house? speaker boehner: absolutely. there needs to be reform of the justice system. last year, i put together a working group that had a recommendation. i support those recommendations by and has with mr. scott. i would like to see it on the floor. >> what are the things you think are important in criminal justice reform? where do you differ? mr. boehner: i do not want to get into all the details. i am not the expert on these. we have a lot of people in freight -- prison that do not need to be there. it is expensive to house prisoners. some of these people are in their are there for flimsy

reasons. i am looking forward to putting the recommendations on the floor. >> on the next washington journal, fawn johnson looks at the highway trust fund, set to expire at the end of the month. paul butler discusses his book, "let's get free," which focuses on reforming the criminal justice system. after that, david o'sullivan talks about the greek economic crisis and white greek lawmakers approved austerity measures overwhelmingly rejected by the citizens. plus your phone calls and comments. washington journal at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> coming up, the arms control association hosting a discussion on the iran nuclear agreement. remarks by vice president biden

on youth activism. after that, the senate finance committee holding a hearing on fraud at the healthcare.gov website. on friday, democrats on the house, energy and commerce committee hosted a forum on climate change in annapolis. we will have that at 11:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> this weekend on the c-span networks, politics, books, and american history. road to the white house coverage features nearly all the presidential candidates and begins in iowa. at 8:00 eastern, we are live from cedar rapids for the hall of fame dinner. saturday, we are in eames iowa. sunday, interviews with lindsey

graham and john kasich. on c-span2's book tv on saturday, we are live from the harlem book fair with talks and panels on economics and race and politics with journalist pamela newkirk and more. then and coulter says the greatest issue facing the u.s. is immigration. on c-span3, saturday on 1:00 eastern, we have a symposium on modern first ladies. speakers include cynthia bid dinger and patricia cryder. after 9:00, jay gurslin of the national archives shows how the army used propaganda in world war ii.

get our complete schedule at c-span.org. >> coming up the arms control association discussion on the iran nuclear agreement. on thursday, john boehner and nancy pelosi talked about the agreement in their weekly briefings. here is a look. >> iran, given everything i've seen so far, this is a bad deal. it paves the way for a nuclear iran. yesterday, the president admitted it would likely further their support of terror activities throughout the region. it blows my mind the administration would agree to lift the arms and missile lands -- bans. and sanctions on a territory that supplied weapons to kill americans. president obama says it is this or war.

that is a false choice. sanctions were working. we will continue to review this. we will fight a bad deal that is wrong for national security and our country. >> two days ago, a historic agreement was announced by the p5+1 that is the product of years of negotiation. i have closely examined the document. it will have my strong support. members are reading the document now. this is the document, plus the annexes. i am proud of the careful attention our members are giving to the document, to the joint comprehensive plan of action. congratulations to president obama, the leaders of the p5+1

and i want to commend secretary kerry for exceptional leadership through to the negotiations. we had very experienced leaders. senator kerry, a long-term senator with experience on the foreign affairs committee, and secretary moneys -- monice. everyone knew they were dealing with people of knowledge. the president has been very clear. a nuclear iran is unacceptable to the united states, the world and in particular to israel. this deal in tents of five our

vigilance over the nuclear ross s -- process. president reagan said trust and verify. i would say distrust and verify. >> next, the arms control association hosting a panel of government and security officials to discuss the challenges of the iranian nuclear agreement, including its impact on u.s. relations with israel and saudi arabia. >> good morning everyone. welcome to the briefing on the nuclear agreement. i am darrell kimmel, director of the arms control association, a

nonpartisan organization established in 1971 to provide information and solutions to address the threat posed by the world's most dangerous weapons. we organized today's event to discuss the recently concluded iran nuclear deal, which is among the most complex and consequential of the nuclear age, which began at 70 years ago today with the first atomic bomb detonated in new mexico. this agreement follows over two years of diplomatic machinations , intense negotiations involving seven nations and longtime adversaries. the arms control association has intensely followed iran's program and diplomatic efforts to rein it in. we have socked to identify practical solutions to address

the many different challenges on the issue so that negotiators can arrive at an agreement that prevents a nuclear iran. our analysis, after looking at the documents, which is over 100 pages, quite substantial, is that it can effectively block iran's potential uranium and plutonium pathways and guard against clandestine weapons programs for more than a generation. that is a view shared by a wide variety of security experts. and we believe it will be an effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons for u.s. and regional security. congress has 60 days to review this complex agreement. we believe every member needs to take a look at the agreement get the answers to their questions, and consider the

benefits and alternative. to help contribute to the debate, we have gathered three experts to discuss the agreement and what its impact will be. will start with the director for nonproliferation policy, kelsey davenport. she has been the author of policy briefs on this issue and has been closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so. she is still recovering from her latest tour of duty in the anna -- vienna. next, we hear from richard matthew, principal deputy coordinator at the u.s. department of state and director for iran on the national security council staff. he was one of the negotiators until the beginning of this year. he is the program director for energy sanctions at the center

on global energy policy at columbia university. he is a nonresident senior fellow at brookings. and we will hear from elan goldberg foreign policy defense expert with extensive experience covering iran. after opening remarks about agreement, we will take your questions. i want to make a final observation before i ask kelsey to talk about nuclear elements of the agreement. like any agreement, this is a product of give and take. it is not perfect. but as a whole, we think it is very strong. it is in many ways stronger than the framework reached in april. it is clear already just a

couple days after this was concluded, that many critics believe by rejecting the agreement and increasing sanctions pressure on iran, the u.s. can somehow convinced the leaders of iran to dismantle its nuclear program or agree to better terms. i think the president thinks because we heard him say this, this is a dangerous illusion. there is not a better deal on the horizon. if congress blocks the agreement, there are going to be very tough, negative consequences. we have spoken with european allies. the international support for sanctions will dissipate. iran would not be subject to limits on its nuclear program. we would lose out on enhanced inspections. the risk of a armed iran would grow. not inevitable, but it would grow. a lot is at stake.

in the coming weeks, we hope congress will take a hard look at the agreement and the alternatives. let me turn it over to kelsey davenport. then we will move on to our other speakers. kelsey: thank you for being here this morning. i think it is morning. i am not sure what time zone i am in. i will talk about the nuclear elements of the deal. while i cannot touch on all 158 pages, during the question and answer, we can certainly explore the areas i did not touch on. from the perspective of the arms control association, this is a strong agreement from a nonproliferation next -- perspective. it exceeds the expectations of what we thought an agreement would need to achieve to block the pathway to nuclear weapons and put in place and intrusive monitoring regime that would ensure quick detection of code are -- covert activity.

it is not perfect, but it needs -- meets nonproliferation goals and is good for regional security. to get into some of the details, the parameters agreed to in april on uranium, they were strong. from our assessment, with the parameters, it would take iran more than 12 months to produce enough material for a nuclear weapon. about 25 kilograms of uranium enriched above 90%. that would be achieved by reducing centrifuges from 19,000 to 6000, of which 5000 will be operating. their stockpile will be capped at 300 kilograms. what we get from the final deal are a number of details that strengthen the assessment that

iran cannot quickly move towards nuclear weapons. one of the things that becomes clear in the deal is that all the excess centrifuge machines will be removed. all the infrastructure, the piping and vacuums, will be taken out and stored under seals that feed directly to the agency so we have greater assurance that if iran tried to access the machines, the iaea would immediately know. iran will be using these machines to replace and repair any broken machines. iran will not be producing any additional centrifuges unless the stockpile of machines reduces to under 500. the idea that iran will use time to build centrifuges and quickly deploy them later is false. these machines will be counted and inventoried under the deal.

