it goes to the t of what have we're here for. the whole purpose of this hearing is to how to confront and stop isis and the levant. we will talk about that, not these other strategies, general dempsey, not the threats around the world. we need a strategy on this problem. i'm deeply disappointed. i don't see the confidence in your testimony or general dempsey's testimony. i believe we are actively carrying out a strategy that the president has and i don't believe it has sufficient respect for the use of military force necessary to be successful. i hate to be a critic about this. this is important. senator mccain warned in 2011 we should not pull out all our troops and we need to remained engaged in that country. and he also warned you if we do it in afghanistan the same thing is liable to happen there. both of which would be tragedies of monumental proportions

considering how much we invested, the soldiers general dempsey led in iraq. so i'm worried -- i'm not happy about this. i think delusion is a word that's too accurate. so i just want to say that here at the beginning. i hope we will get into more details about what you plan to do to reverse this action. and at some point the president's going to have to change his mind, it seems to me. he cannot just function based on a campaign promise when reality is different. secretary carter: do you want me to answer that question? it is a fair question, let me go back to the issue of the strategy, and then i will say something about afghanistan. the strategy is for defeating

isil on the ground in iraq and syria is to train and then enable local forces. that takes some time. senator sessions: i understand that. general dempsey was training the iraqi forces eight years ago. i visited him in iraq. that was his primary responsibility. we've been training them for nearly a decade. and that's not the problem right now. i think the problem is confidence within the iraqi government and the iraqi soldiers that they're going to be supported and that they're going to be victorious and if they had that confidence you'd get more recruits. secretary carter: i agree with that. that is what was lacking under maliki. you're absolutely right. senator sessions: i believe you used the word strategy -- is support, capable and motivated

ground forces where we find them. well, i think general stewart a few months ago testified a new defense intelligence agency had who was there in the al-anbar region and led the effort that the forces when they turned it around in iraq. general dempsey, you remember that effort. and he said, when pressed, i felt that he was reluctant because it wasn't the administration's policy but he acknowledged when you have embedded soldiers observers, the united states forces embedded with troops moving out into combat situations that those iraqi troops will perform better. do you agree with that, general dempsey? general dempsey: i agree that there are points on the battlefield when the j-teches, embedded forces would make them more capable. senator sessions: so is our strategy now, will it remain that we will not do that?

general dempsey: i can tell you that i have not recommended it. whether we do it or not, i am telling you i have not recommended it, senator. and i can explain why if you'd like. senator sessions: well, i want to know why. general dempsey: let's talk about the issue of airpower because it seems to be a -- the most prominent one. in the similar conflict in 2012, the number of aircraft that returned with their ordinance because there were not targets available on the ground was 83%. it's 65% in iraq right now. the joint -- the j-teches and the special force observers are not a silver bull felt of the destruction of isil. the silver bull set getting the syrians to fight. senator sessions: well, i totally agree with that. i just believe we have a few forces, 1,000 forces in mosul mosul would never have fallen. so now our policy is to try to take back this territory?

and what is the reluctance -- what is the reluctance that use our special forces here? see, this is what bothers me. i'm not -- i understand the problem in syria and i'm dubious about what we ought to do about syria i don't know. we probably should not have involved ourselves in libya. but we are committed -- we committed our nation in iraq general. we've been deeply committed for over a decade there. so is it now our policy that you're refusing to allow special forces to be embedded? let's say, two special forces with 600 iraqi troops and a battalion, you rejecting that idea? general dempsey: what i have recommended, if we find a unit which is led and is responsive and has an offensive mission , where we can enable them or

increase their likelihood of success that i will make that recommendation. but to re -- to restore or put embedded advisors in on a habitual basis that environment is just not simply set to do that. and by the way, it's not reluctance. we got 1,600 pilots flying over iraq and syria today. we got 3,500 boots on the ground to train, advise and assess. senator sessions: so if we had a few advisers in the iraqi battalions, you're saying that would not make a positive impact on their morale and their capabilities to actually win? general dempsey: what i'm saying, senator, for a brief temporal, tactical gain we should wait until we see a strategic opportunity to do that. senator sessions: well, i think if we started having some wins isis would have fewer recruits and we would have better morale

with the iraqi recruits too and they'd fight better. it's the chicken and the egg perhaps, but i think it's very important. i hope you'll re-evaluate that and recommend to the president to do that because i think without that we're not joe -- we are not going to be affected. thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both of you in service to our country. i appreciate it very much. you can tell this is a pretty sensitive subject. it is concerning for all of us. as i go around the state of west virginia, my local state, it's a very hockey state and patriotic state and a lot of veterans, speak to all of them. they're confused right now. they really are of what -- you heard the frustration coming out. basically, iraq is not a united country. you have the sunnis, shiites and the kurds. i think secretary carter, you said until they have the will and i think -- general dempsey you said the same thing. until iraq has the will to fight but which group has the will to fight to defend the other group?

that's where we're having the problem. i think it's been said, well, if you have a group that's fighting and the kurds want to fight, why do we still have to make them go through the baghdad centralized government in order for them to get the weapons they need to defend themselves and be aggressive? so they're confused about that. they're confused about in syria trying to spend the money to find people to train. when you acknowledge we only had 60 of them successful right now and the amount of effort we're spending there but i think you had the syrian kurds, they're fighting and some things of that sort. i don't know. and then i'm asked the question we continue to keep trying to train and arm the iraqis and it seems like all they're doing is supplying isil with the equipment that the americans are giving them. and when are we ever going to stop, you know, giving equipment to the people that won't defend it and fight for it?

so i guess, are we talking -- at your level, are you talking to the white house about rethinking the whole iraqi position as far as one centralized government, one iraq or maybe a separate ready iraq? -- separated iraq? secretary carter: i think we're all aware that it is very difficult to govern iraq in a multisectarian manner. we thought about the alternatives to that. i'm sure we have for years and i'm sure you have as well. we are trying to assist prime minister abadi in governing in a different way from the way maliki governed which as senator sessions noted led to the disintegration of the iraqi security forces, the sectarian coloration of them and that's what ultimately led to their collapse in sunni territory.

senator manchin: i've been asked the question -- you just reminded me. they said didn't we see signs , that maliki was incompetent, that he would have gone strictly to a sectarian position as he did not for a strong united iraq, did we not, with all the people we had there, did we not see that coming and could not averted that from happening? secretary carter: i can only speak for myself in that regard and i was not closely involved in that in the time -- and at the time i certainly had that concern with mr. maliki. i met with him several times. it was apparent to me. prime minister abadi says he has a different intention which is to govern iraq from the central but in a decentralized enough way that the kurds, the sunnis and the shiia each have enough , space to carry on their own welfare in the way that they

wish but there is a single integral iraqi state. the -- and that is what he says he's working towards and we're supporting him in that regard. that's why, for example, we -- when we provide arms to the kurds we do it with consent of the iraqi government in order to indicate that we support the idea of a single iraqi government in baghdad but we wanted the kurds in the fight and armed and that has not delayed our arming of the kurds. senator manchin: and then the sunnis and the shiites. secretary carter: and the sunnis and the shiites. that's why it is so important to take the time to train a truly multisectarian iraqi force. there are elements of the iraqi forces that have that right character. for example, their c.t.s.

and so our strategy -- just to go to the beginning -- is to train and equip those local forces. they're essential. then we can help them. and it is a chicken and egg thing except you need to have the capable and motivated ground force, then we can enable it rather than to substitute for it which doesn't lead to lasting result. senator manchin: i think general dempsey, as has been pointed out, we spent multiple years, 10 years-plus, trillion dollars, lost lives in iraq, and we had 100,000 troops there at one time trying to train and defend and get them motivated and that didn't work. that's the hard question. how do you go home and answer that? how do i go home and answer we'll redo this again? i think that's the frustration you've seen coming out of senator sessions. general dempsey: i think it's probably worth mentioning my judgment about how this will evolve over time is that it's a

generational issue. it is transregional, senator. it is elements of it in afghanistan. we see it in iraq and syria we see it in the sinai. we see it in libya. we can't focus like a laser beam on one part of it. it has to be pressure across it. so what we're trying to do is achieve an enduring defeat which means we got to work it through partners because they have more to gain and more to lose and finally we got to find a sustainable level of effort since i do believe this is a generational challenge. senator manchin: i think basically my question overall are we trying to defend the british lines that were drawn 100 years ago, and putting it people in a territory that is not their country. why are we forcing upon people that don't want to accept it? general dempsey: i also share that concern.

that the mideast will never be the mideast again. so everything i recommend to the secretary and to the president is recommended with the intention of being flexible enough that we can -- we can build upon it if we do find that inclusive national unity government in iraq or not. senator manchin: thank you. senator mccain: i can't help but mention the situation was stabilized after the surge and we had won and we predicted if everybody was pulled out that the situation would descend into chaos. it is a fact that thanks to general petraeus and the surge and great sacrifice, the iraq war was won and to ignore that in that conversation, general dempsey, is to me intellectually dishonest. senator ayotte.

