the courtroom, and the cellblock. so, i want to begin with the community because i believe crime is like any other epidemic -- the best time to stop it is before it starts. [applause] i will go ahead and say what i have said 100 times before or 1000 times before and what you've heard me say before -- if we make investments early in our children, we will reduce the need to incarcerate those kids. [applause] so -- one study found that for every dollar we invest in pre-k, it gives us at least that in reducing crime. getting a teenager a job for the summer costs a fraction of what it costs to lock them up for 15 years.

[applause] investing in our communities makes sense. it saves taxpayer money if we are consistent about it. and if we recognize that every child deserves opportunity, not just some, not just our own. [applause] what does not make sense is treating entire neighborhoods is little more than danger zones where we just surround them. we asked police to go in there and do the tough job of trying to contain the hopelessness when we are not willing to make the investment to help lift those communities out of hopelessness. that is not just a police problem. that is a societal problem. [applause] places like west philly or west baltimore or ferguson, missouri. they are part of america, too. they are not separate. they are part of america like anywhere else.

the kids there are american kids. it's like your kids and my kids. we've got to make sure boys and girls in those communities are loved and cherished and supported and nurtured and invested in and we have to have the same standards for those children as we have for our own children. [applause] if you are a parent, you know there are times when boys and girls will act out in school and the question is -- are we letting principals and parents deal with one set of kids and we call the police on another set of kids? that is not the right thing to do. [applause] we've got to make sure our juvenile justice system remembers that kids are different.

don't just tag them as future criminals. reach out to them as future citizens. [applause] even as we recognize that police officers to one of the toughest, bravest jobs around and we do everything in our power and as we do everything in our power to keep those police officers safe on the job, i have talked about this, we have to restore trust between the police and some of the communities they serve. [applause] a good place to start is making sure communities around the country adopt the recommendations from the task force i set up that included law enforcement but also included young people from new york and ferguson and they were able to arrive at a consensus around things like that her training,ection

to make sure policing is more effective and accountable is also more unbiased. [applause] these are steps in the committee that will lead to fewer folks being arrested in the first place. it won't eliminate crime entirely. there will be crime and that's why the second thing we need to change is the courtroom. for nonviolent drug crimes, we need to lower longer mandatory minimum sentences or get rid of them entirely. [applause] give judges some discretion around nonviolent crimes so that potentially, we can steer a young person who has made a mistake in a better direction. we should pass a sentencing reform bill through congress this year. [applause]

we need to ask prosecutors to use their discretion to seek the best punishment, the one that will be most effective instead of just the longest punishment. we should invest in alternatives to prison like drug courts and treatments and probation programs which ultimately can save taxpayers thousands of dollars per defendant each year. even if we are locking up fewer people, even if we are reforming sentencing guidelines, as i said before, some criminals still deserve to go to jail -- as republican senator john cornyn has reminded us virtually all of the people incarcerated in our prisons will eventually, someday, be released. that is why the third-place we need reform is in the cellblock. on thursday, i will be the first sitting president to visit a federal prison.

[applause] and -- and i am going to shine a spotlight on this issue because while the people in our prisons have made some mistakes and sometimes big mistakes, they are also americans. and we have to make sure that as they do their time, and payback their debt to society, that we are increasing the possibility that they can turn their lives around. [applause] that does not mean that we will turn everybody's life around. that does not mean there are not some hard cases. it does mean that we want to be in a position in which if somebody in the midst of

imprisonment recognizes the errors of their ways, is in the process of reflecting about where they have been and where they should be going, we've got to make sure they are in a position to make a turn. that's why we should not tolerate conditions in prison that have no place. in any civilized country [applause] we should not be tolerating overcrowding in prison. we should not be tolerating gang activity in prison. we should not be tolerating rape in present and we should not

make jokes about it in our popular culture. these things are unacceptable. [applause] what's more, i have asked my attorney general to start a review of the over use of solitary confinement across american prisons. [applause] the social science shows an environment like that is often more likely to make inmates more alienated, more hostile, potentially more violent. do we really think it makes sense to lock up so many people alone and tiny cells for 23 hours per day for months and is sometimes years at a time? that is not going to make us safer. that is not going to make us

stronger. if those individuals are ultimately released, how are they ever going to adapt? it's not smart. our prisons should be a place where we can train people for skills that can help them find a job, not train them to become more hardened criminals. [applause] i don't want to pretend like this is all easy. but some places are doing better than others. montgomery county, maryland put a job training center inside the prison walls to give folks a head start in thinking about what might you do otherwise than committing crime. that's a good idea. here is another good idea, one with high partisan support in congress -- let's reward prisoners with reduced sentence as if they complete programs that make them less likely to commit a repeat offense. [applause] let's invest in innovative new approaches to link former president is with employers -- ]former prisoners with employers and help them keep on track.

let's follow the growing numbers of our states and cities and private companies who have decided to ban the box on job applications so that former prisoners who have done their time and are now trying to get straight with society have a decent shot in a job interview. [applause] if folks have served their time and they have reentered society, they should be able to vote. [applause] you know, communities that give our young people every shot, courts that are tough but fair prisons that recognize eventually the majority will be released and so seek to prepare these returning citizens to grab that second chance -- that is where we need to build. i want to add this -- we cannot ask our police or prosecutors or

prison guards for our judges to bear the entire burden of containing and controlling problems that the rest of us are not facing up to and won't do something about. [applause] yes, we have to stand up to

those who are determined to flash investments in our committees of any cause, cutting job training programs, cutting affordable housing programs, cutting community policing programs -- that is shortsighted. those investments makers -- make our country strong. . we got to invest in opportunity more than ever african-american man roughly 25 years ago has a 1 in 2 chance of turning his life around. we properly recognized this is a crisis. right now, the unappointed rate among african-americans is 9.5%. what should we call that? it is a crisis and we have to be just as concerned about

continuing to list job opportunities for young people. [applause] today i have been talking about the criminal justice system but we have to recognize that it's not something we can view in isolation. any system that allows us to turn a blind eye to hopelessness and despair, that's not a justice system, it is an injustice system. that is an extension and a reflection of some broader decisions that we are making as a society. that has to change. that has to change. this is what the marches on washington, what the marches in selma new, what folks like julian bond new, what the marches in this room still no. is that justice is not only the absence of oppression, it is the presence of opportunity.

[applause] justice is giving every child a shot at a great education no matter what zip code they are born into. justice is giving everyone willing to work for the chance at a good job with good wages no matter what their name is, what their skin color is, where they live. 50 years after the voting rights act, justice is protecting that right for every american. justice is living up to the concrete that says i am my brother's keeper and my sister's keeper. justices making sure every young person knows they are special and they are important and that their lives matter, not because they heard it in a hastag but because of the love they feel every ingle day. not just love from their parents or neighborhood emma but love from police, love from politicians. love from someone who is on the other side of the country but

sees that young person is still important to me. [applause] that is what justice is. in the american tradition, and in the immigrant tradition of remaking ourselves, in the christian tradition that says none of us is without sin -- [applause] and all of us need redemption -- justice and redemption go hand-in-hand. [applause] right before i came out here i met with four former presidents, ex offenders. two of them were african-american and one of them was latino and one of them was white. all of them had amazing stories.

one of them dropped out of school when he was a young kid. now he is making films about his experience in the prison system. one of them served 10 years in prison then got a job at five guys which is a tasty burger. [laughter] and they gave him an opportunity and he rose up and became a general manager there and now is doing anti-violence work in the community. [applause] one of them, the young latino man, he came out of prison and was given an opportunity to get trained on green jobs helping the environment but also gave him a marketable skill. he talked about how the way he is staying out of trouble.

