand what a

fundamental turning point this 1953 coup was. this was an episode that really shaped the whole second half of the 20th century and had a great influence on the violent currents that are racing through the world today. it would not have been possible to realize this, even a few years ago. it's only now that we're able to understand the meaning of this episode. for that reason it teaches us a real object lesson in the long-term consequences of foreign intervention. this isn't just a story about foreign policy though. this is a wild spy story in which a real-life james bond set out almost single-handedly to overthrow the government of a foreign country. the cast of characters is truly amazing. and one of the things that i had the most fun doing in writing this book was piecing together all the different accounts and

the different interviews and the different mentions in various books and articles that had been made of this episode. and try to reconstruct almost on an hour by hour basis what happened during those days and nights in august of 1953. i had always asked myself how one actually does go about overthrowing a government. if you have the assignment to go into a foreign country and overthrow the government, what do you do? what do you do on the first day? then what do you do on the second day? now i know. in fact, i'm available for consulting. let me talk first about why this coup took place. then i want to talk a little bit about how it happened. and finally, look back on it from the perspective of today. along the way i want to try to introduce you to the larger than

life characters who populate this fascinating drama. in the years after world war ii in the late '40's and early '50's, the currents of national nationalism and anticolonialism were sweeping through africa and asia and latin america. now, in iran nationalism had one meaning -- it meant the desire of iranians to retake control over their own oil resources. iran sits on one of the greatest seas of petroleum in the world. it was very early in the 20th century that a small group of visionary british politicians led by the young winston churchill who was at that time first lord of the admiralty realized that oil was going to be the key to domination in the 20th century.

winston churchill saw world war i on the horizon. he knew that he was going to have to transform his ships from coal-fired to oil-fired. he knew that the country that controlled oil would have the decisive advantage in the coming war, and that it would also have the ability to dominate the world after the war. but britain does not produce any oil. nor did britain have nicolenies that produced oil. this led churchill and a group of other british officials to concentrate great attention on this problem. it was in iran that they managed to seize control of a huge newly discovered oil resource. the british did this by the simple expedient of bribing the three iranian negotiators at the table and they signed a fantastically lucrative agreement which gave them 100% monopoly on all of the

production extraction refining and sale of iranian oil. in exchange for this, they were to pay iran 16% of the profits. these profits were kalt collated after the company -- were calculated after the company had paid a huge tax to the government and since it was owned principally by the british government, this was essentially paying taxes to the company itself. so even when the iranians asked to see the books as to how the 16% of what was remaining was calculated, they were not allowed to do that. so naturally during the period of the late '40's and early '50's as iranians became more and more aware of the injustice of this arrangement seeing the british at the peak of world power while iranians lived in some of the worst conditions anywhere in the world, their resentment began to grow. winston churchill knew exactly what he was getting when he

signed this very unequal agreement. he called iranian oil a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams. and with it was that oil that maintained britain in a high standard of living all throughout the '30's and '40's. the iranians chafed at this and it was the biter thes than propelled to powter remarkable figure of mow ma'am mad most adeck. he shook the world at the middle of the 20th century. in 1951 "time" magazine chose him as its man of the year. they chose him over winston churchill, harry truman douglas macarthur and dwight eisenhower. and they were right, because during 1951 mosadek had a greater influence on the world than any of those other men.

he rose to power at a time when he was already advanced in age. he was a highly sophisticated intellectual. he had been educated in europe. he was first iranian to win a doctor of law at a european university. he came from a royal family. he was known as highly incorruptible, never accepted a salary from the government. his political flat form had really only two planks. one was democracy. which meant in iran that the shah should rule as a figurehead national symbol like the queen of england while political power would be exercised by the elected parliament and prime minister. the second was nationalizing the arannian oil company which had been making fabulous profits by sucking out the most valuable resource in iran. on the day that mosadek was elected by parliament to be prime minister before accepting the honor he made a condition that the parliament should vote

for the bill that he had prepared nationalizing the british oil company. the parliament did so unanimously. mosadek rode into power on a huge wave of popularity. it was based principally on the consensus that he would be the one who would carry out this transcendent act of nationalizing the british oil company. now, besides being a visionary nationalist, mosadek was also a highly unusual personality. he was extremely emotional. he would break down into tears literally on the floor of the parliament while giving speeches about the suffering of iranians. sometimes he'd even faint dead away from the strain. although on occasion he was known to wink at the doctor from the floor. he had a great sense of political theater. and although he had many physical ailments all during

the period i was writing this book i was never really able to tell where the physical ended and where the psychosomatic ones began. he spent a lot of time in bed and he used to receive diplomats in his pajamas. theses a pebs of his personality were used in the west to ridicule mosadek and make him seem like an unserious person. but actually in iran where centuries of shiite religious practice have sensitized people to public displays of emotion that are far beyond anything with which we're accustomed in the west, these aspects of the personality only seemed to endear him even more to iranians. he seemed to suffer with them even as he was chastising them. mosadek offered the british the chance to carry out the nationalization of the oil company according to british law. if you can remember, in the late

'40's and early '50's they were nationizing many of the industries at home. they were nationalizing the coal and the railway industry and hay they had an elaborate system for deciding who had to compensate who. so mosadek offered to them let's put it in front of your one of your tribunals and we will decide who owes who money. know, the management of the oil company was famously obstinate. for years the friends of the british in iran and the friends of the anglo iranian oil in iran had urged them to compromise to avert the crisis. the american consortium known as the aryan-american oil company reached a deal right around this period with saudi arabia and they gave saudi arabia a 50/50 split. this was an agreement that had the air of fairs than a common person could understand, and many of the pro-british people

in iran urged anglo iranians to make this concession. the chairman of the company flatly refused, and simply said when they need more money, they will come crawling to us on their bellies. now, how did the british react to the you know unanimous vote of the iranian parliament carrying out the nationalization of their oil company? this oil company bear in mind was the largest british commercial enterprise in the whole world. its principal asset was the largest oil refinery in the world. this was not some outpost of the british empire. this was an operation that was central to british, political social and military power. the first british reaction was disbelief. they thought mosadek was trying

to blackmail them for a few extra million. that turned out not not to be true. it became quickly clear. when its became clear to the british that mosadek was deadly serious, they decided as they had been conditioned to do over centuries of colonialism they would simply invade iran and take back the oil field. i discovered two invasion plans. they had one plan to take over all of iran and a more limited one to take over the oil fields and the refinery. but when harry truman heard about this, he went nuts. he told the british this was absolutely out of the question, the americans could never tolerate britain landing troops in iran. then the british decided they would bring the matter to the security council. americans warned them not to do this. the americans told them you know if your case comes forward and the iranian case comes forward, you won't look good.

but the british dismissed this objection. they believed that their case was prima facie, that they had been robbed of an oil company and everyone would understand this. well, back in tehran, mosadek loved the idea of the whole thing being taken to the u.n. he liked it so much that he decided he personally would fly to new york and present the iranian case. when he got to new york he caused a media sensation. he was sort of an eccentric figure bald-headed with enormous arms a very big nose. one of his american translaters said he makes jimmy durante looks like an an amputee. he gave a lot of speeches on american tv. comparing the nationalization of the oil company to the american revolution. he seem very much like your very endearing if mildly eccentric uncle. and americans really took to him on tv. he made a huge impression at the

security council. bear in mind that this was more or less the first time that the voice of a poor country had ever been raised in such an august setting. challenging the governing rule of law in the world. he made such an impression that the security council refused to accept the british resolution. it was first defeat for major british resolution in the history of the u.n. after his triumph at the u.n. he was invited to come to washington to negotiate and consider the possibility of compromise -- a compromise which was never a last -- alas, reached. the scene of mosadek arriving at the train station in washington is a wonderful example of the way mosadek carried himself. mosadek often seem on the at death's door, completely unable

to move or even speak. so it was as he was carried off the train at union station. he was leaning heavily on a cane and his son was also his doctor was essentially carrying him on his left side. he gingerly was brought down to three steps on to the platform and was able just to raise his head a bit. as he looked down the platform, he saw that to everyone's surprise, an official delegation had come to meet him and who was at the head of the delegation, none other than the secretary of state, dean after usen. well, he had never met after ason, but admired him from afar. he leapt up pushed his son aside, threw his cane on to the railroad tracks and skipped merrily down the platform and embraced me.