again, these are provisions that add a greater level of confidence. also, we have more information about the stockpile. iran agreed to reduce the stockpile of low enriched uranium, to about 3.67% or reactor-grade from the 10,000 kilograms it has to 300 kilograms. that includes uranium in all forms. iran will not be able to convert gas into oxide. this is the entire stockpile capped at 300 kilograms. any scrap material that has been processed enriched to 3.67% or up to 20% will be turned into fuel plates for the research reactor. material that cannot be turned into place will be shipped out of the country diluted, or mixed in a form that cannot be

enriched further. additional steps iran will take to ensure that there is not additional material that can be enriched. their has also been concern about the fact the agreement will leave 1000 centrifuges at a facility that iran will in secret -- built in secret deep in the mountains. about 350 of the centrifuges will be used for stable isotope production. these machines cannot be transitioned back to uranium enrichment, which leads 600 machines idle. the rest of the centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. it will be placed under seal at a facility where the 5000

operating centrifuges will continue to produce uranium. they cannot take the machines back, begin operating them quickly, and use the facility to produce enriched uranium. iaea would be able to predict those moves because they will have access on a daily basis to the facility. the facility does not pose a threat for the duration of limitations, 15 years. very strong on the facility. one of the criticisms that frequently has been leveraged against the deal is what will happen after 10 years. in 10 years iran committed to operate 10,000 of its ir1 centrifuges. it will not go over a cliff in 10 years.

the agreement makes clear that the work on advanced centrifuge machine will be limited and phased in in such a way that one day after 10 years, iran cannot deploy hundreds of centrifuges and be weeks away from obtaining the material for a nuclear weapon. to look more closely at the r&d iran has 1000 advanced centrifuges machines in various states at its production facility. they will have a few months to finish up testing with some of the cascades. then it will remove nearly all the advanced machines and store them under seal. during the 10 year duration iran will be allowed to operate one ir4 one ir5 and one ir8

machine. they can test uranium that cannot accumulate enriched uranium. we are not going to see a proliferation of advanced centrifuge machine that iran can use. after 8.5 years, iran will be able to test 30 ir6 and ir8 machines and can produce 200 of each model per year. they will not be producing rotors for these machines. iran, year 10, when they transition the machines, it's capacity will remain relatively stable for the next three years. i am getting to the capacity. that is the measure of efficiency of a centrifuge machine. the capacity of iran's 5060 ir1

centrifuges will remain constant as new machines are introduced. if an ir6 has 10 times the capacity of an ir's1, if they introduce an ir6, they have to remove 10 ir1's. this ensures we will not see a ramp up in activity. it is important to note we should not view any of the elements in isolation. in addition to the restrictions on the number of machines being produced, iran's procurement of materials that can be used for centrifuge development will be monitored by the joint commission set up through the deal.

any changes iran wants to make to r&d will have to be approved by the joint commission. if iran starts to move or move away from the r&d plan it will submit to the iaea as part of additional protocol, it will become quickly to the joint -- apparent quickly to the joint commission. one of the questions relates to transparency and verification elements of the deal. this is something the arms control association was very concerned about because of iran's illicit nuclear activities in the past. we feel be intrusive monitoring regime produced under the agreement will provide the highest degree of confidence iran cannot pursue nuclear weapons at its declared facilities or covertly. the first of the declared facilities iran will have to

expand its nuclear declaration under additional protocol which they have agreed to implement and ratify within eight years of the agreement. the additional protocol is an agreement between iran and the iaea that expands upon iran's comprehensive safeguard agreements, the dumper of declared sites giving inspectors greatest access on short notice. it lays down a number of provisions that allow for continuous monitoring across iran's fuel supply chain. that is 25 years at the uranium mines and mills and 25 years at center fuse production shops and continuous monitoring at facilities as well. this means if, iran wanted to pursue nuclear weapons, they would need to replicate the

entire fuel supply. they would need to find a new source of uranium ore converted to gas and in rich it. these are large-scale programs you cannot hide in a basement or warehouse at a military facility. now, another check against covert nuclear weapons programs comes with the increased access granted to inspectors under additional protocol. it is clear in the deal that, if concerns arrive about illicit nuclear activities, iaea will be permitted managed access to military sites. managed access means iran can state conditions to protect sensitive information but it will ultimately be the iaea's

decision on whether conditions are adequate. if they feel they are not adequate, there is an adjudication mechanism in place that will decide if the iaea should be given expanded access. if they cannot come to a decision within 14 days about access, the joint commission, including members of the p5+1 countries and iran, will have seven days to decide on access by a consensus vote. five of eight members. that means iran, china, and russia together cannot block access. iran will have an additional three days to comply with recommendations. in total, if iaea wants to access a site, they can only be blocked for 24 days. that may be time for iran to remove equipment but not enough

time for iran to eradicate any indication that illicit nuclear activity had taken place. that is in part due to the sophisticated environmental sampling the iaea can conduct. these layers demonstrate the strength of the monitoring and verification. it is worth noting that we consider monitoring and verification in this deal by looking at the iaea. but it is not just iaea that will have its eyes on the nuclear program. national intelligence of the united days, european countries, and israel will watch iran closely. in short, i think james clapper said this is as solid a regime you can get. no elements will provide you a 100% guarantee, but together, it provides a degree of certainty

that iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons. i also think it is important to note that iran's nuclear decision-making has generally been guided by a cost-benefit analysis. with the deal in place, the cost of cheating becomes exponentially higher. this is an agreement that iran voluntarily signed on to. with in the agreement, there are further commitments by iran not to undertake any experiments related to nuclear weapons developments. if they are found to be violating the deal, they will see extremely strong reaction by the international community. it changes the cost-benefit analysis. a few additional elements i think our important that have not gotten much coverage so far. there are conditions where iran cannot export technology unless

improved by the joint commission. that is important when thinking about the spread of technology. there will be joint work on the fabrication of fuel elements which provide the ability to fuel the reactor using domestic fuel it produces. also, if there are concerns about noncompliance, there will be a time-round 35 day work heard -- period that really ensures if any party is not satisfied, it can move on and take the case to the security council. there are a number of provisions that add to the strength and amplify the nonproliferation value. finally, moving forward congress has the opportunity to weigh in on the deal.

with the power congress has to vote comes a great deal of responsibility. if they prevent the deal from being implemented, they need to buy the consequences, which will lead to escalation on the part of iran, increased sanctions and increased chances of military conflict. it is important that congress evaluates the deal on its merits. doesn't block a pathway to their weapons? yes. does it put in place monitoring and verification? yes. really, consider it against the alternatives. there is no better deal out there. we have heard about the need for any time-anywhere inspection. those are not necessary. the atomic energy association can do its job with flexibility under the additional protocol. we have heard more pressure

would induce iran to make greater concessions. a deal like this deal that allows iran to say it that strategic objectives of retaining a limited program and achieving sanctions relief gives them greater by an to the agreement. iran sees incentives to comply. the idea that more concessions were necessary would not produce a stronger deal. also again, i think it is important that when negotiating the deal, we do not miss the forest for the trees. the elements need to be examined together. if we look too closely at one particular detail, we may miss the symbiotic relationship between the entirety of the package. ultimately, the deal removes the threat of an iranian nuclear weapon and is good for regional security.

i think it deserves the support of policymakers in washington. >> thank you kelsey, for the overview and details on new elements. you mentioned sanctions. we will talk about that issue now with richard. richard: thank you for having me and thank you for being here. i want to touch on three points with sanctions. first, i want to touch on the contents of relief and the timeline and sequence. i want to touch on what is left. while there is a sense this means the entire sanctions regime has been taken away, that is not true. some of the sanctions that remain in place will hamper iran's ability to take advantage of some of the relief. last, i want to touch on the impact of sanctions relief and how the iranian economy and

population may use the benefits of sanctions relief. first off, in terms of the content, i have an easier job than kelsey. sanctions relief is fairly straightforward and direct. the decision was made by negotiating partners to make this an issue of the nuclear problem and how to get resolution of the problem i incentivizing rapid iranian action. the timeline is established or implementation is configured as such. the iranians have to complete all of the modifications kelsey outlined with a few of the things that, by their nature, will have to continue on for 10 or 25 years before any new sanctions relief will be given. all this talk of signing bonuses and billions of dollars flooding

iran is false. the way the relief is structured at this point, the way the deal puts it in place, the iranians will not see anything beyond the jordan plan of action relief until they have done their part. period. when they have done their part, the relief they are going to get will be substantial. in the judgment of myself and the administration, it was worthwhile to get the concessions kelsey laid out. first off, all the u.s. sanctions that will be discussed are secondary in nature. they do not include the primary embargo, which is off the table with the exception of a few specific licenses. what the united states has offered to do is provide relief from sanctions imposed on foreign companies interactions with iran.