he just keeps on thinking about his two daughters. i can relate to that because you don't want to disappoint your daughters. you don't want to disappoint those baby girl so he says i go to work and i come home and i grab that little baby and get a kiss and that's keeping me focused. than one of them was arrested six times before his 38th birthday. he was drinking, using drugs rack up dui and sentence after sentence and admits that the sentences he was getting for dui were not reflective of the trouble he was causing. it could have been worse. he spent so much time jogging in place in his cell that inmates nicknamed him " the running man." he was literally going nowhere. he was running in place. then somehow, jeff started examining his life and said this is not me.

he decided to hold himself accountable and quit drinking and went to aa and met a recruiter from the reentry program at the community college in philadelphia, enrolled in classes once he was released nature to show up every day, graduated summa cum laude, with a 3.5 gpa and this fall he will graduate from temple university with a major in criminal justice and a minor in social work and he volunteers helping him inmates get their lives back on track. [applause] it's sort of a cliche -- he says we can do anything. just two years ago, the running man ran his first marathon because he is going somewhere now. [applause] you never look at crossing the finish line, he says of his

journey, you attack at putting one mile after the other. it takes steps. it takes steps. that is true for individuals it's true for our nation. sometimes i get in debates about how to think about progress or the lack of progress when it comes to issues of race and inequality in america. there are times when people say -- the president, he's too optimistic or he's not talking enough about how bad things are. let me tell you something, i see what happens. my heart breaks when i see families impacted. i spend time with those families. i feel their grief. i see those young men on street corners and eventually in prisons and i think to myself, they could be me. the main difference between me and them is i had a more

forgiving environment so that when i slipped up, when i made a mistake, i had a second chance and they've got no margin for error. [applause] i know how hard things are for a lot of folks. but i also know that it takes steps and if we have the courage to take that first step then we take a second step in if we have the kurds to take the second step and suddenly we have taken 10 steps. the next thing you know, you have taken 100 steps and that's not just true for us as individuals but true for us as a nation. we are not perfect but we have the capacity to be more perfect, mile after mile, step after step, they pile up one after the other and pretty soon, that

finish line starts getting insight and we are not where we were. we are in a better place because we had the courage to move forward. [applause] so we cannot ignore the problems we had but we cannot stop running the race. [applause] that is how you win the race. that's how you fix a broken system. that's how you change a country.

the naacp understands that. [applause] think about the race you have run. think about the race ahead. if we keep taking steps toward a more perfect union and close the gap between who we are and who we want to be, america will move forward. there is nothing we cannot do. thank you, god bless you, god bless the united states of america. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its

caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] here's a look. >> speaker boehner, president obama is visiting a prison today during the week. >> i have long believed there needed to be reform.

that's what are things that you differ on? >> i am not the expert. i think it is time we reviewed the process. >> tomorrow what the senate and the house plan to do about it.

and why they approved austerity measures. >> coming up, the arms control association discussing the nuclear agreement. and then remarks on youth activism. later the finance committee holding a hearing on potential fraud. earlier this week announced new horizons had success only flown by the dwarf planet pluto and captured detailed photographs.

you can watch the briefing lies at 1 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> this weekend, two major political events from iowa. we are the only place you can watch or listen to these events in their entirety. we will be live for the iowa democratic party hall of fame dinner. it will mark the first time all five democratic candidates shared the same stage. then we will be live in a name's for the family leadership summit were nine leading republican candidates were scheduled to speak. >> john boehner and nancy pelosi

talked about the briefing. here is a look. >> it blows my mind the americans would agree to end the bands. the sanctions are working at bringing iran to its knees. we are going to fight a deal that is wrong for our country.

>> two days ago a historic nuclear agreement was announced by the p5 plus one. that is the product of years of leadership on the part of president obama. i have closely examined this document and it will have my strong support. members are reading the document. this is the document, plus the annexes very important. i am very proud of the careful attention our members are giving to the joint comprehensive plan of action. congratulations to president obama, two leaders of the p5 plus one, to all of the country. i want to commend secretary kerry for his leadership.

we had experienced leaders. one of the foremost authorities on nuclear technology. everybody knew they were dealing with people of knowledge and knowing the possibilities. the president has been clear. a nuclear iran is unacceptable to the united states, to the world, and in particular, to israel. disagreement is about intensifying our vigilance over every aspect of the iranian nuclear program. we had no illusions.

i would say distrust and verify. >> next, a panel of former government and security officials to discuss attentional challenges of the iran nuclear agreement, including its impact on the relationship with israel and saudi arabia. this is an hour and a half. her. >> good >> good morning.welcome to the arms control association briefing on the p 5 plus one iran nuclear deal injuries the outcomes, implementation and verification. i'm the executive corrector. we are an in depep dent nonpartisan. by the world's dangerous weapons. we organized to discuss p-5 plus

one which is the most complex and conch sequential which began 70 years ago today with the first atomic bomb which was detonated in new mexico. over the period of time, we sought to identify policy solutions to address the many different challenges on this issue so that the negotiators can help arrive at and agreement. and our analysis looking at the documents which is over 100

pages, quite substantial, is that it can effectively block iran on their weapons and weapons program for more than a generation. and that's a view shared from nonproliferation security experts and we believe it will be a net-plus for nuclear non proliferation, the effort to stop nuclear weapons. congress has 60 days to review this agreement and we believe that each and every member need to take a look at this agreement and get the answers to their questions and consider the benefits and the alternatives. and so to help contribute to this date, we have gathered three top-notch experts to discuss the agreement.

kelsey davenport and she has been very closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so. and she is still recovering from her latest tour of duty in vienna. and next, we will hear from richard nephew. and he is see center of global energy policy and resident fellow at the fellow. and i want to hear from senior fellow for middle east security

for american security and foreign policy with extensive government experience. so after their opening comments and remarks about the agreement and impacts, we will take your questions. i want to make a final observation. talk about the nuclear nonproliferation elements of the agreement. like any politic agreement it is one of give and take. we think it is very strong and many ways stronger than the framework that was reached in early april. yet it is clear already just a couple of days after this agreement was concluded that many critics believe that by rejecting the agreement, by increase ink sanctions the u.s. can convince the leaders of iran

to dismantle its nuclear programs. i think, i think the president thinks that this is basically a dangerous illusion. there isn't a better deal. if congress olympics this agreement, they are going to be tough negative consequences. we have spoken with our european allies and our international support will dissipate. iran will not be subject to limits on its nuclear program. we will lose out on enhanced inspections and the conflicts would grow. so a lot of it is at stake. and we hope congress is going to take a hard look at the agreement and the alternatives. with that. let me turn it over to our panelists. >> thank you all for being here

this morning. i'm not quite sure what time zone i'm in. i want to talk about the nuclear elements of the deal and i won't talk about all of the 158 pages of the agreement, we will explore on the agreement. the perspective this is a very strong agreement. in many ways, it exceeds the expectations of what we sought a good agreement would need to achieve to block iran's pathway and put in place that would ensure quick detection of any covert activity. no. this deal is not perfect, but good enough and meets the nonproliferation goal and safeguards national security and good for regional security as well. to get into the details.