>> the president signed an agreement to pull all forces. senator mccain: the people there know they could have. senator ayotte. senator ayotte: i want to thank both of you for being here for your service to the country. we appreciate it. i want to ask you, secretary carter, you said and answered senator manchin that in fact our -- the arms we're providing for the kurds we're doing so with the consent of the iraqi central government. does that mean we're doing it directly or are we going through the iraqi central government question mark -- government? secretary carter: first off, we're not the on ones. we and others basically convey the weapons directly to the kurds. but we inform the iraqi government and get their formal consent to it. so it doesn't delay the arming of the kurds. we're trying to stick up for basically the iraqi central government. senator ayotte: because we heard complaints -- going through the

iraqi central government and then to the kurds so i'm glad to hear we're directly providing it to the kurds, letting the iraqi central government know what we're providing. secretary carter: mr. barzani was here in town a few weeks ago. it was great -- what was being provided and he noted the delays, which is the principal problem that were experienced early on are not being experienced now either in the shipment of our equipment or that of others, for example, the germans providing anti-tank munitions which they value very much. but we're trying to stick up to the principle that iraq is a single unitary multisectarian state and difficult as that may be that is much preferred to the alternative which is the sectarian disintegration of iraq. senator ayotte: let me follow-up. so clearly the kurds are capable and motivated. at this point what are they receiving all of the weapons they asked for?

because as i understood it, isis at one -- isis unfortunately captured some of the armaments we left in iraq and some of them heavy armaments. the kurds are quite effective but it's hard if you're , outarmed. and are they now receiving -- what have they requested that we're not providing and if so why? secretary carter: i'll let chairman dempsey answer that. again, just to say it's not just us. i think there are more than 12 nations overall arming the kurds and i noted i was with the german defense minister over in germany last week and she was providing to the kurds these critical anti-tank weapons of the kinds the germans make that is especially effective. so it's not just us, and the kurds are an example of what we're looking for which is an effective ground force that will stick up for itself, martin e.

-- it sells hold together, take , and hold territory. that's why we're providing them with support. senator ayotte: so we agree with that? i think there's been broad agreement on that. we went to make sure they have what they need. general dempsey: we probably haven't provided in the quantity they provided. mraps, for example. we are working to address those quantity issues. senator ayotte: i wanted to ask -- follow-up on a different topic. because, general dempsey, you mentioned some of the other challenges we face around the world, including the malign influence of iran. i read today in the press that in fact iran was actually pushing for the lifting of the arms embargo at the u.n. and also the resolution that , bans iran from developing ballistic missiles.

so i wanted to get both of your thoughts on those two issues and the importance of as we look at iran's malign influence we can , tell them not only supporting the assad regime, the hudi renls -- rebels, and we heard reports on the taliban undermining our interests so your thoughts on those two issues? secretary carter: secretary kerry is conducting those negotiations. i agree with your perspective, namely that there are -- we have serious concerns with iranian malign activities outside of the nuclear issue which is the focus of those talks. and it is in several different locations around the region. and whatever happens as far as an agreement over the nuclear program with respect to iran is

concerned, i think we -- and certainly i feel -- have a clear duty in the department of defense first of all to defend our friends and allies, keep a robust posture in the gulf. our friends and allies to include especially israel. maintain our robust posture and continue to maintain the military means to strike iran's nuclear program if we were ordered to do so. we work on all three of those things and we'll work on them whether or not an agreement is reached in geneva. senator ayotte: so just to be clear, secretary, it doesn't sound like based on what you're saying, given their malign activity in the region it would be a good idea to lift the arms embargo right now on what iran receives, would you agree with me? secretary carter: we want them to continue to be isolated as a

military, and limited in terms of the kind of equipment material they are able to -- senator ayotte: can you explain to us why is it important for continuing to stop them from having an icbm program? we know they have one. secretary carter: the reason that we want to stop iran from having an icbm program is that the i in icbm stands for intercontinental which means having the capability from -- the ability to fly from iran to the united states and we don't want that. that's why we oppose icbm's. general dempsey: we should under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking. senator ayotte: thank you. i also just wanted to point out something, secretary carter,

when the chairman had asked but -- asked about the defense authorization, one thing that i think needs to be pointed out, the president has said he will veto it. the defense authorization received 71 votes in the senate. i would describe that as very bipartisan. and so it troubles me that he would seek to veto something that received 71 votes. secretary carter: thank you fred thank you, secretary, thank you. i just got back with senator mccain. i just got back from a meeting and the sunni tribal leaders some of them were from the had a deetha area. some said we have stood with you, we have faith with you but we have people who are now eating grass in our town. we have no food, we have no

supplies, and we have been told the only airlifts that can come in would be on military transport. senator donnelly: is there anything you can do to help feed our people? so i wanted to put that before you to see if there's something we can do to be of aid to these individuals. secretary carter: first of all i want to thank you, senator donnelly, also, senator kane for traveling there. we appreciate it. on behalf of the 3,550 members of our armed forces that are in iraq and conducting this fight thank you for taking the time to visit them this fourth of july weekend. the humanitarian situation is yet another tragic consequence of what is going on with isil. it remains one of the coalition's efforts, as i indicated in my opening

statement, to relieve the humanitarian situation. that's very difficult to do when there is not order and control and so this is why we need to get a security situation that's stable, ground forces that's -- that are capable of seizing territory, holding territory and that's the only way to get the situation turned around in iraq or in syria. it's very sad and tragic. in the case of iraq, as noted something brought about by the , re-emergence of sectarianism. in a tragic way. general dempsey: one of the reasons we went to an airbase is to advise and assist in the anbar operation center which is these kind of issues should actually migrate through. you should be interested to know the iraqis have the capability

to address that. they have c-130-j, state-of-the-art -- senator donnelly: i know they do but they're not. general dempsey: we'll pass it to the guy -- senator donnelly: when you're hungry, you don't want u.s. food or iraqi food you just want help. one of the bonds created with these leaders is they said we , always felt we could count on you. and to follow up on that, as we look at ramadi and other areas and the iraqi armed forces, one of the -- one of the great tragedies of this whole thing was that the number of isis fighters in ramadi was extraordinarily insignificant in terms of the overall number, but the iraqi forces headed the other way. and so i wanted to hear your thoughts on making sure that the iraqi forces, now that there's no back door anymore, there's one way through ramadi and that's forward.

secretary carter: i'll say something about that and then, chairman, you may want to add. the way you recount, the fall of ramadi is correct. ramadi needs to be retaken and the way to do it so to have a force under the competent command and control of the iraqi security forces commanders which has been a challenge, and a plan and the means to -- as you say -- make sure they don't bog down and they're able to take ramadi and move through ramadi. this will be a test of the competence of the iraqi security forces. and it's a test that they must pass and therefore our and the coalition's involvement is to

try to train equip, and support them to be successful. and we're going to take the time and encourage them to take the time so when the operation when they do conduct it is successful. senator donnelly: one of the sidespinoffs when it is successful and ramadi is taken back is that isis will then look for a quick p.r. claim somewhere else. and so i want to make sure that we're ready in surrounding towns and surrounding areas so when ramadi falls we know they'll step somewhere else and that we have a plan in place to protect those other towns as well. general dempsey: the ramadi campaign, which about a month ago, was about to be executed precipitously has been with our help is now a very deliberate campaign, first isolate it and then go back to recapture it with the supporting help in fallujah. our presence in the anbar operation center is allowing the iraqi security forces to take a more deliberate campaign

approach and to avoid the very toothpaste aspect of the way isil squirts around the battlefield when you squeeze it in one place and it turns up another. but this is very much us helping them understand the threat and formulate a campaign to address it so that they get credit for it and that they become credible to the people of al-anbar province. senator donnelly: well, as i'm sure you know the sunni tribal leaders, they have -- tremendous value with the relationship they've established over the years with the united states established in blood and treasure. and so what gives them confidence more than anything is knowing that not that our soldiers are in the front, not that our soldiers are in the combat, but that we're there to help guide and help provide advice and help provide plan and

help provide air cover is the other thing that they talked to us about. they said, you have no idea how our spirits soar when we see the air assets. they want to make sure all of that is going to be in place. then they're willing to buy in. if not they feel their families are exposed. one last thing i wanted to ask you, i see my time is running short -- and that is in syria, in -- you don't want to answer this. i'll ask second round. the question comes up, so when assad goes, if assad goes, how does the space get filled with people that can help? as opposed to crisis, -- isis, i know that's the tremendous challenge you have too. and it seems like we are getting further behind the curve as opposed to in front of the curve on that question. secretary carter: thank you.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. he and traveled there and we saw brave and skilled soldiers constructing vehicle's to meet the needs. they need aid and some have first aid kits. some have first aid kits that look like mash. moving on to islamic state, a point that i do not think has