during the stay in washington no compromise was able to be reached. the british after their defeat at the u.n. decided to stage a coup and overthrow mosadek. they ordered their agents to arrange such a coup and the agents made the appropriate contacts. mosadek, however, caught wind of this. he heard of what was going on. and he did the only thing he could have done -- to protect himself, he closed the british embassy. and he sent all the british diplomats home. among them, of course, were all the secret agents who were planning the coup. now, the british had nothing. they could not invade. they had no diplomatic tools left. even the world court had thrown out their case. and they had no agents on the ground to stage a coup. they had lost their oil company. the only thing left to them was to appeal to the americans. and prime minister churchill then 77 years old and starting to fade but still a real product of the imperial

tradition, long-time lover of clandestine operations appealed directly to president truman. truman turned him down. truman resisted all of churchill's pressures. he essentially told him the c.i.a. has never overthrown a government before. we don't want to get into this business. we don't understand that country we are not going violently to intervene in its political development without understanding it. truman was worried about the c.i.a. and what it might become. in one of of his diary entries what used the phrase american gestapo to what he feared the c.i.a. could develop into if it were left unchecked. so now, the british were finished. they lost their oil company they had no tools to get it back and the americans wouldn't help them. the story might have ended there had it not been for the american election of november 1952. in that election dwight

eisenhower came -- was elected and brought with him a team that had -- during the campaign denounced the incumbent truman administration for not being tough enough on communism and other threats to american security abroad. well, news of the american election electrified the british foreign office and the british secret service. they were so excited that they could not even wait for eisenhower to be inaugurated before making their appeal again. two weeks after the election the british sent one of their top agents actually a guy who had been the chief of the british intelligence station in tehran before mosadek closed it to washington. his job was present the plan for the coup to the new group, the incoming eisenhower administration and see if you can persuade them to embrace the project that the truman administration had rejected. now, the agent who came to make

this appeal later wrote a memoir that i quote in my book. in this emory, he -- in the memoir, he mentions the mission. this is what he writes. i knew that our traditional argument would not move the american. our traditional argument was mosadek took away our oil company, please overthrow him so we can have our oil company back. this was not an argument that would move americans. so he wrote i knew i needed a different argument and i knew what argument to use. i would say that mosadek was opening iran up to the possibility of a communist takeover. sure enough, there's the argument that this agent used. the dulles brothers secretary of state designate john foster dulles and his brother alan, the incoming c.i.a. director, jumped at this argument.

before even allowing that british agent to go home more than two months before the inauguration they had given him an informal sign that the united states would now change its policy. sure enough, over the next few month, president eisenhower and all the other members of the administration who had a voice in these matters agreed to carry out this coup jointly with the british, in planning but alone on the ground in iran. now, as i said earlier in my book, i have reconstructed in great deal everything that happened in iran during those weeks of august 1953. i don't want to go through all the detail news but let me give you a general idea of the way that the coup was carried out. the c.i.a. chose one of its most intrepid agent kermit roosevelt actually, the grandson of theodore roosevelt to sneak into

iran in late july 1953 and begin organizing the coup. now what can he do? first of all he began bribing newspaper editors and columnists and reporters to write all sorts of defamatory lies about mosadek in the newspaper. secondly, he began bribing members of parliament, and leaders of political parties that were part of mosadek's coalition so they would quit the coalition or begin to denounce mosadek. he began bribing mule whats so that a tri -- at friday prayers in the mosque people would hear denunciation of mosadek as being against the islamic faith. he also threw the military attache and began bribing mid-ranking military officer so they would be ready with their units to join the coup when the moment came. one of the most brilliant ideas that he had was to sew upheaval

on the streets of tehran. he got into the mobs are us business. he was able to recruit several street gang leaders including the most famous and flamboyant one in tehran shaban the brainless who ran a protection rack net the vegetable market and had a lot of tough guys around him who were always looking to earn a few extra bucks or a few extra riyals as it was at that time. this is the assignment that he gave to shaban. i want you to get several hundred men, and i want them to rampage through the streets of tehran. i want them to beat up anyone they see. i want them to smash shop windows, fire their guns into mosques and shout we love mosadek and communism. long live people's republic of iran. well this would naturally have the effect of turning any decent hue many man being against mosadek. then in the further inspiration

roosevelt hired another mob to attack this mob. thereby, giving the impression that the streets of tehran were in chaos and mosadek had completely lost control of the situation. during this time kermit roosevelt was sneaking into the royal palace at midnight concealed under a blanket in the back seat of a car to meet quietly with the shah and secure his participation in the coup. the shah who was at that time a very meek and cowardly and indecisive figure was terrified of getting into anything that might endanger him given the power of u.s. and britain he had no choice in the end. but kermit roosevelt had to use a lot of means to twist his arm. he brought several people in to apply pressure on the shah. one of them was none other than general h. norman schwarzkopf the father of the gulf war general. general schwarzkopf had been a

flamboyant military figure in iran during the 1940's when the shah was a young man and still had great influence over them. the meeting was amazing. the state department had given schwarzkopf a cover mission of visiting american installations in the rege son his visit to iran wouldn't arouse suspicion. although "pravda" figured out what was up and printed a story denounssing its. he went in to meet with the shah in the royal palace, but the shah was so terrified of microphones that he wouldn't say a world to schwarzkopf. he just gestured. he then pulled a table away from the wall and felt in the grand ballroom of the palace he pulled it out into the middle of the room presumably furthest possible away from the microphones. he climbed up on the chair, he gestured to general schwarzkopf

who came up and sat with them and they conducted their conversation by whispering to each other on that table. through these and a series of other pressures, the shah was finally brought on board, and his job was to sign a dekri dismissing mosadek from office. this was a highly dubious legality since only the parliament had the right to hire and fire prime ministers. but nonetheless the order to the officer who was to deliver this decree was when mosadek resists as he surely will you will arrest him and then we proclaim our own guy as the prime minister. the c.i.a. had chosen a ka shirred iranian officer as the savior of iran. what happened on the night of august 15 1953 the officer who had been chosen to deliver this decree came to mosadek's door

and out of the shadows come other soldiers and they grab him. it turned out that the coup had been betrayed. the security services had found out about it and the officer who was supposed to arrest mosadek was himself arrested. so now the coup had failed. the shah had only signed this decree on condition that he could leave tehran immediately. he wanted to be near an airport. he was a pilot himself. sure enough, at 6:00 a.m. when he heard that mosadek was still in power he literally ran across the tarmac into his little private lane with just a little have a he's jumped into his plane and flew to baghdad and later on to rome where he told people he'd be looking for work since he wasn't able to go back to iran any time soon. now back in tehran, mosadek and the people around him assumed that the shah had been behind this coup. after all, he was the one that had signed the decree. now, the shah was gone.

so as far as they knew, the danger was over. mosadek never had any idea that there even existed such a person as kermit roosevelt working inside the u.s. embassy and paying somebody thousands of dollars and working so intensively to overthrow him. i honestly believe if mosadek could come back to life and read my book, he'd be shocked. he had no idea till his dying day in 1957 of how involved the plot was that resulted in his overthrow. after the first coup failed on august 15th, the c.i.a. in washington sent an urgent cable to kermit roosevelt telling him you better get out of there in a big hurry before they find out who you are and kill you. but roosevelt decided i can still do this. i was here to overthrow this guy and i still have some tools. i want to try again. bear in mind, this was a time when c.i.a. agents operated

mainly by their wits. they were not in moment to moment communication with langley or anywhere else. and kermit roosevelt now having to ditch the plan that had taken british and american spymasters weeks to draw up came up with another plan of his own. after four more days of rioting and denunciations of mosadek from various quarters he struck again. on august 19 1953,28 or more by the iranian calendar a fateful day. the streets of iran were full of rioters and protesters, many of them paid by roosevelt, directly or indirect limit but i think many joining in without realizing what was going on. there were gun battles as military units whose leaders had been bribed joined the fight.