the parameters that were agreed to were detailed and strong and from our assessment with these parameters in place it would take they will 12 months to produce a nuclear weapon. and that will be achieved by reducing centrifuges from 19,to 6,000. iran's stockpile will be capped at 300 kilograms. what we get from the final deal is details that iran cannot quickly move towards nuclear weapons. one of the things that becomes clear. all of the centrifuge machines will be removed. all of the piping, vacuums will be taken out and stored under

iaea seals and we have greater assurance that if iran were pry to access these machines, they would immediately know. it is important to note that iran will be using these machines to replace and repair any broken machines. and iran will not be producing any additional centrifugeses unless the stockpile is reduced to under 500. iran is going to use time to buildup centrifuges to deloy them later is false and they will be inventoried under the deal. these are provision that will add a greater level of confidence. we have more information about the stockpile. iran agreed to reduce stockpile

so uranium enriched to reactor grade from the approximate 10 thureks kilo grams down to 3,000 dill l kilo grams. and oxide can be converted back to gas. so this entire stockpile. and any scrap material that is in process that is enriched to .6 % or 20% will be turned into fuel place and the material that can't be turned will be shipped out of the country diluted or mixed in a form that it cannot be enriched further. additional steps to ensure there is not scrap material. providing more assurance that iran cannot obtain a bomb. now there has been some concern

about the agreement leaves 1,000 centrifuges at the facility which iran begins to build in secret deep in the mountain. now the 1,000 september try fugse that will be there 350 of the century fooges will be used for isotope production. these machines cannot be transitioned back to uranium enrichment and leaves 600 machines. the rest of the centrifuges and the infrastructure will be removed and will be placed under fields back in the facility which is where the 500 centrifuges will be placed.

cun of the crist simms that have been leveled, what will happen after 10 years, in 10 years iran committed for 10 years to operate 5,060 of its centrifuges. iran isn't going to go offer a cliff a this agreement makes it clear that the work on centrifuge machines will be limited and they will be phased in in such a way that one day after 10 years, that iran cannot deploys the centrifuges and be

weeks away for obtaining the materials. to look a little bit more closely at the r&d iran has 1,000 advanced september try fallujah machines at its pilot proubs facility. it will have a few months to finish up the testing with some of those. and it will remove nearly all of the advanced machines and store them under seal. iran will be allowed to operate one i.r. 4 machine, one i.r. 5 machine and one i.r. 5 machine. it contests these machines but can't acouple plate enrichede uranium. and after about 8 and-a-half

years, iran will be able to test 30 implet r. 6 machines and 30 i.r. machines and they can begin producing 200 of each of these models per year but will not producing the rotors. so around the year when iran transitions, its capacity will remain a relatively stable for the next three years. so through the capacity is the measure of capacity. that means that the capacity of iran's 0,060 i.r. 5 centrifuges will remain. so if a machine has 10 times the capacity of an i.r. one machine

if it produces an i.r. 6 machine, they have to remove the machines. we won't see a rampup immediately after the 10-year restrictions on using i.r. 1's. it's important to note that we should not voo any of these elements in isolation. in addition to these restrictions on the number of machines that are being produced. iran's materials that can be used will be monitored by the joint commission, which is set up through the deal and any changes that iran wants to make to its r&d will have to be approved. if iran starts to move or try to move away from the r&d plan that it will submit to the iaea, it

will become clear through the joint commission. so one of the other areas there has been a question relates to the transparency and monetary policy and this is something that the association we we were very concerned about because of iran's nuclear activities in the past. we feel that the inspections and monitoring and veskets regime produced under this regime that iran cannot pursue its nuclear facilities. so first at the declared facilities iran will have to expand it nuclear declaration under its additional protocol which iran will ratify within the eight years of the depreement. the additional protocol is an

agreement that expands upon iran's safeguard agreements and gives inspectors greater access and short notice to inspect thinks sites. the agreement lays down the provisions that allows monitoring. in the next 25 years that the uranium mines and mills, and then the continuous monitoring. essentially this means if iran wanted to pursue nuclear weapons they would need to replicate the entire fuel supply and find a new source of uranium ore and convert that into gas and enrich it. these are large program. you aren't going to hide it in a basement or a warehouse.

thoy another check against this covert -- the concern about a covert nuclear weapons program comes with the increased access that will be granted to inspectors and it's very clear in the deal that if concerns arise about illicit nuclear activities, the iaea will express concerns. manageed that iran can protect military information, but it's important to realize the iaea's decision about whether or not the conditions iran places on access is adequate and if they are not adequate there is an ajudication mechanism in place. iran and the aeia cannot come to

a discussion, the joint commission question includes the countries, the european union and iran will decide it. so five of the eight members. that means china russia and iran can't block access. and they will have three days. in total, if they want to ack assist a site they can only be blocked from that for 24 days. 1 days may be time for iran to remove any equipment but isn't enough time to arad indicate any indication. and that is in part due to the sophisticated that the iaea can

conduct. these demonstrate the strength of the monetary and verification. i think it's worth noting, too but looking at the iaea and not going to have its eyes. the national intelligence organization of the united states european countries will continue to watch iran very closely. in short to sum up, i think the director of national intelligence said this is as solid as you can get. no element is going to provide you 100 gar and at the but iran is not pursuing nuclear wins. i think it's important to note that iran's nuclear addition-making has been benefited. with this deal in place the

cost of cheating has become higher because this is an agreement that iran voluntarily signed on to and within the agreement there are further commitments by iran not to undertake any experiments related to nuclear weapons development. if they violate strong reaction by the international community and changes the cost benefit analysis. there are a few additional elements that are important and worth noting that i don't think has gotten much conch. there are conditions where iran cannot export technology unless it is approved by the joint commission. and there will be joint work on the fabry occasion of fuel elements which provides iran the

ability to fuel the reactor using the domestic fuel it produces and if there are concerns about noncompliance, there will be a time-bound, -day period that consists of review by the joint commission that really ensures that if any party is not satisfied with the breach it can move on and take the case to the security council. there are a number of other provisions in this deal that adds to its strength and amply files the nonproliferation value. finally moving forward, congress has the opportunity to weigh in on this deal. but with the power that congress has to vote on an greelt comes with responsibility. if they cause or prevent this deal being prevented, this will lead to escalation on the part of iran, sanctions from the u.s.

side and could increase the chances of a military conflict. when looking at this deal, congress looks at the deal. does it block the deal? yes. does it put in place monitoring and truth in modification? yes. and really, also considered against the alternatives, there is noo better deal out there. we have heard the time for anywhere, any time inspections. they can do their job. we have heard that more pressure would perhaps induce iran to make greater inspections. the deal that allows iran that it met its objectives of maintaining military programs and sanctions release, it makes

the deal more sustainable because iran sees incensetive to comply. this idea of more con sense -- concessions were necessary wouldn't make a stronger deal. all of these elements need to be viewed together. if we look too closely at any one particular detail, we may miss the relationship between the entirety of the package and ultimately this deal removes the threat of a iranian nuclear weapon. it is good for regional security. and it deserves the support of all in washington. >> i thank you for that overview and you mentioned sanctions and turn to that issue now.

