of the penalty box for violating multiple resolutions. this isn't a neutral playing field. the burden of proof should be on the iranians, not on us to prove they are not adhering. this sense of equivalency i don't think is an accurate reflection of what is really going on here. take, mr. chairman. -- thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for the invitation to be here. i am here with friends and people i respect very much. we all start with the presumption it is in the national security interest of the united states to deny iran and nuclear weapon.

the united states and president obama have said we will use any weapon at our disposal to accomplish that. the route taken doesn't start there. the bush administration sought negotiations. that led to sanctions. the obama administration pushed stronger sanctions that really made a difference on the iranians. the obama administration came back with a negotiated agreement. this is among the most complex agreements any of us can hope to judge. it is filled with painful trade-offs. there are risks to acting and risks to not acting. i agree that this will be one of the most consequential votes any of us will take. for diplomatic history you may

have to go back to the league of nations in 1920 four when congress played such a role in whether we go forward or whether we don't go forward. i worked on iran policy for three years. i helped to sanction iran. i believe we have to contain the threat in the middle east, but i also believe president obama's policy is worth your support. i'm going to support it because i think it is the best alternative. if i could design the perfect alternative, it is not available to the united states. whether we oppose it or support it we have got to make it about what the alternatives have been. here is what president obama and

senator kerry have done. it will deny a nuclear weapon because it won't have the fissile material. it closes out the route towards fissile material. iran's plutoniaum reactor will be put off line. they won't be able to develop a nuclear weapon. the enrichment program will be closed quickly. they will still have centrifuges, but at a lower power than the advanced centrifuges. the uranium will be 300 kilograms.

right now the obama administration has said iran may be two or three months away from a nuclear weapon. with this deal for the next 10 years as the program is frozen, iran will be a year away from a nuclear weapon. i think the administration can make a case that the program is going to be frozen and that i think is an important attribute to the deal. iran will be subject did to sanctions it has never been subjected to before. third, should iran sheet? -- cheat -- i assume they will. given that they have lied in the

past. we have the ability to reimpose sanctions. the united states would have the opportunity to form a coalition to sanction them. this does give the united states a chance to resolve this problem diplomatically peacefully through a tough-minded negotiation, and i don't say that lightly because i am someone who believes we should keep the threat of force on the table and any american president would be justified using it if we felt iran was close to a nuclear weapon, but we are not at that point. no one is contesting the iranians are close to a nuclear weapon. the use of force is not pertinent. if we had a chance to avoid a third major conflict in the middle east since 9/11, and if we can stop iran, that is a good

course for the united states. i don't think it's a perfect deal. i have had trouble trying to weigh the risks on both sides to weigh the pros and cons. if i were a member, i would want to focus on some of the questions already focused on. i would want to look at the fact the program will be frozen in effect and mothballed for 10 years. when the 10 years is over, the superstructure of the program will be intact. iran will have the theoretical right to build back up the weapon. that is a trade-off. this is a real world negotiation. that program is not being entirely dismantled.

i think it is important the iaea will have insight into the program, but will they have a clear line of sight? what does managed access to a nuclear plant mean? i think it means iran is going to write some of the rules about how the plan is inspected. third, would we actually be able to reimpose sanctions should iran change or violate the agreement? none of us know. it would require a tough-minded american president. it would require us to assemble a coalition that took 10 years to build. i think the europeans will be with us. i wonder if the chinese will. these are real trade-offs.

we have to compromise. i say this. i think the only way to look at this is what is the ideal solution. the ideal solution is not available to us. i can think of other alternatives. one is should we just walk away. should we have left negotiations? should we have withdrawn support? we could have done that. i think i know what would have happened. our coalition, which contains

every country. i know what would have happened to the sanctions regime, and that is our leverage. it would have dissipated over time. the chinese would want to go for energy contracts. the indian government would want to go for more oil in iran. our allies would want to go to a trading relationship. the united states can sanction all they want, but what got iran to the table were global sanctions. it was japan and south korea and india not buying as much oil and gas. it was european financial sanctions. if you walked away and the coalition dissolved, there goes the leverage. if i have to weigh that option versus president obama's option

i favor president obama's option. we could have gone to the use of military force. general hayden would be a far greater authority than i would on the issue. i believe the united states has the power to destroy iran's nuclear facilities. that might buy three or four years. you cannot bomb the scientific knowledge their engineers and scientists have. they know how to mine uranium. they know how to convert it. they know how to assemble a nuclear warhead. the military option is a tactical option. it buys you time. president obama's option buys us 10 years where we can be assured their program is frozen. i don't think these other options work for the united

states in the real world of international politics and diplomacy. that is why i think president obama is worthy of your support and i am going to support him. at the same time the obama administration will pursue this difficult agreement with iran, i think we are going to have to push back against the iranians in the middle east. they are the most influential country in iraq. they are running arms to hezbollah and instigating the revolt of the tribes in yemen that have torn the country apart. they are making a big play for power in the sunni world.

i think we are in the position of supporting a nuclear deal and believing president obama needs to push back for a strong coalition, and i would hope president obama and the obama administration would make up with israel, would end the war of words, would reinforce our military relationship with israel so we can contain iranian power in the middle east. i think that is important. as someone who served in democratic and republican administrations, i would hope we could have a bipartisan debate. there are obvious differences between the bush and obama administrations. both wanted to have a negotiated

outcome. that is what we were aiming for. when iran denied us we turned to sanctions. we are going to need bipartisan unity and support for our president if we are going to ultimately defeat this threat. >> thank you chairman, ranking member, for inviting me back to this forum. i will stay in my allotted time. the judge would cut me off, but he is not here right now. since the advent of the iranian nuclear conference in 2002, two principles have guided the position.

those were what kind of program iran is an title to and practical needs for enrichment. it should be allowed a symbolic program. that would allow the leadership to save face while there would be assurances a symbolic program would not be used for military purposes. the second position that guided the policy was that iran can rejoin the community once it establishes the trust of the international community. these were embraced and persuaded the countries to accept. the notion of tactical needs has

been replaced by the one-year break out period. and the notion of trust and confidence in the international community has been replaced whereby an arbitrary time clock will determine when iran can proceed. it is not different from japan. japan can be trusted. iran should not. this deal and implications have to be articulated in the context of the changing nature of the foreign policy. it is important to know the supreme leader stands as the most important in iran.

he never had commanding influence of syria. lebanese politics only did him. the islamic republic has a commanding position in iraq. it is the most significant external power in syria. they have a leading proxy and of course in the gulf. there is a debate. what would the islamic republic spend its money on? imperialism has its costs. i do believe some of the money will be spent on domestic needs. the wing of iranian politics

have been concerned with the chinese model. in that sense you could make a case the administration has been one of the most repressive. they would require some relief. the idea is by granting a measure of economic rewards you can purchase the mystic consent. it is the case because the islamic republic continues to be haunted by the green revolution. they need an arms commitment. in the end the deal may not rest upon trust, but it does rest on hope the hope that a decade from now the islamic republic will be a different regime.