if you are in a number of companies out there, you will be able to do business with iran after the iranians have done the nuclear steps they are supposed to do. it will be across a wide range of sectors. the energy sector in the sale and purchase of products. investment, financial services transaction, insurance transportation. a wide range of activity they will be able to do with foreign companies and foreign actors subject to their own law. this will not take place until after the nuclear steps have been taken, which will take a long time. the way the timeline is set up, we are now in a period you could call phase one leading up to adoption day. it is during this period that every country has to go to its national legislature and get buy -in.

upon expiration of a 90 day clock the iranians will start to take steps. this will include removal of centrifuges, modification of reactors, and a number of things kelsie was describing. for the u.s. and eu, there is a requirement to have in place waivers and legal modifications to sanctions that will start upon verification the iranians have done what they are supposed to do. there will be promulgation of new regulation and executive orders. they will be tied to a trigger. that is a report by the director general that the things the iranians have -- are supposed to do have been done. there is argument about how long it will take. my assessment is easily four to

six months for the iranians achieve the removal. it could theoretically go faster , but i think that is a good timeline. 90 days plus four or six months, we are talking april or march when the iranians achieve centrally and see new business form. that means for the time being, they are highly incentivized to do the things they are supposed to do. we will see them take all the steps. i remember there was a lot of suggestion iranians were going to stop implementing obligations before the deal becomes implemented. i think the scope of relief suggests that would not be the case. there is a hiatus in terms of sanction relief for eight years

when the iaea reaches a broader: collusion of the nuclear program -- conclusion of the nuclear program. during this time, iran will be under restrictions. under the eight year time frame iranians are going to have to go to the procurement channel established by the joint commission for any nuclear related items because the security restrictions will remain in place. they will require iran to describe what it intends to do with the items and submit and use verification checks to ensure they are actually going where they are supposed to be going. in this instance, it is a restriction on the iranians and still being utilized under parts

of the restrictions in place. the procurement channel will extend to years beyond adoption until the u.n. security council requirements are canceled in 10 years time. there will be at the eight your period modifications to other legal instruments, including the u.s. and eu. these primarily deal with potential sources of concern. it is notable that, if you look at the text, what is put in is not iran will get to import whatever it wants from whoever wants to import. rather, iran will be treated like anybody else which means they will be subject to export control and u.s. sanctions if we found out there were things going on we had concerns about. that is basically it.

the iranians don't get anything until they implement their nuclear obligations. that will take between four to six months after the 90-day period. april of 2016. the question is, what's left? there are a number of restrictions that remain in place with their -- with regards to their ability to acquire nuclear related items. but that's not the limit of it. u.s. sanctions with respect to terrorism and human rights will remain in place. the u.s.' primary embargo will remain in place. with the exception of some very specific, licensable transactions involving, for instance, the sale of commercial planes. however, even in that provision, it's very clearly stated that they have to be used for civil uses. so if the united states were to find, all of a sudden, that a brand new boeing that arrived in tehran was now funneling arms into assad, we're talking if

assad is still in power many years from now, that would be cause to terminate the licensing as clearly stated in the text. this also means, therefore, that the iranians have to be on their best behavior with respect to these planes because they are quite obvious. as we've discovered, the united states has the ability to detect what kinds of planes are being used for what kinds of purposes and then to identify them back to the international community. the iranians are also going to have to deal with the continued sanctions. they have a number of people including the iran revolutionary guard corps which will remain under sanction, and others who will remain under sanctions. there's been a lot of talk about this i'll take a moment to describe it about what's contained in the deal. he will be delisted by the u.n. and the e.u. because he was delisted by both of those. in the united states, he was designated for terrorism.

that means he stays in place as a sanctioned individual until such time as he stops engaging in things we consider to be terrorism. i don't really think that's a likely event. this is also important because the united states is not removing the infrastructure it uses to make these residual sanctions impactful and that includes the conference of iran accountability assessment act. it's in a this provision that the united states has exerted a lot of pressure on international financial system with respect to designated entities. basically, the law provides for the united states to sanction those who conduct transactions on behalf of u.s. designated people. now the list of u.s. designated people is going to go down when the nuclear related targets are removed but it will not go away. particularly for terrorism human rights and other related targets.

so the iranians are still going to be under the pressure of having to face financial sector cutoffs for all those entities and individuals who remain on the list, which means that institutions like the bank that's a u.s. designated bank for terrorism related purposes are going to remain and the financial impact on that bank is going to remain as well. this means that any additional targets the u.s. identifies as involved in terrorism or human rights related violations also are potentially subject to the same sort of cutoff. so the iranians still are going to worry about what could happen to their financial sector if they use the banks that we're delisting now for different purposes. i think it's important at this juncture to note that the sanctions relief will not be this end all and be all restoration and renaissance for iran. it's going to do a lot. but the very point that some sanctions remain and the fact

that there is going to be reputational and business risk attached to doing business in iran means that the sanctions relief is going to take a long time to mature. now, from one perspective, this is really good. because that means that for those of us who are concerned about iran's ability to do awful things in the region, it means that there is a way of pacing and controlling and modifying iranian behavior because if we continue to identify individuals and entities as involved in terrorism, the iranians will have to deal with the consequences of that. this is not u.s. unilateral sanctions disarmament. period. this is a step to provide iran palpable, useful relief but they'll be under the same threat with respect to these institutions that they were yesterday, the day before that 10 years -- not 10 year, but at this point, five years ago. when you add that to the fact

that a lot of businesses are going to be concerned about the possibility of snap back, i think you can see that there is going to take a long time for there to be a resurgence and a lot of really long-term trade in iraq. my own expectations is that the iranians are going to see a lot of short-term business deals purchases of their oil, things that people can do and then get out of iran if they need to, for the initial couple of years. this is simple prudence on the part of international businesses. it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to do multibillion dollars' worth of investment in the country when you have the risk of snapback or some other concern that could get you in hot water both in washington as well as with your stockholders. there may be some businesses that are willing to do this. but i would bet that they're going to build force majeure clauses into their contracts to allow them to get out quickly. so the business operating

environment will be different than it will be in other countries in the middle east. this is not withstanding the sanctions because iran is a difficult place to do business itself. the bureaucratic tape in tehran is as difficult to do business with as anywhere in the world. oil companies have said that they don't find the current contract the iranians are starting to be about with respect to oil services is all that good and they're looking for better terms. it will take time for iran to get through their bureaucratic process and get over the nervousness for companies to plunge back. but iran will get something. i think the real threat to the longevity of the deal is that this is too slow in coming on. i think there's a risk the iranians say, we're not getting what we need. at that point you can see them say, we need to reconsider the terms of the deal. i think the sanctions picture in

iran is favorable to the p-5 plus one. favorable to the united states. it will provide iran some advantages but is not something that overnight will change the iranian economy, it's going to take time and there are ways to control it still further. thank you. >> thanks, richard, that was very helpful. now we'll turn to allan who will take about the regional dynamics. >> thanks. i thought i'd talk about the three major actors in the agreement. the first being iran, the second being saudi arabia and the gulf states around it and the third being israel. i should start from the position that because of the nonproliferation benefits of the agreement, i very much agree with my colleagues up here that this is something that is in the national interest of the united

states and we need to be pursuing. but the regional ramifications will be much more complicated and mixed. there's going to be some negative downsides and we'll have to manage especially with our traditional partners over the next few years. that doesn't mean we should be letting the tail wag the dog and not doing something that's in america's fundamental national security interest but this is something we have to deal with. so starting with how we expect the deal to shake out in iran over the next few year, you hear these two schools of thought and theories. one is, president rouhani, the prime minister, these are pragmatists. they're not democrats, they're men of the revolution. i don't think they're looking for liberalism western style to break out tomorrow in tehran but they are more pragmatic when they weigh the economic benefits and the benefits international engagement versus support for terrorism and the nuclear program and are more interested in those first set of interests