richard, thanks for being here. >> thanks for being here today. i was going to touch on three points to deal with the issue. first, i wanted to touch on the contents of the relief and time line and how it would be rolled out. second i want to touch on what is left. while there is a sense left out there and the regime has been taken away that is not true. and soft sanctions remaining in place, it may be a future problem. and i want to touch on the impact of sanctions relief and how the combhi and the security apparatus may use the benefits of sanctions relief. first off, in terms of the contents i have a much easier job because the sanctions pack acknowledge is straightforward

and direct and broad. the decision was made by the negotiating partners to make this an issue of the nuclear problem by incentivizings. so the time line that has been established for implementation of relief is configured as such. they have to complete the configurations with a few thing by their very nature will continue on. before any new sanctions relief will be given. it is awful. the way the relief is structured and the way the deal puts in place, the iranians aren't going to see anything beyond the joint plan of actions until they have

done their part, period. now, when thiff done their part, the relief they are going to get is substantial. and in the judgment of myself and the administration, it was worth while to get the reconciliations. what's in play? first off, all of the u.s. sanctions that are going to be discussed hire are secondary in nature and don't discuss the embargo. what the united states has offered to do is to provide relief from the sanctions it imposes on foreign countries. if you are bp, any number of other companies, you are no going to being able to do business with iran after the iranians have done the steps they have to do steps. the energy sector both in tirms

of the sale and purchase of products financial services and financial transactions, insurance, transportation. again, with foreign companies and foreign actors subject to their own laws. this will not take place numb these stips have been taken. the way that the time line has been set up, we are now in a period that you could loosely call phase one. in 90-day period that every single country has to go to its national legislatures and bue into the deal. upon their erm recommendations then the iranians will take their steps. century trugse and variety of

other nuclear things that kelsey was describing. for the united states-union union, there is a requirement to have the waivers and legal modification to sanctions that will start upon i.a. verification. so there will be promulgation of new regulation and new executive orders. but they are going to be tied to a trigger and that is a report that the iranians are supposed to do that haven't been done. there are estimates as to how long this could take. my own estimate is that it would be easily four to six months before the iranians will achieve the removal. it is theoretically that it could take faster. if you add 90 days, we are talking about april, march,

where the iranians will achieve sanctions and start to see new business start to flow. that is very important, because that means for the time being, the iranians are incentivized to do things they were supposed to and see a dollar. backs during the joint plan of action, there was a lot of suggestion that the iranians were going to stop the deal. i think frankly the scope and scale suggests that would not be the case here. there is then a hiatus in sanctions relief for eight years or reaching a broader conclusion in a nuclear program. during this time, relief will continue to exist. but they are going to be

underrestrictions. and how it relates to the sanctions that still remain. under this eighth-yoor time period, the iranians have to go to the joint commission for any nuclear-related items. the resixes are restrictions are going to remain in place. so they have to submit itself to end-use verification checks to ensure their going where they're supposed to be going. in this instance it's both a restriction on the iranians as well as still being utilized as part of the sanctions regime that will be in place. the procurement channel itself will extend another two years beyond this eight-year period until the u.n. security council's requirements are canceled in 10 years' time. there will be at this eight-year

period though, modifications to other parts of the security council infrastructure and other legal instruments, including the united states and e.u. these primarily deal with proliferation related items and potential sources of concern. it's notable though, that if you look at the text, what's put in is not iran will get to incorporate whatever -- import whatever it wants to import from whoever it wants to import. rather, from the u.s. perspective, iran will be treated like anybody else. which means they're subject to export controls and could still be subject to u.s. sanctions if we find things we have concerns about. that's basically it. the iranians don't get anything until they implement their nuclear obligations. that will take between four to six months after the 90-day period. nothing april -- until april of

2016. the question is is, what's left? there are a number of restrictions that remain in place with their -- with regards to their ability to acquire nuclear related items. but that's not the limit of it. u.s. sanctions with respect to terrorism and human rights will remain in place. the u.s.' primary embargo will remain in place. with the exception of some very specific licenseable trance actions involving, for instance, the sale of commercial planes. however, even in that provision, it's very clearly stated that they have to be used for civil uses. so if the united states were to find, all of a sudden, that a brand new boeing that arrived in tehran was now funneling arms into assad, we're talking if assad is still in power many years from now, that would be cause to terminate the licensing as clearly stated in the text. this also means, therefore, that the iranians have to be on their best behavior with respect to these planes because they are quite obvious.

as we've discovered, the united states has the ability to detect what kinds of planes are being used for what kinds of purposes and then to identify them back to the international community. the iranians are also going to have to deal with the continued sanctions. they have a number of people including the iran revolutionary guard corps which will remain under sanction, and others who will remain under sanctions. there's been a lot of talk about this i'll take a moment to describe it about what's contained in the deal. he will be delisted by the u.n. and the e.u. because he was delisted by both of those. in the yeats he was designated for terrorism. that means he stays in place as a sanctioned individual until such time as he stops engaging in things we consider to be terrorism. i don't really think that's a likely event. this is also important because the united states is not removing the infrastructure it

uses to make these residual sanctions impactful and that includes the conference of iran accountability assessment act. it's in a this provision that the united states has exerted a lot of pressure on international financial system with respect to designated entities. basically, the law provides for the united states to sanction those who conduct transactions on behalf of u.s. designated people. now the list of u.s. designated people is going to go down when the nuclear related targets are removed but it will not go away. particularly for terrorism, human rights and other related targets. so the iranians are still going to be under the pressure of having to face financial sector cutoffs for all those entities and individuals who remain on the list which means that institutions like the bank that's a u.s. designated bank

for terrorism related purposes are going to remain and the financial impact on that bank is going to remain as well. this means that any additional targets the u.s. identifies as involved in terrorism or human rights related violations also are potentially subject to the same sort of cutoff. so the iranians still are going to have to learn about what could dosh worry about what could happen to their financial sector if they use the banks that we're delisting now for different purposes. i think it's important at this juncture to note that the sanctions relief will not be this end all and be all restoration and renaissance for iran. it's going to do a lot. but the very point that some sanctions remain and the fact that there is going to be reputational and business risk attached to doing business in iran means that the sanctions relief is going to take a long time to mature. now, from one perspective this is really good. because that means that for

those of us who are concerned about iran's ability to do awful things in the region it means that there is a way of pacing and controlling and modifying iranian behavior because if we continue to identify individuals and entities as involved in terrorism, the iranians will have to deal with the consequences of that. this is not u.s. unilateral sanctions disarmament. period. this is a step to provide iran palpable useful relief but they'll be under the same threat with respect to these institutions that they were yesterday, the day before that, 10 years -- not 10 year, but at this point, five years ago. when you add that to the fact that a lot of businesses are going to be concerned about the possibility of snap back, i think you can see that there is going to take a long time for there to be a resurgence and a lot of really long-term trade in iraq. my own expectations is that the iranians are going to see a lot

of short-term business deals purchases of their oil things that people can do and then get out of iran if they need to, for the initial couple of years. this is simple prudence on the part of international businesses. it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to do multibillion dollars' worth of investment in the country when you have the risk of snapback or some other concern that could get you in hot water both in washington as well as with your stockholders. there may be some businesses that are willing to do this. but i would bet that they're going to build force majeure clauses into their contracts to allow them to get out quick. -- quickly. so the business operating environment will be different than it will be in other countries in the middle east. this is not withstanding the sanctions because iran is a difficult place to do business itself. the bureaucratic tape in tehran

is as difficult to do business with as anywhere in the world. a numb of oil companies have said that they don't find the current contract the iranians are starting to be about with respect to oil services is all that good and they're looking for better terms. it will take time for iran to get through their bureaucratic process and get over the nervousness for companies to plunge back. in but iran will get something. i think the real threat to the longevity of the deal is that this is too slow in coming on. i think it's a -- there's a risk the iran yavens say, we're not getting what we need. at that point you can see them say, we need to reconsider the terms of the deal. i think the sanctions picture in iran is favorable to the p-5 plus one. favorable to the united states. it will provide iran some advantages but is not something that overnight will change the iranian economy, it's going to take time and there are ways to

control it still further. thank you. >> thanks, richard, that was very helpful. now we'll turn to allan who will take about the regional dynamics. >> thanks. i thought i'd talk about the three major actors in the agreement. the first being iran, the second being saudi arabia and the gulf states around it and the third being israel. i should start from the position that because of the nonproliferation benefits of the agreement, i very much agree with my colleagues up here that this is something that is in the national interest of the united states and we need to be pursuing. but the regional ramifications will be much more complicated and mixed. there's going to be some negative downsides and we'll have to manage especially with our traditional partners over the next few years. that doesn't mean we should be