the power that is no longer animated by anti-americanism and anti-zionism. after watching the islamic republic for two decades, it is a hope i have difficulty sharing. >> i would like to just go to the question of the arms embargo. this was a last-minute addendum to this agreement. a demand the u.n. lift the arms embargo not just to conventional weapons, that iran could better arm with. it also goes to the issue of

iran's capability to get access to international technical assistance it sees to improve its program. last week the secretary of defense sounded the alarm about what this would mean if they get this capability to have an icbm reach the united states. russia stepped in. russia wants to transfer this technical assistance to iran. this is the most recent issue that caught us by surprise. the other element of surprise was the discovery iran committed to transferring to hamas not just funding to build the tunnels but also a new

generation of rockets and weapons and the additional announcement iran was going to transfer guidance systems to the rockets and missiles hezbollah has at its disposal but not quite as effective because of the iron dome as they could be if the head -- if they had these systems. the fact iran is willing to do this and to demand upfront payment of the signing bonus is something that really drove the attention of a number of members of congress is the information

was surfacing. i would like comments on this. you might have insights as well. >> nick can talk about the u.n. as i understand, the embargoes had to do with regional behavior and nothing to do with the regional dispute that was ongoing. iran has developed a defense industry, so there is always going to be a problem of iranian transference of missile technology and other forms. once it retires they have access to technology. >> not only will they be able to export the technology they have

developed more easily to their allies but they are also going to be able to import the technology they need. ambassador burns? >> there is no question the iranians were trying to split the p5 with this proposal. there is no way we could have accepted this. if we can maintain these weapons embargoes for import and export, that is good for the united states. >> in 10 years they are going to have the capability under this agreement. why would we want to agree for five years and then eight years

for that capability? why would the united states sign off on such an agreement? >> i am just a private citizen. this is a painful trade-offs. i would hope we could complete it. how would we work once these embargoes are lifted? we will have to use the power to prevent the sale to iran. >> let me just ask general hayden. >> i find it incoherent. we have a lot of complaints about iranian behavior. we have dismissed the ballistic missile part to focus on the

nuclear. we have taken a bunch of things off the table we can conclude. now we get to the agreement. the iranians are walking up the ladder and including things they refuse to discuss with us. i don't understand why the sanctions are even in an agreement on the nuclear program. >> the administration was once on the same page as congress on this issue of anywhere, anytime inspections, but the iranians pushed back very hard, boasting they would not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military site. now we are signing up for

managed access. a report says inspectors will get access to the sites only after consultation with the iranians, with the russians, with china, and other world powers in this negotiation. we wanted to get this within 24 hours. that was the original idea. this agreement would give inspectors access in 24 days after all the steps. that is predicated on the idea we have cooperation in backing the access. my question here, we never believed the iranians would ever

make its way into a weapon. we always believed that work would be done somewhere else in secret. how confident are you in a managed access process that includes iran on the committee that determines whether or not we have access? >> i have several issues. i already mentioned one, but this is the one i am most concerned about. we eliminated the margin of error. i would never come to you and tell you american national technical means will be sufficient for verifying this agreement. without a regime i would not tell you it is ok.

that really puts the weight of effort on the ability to go anywhere at any time. we have taken that from the technical level. it needs to resolve. we have put it at a political level. that is a point for chaos ambiguity, and doubt. we are not going to be able to tell you for sure where the iranians are. >> thanks, mr. chairman. this question really highlights the greatest specific weakness of the agreement announced today. we are dealing with a country that has proven they will not play by international rules. they have delayed inspectors

from the united nations. now we are taking a risk of making this trade where we and sanctions in return for temporarily freezing the nuclear program if they do what they say they will do, and the one hope we could have is the anytime anywhere inspections. the agreement that came out is the greatest disappointment, because basically excessive bureaucratic process that goes 21 days during which iran can remove anything in violation of the agreement that they want to. i urge members of this congress to focus on the section of this agreement on access.

this is one iran won hands down. consequences are devastating. >> thank you. >> first, i want to thank the witnesses for a thoughtful presentation and the establishment of the tone about this crucial vote. i raised earlier my concern about access. you gave an excellent presentation on the trade-offs they needed to make and the skepticism you have

what i am trying to grapple with is what that looks like over time. initially, you said it was really important that as we move forward, that would push back against the iranians in the middle east. you detail the many ways in which they have exerted their influence throughout the region. i would ask, getting back to the issue of resources, when they satisfy the terms of their nuclear related conditions, and have access to their frozen assets. whether it is $1 billion or $50

billion if we acknowledge that they will invest in their own economy, some portion will be used to support what the end doing in the region. if the goal is peace short-term is it likely the infusion of additional money will lead to less piece and more violence through their terror proxies? >> thank you, very much. i would syay the goal here has been to deny them a nuclear weapon. if not, we resort to military means. yes, it is a peaceful solution, but is one that is in our interest. . it is worth doing that is how i understand the logic here. that is why i support it.

you ask a good question -- we're dealing with two different iranian governments. i think they're generally reformist and their context that is the veneer, the government we have been dealing with. but there was another government the commander of the iranian revolutionary guard corps. that is an aggressive, violent organization. i assume that some of the money from sanction relief will go to economic improvements. . their terrible problems at home they have to rebuild the structure of that country. and to supporting terrorist groups. at the same time, and my input in our interests, it is

definitely in our interests to strengthen our coalition with israel and the arab countries and to push back on the arabians. >> you talk about two different governments, how we spend all of this time negotiating with one to get to an agreement only to see that government then and off responsibility going forward to the other government wreaking havoc throughout the region? >> i will touch on this in the following way. i've heard you can transact and arms agreement and maintain pressure. i'm not sure that is possible. the principal means that the united states tries to discipline hereon has been to economic -- discipline iran has been to economic sanctions.

this agreement stipulates that over the area of 10 years in this agreement, central-bank sanctions are to be waived. is that a human rights sanction? it is a sanction that will be waived. the course of action that the united states has will lessen. so the american experience was the 1973 arms agreement was also one of the most aggressive decade in soviet history. that culminated in the invasion of afghanistan. the ability of united states to enforce, contain, or reforms their regression has diminished -- aggression has diminished.