for iran. are they going to gain more influence and then be able to reflect into a more pragmatic iranian foreign policy? there's a strong case to be made that's the case. rouhani was elected based on the fact and allowed to come to power also by the supreme leader that he would get this nuclear agreement. he's going to have tremendous credibility and leverage. we have parliamentary elections in iran next march. it will be an interesting time in terms of the sanctions relief calendar that richard just laid out to see if the pragmatic faction can pick up more seats in the iranian system. i do think rouhani now could have more influence in other areas of iran -- iranian foreign policy. on the other hand, you could make the argument that the hardliners are going to double down. that they'll want to batten down the hatches, they'll not want to see this deal lead to more liberalization. they'll take a harder line. they'll use some of that money

that comes in to increase their support for some of their activities in syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere in the region. that's going to happen too. i would argue that most likely scenario is, both of these things are going to happen at the same time. what you're going to end up with in iran, very likely, for the next few years is a very intense political competition amongst the various factors who ultimately makes the final decision. he's skeptical of the united states, not left iran in years but he's also somebody who rules by consensus. so if all the key factions come to him and say, this is what we should do, he usually goes in that direction. i don't see him pursuing a major rapprochement with the united states in the years ahead but he's going to pass from the scene at some point, i think before the expiration of this deal, given his health and his

age and at that moment we'll see what has this agreement and what has the aftermath in terms of the political debate inside iran done? who is his successor? what kind of system comes after him? we haven't had a transition of power in iran since 1989. this is going to be a major moment to indicate if we're going to see a fundamental shift in iran's foreign policy. whether the fundamental shift happens or not, the deal is implementable, the agreement still happens. this is a potential huge benefit we have to watch over the next few years. the second challenge is israel. what happens there. now obviously, the israelis are close partners of ours, and i spent years at the pentagon working in iran where one of our primary interests was in dealing with israel and reassuring israel and talking to them about the nuclear program, especially the time where speculation was much more rife that they might consider taking things into their own hands.

what i found from those exchanges was a couple of things. one, the israelis, it's a small country, surrounded by a lot of unfriendly neighbors in a tough part of the world. the approach that they take, they assume the absolute worst case scenario. it's the joke, american foreign policymakers we do our contingency planning based on worst case scenarios and we do our policy based on most likely scenarios. israelis do their worst case contingency planning and policy on worst case scenarios. part of this is the difference in personal styles. and part of it is the difference we've had with israel in differing risk perceptions. going forward -- well, one thing i'll say, one of the unfortunate

side effects is, i always found engaging with israelis was useful when you were doing things like negotiating with iran. they would come in with smart people who spent all their time working on this and give you the worst case scenarios. they would red team it for you in some ways. really effectively. you could say, we don't believe that's credible, but sometimes you could say, that's something we haven't thought about. then it helps improve american policy. i think it's unfortunate we've had a split and divide that's limited that over the next few months. what happens next there? prime minister has made very clear that he's going to oppose this agreement and try to undermine it in congress. i think that's a big mistake. because i think at the end of the day, i do not think it's likely he'll succeed and what he's doing by doing that is taking a bipartisan issue and turning it into a wedge issue inside the u.s. congress which i

think is damaging for israel's long-term interest. i think there's -- look, there's a lot of people, the political establishment in israel is against the agreement because prime minister netanyahu set conditions where it's impossible to be for the agreement. even his political critics will say, i don't like your approach on how you're dealing with americans but i hate this deal. the security establishment is different. they're much more subtle about it. i think because they also take that lower risk perception they're ultimately uncomfortable with some elements of the agreement but they don't see it as the existential threat the prime minister does. what they do also, are concerned about is the way the prime minister decided to handle himself with this very public confrontation with the president, going to the american media, going to congress on this. and trying to circumvent the executive branch. and that's something that i think causes a lot of anxiety -- anxiety for israelis because iran might in many of their sues

-- views bmx essential threat. but fraying of the u.s.-israeli relationship is a huge threat and is a threat to israel's security for many of them. i think the big question is what happens after the 60 days? what happens after the congressional vote? do the israelis finally say, does the prime minister, which is being encouraged by many to do, finally say, i'll take my disagreement quiet and we'll start quietly engaging with the administration and seeing if the united states can find ways to fill this security gap that we now feel and these insecurities through american reassurances which is what we've traditionally done or does he decide to write off this president and spend the next year and a half publicly confronting him? i really hope that he chooses the former and not the latter and i know that there's a lot of people in the security establishment in israel that hope to see that too. we're going to have to wait and see. the president has already reached out. president obama reached out to prime minister netanyahu in april and tried to bring him back into the fold and said,

let's take our conversations quietly to back channels. he was rejected at the time but let's see if the view changes in september. we'll have to wait and see about that. there's the third element here saudi arabia and the gulf states. they view things differently than the israelis. they have some overlaps and some differences too. whereas israel really is focused on the nuclear program and cares about iran's regional behavior. saudi arabia really is focused on the regional question. they care about iran's support for terrorism, they view what is happening right now in the region as iran picking up influence and syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere. that's the major anxiety. people speculate saudi arabia will respond to this by starting to build out its own nuclear infrastructure. i don't think that's the problem. i think that's unlikely. that's expensive, takes time,

there are costs in terms of international reactions, their relationship with the united states. i think the real concern is that they're feeling, they have this concern that the united states is pivoting to iran. and rearranging the alliance dynamics in the middle east, which i don't think is what the obama administration is intending to do. we still have a lot of things where we disagree with the iranians. feeling that concern, the saudis start to lash out in destabilizing ways and take steps that are against our interest and against their interest in the region and i think the best example of that might be what they've done in yemen recently with this intervention without a clear strategic plan about what happens after you start putting a blockade on yemen with no end game in sight. so that's, i think, the more

fundamental question for the saudis and one that the united states is going to have to wrestle with, so it's this president and the next. the reality is it's going to be hard for this president to do it. any president who is the one who cuts the deal with iran, which i think we needed to do, is going to take a big hit in the gulf and in israel as president obama has done. it's almost the next president who has to come in and start to do the big hug with some of our partners. so what do we do going forward to address these challenges? there's three or four things we need to do. first, take advantage of the fact that we actually have this channel of communications with the iranians for the first time in 35 years. that's meaningful and important. the fact that john kerry and zarif have email addresses and phone numbers and there is a channel. i can't tell you how many times we'd run into at the pentagon find ways to communicate with iranians. whether it was find ways to avoid conflict here, or knock it

off, you're going in the wrong direction. talking is always better than not talking and seeing if there are ways to start working together on some discrete issues, our interest in afghanistan, maritime security and avoiding potential escalation in the gulf inadvertent escalation in the gulf are two things for pursuit. more things like that. but even as we do that especially as the sanctions are coming off, it makes sense to push back more forcefully on some of iran's destabilizing activities in the region through joint efforts with our partners, showing up in saudi arabia for example with a high level delegation led by ash carter and john brennan saying we're here to talk not about the nuclear program and not about how to deal with isis, we're here to have a serious and strategic conversation with you about how to deal with iran in the region. let's talk about steps we can take together. joint covert action.