letting the tail wag the dog and not doing something that's in america's fundamental national security interest but this is something we have to deal with. so starting with how we expect the deal to shake out in iran over the next few year, you hear these two schools of thought and theories. one is president rouhani the prime minister these are pragmatists. they're not democrats, they're men of the revolution. i don't think they're looking for liberalism wen style to break out tomorrow in tehran but they are more pragmatic when think weigh the economic benefits and the benefits international engagement versus support for terrorism and the nuclear program and are more interested in those first set of interests for iran. are they going to gain more influence and then be able to reflect into a more pragmatic iranian foreign policy? there's a strong case to be made that's the case. rouhani was elected based on the fact and allowed to come to power also by the supreme leader

that he would get this nuclear agreement. he's going to have tremendous credibility and leverage. we have parliamentary elections in iran next march. it will be an interesting time in terms of the sanctions relief calendar that richard just laid out to see if the pragmatic faction can pick up more seats in the iranian system. i do think rouhani now could have more influence in other areas of iran -- iranian foreign policy. on the other hand, you could make the argument that the hardliners are going to double down. that they'll want to batten down the hatches, they'll not want to see this deal lead to more liberalization. they'll take a harder line. they'll use some of that money that comes in to increase their support for some of their activities in syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere in the region. that's going to happen too. i would argue that most likely scenario is, both of these things are going to happen at

the same time. what you're going to end up with in iran, very likely for the next few years is a very intense political competition amongst the various factors who ultimately makes the final decision. he's skeptical of the united states, not left iran in years but he's also somebody who rules by consensus. so if all the key factions come to him and say this is what we should do, he usually goes in that direction. i don't see him pursuing a major rapprochement with the united states in the years ahead but he's going to pass from the scene at some point, i think before the expiration of this deal, given his health and his age and at that moment we'll see what has this agreement and what has the aftermath in terms of the political debate inside iran done? who is his successor? what kind of system comes after him? we haven't had a transition of

pow for the iran since 1989. this is going to be a major moment to indicate if we're going to see a fundamental shift nigh ran's foreign policy. whether the fundamental shift happens or not, the deal is implementable, the agreement still happens. this is a potential huge benefit we have to watch over the next few years. the second challenge is israel. what happens there. now obviously, the israelis are close partners of ours, and i spent years at the pentagon working in iran where one of our primary interests was in dealing with israel and reassuring israel and talking to them about the nuclear program, especially the time where speculation was much more rife that they might consider taking things into their own hands. what i found from those exchanges was a couple of things. one, the israelis, it's a small country, surrounded by a lot of unfriendly neighbors in a tough part of the world. the approach that they take, they assume the absolute worst

case scenario. it's the joke, american foreign policymakers we do our contingency planning based on worst case scenarios and we do our policy based on most likely scenarios. israelis do their worst case plan -- their contingency planning and policy on worst case scenarios. part of this is the difference in personal styles. and part of it is the difference we've had with israel in differing risk perceptions. going forward -- well, one thing i'll say, one of the unfortunate side effects is, i always found engaging with israelis was useful when you were doing things like negotiating with iran. they would come in with smart people who spent all their time working on this and give you the worst case scenarios.

they would red team it for you in some aways. really effectively. you could say, we don't believe that's credible, but sometimes you could say, that's something we haven't thought about. then it helps improve american policy. i think it's unfortunate we've had a splate and divide that's limited that over the next few months. what happens next there? prime minister has made very clear that he's going to oppose this agreement and try to undermine it in congress. i think that's a big mistake. because i think at the end of the day oklahoma it's likely he'll succeed and what he's doing by doing that is really taking a boish issue and turning it into support for israel into a wedge issue inside the u.s. congress which i think is damaging for israel's long-term interest. i think there's -- look, there's a lot of people, the political establishment in israel is against the agreement because prime minister netanyahu set conditions where it's impossible to be for the agreement. even his political critics will

say, i don't like your approach on how you're dealing with americans but i hate this deal. the security establishment is different. they're much more subtle about it. i think because they also take that lower risk perception they're ultimately uncomfortable with some element os -- elements of the agreement but they don't see it as the exiss ten rble threat the prime minister does. what they do also, are concerned about is the way the prime minister decided to handle himself with this very public confrontation with the president, going to the american media, going to congress on this. and trying to circumvent the executive branch. and that's something that i think causes a lot of anxiety -- anxiety for israelis because iran might in many of their sues be an exiss ten rble threat. but fraying of the u.s.-israeli relationship is a huge threat and is a threat to israel's security for many of them. i think the big question is what happens after the 60 days? what happens after the congressional vote?

do the israelis finally say, does the prime minister, which is being encouraged by many to do, finally say, i'll take my disagreement quiet and we'll start quietly engaging with the administration and seing if the united states can find ways to fill this security gap that we now feel and these insecurities through american reassurances which is what we've traditionally done or does he decide to write off this president and spend the next year and a half publicly confronting him? i really hope that he chooses the former and not the latter and i know that there's a lot of people in the security establishment in israel that hope to see that too. we're going to have to wait and see. the president has already reached out. president obama reached out to prime minister netanyahu in april and tried to bring him back into the fold and said, let's take our communications privately and consult in closed rooms as opposed to this public status. he was rejected at the time but let's see if the view changes in

september. we'll have to wait and see about that. there's the third element here, saudi arabia and the gulf states. they view things differently than the israelis. they have some overlaps and some differences too. israel really is focused on the nuclear program and cares about iran's regional behavior. saudi arabia really is -- really is focused on the regional question. they care about iran's support for terrorism, they view what is happening right now in the region as iran picking up influence and syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere. that's the major anxiety. -- anxiety. people speculate saudi arabia will respond to this by tarting to build out its own nuclear infrastructure. i don't think that's the problem. i think that's unlikely. that's expensive, takes time there are costs to them in materials of international reactions, in terms of their reaction -- relationship with the united states. i think the real concern is that they're feeling, they have this concern that the united states is pivoting to iran.

and rearranging the alliance dynamics in the united states. which i don't think is what the obama administration is intending to do. we still have a lot of things where we disagree with the iranians. feeling that concern, the saudis start to lash out in destabilizing ways and take steps that are against our interest and against their interest in the region and i think the best example of that might be what they've done in yemen recently with this intervention without a clear strategic plan about what happens after you start putting a blockade on yemen with no end game in sight. so that's, i think, the more fundamental question for the saw -- saudis and one that the united states is going to have to wrestle with, so it's this president and the next. the reality is it's going to be hard for this president to do it. any president who is the one who cuts the deal with iran, which i think we needed to do, is going to take a big hit in the gulf

and in israel as president obama has done. it's almost the next president who has to come in and start to do the big hug with some of our partners. so what do we do going forward to address these challenges? there's three or four things we need to do. first, take advantage of the fact that we actually have this channel of communications with the iranians for the first time in 35 years. that's meaningful and important. the fact that they have email addresses and phone numbers and there is a channel. i can't tell you how many times we'd run into at the pentagon, find ways to communicate with iranians. whether it was find ways to avoid conflict here, or knock it off, you're going in the wrong direction. talking is always better than not talking and seing if there are ways to start working together on some discrete issues, our interest in afghanistan, maritime security and avoiding potential escalation in the gulf,