been discussed here today is islamic state in egypt. there have been attacks and a islamic state takes credit for the attacks. 1200 of them are american personnel. can you explain to us what steps we have taken to make sure the troops are protected and that we are working to defeat islamic state? >> let me address the ukraine and the chairman can address the sinai. i have been there many times and the government and the people there, vladimir putin had the

opposite effect of whatever he thought would attract that. he has strengthened the feelings of the ukrainian's. they want a future they determine. we are constantly assessing the kind of assistance we provide. the principal kind of assistance -- i'll come back to the military part in a moment -- but i cannot emphasize the importance of the ukraine. that is in the hands of the european's. so are the sanctions. that is the main event. i cannot emphasize the of that because it is mostly a matter

for the european union, rather than the united states. we are less direct we involved. we support the sanctions. the efforts support the reform. i talked to the defense minister about what he needed and his focus was on training. we will reassess that. we are assessing that and i am open to what we do in the future. i have indicated that and continue to. we have trainers now .

i should say the defense minister of ukraine used to be the interior minister which is a very good combination, because the russian and separatist threat is a hybrid kind of threat. hybrid in the sense that it's signified by the little green men phenomenon. a combination of the exercise of maligned influence through sort of k.g.b.-type tactics on the one hand and battlefield operations on the other. he's somebody who really understands that kind of hybrid warfare. that's where he wants our help. senator cotton: thank you, mr. secretary. i don't mean to cut you off. general dempsey: about nine months ago anticipating and watching the intel stream about the radicalization of the sigh my. he and the fact that the egyptian armed forces had moved resources to their western border.

we actually did a joint staff integrated vulnerability assessment, as a result of that we introduced blue force tracker, rate towers, changed movement techniques, enhanced their communications, general dempsey: put in counter mortar radars. things you are familiar with. i also have been in touch with our egyptian armed forces colleagues. they brought back egyptian armed forces into the sinai. they accompanied us on our movements when we make them. of course we recently released some of the capabilities that have been withheld from them so they could address their terrorist threat in the sinai. senator cotton: you're confident that american personnel in the sinai currently has adequate protection against terrorist activity there? general dempsey: i'm confident they are adequately protected. but i fully expect that threat to increase.

i recently had a conversation with the secretary about the future of the m.f.o. mission which hasn't changed in the last 50 years. senator cotton: thank you. i'd now like to move to the heart of the islamic state. for the record i think the islamic state is a grave and throwing threat. until they develop their own ballistic missile program, i believe the islamic republic will be a greater threat than the islamic state. that is the islamic republic of iran. my objections to the course we have taken in the nuclear negotiations are well-known and i will not repeat them here. i will note that iran remains an anti-american terror sponsoring outlaw regime. responsible for the deaths of hundreds of americans from lebanon to iraq, afghanistan. general dempsey, you served three different tours in or associated with iraq.

how many american soldiers died at the hands of iranian militias or foreign projectiles during your command? general dempsey: i recently heard both the chief staff of the army and the current sent come commander put that number at about 500. senator cotton: hundreds of americans died, and probably thousands were wounded or suspected of being wounded. what should we say to their families? the families who are dead as a result of the roadside bombs. and give iran tens of billions of dollars in sanction relief and international legitimacy without them changing their behavior? general dempsey: i told them that solving the nuclear issue diplomatically, is a positive outcome, but make no mistake about it. there is at least five other maligned activities in which iran is engaged that cause me grave security concerns. we will take our eye on those five. ballistic missiles, sea base mines, cyber activities, arms trafficking, and proxies. senator cotton: thank you. senator hirono: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, secretary carter, and general dempsey, for being here and for your commitment.

general dempsey, you testified before the house armed services committee that i quote, i would not recommend we put u.s. forces in harm's way. we are talking about iraq, simply to stiffen the spine of local forces. their spine is not stiffened by the threat of isil on their way of life, nothing we do is going to stiffen their spine. general dempsey, what is it going to take to stiffen the spines of the forces? general dempsey: if it takes us to stiffen their fine in the face of a threat that is existential to them, it's -- doesn't seem to me they are going to be stiffened. everything there -- you asked me what -- the things that we are doing, i mentioned a few earlier, about expanding our network of points where we touched them, helped them train, helped them target, helped them understand the -- how to

integrate with each other, army and police. those things have had the effect of giving them greater confidence. i just make the point i don't think the added step of accompanying them into combat would make a strategic difference except if we get to the point where there's a major offensive that we think will only or could be increased in terms of its probability of success by our presence. senator hirono: as far as you are concerned, we are taking those steps that will enable them to be able to fight for themselves. i agree with you that there is no number of our troops that we can send there that will result in a lasting kind of situation. you also talked about your recent trip to israel where you discussed various scenarios involving assad's departure. i don't know whether assad's departure is anywhere in the near future, but let's assume there is a departure. how would his departure affect the dynamics of what happens in syria? would isil step in to fill the power vacuum?

how would assad's departure change our strategy regarding isil? general dempsey: let me tell you about our military planning efforts. our israeli counterparts and jordanian counterparts very much believe the possibility of the regime collapsing or enclaving itself, is possible. so they were very eager to have consultations with us about what that would precipitate. and you -- your description of it is one that at least our regional partners expressed, which is to say we don't want this to be a footrace if it occurs between isil and others. all these other groups converging on damascus. i won't sit here today and tell

you i have the answer to that, but i will tell you that we are in consultations even as i sit here with the turks, the israelis, and the jordanians about that scenario. senator hirono: so what you're doing is to prepare for that possible eventuality and to ensure that these other groups not just step in and take over but if -- let's say that -- put it this way. if assad departs, does that somehow make our mission against isil simpler? easier to target? is that a way to think about it? general dempsey: i'm on a roll. that's a subject of golden state debate, actually. the debate framed somewhat this way. is the presence of assad, the catalyst for these issues, these radical ideologies and violent extremist organizations?

or did they emanate somehow else and they simply news the presence of the assad regime as a recruiting tool? depending how you answer that question will largely shape how you think about solving the problems. the situation militarily is such that what we are trying to provide with partners is options. that is to say we are trying to form a network of partners partners that we may not have conceived before, like the y.p.g., syrian kurds in and around kobhani and the east bank of the euphrates river. we are trying to provide option that is will allow us to shape and react depending on what the internal situation, how it evolves. we are working most closely with those who border syria who have, again, the most to gain and most to lose. senator hirono: turn to the training that we are doing with the moderate syrian forces. we recognize that you're having great difficulty while training not only the syrians but also in iraq. you described this as a

generational challenge. so while we are slowly training the local forces to fight for themselves, what are some of the other things that we need to be doing contemporaneously? is it those nine action items that need to be occurring at the same time? general dempsey: it is. secretary carter: it is, for example, if i may, in recognition of the fact that it's going to take some time to build the forces that -- to beat isil and the territory in syria and iraq, that's a fact. we are going to do that. i'm sure we'll be successful. it will take time. we need to defend ourselves in the meantime. because there are parts of isil that would like to attack us and our friends around the world and that's where homeland security and the f.b.i. and the rest of our efforts to protect ourselves come in. so on the within hand we need to go to the territory where isil arose and defeat it there. we will do that. about at the same time and in the meantime, we need to

continue to defend our people and our country against these guys. and some of them have the ambition to go to syria, train and come back to the united states. you have seen that already in europe. we see some signs of that in the united states. and that's why i was so laborious in describing the nine lines of effort. the ones we are talking about that we have principle responsibility, are two of those nine. the others are really critical as well because as senator cotton said a moment ago, isil is a grave threat. these guys do want to do us harm and our friends and allies in the region. if i can say something about

this, you asked about the assad regime and the chairman answered that. obviously the -- we would like to see occur is for assad to leave the scene, but for the state of syria not to disintegrate completely because we know what's down that road. and now that is a diplomatic task that is under way as the chairman indicated. and that is the outcome that would be by far preferable i think not only for the united states and our national security interests, but for the people of syria who are suffering so terribly now. there are so many refugees. it's really a tragic situation in the human sense. but assad needs to go, but the structures of governance need to stay. or we hope they will stay, because we know what life is like without structures of governance in the middle east. senator hirono: thank you.

