iran constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in history. these measures have clearly demonstrated to their leaders the cost of flouting international law cutting them off from the world's markets and crippling their economy. today, the iranian economy is about 20% smaller than it remained in the pre-2012 growth path. together we established a web of far reaching u.s. and international sanctions that persuaded iran's leadership to come to the table, prepared to roll back its nuclear program. international consensus and cooperation to achieve this is bible -- vital. the unity of purpose produced for tough un security council resolutions and national security sanctions in many countries. the point of these sanctions was to change iran's nuclear

behavior, by holding out the prospect of relief if the world's concerns were addressed. once the iaea verifies that iran has taken key steps to rollback its nuclear program and extend its breakout time to at least one year, sanctions relief would come into effect. there is no signing bonus. to be clear, there will be no immediate changes to you in, eu, or u.s. sanctions. only if iran fulfills the necessary nuclear conditions will be u.n. suspend secondary sanctions on a limited basis. of course we must guard against the possibility that i run -- iran does not uphold it set of the deal. if iran violates its commitments once we have suspended the sanctions, we will be able to snap that vote to the u.s. and human sections. since prohibiting the human stamp act requires a prohibitive

vote from the un security council, the united states has the ability to force every imposition -- the reimposition of those sections. we will maintain significant sections that follow outside the scope of the nuclear dell, -- deal, including our primary u.s. trade embargo. with limited exceptions, iran will continue to be net i've access to the world's largest market, and we will maintain powerful sanctions targeting iran's support for terrorist groups such as hezbollah, it's backing of the resolve machine -- the assad regime, and its human rights abuses at home. we will not be relieving sanctions on iran's guard corps,'s subsidiaries, or senior

officials. some argue that sections relief is premature and telegram -- intel iran faces these activities. i understand the concern but iran's ties to terrorist groups are why we must keep it from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those two threats would raise a nightmare scenario. a nuclear iran would be a far more menacing threat. if we cannot solve both concerns at once, we need to address them. this will address the nuclear danger, freezing us and our allies -- freeing us and our allies to monitor iran more aggressively. we must also be measured and realistic and understand what sanctions relief will mean to iran. iran's $1 billion in restrictive foreign reserves, which many fear will be used for nefarious purposes contradicts its

long-term savings, not its annual budgetary allowance. we estimate that after sanctions relief, iran will be able to freely exacerbate only half of these reserves, or about $50 billion. that is because over $20 billion is created -- limited to projects in china, where it cannot be spent, and tens of billions in additional funds are not performing well to iran's energy and banking sector. in reality, iran cannot simply spend the resources, as they will likely be needed to meet international payment obligations. moreover, president rouhani was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces an imperative to meet those promises. he faces over half $1 trillion in pressing -- half a trillion dollars. iran is in an economic coal -- hold that will take years to

climb out of. backing away from the steel to escalate the economic pressure and try to obtain a barter -- broader capitulation from iran would be a mistake. even if one believed that extending sanctions pressure was a better course that resolving the threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is not available. our partners agreed to impose costly sanctions on iran for one reason -- to put a stop to its nuclear program. if we change our terms now and insist these countries escalate those sanctions and applied into objectionable activities, they would balk, and we would be left with neither a nuclear deal more effective sanctions. it is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions pressure would force iran to capitulate. it is impractical to believe that we could count on a global

coalition of partners after turning down a deal that our partners believes is a good one. the plan of action is a strong deal, with phase relief after iran the phils's commitments to rollback its nuclear program with a powerful step back later if they break the deal. that is an overriding national security priority, and it should not be put at risk, not at the prospect of an unconstrained nuclear program consist -- presents a threat to the world. thank you, and we look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you very much. thank you for your testimony. it has been stated many times that the eyes states has maintained its ability to impose sanctions relative to human rights violations and ballistic missile issues, and i have read the j cpl a and there are

several -- the jcpoa, and it gives me concerned. paragraph 29 -- the parties will refrain from any policies to directly or adversely reflect normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. i just want to get your assurance that we have full ability to use the tools of sanctions against iran for its support of terrorism nonnuclear activities, which include congressional action. >> it was a matter of extension -- extensive discussion in the negotiations. we made clear that we retained the ability and we were going to keep in place sanctions on terrorism, on regional destabilization, on human rights violations -- in fact, we are

not lifting sanctions based on those authorities, and we are not designate -- de-designating entities designated for those reasons. we also reserve the right to put additional sanctions in place to address concerns about terrorism , human rights, and -- >> and when you say we come a that is congress in the united states. sec. lew: congress has authority in this area. another is registration pending regarding has the law. we would work with you on legislation. the thing we can't do is we can't just put right back in place everything that was part of the nuclear sanctions and put a new label on it. we have reserved our rights to put sanctions in place that address those continuing activities. >> the iran sanctions act expires at the end of 2016. we will still be in the jcp away -- jcpoa period of time in

which this is a viable hedge against iran's cheating's. congress may want to extend that loss about that power is available immediately if iran were to violate the agreement. is that permitted under the jcpoa? sec. lew: if it is on exploration, that is one thing if it is well in advance, that is another. coming out of the box is different from what you do when it expires. >> secretary, the question is why that would be, but we will get to that. there are three types of activities that could take place in violation of the jcpoa by i run. they could be using nuclear material in violation, and you have already addressed that issue, but it could involve weaponization or research not using nuclear materials.

with the 24 day delay in those cases compromise our ability to determine whether ironic is in compliance with the agreement? sec. lew: again, the nuclear material i think we have addressed. it is quite secure. when it goes in to weaponization activities, even there there is a spectrum. for example, working with iranian metal is something that would still involve nuclear material. i think we would have strong tools there. we go to some other activities not getting into too many specifics, there will still be a variety of signatures, for example, my second priority on the weaponize asian list would be explosively -- weaponization list would be explosively driven devices. there are telltale signs that we would have what the iaea inspectors would have access to.