>> in our negotiations, you suggest we should be more as a warning sign. >> i challenge the thesis that you can maintain that and have a rebellious state. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman. i would like to remind my good friend that while he says that are two governments both were very much active just this past friday when they were chanting death to america. .gov these separate entities, they have one goal in mine. -- mind. we ignore that. according to reports, the white house seems to have caved on almost every one of iran's

demands, blowing past its own red lines on verifications, inspections, unsanctioned relief, and coming clean on past nuclear ambitions. oalong the wya, -- way the administration has made excuse after excuse. every iranian violation in order to continue negotiations providing billions of dollars in sanctions relief. it is said to provide billions more. now, we know that iran will continue funding hegemonic ambitions throughout the middle east. it will support terrorism throughout the world just as it has been an lebanon and syria. it is clear that this deal is a

far cry from every redline that the white house and health imposed. it is a lower threshold than the u.n security council. i read these resolutions, and i think that is like a fairytale. once upon a time, the world powers got together and said this is what we will demand. the administration kept lowering the bar defending its violations of the iranians every step of the way. going legacy shopping, here is another item off the shelf. people will be worried about whatever else is going on in the music industry, nobody will pay attention. let's look at the shiny keys. the administration has reportedly said that it will only lift the nuclear related sanctions even though officials would never describe exactly how

that was defined. now reports indicate that the administration has caved to the arabian claim that all the sanctions are nuclear related. do you believe they should be lifting sanctions imposed on iran? considering its support for terrorism, and following up on the exact point, general hayden has pointed out that it must be allowed to inspect the suspect locations. you had told us that weaponization would never occur at those facilities. it would be done at a secret facility. the deal could allow suspect activities to have access only after consultation with the iranians. secretary kerry has stated that

expecting iran's coming clean up possible military dimensions isn't even necessary because the u.s. has full knowledge of their activity. manny and intelligence committee including dia director michael flynn have argued that the limits of u.s. intelligence in iran. it makes it impossible, how can we trust them to give you an expect there's access -- u.n in spectors. how hard is it to gather intelligence? how can the full knowledge of their activities with that access to all of these sites? finally, many supporters have been floating the fantastical idea that iran will change its behavior as a result of this agreement and become a better neighbor. how will lifting the sanctions

and influx of new money, change their involvement throughout the middle east? they will have more money to be involved in its hegemonic ambitions. not only these sanctions, we are done with that, might as well rip that one up. what about our u.s. sanctions? we talk about what sanctions we will lift -- there are some within our control. but there were so many executive order sanctions, so many provisions that he can wave. i know i am out of time. i am greatly saddened, sickened, and frustrated over this deal.

>> thank you. let the first set the record straight. the sanctions, especially the secondary sanctions, are the only reason a ron make any -- iran make any concessions at all. for 30 years, congress had it right. congress -- the executive branch had it wrong. the president block to them in the senate. i and disappointed in this deal for all the reasons that have been brought up. the arms embargo was not a nuclear sanction, yet it is being waived. the iran sanctions act is being waived. only one of the reasons it was imposed was nuclear. we only get the things that we

don't need and they can't sell anywhere else. i think you are right in saying it will spend a big chunk of this money they get for domestic purposes. in addition, they will spend it on corruption. they are good at that. they will kill a lot of sunnis. they love if you billion left over to kill americans and work other mischief. a number of people talked about that we will see a change in the government. the imposed sanctions to change the government on the fair that if you deprive the government of economic benefit, you put pressure on them to change. now we will shower them with money. they will get and economic benefit. it is not the way to cause a government to lose its grip on power.

i will simply point out that you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bail of marijuana. it is not the classy way to do it. obviously they want a missile and they only one reason for creating them. political pundits all over the various channels are asking if it is a good deal. did obama do a good job? they can be politicians. we are here in the real world. we have a disappointing deal that has the full support of the american president, but also of the p5 plus 1/ imagine a selling them that they should not invest in oil fields human the president obama thinks they should. we would not achieve our purpose. in the real world, senator

lieberman points out that we can endorse or reject this agreement. there were something else we could do, we could refuse to endorse it, and refuse to reject it. that is probably what we will do. but, i should mention, this deal is that some good points. the good points are in the first year. stockpiles are being shipped out. centrifuges are being mothballed. if we don't take any action in the first year, we get the benefit and the detriment of the first year of the deal. the 10th the year is absolutely terrible. iran has free access to 10 times as many centrifuges. and so i think our focus needs to be thinking about preventing year 10. we can pass a resolution, it to

be voted down overwhelmingly. in the future, congresses and presidents would be free to take action before year 10. that will be the strongest statement against the agreement. what is more likely to happen is a resolution of disapproval. it will pass vetoed, the veto is likely to be sustained. so, we reach the same position, or just congress declaring that it doesn't like the position. we do so in the most pitiful way, the final vote to being a victory for those that support the agreement. so, i think this deal is going to go into force. what i would like, what advice to you give president's next

decade as about to prevent iran from having an industrial size enrichment program where the breakout time would be almost zero. general hayden: i don't have a good answer to that question. this deal guarantees the reality -- >> it is not binding. let's say a ron cut -- iran kind of lives within the deal. another president can say all options are on the table. what can the president do to make sure that this terrible year 10 does not go into force? senator lieberman: the first

thing you want to say is to offer a different viewpoint from the outside about what would happen here in congress. i am not prepared to say, based on conversations i have had that this agreement will be approved or disapproved, and a presidential veto will not be overridden. i think people's minds are open they are concerned. i have said that whether congress would override a veto would depend on the specific terms of the agreement. now we have seen the agreement. the fact that it legitimizes iran as a nuclear weapons power even more, the access provisions are full of holes and don't give up any hope this country, which is constantly cheated will ab

ide by the agreement here. i thihnk it is definitely possible that this agreement will be rejected by congress. eight presidents veto overridden. if it is not, the latitude of future presidents will be expanded if there is an initial rejection of the agreement as a veto is not overridden. they could even ask for a reposition of sanctions based on a premise that congress was upset. a majority of members of both houses voted to reject the agreement. >> on page three, it says iran

will be treated the same way as any nonnuclear state. you don't like that phrase? >> you have to have a president who demands that. i do think one path would be is to suggest that after 10 years all the parties will vote whether to extend the restrictions. there is a precedent for that it is copy -- called the npt. that have to be we do go dealer agreement. >> president obama and his successor, do three things vigilant on expections -- inspections. and reimpose sanctions if necessary.

three, retain the right to use military force. there is a strategy where this can be implemented. >> thank you for holding this extraordinarily timely meeting. not only has the arabian government just orchestrated death to -- iranian government just orchestrated death to america gatherings, we have had hearings on that and they are still incarcerated and subjected to cruel treatment. now we deal with them. i think your comments about this fall short. you mentioned that it is not a perfect deal, who expected a perfect the deal? that sounds like a straw man argument. other issues like ballistic missiles enrichment, which was

always a foundation of a deal they are off the table. now there will be enrichment allowed. i think that was a major mistake. in a statement of bad faith president obama vowed to veto a congressional move to block this agreement. this is day one, he is already talking veto. why not persuade congress about it's content? instead, the veto card goes right up. one of several achilles heels have was that defined? on a regional nuclear arms race, we all want peace. will this begin, or foment, a nuclear arms race in the region? perhaps you could touch on that?

you talked about how it buys us 10 years if iran is newly infused with cash, and the sanctions were not aggressively and lamented, that implemented. it was a lifeline in china, now they will get huge infusions of cash which will hurt the region. it will be a multiplier affect. that is a very serious problem. we know of what netanyahu said. let me ask you also, one of the key questions is or not the obama administration, and the p5 plus 1 partners can be trusted to punish iran as they are likely to occur? or will nothing happen?