senator, mr. chairman. senator rounds: thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, first of all let me say thank you for your service to the country. we find ourselves in a precarious position in a number of areas. general dempsey, as i sat here and listened to your assessment of the world today from your point of view, it was alarming to find that location after location we find ourselves being challenged. and we find ourselves being pressured into positions that perhaps 10 years ago we would not have found ourselves in whether it be with regard to the pacific rim areas or whether we find ourselves in the ukraine area. our challenges are many. yet at the same time it doesn't appear that this has come in as

a surprise. as you move farther along and specifically into the area that we had today, which was in terms of our challenges with isil and defeating isil, it seems to me we found ourselves once again in a position where there weren't surprises. the secretary stated that the iraqi security forces were severely degraded after four divisions dissolved in mosul 8 fell in june. the secretary wasn't in his position at the time, you were sir, was that a surprise to you? general dempsey: they collapsed because of poor governance and sectarianism. i was surprised at the rapidity of it. i suppose to you the degree to which the leadership had been changed out for all the wrong reasons by the maliki government were the conditions under which that occurred. senator rounds: if four divisions that were lost there if they were there today, would four divisions, does that make a difference between us moving forward with the defeat of isis, or is that the -- not the right

number? what's the number going to take in temples boots on the ground not american troops on the ground but largely allied forces on the ground? what's the number it takes to move forward with whatever strategies are in place, if there are strategies in place. i'm assuming we'll get into that. what's the number that we want to see in the ground? general dempsey: the commander at centcom testified to recapture mosul he'll need nine brigades' worth of security forces. six from the government of iraq and three from the kurdish region. that would be for mosul. then restoration of the border which would be the ultimate

step, restoration of their sovereign territory defined as the border between syria and iraq. that would be largely a federal police or border issue. i am not aware that that number has been identified. but the initial goal is to form or reequip nine brigades. senator rounds: what's the time frame that can be accomplished in? general dempsey: putting a temporal dimension on this is risky at best because the campaign is dependent on a coalition and it's dependent on the network of actors that include the sunni tribes, the iraqi security forces themselves, the counter terrorist service, and the kurds. the act of describing when those groups could all come together to establish the conditions to do this is just difficult to pin down. even if i knew the answer to that question, i would be loathe to report it to you in an open hearing.

but i have said that from the beginning that it was probably a three-year effort to restore sovereignty to iraq. and we are eight months into that. senator rounds: general, we pride ourselves and we point out the fact that we truly do have the greatest fighting force in the world. yet right now we find ourselves as the president stated some time ago he called isis the j.v. team. clearly that's not the position that i think the administration would take today. we have identified that they are clearly a threat. we have identified a nine-point plan here, mr. secretary, in which you identified all the things that have to happen including the defense of our country from these individuals. at what point during this three-year time frame or what is the possibility during this three-year time frame that the patience that you have shown general, and that the secretary has alluded to here, to build us up, what is the probability that

this time frame gets away from us? are we in the position to make this thing last for three years without literally upping our own point in order to defend ourselves? at what point does it look like we are going to have to amp this thing up using our own resources to a greater degree than what we have today? general dempsey: i said three years for iraq. isil -- i have also described isil in general as a generational problem because of its allure in notably the sunni sector of islam. we just have to have a sunni partner in order to address this challenge of isil. so although i have said three years for iraq, it's more like a generation, which i suppose is reasonably defined as 20 years to address the violent extremists allure of isil in the sunni world. that allure will only be stripped away when someone actually takes care of them and

governs them. to your question. are there points at which we should and would consider the introduction of additional u.s. military combat capabilities? the answer is yes. i think you have seen us do that in the raid that we conducted into syria to capture and kill a group affiliated with abu asief. and i think that we are always on the assert -- or always on the lookout for those opportunities and can use our capabilities as necessary to deal with those. senator rounds: do you feel you're in a political appropriate position and that you have the backing to step in when needed to take care of the problem when the time is right? general dempsey: if you're asking -- i can't answer what answer i would receive. i have the confidence that my recommendation would be accepted and debated in the context of everything else we are doing. senator rounds: senator, let me help out here, if i may.

i think if part of our strategy is to look for opportunities to do more in the sense of creating capable ground force, that we can support, so we welcome those opportunities. we are taking those opportunities in the case of syria. so i don't want to speak for the chairman, but in terms of is the opportunity to do more in that sense, not as a substitute for local people, but as a way of enabling them and assisting them, that really is the strategy. so i think we welcome those opportunities when we find them. we are trying to create those opportunities in the sunni areas, as was noted earlier. we are taking some opportunities in the kurdish area, and we hope we have more, including in syria.

mr. chairman, my time has expired. i make one comment. it appears to me if our strategy is waiting on other people to get their stuff in order, that doesn't seem to be as practical as taking advantage of and literally going out and proactively taking care of the problem, if need be. we've got the greatest fighting force in the world. the last thing i want to see is have them engage boots on the ground. but if it means boots on the ground or additional folks there fighting there, as opposed to having a successful attack on this homeland, then i think we all agree on what we ought to be doing. i just hope the strategy includes that as a possibility. senator mccain: senator heinrich. senator heinrich: senator, chairman, welcome to you both. thank you very much for your service. let me start by staying surge or no surge i think it's pretty

clear, to my constituents, that the iraq war remains one of the greatest u.s. foreign policy mistakes of the last century. and one that i hope we have learned a few lessons from. i want to follow up, secretary on what senator hirono raised. one lesson that i believe we should have learned by now is that eliminating one terrible middle eastern dictator can too often lead to even more brutal influences. filling the leadership vacuum. we have seen that play out too many times. we have seen it to some extent both in iraq and libya. should we be concerned that in syria a post-assad reality could create a vacuum that isil is far better positioned to fill than any of the other regional forces? i'm not sure we -- i think we should be almost as concerned with forces like the front. and if assad does fall shouldn't we have more than discussions on the table? shouldn't we have a plan to make sure that some amount of governance remains particularly, in damascus? secretary carter: yes, we should and we do.

that is our strategy with respect to the political transition. now, for reasons that are easy to understand, our influence with assad are u.s. influence is not great. we are trying to influence those who influence him to remove himself from the government of damascus while keeping intact the structures of governance for the very reason you adduce which is we know what happens in these middle eastern countries when the structures of government disintegrate. and we would like to not see that happen. in syria, even though we know that the persistence much assad -- of assad at the had many of damascus is a fuel tore isis and others fighting him.

so he needs to go to remove that fuel, but we don't want to see the structures of governance go at the same time. and that is the challenge, but that's what we are trying to achieve. senator heinrich: i think that's certainly the right goal. i think we have missed that ball in the past. and syria is an enormous country. if we saw damascus loose its governance capability, the implication for the entire region and world would be enormous. secretary carter, you mentioned as well to be successful on the ground against isil, the fight needs to be led by local capable ground forces. i don't think we should give in to impatience. they should not be western forces. they should not be american forces. we certainly heard that from our partners in places like jordan. this means that we have to place a great deal of emphasis on training motivated and reliable partners. you have gone a little bit over the small number of iraqi security forces. recruited what some of those challenges are.

the bottleneck related to the vetting process. but are there other factors that you had attribute for the lack of trainees? i guess one of the questions i have related to that is, what steps in addition to the steps that you're taking, what steps is the iraqi government taking to address this shortfall in order to meet those kinds of training targets we'd like to see? secretary carter: thank you, senator. i think in iraq the principal limiting factor on sunni trainees, which is one of our focuses, has been their belief that the government in baghdad was not fully supportive of them. that is the challenge before

prime minister abadi. he says he wants to do that. that's critical because only sunnis can take back anbar. only sunnis can govern anbar when it's all over. so if we are going to rest anbar -- wrest anbar from the likes of isil, which we must do, we must have sunnis on our side. so abadi is saying all the right things, as the chairman noted, we are trying to support him in doing all the right things, and for us -- mr. heinrich: i agree wholeheartedly. my concern is abadi doing enough to begin to generate confidence in the sunni population in that region? secretary carter: i think he is doing everything he personally can.

i think it he is challenged in baghdad by others who would have it the old way, the sectarian way. and so he's not able to make everything happen when and as he said. we have had some delays and frustration as a result of that. i think things are getting better. we are getting more trainees. it was noted earlier that there is some confidence among sunni tribes that we will help them train, equip them, support them, and get them back in the fight. that there's a future for them, not even withstanding the difficulties of multisectarian governance. in the meantime, as senator rounds said, i think and i said this before i want to restate it, we need to take action to defend ourselves against isil, not just from iraq and syria but elsewhere. typically foreign fighters. even as we defeat them in the place from which they arose. they have metastasized now.