more aggressive interdiction. potentially more serious efforts to train sunni opposition in syria and in iraq. partners we can work with in both those countries. things like that that will signal to our partners that we mean it when we say we're going to push back on this behavior we don't find acceptable in iran. and also important signals to the iranians that we're going to, that the nuclear deal doesn't give you free range over the region to pursue these opportunities. we're going to push back. when the united states pushes back against iran, iran backs off. iran has no interest in a fight with the united states. sometimes you have to flex your muscles as a deterrent. that is another key thing we have to be doing. the third element obviously needs to be reassurance of other forms beyond those two. which for our partners, i don't think we need to be selling the saudis s-35's. they already outspend the

iranians dramatically. it's not about big weaponry. it's about the small stuff. training them to actually counter some of this low-end asymmetric warfare. but the security assurances, to some extent, there's things we could be doing with our partners and activities with the israelis, that can signal to them that we're sticking around we're going to push back. when the united states pushes back against iran, iran backs off. iran has no interest in a fight with the united states. sometimes you have to flex your muscles as a deterrent. another key thing we have to be doing. the third element obviously needs to be reassurance of other forms beyond those two. which for our partners, i don't think we need to be selling the saudis s-35's. they already outspend the iranians dramatically. it's not about big weaponry. it's about the small stuff. training them to actually counter some of this low-end asymmetric warfare. but the security assurances, to some extent, there's things we could be doing with our partners

and activities with the israelis, that can signal to them that we're sticking around that this isn't the fundamental strategic pivot, that we're going to push back as we engage, and we can do both. i'll close by saying, you know it's a very complicated balancing act to pull something like that off, send some mixed messages. this has worked on iran's nuclear program. we spent the last five or 10 years using a combination of praise and pressure. if we apply that to problems with iran in the northeast, i think you can get there with this -- in the middle east, i think you can get there with this combination of tools. >> thank you very much. as i said at the beginning, this process is complex. it's consequential. and i think we've given you quite a bill to contemplate. it's now your turn to ask us a few questions and we're going to try to answer, i'll start with some of the journalists who are here. virginia, there's a question up here in front. if you could bring the mike up and just identify yourself and tell us who you would like to answer the question. >> mike, "new york times," i have a question on the sequencing of sanctions relief. a technical question but just to clarify. in the 150-plus page document. the broad conclusion to be issued by the iaea is not going to come for a period of years but director -- but the director general on the day the agreement was promulgated put out a road

map to lead to an assessment by december 15. he articulated a number of steps that are to be taken. as you understand the agreement, what sanctions relief can be provided prior to this december 15 assessment of where iran stands on possible military dimensions and what sanctions relief can only be provided after this assessment is completed and if it's a favorable resolution? >> that's a great question. it's especially complicated because we've now got two processes that are working simultaneously here. i would say very simply, i don't see any sanctions relief happening before p.m.d. has been laid to rest. that's in part because the obligation on iran is somewhat different than the obligation the iaea has taken unto itself.

right? the timing of the obligation the iaea has accepted is it gets iran's compliance by the 15th of october. well, based upon the structure of the implementation phase of the deal, there's zero chance that any sanctions relief can happen before that cooperation has been given, right? it's written into the document as an obligation of the iranians to have done this by adoption day. and so as a consequence of that, if they didn't provide the cooperation, the united states and p-5 plus one partners would be in a position to say we don't have to fill in the terms of the deal. so they could walk away altogether, you could go to the dispute resolution process, so on and so forth. bottom line, because of when iran has to take its steps, i don't think there's any chance any additional relief could be given. now, there is potentially a theoretical world in which

adoption has taken place, the iranians speed through implementation and the director general has not issued his report by the 15th of december. i can see that -- i concede that as a theoretical possibility. it's highly unlikely, almost impossible, because of how long it would take them to do things like removing centrifuges but that's something that theoretically could happen system of what are you going to get out of the report from the inspector general? only two conclusions could come out of it. iran had a weapons program, iran didn't have a weapons program. in either circumstance we , already think we know the answer to the first and we think it's the first. there's nothing that's going to change the timing of relief and the timing of what goes forward because we already know the answer to it and the transparency to verify it's not ongoing will have begun. i don't see in reading the documents that there's an explicit sanctions tied to the explicit bit of p.m.d.

but i think the way the sequence works, what the requirements are on each party of this, means that there won't be any relief until iran has done its part and then the report itself will be icing on the cake. >> let me ask you, richard, and kelsey, to clarify one aspect of this. when we say iran does it its part with respect to the iaea investigations, that means what? as i understand it, i'm reading it, that means the iranians need to provide the cooperation, the information, the access that the iaea believes is necessary for it to close out its investigation but not necessarily the time it would take for the agency, which can take a long time, to draw conclusions from that information. is that correct? or what is your -- am i wrong on this? kelsey: according to the road map, iran has to provide the

international atomic energy agency with the information, access, answer all of the concerns that the agency laid out in the annex to its november, 2011, report and it needs to provide that information by august 15. then iran -- or the iaea will evaluate that information and by september 15, if they want to ask iran any followup questions, then that information can then -- then iran can have some time to followup with that information and ideally this process is all concluded by october 15. then by december 15 the iaea has said it will issue its assessment about the, sort of the full system of iran's past p.m.d. work. so that's according to the separate road map that the iaea and iran agreed upon and announced the same day as the deal which was tuesday.

>> all right. other journalists with questions? yes, ma'am. thank you. >> hi, jessica, "huffington post." this is mostly for richard. is there any concern about a kind of contradiction or contradictory message that could be sent if congress imposes new sanctions immediately after the deal? there was a thought to extend the 1996 sanctions. what kind of message would it send to extend sanctions under the guise of it being related to terrorism or human rights in the region? richard: i would definitely say there's always a risk of mixed messages here and i think there's a risk that acting to some degree precipitously with respect to imposing new sanctions is a real proble

that said let's be clear. , the iranians are not agreeing anywhere in this that they won't engage in things that look to us like terrorism or violations of human rights or other actions we've got problems with. they aren't changing their fundamental behaviors either. what i think will have to happen frankly is navigating attention -- navigating a tension between iranians doing bad acts in the region but not pursuing nuclear-related bad actions that cause us to walk away from the keel. us addressing this iranian bad acts but not doing so to such a degree the iranians say forget it, we're going to get our nuclear weapons program back because we think the deal is coming unhinged through the back door. i think the text, it's interesting, tries to deal with this a couple of different ways. that the parties agree not to do things that are at variance with the purposes of the jacoa, that the parties agree not to back door things in regulation.

that were lifted as part of the deal. i think there's a tension here. i think it would be better to let the deal implement itself and get started before anybody on either side starts trying to rock the boat. i think the true test of the deal will be can we keep it going? can we keep this arms control arrangement and this nonproliferation arrangement together not withstanding the fact that we've got all these other problems? we were able to do so with the soviet union, we were able to do so with the n.p.t., you think about it in a broader sense. i think we can do that here but we have to be careful about what we do. >> other questions? please? over here on this side. this gentleman. then nancy. >> i'm russ, with federal foreign relations, minority side. this question is mostly for you. kelsey, this is not a perfect deal, but are there significant loopholes in the monitor regular jet stream in your opinion maybe specifically with regard

to secret facilities or perhaps undeclared nuclear efforts or are there no significant loopholes? thank you. kelsey: i don't see any significant loopholes in terms of the monitoring and verification. and that's in part because of the flexibility granted to the international atomic energy agency under the additional protocol. also, i think it's important to remember that with this accelerated timeline of the p.m.d. investigation, the agency can still use the information gathered to inform its future decisions about what it monitors, what it looks for and where it goes. because when you consider the entirety of iran's nuclear program, with the expanded declaration under the additional protocol, the iaea will now have much more regular access to every element of iran's knew

==-- iran's nuclear program, but far expanded from what it has access to now. that includes the mines and mill the heavy water production plants for the iraq reactor. all areas that the iaea has had little access to in the past. there also is an element that will be put in place, modified 3.1, to the iaea safeguards agreement, that ensures early notification of the iaea to design changes of facilities or if iran decides to build any new nuclear facilities system of when you consider early notification, when you consider the expanded declaration and short notice to all the facilities in the expanded declaration, when you consider the flexibility that will allow the iaea inspectors to access 24 days, and then you layer on top of that the continuous

monitoring, the use of advanced technologies to check enrichment levels on a regular basis, to, you know, use radio seals an then you add on top that u.s. intelligence, the intelligence of other countries, including israel, i think you have a system that is so layered that even if no one element is 100% guarantee, an alarm bill will trip at some point because iran would need to recreate the entirety of its process in order to covertly pursue nuclear weapons. so i really think this is as strong as it needs to be to provide the highest guarantee that there will be no illicit activities. or if they are that they will be detected quickly. then the u.s. and international community will have time to respond. >> that's a very good explanation.