>> let me just respond to tehhe question about nonproliferation. this will be an ironic and painful result. an agreement to reduce the presence of nuclear weapons in the middle east, because it eventually allows a radical state to get nuclear weapons will in fact encourage other powers within the middle east to invest in nuclear weapons. that is a -- that makes the middle east even more literally explosive. officials within the saudi government have already said to people if an agreement enables iran to become a nuclear

weapon's power, they will not wait until that happens. they will build up their own capacity. the fact that, i looked at this from the point of view of america. is as much more risk for america and reward for iran than it should. governments in the middle east are also making the same calculations throughout the arab world. they will take actions. if we think it is a bad deal, they will think it is a terrible deal. it is their neighborhood. the result will be exactly the opposite of what was hoped for here which is a more peaceful middle east. it will be a much more violent and potentially explosive, middle east. >> the more the administration

argues if this deal is a vote for war, the more you take off the table to use military power. i don't think anyone believes that is a realistic option of the moment. i don't think they believe that for more than a year or two. that does actually weaknen our position. quirks that me ask about in the report itself, it says iran intends to ship off fuel. its it intends, it doesn't say requires. that is pretty weak. >> i understand it is a requirement.

it is part of the deal. >> i would say it is a good question and one that i am sure you in the committee will get answered. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me first ask, i was listening to ambassador burns's testimony, and during his testimony one of the things he highlighted was -- if the united states had walked away and said no and the other partners were trying to strike a deal. my first question, do you think we should walk away, even if that meant the dissolution of the p5 plus 1, and the unity we

have had for the last 20 months? would you walk away from such a deal? >> what is happened is, if we did that today it would dissolve the unity and we would be blamed. that is a corner we have painted ourselves and to. >> right now, you would agree that it would make it quite difficult. therefore, the sanctions that have brought iran to agree to negotiations when it was also ambassador burns's testimony that the bush administration tried to get them to agree and they would not. there has been a change from what took place at the end of the bush administration because

we did not have this outside unity with the p5 plus 1. that could relieve some of the pressure on iran. the only thing i am looking at is -- what is the opportunity to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon? collects at the good russians, and the chinese heel off immediately. they did not want to be there in the first place. it to get high level of skill to get them in the circle. there is greater hope with the french, and the british. we're painted ourselves into the corner. for us to undo those would make it very difficult. collects the problem is, while negotiations were going on, we weren't in the room. how those negotiations took

place, who was demanding what becomes important. i think it is important for members of congress to try to talk to our colleagues defined at what their feelings are find out where they are on this. it is important to talk to scientists, not just the politics. i would suggest members of this committee traveled ileana and talk to the -- travel to vienna. will that prevent, in their opinion as scientists, from my viewpoint, having had this -- this is a very important vote. i can't leave it in a vacuum. i had another important vote when we were talking about ira

q. it were questions that if we should debate? should be have verification? what happened at that point there was imminent danger of a rock -- of iraq having weapons of mass destruction. i can remember the case went to the u.n. we are still -- i think we should learn a lesson, because we are still paying for that. we do not do everything we could first kid if he did everything we could first and they still had weapons, we could have done what we did anyways. he we are again with the opportunity. i agree this is not perfect. i do not know any perfect bill that has been made in this united states congress.

not one. i'm not looking for a perfect bill. >> i agree. the correct question you just framed it is is this frame good enough -- is this deal good enough? to avoid sliding from that position. >> we should also keep in context that we are not dealing -- we are not doing it ourselves, we are doing it unilaterally. forget about the other five partners for this deal. you've got negotiations. leadership keeping this group together, that is leadership so that we can get to this point. otherwise, we do not get here. we do not advocate choices. this gives us a choice. we should at least look at it and talk to scientists.

we have not talked to any scientist. we're not going to the aei a desk to the ie ae -- to the iaea. >> that is the position -- all we have here is the fine print really matters. there is no margin for error. >> chilly go to mr. dana rohrabacher. >> thank you mr. chairman and ranking member angle -- ranking member angleengle who is not here today. what we discussed today is being held by a government entity that

holds for americans hostage. -- permit our president to take a non-diplomatic iranian officials into custody until their government returns these americans they are holding illegally. of course, we will not do that, because we do not want to make the iranian mullah regime angry by doing something like that. in fact, we have refrained -- the mullahs have already won a great deal by this elongated negotiation. for all of these years, we have been refraining from supporting the democratic elements in iran against the mullahs for fear that it would upset the negotiations over the nuclear

deal. we've already been a loser, even before this supposedly agreement. what i like to ask, does anyone on the panel no whether or not this agreement includes an iranian agreement, not to obtain a nuclear weapon from another source, rather than building one on their own? >> i think this agreement stipulates that a member of and pt -- as a member of npt it has foregone any nuclear weapon. >> the answer is, yes, part of this agreement is the iranians have agreed not to obtain a nuclear weapon from someone else. >> it says iran will become a member of the npt, it forgoes the option of having a nuclear weapon. it does not specify the source but it is foreclosed as an

option as a matter of principle. >> if i may add, it seems to me that iran has developed a lot of the nuclear capability that it has today in violation of its obligations under the non-pro the prolific -- nonproliferation treaty. more evidence -- they should not do this under the npt, but they violated the npt wantonly before. >> if we can expect the same type of behavior that they have made with other agreements, they could easily obtain a nuclear weapon from an illegal source. another question for the panel we have people who know about

u.s. intelligence, are there nuclear weapons that some groups might be able to obtain on a market, rather than develop their own weapon? >> of course, always watching the north koreans. we watch them build a plutonium reactor. just at the last minute. just to spinoff the scenario that senator lieberman is talking about regarding the sunnis. one possible scenario is that the saudi's will go to the pakistanis in order to get nuclear devices to balance what they viewed to be the iranian threat. >> what we have is basically a situation where we have not refrained from supporting the democratic elements and iran, which is the real solution is eating rid of the mullah regime

and getting a democratic government in their that does not seek to possess nuclear weapons, but of course we are actually undermining that opportunity, over these last six years. in fact, this agreement may undermine it further. i thank you all for your testimony today. i think you have given us a lot to think about. i would hope that all of us here would do our duty. i do not think it is a tough decision. i think it is very clear that this is a rotten deal. we will keep an open mind to see if we can be convinced that there are some other benefits to it. thank you. >> karen bass of california. >> i had a few questions that focus on the process and also the consequences of our actions. a couple of people have asked questions about our partners from the other countries. i was wondering about the p5