they have aspired to be a global net work we have to fight them where they are. we can't wait for that. we need to do that and do that every day. senator heinrich: i want to leave you with one last question, a general one. you may have seen the "politico" article from a couple days ago that explained what are called the diesh effect. sort of the modern example of the ancient proverb the enemy of my enemy is my friend. whether it's hamas, or others there are a number entities that may be enemies of the u.s. enemies of our allies, that currently share the same opposition to isil. what are your thoughts on that observation generally? wouldn't you agree that it's that reality that is part of the reason why this is such a complicated nut to crack? secretary carter: it is the reason why it's complicated.

and again sectarianism is what brought us to this point. so we are willing to and we are and have supported elements of the iraqi security forces that have a very large shiia composition to them, but if and only if they are under the direction and control of the government of iraq. and there are shiia forces in iraq that are not under the direction of control. we will not support them because that sectarianism, that's sectarian civil war.

we know it leads down that road and we are trying to stop iraq from going down that road. senator ernst: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you secretary and chairman for being with us today. i appreciate your efforts in this area. secretary carter, i would like to start with you because right now i am very confused. you have stated earlier and then you affirmed to senator ayotte that we are directly arming the kurds in consultation with the iraqi government. would you state that again? secretary carter: you are using the word directly and she used the word directly and i did, too. let me be clear about that which is we do it in a way that doesn't delay the shipments and don't you narrow down the shipments at all but is by through, and with the government iraq. we are sticking with that principle not because we want to help the kurds. but because we also want to stick up for the principle of multisectarianism. that is the reason. but we are insistent it not lead to delays. as i said i spoke to mr. barzani and make sure he's getting the right kind of equipment not just

from us but the germans and the others in a timely manner. they are getting that equipment and they are performing extremely well with it. see if the chair wants to add anything about the method of arming. senator earns: we are arming the kurds. it's not being delayed. i know that was stated earlier. there are no significant delays. i do want to emphasize as you know over the last several months my colleagues, a number of my colleagues and i have been working on legislation to directly on the kurds in consultation with the iraqi government. and i know that you and secretary kerry also had very strongly worded letters to the chairman of the committee emphasizing that we should not be directly arming the kurds in consultation with the iraqi government because there were no delays. and yet the president now has come out and said that we will

be arming them in an expedited manner. well, if there were no delays, i don't understand why now we need an additional several hundred members of our armed services on the ground in iraq and that we are expediting the process. if there were no delays, we don't need to be expediting the process. i just needed to clarify that because it was stated a number times that we were directly arming the kurds, which second kerry had said last year he doesn't have the authority, the president doesn't have the authority to do. i still believe we need to be directly arming them in consultation with the iraqi government. following the fall of ramadi general dempsey, you stated that if the kurds fail to take measures to be more influence with sunnis, kurds, or other groups, u.s. support for the

central government could be curtailed. considering the fall of the most western part of iraq to isis that didn't trigger a decision point on the part of the iraqi government. and its commitment to iraq -- i'm not sure what else the iraqi government needs to fail at before the administration changes its strategy and how we support our willing partners in iraq, the kurdish, peshmerga they are willing partners. we need to do more for them. we cannot defeat isis in iraq by continuing to beg, hope, and pray that sectarian iraqi government, which is still overshadowed, we heard it a number times, by previous prime minister maliki in iran, we don't think there were vigorously defend the iraqi people equally. i don't believe they will. but we talked also about being

more inclusive. that was mentioned again. more inclusive. i hear that time and time again. but what i would like a definition of what does more inclusive look like, and how do we measure more inclusive? gentlemen, if you would address that. secretary carter: i would begin by noting the words of prime minister abadi when he was here. i think he used the word decentralized iraq. that is one in which there is a central government in baghdad, an integral state of iraq. there is substantial opportunity for self-determination around the country among sunnis, among shiias, and among kurds.

it seems to me that's a wise way of approaching what multisectarianism means. i think government in baghdad that allows the different parties there degree of self-determination to maintain security within their own territory and to govern themselves, sharing things like the oil wealth of the country and so forth, that is what he says he is for. and that's the way he described it when he was here in washington to all of that. and that is, in my judgment, certainly better than the alternative which is sectarian disintegration. which could still occur in iraq, but i think we all looking into that abyss know what resides there. it's further violence for the citizens of iraq and further opportunity for groups like isil that don't -- aren't preoccupied with the long-term welfare of the territories they occupy. they want to use them for further violence.

that is prime minister abadi's definition, and i think we are trying to support him in his aspiration to make good on that definition. senator ernst: thank you general. anything to add? general dempsey: the intentions of the government of iraq and control over groups not directly responsive to the minister of defense. whether there's retribution. it was at that receipt i was speaking about as these families come back to tikrit, we are watching and it's worth watching on whether they are able to return to their homes or not. i think the same will be true once ramadi is recaptured. and we'll probably be watching how the campaign in fallujah unfolds to ensure that the popular mobilization forces propagate a campaign that's not characterized by retribution and dramatic collateral damage.

those are all things to watch carefully. senator ernst: i think we have willing partners there and we need to assist them. one further comment briefly. you stated you haven't seen a request list from the kurds on the type of equipment and arms that they need, is that correct? secretary carter: no, i have seen such requests. we honored such requests. we shipped a lot of equipment. and i should once again repeat not just the united states. there are a number of countries that are equipping the kurds. in some cases they prefer the equipment of other countries. for example german anti-tank weapons. that's fine with us. the germans are providing those. senator ernst: that's one thing i know president barzani presented to us during his visit with the members of the senate armed services committee. i wanted to make sure we were clear on that and they have -- secretary carter: they d we

discussed the same list. i have discussed it with others who are, for example, the german defense minister i mentioned when i was in germany a couple weeks ago. her commitment to do exactly the same. they have done a great job of equipping the kurds. that's an example of a competent ground force. but also governs within the territory that it controls. that's really the -- what we are looking for in that entire region. going to be hard to get, but it's what we are looking for. senator ernst: they are there and willing. thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. senator mccain: senator kaine. senator kaine: i have a number of questions and concerns about the ongoing mission of isil which i'll address, but i got to begin by just saying my concerns about the administration strategy peel next -- pale next to my concerns about congress and what congress is doing. what congress is supposed to do is to provide a budget to you to defend the nation. and win this battle.

congress is supposed to authorize a war that is now 11 months in. we have not done either. we are not giving you a budget. we are using a gimmick and whether the gimmick is the gimmicks of the past continuing resolutions or the current gimmick du jour, which is a use of nonrecurring o.c.o. funding we are not giving you the budget. we are not doing it because let's just be blunt, congress to this point has decided the budget caps enacted in august of 2011 is a higher national priority than defeating isil. and as long as we view that as a higher national priority than defeating isil, we are not going to give you the budget you need. it is my hope as you testified secretary carter, we will find a better path. something like a murray-ryan budget deal.

i know the chair has been significant in speaking out for this as well. we are not doing what we ought to be doing on the budget side. and we are also not doing what we ought to be doing under article 1, section 8, which is declaring war. tomorrow is the 11 month anniversary of the initiation of the bombing campaign. we spent $3 billion. we got 3,500 people deployed away from their families risking their lives. aside from a single vote in the senate foreign relations committee in december, there has not been house committee action or floor debate of any significance. there's not been any meaningful debate on the senate floor about whether or not we should be engaged in this war. even though 3/4 of the members of congress by my estimation believe that there should be u.s. military action against isil with some differences in detachment, we don't want to have a debate and vote because we don't want to put our names on it. we don't want to be held accountable for a vote. so we could criticize all we want. i'll get into some criticisms.

bottom line, congress is not doing either of the two things we are uniquely supposed to do provide you a budget to win and authorize war. and that -- i think we can make our criticisms have a much greater legitimacy if as an institution we would do what we are supposed to do. i just returned from the region and senator donnelly mentioned it. we are seeing some significant successes against isil in some parts of the battlefield. in iraq and syria, largely in the areas where we are relying on partners with the kurds. the k.r.g., regional government in iraq and kurds in the north of syria. president barzani we met him on sunday in erbil, two sundays ago, he said this, very important, especially for anyone who would say the u.s. doesn't have a strategy. thank you to the united states of america. if the president had not started a bombing campaign on the august -- on august 8, near erbil, we might not be here today.