when one gets into other areas such as computer modeling, that is a different kind of detection challenge. in all of these cases, to go to undeclared sites we have to rely upon our intelligence capabilities those of our partners, to be able to point the iaea to suspicious activities. but there are none the nuclear signatures, but it does get more copper gated. sen. cardin: secretary kerry, i want you to elaborate more on our capacity to the time limits, and iran's obligations to the time limits in regards to weaponization of a nuclear weapon. i understand you so obligations -- they still have obligations under their nonproliferation treaty and obligations under protocols, but could you tell us

how much lead time we will have and what assurances do we have that we will detect and take action before iran becomes a nuclear weapons state? sec. lew: first of all throughout -- sec. kerry: throughout the entire life of the agreement the protocol provides for the right of access. that is where the 24 hour notice comes from, and they have to respond to it. if we had in the intelligence regarding the suspicious activity or suspicious sites, i would add that among many -- the p5 plus one -- israel, other countries -- we would have an incredible amount of sourcing for this. we would then be able to put the

ax down, and they would have to respond to that. if we they don't respond, we would have the ability to put back in place sanctions or take other actions if we deem that appropriate -- sen. cardin: after the 15 years? sec. kerry: yes, melanie -- yes. we also have a plan that tracks centrifuged productions and we have a 25 year insight which is an access and monitoring tracking of their life of the uranium cycle. from the mining, the mills, the yellowcake production, the gasification, the centrifuged out into the wast -- centrifuge, out into the waste, we will have the ability to monitor that every step of the

way. if we have an extra amount of raw uranium or coming out or if there is an excess amount of milling take place -- taking place and some is averted somewhere, we are going to have extraordinary insight. in addition, under the additional protocol and under the iaea process for civil nuclear programs, all of the facilities are declared, because it is a civil nuclear program. as such, there is literally 20 47 visitation in those sites -- 24/seven visitation in those sites. -- 24/7 visitation. we are going to have amazing insight because they are living by the ndt, or allegedly, and that's what we are going to have to make sure they are doing. we have day today insight on to that. -- into that.

on the agreement, which a number of people called a stork mistake and a tragedy, those same people asked for us to keep that in place -- a historic mistake, those same people asked us to keep that in place to think years earlier because it worked. iran has lived up to every component of that. they reduced the 20% uranium they undid iraq, so on and so forth. they will have this level of insight, which i think is not being examined and understood. nothing ends at 15 years. the size of the stockpile and -- in things -- ends. a civil nuclear program or's -- requires enrichment at 5% or so. if you start to enrich higher,

around 20%, you're talking about the tehran research reactor and a few other things, but there is no rationale for richmond -- for enrichment above that. we would have insight to that enrichment program that would instantly know if they would be able to go some -- if they were going to go somewhere else. red flags would be everywhere and we would be able to respond. the fact is the breakout team never goes down to a level below which we have an ability to respond. sen. cardin: thank you. >> mr. chairman, man just ask -- may i just ask -- what could be a collateral benefit of this agreement is, going to the uranium supply chain -- the safeguards -- i just want to add that this is something the iaea really wants to have much more broadly. this would be a first in moving towards cradle-to-grave safeguards.

>> i might add that there are other parts that we cannot talk about relative to some of their procedures, which i alluded to. i would say to mr. secretary yes, people have said that they would rather keep it in place and move to something worse. that doesn't mean that people particularly like it in the first place, but on comparison. i just want to clarify that. sen. risch: senator cardin who i have the highest respect for made a statement, and that is what we really need -- that we really need to leave emotion out of this. i couldn't agree more. this should be done in a nonemotional way, but that doesn't mean we leave common sense out of this, with all due respect. we have gone to the mantra of no deal is better than a bad deal. i have heard people say that. now we have gotten to the point where you have to accept this or

else it's war. the mantra has changed dramatically. all i can say is after reviewing this, even in a cursory fashion anyone who believes this is a good deal really joins the ranks of the most naive people on the face of the earth. when you're dealing with the people we are dealing with, with the history they have of chaining and everything else, anyone who can say this is a good deal -- i know the justification is well, it's not perfect -- the word perfect should not even be used in a sentence with this agreement. one of the most disappointing things is that we have been told we have no choice in this. we have no choice because we have gone from the position where we started, when we had iran isolated and they reviewed on the world -- were viewed on the world's stage as the pariah.

if we don't go along with this, the other negotiators well, and the isolate -- the united states will be isolated on this issue and we will be the pariah. they can about that. -- think about that. these negotiateions have gone to a situation where we had iran exactly where he wanted them, but now, if we don't go along with this, we will be the isolated pariah on the national stage. the other thing that was important is verification. we have to have verification. this is the number one thing on verification. everyone here knows that there is a site called part in. -- parchen. it was designed to ensure that nuclear ambitions are only for peaceful purposes -- i heard the secretary say we are going to ensure that nuclear ambitions are only for peaceful purposes.

how would parchan ensure that? it stays in place. does that sound like it's for peaceful purposes? let me tell you the worst thing about that. we can't even take samples there. iaea can't take samples there. they are going to be able to test by themselves. even the nfl wouldn't go along with this. how in the world can you have a nation like i run -- iran doing their own testing? secretary moneys toles don't worry, we are going to watch on tv, and there is -- secretary moniz told us, don't worry, we can watch it on tv. are we going to trust ironic -- iran to do this? that this is a good deal?

don't worry, we're going to watch over their shoulder and put protections in place that are bulletproof. we are going to trust iran to do their own testing? this is absolutely ludicrous. the one thing that bothers me incredibly is the billions of dollars that are on is going to get -- iran is going to get. while they have been in a horrible financial condition and we have gotten them there, one of the national priorities has been -- there are national priorities has been to support terrorism stop they have supported hezbollah hamas with financial aid, military aid -- every can of eight there is. everything we are trying to do in the world as their fingerprints on it, trying to do us in. these billions of dollars are going to be put back in their hands within nine months. again we were told yesterday it doesn't matter what we do --

congress, go ahead and do your thing -- it doesn't matter because we don't have control over this money, because it was the other people who said they would have control over the money, and no matter what they do they will release billions of dollars. i've got to tell you, this is a heavy lift when you sleep at night and you say i'm going to vote to release $50 billion. started at $100 billion. now you got it at $50 billion. knowing that that money -- a portion of that money is going to be directly transferred to people who are going to be trying to kill americans and are trying to kill innocent people and our allies. to be able to walk away from this and say that this is a good deal is ludicrous. with all due respect, you guys

have been bamboozled, and the american people are going to pay. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator boxer. >> my time is up, mr. chairman. i expect we will hear lots. sec. kerry: isn't there time built in for answers? >> i am more than glad for you to take a moment to answer and let this get a fair hearing. sec. kerry: let me start with a hearing. the comment was made that it is naive if you think this is a good deal. this is an article from "the washington post." "how the iran deal is good for israel." according to israelis, who know what they are talking about. i encourage you to read it. it says here that a host of leaders have come out in various stages of negotiations and

support the obama administration's efforts. in an interview this week, the former head of shin bet, or israel's top to mystic security agency says that israel's partitions were playing with fear in a peaceful society. he stated this was an effective way to curb the iranian threat. i don't think he's naive. the former chief of the sod hailed obama's victory. look folks senator, you said you had them exactly where you wanted them. 90,000 centrifuges. enough missile material for bombs. is that where we wanted them? what was the purpose of those sanctions? i was chairman when i passed those, and our purpose was to bring them to negotiations.