plus one and wanting to know if they have a similar process where they are voting in their legislative body. what happens at the u.n. maybe you could put it in sequence, ambassador burns? >> the p5 plus one group was put together by the u.s. and britain in december 2005. the reason why am supporting the president's initiative, if you keep this group together, that is the leverage point, through sanctions and inspections. if the group dissolves, we lose our leverage. it is a disparate group. the french, germans and british will have to go back and report to the two parliaments on this deal. i'm very strongly sure that president putin does not have to worry too much. >> do you have any sense of fans

and britain? what is your sense of that? >> my sense of the politics in europe is in the main, the parliaments -- and the publics are struck -- are supportive of the deal. i believe that is true in europe across the board. we are sanctioning russia over ukraine. we're going to have to work with russia to try to get them on our side. i think the country that is weakest is china, because they tend to be motivated by martial purposes. we have to worry about law and order in the middle east, and so it is a very difficult coalition. behind it, you also have major purchases of uranium energy. india, very important that we keep them in the coalition. >> had you playing out that the un security council? >> there is no question that

part of the implementation is there will be a new security council resolution that will take away the sanctions, at least those that have been floated -- that have been voted on by the united nations. it is a short they will win that vote. >> you have any concerns that any countries will exercise their veto power? >> no, i think the deal worked out is that they will not exercise the veto. they will go forward. there is 0% probability that any country uses the veto. >> if we turn this down and we override a veto? -- a veto, how do you see this playing out then? people want to go over and make business deals from there is countries. if we override the residents veto, what happens then? next if the president -- >> if

the president of rice -- you will see the dissolution of the p5 group. the breakdown of solidarity on sanctions. the commercial impulse of a lot of these countries to do business with iran will take over. i ran -- iran will be in position to get sanctions relief. they will not have constraints on their nuclear program here at >> how do we hold them accountable? how will the rest of the world? >> iran will not be accountable. they will be up to proceed with uranium programs which they have not been up to do for 13 months. we've all try to find what is the question? my question is what is the best alternative? we live in the real world. i think it is this deal.

we cannot go back and design a better process, five years back. i disagree with senator lieberman on one question, if we are worried about proliferation that the saudi's may want to compete with the uranium and develop a nuclear weapon, -- it leaves the iranians without constraints on their nuclear program. the way to resolve the proliferation problem is to lock in freeze and the iranian program for the next six years. >> you said sanctions would breakdown, and let us say we want to bring sanctions back again, how would you be into bring them back? >> if that happened, obviously the president and secretary state would want to reassemble the regime with iran. if they were continuing with their research it would be difficult to do.

>> whether it is 10 years, if we could do year nine, and i'm asking you this from your pv's experience. this comes across as 10 years happens and everything goes back to normal. what a new agreement begin to be negotiated around year eight or year nine? >> if you still have the ayatollahs in control, or a radical government, you would have to put together another sanctions regime. threaten them reserve the right to use military force if they saw a nuclear weapon. >> thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, we go to steve shalit of ohio. >> thank you mr. chairman. senator lieberman i will begin with you. as has already been mentioned prime minister netanyahu has referred to this agreement as a mistake of historic proportions. what position does this put israel in?

>> thanks, congressman. obviously netanyahu under the leadership as israel is -- leadership of israel is better prepared than i am. it is clear that based on the violent anti-israel rhetoric of the islamic republic of iran. based on the support of iran from the terrorists who threaten israel, the idea that the iranians would have a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable. of time -- on for see it -- in the foreseeable period of time it would lead the israeli government to make a decision to be better protected. what interesting things -- one

of the interesting things is the israeli system, from what i see the feeling about this agreement and worrying about it in the weeks preceding it is shared across a very broad spectrum of the israeli medical establishment. be more specific herzog was the leader of the opposition. he basically said the same things about an agreement, on nuclear weapons with iran, that netanyahu has said. >> let me turn to you at this point, when you combine the lifting of the arms embargo and disagreement, shouldn't it be concerning to us, ourng to us, our security?

that the concern that the international continental lithic -- ballistic goes from russia to iran. that puts us directly in harm's way from a nuclear armed iran somewhere down the road? >> it puts us in a position of being more threatened by a more capable iran with or without a nuclear device. the senator talked about israel and how this frightens israel he's. -- frightens israel is. that will allow the normalization of a whole host of relationships as you are suggesting, that will allow the iranians build a strain. the next comments that we have to work hard to make sure that does not happen, because they are engaged in egregious

teenager. it is true and aspirational. i think for the rest of the world, this is welcoming this iran back into the world of nations. >> you got limited time left. let me put two questions to you. one is is not likely this deal that you're going to see a pretty significant reaction by the gulf states and the saudi's. they have to counter a much stronger iran now that is going to have nuclear weapons as a result of this. you're good to see an arms race there. sickly this desk secondly, this giving two weeks notice, you can move on a lot of incriminating evidence within two weeks notice . would that be accurate? i will give you whatever time i have left. >> whether this can lead to

proliferation, my suspicion is the saudi's and golf states are going to match -- and the gulf states are going to try and match iran's capabilities. it is not happen in absence of a deal, because of the confidence the countries have in the united states and its intentions to restrict iranian nuclear programs. this agreement says iran will be treated -- i would like to hear a defense of the clause. the own thing i that it is about to expire and we should try to have it not expire. if you defend this agreement you should -- you should defend white it should expire in 10 years. a domestic procedure will be in place. they have a evidence of untoward activity.

then it will ask the iranian government for permission to deal with that act. i do not know what that means in terms of expecting -- inspecting their military facility. i do not know the answer. it is not obvious to me. there is -- if there is a dispute, it will go to a committee. they have a dispute committee. once the committee says iran is wrong and iea should have access. it will go to the security council. security council can do lots of different things. they cannot impose economic sanctions on iraq. -- sections on iran. it can recommend national measures, but those measures will have to be negotiated on a case-by-case by the united states government. when success of american the

mats and try to -- >> during the long. of time -- during the long period of time, there were no inspections. >> we go to mr. william keating of massachusetts. >> i want to thank the witnesses for the seriousness and tone of which they have conducted themselves. as well as my colleagues. i hope this is a harbinger of the way we are discussing this issue going forward. it is one of the more serious issues we're going to have. i speak of -- i speak for most of congress, where beginning to digest this. mary in no position to take a position just yet. many of your comments are thoughtful. that being said, i want to go back to a few areas of interest. talked about how the coalition is likely to unravel and we lose

our strength in terms of sanctions. there's another area that might change if this is stalled or we walk away. that is the issue of we are negotiating with iran before they have their nuclear program in place. what would be negotiations be in your mind after they have that? how much more difficult that be? how would they be limited if we wait? >> thank you, mr. keating. magic is opportunity -- may i take this opportunity to say i am one of your constituents. >> i am glad i commended all of you. [laughter] >> we have had a better experience with north korea. once north korea obtains nuclear weapons it becomes impossible to negotiate, because they have the leverage.