that bombing campaign likely helped save the existence of the k.r.g. which has been a good partner. and they lead with that. they don't lead with we are not getting weapons. they don't lead with we don't like working with baghdad. they lead with thank you to the united states for helping save us. save our region, save our way of life. that's important for us to acknowledge. that wasn't by accident. that's a strategy. we helped save and important ally by acting, the president acting when he did. there are challenges, too. the iraqi unification was a challenge when we met. there is mixed reviews. positive on the intent. but mixed on the follow through. in the sunni area in particular, a lot of criticism. some support the anbar governor. supports what prime minister abadi is doing, but a lot of tribal leaders don't and a lot don't think we are doing what we can do. when they look at what we are doing with the kurds and compare with what we are not doing with

them, it sticks in their craw. finally the challenges in syria are significant. let me ask you this question today front page article in "the washington post" dealing with the routing of isil in northern syria. quote, the unexpected route of islamic state forces across a wide arc of territory in the northeastern syria heartland has exposed vulnerabilities in the ranks of the militants and the limits of the u.s.-led strategy device that confront them. islamic state fighters had been driven out a third of their flagship province in recent weeks by a kurdish-led force that emerged as one of the most effective american partners in the war. the offensive backed by u.s. air strikes has deprived the militants of control of their most important border crossing with turkey. and forced them on to the defensive in their self-proclaimed capital of rocca city, something that would have been unthinkable as recently as a month ago. that's what's happening right now.

but every success has a challenge. there is a worm in this apple. the worm is this. as we have succeeded in our partnership with the kurds in northern syria, it's caused grave concern by the turkish government, grave concern by a number of the sunni forces in syria we are partnering with. how do we continue to manage the kurds to be successful with the battle against isil and partner with them to be successful without causing additional undo challenges to help sunnis be successful against isil? secretary carter: thank you. by the way thank you once again for traveling there, much appreciated. let me start with the turks. turkey is -- has a long common border with both syria and iraq, which has remained disturbingly permeable to foreign fighters and resupply throughout the course of this conflict.

and we have some people actually talking to the turks just today as the chairman alluded to a while ago. in order to try to get the turks to up their game, they are a nato ally, they have a strong stake in things in stability to their south. i believe they could do more along the border. and so in the meantime it is true that the kurds are acting and because the kurds are capable of acting we are supporting them. that is successful. and it does threaten roka. i think the tension with respect to the sunnis is best managed in the way we are hoping prime minister abadi will manage t namely by letting them each succeed within their own territory, defeat isil, and have

substantial, his word, decentralization of governance in iraq that gives -- allows them substantial opportunity to determine their own destiny in the territory that they control. what is what multisectariantism in iraq would mean as you indicated. it's a lot tougher in syria. that's the objective that we have to have sunnis. i would like to see the sunni tribesmen, tribal leaders that you met with, be as successful as the kurds are. we would welcome that. that's what we are trying to stimulate. and we are willing to do more as the chairman indicated and i indicated when we have a capable ground force that we can support the way we did support over the weekend the kurds in the north

with their power. senator kaine: i want to agree with the line of your questioning earlier, mr. chair. i think it would be absolutely foolish for us not to clarify the rules of engagement for the syrian trained folks inserted back into the field to make clear that the u.s. will support them if they come under attack by the assad regime. for them to go back in without a guarantee on that score would seem -- we would lose all credibility if we don't provide that. i would encourage the administration to clarify that aspect of the rules of engagement. thank you. senator mccain: i thank you, senator. i have been asking that question for a long time. and i keep getting the answer, well, we haven't made that policy decision. it's shameful. shameful to send people in and not assure them that we will defend them against attacks.

senator graham. senator graham: to build on what we are talking about. do we have the legal authority to assist a free syrian army that we train against assad? is there a doubt about that? secretary carter: i am not sure about the legalities of it senator, to be quite honest. senator graham: if there's any doubt about whether or not we have the legal authority to protect the troops we train against assad, please let the committee know. you don't have to answer right now, but that's a big decision. if there is a lack of legal authority, i want to know why and what we can do to fix it. secretary carter: appreciate t i'll take that back. senator graham: general dempsey, thank you for your decades of service. i appreciate that. general dempsey, would you agree there are more terrorist organization was more safe havens, with more weapons, with more capability, with more men

to strike the homeland than any time since 9/11? secretary carter: thank you for your service, i know you're retired recently. yes. senator graham: do you believe that isil is expanding in other countries as we speak? general dempsey: yes. senator graham: when it comes to iraq, do you both agree that petitions iraq into three separate countries is probably not a viable strategy? secretary carter: i certainly agree with that, yes. senator graham: do you agree that the sunni world would object giving the southern part of iraq to iran? that's what would happen, right if we petition the south, do you agree with that? secretary carter: that sounds like sectarianism to me. we know what lies down that road. senator graham: independent kurdistan will create a lot with turkey and region at large, a separate independent state? secretary carter: for the turks, separate independent state would

be very problematic. and within iraq, i think a substantial autonomy within a decentralized but integral iraq is still possible. that's what abadi -- senator graham: do you agree with that general? general dempsey: i do. senator graham: petitioning is not a viable strategy. back to the kurds, do either one of you believe that the kurds have the ability, will to go in to liberate ramadi? secretary carter: i think they may have the ability. and we are obviously trying to facilitate their movement south. whether they have the will is another matter. the only reason that i say that is that they are getting, at that point, to the edge of the territory that is kurdish. senator graham: that's my point. for anybody to suggest that the kurds have answered all of our problems, they don't -- the kurds are not going to liberate syria, do you agree with that?

they'll be part of the component but not the liberating force. secretary carter: part of the component. senator graham: as to assad, what's more likely, president obama leaves office in 2017, or assad goes first? secretary carter: well, it's certain that president obama will leave -- senator graham: i know that. secretary carter: that's an easy question. whether assad will be in power then -- senator graham: who leaves first? obama or assad? secretary carter: i certainly hope it's assad. senator graham: i do, but i don't think so. the bottom line, if assad stays in power, do you worry about jordan and lebanon being a victim of the war in syria? if it continues. that jordan and lebanon will become a casualty of the war in syria?

secretary carter: i think jordan and lebanon are already suffering from the effects of war. senator graham: it could even get worse. secretary carter: that's exactly the concern we should all have about -- one of the concerns we should have about what's going on in syria. it's not just the syria people, it's the neighbors as well. senator graham: do you agree with me no arab force will go in and fight isil alone unless you put assad on the table? secretary carter: i see what you're getting at. it gets back to our train and equip program. we are finding people whose principal security fear for their own people, this is really for their own villages, is isil. so they are willing to go and fight against isil. there are others who want to fight against assad. that's another matter. senator graham: here's my point. they are recruiting more foreign fighters than we are training free syrian army.

the math doesn't work. this is never going to result in assad or isil being degraded or destroyed. the only way i see isil to be degraded our destroyed is for a ground force, regional in nature, to go into syria. do you believe -- do you agree with me that no ground force made of turks, saudis, egyptians, you name it, are going into syria besides isil unless one of the goals is to replace assad? they are not going to give half of syria to iran? secretary carter: that sounds sensible to me. i certainly wish that such a force would be created. one of the great disappointments in all of this is that the sunni world more broadly isn't more -- senator graham: let's take that

for a moment. if we went to turkey, egypt, saudi arabia tomorrow and said we would like to use your army we'll be integrated, would you agree with me for them to say yes that we would have to make assad a target of that army? and are we willing to do that? secretary carter: let's see. i would guess that -- it's very hypothetical because sadly none of them has indicated -- senator graham: here's what they told me. secretary carter: i see what you're driving at which is will the rest of sunni middle east participate in this conflict? i certainly wish they would. the one answer i know, senator is for the turks. turks have stated their position which is that they definitely want assad to go. and the conditions for any other participation so far has been that they want to fight against assad. senator graham: i would suggest you do the following and you travel a lot. we went to qatar, saudi arabia we went all over the middle east and they told us to a person we would gladly join forces with you upon the condition that assad is part of the target set. and nobody in the united states

will tell them whether or not we are willing to take assad on militarily as part of the ground force. i would suggest instead of being upset with the sunni arab world that our problems lie within ourselves. that we are not putting assad on the table militarily. do you agree with that? do you think assad is on the table military? -- militarily? secretary carter: senator, as i'm sure you know, his position on the battlefield is more tenuous today than it has been for a long time.