so we've negotiated. and i guarantee you, for the first 15 years, you have unbelievable restraints that make it impossible to even think about making a bomb. at the end of 15 years you have every option you have today. your decision is whether you want those 15 years to be right now, or take the 15 years and figure out whether or not this is going to work. that is the choice. i don't know what you mean by we have them right where we wanted them. to what end? >> before i turn to senator boxer, i do want to say that iran has been in masterful job -- has done a masterful job. giving you a talking point with the 19,000 centrifuges, 10 of which are operating, but we all know they are antiques. they are antiques. we all talk about the number of centrifuges, but the steel lays out -- this deal lays out their

ability to continue research and development on the ir-8s, and in your age they can finalize that. sec. kerry: for a peaceful program. sen. corker: they did a masterful job in getting the west and other countries to focus over here on something that is of no use to them. while they are able to draft an agreement thatt gives them a pathway to sophisticated development on something, so with that, secretary boxer. >> every element of the r&d program is rolled back in time.

the fact is they right now have -- they are very active in all these areas, and it is significantly delayed. that is a fact. sen. cardin: and it is a fact in year 8 -- sen. corker: it is a fact in your age -- let me go to senator boxer. >> senator, that is an incorrect characterization. i apologize. it is a small cascade that they can start to do years after their current plans. sen. corker: and many people thought it was going to take them that long to even think they have the capacity to do that, so as a mentioned, from a critical path standpoint, they have been brilliant. sen. boxer: are you ready for me? >> im. [laughter] sen. boxer: ok.

colleagues, put me down as someone who thinks iran is a bad and dangerous actor. i don't think there is one person involved to doesn't think that. that's why a believe we need to curb their nuclear ambitions. i think it is essential. i don't think the american people want another war, and at the end of the day, i think that's really the option. which everyone tiptoes around all stop -- everyone tiptoes around. i support the right of my colleagues to support anything they want. but you said there and you have heard two of my colleagues go after you with words that i am going to repeat. you were fleeced, one said, the other said you have been bamboozled. putting aside the fact that i

think that is disrespectful and insulting, that is their right to do. there are other ways to express your disagreement, but that goes to your core as a human being and your intelligence, and i think you are highly intelligent. let me ask you, and if you could just answer yes or no -- i know it's hard, secretary kerry, to do so -- [laughter] sen. boxer: sen. boxer: sen. boxer: because we are senators and it is not our way. i want to ask you, does the united kingdom, our strong ally, support this? sec. kerry: yes. sen. boxer: does australia, one of our strong as allies, support this? sec. kerry: yes. sen. boxer: does germany support this accord? sec. kerry: yes.

sen. boxer: does france support this accord? sec. kerry: yes. sen. boxer: does new zealand to support this accord? sec. kerry: i haven't seen their statement. sen. boxer: well, they are on the security council and they voted for it. did jordan voice its support? sec. kerry: yes. sen. boxer: did spain? did nigeria? did lithuania? sec. kerry: yes. sen. boxer: you get the drift. if you were bamboozled him of the world has been bamboozled. that is ridiculous. and it is unfair, and it is wrong. he can disagree -- you can disagree, for sure, with aspects of this agreement, but i think we need to stay away from that kind of rhetoric. i had the agreement right here and i have read it, and one thing that i was surprised as i sat down to read it, i thought

would i be able to understand this document? it is very understandable, so i want to cite a couple of things in here -- iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will i run -- iran ever seek develop or require any nuclear weapons. that is one phrase. another one is -- this one is number 16. iran will not engage in activities that would contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium. that is in this accord. one of the things i want to do is send out a message to our run. -- iran. not to the people of iran, who are very good people, but to those folks there that are dangerous.

that is -- you said it will clearly -- if you don't live up to it, i guarantee you the consequences will not be pretty. i think that is an important message that has to go out, because they signed it, and they said it, and the all world is watching them -- whole world is watching them. secretary kerry, i authored the u.s.-israel strategic partnership act and the u.s.-israel enhanced security cooperation act. president obama signed both of those. it means that we stand shoulder to shoulder with our closest allies. we know israel does not like this agreement. i am very glad that you read those comments because the truth is, there is division. it is quiet, but there are some who think this was the way to go. i would hope, as someone who has stood tall for this relationship

with israel, at the end of the day, i think this relationship is going to be even more strength in. i want to get your view on that because i know ash carter went to israel. do you have anything to report about that how meet -- about that meeting and how that went? sec. kerry: secretary carter went with the intentions of letting out and beginning a dialogue in great detail, what she did with the defense minister of israel. they had almost a day longer meeting in which they discussed the many ways in which we are prepared to work with israel, understanding the very dangerous dynamics of the region right now. secretary carter, in fact, went there to review with them what the threat is currently with isil and so forth.

these are all things we are prepared to push back on in any number of ways, and we also believe that there is a potential of a new alignment in the region. i will be going to speak with all the jcc members in a few days to talk about the ways in which the gulf can come together with israel and others in a new alignment. sen. boxer: i want to press you on that, because we were reading about saudi arabia's words today in the press. i don't have enough time to check it out, and i wanted to ask you -- do you believe the saudi's are supportive now, despite the fact that they view iran as a regional adversary? sec. kerry: i believe they will be supported. -- supportive. i met with the prime minister a few days ago -- he indicated that they are prepared to support it if certain things happen. those things i believe are going to happen, so i anticipate that.