the climactic battle happened at night in front of mosadek's house. 100 people were killed in that battle alone. by midnight, mosadek's house was in flames he had fled and the coup had succeeded. a couple of days later just before leaving iran kermit roosevelt stopped in to meet the shah for one last time. this time, he was able to come sitting up in the back seat in the car in a suit instead of hiding under a blanket. and the shah toasted him and said this. the shah having come back to -- from rome where he was sitzing in a restaurant when he learned of the success of the second coup. i owe my throne to god my people, to my army and you. which was exactly right. i think he might have reversed the order.

now, kermit roosevelt came back to washington to great acclaim. he gave a briefing at the white house. president eisenhower later denied in his memoir took place but in actual fact he pinned a medal on roosevelt's chest. and roosevelt later wrote about this session in the white house. he said one member of my audience secretary of state john foster dulles had a wide grin on his face and was purring like a giant cat. my instinct told me he was planning. sure enough a few weeks later kermit voz veld was called in to his boss' office, you did such a great job overthrowing mosadek in iran, we decided we don't like that guy down in guatemala. couldn't you go down there and do it again?

well roosevelt demurred but another group was found and less than a year after the elected government of iran was overthrown, the elected government of guatemala was overthrown. with also heinous consequences leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a savage civil war that lasted over 30 years. this set the united states out in the direction of covert action and regime change. it's hard to imagine today, but it was not inevitable that the c.i.a. become an agency that was involved in overthrowing governments and destabilizing country countries. inform, it became so only after the established policy of the u.s. president was reversed by the eisenhower administration. so much of history stemmed from those few weeks in tehran. let me talk a little bit about

what i mean. as i said earlier, that coup could have been considered a success from the american perspective for the whole next 25 years. that was the period when the shah was in power and served as faithful ally of the united states. but let's look at it from the perspective of today. the shah's repressive regime shut off all political alternatives for anybody who was against the dictatorship. the only place that had a principled opposition and that was rooted in the iranian masses was the fundamentalist branch of islam. fundamentalism began do attract many people who were disillusioned with the impossibility of change. the shah's repressive regime led to the explosion of the late 1970's that we call the islamic revolution. that revolution brought to power a group of fanatically

anti-american clericses who proceeded to launch a campaign of terror against american and other western targets. that regime also inspired fundamentalist in many other countries including next door afghanistan. where the taliban came to power, and gave sanctuary to osama bin laden and al qaeda. this is why i think you can say that it's not far-fetched to draw a line from the 1953 coup in iran through the shah's dictatorship and the islamic revolution to al qaeda and the fireballs that engulfed the world trade center in new york. the world has paid a terrible price for the lack of democracy in the middle east. why is there such a lack of democracy there? when the united states -- there are many reasons of course. as i was studying history in college, i was always warned not to draw direct cause and effect

relationships in history. i hope my teacher is not in the room. we sent a message in 1953 that resounded throughout the middle east. the message was the united states which is the rising power to replace the fading british in this region does not want to see the emergence of democratic governments. we want strong man rule and that's what we got. a whole generation of rising leaders in the middle east understood that if they wanted to build regimes that were going to be supported by the united states, they could not go in the democratic direction. they needed to go in the direction of iran. strong man rule that would guarantee support for the u.s. and cold war conflict, and also guarantee access for american companies to the oil that is the middle east's most important product. so from that one episode a

deep-seated anti-americanism grew in iran that s >> the supreme court will hear cases. in a lethal injection case, the court has upheld the use of a controversial drug. they case from oklahoma says -- the drug has been used in executions in arizona, ohio, and oklahoma. it took longer than usual raising concerns the drug was not performing as intended. the supreme court upheld arizona congressional districts drawn by an independent petition.

states like california uses and independent commission to draw boundaries. you can hear the argument from the cases. we will begin with the case that determines whether or not the epa needed to take costs into account in regards to mercury and other toxic emissions. all oral arguments are tonight starting at 6:25 eastern. live coverage as president obama signs a number of bills into law, including a bill to expand trade with africa. chris christie is expected to enter the presidential race tomorrow. he will make his announcement from northern new jersey.

>> book tv will cover book festivals around the country. in july, we are live at the harlem book fair. we have author interviews and panel discussions. in september, we are live from the capital for the national book festival. that is a few of the events this summer. >> tomorrow is the deadline for agreements with enron. we are showing events from our archives. next iranian born author talks about u.s. iran relations.

>> thank you. that introduction was lovely. there are no experts, in case you were wondering. there is no such thing as expertise on iran. it is too difficult to claim that they are an expert. whether they are going to build a bomb, whether they are not whether they're going to go to war, all of that stuff that experts claim to know, they actually don't. and the proof of that is that in 2009, when there was an election in iran, a presidential election in iran, there wasn't a single expert, myself included as a nonexpert, who predicted what was going to happen and the aftermath of that election.

so now we've got a whole new election happening in iran and there's all sorts of new expertise about expert opinion about what's going to happen with the election in iran, how it's going to affect the nuclear program, how it's going to affect relations with the united states and iran. and again, i would argue that no one really knows. and i'll talk a little bit about what we do know about iran. rather than what we think we know. iran is, as i said earlier at a dinner, i have the fortune or misfortune, however you look at it, of being bi-cultural. what i know of iran is through the culture of my parents and my family. and the time i've spent in iran. which isn't as much as i would like it to have been. and my contacts with iranians, all kinds of iranians -- politicians, dave mentioned that i have met and translated for and even advised iranian presidents. i've had the fortune of being able to look at issues through

iranian eyes. my own eyes, which are partly iranian, but also through the eyes of iranians that i've gotten close to. and i think that's actually the primary problem that we have in america with foreign relations that we have a very difficult time looking at issues through the eyes of someone else. through the eyes of another culture. particularly a culture which seems to be in conflict with us. and iran has seemed to be seemed to have been in conflict with us for now over 30 years. question is, is there any way for us as americans, americans who don't have the experience or the bi-cultural background, to be able to understand where iran is coming from or the iranian government's coming from or where the iranian people are coming from? is there a way for us to accommodate what their concerns are and what they want to be in this so-called family of nations that exists right now?

hopefully at peace with each other. that's a good question. i can't answer that question because i'm bi-cultural. it's very difficult for me to answer that question. i think i know. but i can't look at iran purely through american eyes. what i'm going to do tonight is try to explain a little bit about iran from the perspective of iranians, not from the perspective of an american. when we look at iran i think, and it's in the news all the time, the scary country, 80 million people who seem to be religious fanatics which we don't like in america, generally speaking, who are bent on the destruction of israel, one of our closest allies if not our closest ally. who are bent on reducing our influence and power in the world and challenging the u.s. in almost every instance where our interests intersect, such as in afghanistan, iraq, syria lebanon, with hamas, with hezbollah.

that is what we see of iran. and what we see in the media of iran is also very alarmist. we have a crazy president in iran who talks about there being no homosexuals in iran, to wanting to wipe israel off the map, to talking about the evil of zionism, to talking about how iran is a super power and is going to challenge america and is actually going to be victorious in this battle between east and west. so this is what we get from the media to a large degree what is we see all the time, but it of course as intelligent people we know that can't possibly be the truth. and it isn't. it isn't the truth. it is true that president ahmadinejad is a little wacko.

it is true that he comes across as very wacko. it is true that his rhetoric sounds to our ears completely insane. it is also true that his rhetoric doesn't sound insane to a large population inside iran and doesn't sound insane to a large population in the developing world, not just iran. it's also true that he doesn't represent the iranian people fully. it's true that the iranians we see on tv sometimes all the way back to the hostage crisis jumping up and down and shouting death to america, scenes of tehran on television of people walking on the american flag, we also know that that, we actually know that, most intelligent people know that doesn't represent 80 million people. but it is also true at the same time that the iranian government is at odds with the u.s. government in many instances. and in many places in the world. particularly in the middle east. the question is, why is that? why should we be at odds with iran?