senator graham: the point is, is our efforts designed to take assad out military? or are we focusing -- secretary carter: our approach as has been stated clearly for some time to try to find a political exit for assad rather than a u.s.-led military exit. that is the approach. senator graham: thank you. senator nelson: thank both of you for your decades of service and that includes you, mr. secretary, because you have given decades. i want to follow up on that line of questioning. if assad exited tomorrow, what would be the likely strategy that we would use going forward? secretary carter: our strategy would be to encourage the moderate opposition to partner with the structures of the

secretary carter: our strategy would be to encourage the moderate opposition to partner with the structures of the secretary carter: our strategy would be to encourage the moderate opposition to partner with the structures of the then they would, in turn, need to go and reclaim their territory from isil. and i think the united states and the rest of the international coalition would be pleased to support them in that. senator nelson: does assad exiting sooner rather than later, does that create conditions that are so chaotic

for the interests of the united states, or is the interest of the united states in him leaving sooner than later? secretary carter: i think sooner , and in a way, as i indicated, that -- reason for -- to get back to the earlier line of questioning, for a political rather than military transition for us to support and seek that is that it is less disruptive, less chaotic, less sparks sectarianism and therefore violence. that's why it's much to be preferred over a simple toppling of assad, because you don't know what's on the other side of a simple toppling of assad. i know it's unsatisfying to talk about a political transition when he himself is very little indication of wanting to do that. that is much to be preferred if

we can have that. otherwise we know what happens when these countries disintegrate. senator nelson: were a political solution to be found for his exit, which of course is going to be difficult with iran being his mentor, but putin could be instrumental in arranging some kind of exit strategy, but were it to be a political solution, do you think it reasonable that there would be some accommodation so that the minority would not be slaughtered? secretary carter: i think there has to be that ingredient. first of all the alowhite community will fight for the territory in the northwest. but once again that's just further conflict, further civil

war, and ethnic cleansing of any kind is the kind of thing you could see on the other side of a collapse there. and we know how tragic that is for people. senator nelson: what would his arranged exit do with regard to hezbollah, and will they resist it the whole way? . secretary carter: hezbollah has been one of the principled supporters of the assad regime so they do not give any indication of welcoming the path that we're discussing here. the russians, perhaps. i know that we've been in contact with the russians about that over the years, and certainly i think that they would, if they threw their weight behind such a transition

be influential with assad and so i certainly hope they would be but i have no confidence as i sit here right now that they will. senator nelson: when, mr. secretary, when you look at a map like this, a map of syria that i assume you handed out somebody did, that's a mess. and maybe it is the only solution is the solution of a political exit for assad so that we can go after these extremist elements. by the way, i had to leave the committee to do an interview on cnn, and the whole focus that they wanted to jump on was your statement earlier in the hearing that we had only trained up 60.

but i pointed out to them what you said was the vetting is very difficult and in fact we are vetting some several thousands additional, and the vet is a lot more tore -- tortuous because certainly don't want to have a guy trained up and then you ends up aiming his gun back at us. in iraq, do you think that this new prime minister has the capability of getting out of his shiite mold and does he have the capability of bringing all the shiites with all of the iranian influence in his government in order to reach

out with an olive branch to the sunnis? secretary carter: thank you. with respect to the first part of your remarks, i'm always going to be truthful to you and the number is 60 and i think we stated that number before but i said it today and i will always tell the truth. and that is a small class. it results from the fact that that is the number that got through the very rigorous vetting and selection process we have. general negata who runs that program believes he has learned a lot. he has 7,000 behind that so i expect those numbers to increase. but i wanted to tell the truth and i did tell the truth. we expect that number to improve but you deserve to know where things stand and i'm telling you where things

stand. with respect to abadi, there i'd say also that he has indicated to us and he was in washington and i spoke to many of you as well, his intention to proceed in a way that is distinctly different than the way his predecessor preceded him which led to the situation we now have in iraq. we're certainly supporting him in that regard, but one can see that his intentions are contested in baghdad. and so we continue to support him. we continue to think -- get back to the earlier line of question that a multisectarian future for iraq is the best for stability and peace and the best for the defeat of isil. but he will have some substantial influence over that but it's clear he doesn't have absolute control in baghdad. we are supporting him. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

and thank you, secretary carter and general dempsey, for being mike lee here today. general dempsey, i especially want to thank you for your decades of service to your country and to the cause of freedom. we wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors. i'm not sure whether this will be the last time we're privileged to speak with you in a hearing but regardless please know how much we appreciate all you've done for our country and i want to thank the men and women who are deployed in iraq and in so many other places in the middle east for their -- and for their service to our country. senator lee: although they've not been labeled combat troops they're still operating under dangerous circumstances. i want to follow up on the discussion between senator mccain and secretary carter on how we might support syrian rebels once they return from training.

mr. secretary, you stated that you believe we have an obligation to those we train to provide them with protection. and i agree with that. and i also believe we have an obligation to let the american people know and that you have an obligation to let congress know and help us to fully understand what the strategy entails, what that means. that the funding, the timing and the effort that providing any such protection might entail and what it will necessitate. so can you tell us, when will the department of defense fully explain to the american people and to congress what the strategy will involve, what it's going to cost our government? i've said this before but this is something that should have

been made clear last year when the president came up with this plan. regardless, it's better late than never. it's good we do it now rather than not at all. can you tell us when that might occur? secretary carter: i'll continuously tell you what's going on over there with respect to what's gong in iraq and with respect to syria. we're going to have to, as i said, i think we have an obligation to support those fighters when they go in there. we have to decide under exactly what conditions and what way we'll make that tactical decision when we -- when we introduce them. but i think the main thing is that we increase that number from what is now very small number. i'm not surprised that it's running on television into a much larger number. i think we can do that. the officer who runs this

program believes that he will be able to do that, and we'll keep you apprised of our progress and i'll tell you every day what i know as i've done here today. senator lee: thank you. i appreciate that. i look forward to that. now, u.s. strategy in syria is to empower the quote-unquote moderate opposition to defeat isis and to put enough pressure on the assad settlement. for the sake of this discussion, let's say they're successful in degrading isis to the point they are no longer a factor in syria. what does pressuring assad and the supporters into a negotiated settlement or his supporters into anegotiated

settlement look like, especially given support from iran and hezbollah that they currently enjoy, specifically what role will the united states play in bringing about the pressure and support to achieve this kind of settlement? secretary carter: i think the way it would look, the outcome that we are aiming for is one in which bashar al-assad and those who have been associated with his atrocities in syria are removed and -- but the structures of government in damascus and in iraq that remain continue on our -- in an inclusively governed way that is multisectarian to clull -- to include others that can then return to the task of regaining its sovereign territory from isil to the east in a project that would look like what we are working with baghdad to accomplish to its west in

iraq. that is the post-assad transition that will be the best for the syrian people and the best for our counterisil strat -- counter-isil strategy. senator lee: do you think it is necessary to engage the assad regime forces that may come into conflict with any rebels we may train? secretary carter: i'm going to be very careful how i answer a legal question in that regard and i prefer to get back to you in that regard. senator lee: ok. now, mr. secretary, what level of command and control in your opinion does isis leadership have over these various affiliate groups across the

middle east and northern africa as well as lone wolf individuals or groups in europe and the western hemisphere? secretary carter: it's mixed. but in the main, not entirely, but in the main what one sees is a mixture of groups that were already radicalized and already intent upon attacking the west or attacking western interests or destabilizing places in the middle east rebranding themselves as isil because of this seemingly -- seeming success it had. and then to get to the lone wolf part, you see people who have had no training, no association with it, including americans who go on the internet and find themselves inthralled because whatever lost souls they are inthralled by the violence or whatever associated with isil and self-radicalize and unfortunately undertake to do violence. so you see that spectrum there. you do see some effort by isil, meaning isil in syria and iraq, to command and control but it's not exclusively that way. i say all this because it's very distinctly different from the al qaeda model. the al qaeda model was a very hire arcial goal, very clear command and control type terrorist enemy and that meant they had discipline and that meant they could take on big things like 9/11 but it also meant that when we started to go after them they were vulnerable to attacks on the command and control structure and on their logistic structure. isil is more resilient because

it's more decentralized and more informal in that sense. it takes a different kind of campaign. we're highly aware of that as is law enforcement, by the way. deb fischer: senator lee: thank you. i see my time has expired. thank you, mr. chairman. >> chairman mccain ask that i recognize senator fischer. senator fischer: thank you. i want to thank you, general dempsey, for the many, many years that you served the people of this country and the military families that have been under you. thank you, sir. mr. carter, earlier senator rounds had a conversation with general dempsey about the act of patience and time and i know the general counsels patience and he has discussed time. what role do you see time playing in our strategy? do you have a strategy on forces, on containing isil? are we going to allow them to be able to maintain control of ashton b. carter: territory for the next three to five years? is that going to be acceptable to us? and do you see risks with that type of strategy? secretary carter: well, i think we're going to continue to strike and apply pressure to isil. throughout this period. we're doing it now. we do it every day. it's had some effect. and we're going to continue every single day as we did over this past weekend to defend ourselves against isil including these homegrown people. all that will go on and has to go on because we have to protect ourselves in the meantime. what takes the time -- and i say this because it's different from the al qaeda model which was a very hierarchy goal and very clear command and control type terrorist enemy and meant they had discipline and meant they could take on big things like 9/11 but also meant when we started to go after them they were vulnerable to attacks in the command and control structure and logistics structure. isil is more resilient because it is more decentralized and informal and takes a different campaign and we're highly aware of that, as is law enforcement, by the way. >> thank you. mr. chairman.