they have protection from china as well. both president bush and president obama have been right to try and go at this in a more direct way. to try and stop renegotiations with iran before they go across the threshold. what president obama has been in to do is buy us 10 years. we cannot hope that the iranians will change. we have to go through these 10 years with a lot of vision and toughness and maybe replay all of this 10 years from now. we do have international immunity in the end, even some of the senecal as president putin does not -- even someone as senecal cynical as president putin does not want a nuclear iran. i think this is the time for negotiations. i believe, reflecting on the

history of a post-9/11 area, we should exhaust diplomacy. if it fails, then we have the military option to rely on. that is the proper sequence. >> i tried to get in a couple questions. one of my concerns was break -- was raised by ambassador burns. the idea that this agreement would result in the saudi's in the gulf state just moving forward. there is a line getting to the nuclear program. there's no doubt they are going to go do that. if they are going to get that anyways, wouldn't they have done that anyways? my point is, it is not the agreement that is going to make them go forward with their own

nuclear program, in the absence of an agreement, they have gone forward anyway. i think it is kind of a moot point. i understand what you said. do any of the other panelists have a view? >> the gulf states have not moved forward. >> no. if this becomes a reality, what is your consensus? >> mr. keating, right now they have not. they have not because we are a part of their team. there's going to be a perception that we switch sides. we are no longer playing on the squad. >> i want to get warmer question and. -- i want to get one more question in. quickly, i think the real

concern is if the coalition unravels, that creates a problem. if iran violates, how easy will it be to constitute that coalition for sanctions again? >> first i should reassure you that i have a lot more kind -- a level of confidence and tom brady didn't ayatollah. -- tom brady than ayatollah. it strengthened our position. we have to talk about trade-offs. i would rather have us reject a bad deal and run the risk of having p5 plus one coalition dissolve. it will cover must of security and that of our allies in the middle east. part of what has been lost is the iranians needed this

agreement more than we did. in the not seem like this. they are in a lot more trouble than we are economically. if for some reason the coalition falls apart, we are still the economic superpower of the world. access to our banking system is still necessary for economic growth. we have the capacity ourselves to reimpose sanctions on them. >> i'm going over my time. >> joe wilson, suck a lot of. >> thank you mr. chairman. -- joe wilson, south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i am grateful for the panel being your today. you are making a difference. i am disappointed the presidents desk the president has made dangerous concessions.

this regime sponsors terrorists to attack american families and often calls for the death of our allies and israel. your testimony today that this is a bad deal that should be overridden. think you very much for your courage. for policy initiative board member wrote today, "it is obviously a very good deal for the regime. a bad deal for america." congress should override the presidents veto and return america's orion aussie -- america's iran policy to a position of strength. in the coming days, all the american people are allowed to consider the agreement truthfully and holds the president accountable in an effort to achieve political gain, president obama has ignored the american people.

i agree with israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu this is a mistake of historical proportions. with that in mind, senator lieberman, it should be remembered that the secretary of state designated iran, january 23 1984, or than 30 years ago. this is in response to the october 1983 bombing of the u.s. marine barracks in beirut. killing over 300 marines. this was perpetrated by the iranian regime. keeping that in mind, has there been a change in course i the iranian gene -- iranian regime, leading up to the negotiations that occurred today, or has been agreed to today. >> this is an important plan. it is easy to get focused on

today and forget tomorrow. but tomorrow is who this agreement is with. this iranian government has the blood of a lot of americans on his hands. the marines at the barracks in beirut, and the soldiers at colbert towers. hundreds of american soldiers were killed in iraq by a shia militia that were trained in iran. the irgc. the question is a good one. someone said before, iran has two governments. i do not think so. iran has one government and two faces. the government in power is ayatollah and the irgc. the face that they put out occasionally is prime minister rouhani. and now, the prime minister's

arif. does anyone really think that's arif and ronnie are representative of the government? not in the final analysis. as you consider this >> additional lirks the i.e.d. devices that killed hundreds of americans in iraq and also in aphibarnrat, i had two sons in iraq and another in aphibarnrat. they had to -- afghanistan. you brought up about the government-sponsored newspaper in teheran. people needed to know what the exact quote was. one fine day cease to be visible on the map of the world. goodness gracious. what are we facing? and general, by lifting the

economic sanctions what'll this do to our efforts to stop the degrading of terrorism? what does this do to the stability of iraq, syria and yemen? >> congressman it just increases iranian capacity across the board. that is an unavoidable consequence of this. it may be something we're willing to pay the price for. i don't think so. because of the nuke portfolio. but unavoidably iran is more capable of continuing the policies it has been following for the last several decades and no evidence that this agreement or anything else will make iranians change that course. >> thank you very much. each of you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i too want to thank the witnesses for your thoughtful testimony and assisting us in a very, very consequent rble decision.

i want to start by thage i think the objective of these negotiations was preventing a nuke iran. as we decide whether to support of disapprove of this agreement, it should be measured against that objectsive. there is lots more work to do. nobody should have imagined that this agreement would solve all of the challenges we face and result in a complete transformation of the ideology, behaviors and intentions of iran. because if that is the test, there is no question that the agreement fails. senator leishman, you just testified that it allows iran to be a nuke weapons state and makes it inevitable. it is a comprehensive long-term deal with iran that'll prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. who is right? the sf the objective to prevent

a nuke iran senator leishman says it is inevitable. lieberman said it is inevitable. >> i respect senator lieberman's opinion here. i don't want to take issue with him at all. i don't think it is possible to say this agreement will 100% prevent iran from becoming a nuke weapons power. i think that would be the wrong way to look at this. i think it gives us the greatest probability of preventing that. that's why i'm supportive of it. i see the downsides. congress might have to struggle through what we have all talked about this morning. can you reimpose sanctions? what is the nature of this regime? but i am convinced we have to try this first and we have to be vigorous in trying to implement it and if it works, we're ahead of the game. if it doesn't work, we have

other options. but i would also say -- i wouldn't say if you're opposed to this deal, that somehow leads to war. i think that is false too. i think if a deal unravels, the irans are smart enough they won't go the nuclear threshold. they will go some way behind that that'll not invite a military response. if you're against it you're going to get a war. if you're for it you can assure the american people there will be no nuke weapon. i think the reality is very complex between the two. >> building on that, much of the argument has been made even today that what this agreement attempts to do is buy a decade. by this period of peace or period of at least iran not moving toward a nuke weapon. the argument of course being that toward the end of that

period somehow iran will be stronger. they will have greater economic success. they will be able to withstand the sanctions better than they are today. our argument on the reverse side is that we will know more about the nuke program than we have ever known before. seems to me that is one of the other questions we need to struggle with. where do we end up. no options are off the table at the end of that period. military options. all of the options that are available today remain available. the only question is what is the difference in the strength of our positions? >> right. i think one way to look at this is there is a lot of risk here going forward. there is a lot of risk not going forward and you have to try to weigh the risks on both sides. i think there is a case to be made that there is a possibility this regime is going to change. become less virulent and