senator, i am sorry to diverge but i just wanted to mention -- i forgot the quote -- because i don't want to be accused of the person making the choices, military or otherwise. the chief of the massage also said -- mostouussad said everyone who is followed iran in recent decades has to admit truthfully that they never believed iran will be able to discuss these issues, let alone agreed to the measures imposed upon them by the world powers. the alternative would be military strikes, which would plunge the region into deeper insecurity and likely would not a successful. -- be successful. we are not alone in describing the choices here. i think, senator, there is a real potential in how the change in the middle east as the

potential to have a confrontation. this does not add the possibility of a confrontation with iran, depending on the choices they make. sen. boxer: would you just think wendy sherman for me, personally, for her worked on? donald trump said something -- why don't you bring women into this negotiation -- it would go much better. wendy sherman is fantastic. i wish she was here. sec. kerry: she is spectacular. she did an extraordinary job. we will not be where we are without whitney, jack, and an incredible team -- a team, by the way, all across the government of the united states. experts whose life is spent analyzing iran, who came from the and -- the energy department, the intelligence committee, believe me, they are resetting group of people, and nobody -- they are a savvy group of people, and nobody pulled all

over their eyes. >> thank you, senator remo -- rubio. sen. rubio: it has been stated that you believe this deal is going to be rejected. while winning the approval of congress would be nice, your goal is basically to convince enough democrats to support the deal that you can override and the president can veto. for the most part, this is a done deal, but i think it is important for the world and iran to understand that as far as the american sections are concerned this is a deal whose survival is not guaranteed beyond the term of the current president. i hope the next president is someone who will remove the national security waiver and reimposed the congressional sanctions that were passed by congress, because the steel is fundamentally flawed. i believe it weakens our national security and makes the world a more dangerous place. throughout the process, by the way, this a ministration is repeatedly capitulating -- this

administration has repeatedly capitulated on several items. i understand all the disputes about the terms, but clearly there was a perception created among my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that we were pressing for anywhere, anytime and inspections, including potential covert sites. this actions are also hollow. we have this 24 day arbitration process that i wrong is going to test and -- that iran is going to test an exploit. they know once the international sanctions are gone, it will be impossible to snap back. it has been bragged that, quote once the structure of the sanctions collapse, it will be impossible to reconstruct it. he also bragged that violations -- and criminal violations will not be prosecuted. no matter what happens, i run will keep the billions of

dollars it received upfront basically essays -- basically as a signing bonus. iran will be able to maintain ballistic missiles for nuclear warfare. all of these promises they are making are filled with lies. their developing long-range rockets capable of hitting this very room one day not so far in the future. the deal also allows the arms embargo to eventually end. for terrorism, this deal provides billions to a regime that directly threatens the interest of the united states and our allies. lastly, nothing in the deal holds iran to account on human rights. quite the opposite. the iranian regime is being rewarded for its atrocious human rights record. i know you said that you brought up the american hostages in every negotiation, and i think we all thank you for that. but to the families who are missing and attained in iran

such as robert levinson, this deal is brought no information regarding their loved ones. this deal is nothing for washington post supporter jason whose brother ali is in this room today. you negotiated with a official who impressed on jason's case and light to the world, -- lied to the world saying we don't jail for people's opinions. a dictator wrote a letter in prison saying, quote, secretary kerryuy is offering economic concessions to save them to economic meltdown as iran and hostages. the only people this deal does anything for directly are the iranian officials who want to execute their people, who hate israel and seek to why the jewish state from the face of

the planet, who want to spread mayhem throughout the middle east and help us odd slaughter the syrian people and perhaps kill israelis and americans while they are at it. secretary kerry, i do not fault you for engaging in diplomacy, i don't. i do fault that you are striking a terrible deal with iran. i hope enough of my colleagues can be dissuaded -- persuaded to vote against the steel. -- this deal. there any and -- the iranian regime in the world should know that this deal is your deal with iran. the next president is under no obligation to live up to its. the iranian regime and the world should know that this congress does not support the steel, and the deal could go away on the days that president obama leaves office. on an and note, i want to ask about this -- if you were to go

into iran and building manufacturing the silly, and the nest -- the next president of the united states lets the security waiver are iran violates the deal, did the sanctions apply against that facility moving forward? if a company goes into iran now after this deal, else a manufacturing facility of any kind, and in iran violates the deal, and the sanctions kick back in, well that facility be able to continue to operate without facing sanctions? >> if a company asked to go in to do business with iran while sanctions are lifting, that would be permitted. if iran violates the deal, they would not be able to continue doing things that are in violation of the sanctions. sen. rubio: it is important for companies anywhere in the world to know that whatever investment they make in iran, they are risking it. they are living on the hope that

iran never violates the deal and that the next president does not reimpose u.s. congressional sections by which they would become a sectional entity. i have one more specific question. there is a section titled "nuclear security," in the document states that those who negotiated the deal are prepared to cooperate with iran on the implementations of nuclear security guidelines and best practices. there is a provision that reads cooperation through training and workshops to strengthen iran's ability to protect against and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems. here is my questions. if israel decides it does not like this deal, and it wants to sabotage an iranian nuclear program, does the steel obligate us -- does this deal obligate us

to protect its the sabotage of any country in the world? -- against the sabotage of any country in the world? >> that refers to things like physical security and safeguards. all of our options would remain in place. sen. rubio: i guess that's my point. if israel conducts an airstrike against a physical facility, does this deal require us to help iran protect and respond to that threat? >> no. sen. rubio: it does not. >> the purpose of that is to have longer-term guarantees, as we enter a world in which cyber warfare is increasingly concerned for everybody, that if you are going to have a nuclear capacity, you clearly want to be able to make sure that those are adequately protected, but i can assure you, we will coordinate

in every possible way with israel with respect to israel's concern -- sen. rubio: israel conducts a cyber attack against the nuclear iranian program -- sec. kerry: i assure you that we will be correlating closely with israel as we do on every aspect of national security. i don't see any way possible that we will be in click -- in conflict with israel with respect to what we might want to do there and we will have to wait until we get to that point. i listened to a long list of your objections about it, but there is no alternative that you or anybody else has proposed as to what -- sen. rubio: i sure have secretary. sec. kerry: i am confident that the next president will have enough common sense that if this

is being up limited, they will not just arbitrarily in bang it. -- in bang it. -- end it. i cannot see someone money saying, let's go back to where they were, where they are completely free to do anything they want, without any inspections, restraints, or insights. i don't think any president will do that. sen. rubio: before you signed this deal, iran was already in violation of existing mandates, including a thing they had signed on to in the past. sec. kerry: this deal brings them back into compliance, senator. if they don't live up to it every option we have today is on the table. we don't lose anything here. the way we lose is by rejecting the deal, because then you have no restraints. you have no sections. you have no insight. you have no inspectors. you have no reduction of their

stockpile. if you want to conveniently forget the fact that they had enough is a material -- enough material to build 10 or 12 bombs, that is the same as israel. if you go back to that without any alternative, other than what most people think is going to be the alternative, which is confrontation, nobody has a plan that is articulated -- as articulated and reasonable as to how you're going to strengthen this and do something more, when the supreme leader of iran and others believe they have signed an agreement with the world. the rest of the world thinks it's a good agreement. if you think the ayatollah will come back and negotiate again with an american, that is fantasy. you are never going to see that because we will have proven we are not trustworthy. we have 535 secretaries of state. that is going to undo a whole bunch of efforts and things that matter with people in the world.