i mean it's a reminder of one of , the fundamentals of monitoring and verification that i think people lose track of. there's no such thing as 100% certainty of compliance with an agreement. and one of the major purposes is to increase our confidence into the high 90's that we can detect militarily significant noncompliant activity. what does that mean for the cheater? it means the potential cheater is looking at a high 90% chance they'll get caught. that means they have to weigh the benefits and costs system of in that sense, it can serve as a deterrent. especially when you factor in what the losses are. so you know, there are going to be critics who are going to say this could be better here. that could be better there. and those may be valid criticisms. but as a whole, as kelsey said the system needs to be considered as a whole and when

you consider what monitoring and verification is designed to do it's not 100% certainty but it is getting to the high, high 90's that we can catch major violations. kelsey: i would just add, before this deal was reached, before the interim deal was reached, a representative said with high confidence that the united states would be able to detect would be able to detect any iranian attempts to divert material for a nuclear weapon before they were able to accumulate enough material for one bomb. so that is before all of these additional measures being put in place. so i think that really does speak to how much the u.s. could do in the past and when you add all of these other elements on top of that, it provides an even stronger guarantee. >> we had another question up front here. just wait for the mike, please.

nancy thank you. , >> nancy gallagher, university of maryland. one of the issues that became a public controversy in the end game in the negotiations was what was going to happen with u.n. sanctions on ballistic missiles and conventional arms and some people in effect said, iran tried to reopen something that had been settled at the very last minute. you know other people say, no, , this was an open question all along that wasn't settled. given that the lausanne framework was never released and they both released differing statements and both agreed not to say anything that was completely against it, was that genuinely a -- an open question at the time?

>> richard, you want to take that one? folks should know "the new york times" has an interesting account of that issue just this morning. richard? richard: you'd have to talk to the negotiators themselves. i haven't been in the room since december. i don't know to what degree he was agreed in lausanne. i do think there probably was a notional or provisional agreement on this point. i think that the way that it erupted as a problem particularly with the russians coming in as they did in support of the iranian position, it struck me as something that was being reopened or if it wasn't already closed, it was pretty close, people were pretty confident it was going to be closed and then it came back open. but that said, the fundamental principle of this negotiation was always that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. so i am quite sure that the

way the iranians probably described it to themselves and to the americans, if in fact it is true they tried to reopen something is that, no, other parts of the deal necessitated us coming back on this point. so in the end, it's certainly interesting to know the back and forth, i kind of look at the end result. keeping a five-year conventional arms embargo in place against iran when it was only adopted by the u.n. because of the nuclear related issue is pretty good especially when you have the complementary u.s. sanctions that will permit us to impose pressure on people providing those systems to iran going forward until whenever. >> let's go here on the left. this gentleman. go ahead, steve. >> i'm steve, with the u.s. conference of catholic bishops. i have a question but i'd like to make a brief comment first. i think one of the things we have that's going to be in the discourse is hope versus fear, right? hope versus fear.

as a person of faith, of course, i'd like to speak for hope a little bit. i think we should not underestimate what implementation, painstaking implementation of this agreement will do to transform international relationships. particularly the u.s.-iranian relationship long-term. to build trust. through verification, not just through good feeling. but my question is this. we keep talking about the date by which iran could rush to enough material for a bomb. and that's one year. and it seems to be the assumption that then in a year they could have a bomb to threaten their neighbors. well, they have to test it. they have to deploy it. presumably you'd want to have more than one bomb if you're going to become a nuclear power because after you use the first one, you're kind of out of luck. you know? [laughter] so what is the realistic -- i mean, it seems we have a great deal of time even after that

material is acquired before this becomes a genuine threat to the u.s. or anyone else. >> real quick on that, the reason why the one-year breakout timeline has been used as a measuring stick for the success of this, one of then are -- one of the reasons is that once a country has enough fissile material for one bomb, it's difficult to keep track of what they're doing with it. but you're exactly right. that, you know, 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium does not a nuclear arsenal make. there are many other steps to be taken. it has to be fashioned into a workable device. the country would like to test it to make sure it works. there are some designs that do not have to be tested. it would have to be mated with a delivery vehicle, delivery system. there's more time that would be necessary and of course one nuclear weapon doesn't do you too much good as a strategic weapon, maybe as a terror weapon.

so -- but what's clear in this agreement -- is this agreement does block all the pathways to acquiring even that much material so iran can't do it in less than one year. and we mentioned the plutonium route in the beginning but the plutonium path to the bomb is for all intents and purposes completely blocked because the iraq reactor is going to be modified with chinese assistance so they can't be producing a significant amount of plutonium in the spent fuel. so this is very strong in terms , of preventing iran from amassing even that amount of material. we have a lot of questions here . i will try to get to a few of you. we won't get to all of you. why don't we go with, try in the back, if you could, virginia the gentleman on your side, near the middle row. thank you. yes?

>> my question is to mr. nephew. one of the several headlines have been, the concern is the sanctions, as well as sanctions against the central bank. of course, if it was european initiated -- in your view, what would happen to those entities mostly the central bank and local banks in iran, how would that work out? and the second question -- what do you make of the comments that

the president made yesterday about the example of -- syria? he mentioned that it could be considered by the u.s. what do you make of that comment? >> so the terms of the deal basically removed sanctions that are the most pressing on the central bank of iran and permit iran, generally speaking, to have access to the swiss system with respect to institutions that were previously designated. so, this will permit the iranians to allow broader financial ties internationally as well as accessing iranian money located in banks around the world. again once it is certified. >> on the question of syria, i would say that, i would argue that probably syria is not where we want to start in terms of

cooperation with the iranians. it's probably the area where we have the most tension. if you're trying to overcome 35 years of this taboo of not talking to each other, this seems to be an area where our interests are fundamentally opposed unless they want to move to a political solution where assad, where they accept the transition away from assad. at the same time i think if we were to go tomorrow to the iranians and say let's talk about syria, it would reinforce the saudis and the rest of the region's minds our plans to sell out area interests and cut a deal with iran. i think it probably makes sense to start with issues that are less raw and also to think about if we're going to first spend time push back in syria and building up american leverage an d investment and then coming to the negotiating table, at the end of the day, civil wars only end three ways, one, an outside power comes in and sits on the whole thing, not happening. two, one side wins.

again, very unlikely at this point in syria. and three a negotiated political solution. iran will have to be part of that negotiated political solution but i think first expectations on the ground their calculus needs to change. our sunni partners' calculus needs to change and we need to have a policy of pushing back against iran while finding ways to reassure our partners. >> i see jessica matthews a former president here at carnegie. now a senior fellow. why don't you go ahead. >> thanks, darryl. i wondered from all four of your points of view, what are the opportunities for one side or the other to fail to clearly meet their obligations that will lead to the kind of muddle that led to the unraveling of the north korea deal, for example. well, you violated first, no you fell short first, no, you did -- you know, where are we likely to

get in trouble in that respect? >> that's a good question. i hadn't thought about it deeply since i woke up at 4:00 in the morning to look at the agreement. but why don't we ask each of you to give your take on that. that's a good question. starting maybe with richard. and then kelsey. richard: i think the biggest threat is because of the regional issues and terrorism related issues, we have to continue on active -- an active sanctions policy that eventually chips away at the benefits provided and relief. when you combine that with iranian fiscal mismanagement and inability to do with their economy what they could do either because of corruption or just because they screw up or because oil prices remain low or investment doesn't flow as fast if the iranian government says we're not getting what we're supposed to get. this might be honest that

they're not getting what they're supposed to get because of other sanctions. it may be just a front to cover what is a bad economic policy on on the iranian part. but that could make the iranians, and certainly a pop figure like ahmadinejad, or who knows who the next president of iran will be, could say, it's rouhani that's causing the problem. >> and the fact that the sanctions relief might come after parliamentary elections as a major problem here? >> i don't see it as a major problem but it -- but certainly from an iranian rouhani political stance, it would have been better for him and his guys to have it before.the celebratory mood in tehran is, he's going to get a boost in the parliamentary process. frankly it would have been worse , for him if the relief was already six months in place and they hadn't seen money coming in. the timing might be ok for him.