aggressive. but we can't bank our strategy on that. hope cannot be the basis of that strategy. we have to be prepared for either outcome. if we take advantage of a positive turn of events, we have to hope this regime hasn't changed and tries to turn back towards a nuke future. >> one of the things you said is you challenge the sup decision that you can challenge a revolutionary state and have an arms agreement which is of course what this proposal attempts to do. why do you think we can't do both of those things? >> i think in the context of the -- what i was suggesting congressman, it is difficult to maintain an arms control agreement as well as course of leverage because the principle course of leverage we have exercised on iran is chick. we have never respond -- is economic. this agreement commits the united states and the international community to

unwind economic sanctions on iran over a decade. your course of menu shrinks. you have the military at your disposal. i just don't think there is a military solution to this. basically if you want to pressure iran and historically we have pressured them through economic sanctions that option is becoming less available as you are committed to unwinding those sanctions. >> let me ask one last question of you and senator lieberman. what do you think will happen if the veto is sustained? what do you think happens next? >> we're in absolutely unchartered waters, congressman. it would depend on the strength of the american argument, the willingness of the administration to go to our allice and explain why we have chosen -- allies and explain why we have chosen a no -- a new action.

as ambassador byrnes points out the under international con sen -- -- consensus we get, the more reck bring to bear. >> i would say that i would hope that the administration would try to regather the p5+1 and basically go back to iran and say we couldn't sell it. we have to do a better deal here. again, i believe that iran needs a deal much more than we do. the other thing is that at that point, we probably would want to look at increasing sanctions to give them another motivation to come back and making credible president and congress that we're prepared to use our military power if our intelligence tells us that they have actually turned the corner and are beginning to nukize their program. >> thank you. i yield back.

>> let me thank the witnesses. in some respects, i thought the train has already left the station. even if we disapprove of this. unless the administration exercises leadership, those sanctions will certainly be lifted. regardless of what we do in the united states. i think that is maybe something we haven't discussed here today. and then from the homeland security standpoint, that means we have billionsor dollars being restored to the iranians that can then go into these terrorist operations. we know that they control five capitals now. really arguably, teheran baghdad, damascus, beirut, yemen.

that's what greatly concerns me. i don't know if we can turn the clock back on this. now that the p5 has agreed to this, when i was in europe the ambassador, they are very supportive of this the deal. primarily, i think because they have a lot of money to be made on this. so i don't know what we can do to stop it. i can tell you what i'm concerned about is the last minute as the chairman mentioned the last minute arms embargaino being lifted which can lead to russiantology and the sanctions being lifts as well not to mention, you know, when you look at the track record of the iaea and whether they truly can perform this mission with unfettered acts, i highly doubt the iranians are going to give us access to. what are they giving us access to? nuclear facility sites.

it doesn't include their nuclear facilities where a lot of this could take place. lastly, the intercontinental ballistic missilings. intelligence estimates are indicate big the end of possibly as early as next year could have capability to hit the united statesor america. there is only one reason why you produce these things. it is to deliver a nuke warhead. so all of these things put together nigs to the rhetoric, i think i agree with senator lieberman, it is more risk for america and more reward for iran. i want to end with this. this is probably the worst -- when i was in saudi i think senator and general, as you mentioned, they asked me why are you negotiating with iran? why are you doing this? netanyahu. why are you doing this? this will result in a nuke arms

race in the middle east. as you indicated saudis are taking steps now. maybe working with pakistan to produce their own nuke capability. turkey is going to want that. egypt is going to want it and on and on and on. i think that is one of my biggest concerns here is the result of all of this backfiring and then not so great result. senator, general if you could both comment on all of that. >> well, chairman, it is good to see you. i agree with you. all of your concerns about what happens at the united nations if congress rejected the agreement and the president's veto is overridden is a really interesting question. in the most direct sense you would think that the deal therefore would be dead so that it would there would not be a basis for going to the united nations but based on -- i read it 1 1/2 times this morning. i'm not sure that i could swear to that under oath.

it is a real interesting question. again, i come back to what i said before. let's never underestimate our power. we're a military power and an economic power. if we continue to apply sanctions which deny iran and countries that deal with iran to our banking system, it is going to affect the iranian economy. and let's never forget that. >> i'm trying to play catch one the agreement and read the fine print this morning. it is not at all clear to me that this will not be resolved in new york before the congressional review period has expired. we may have the system go to one deliberative body about this before this deliberative body has a chance to vote. >> if the u.n. security council approves this before congress has a chance to vote on it and then what happens, the sanctions lifted by the

european or international partners irrespective of what the united states does. i don't know the answers to this as this agreement just came out. >> you raise a really interesting question. it maybe that one of the points as you that you could achieve it on, not to go to the united nations. that seems to me that our constitution requires that kind of respect first per congressional consideration. >> i agree 100%. i yield back. >> let's go to loice frankel of florida. >> thank you, mr. chair. i know we all agree that iran should not get a nuclear

weapon. it would put the most dangerous weapon in terror and most likely lead to a proliferation in the middle east region. i want to say i think because of this seriousness of this issue that swre to all take a very -- we have to all take a very objective nonpartisan scrutiny of this issue. and this respective deal. i think mr. meeks made a point also that i wanted to echo which is you know, not knowing what went on in the ruling with our partners makes some of the deal un-- not understandable to me. because this is one of my -- i don't mean to simplify what is a 70-page agreement that has

taken literally years to get to this point, but this is one of my biggest anxiety points that has been raised, which is we're going to give iran billions of dollars. they are going to continue their terrorism all over the world. and then at the end of 15 years, they are allowed to continue to enrich so this is part that i don't understand. what happens in 15 years? i know we will -- i suspect that we are going to know more, which is a good thing, but is iran going to be nicer or are they going to be less susceptible to economic sanctions? that is to me -- that is a sticky point. then on the other side of the coin, though, to me, another anxiety point is, you know, if

we walk away and went to let's put more sanctions on, do you think a us versus them approach in other words, i know we need our partners to help us with these sanctions, do you think they would be amiable to you have to be with us or there will be other economic consequences from the united states? those are my two questions. if someone wants to take a shot at it. >> i would be happy to. i would just say that i think all of us agree on iranian support for terrorism on the american hostages, these are vital issues. but there is a reason why both the last two administrations have focused more on the nuclear issue. it is the greater immediate danger. in government, as you know you to make those choices. i think the choice is right to have this negotiation. we have to pressure them on the

other issues but you have to go at this issue first and foremost. second i don't believe that sanctions, u.s. sanctions alone can work. i agree with senator lieberman that we're the biggest economy in the world and we can do a lot of damage to the iranians, but what really tipped the balance and drove them to the negotiating table is that the rest of the world got involved too. if the congress disapproves, you have lost your leverage. third, in their snare crow, and a previous member asked, my colleague to my right, about that scenario, if there is disapproval, what'll be united states do? we could go back to the p5. i don't think russia and china would want to form the same coalition and go back to the first step 10 years ago in trying to pressure the iranians. i think we would be without leverage and our president would be weakened and all of the work other the last 10 years i think would have been undercut. that's why i'm strongly for it

despite the misgivings, strongly for approval of this agreement. >> they would most likely be stronger in 15 years, especially economically. >> i would assume they will be stronger economically. we don't know what kind of country they will be like in terms of their behavior because we can't look into a crystal ball. we can't build a policy on hoping they will change. there has been too much talk i think, from some parts of the administration that somehow it is going to be a headlinemoon. somehow iran and iraq are going to become partners in the middle east. i don't see it. >> do you think that we could get sankses back on the table? >> i think if congress rejects this agreement i think the next step is to go back to iran and urge them to come back to negotiations. it is just practical cal politics.