what is there about iran or this government in particular, this regime in particular that makes it impossible for us to have figured out how to be on good terms or at least on speaking terms with them over the last 30 years? well, the first answer to that is the hostage crisis. we tried, we had -- sorry, we had an embassy there, they took our hostages, they did something evil that was against international law, so we stopped speaking to them. we cut off diplomatic relations. that was that. now they're our enemy, they're against us, and we will do everything to undermine them. which included supporting saddam hussein when he went to war with iran. supporting him militarily, intelligence-wise, and supporting the countries that supported him financially. that's the easy answer. the more complicated answer is that there are grievances on both sides.

the main grievance that the united states has starts with the hostage crisis but then goes on to iran's support for act there's we don't approve of such as hezbollah in lebanon and the palestinian resistance in israel. and the occupied territories. the grievance on the iranian side is the side that we tend to miss. and we tend not to talk about. and the grievances on the iranian side go back all the way to world war ii. after world war ii, during world war ii, the allied powers had the shah's father removed from power because he was an axis sympathizers and installed the son. seven or eight years later there was a democratic -- he was a very weak ruler. there was a constitutional monarchy. there was a elected prime minister. and the elected prime minister in 1953 was mohammad musadev who was a nationalist who believed in iran's national interests and didn't believe in being allied to either east or

west and didn't believe in taking orders from the united states or anyone else. particularly great britain, at that time. at that time, iran's oil, iran's income from its oil, was less than the taxes that bp was paying to the british government for the sale of that oil. so he nationalized the oil industry. and the british and the americans, to make a very long story short, for those of you who know it, the british and american governments decided to remove that democratically elected prime minister and return the shah to power, who had fred iran in fear that he would be arrested. that coup, the 1953 coup, is something that every iranian knows about, every iranian has known about forever, has been taught in schools since 1979 and every iranian knows that was

instigated that coup was instigated by the united states. and great britain. but mainly, it wouldn't have happened without the united states. so, as far as iranians are concerned, and particularly the revolutionaries who took over power in '79 and who are now in control of the country, for them, the u.s. is a country that took away their democratic aspirations. it's true, it was more than 50 years ago. but it's still a recent memory for many of those people. and that since then, certainly since 1979, has tried to undermine iran's movement toward an independent democratic or somewhat democratic state. so the antagonism goes back to 1953. but it's not just to 1953. a lot of people will write books or write articles about how the iranians have a grievance against the united states because of the 1953 coup. it's not just that.

since 1979 and the hostage crisis, the iranians feel that the u.s. has tried to undermine iran in many ways. and i'll just point out a few of the more recent things that the iranians will point out and say this shows american bad faith towards iran. the nuclear issue as being a primary one, that the united states is making certain demands of iran that most iranians believe iran has a right to. a right to let's say nuclear enrichment at this point. most iranians believe iran has a right to a nuclear program under the treaty they have signed and that the united states is unreasonable in demanding they stop that. they believe the united states has gone further than just demanding iran stop that. and has actually had programs to undermine the regime. regime change programs. in fact, there was at one point

i think a $400 million budget to foment revolution in iran under president bush, there was. and i'm not sure where it stands now, the budget for covert and overt activity against the iranian regime. so the iranian people and the iranian regime, and the iranian ren jet stream is very good at propaganda and telling its people what's going on in the world, what's going on with america and iran -- the view there is that america cannot abide by iran's independence, by iran wanting to make its own decisions, and being an independent actor in the middle east. and wants to impose its will on iran. wants did impose a form of government on iran, wants to impose a form -- wants to impose its ideals and ideology on iran, and iran is resisting that. and another example for the iranians is the sass saying of -- the assassination of nuclear

scientists which is blamed on israel and the united states. and although the united states claims that it's not involved in the assassination of iranian nuclear scientists, that's not very much -- that's not very well believed in iran by even ordinary iranians who dislike the regime. then you have the virus introduced to the program running the nuclear program which caused a lot of damage. the iranian people have two major concerns in life. they have one concern which is economic, which we all have. everybody wants to have a good economic life, have a stable life, have a stable country, a stable economy. and to do well. their second concern, secondary concern, is a socio political concern. so they want a government that represents them. those two are their own primary

concerns for the iranian people. the iranian government knows those two are the primary concerns. they know the economic concerns. they know it's more important. but for the iranians there's a third concern. something we don't generally have to think about in america. that is what their nation stands for. the iranian people are proud people who've had 25 years -- 2500 years of history. at least they think they've had 2500 years of history as a nation state. and a nation state that was created at a time when there were very few nation states. there were mostly city states at that time. and iran forged together this nation out of different tribes different ethnicities and created this country called iran. it was always called iran by the iranians. it was called persia by the greeks and british. iranian kids who go to school were always taught iranian history.

the same way we're taught american history. they were taught about this grand, great empire that did a lot of good things. it was very powerful, that was independent, that was influential where the language was influential across the world. and they've seen the decline. and they blame part of that decline on the weakness of iran. the weakness of its rulers and the strength of the west. and what the '79 revolution was supposed to do and why it was popular for many iranians was that it claimed that it was going to make iranian another great country that was going to be independent. not necessarily to compete militarily, not necessarily to compete in terms of power on the world stage, but to be competitive as an independent nation state that was not going to take orders or dictate from any other country. that was a popular sentiment. and that's still a sentiment that is very much a part of the iranian experience. inside iran and even among

iranians outside of iran. even among iranian americans who live here who might despise the regime and what it does in terms of human rights and civil rights. but still believe that iran should be an independent nation, should not be a country that is allied, necessarily, to one country -- to another greater power or not. so for iranians, that third concern is actually quite important. and that's the concern that the regime has been able to play on for the last 30 years. and particularly in the last ten years when it's been about the nuclear issue. this concern that we want to be an independent nation. we don't want to be dictated to by the west. we don't want to be dictated by anybody let alone the west. in the walls they carved into the walls neither east nor west. it's important to the iranians to not be linked to the communist east or the capitalist west.

and that sentiment still plays a very strong role in the iranian culture. so i'm going to move to whether this government or this regime is an act that is possible to do business with for the united states. given the fact that they have as we know post-2009, quite a lot of discontent economically and sociopolitically. the first two concerns that most iranians have. they don't have a lot of discontent when it comes to their stance on independence. and the nuclear issue is what is driving that stance right now. for iranians and why the nuclear issue is still a very popular issue. nuclear program is still a popular issue for most iranians inside iran. even the polls -- latest polls -- although polls can be quite not accurate in countries like iran where people tend not to

answer truthfully because they're afraid their answers might become public. and people generally tend not to want to answer questions by someone anonymously on the phone. but there have been numerous polls done internally and by external polling -- u.s. based polling companies that have shown that even though the nuclear program has diminished somewhat in its popularity, it's still popular. and the iran stance on the nuclear program is popular by an overwhelming majority inside iran. still an overwhelming majority. and that's what i was talking about that third issue. now we can talk about what this

regime is. and whether what we -- how we relate to them, whether it's even possible for us to relate to them. talking about ahmadinejad first. ahmadinejad has been blown way out of proportion in the west. by our media. and you can't blame our media. our media likes to look for stuff that's interesting, exciting, sensationalist. and ahmadinejad, you know, he fits that bill. if he was reasonable, he wouldn't get a lot of air time. he's much more interesting as an unreasonable person. and we like wackos. the media is concerned about him being a little wacko instead of him actually being a threat. in ahmadinejad's case, it was both. this obsession about him being a threat as well as a wacko. but ahmadinejad in iran is not as important as we made him out to be here. it was much more convenient for the media to make him out to be the leader of iran. that's the word they've used often. when he's, in fact, not the

leader of iran. iran has a very, very complicated political structure. and it might bore people to death for me to go into it. but i'll go into it briefly. it is somewhat democratic, not in the way we imagine in that there is a supreme leader. a lot of words i'm going to use -- these terms are for orwellian. there is a supreme leader that is supreme. he is the ultimate authority in iran. the way it's structured is the supreme leader is chosen by a body of clerics called the assembly of experts. now, that's a pretty orwellian term too. they are voted on by the people. every six years. but i have yet to come across an iranian i know who has ever voted in that election. so you have to assume that people who go out and vote for the assembly of experts are people who are really regime supporters. and they vote for relatively conservative ayatollahs.