inadvertent escalation in the gulf are two things for pursuit. more things like that. but even as we do that, especially as the sanctions are coming off, it makes sense to push back more forcefully on some of iran's destabilizing activities in the region through joint efforts with our partners, showing up in saudi arabia for example with a high level dell fwation led by ash carter and john brennan saying we're here to talk not about the nuclear program and not about how to deal with isis, we're here to have a serious and strategic conversation with you about how to deal with iran in the region. let's talk about steps we can take together. more aggressive interdiction. more -- potentially more serious efforts to train sunni opposition in syria and in iraq. partners we can work with in both those countries. things like that that will signal to our partners that we

mean it when we say we're going to push back on this behavior we don't find acceptable in iran. and also important signals to the iranians that we're going to that the nuclear deal doesn't give you free range over the region to pursue these opportunities. we're going to push back. when the united states pushes back against iran, iran backs off. iran has no interest in a fight with the united states. sometimes you have to flex your muscles as a deterrent. another key thing we have to be doing. the third element obviously needs to be reassurance of other forms beyond those two. which for our partners, i don't think we need to be selling the saudis s-35's. they already outspend the iranians dramatically. it's not about big weaponry. it's about the small stuff. training them to actually counter some of this low-end asymmetric warfare. but the security assurances, to some extent, there's things we could be doing with our partners

and activities with the israelis, that can signal to them that we're sticking around that this isn't the fundamental strategic pivot, that we're going to push back as we engage, and we can do both. i'll close by saying, you know, it's a very complicated balancing act to pull something like that off, send some mixed messages. this has worked on iran's nuclear program. we spent the last five or 10 years using a combination of praise and pressure. if we apply that to problems with iran in the northeast i think you can get there with this -- in the middle east, i think you can get there with this combination of tools. >> thank you very much. as i said at the beginning, this process is complex. it's consequential. and i think we've given you quite a bill to contemplate. it's now your turn to ask us a

few questions and we're going to try to answer, i'll start with some of the journalists who are here. virginia there's a question up here in front. if you could bring the mike up and just identify yourself and tell us who you would like to answer the question. >> mike, "new york times," i have a question on the sequencing of sanctions relief. a technical question but just to clarify. in the 150-plus page document. the broad conclusion to be issued by the iaea is not going to come for a period of years but director -- but the director general on the day the agreement was promulgated put out a road map to lead to an assessment by december 15. he articulated a number of steps that are to be taken. as you understand the agreement what sanctions relief can be provided prior to this december

15 assessment of where iran stands on possible military dimensions and what sanctions relief can only be provided after this assessment is completed and if it's a favorable resolution? >> that's a great question. it's especially complicated because we've now got two processes that are working simultaneously here. i would say very simply i don't see any sanctions relief happening before p.m.d. has been laid to rest. that's in part because the obligation on iran is somewhat different than the obligation the ai -- the iaea has taken unto itself. the timing of the obligation the iaea has accepted is it gets iran's compliance by the 15th of october. well based upon the structure

of the implementation phase of the deal, there's zero chance that any sanctions relief can happen before that cooperation has been given, right? it's written into the document as an obligation of the iranians to have done this by adoption day. and so as a consequence of that if they didn't provide the cooperation, the united states and p-5 plus one partners would be in a position to say we don't have to fill in the terms of the deal. they could walk away altogether, you could go to the dispute resolution process so on and so forth. bottom line, because of when iran has to take its steps, i don't think there's any chance additional relief could be given. now, there is potentially a theoretical world in which adoption has taken place, the iranians speed through implementation and the director general has not issued his report by the 15th of december. i can see that -- i concede that as a theoretical possibility.

it's highly unlikely almost impossible, because of how long it would take them to do things like removing centrifuges but that's something that theoretically could happen system of what are you going to get out of the report from the inspector general? only two conclusions could come out of it. iran had a weapons program, iran didn't have a weapons program. we already think we know the answer to the first and we think it's the first. there's nothing that's going to change the timing of relief and the timing of what goes forward because we already know the answer to it and the transparency to verify it's not ongoing will have begun. i don't see in reading the documents that there's an explicit sanctions tied to the explicitted by of -- bit of p.m.d. but enge the way the sequence works, what the requirements are on each party of this, means that there won't be any relief until iran has done its part and then the report itself will be icing on the cake. >> let me ask you, richard, and

kelsey, to clarify one aspect of this. when we say iran does it its part with respect to the iaea investigations, that means what? as i understand it i'm reading it, that means the iranians need to provide the cooperation, the information, the access that the iaea believes is necessary for it to close out its investigation but not necessarily the timing it -- the time it would take for the agency, which can take a long time, to draw conclusions from that information. is that correct? or what is your -- am i wrong on this? kelsey: according to the road map, iran has to provide the international atomic with the information, access, answer all of the concerns that the agency laid out in the annex to its november 2011, report and it needs to provide that information by august 15. then iran -- or the iaea will

evaluate that information and by september 15, if they want to ask iran any followup questions then that information can then -- then iran can have some time to followup with that information and ideally this process is cob colluded by october 15. then by december 15 the iaea will issue its assessment about the, sort of the full system of iran's past p.m.d. work. so that's according to the separate road map that the iaea and iran agreed upon and announced the same day as the deal which was tuesday. >> all right. other journalists with questions? yes, ma'am. thank you. >> hi, jessica "huffington post."

this is mostly for richard. is there any concern about a kind of contradiction or contradictory message that could be sent if congress imposes new sanctions immediately after the deal? there was a thought to extend the 1996 sanctions. what kind of message would it send to extend sanctions under the guise of it being related to terrorism or human rights in the region? richard: i would definitely say there's always a risk of mixed messages here and i think there's a risk that acting to some degree precipitously with respect to imposing new sanctions is a real problem. let's be clear. the iranians are not agreeing anywhere in this that they won't engage in things that look to us like terrorism or violations of human rights or other actions we've got problems with. they aren't changing their fundamental behaviors either.

what i think will have to happen is navigating attention -- navigating a tension between iranians doing bad acts in the region but not pursuing nuclear-related bad appings that cause us to walk away from the keel. us addressing this iranian bad acts but not doing so to such a degree the iranians say forget it, we're going to get our nuclear weapons program back because we think the deal is coming unhinged through the back door. i think the text, it's interesting, tries to deal with this a couple of different ways. that the parties agree not to do things that are at variance with the purposes of the jacoa, that the parties agree not to back door things in regulation. i think there's a tension here. i think it would be better to let the deal ime. -- implement itself and get started before anybody on either side starts trying to rock the boat. i think the true test of the deal will be can we keep it going? can we keep this arms control

arrangement and this nonproliferation arrangement together not withstanding the fact that we've got all these other problems? we were able to do so with the soviet union we were able to do so with the n.p.t., you think about it in a broader sense. i think we can do that here but we have to be careful about what we do. >> other questions? over here on this side. >> i'm russ, with federal foreign relations, minority side. kelsey this is not a perfect deal but are there significant loopholes in the monitor regular jet stream in your opinion, maybe specifically with regard to secret facilities or perhaps undeclared nuclear efforts or are there no significant loopholes? kelsey: i don't see any significant loopholes in terms of the monitoring and verification. and that's in part because of

the flexibility granted to the international atomic energy agency under the additional protocol. also, i think it's important to remember that with this accelerated timeline of the p.m.d. investigation the agency can still use the information gathered to inform its future decisions about what it monitors what it looks for and where it goes. because when you consider the entirety of iran's nuclear program, with the expanded declaration under the additional protocol, the iaea will now have much more regular access to every element of iran's knew leer program, but far expanded from what it has access to now. that includes the mines and mill the heavy water production plants for the iraq reactor. all areas that the iaea has had

little access to in the past. there also is an element that will be put in place, modified cose 3.1, to the iaea safeguards agreement, that ensures early notification of the iaea to design changes of facilities or if iran decides to build any new nuclear facilities system of when you consider early notification, when you consider the expanded declaration and short notice to all the facilities in the expanded declaration, when you consider the flexibility that will allow the iaea inspectors to access sites if concerns arise within 24 days, and then you layer on top of that the continuous monitor, the use of advanced technologies to check enrichment levels on a regular basis, to you know use radio seals an then you add on top that u.s.