they say we did our best to sell it and we couldn't sell it. representatives in our country said no, we don't go with it. if they are recalcitrant i think we have to go back to sanctions. can we get some of our allies? i hope so. i don't know. i would have loved to have this be a good deal, close the door as we originally said we would to iran becoming a nuke power. that would have allowed us to end our sanctions on them. that would have had a tough air-tight inspections regime which you have to have with a country that has such a record of cheating and deceit and delay. this is not it. therefore they are going to get money. i think of course we never know what iran will look like in 10 or 15 years, but i think ratifying this agreement will make it more likely that the radicals who are this charge of iran will still be in charge of

iran. why? because they will use some of this money they get as a result of lifting sanctions to strengthen their position inside the country. let alone what they will do to expand what they have done through terrorists and others in the region. they will have money to use to make in iran happier than they are now and it will be harder for the opposition which is there. not supported by us or anybody else, but it is there. to have a chance to overthroe the extremists. >> we're going to ted o texas. >> he has made it clear that he wants death to america. he said that numerous times. now it seems to me that the wolf has made a deal with the

sheep not to eat the sheep for 10 years. and then what? suffer? we don't know. concern was there any discussions that there needed to be free elections in iran that to let the people decide who should rule over them? does anybody know about the discussion on that and this deal which has taken place for sometime? >> i don't. i assume it was off the table and wasn't mentioned. a lot of things that bother us, their terrorism and incarceration of americans the deprivation of human rights of their own people. unfortunately you can go on and on. >> do you agree or not that the best hope really for security, world security and iran is that they had a regime change with peaceful elections.

senator lieberman? >> i certainly do. that is ultimate answer. we haven't tried or done very much to bring that about. during the cold war, even while we were making arms control agreements with the soviets, we were supporting opposition movements within eastern europe for instance. we were supporting the refuseniks in russia. there is a precedent for that. >> does this deal -- the hope and this deal based on the premise that we will trust the iranians to comply? >> so as i have said i don't think there is any basis in iranian behavior for the last three decades to trust them and you can recite the litany in ways in which they justified that unfortunate conclusion. one way in which you could have confidence in this agreement is

if the inspections provisions of it were airtight anywhere any time. but they are not. they create a whole negotiating process. 14 days, 21 days. appeal to abort. it is an invitation to the iranians to and if they are caught with something wrong, to get it out of the view of the international inspectors. >> in the area of inspections whatever you're inspecting giving notice to whoever you're going to inspect always allows them to hide or fix the problem before you get there. it seems to me with 24 days you would be able to hide the grand canyon or something. i find that a problem. >> is it still a policy of iran today to destroy the united states? >> well, until we hear

otherwise, i think we have to say it is. >> and israel as well? >> and israel. now you notice that the demonstration for the first time in my memory, visibly and audibly brought saudi arabia into the pantheon of those that the iranian government wants to destroy. >> then let's talk about saudi arabia. iran wants to be the big player in the middle east. does this deal that i have here, does that encourage saudi arabia, turkey and egypt to develop nuclear weapon capability to deter iran? >> it sure does in my opinion. as others have said general hayden, it does something else. it raises real alarm in the minds and hearts of our traditional allies and the

sunni muslim world and in israel about whether the u.s. has changed its traditional alliance relationship with those countries and now it is either tilting toward iran or at least pulling back to a kind of neutrality. if this agreement is left to go into effect, i think one of the great imperatives for the u.s. is to not do whatever it can it is going to be hard to reassure the muslim arab countries, sunni muslim countries and israel that we're still with them. >> one more question. general, this question. icbm's, when iran gets icbms, what would be the purpose have to be nuclear but a weapon of mass destruction. and, of course -

where would they go to this iran? >> those kind of weapons have no real military or political utility. they just have a high explosive warhead on them. it doesn't necessarily have to be nuclear. >> where could they go? >> if they are intercontinental ballistic they could reach north america. >> they could even reach texas? >> yes, sir. >> i yield back. >> reaching texas, now we're talking crazy. thank you all for being here. what a stimulating and challenging conversation. i think we member s of congress face a very challenging vote in september and senator leishman, welcome back to your home. i must say, senator lieberman, i'm troubled by things you have said here today. you agreed with congressman

mccall. you said you agreed with everything he said. one of the things he said is why engage with iran at all? do you think it was a >> thank you for welcoming me back. i'm probably too fusive for anyone who is chairman of homeland security. i didn't oppose the negotiations. i did not oppose the negotiations. i thought it was encouraging that the negotiations were occurring. much preferable to have a peaceful resolution to this conflict. what i'm saying this morning i think the result on first look, just came out a few hours ago is that this deal is not a good one for the u.s. or our allies and it is a very good one for iran. >> yes, i heard you say that. it seems awfully early to do that but apparently you have made up your mind. well i haven't.

>> i just wanted to share with you based on what was agreed to at lozan, which was in april which basically said this will be a temporary freeze on the iranian pram program if they keep their word and they have their way to become a nuke power. >> i think some of the questions raised are lenlt mat. i think we have to weigh the alternative. we can't present that there is a perfect alternative. i think that is some of the problems some of the discussion we have around here. you also said that we can just go back to the p5+1 and say we just couldn't sell it and let's start over again and reengage the iranians. i don't know anybody who believes that has any high probability of success. as a matter of fact, the very opposite is likely to happen. if we disavow this agreement, p5+1 falls apart and iran races, not walks to accelerate

its nuke development program and is not about to come back to the table. surely you would at least see that is just as likely as the scenario you laid out? >> well, i don't know. i actually agree with what ambassador byrnes said here. if the agreement is rejected, that iran will not rush to build a nuke leer weapon. they will retool their -- nuclear weapon. they will retool their program. they will worry that the u.s. or israel if there is clear intelligence showing they are making -- a nuke weapons capacity that the u.s. or israel will attack them militarily. they don't want that. >> i take your point. that is one thing we can consider. but surely there is a chance that is not what's going to happen.