ilan: i agree that's the greatest risk of the deal but there is an american policy solution to it. a lot of times we have multiple tools to go after terrorism, some of which are the intelligence community, some of which are deployed by d.o.d. and some by treasury. oftentimes the treasury approach, let's sanction something because that's the lowest risk approach. it involves the least risk of kinetic action military , escalation, things like that. it might actually be the given paradoxically, given we have this nuclear agreement, the sanctions to respond to iranian terrorism might be the riskiest approach because it undermines a broader interest we have in perpetuating the nuclear deal. maybe d.o.d. and the intelligence community need to be thinking more, and those tools need to be used more aggressively in some of the steps we take because there's risk associated with that, too obviously, but it's a way to compartmentalize and try to

separate and protect the agreement and our nonproliferation interests and other interests in the region. kelsey: i agree with what they said and also add another concern about any party intentionally exploiting the review process and the ability then to go to the u.n. security council with the intention of not resolving the dispute but actually trying to kill the deal. because essentially if a party does not think, if any one of the states does not think that an ambiguity or concern has been resolved in the joint commission or then through the ministerial level or going to an arbitration panel they can go directly to the u.n. security council and for the permanent five members you know vetoing the resolution , will start to put sanctions back in place. that could be deliberately used, i think, to prevent the

agreement from moving forward. and that option will remain open past this administration and when you hear some of the presidential candidates explicitly talking about wanting to unravel the deal, there certainly is an opening there. that gives me some concern. >> one other quibbling thought. this is not so much a big threat to the implementation of the agreement but it's something that i think everyone needs to pay attention to, including the congress and the other governments involved in the negotiation, p-5 plus one, which is that the iaea will need additional resources to do added work. the iaea has a rotating team about 50 people on the iran file. they do a very good job. but they're going to need more people. they're going to need more resources. and there is a zero budget growth policy affecting all u.n. agencies and so it's going to require voluntary contributions, additional contributions from key states, the united states, to give the agency the resources

they need. we'll probably be hearing from the director general amano nowwe will probably hear from director general amano in the coming weeks now that he knows what the terms are and we will hear the kind of resources he needs. it will require the government stepping up and providing those resources. >> one small point. what happens with our presidential transition? i do think that if the agreement is opposed -- i think the next president will implement it. the question is, will they do it holding their nose? what about a senior advisor or

act secretary of state that has direct access or will it be a secretary of state deep inside that no one is listening to? in that case i think the agreement falls apart by neglect. been lots of examples of that and there are different levels of prioritization of iraq issues. obama in many ways executed the bush drawdown plan and the level of senior-level engagement, nobody watched the issue. this matters a lot and another example was the clinton bush handover on al qaeda. this is a problem that we have and that we will have to deal with. >> i need to point out one of the thing. we talk a lot about risk coming from the p5+1 side, have to keep in mind the iranians have

cheated on their treaty obligations for 30 plus years. it is not sow the -- it is not outside the realm of possibility that they would have some guide to something he is not to do -- there are a variety of things on the i ron side -- iran side. we have to make sure the irradiance do their part. -- iranians do their part. >> we weren't expressing it because it is quite obvious. there will be problems. there are mechanisms available to deal with them but it will take continued good judgment, political leadership and good faith efforts on the part of the iranians so we don't have a major blowup along the way. we are almost out of time. i want to see if there is one more quick question and then we

will be closing. why don't we go with this gentleman on the right side. right there. your microphone is right in front of you. >> and with the embassy of denmark. i want to ask jessica at the stump and block she saw ahead and that was pretty well answered -- the second one to richard on the sanctions. there is a stipulation and the agreement that says if there is anything inconsistent at the u.s. state and local level, the federal government can do whatever it can in its power to do that. could you clarify that it be possible that you would have a local state government that would put in their own iranian sanctions and if you see that as a someone block? >> there are local state divestment campaigns that deal with iran that are considered to

be sanctions. under our federal system of government there are limitations. that is why the language is stated as it is. there is no commitment on the part of united states federal government to force the states to abandon divestment strategies. there are laws on the books that basically give cover to the depths -- to divestment and say it is something local officials ought to be able to do. you could see some attempt to modify that but more broadly two things. a general statement of advocacy that divestment decisions inconsistent with the deal are not helpful. the supremacy clause should grant that to the federal government but second i think there is a bigger concern about

the overuse of federal authorities by local jurisdictions including sanctions. what this is intending to say is if you are a financial regulator discovers you too. with this may set up his legal challenges. especially if the iranians were to complain that a particular case was inconsistent with the deal. we'll have to see. >> as we said it is complex. there is a lot to this agreement and we hope you have clarified a good bit about how the agreement is supposed to work, what is at stake and what are some of the other considerations down the road and we hope to provide some insight as to why so many believe this is on balance in u.s. national security interests and a major step forward for the

nuclear nonproliferation effort, especially in the most volatile region of the middle east. i want to thank everybody who came here today, the audience on c-span and our speakers for their great presentations. the transcript of this event will be on the arms control association website within a couple days. there is more information about the agreement iran is true program -- iran's program and more details on the site. please join me in giving our speakers around of applause. [applause] we are adjourned. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> coming up on c-span, remarks

by vice president biden on youth activism. then the senate finance committee holding a hearing on potential fraud. after that, president obama visiting the federal correctional institution followed by the president talking about his plans for changing the criminal justice system. >> on the next "washington journal" font johnson looks at the highway -- fawn johnson looks at the highway trust fund and what the senate and house plan to do about it. then the paul butler examines his book "let's get free." after that, eu ambassador to the united states david o'sullivan talks about the greek economic crisis and why greek economic leaders approved austerity measures that were overwhelmingly rejected by their citizens.

>> earlier this week, nasa announced new horizons had successfully's flown by the dwarf planet pluto and captured first of its kind highly detailed photographs of the surface and its moons. you can watch the briefing live at 1:00 p.m. et on c-span. when francis fulsome married grover cleveland, she became a first lady of many first's. the first and only first lady to be married in the white house. when she died on october 29, she lived an additional 51 years after leaving the white house. longer than any other first lady. this sunday night on the c-span's original series "first

lady's." sundays at 8:00 p.m. est. on c-span3. >> vice president biden spoke at the center for american progress on thursday. he spoke about remarks young people can get involved with including gun control, the environment and campaign finance reform. this is 40 minutes. v.p. biden: that was a great introduction and i appreciate it very much. and you are working on something that has been a project of mine and near and dear to my heart since i was an undergraduate school before it was an issue

where people were willing to face the reality of the millions of women's being victimized by social standards and cultural standards that are antiquated and had to be changed. i want to thank neera for her leadership in this entire organization and and johnson for her -- ann johnson for her leadership with generation progress. it is great to be back here. you take we back and you remind me of why i got involved in the first place. i was going say it wasn't too many years ago but it was 200 years ago that i sat where you are. [laughter] i know that you have had a full

day. you have heard from a lot of great american leaders. you got a chance to speak in many sessions. i basically came to say thank you. you have shown passion on issues that are the same issues that animated my passion, my concern when i was a kid in wilmington delaware, getting involved in public issues. for me it started with the civil rights movement but it moved on from there. when i got to the senate, is a 29-year-old kid the first bill i ever introduced in the senate was a bill for the student loan program for middle-class guys like me and my sister.