senator fischer: thank you. i want to thank you, general dempsey, for the many, many years that you served the people of this country and the military families that have been under you. thank you, sir. mr. carter, earlier senator rounds had a conversation with general dempsey about the act of patience and time and i know the general counsels patience and he has discussed time. what role do you see time playing in our strategy? do you have a strategy on forces, on containing isil? are we going to allow them to be able to maintain control of ashton b. -- territory for the next three

to five years? is that going to be acceptable to us? and do you see risks with that type of strategy? secretary carter: well, i think we're going to continue to strike and apply pressure to isil. throughout this period. we're doing it now. we do it every day. it's had some effect. and we're going to continue every single day as we did over this past weekend to defend ourselves against isil including these homegrown people. all that will go on and has to go on because we have to protect ourselves in the meantime. what takes the time -- and i think this is what the chairman was getting at -- what takes the time is -- and this is just in the nature of things, getting a lasting result. a lasting result is one where not only isil is defeated but they stay defeated. in order for them to stay defeated there has to be somebody on that territory who's keeping the peace and governing and replacing the isil in the territory.

that takes some time. we're working with the kurds to do that. we're working with sunni tribes, but that's in the nature of things. we want that to go as quickly as possible. and we're hastening that to the best of our ability, as are members of the coalition. but that is the thing that takes martin e. -- toes the time to build. but in the meantime we have to protect ourselves and we have to keep pressure on isil and we'll be doing that constantly. senator fischer: i agree with you on that. >> would you mind? i thought about this a lot. your question is really whether patience increases risk. general dempsey: that's really your question. i think patience probably does increase risk to the mission somehow because it extends the time when other things could happen, right? ment but i think were we to

take things differently and -- but i think were we to take things differently, it increases risk to our force and increases risk to the other missions that we're held accountable to accomplish globally. what i get paid for is to give advice to the secretary of defense with the j.c.s. and the president on managing risk. so to your question, does risk increase due to patience? of course. but the alternative increases risk in other ways and it's our job to manage that risk. senator fischer: as you look at managing that risk and you look at balancing it. how do you reach a decision where you can maintain that patience when you know that when isil controls that territory that they have now and they continue to advance in other areas whether it will be in the region or in russia

that that is recruitment item for them and it will inspire attacks whether it's in that region or elsewhere around the world, how do you balance that and have the risk that we face in our homeland continue what i think would be continued -- continue to grow because of possibly an overabundance of patience? general dempsey: as i said, this is the issue which the campaign turns, correct? what you have to be assured of is that as we manage risk, we look at those things which could threaten u.s. persons and facilities around the globe and the homeland. and where we see risk accruing that could have threatened that national security interest.

there is no his tans -- there's no hesitance for us toact unilaterally and decisively. on the other hand, this campaign is built on the premise that it relies upon other actor that necessarily requires a degree of patience that we need to nurture, we need to reinforce and we need to understand in the context of the other things we're trying to accomplish not only in the middle east but globally. so if you're suggesting that isil's threat to the homeland could increase because of that patience, i concede that risk. we take onboard the responsibility to manage it, but i would also suggest to you that we would contribute mightily to isil's message as a movement where we to confront them directly on the ground in iraq and syria. senator fischer: if we look at patience, if we look at

restraint, don't you think that with our restraint we're in many ways encouraging the iraqis to look elsewhere and to especially look to iran and invite them into iraq where they are because they know that iran will be there fighting a common enemy that they both face at this point? aren't we opening that door to iran with this -- what i kind of view as an overabundance of patience? to me is the greatest risk. general dempsey: when you look what we're doing -- by the way, the government of iran has been reaching out to iran since roughly 2004, and they have probably increased their outreach to iran but has very little to do what we're doing or not doing.

it has everything to do with the fact that they believe that their future -- that it's their turn and that their particular form of governance which is not yet inclusive as it needs to be is the right form of governance. so they were going to do this whether we were there or not or whatever manner in which exert our influence. senator fischer: so they have boots on the ground in iraq through no action of the united states or inaction by the united states? general dempsey: i would say that their -- the advisors that have been sent, the i.s.r. they are flying and some of the capabilities they provided to the government of iraq i would agree that they would have provided that whether we were there or -- senator fiscrer:the question, it wasn't a statement.

general dempsey: the answer is yes, they would have been there regardless of our presence. senator fischer: thank you. >> thank you, gentlemen, for the testimony today. general dempsey, i want to join my colleagues in commending you for your decades of service and, secretary carter, it's good getting caught up last week. i appreciate youroutstanding service to our country. you know, there's been a lot of criticism of the president when you in had august, 2014, and then just a couple weeks ago at the g-7 meeting talked about how we don't have a strategy yet with regard to isis. he said that in 2014. he again said it again a couple weeks ago. but what he really has not been criticized for -- and i think it's something i'd like to get your view on -- is each time he's talked about a lack of a strategy, he's essentially put it on your plate. he said theguys at the department of

defense are coming up with options. still haven't gotten them yet. d.o.d. is working this. literally said that a version of that in august of 2014 and in june of 2015, did it take the department of defense a year to come one a strategy to defeat isis? secretary carter: first, thank you for your conversation. thank you everything you're doing, especially to our asia pacific strategy. senator, very grateful for your travels there and your leadership. we just spoke yesterday at the pentagon with the president about his strategy and the strategy is the one that you laid out. i described today. senator sullivan: ok. secretary carter: he described eight or nine months ago and that doesn't -- and this is important. it involves us and we have an important role. senator sullivan: right.

secretary carter: but it involves other parts of the government as well. that's one of the reasons to keep laborously citing nine lines of effort. there are literally nine lines of effort. we don't directly, for example try to interdict self-radicalized americans. the f.b.i. does that. we don't do that. but we got to do that we're working on these difficult problems of iraq. senator sullivan: now, mr. secretary, i agree with you 100% on that. to me it was a little bit -- maybe you just can't answer the question directly. i wish you would. but the fact that the president -- it just goes to some of the process here. the president for years essentially has been saying, we don't have a strategy because the guys over at the d.o.d. has given me one. a, it's not how we develop strategy as you mentioned. this needs to be all instruments of american power. the military is clearly one but we need economic, energy diplomatic. the whole list.

that has to be developed by the white house, not by the department of defense. so i don't think it took a year for the pentagon to come up with a strategy. and despite the fact that the president eave time he said we don't have a strategy said it was essentially your fault. i don't think it was your fault. i think it was the white house's fault. i just want to be on record saying i think it's unfair criticism to be put of the chairman or the secretary to say we don't have a strategy yet and it's because of d.o.d. i guess he can say we now have a strategy. is this the strategy? secretary carter: this is the strategy. and it is devised by the president and the white house. we play a role in it. i did not observe any waiting for us to come up with a strategy. senator sullivan: well, he actually said it twice. secretary carter: the strategy that i described, the nine lines of effort was i think described at the end of the last -- of last summer. it makes perfect sense our strategy has all the parts that the nine lines of effort

described. yesterday's meeting was to give him an update and to get his guidance on how we go forward. we did that. it happened to be at the pentagon and the focus was on the two of the nine lines of effort that we're responsible for. but there were other members of the national security community, which is essential to this, who were present and participated in that discussion and sosenator sullivan: mr. chairman, i don't assume it took a year for the military to come up with options for the president. general dempsey: no. i'd be happy to answer it. we're frequently and constantly adapting options but the context of when you said that, he had asked us, is there something more we need to be doing with the sunni tribes? that's the context of your question. the real issue is whether we should be doing more with the sunni tribes and the outcome of that conversation and the

planning that went into it was the air base train and advice platform. senator sullivan: i know there was discussion with the ndaa. i think it's a good bill, very bipartisan bill. senator reed and chairman mccain should be commended for the great work they did. one of the things we dan -- try and do in thebill is bolster the credibility where the united states is seen as working, having a strategy both supported by the executive branch and the legislative branch and some of us think our credibility in certain areas of the world has been weak and it's been one of the weaknesses of our national security and foreign policy strategy. but we tried to do that in a number of areas. i want to provide two examples. you kind of hinted at one, mr. secretary. the rebalance to the asia pacific. there's some strong language in there about the support for

that from the congress. very bipartisan. and how we need to be increasing troops in the asia pacific. also very much a focus that i think an area that i think mr. secretary, said we were late in the game in the arctic. i would recommend you take a look at the "newsweek" this week talks about -- cover story on the arctic. the title is actually "in the race to control the arctic: the u.s. lags behind." it takes about how this is developing as the new great game. kipling's famous phrase, a critical strategic area. how the russians are very, very involved in the arctic. mr. chairman, you actually in testimony in front of this economy talked about the foreign combad brigade, their exercise in the last couple months. and then the comment on the coast guard is saying it's a new geopolitical cold war the u.s. is in danger of losing. we're not even playing in this game at all.