and the assembly is all clerics. it's like a college of cardinals. that assembly of experts has the ability to appoint a supreme leader and during that can monitor his performance and impeach him. like the cardinals can impose a -- depose a pope, under certain circumstances. so this is where they claim their legitimacy. saying i'm elected through the assembly of experts. then you have the other governmental bodies that are all ultimately answerable to the supreme leader. guardian council, another group of six clerics who are to mediate between -- this is -- sorry. between parliament and the executive branch. there are actually three

branches of government in iran and they are elected. there's a legislative branch which is the parliament. then there's the presidency. and if anybody's been following iran in the last few months or last year, you know inside iran there's a huge battle going on between those three branches of government. that said -- so there is a somewhat democratic system in place and the constitution is somewhat democratic. but that said, there is still the supreme leader who has the final say in everything and people defer to him. so the supreme leader was always the person who has been dealing with the nuclear issue. he's always the person who ultimately will make the decision on whether to talk to america, whether to make a deal with america. he's always the person who has the military capability. he is the person if iran ever builds a nuclear weapon -- if it were to do that -- he is the person who will have his finger on the button. not someone like ahmadinejad who is the president of iran. or whoever the next president of

iran is. in fact, the government system in iran, the president isn't even the commander in chief. the commander in chief is the supreme leader. so he doesn't have control over the military. so even if ahmadinejad really wanted to wipe israel off the map, he wouldn't have the ability to do so. he doesn't have his finger on any button let alone a nuclear button. he doesn't have the ability to make a decision on the nuclear issue. that's handled by the supreme national security council which is answerable only to the supreme leader. and it's he who appoints the people to the supreme national security council but in the constitution the president is automatically on that council, but he's just one voice of many. so the iranian government is -- seems opaque, seems very complicated. you do have these three branches of government. they're constantly fighting each other quite openly. and the media in iran is actually quite open in being

able to criticize one branch of government or another branch. there isn't freedom of press in iran, i'm not suggesting there is. but there's more freedom of press in iran than in other allied countries such as bahrain or even qatar and places like that. there is more freedom for the press to criticize the government. and there are certain red lines that cannot be crossed by the media. but you have a system that seems complicated and i think president obama realized. the supreme leader being supreme generally doesn't talk to anybody. and he has not left iran since he became president in 1989. since he became supreme leader. sorry. he was president before. one time he was a president. since 1989 he has not left iran. he thinks being the supreme

leader, that people have to come to him. and there's actually a book out right now by a couple of ex-u.s. intelligence people who are suggesting that's exactly what obama should do. is actually go to tehran. they titled the book with the"going to tehran." so he doesn't ordinarily meet with people. he doesn't meet with foreign politicians. he does occasionally meet with heads of state from muslim countries or african countries developing countries who come to tehran. he will have a brief meeting with them. but he doesn't negotiate. so it's a very complicated structure. but president obama did send a letter to the supreme leader instead of to ahmadinejad. now, as far as the iranians are concerned, this caused -- as far

as many iranians are concerned this caused more problems than it solved. president obama recognized ahmadinejad is not the person to discuss things with. so let's send a letter to the guy who's responsible, the supreme leader. ahmadinejad had been the first iranian president since the revolution to congratulate an american president in writing on their election. so ahmadinejad sent a letter to president obama on being elected in 2008. he didn't get a response. he was very offended ahmadinejad was very offended he didn't get a response from president obama.

so he started causing problems inside iran in terms of dealing with the administration. he mentioned americans aren't really interested in speaking to us or they're not really interested in engaging. it's all nonsense. they just pretend that they want to. they won't even respond to a congratulatory letter i sent them. that became a bit of a problem in the regime in iran. the supreme leader did respond sent a letter back. the reason i know this -- this has never been public. the only reason i know is a friend of mine helped compose that letter. somebody who was in the iranian government at the time. so the problem keeps compounding itself because of this cultural misunderstanding between the u.s. and iran on both sides.

the iranians think the american side isn't genuine. the american side isn't really after engagement but is trying to undermine them all the time. the american side doesn't understand the iranian side, doesn't understand the importance of responding to a congratulatory letter. and the u.s. side thinks that iran is impossible because every time we try to do anything, we don't get a response that we want. any time we try to reach out or as president obama says reaching out a hand and it's met with a fist. from the american perspective, we can see that. we can see the iranians aren't reacting well to our outreach. from the iranian side, whether it's the people of iran or whether it's the government, the outreach is actually very weak. it's like, yes, we would like to talk to you guys about your nuclear program and a few other things. afghanistan, syria, iraq. but mainly the nuclear program right now. and right now we would like you to do this. we're telling you we want you to do this. so the iranians say the americans already have what they want us to do which is to stop enriching uranium, to not be able to do what every other

country is allowed to do so they're picking on us. at the same time, the same time they're doing this they're also saying and while asking you to do this, we are going to leave all options on the table which means potentially we could -- if you don't do what we want you to do, we're going to bomb you. and we're going to force you to do what we want. and before we bomb you, we're going to try a few other things. so we're going to really cripple your economy. we're going to sanction the hell out of you. we're going to do something that will make it impossible for you to sell your oil, impossible for you to feed your people, impossible for you to balance your budgets, and really just squeeze you so much that it becomes painful not just for you but also for your citizens. and we'll keep doing that until you agree to do what we want you to do.

and all the while at the same time, by the way, if you don't do it we can bomb you. the iranians say, well, you know, that doesn't really work. if you threaten us, then you're not trying to engage us. if you're sanctioning every single thing, our oil, foreign exchange, you're cutting us off from the international banking system. you're trying -- what you're actually trying to do is destroy us. so what's the engagement? there is no engagement. you're not really talking to us. you're telling us -- you're dictating to us in the same way you've dictated to other countries as a superpower. and the same way you dictated to iraq and the same way you continue to dictate to some of your other allied weaker countries. and that's not acceptable. and for the iranian people, by and large i would say they would

agree with this government. no matter how much they dislike the government. no matter how much they feel the government's not representative of them in many other ways and no matter how much they feel that the human rights situation -- civil rights situation in iran, the democratic process all of those situations or all those issues are of importance and are not in the situation where the iranian people want them to be. despite that, they are still going to support the nation when it comes to its rights. because once you give up some of your rights because you're told to, once you accept being dictated to, then you really

don't have independence anymore. and that is really, really important for the iranian people. it's something i think our politicians have to understand not just with iran but with every country we deal with. we're used to being able to tell other countries what to do. we're used to being able to throw our weight around. it doesn't work anymore. it can only work if we really are willing to go to war -- to a perpetual war with all these countries that don't want to listen to us. and i don't think any of us believe that we are capable of that even anymore of going to war with a bunch of other countries. particularly in the middle east.

so the sanctions and the threats on iran aren't accomplishing what they are meant to accomplish. sanctions and threats are meant to accomplish two things. one is to change the behavior of the regime. or to force the people to change the behavior of their regime. in other words to squeeze the people so much they get so unhappy with the regime that they rise up and overthrow the regime. and then there's a regime that's more into doing what we want it to do. neither of those things are going to happen in iran. neither of them have happened and neither are going to happen. if anything, sanctions have not quite decimated yet, but have hurt the middle class to a point where the middle class have virtually no say anymore in civil society in iran. the middle class is getting smaller and weaker and it's the middle class in countries that tend to be the agents of change.