that is what is at stake. sen. corker: mr. secretary, just to ensure that i have appropriately addressed the situation, i want to reframe it and say that we have been fleeced and not make that think it is directed at him. -- at you. one of the ways we have brought them in compliance is that we have agreed to let them do what they are doing and actually agreed to let them do it on an industrialized basis. i have to say, that is how we brought them into compliance. sec. kerry: this is an important point. we are not alone in this. the bush ministration propose the exact same thing. -- administration proposed the exact same thing. this is not just something that president obama dreamed up of.

in 2000 eight, president bush and condoleezza rice signed the referendum with p5 plus one, and they said that in return for iran doing things with a nuclear program, years were going to do -- recognize iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will stop that's all we are doing. treat iran's nuclear program in the same matter of any nonnuclear state party. provide technical and financial assistance for peaceful nuclear energy, including the state-of-the-art power reactor support for r&d and legally binding fuel supply guarantees. improve relations with iran and support iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs. think about that. work with iran and others about confidence building measures and regional security. reaffirmation of the obligation to refrain from the threat that is enforced. cooperation on afghanistan. step towards normalization of

trade and economic relations. energy partnership. civil aviation cooperation. assistance in iran's economic and social development. all of that was offered by president george w. bush, june 12 2008, the didn't happen. -- but didn't happen. sen. corker: you are filibustering. the one element you left out that they did not agree to was allowing them to enrich. if i could -- sec. kerry: that's fine. sen. mendez: i appreciate the work you have been in pursuit of. i think that no one would want to be applauding you more than i, who has been following our on since my days -- iran since my days on the committee nearly 20 years ago.

as the office of the sections was in, the recognized to bring a run to the negotiating table. -- iran to the negotiating table. i'm concerned that the deal and shines for iran -- enshrines for iran and coerces the international community to assisting iran in completing a nuclear program complete with industrial enrichment. i understand the program will be in's -- will be subject to iran's npt obligations, i think it fails to appreciate our hands history of deception and its nuclear program and its violations of the npt. in the long run, i think it will make it harder to demonstrate that iran's program is not being used for a peaceful purpose, because iran will have legitimate reasons for advanced centrifuges and enrichment program. we will have to demonstrate that it's intention is dual use and not justified by its industrial make clear power program.

that is a much more difficult burden. mr. secretary, you have always been skeptical about sections. but when you were chairman of this committee, and a hearing on sections legislation when at i was offering when the of ministration was vigorously arguing against it, your comment was -- what you are really saying that this is a blunt instrument that risks adverse reaction, as opposed to account joint effort. -- a calculated effort. in that hearing, i had to come back because i didn't expect that the question of the amendment would come up. they were there trying to excoriate the effort. it passed 99-0 and was embraced by the administration is the reason iran has come back to the negotiating table.

let me ask -- under the sanctions heading of the agreement, paragraph 26 says, and i quote -- the united states ministration acting consistent with the roles of president and the congress, will refrain from reintroducing orrery imposing sanctions specified in annex two, which is basically the sanctions this committee and congress passed, thd. i read that to mean that we cannot reintroduce or reimpose the existing sanctions that congress passed into law. is that right? sec. lew: senator, we have been very clear sec. lew: that we retain our right -- we have been very clear that we retain our right and we will impose sections that are not nuclear if they live with the nuclear agreement and they violate other -- asen. mendez: i am talking

about the provisions that will expire next year. if step back print -- if snapback provisions -- will the president agreed to reinforce the authorization of the existing sanctions that passed the senate 99-0 and will expire next year? sec. lew: let me be clear, the sections that are being lifted if iran complies we said we would not reimpose nuclear sanctions if they live with a nuclear agreement. quite my point is this -- if you're going to snap back, you have to snap back for something. sec. lew: snet back -- >> don't need up my time, with all due respect. -- heat up my time. if the sanctions that brought iran to the table expire next

year and we don't reauthorize it, there is nothing to snap back to, so why won't you simply say that the administration supports, under all the same provisions, including the president's waivers the sanctions so that the iranians know, if they violate, that the snapback will also include the snapback that congress passed. sen. boxer: sec. lew:sec. lew: we have a regime in effect -- if iran complies, we will lift stations and it is premature to talk about extending a law that -- senator mendez: it expires next year. -- senator menendez: it expires next year. i don't understand how we ultimately have a credible believe that snapback means

something, if in fact you are not going to have the ability to have the sanctions in place. let me ask this to the secretary -- is the president willing to make a clear and unequivocal statement, not that all options are on the table that under no circumstances will iran be permitted to acquire a nuclear 11. secretary kerry? -- a nuclear weapon. secretary kerry? did you your my question? sec. kerry: i apologize. sen. menendez. : is the president willing to make a clear statement that iran will not be permitted to acquire

a nuclear weapon? sec. kerry: he has said that. he has said very clearly under no circumstances will they be allowed to get a nuclear weapon -- carter reiterated -- sen. menendez: i have limited time. mr. secretary, i am seriously concerned about the lifting of the arms embargo that creek its way into this deal. as i read the security council resolution on page 119 the ban iranian ballistic missiles has been lifted. the new security council resolution is clear -- iran is not prohibited from carrying out the listing missile work. the resolution merely says iran is called upon not to undertake such activity. previously, and security council resolution 1929, the council used mandatory language, where

it said, quote iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. why would we accept inferior language that changes the mandatory shall to a permissive call upon? we often call upon a lot of countries to do or stop certain actions in the u.n. can you answer simply -- is around -- is iran and from ballistic -- banned from ballistic missile work over the next year's? sec. kerry: well, your answer senator? that is not accurate. the exact language in the barco -- in the embargo is in agreement with respect to launches. that is under article 25 of the u.n..