intelligence the intelligence of other countries including israel, i think you have a system that is so layered that even if no one element is 100% guarantee, an alarm bill will trip at some point because iran would need to recreate the entirety of its process in order to covertly pursue nuclear ep wes. so i raily -- knew leer weapons. so i really think this is as strong as it needs to be to provide the highest guarantee that there will be no ill list activities. or if they are that they will be detected quickly. then the u.s. and international community will have time to respond. >> that's a very good explanation. it's ea are -- it's a reminder of one of the fundamentals of monitoring and verification that i think people lose track of. there's no such thing as 100%

certainty of compliance with an agreement. and one of the major purposes is to increase our confidence into the high 90's that we can detect militarily significant noncompliant activity. what does that mean for the cheat her it means the potential cheater is looking at a high 90% chance they'll get caught. that means they have to weigh the benefits and costs system of in that sense, it can serve as a deterrent. especially when you factor in what the losses are. so you know, there are going to be critics who are going to say this could be better here. that could be better there. and those may be valid criticisms. but as a whole, as kelsey said, the system needs to be considered as a whole and when you consider what monitoring and verification is designed to do, it's not 100% certainty but it is getting to the high high 90's that we can catch major violations. >> i would just add, before this

deal was reached before the interim deal was reached a representative said with high confidence that the united states would be able to detect, would be able to detect any iranian attempts to divert material for a nuclear weapon before they were eable to accumlit -- accumulate enough material for one bomb. that is before all of these additional measures being put in place. so i think that really does speak to how much the u.s. could do in the past and when you add all of these other elements on top of that, it provides an even stronger guarantee. >> we had another question up front here. wait for the mike, please. thank you. >> nancy gallagher, university of maryland. one of the issues that became a public controversy in the end game in the negotiations was what was going to happen with u.n. sanctions on ballistic

missions -- missiles ancon ventional arms and some people in effect said iran tried to reopen something that had been settled at the very last minute. other people say, no, this was an open question all along that wasn't settled. given that the la san framework itself -- the lasa -- lausanne framework was never released and they botheleased differing statements and both agreed not to say anything that was completely against it, was that genuinely a -- an open question at the time? >> "the new york times" has an interesting account of that issue just this morning. richard? richard: you'd have to talk to the negotiators themselves. i haven't been in the room since

december. i don't know to what degree he was agreed in la zahn. -- in lausanne. i do think there probably was a notional or provisional agreement on this point. i think that the way that it erupted as a problem, particularly with the russians coming in as they did in support of the iranian position, it struck me as something that was being reopened or if it wasn't already closed, it was pretty close, people were pretty confident it was going to be closed and then it came back open. but that said, the fundamental principle of this negotiation was always that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. so i am quite sure that the iranians probably described it to themselves and to the americans, if in fact it is true they tried to reopen something is that, no, other part theefs deal necessitated us coming back on this point. so in the end, it's certainly interesting to know the back and forth, i kind of look at the end result.

keeping a five-year conventional arms embargo in place against iran when it was only adopted by the u.n. because of the nuclear related issue is pretty good especially when you have the complementary u.s. sanctions that will permit taos impose pressure on people providing those systems to iran going forward until whenever. >> let's go here on the left. >> i'm steve with the u.s. conference of catholic bishops. i have a question but i'd like to make a brief comment first. i think one of the things we have that's going to be in the discourse is hope versus fear, right? hope versus fear. as a person of faith, of course i'd like to speak for hope a little bit. i think we should not underestimate what implementation, painstaking implementation of this agreement will do to transform

international relationships. particularly the u.s.-iranian relationship long-term. to build trust. through verification, not just through good feeling. but my question is this. we keep talking about the date by which iran could rush to enough material for a bomb. and that's one year. and it seems to be the assumption that then in a year they could have a bomb to threaten their neighbors. well, they have to test it. they have to deploy it. presumably you'd want to have more than one bomb if you're going to become a nuclear power because after you use the first one, you're kind of out of luck. so what is the realistic -- i mean, it seems we have a great deal of time even after that material is acquired before this becomes a genuine threat to the u.s. or anyone else. >> real quick on that, the reason why the one-year breakout timeline has been used as a measuring stick for the success

of this, one of then are -- one of the reasons is that once a country has enough fissile material for one bomb, it's difficult to keep prack track of what they're doing with it. but you're exactly right. that you know, 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium does not a nuclear arsenal make. there are many other steps to be taken. it has to be fashioned into a workable device. the country would like to test it to make sure it works. it would have to be mated with a delivery vehicle, delivery system. there's more time that would be necessary and of course one nuclear weapon doesn't do you too much good as a strategic weapon, maybe as a terror weapon. so -- but what's clear in this agreement -- is this agreement does block all the pathways to acquiring even that much material so iran can't do it in less than one year. and we mentioned the plutonium route in the beginning but the

plutonium path to the bomb is for all intents and purposes completely blocked because the iraq reactor is going to be modified with chinese assistance so they can't be producing a significant amount of plutonium in the spent fuel. this is very strong in terms of preventing iran from amassing even that amount of material. we have a lot of questions here system of let me try to get to a few of you. we won't get to all of you. why don't we go with, try toe back, if you could, virming, the gentleman on your side, near the middle row. thank you. >> my question is to mr. nephew.

several headlines have been, the concern is the sanctions, as well as sanctions against the central bank. in your view, what would happen to those entities mostly the central bank and local banks in iran, how would that work out? and the second question -- what do you make of the comments that the president made yesterday about the example of --

[inaudible] what do you make of that comment? >> so the terms of the deal basically removed sanctions that are the most pressing on the central bank of iran and permit iran, generally speaking, to have access to the swiss system with respect to institutions that were previously designated. this will allow broader financial ties internationally as well as accessing iranian money located in banks around the world. >> on the question of syria, i would say that, i would argue that probably syria is not where we want to start in terms of cooperation with the iranians. it's probably the area where we have the most tension. if you're trying to overcome 35 years of this taboo of not talking to each other, this seems to be an area where our interests are fundamentally

opposed unless they want to move to a political solution where assad, where they accept the transition awaugh from assad. at the same time i think if we were to go tomorrow to the iranians and say let's talk about syria, it would reinforce the saudis and the rest of the region's minds our plans to sell out ashe interests and cut a deal with iran. i think it probably makes sense to start with issues that are less raw and also to think about if we're going to first spend time push back in syria and building up american leverage an investment and then coming to the negotiating table at the end of the day civil wars only end three ways, one, an outside power comes in and sitz on the whole thing, not happening. two, one side wins. again, very unlikely at this point in syria. and three a negotiated political solution. iran will have to be part of that negotiated political solution but i think first expectations on the ground,

their calculus needs to change. our sue nu -- sunni partners' calculus needs to change and we need to have a policy of pushing back against iran while finding ways to reassure our partners. >> i see jessica matthews a former president here at carnegie. why don't you go ahead. >> thanks, darryl. i wondered from all four of your points of view what are the opportunities for one side or the other to fail to clearly meet their obligations that will lead to the kind of muddle that led to the unraveling of the north korea deal for example. well, you violated first, no you fell short first no, you did -- you know, where are we likely to get in trouble in that respect? >> that's a good question. i hadn't thought about it deeply since i woke up at 4:00 in the morning to look at the agreement.