the threats are actually causing the iranians to be more intransigent rather than be cooperative in terms of wanting to try to resolve what is the main issue with iran which is the nuclear issue. the iranians today look around them and they say well, north korea actually has nuclear weapons, is testing nuclear weapons. and they're not threatening -- they are under sanction, that's

true. they are under sanction by the united states and other countries, but nobody's threatening to go to war with north korea. yet we don't have nuclear weapons and they're threatening to come to war with us. this doesn't make any sense. we could resolve this issue if the united states particularly the united states because the other countries that are involved, the view in iran is they are not the influential parties. if the united states was willing to accept iran as an islamic

republic, as a country that is an independent country, as a legislate government that has legitimate interests, that as far as the people are concerned has not happened. we have not yet accepted that the islamic republic is a country that we should be able to treat in exactly the same way

we treat any other independent powerful country. this is a demand iran has. the iranian regime -- and i'll talk a little bit about the regime and the presidential elections coming up. and the dissatisfaction with the regime. the regime was based on three things. its legitimacy, the islamic republic was based on three things. religious legitimacy derived from shia theology. second one was its support for the poor, a just society where there was going to be more equality, no corruption, people would have an opportunity to better themselves. and the government would take care in a socialist way take care of the poorest and the weakest in society. that was the second legitimate factor for the islamic republic. and the third was this independence issue i talk about. the first two issues have kind of weakened considerably.

the religious legitimacy has been weakens particularly since 2009 when many of the ayatollahs were seen to be cruel and not caring about any of the things they talked about in the past and democratic values. but even down to torture and arrests of human rights activists and protesters and stuff like that. you lose legitimacy if you do things that are not very religious or at least accepted in the religion. and even islam doesn't accept torture of prisoners for no reason or for any reason actually. so they lost that. they have this one legitimate -- and they lost the legitimacy of being for justice and for being the poor and for being against corruption and for equality for people partly because there's as much corruption now as there was probably in the last years of the shah's regime. if not more. and there's a huge gap in wealth between the haves and the have nots. and there's a lot of resentment inside iran even amongst people who support the regime. there's a lot of resentment about the fact there's a class of society, people associated with the revolution, people associated with the regime who do well economically and live very well and go around throwing their weight around. when there's people who are suffering. so that legitimacy is gone. wasn't -- it was there at the

beginning of the revolution. the beginning of the revolution, anybody who had a mercedes kept it in a garage because they didn't want to seem to be wealthy than anybody else. now you've got bugattis in iran when there's people who can't make their -- can't even feed their families. so that legitimacy is gone. the only legitimacy they have left in iran, really, is this legitimacy of an independent state that's going to fight for the iranian nation's rights. now, for the people of iran, we are always as americans interested in other cultures and what the political systems are and how -- whether the dictatorship is wanted. and we have sympathy for people who stand up to dictators and autocrats. as far as the united states foreign policy is concerned, though, the two issues whether

iran has a horrible human rights record and is an undemocratic country should not be related to the nuclear issue. they are -- as far as i'm concerned -- unrelated. if you you try to relate those two issues, you'll never get anywhere with the iranian government. you're not going to be able to bring down the iranian government through rhetoric. you're not going to be able to get the iranian people to rise up against this regime through rhetoric. and by telling the iranian regime that we hate you because of your human rights record, by telling the iranians we with you against the dictatorship, you're helping the regime. they turn around and say they're not worried about the nuclear issue.

what they're really trying to do is overthrow us. what they're really trying to do is overthrow the regime you voted into power 33 years ago. your government, your system of government that you wanted, the americans don't want. that's what they're really concerned about. it's not the nuclear issue. then at that point anybody who disagreed with the government -- if there is a civil society or opposition to iran, anyone who disagrees to the government becomes suspect. oh, you're actually working for the americans. you're actually going the job of

the americans because that's what they want. they want a liberal democracy in iran which they can control. and by criticizing us you're actually helping the enemy. so it helps the regime when you do that. so i remind you those things aren't very related. even amongst iranians they are not really remitted. if you look at the protest in iran and what people were demanding then, it wasn't an end to the nuclear program. it wasn't relations with the united states. people were not walking down the streets of tehran saying after ahmadinejad was re-elected, they weren't saying we want relations with america. you know, to open a u.s. embassy. we want the americans to come here. no. they were complaining about their own system, their own lack of civil rights, about the rigging of the vote for those who believe the vote had been rigged.

it had nothing to do with america or relations with america and nothing to do with the nuclear issue. every single candidate in iran who has ever run for public office, the most reform from the most reformed side, the one who is believe there should be a democracy in iran, to the hard lined all supported the nuclear program. the candidate -- leading candidate who lost to ahmadinejad in 2009 who's under house arrest and has been under house arrest for two and a half years now, he still to this day says he supports iran's nuclear program. and in fact, wouldn't give one iota -- compromise one iota with the united states. so the nuclear issue is really separate from the human rights and the civil rights issue in iran. and i suggest always that it is absolutely okay for us as americans, as independent non-ngos, even for the u.s. government to express dismay about human rights abuses. to express moral support for irans who are trying to build a

better society in iran. but to make that a primary consideration won't get us anywhere with -- i like that cell phone ring. my cell phone doesn't work. it's not going to get us anywhere with -- in terms of trying to come to some sort of agreement on the nuclear issue with iran. it's not a cell phone. someone's actually practicing. even better. musical accompaniment. so i'm not going to be too long because i don't -- i know people actually prefer to ask questions and try to get answers to questions rather than just listen to me go on and on about various things that could bore you to tears. but i think that the main thing i'm trying to get across is that iran is not actually that unique in terms of being a difficult state to work with. it's unique because it's one of the few times in our history if you set aside a few examples like cuba and the cold war countries that were allied with the soviet union. that comes out and defies us all the time. we just don't like to be defied. we don't like to hear that someone doesn't like something of ours. we think, even know not all of us believe we have a perfect political system in america or

that everything is perfect here in terms of democracy, we like to think it's as good as it gets. it's pretty close to being the best thing out there. so why wouldn't other people in other countries want the same things we want? why wouldn't they want to have a system that is similar to ours? why wouldn't they want to have the exact same freedoms that we enjoy here? well, it's complicated. because not everybody believes the way -- not everybody comes from the same culture. not everybody believes there are certain freedoms that we have today that we didn't have, by the way, 50 years ago that we think are natural freedoms. you should be able to do this. you should be able to say this. you should be able to, you know, date whoever you want. you should be able to be openly homosexual. all those issues. you should be able to marry if

you're gay. all those things that have changed in the american society over the last 40, 50 years. civil rights in america. those are things that aren't necessarily in the cultures of a lot of other countries yet. i think they will get there. i think things that are moral, things that are good, things that are reasonable will get there. but not every society is willing to be exactly like america. not every society wants their mtv. i think it's good that there are people who do want their mtv in iran and there are plenty of people who do. just based on the number of people who have illegal satellite connections and watch mtv. but society as a whole hasn't gotten there where it wants to be exactly like america. that doesn't mean that people -- we shouldn't stand up for women's rights, for example, in iran. doesn't mean we shouldn't decry segregation. we shouldn't decry various aspects of civil rights that are

abused. but it also doesn't mean that we should try to impose our way of life and our thinking and our ideology on other people without taking into consideration that there's a culture there that is proud, that needs to evolve in its own way and its own time. and whatever changes come to the government, whatever changes in terms of the political system happened, have to happen internally. they can't happen because we want them to happen. that's just not going to happen with iran. you know, we tried that in iraq. and we were able to bring about the change in iraq. but i think in the long-term when we look at it, there are few people who are going to say that for america -- maybe for the iraqi people 50 years from now they'll say thank god the americans removed saddam hussein because we got what we wanted in the end. but for america, i don't think america is going to get what it wants out of iraq or has gotten what it wants out of iraq. and certainly not at the cost -- and i don't mean financial, in terms of american interest and the number of dead and wounded we had from that conflict. for america, it's never going to have been worth it. i think when it comes to iran, we have to look at these things