that is exactly where it is today in the language. in addition to that, iran did not want it, and we insisted on it. they are restrained from any sharing of missile technology -- any purchase of missile technology, work on missiles -- they cannot do that under article 41, which is chapter seven and mandatory. it does have the language as well. sen. menendez: i am reading to you from the security council resolution that was adopted, the agreement. that security council resolution says -- sec. kerry: [indiscernible] sen. menendez: mr. secretary, i am not making this up. iran is called upon -- sec. kerry: that is the same winglets that is in the embargo now.

we transferred it to this, and that's what it is. sen. menendez: i don't know why you wouldn't just keep the same language, which made it clear that you shall not, and because they sec. menendez: final question. the whole purpose of understanding the military dimensions of what happened is not for iranians to declare culpability, but to understand how far they got along in their weaponization efforts. general hayden said we have estimates but they are just that. is it true that the iranians will be able to take the example that they said? if at the beginning is what you are given is derived by the perpetrator -- sec. kerry: as you know, that is

a classified component of this supposed to be discuss in a classified session. we are prepared to fully brief you and a classified session. secretary moniz has had his team red team that effort and he has made some additional add-ons to where we are but it is part of the confidential agreement between the iaea and iran. the iaea says they are satisfied if they can do this in a way that does not compromise their knees and adequately gets the answers they need. sec. menendez: my time is up. if that is true, that would be the equivalent of the fox guarding the chicken. sec. kerry: i'm not confirming what is happening, i am just saying that the iaea has the ability to get the answers that they need. do you want to say anything?

>> this is a roadmap worked out between the iaea and iran. sec. moniz: we do not have the documents as is customary confidential between the country and the agency. but clearly, they have -- they know that they must have and be able to articulate a process with integrity in terms of making the measurements and being able to analyze them through their own laboratories and the network of laboratories, including u.s. laboratories that to the analysis of these kinds of samples. sec. lew: let me just say, you

need to go have that meeting. it will take about five seconds, ok? -- it will -- i will also add that we, as a nation, do not even have a copy. senator cardin and i have asked for this. we don't even have a copy. sen. corker: we don't have a copy of the agreement -- you understand this quickly and five seconds. we don't even have a copy of the agreement to ascertain on the half -- on behalf of the american people whether they iaea process which, again, you should look into this part of it -- has any integrity. it is very disappointing.

sec. menendez: the documents in question are kept confidential between iran and iaea. sen cardin: in regards to the military dimension -- they are critical for the baseline to deal with moving forward so it is a very important part and from what we can tell if we can get eyes on that document, it may answer some of our questions. secretary moniz has reached these kinds of conclusions. i think transparency will help us all better understand that i would just hope that in a confidential setting, they were been opportunity to review those documents. sen. johnson: how can that be confidential and why would that be classified? i can see iaea having those

agreements of numeral powers. iran is not a normal nation. we rushed to the united nations had this deal approved, and we don't even understand how the samples are going to be collected. secretary kerry, i have heard this deal described as historic. i will not use biden's full terminology but this is a big deal, correct? this is a big deal right? sec. kerry: this is an important agreement. sen. johnson: during our limited to date on the review act, i offered a couple of amendments and try to offer a third. two thirds of the senate should affirmatively approved such a big, historic deal. that, unfortunately, that amendment failed. i never got a vote on my next step in the process deeming

this a congressional executive agreement where both chambers ought to be involved. they would have to prove this with just a simple majority vote. the third amendment i try to offer reflected but we actually ended up getting in this convoluted process of voter disapproval, which would have been a congressional executive agreement with a low threshold approval of only 34 votes. that is unconstitutional. yet that is all we have heard my question is, if you are so confident that this is a great deal why wouldn't have you been supportive of allowing the american people to be involved in the decision through their elected representatives as to whether or not that was by just allowing both chambers to have a simple vote of approval rather than this but it process which -- let's face it -- you are quite confident that you are going to win this.

convince me that this what we are going through is not just a picture raid, because i am afraid -- just a big charade. sec. kerry: it wasn't my decision. sen. johnson: the administration certainly did not offer any kind of support for a more robust review process and you have certainly circumvented this congress by undermining our review process by having security council's approved this, is that true? sec. kerry: on the contrary, and this is a long time process over several centuries of executive -- of political agreements between countries. sen. johnson: so this is more than political agreement -- i want to go on. secretary moniz, if iran wants a

peaceful nuclear program there is no reason for them to have to enrich uranium, is there? sec. moniz: clearly, there is uranium available on the international market. sen. johnson: if they wanted a peaceful program, there is no need for them to enrich uranium. for example, when south africa and libya gave up their nuclear programs to be welcomed into the world of nations in a more normal fashion, they completely give up enrichment. we dismantled that. that is what we -- sec. moniz: i believe that is the case, especially with south africa, because they had a weapons program that was his mental. if i may add, by the way, the documents of the iaea and south africa and a dismantlement

program remain confidential. sen. johnson: are you familiar with the emp commission's 2008 report? sec. moniz: no, i am not. sen. johnson: do you know what emp is. sec. moniz: you will have to explain it. sen. johnson: electromagnetic pulse. sec. moniz: i am not, sir. i apologize. sen. johnson: i will send you a number of questions because the recommendations were from the department of homeland security for the department of energy. are you familiar with dr. garr win? sec. moniz: everybody is. sen. johnson: he testified yesterday with the former cia director about the threat of

emp. one of the reasons i held that hearing is -- nobody knows how this is going to gain out -- but the inevitable conclusion of this deal is that eventually iran will have a nuclear weapon. are you aware of the fact that iran has launched emp attacks? sec. moniz: no, i am not. sen. johnson: they have done that. an emp attack would be conducted by somebody night north korea or iran and can be conducted from a ship using a scud missile and the fact that you as the secretary of the department of energy, are not even aware of the 15 recommendations, things like evaluating quick fixes in the event of an emp attack. the fact that for literally 20-70,000,000 dollars, we could protect -- $20 million-$70

million -- i am highly concerned. if you are not even aware of these recommendations that were made public in 2008, seven years later, in testimony before our committee, we have done nothing, virtually nothing to address these recommendations by the commission. sec. moniz: first of all, i do not know that report. many of them must apply to dhs. on the transformer question, if you look at our energy review published in april, we identify emp as a risk to transformers and we are beginning to work up a response. sen. johnson: seven years later we have done nothing to protect ourselves. my point being we have heard

$50 billion to $104 billion. it is 13% of our eco--- of iran's economy. if the american economy had an interjection of 13% of our economy, that would be $2.4 trillion. this is not chump change. we have seen what kind of act or iran is -- actor iran is on the world stage. what this deal does is interject tens of billions -- 13% up front if he runs economy into -- into iran's economy into state-funded terrorism and when senator ruiz said we have them where we want them, i agree. we did not want them with centrifuges. but this deal puts them in a better position, this strengthens their hands. from this is standpoint, i am concerned.