but why don't we ask each of you to give your take on that. that's a good question. starting maybe with richard. richard: i think the biggest threat is because of the regional issues and terrorism related issues we have to continue on active -- an active sanctions policy that eventually chips away at the benefit prossvided and relief. when you combine that with iranian fiscals me management and inability to do with their economy what they could do, either because of corruption or just because they screw up or because oil prices remain low or investment doesn't flow as fast if the iranian goth says we're not getting what we're supposed to get. this might be honest that they're not getting what they're supposed to get because of other sanctions. it may be just a front to cover what is a bad economic policy on the igranian part. but that could make the iranians, and certainly a pop ewist figure like ahmadinejad,

or who knows who the next president of iran will be, could say, it's rouhani that's causing the problem. >> and the fact that the sanctions relief might come after parliamentary elections as a major problem here? >> i don't see it as a major problem but it -- but certainly from an iranian rouhani political stance, it would have been better for him and his guys to have it before. the celebratory mood in tehran is, he's going to get a boost in the parliamentary process. it would have been worse for him if the relief was already six months in place and they hadn't seen money coming in. the timing might be ok for him. ilan: i agree that's the greatest risk of the deal but there is an american policy solution to it. a lot of times we have multiple tools to go after terrorism, some of which are the

intelligence community, some of which are deployed by d.o.d. and some by treasury. the treasury approach, let's sanction something because that's the lowest risk approach. it involves the least risk of military escalation, things like that. it might actually be the given paradoxcally given we have this nuclear agreement, the sanctions to respond to iranian terrorism might be the riskiest approach because it undermoo -- undermines a broader interest we have in perpetuating the nuclear deal. maybe d.o.d. and the intelligence community need to be thinking more, and those tools need to be used more aggressively in some of the steps we take because there's risk associated with that, too obviously, but it's a way to compartmentalize and try to separate and protect the agreement and our nonproliferation interests and other interests in the region. kelsey: i agree with what they

said and also add another concern about any party intentionally exploiting the review process and the ability then to go to the u.n. security council with the intention of not resolving the dispute but actually trying to kill the deal. because essentially if a party does not think, if any one of the states does not think that an ambiguity or concern has been resofted in the joint commission or then through the ministerial level or going to an arbitration panel they can go directly to the u.n. security council and for the permanent five members, vetoing the resolution will start to put sanctions back in place. that could be deliberately used, i think, to prevent the agreement from moving forward. and that option will remain open past this administration and when you hear some of the presidential candidates explicitly talking about wanting to unravel the deal, there certainly is an opening there.

that gives me some concern. >> one other quibbling thought. this is not so much a big threat to the implementation of the agreement but it's something that i think everyone needs to pay attention to, including the congress and the other governments involved in the negotiation, p-5 plus one, which is that the iaea will need additional resources to do added work. the iaea has a rotating team about 50 people on the iran file. they do a very good job. but they're going to need more people. they're going to need more resources. and there is a zero budget growth policy affecting all u.n. agencies and so it's going to require voluntary contributions additional contributions from key states, the united states, to give the agency the resources they need. that's probably -- we'll probably be hearing from the director general amano now that he knows what the terms are and

what they need to know, we'll be hearing more from him about what kind of resources he needs on an annual and ongoing pay sis. it can be done it's just going to require governments stepping up and providing those resources. >> one small point. one other key, i think, vulnerability to this that kelsey got at. what happens with our presidential transition? and i don't think that, even if it's a republican or somebody who opposed the agreement, if it's implemented for the next year and a half, i think the next president will continue to implement it. but will they implement it holding their nose? will bit the innovate eunited states and secretary of the state or senior level envoy who has direct access to the president of the united states, or will it be some deputy assistant secretary of state deep inside the state department that nobody's really listening to? and in that keas i think the agreement falls apart by neglect.

we have lot of cases, one example is north korea. another example of that different levels of prioritization of the iraq issue in the bush and obama administrations. obama executed the bush drawdown plan but the level of senior level engagement, nobody watched the issue for a few years. this matters a lot. it's -- another example is the clinton-bush and handover on al qaeda. this is a problem with the u.s. that we have and we have to deal with. i just need to point out one other thing too. richard: we talked about risk coming from the p-5 plus one. the iranians have cheated on their treaty obligations for 30-odd years. it is not at all outside of their capacity to either cheat intentionally, have some guy do something he's not supposed to do and have it become a much bigger problem there are a variety of things on the iran

side that could mange this deal fall apart too. it should be noted, we were thinking about our own perspective but we have to make sure the iranians do their part too. >> that's part of our concern and we simply weren't expressing it because it's quite obvious. there will be problems. i think there is this is a long-term agreelt. there are going to be disputes. and there are mechanisms available to deal with them. but it's going to take continued good judgment, political leadership and good faith efforts, particularly on the part of the iranen -- iranians so we don't have a major blowup along the way. we are almost out of time. i want to see if there's one more quick question we can answer and then we're going to be closing. why don't we go with this gentleman on the right side. if you could get over to him. right there. your mike is right in front of you sir. >> ok.

i'm with the embassy. i was going to ask the same question as jessica first of all, but i think that's pretty well answered so the second i have is very specific since richard was there is there anything inconsistent at the u.s. state and local levels, the federal government will do whatever it can to ensure that. could you clarify where that could be possible where you could a local or state government that could put in their own iran sanctions and if you see that as a stumbling block? >> there are. there are state and local di vestment campaigns. primarily that deal with iran, that could be and i think are considered to be sanctions both by the people who came up with the idea as well as by the iranians. under our federal system of government, there are limitations as to what the federal government can do here. that's why the language will stay as it is. there is no commitment on the

part of the united states federal government to force the states to abandon di vestment strategies and things like that. there are laws on the books in the federal system that basically give cover to di vestment and say it's something that state and local officials ought to be able to do. i think you could see some attempt to modify that. but i think more broadly there's going to be two things. one is a general statement of advocacy that di vestment decisions that are inconsistent with the terms of the deal are not helpful under the foreign policy authorities given to the federal government. there should be -- the supremacy clause should grant that to the federal government and state and local governments shouldn't do things inaccident with that. but there's concern about the overuse of federal authority by local jurisdictions including sanctions that may be suspected. i think what this is intended to say is if you're a financial regulator and the federal government has suspended a sanction covers you too. what this may set up in the future is legal challenge.

frankly. between the federal, state and local levels to deal with particular cases. especially if the iranians were to plain that a particular case is inconsistent with the deal. we have to see how the courts will deal with that if and when it comes up. >> as we said, it's complex. there's a lot to this agreement. we hope we clarified a good bit about how the agreement is supposed to work. what's at stake. what are some of the other considerations down the road. an also we hope we provide some insight into why so many believe this is in the -- on balance in the u.s.'s national security interest and a major step forward for the nuclear nonproliferation efforts especially in the world's most volatile region, the middle east. i want to thank everyone who came here today in our audience. i want to thank the audience on c-span.

more than anything i want to thank our speakers for the presentations. the transcript of this event will be on the website without a couple of days. there's more about the agreement, the negotiations and please join me in a round of applause for our great speakers today. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> we are adjourned. thank you.

later why greek lawmakers approved austerity measures that were rejected. live at 7am eastern. >> on friday the event is live on c-span, too. -- c-span 2.