i touched upon. but i think we can't obsess about one thing or another and have to really think about whether we as a country want to forget about the hostage crisis, have the irans forget about 1953 and move forward and say, look we will recognize your grievances, you recognize our grievances. >> more on enrollment in a moment. first, the supreme court has made decisions. they upheld the use of a lethal drug in lisa jackson -- lethal injection. the case from oklahoma the sedative can be used in execution without violating the

ban on cruel and unusual punishment. the supreme court also upheld the arizona congressional districts that were drawn by an independent commission instead of the state legislature. the arizona case stemmed from voter approval of an independent commission back in 2000 station. -- in 2000. you can hear the oral arguments in the case is decided today starting at 625 p.m. eastern time with the epa clean air case in which the regulations were scarfed down. and then at 8:00 p.m. eastern a challenge to the use of lethal injection in some states. and the question of state redistricting. live coverage as president obama gets ready to sign a number of bills into law in including a trade bail on africa. and the new jersey governor chris christie is expected to

enter the presidential race tomorrow. he will be making his announcement from northern new jersey. >> tonight, we've visited microsoft's washington dc office to hear about their current goals. >> i'm hopeful at point congress will take on is because it is very important, and frequently i do not have the exact numbers, but we have some of the innovators that a here and the researchers that are here. we have them all over the world that make contributions for our scientists and are engineers. and for other companies as well. there is still a need. look at it from a job perspective. >> the application is actually

to collect mosquitoes that have bitten people and to determine what kind of viruses might be around. what kind of diseases might be around. through taking the blood samples of the mosquitoes have figuring out the genetic code of some of the constituents of their blood. >> the premise of this project was what we would be of the to do with data that is freely available to the environment today. one of the things that we have is that there is a lot of aircraft flying around in the united states that could be considered censored. they are providing information and it is relatively freely available to is provided by the faa.

there are companies like flight of where they use that information to find information to the community about what airplanes are doing. we decided to take that information and see if we can use the to help us contact a more accurate forecast. what the wind is doing in terms of speed and direction above the earth. >> that is tonight at 8:00 a.m. eastern on the communicators on c-span2. >> tomorrow is the deadline set by negotiations come up with a decision on a wrong. and look at the human rights record and the prospect for change under the president of the panel discussion that included a critic of the iranian government.

this is about 25 minutes. >> let me start with you. what is your sense of what is going on in iran right now? you people think it's wonderful and that he is a reformer and people think the 2009 uprising is over and are satisfied with the dish with what is going on. are they supportive of iran's nuclear weapons program? what do we know and what don't we know?

>> first of all, when it comes to the source of error information, we need to remember that iran is not like north korea. iran is a country where the censorship is at play with the press. however, if you are an iranian specialist coming of the opportunity to get information through different media in spite of the fact that all the media is censored by the government. particularly if we look at the smaller circulation magazines and journals and a special economic newspapers, iran is just like america in that sense. most people do not read economic newspapers. as an iran expert, the first thing is to read economic newspapers in order to get the information. what you also should do -- this is something we do every day -- take a look at specialist journals and magazines particularly those of the revolutionary guards. there is one weekly publication which expresses the political line of leadership of the revolutionary guard and on the other hand, you have the

newspaper daily which expresses the views of mr. rohani and the other newspapers in the middle. there are different sources of information we can consult. it is not just the opinion of the broader public but they give us extremely important insight into the thinking of different elite groups within the mafia family of the ruling clans of the islamic public a that republic of iran. those of you who are fans of "the godfather" think of the rohani group as the corleone's. read the newspapers and take a look at what you find out is it has nothing to do with liberalizing the political system it has nothing to do with democracy. it has absolutely nothing to do with opening up the economy of iran but it has a lot to do with taking privileges away from the revolutionary guard and back to the first generation of revolutionaries of the islamic republic. >> you might want to discuss a little bit in this regard. your confrontation with the

foreign minister zuri. you can use that as a jumping off point. >> a few months ago, i attended a lunch with the foreign minister zarif and a few other people and after the lunch, i approached him and asked him if he thought it was ironic that he enjoys posting on facebook when his government bans it and iran to which he replied, ha-ha that's life. [laughter] that is word for word what he said. i said when will one of the most famous political prisoners be free. he said i don't know who that is. i published this in the daily beast. it got picked up from there. thousands of iranians wrote the foreign minister on facebook and after a lot of pressure internally and globally, it was picked up widely by the press, they released the prisoner on furlough for about a week. when the media pressure died down, he was put right back into

prison. what was interesting is maybe my 15 or 20 minute debate/confrontation/discussion with the u.s. ambassador. when i approached him about the same issues, i asked why the foreign minister guest to both on facebook when it's banned in iran and he turned to his aid and said word for word -- are the facebook and twitter banned in iran? i assured him they were and i listed a bunch of political prisoners and asked when they will be free. he said i don't know who they are. i asked if he heard of other prisoners. he heard of one. the only reason is because her name is constantly in the media. which i thought was instructive. i think he's probably lying about the others. it's a testament to the power of international media to raise these names and make iranian

diplomats pay a price. during the lunch, zarif sounded like a cross between mother theresa and gandhi. in his telling, there is no government on the planet more dedicated to peace and freedom and democracy and justice and it is sad to read port that he has exceeded in convincing much of the world's governments and much of the world's media -- when i left that lunch, a very renowned journalist turned to me and said, isn't he so wonderful? and there were very few difficult questions. this is the sort of situation which i hope to change. anytime an iranian diplomat steps outside of his office, he should be confronted with a cacophony of the names of all of the political prisoners. i think there is a direct link to how much treasure we put on this vicious theocratic regime and how much they open.

the fact that even in today's age, they let the prisoner out of prison for a week after the international outcry says that the same model that was used for soviet dissidents to pressure the regime to raise the international pressure is still effective. i used to work for natan sharansnky. gorbachev was asked why he was released and he said everyone was talking about him. they held placards to ask for his release. there were meetings with soviet negotiators and they bring up the names of the dissidents and then had a real effect on soviet

policy. that is one small confrontation but it is one i think we can be part of re-creating over and over so we don't let the regime get away with their absurd narrative that things are getting much better at a time when there are thousands of people in prison like lawyers and christian leaders and so on. >> go ahead, mike. >> this goes back to people don't get the importance of what david is talking about. even during the holocaust, european countries found

especially the danes were good at this, found that when people wrote letters to concentration camp prisoners, sent them presence, wrote them postcards whatever -- they had a much better survival rate than people who did not get attention. that was because, in part, writing to them and calling them out and naming them and putting their names on lists given to foreign ministers and so forth removes the cloak of anonymity from them. it is much easier for regimes to kill anonymous people than it is to kill people who have real names and real faces and people out there in the world who are calling attention to them. this has worked over and over again. >> i want to press all of you on this -- it strikes me that letters to political prisoners would not have saved james

foley. at the same time, it also seems that among organizations that are identifiably jihadist whether it's the islamic state or the islamic republic, there are common goals, common themes even if they are different strategies. how do we understand that? should we say the iranian regime is much more moderate than the islamic state? we should recognize they don't cut reporters heads often talk about that as progress? or should we see all of these various self-proclaimed jihadist groups essentially similar even though their strategies are different? you might want to start. >> one of the issues is that the iranian government -- what they want to avoid is diplomatic isolation. this is something they fear. what they have been particularly happy about when it comes to negotiations is that they genuinely believe that if they give some tactical concessions in the nuclear issue, nobody would care to talk about human rights in iran. this is a policy they have been pursuing. these are the statements that mr. homeini is making himself in public and it is the threats he is making against the u.s.

government saying that if we accept your nuclear terms, do not come after us with the human rights issue. the answer of the obama administration and all civilized governments in the world should the, no, there is a connection. how are regime treats its own population at home also relates to the way it would behave and international political settings. this is the connection i think that we really need to make here in the west to threaten them to say sanctions do not only apply if you reach your contractual obligations. there is something called human rights. lets not forget that the u.s. government and u.s. president have on many occasions may direct addresses to the iranian public. how do you think the iranian public would feel if they are totally abandoned by washington? does washington only care about nuclear issues?