>> can i respond to the point about iranian assets? let's be clear of what those assets are. it is not money we are giving to iran. it is iran's money that was locked up because of international nuclear sanctions that were designed to bring them to the table to negotiate an agreement. sec. lew: all that we have gone through is to analyze what that is it is not us giving them money. if there is a nuclear agreement that meets the criteria that the sanctions were designed to achieve, and that was the reason they were locked up. there are competing demands for that -- whatever it is -- we think it is about $50 billion. there is at least $500 billion of domestic demand. they cannot possibly scratch the surface of that need prayer we have never said there would be a penny going to -- purposes, they have managed to find money to put into maligned purposes but it would not exaggerate how much that is going to change. the assessment that we have that

the intelligence community has is that able not be a change in direction, that it will be on the margin, not the kind of increase that you are describing. >> before moving to senator sheen, we haven't lifted our sanctions -- which is the entity which carries out all of the terrorism on behalf of iran. what we uniquely did was we lifted sanctions and all their financial institutions. they are going to be the number one beneficiary of the sanctions lifting. we didn't lift sanctions on them, it is like not lifting sanctions on a holdings company but we lifted sanctions on the entity that receives the money that through the economic growth that shipment of oil and all of the things they do to empower them on top -- this is

almost chump change compared to what will happen over this next decade and so -- i would like to say that. >> could i just respond? we are not lifting sanctions on banks that were section for reasons related to terrorism. we have retained the ability -- >> those entities, if they violate the terms of our sanctions and our regime tensions on terrorism could be anxious and -- >> we have not said that any of those decisions are protected and in terms of the snapback, the point that senator menendez concluded is not correct. we have tools with or without sanctions to snap back sanctions through the nda a sanctions on oil and financial institutions. >> i would just like to move to senator sheen by saying they disagree with that. great britain disagrees with that, germany disagrees, france disagrees great i talk to about this last night.

the tool that we have through the nuclear file are not available to be applied. senator menendez try to pursue that. the other countries disagree. most of the most accurate assessment of this steel from what i have been able to rate has been coming from iran. and >> if the ron violates it though sections can come back on nuclear. if they finally terrorism sanctions, we have the ability to sanction on other grounds so it is not a fair conclusion that institutions continue to engage funding terrorism or regional destabilization are and need from those kinds of sanctions traded it is just not correct. >> i stand by my assessment, as do the other countries who negotiated the deal with the -- >> actually, other countries went back i am just going to stop, we will get to senator sheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. sen. sheen:thank you to the negotiating

team for the chum mend us effort that it took to get us to this point. sen. shaheen: before you ask my questions, i just want to say that i don't think it is to the benefit of this committee, this congress, or the american people for any of us to impugn the motives or the intellect of anybody involved in this discussion. i think people have strong views about how they feel and it is appropriate to express those views but to -- because somebody disagrees with you to suggest that their motives are not in the best interest of this country or that their intellect is questionable, i think does not advance the debate in a way that it should be advanced, so mr. chairman, i appreciate you and the ranking member and hope that we will keep this debate in a civil discussion.

i also wanted to point out for the record that everybody on this committee voted for the iran nuclear review act of 2015. it was unanimous. while all of us have concerns about everything, some of the provisions that were in it, it was voted for by the committee unanimously. to go to my questions i want to follow up on the issues that were raised with respect to the possible military dimensions of the past iranian nuclear activities. because that is an area where i am not clear about how we can be confident that the iaea is going to be on to get the information that it needs to complete its investigation. can you speak to that a little bit and talk about why you believe we are going to have the information that we need?

sec. moniz: the iaea is very strong, technically. every inspector since like 1980, has been trained at los alamos national laboratory. they have a very strong reputation, which, quite frankly, they need to guard to make sure they have a process with integrity. it is their responsibility -- there is nothing unusual here, there is no side agreement. this is the way it works. the iaea negotiates with the country. what we achieved in negotiations is to get iran to the table with them because without satisfying the requirements by october 15 to satisfy the agency, they there will not be any agreement going forward. that is clear. after years of stiffing them --

to use a technical term -- then what we have done is forced them to the table. they went to tehran -- not just the director general but the senior people who do safe guards. they came back and feel that they have a process with integrity. in this environment, i can only say -- and i will say flat out i have personally not seen those documents that gentleman referred to, i had something of an oral briefing -- with that, we have assembled a national lab team to think through the kinds of processes that we anticipate into recommend steps that might mitigate any risk. but again, ultimately, we rely upon the iaea. they will make a report. the director general has committed to trying to get that out this year. and of course, that report is where one will see what the

conclusions are and what the basis for their conclusions are. >> can i get this to you somehow. this is the iaea board of governors roadmap. it is a letter we have submitted. it lays out the agreement between iran and the iaea as to what they are going to do and when and how. sen. shaheen: can we have it introduces the record? sec. kerry: i would like that very much. sen. shaheen: can i ask either before or after that report is produced, will the intelligence community hearre or in other countries way in and assess whether they believe that that report reflects an accurate discussion of iran's past activity? sec. moniz: i would have to defer to the intelligence community for their reaction but i can assure you that our doe

experts will look over this very carefully. sen. shaheen: thank you. secretary lu, can you commit that there will be no sanctions relief until the ron has provided the iaea with this information? sec. lew: absolutely. until they have completed their obligations, we will not be relieving any u.s. sanctions or international sanctions. sen. shaheen: i don't know who wants to respond to this but, at the time we began negotiations what was the best estimate of our intelligence community about the time for iran to break out with a nuclear weapon? sec. kerry: the best estimate was 2-3 months. sen. shaheen: was there an agreement about that estimate? sec. kerry: yes. there was a disagreement with a couple other countries, but

there was not a disagreement in our intel community. sen. shaheen: as we look at this agreement going into it affect, is there an estimate about how long it might take to get to a nuclear weapon at the end of this agreement if iran decides to pursue that option at the end of -- sec. kerry: the breakout time has it is used in this negotiation is a hybrid of the traditional understanding of breakout time. breakout time and arms control has usually been referred to as the time it takes to get a weapon. we have been dealing only with the amount of time it takes to get enough material to produce one weapon. you still have to produce the weapon and most people don't guesstimate -- there is a lot of