i remember, when we talk about student loans and access to college, we think of it only in terms of qualified students who will be denied an opportunity. like a lot of you, i think of it in terms of the mother and father who dream of opportunities for their kids, but feel incredibly inadequate because somehow they cannot find the resources to get their child to school. i remember when my father went to get a loan, i was a pretty good athlete and had some opportunities, but i still needed money. i went down to where my dad works and asked his secretary where he was and she said he is outside the building. i walked around to see him pacing akin fourth -- back and

forth. he saw me and looked up and said joey, i am so sorry. i said what happened? this was before cell phones, did something happen? he said i went to the bank to try to borrow money to get you to school they would not lend me the money, i am so ashamed. i am so sorry. if we don't give a child who is qualified an opportunity and not only deprives the child of opportunity, it deprives the parents of the dignity that they are entitled to. there is nothing worse for apparent in looking at their child when they are in need or sick and knowing there is nothing they can do to help. that is the first bill that i ever introduced. all the way to "it's on us" and

when i wrote the "women's act." i am not saying that -- i hope it doesn't come out the wrong way. i am not saying that for credit but i want to remind you of why what you are doing is so important. when i wrote that act, no one was for it. every woman's organization opposed to initially. they thought it would take the focus off of other issues, gender equality to rights related to reproduction. i was told there is nothing we could do. but i didn't believe that, like you didn't believe it. criminal justice reform. for 17 years i was chairman and ranking member of the judiciary committee. what you are focusing on was my

passion for all of those years from reform to dealing with gun violence. which i have been, in some cases extremely successful with, like the biden bill that expired under george bush, to the efforts to rewrite legislation which we have not been able to get past in this administration. immigration reform. an issue in my first campaign because chavez was trying to organize farmers and my state of delaware the way migrant workers were being treated was an abomination. for me it is been the civil rights issue of the generation.

the deck is stacked against them. i know i am referred to, almost a joke in washington, "middle-class joe." in washington that is not a compliment. it means you are not sophisticated. but i am middle-class. the reason i always talk about the middle class is simple. when the middle class does well, wealthy people do well and the poor have a way up. they are all of the things that are animating your passions. it is a simple proposition. my father used to say, every single person is entitled to be treated with dignity. the absence of economic opportunity -- there is no way to be afforded the dignity

people deserve. i applaud your passion. i urge you to never apologize for it. never, never try to explain it away. passion is what ultimately changes circumstances in this country. what i would like to talk to you about today is how you translate that passion into real, meaningful progress for the country. it is the only thing i know more about than you because i have been hanging around for a long time. it takes a lot of moral and political courage. it is about asking what you are willing to lose over as much as what you are willing to fight for. because i was elected as a 29-year-old kid, since that day

everyone who ran for office in delaware would compensate what is the secret? if i wonder had to be a secret that i found out. i'm serious. what do i have to know most? you have to look at one thing. whether you run for office or not i urge you to think about this. what are you willing to lose over? what is so important to you that you would rather lose than capitulate. if you cannot answer that question, you are in the wrong endeavor. you won't be happy if you have to constantly compromise what you believe because of pressure and interest groups and money. here is the truth -- no major issue of the day do the

american people disagree with any of the issues we are fighting for. marriage equality, raising minimum wage, early childhood education, gun violence prevention i could go on and on. something like 70% to 90% of people agree on every one of those issues. it is not a question of convincing the american people that we are right on the issues that we are for it is a question of demanding political courage of elected officials to meet the expectations of the american people. courage they only find if the people manned them to demonstrate it -- demand them to demonstrate it. you should be proud how you have already moved this country. you in this room have moved your generation. we had a huge victory on

marriage equality last month. it was a horrific battle waged by men and women in the lgbt community. some of them risked their lives in the fight by coming out. but your generation -- you are the cultural tipping point. you changed the nature of the discussion in america. you altered it. now there is a full-fledged acceptance. we still need you. today, where there is the freedom to marry in 50 states, and more than half the states marriage can be recognized but that same day you can be fired from your job just because you are lgbt. just because you are lesbian gay or transgender. no explanation is required. in 32 states, you are fired.

it is outrageous. the reason why it persists in my view is that the american people don't know what can be done, even in those states. that is where you guys come in. you have the passion and the energy to bring to the people of those states the knowledge that this can happen. i get roundly criticized for coming out when others -- anyway. [laughter] coming out on television for marriage equality. here is the point i want to make. thank you, i realize i am an unusual politician trying to dampen applause -- [laughter] all kidding aside i was absolutely certain. i was taking no chance. i made a bet with some very

common in people who you would know if i mentioned their names that overwhelmingly the american people agreed with me, and they did because they are decent. one of the things you can do better than anyone else is give voice to what is happening. american people are basically he sent. once -- decent. once you give voice to it consistently enough, unrelentingly enough, the public will demand of their leaders that they respond. fighting unemployment discrimination is a next big thing. just as you made marriage equality the case of your generation, you can make gun violence prevention the case of your generation now. ][cheers and applause] you can. there is this so-called white crime bill that passed in the early 1990's.

we made great progress. we didn't have assault weapons and we had extensive background checks and so forth. crime dramatically dropped during that period. what happened? in order for me to get it done i had to agree that it would be reauthorized in 10 years. 10 years to around on a republican watch. the tragedy of al gore having lost that election to the supreme court was tragic. it would have been very different the previous eight years. it all got wiped out. as the president said, in this great country of ours, why are we the only great civilized country where there is carnage after carnage. no response after 20 children and six of those massacred in newtown, the president asked me

to put together the legislative agenda of sensible gun control we believe the american people accept. from banning military style assault weapons, to background checks, to making schools safer mental health services and so one. with a lot of help and a brilliant staff, i put together a package. we announced to the american people and we went on the road to sell it. and we sold it. overwhelmingly to the american people. but we called on congress to pass it, it didn't move at all. we waged an aggressive effort to make the case to the people, and collectively we succeeded. 90% of the american people, 85% of households with members of the nra supported it.

90% of people in red states. 85% of households with an nra member in it supported the rational proposal we put forward on background checks. those public officials who were asked to step up -- they didn't have to worry about being outspent. because of a guy i like a lot michael bloomberg and because of two really fine people, congresswoman gabby giffords and mark kelly -- [cheers and applause] but combined it was the first time in a legislative shoot out that the nra was outspent, and we still failed. why? in my opinion, because of the

political influence of extremely powerful groups, not just the nra, but the gun lobby and manufacturers, elected officials were unwilling to risk their seats based on past examples, rather than do what they knew to be the right thing to do. i have observed that there is a consistent attribute of human nature that affects the decision not only of elected officials but all of us. never underestimate the ability of the human mind to rationalize. i don't know how many members told me, i cannot take the risk, because if i lose you won't have me here to help on food stamps, or the other good things.

it is called rationalization. you are all susceptible to it. everybody is. something that i urge you to do is to first understand and expose those elected officials who were otherwise good people. they are, by the way. who engage in this rationalization. they will do it with you. i cannot do it in my state because of -- when i introduced gun legislation, my state has the third highest percentage of gun ownership in any state in the nation. the nra went at me hammer and nail. told all of the hunters that i would take away their shotguns.

i am living proof to tell you there is nothing special about me. if you go out and make the case, it is common sense and you stand by your convictions, we can win. if you help us make the case on rational gun policy what it should be, it makes it so much more difficult for elected officials who don't have enough courage sometimes cannot rationalize. -- to not rationalize. environmental awareness is what got my generation involved with the civil rights movement in the 1970's. those are one of the three things i ran on. civil rights, the issues with iran -- as important as this was to my generation, it is so much

more important now. for your children, your grandchildren and your great-grandchildren. climate change israel, azriel -- climate change is real, it is as real as gravity. why do most republicans who know that and understand the danger, why they continue to persist in this fiction? since day one, at your insistence, the president has carried out the most consequential efforts to curb pollution, to develop renewable energy here at home, but again -- i think the coordinated city i city, state i state, national tax on common sense provided by billionaires and multimillionaires and interest

groups, has been extremely effective. what happens again? what is the rationale? a congressman who you know knows better, and they will say we cannot do that extreme climate legislation, because we will lose jobs at home. it will hurt the economy. it will cost ordinary people opportunity. which you know, none of which is true. so you and i we have to change the calculus. we have to make it impossible for an entire political party that i -- to deny climate change we will witness fight that we need to win sooner t