is an important message that washington needs to send to the iranian government and the iranian public. >> i would say the support of dissidents is not just a moral but a strategic issue as well. they say there can be no peace between countries until there is peace inside of countries. how government treats its own people is a direct reflection of how the government will treat its neighbors and it's silly to think the government like iran when it is brutalizing and torturing and jailing dissidents and lawyers and journalists will turn to its historic enemies and treat them with magnanimity. it's a silly contention. i think the way the issue is used in the soviet context was that it was a tool to bring about the end of the soviet union, not merely to contain them but end of the soviet union. so, too, it can be used in the iranian context. when you look at the boldness of some unlike senator jackson who confronted the soviet union and

directly linked most favored country status, that drove the soviets crazy. if you read the memoirs of gromyko or anyone else, when carter and reagan would bring up the names of dissidents, they really hated it. that is one sign that it's the right approach. that is one sign that it's the i think human rights is a real achilles' heel of the iranian regime. they are dependent upon external actors to some degree. their economy is being hit hard. if we understand this human rights issue not just as the right thing to do morally but that opening up this closed society is critical to the peace and stability of the region, we will begin to utilize it as a tool in the war against theocracy and dictatorship. >> do you want to add to that? [applause] >> there is a real identity, i

think you put it exactly right this is an idea between moral imperatives and strategic imperative to it is rare that you find such a perfect fit of one to the other. and the degree to which the myth of rouhani has been created along the same lines of the myth of gorbachev is a real throwback for me because i saw them emerge with their level aspects. they liked jazz there was ahead of qiagen n.v. but they liked

dixieland music and all those sorts of things. -- they were head of kgb but they liked dixieland music. there was a human element to them and so on. rouhani is a man of the system. he is a pure product of the system. he came of age in it, he worked in it all his life. he has always been a loyal servant of the system itself. and now here he is at the top and people don't talk much about what he is really all about and what he really wants. why does he take all these different positions? because the main game that's being played inside iran right now among the various factions who are contending among one another is to is going to secede -- 16 how many -- follow the current leader? he is believed to be sick.

no one would be surprised if the dropped dead tomorrow. they are all moving rubric for the succession. they are all trying to make sure. they are acquiring sport everywhere. each individual faction has greater autonomy, say greater run on its own enemies. ronnie's government is setting records for executions, tortures censorship, incomparably worse than augmented the previous. and while he is the angel child who is objectively, by any manager, much worse. this tells us that there are

these fractures inside. and one point about what we know and what we don't know. in a wrong there are a lot of known unknowns. if you look at our history at anticipating israel developments inside the country look at 2009 which was bigger than the uprising that overthrew the shaw in 1979. i think it is fair to say that no one inside government saw that government. in a series position to -- and no one in a serious position to make policy or affect policy. they were amazed because there had been no opposition standing

inside iran, and even if they sought existing, they did not have leaders. there was this direction, and people said it was there all along. you will see that the was there

all along. if you go back and read the press of 2009, june and onwards, you'll see that the intelligence community and the policy making community, they are saying we don't have to do anything because these people are irresistable. look at them all. they're going to win. it's sort of a precurser of the assad is going to fall. no, assad is going to win. no, assad is going to fall. no assad is going to win. types of conventional wisdoms. so the bottom line, we don't know. we didn't know in 2009. and we don't know today. what we do know is that the regime acts as if there was something serious to be afraid of. we can say that. this increase in slaughter and mayhem, the increase in censorship, all of that, that bespeaks a regime which doesn't think it has control and which this -- so whenever more than three people gather on a street corner in any major street in the country, they're either broken up, beaten up, or sent home or whatever. >> michael, you talked about record numbers of executions incarcerations.

i guarantee you that most people don't know that, most people think that we're in a period of post ahmadinejad of reform and moderation. if you simply read the media as i suggested earlier i think you would get that impression. maybe if you come to think tanks you would have a different understanding. does that not suggest -- let me start with ali on this, that the regime is doing very well on public relations, in fact it's winning the public relations war right now and perhaps the media is not doing their job in terms of covering iran? >> absolutely. i think it's very clear, if you compare mr. rouhani to his predecessor mr. ahmadinejad, mr. rouhani is a sophisticated man. he speaks like a lawyer. he's a trained lawyer. mr. ahmadinejad was an engineer but spoke like a truck driver. mr. romney -- rouhani is in silk robes. these are some of the findings of this government. mr. ahmadinejad managed to

isolate iran diplomatically. they are in reality bringing iran out of diplomatic isolation. so yes they are succeeding and the western media is not paying the attention they should. they should to begin with start reading what he has said all over the years. back in 1999, iran, the islamic republic, experienced ets most serious political unrest. that was the tehran university unrest which spread to the entire country. which politician do you think it was who went to the public and supported the revolutionary guard and the police suppression of the students movement? mr. rouhani. he systemically called the iranian students foreign agents. it was he who systemically as chairman of the supreme national security council was banning

newspapers and now people are expecting that he of all the people is going to allow freedom of the press? why? why? this is why i believe is the mistake of the western press that they do not pay attention. they do not take a look at the history of those individuals. therefore, they have expectations which is totally immature. some younger people in tehran have these kind of expectations. this is why they voted for him. but you cannot blame them. they are young and naive. here in washington people are not so young but naive. this is one of the complaints that i have when it comes to

u.s. government view of the rohanie cabinet. >> i think the regime has succeeded in making 98% of the discourse of the nuclear issue maybe even higher, and convinced the west is how to prevent iran from getting nuke deleer weapons. without nuclear weapons, with purely conventional arms hundreds of millions of people have been killed in the last 150 years. 200,000 people slaughtered in syria, 800,000 in rwanda, tens of millions in world war ii. so i think we need to dramatically and unequivocally restore the focus to the human rights question. when his wife was touring the state department one time in the 80's she would tell a story that there was a huge map on the wall and one of the senior state department officials said with all due respect you don't really expect us to relegate your husband's release to all these important geostrategic challenges. what you don't understand is those issues won't be resolved until my husband is released. and i think we're aware of the informations. there are lists of hundreds of thousands of political prisoners but many people don't get the link between internal freedom

and external peace. and just real quick about the issue of the letters ba to baghdadie. emboldning dissidents also encourages those movements inside iran. there's nothing more fearful for a disdent than feeling alone and isolated and not cared about by the rest of the world. we can do an enormous amount to increase the strength of disdent movements inside authoritarian countries simply by speaking out and supporting them. this helps gives them the impetus to rise up against those who throw them in prison. i think that's another issue that the west doesn't understand. and i completely agree about missing what has become conventional wisdom of even the arab spring. it's fantastic to look back at the predictions of supposedly smart people in 2009 newsweek said that the best thing for syria was a wise and charismatic

leader named assad and in 2010 kerry said he was a partner for peace, prosperity and stability. and in 2011, they said syria was an island of stability. and you look at those talking about egypt as a rock of stability in an island of stability and secretary clinton's famous remark on january 25 is our assessment that the egyptian government is stable. all of these were false and just dangerously wrong in no small part i think because they weren't listening and they missed the fact that the amount of double thinkers is always bigger than we think and the amount of true believers is typically lower than we think. >> the only thing i'll push you on a little bit, and i may have mission -- have misunderstood. yes, greater emphasis in human rights is called for but that shouldn't mean less emphasis on the nuclear issue. if this regime should get nuclear weapons, the amount of repression and carnage we could

see under that nuclear umbrella for the remainder of this century would make what's going on now seem very small. >> no question it and instantly large danger. but i think the unfortunate correlator is that people underestimate the danger of the regime staying in power and supporting terrorism and undermining every single gulf country and funding terrorism as far as the eye can see and bruletly repressing 80 million people for decades. that's an absolutely untenable and unforgiveable situation which we can work faster to undo. >> more on iran in just a moment. today, the last day of the supreme court current term. a decision, five-four, in which justices say the epa failed to take cost into account. the court of