time be on that. we have been operating with the big safety cushion here. we will have one year of breakout time for material for one weapon for at least 10 years. then it begins to tail down but not as a cliff, it tales down as we go through the next five years. and then we are indeed arriving at a point where iran has hopefully achieved normal status . if they haven't, the agreement has not worked in the sense that they violated it and we have gone back to step back and have the sanctions back in place. sen. shaheen: again can you answer whether all of our intelligence agencies are agreed on that particular breakout period? sec. kerry: our intelligence community worked this very hard and it is a very precise formula which feeds in the most rapid

possible rate by looking at the numbers -- the amount of enrichment, the capacity for enrichment -- all of the many, many factors that go into it makes a complicated formula. everybody is an agreement as to where we are. sec. moniz: it also includes capacity to rebuild the infrastructure that they are taking out. i might add that beyond the 15 years where there are severe constraints, in terms of visibility, i remind you that for 20 years there is still containment and surveillance activities for any centrifuge sensitive parts manufacturing. they will all be labeled, track etc.. ed etc. it is like follow the uranium and the centrifuges. sen. shaheen: my time has expired, thank you all.

>> i don't agree with that characterization, mr. chairman. sen. flake: i hope you will take these questions in the spirit they are given, i am not looking to play gotcha at all. i commend you for the hard work that has been done. there is some disagreement here with the text of the agreement as we read it. and the explanation that is given. let me just cover a couple of these points. on adoption day for the implementation plan, it says iran will inform the that effective on -- they will additionally supply the protocol hand -- pending its ramification by the parliament and the iranian parliament and will fully implement the modified code 3.1.

it is voluntary to live by the additional protocol -- what happens if parliament -- first, what is the timetable that is required for the parliament to address the additional protocol? sec. moniz: they have to live by the additional particle -- >> understood -- >> going forward, they have eight years -- within eight years to adopt it formally within -- but their material reach as of adoption day -- if they do not live by a. it is fully understood by everybody that would be a material breach. >> but there is no timetable that the parliament -- >> they have to do it within eight years -- >> within eight years? so that is the time. . period. >> which is before sanctions were lifted, see you have snapback capacity as a result. >> understood.

december 2011, the president signed into law the ndaa which included sanctions on iran's central bank. the sanctions penalized for an financial institutions that were doing business with iran's central bank. these sanctions will ultimately be suspended. because of the jcpoa. what i am trying to understand -- according to the agreement, the u.s. agreement with respect to the roles of the president and the congress will refrain from reintroducing a re-imposing the sanctions specified in annex to that it has ceased to comply under the joa without prejudice to the process. this is what i think a lot of us are having a hard time reconciling. what would constitute reintroducing, re-imposing sanctions specified -- existing

sanctions? if because iran didn't violate the nuclear part of the agreement but, for other reasons, committed terrorism abroad about of americans we wanted to penalize him, we wanted to sanction them, could we impose sanctions on iran's central bank because that would mimic or be similar to what was done before but it would be in a different context yucca would that be allowed or whether that lead to some violation on our part of the agreement? sec. lew: i'm going to take a stab at this because we have been going around on it and i want to try, if i can -- sec. kerry: first of all we will not violate it if we use our authority to impose sapingss on iran for terrorism, human rights missiles, or any other nonnuclear reason.

and it does not provide iran any relief from u.s. sanctions under any of those authorities or other authorities mind you. i'll go through some of those other authorities. what we have committed to do is quite specific. iran was fearful that having witnessed the desire within the congress for more sanctions that even if we cut an agreement you folks might just turn around the day after and say, too bad. we're coming back with all the same sanctions and then the president is in veto status or override status or whatever. what they really wanted was a clarity that we're not going to reimpose the specific nuclear related sanction provisions as specified in annex two to this contingent on them abiding by the commitments of the agreement. so it's really simply a clarification to them that

we're not going to come back and just slap them on again. but that absolutely does not mean we are precluded from sanctioning iranian actors, sectors, or any actions if circumstances warrant. so all of our other sanctions authorities remain in place unaffected by this agreement and iran only said if you read what it says that they would treat the imposition of new nuclear-related sanction sanctions as the grounds to cease performing but they are clear and we are clear we have all the other kinds of authorities. let moo he be specific on that because it is -- let me be specific on that. it is important for the debate to be clare. even with the lifting of sanctions after eight years of missiles or five years in arms or the u.n. sanctions, it's only the u.n. sanctions. we still have sanctions. our primary embargo is still in place. we are still sanctioning them.

and, i might add for those things that we want to deal with in terms of their behavior for instance, hezbollah, there is a u.n. resolution 1701, that prevents the transfer of any weapons to hezbollah. that will cop tin. what we need to do is make sure we're enforcing it. >> i think we've got that. i just want to make sure if we say, all right. what was effective on iran, what really has brought them to the table more than anything else in my view are the sanctions on the central bank because it's more difficult for russia ks china, and other actors to help them evade these sanctions. if we decided we want to impose penalties to deter them from terrorist activity and we impose sanctions on their central bank that that won't be a material breach to the accord. secretary kerry: no. >> that will not. one other question on the broader topic. assuming this goes into effect, we're going to need desperately need a regional security

framework that you touched on and some discussions are already going on. i would just encourage you that i understand the problem with 535 secretaries of state. can't have that. but i would encourage you to reach out to at least the relevant committees here as that framework is p you the in place, to make sure that it can endure longer than just the first couple of years in this agreement. we all know to have the institutional fortitude to move ahead, it's best to have congress involved. and there are many points between 535 secretaries of state and proper consultation with the relevant committees at least in jurisdiction here. >> i couldn't concur more. you are absolutely dead on. we agree. and by the way, i think in the course of this negotiation

prior to the passage of the requirement of the 60 days, which we understand and joined in with working with the chairman and we're grateful to the chairman for the cooperation on that, but there were a huge number of briefings and hearings and telephone calls and meetings and so forth literally in the hundreds. i couldn't agree with you more about this new arrangement. we are talking about arms transfers, special operations training, about counterterrorism, counterinsurgency. we have a major need here to build capacity in many of those countries. the gulf states spend about $130 billion a year on their defense. iran spends $15 million. yet you see a disparity in terms of what's happening within the region. that has to be addressed and that's the purpose of our initiative. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator. i do appreciate you joining in

with us about an hour and a half before our vote on that agreement. senator udall. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me also just echo what everyone said. i very much appreciate the negotiators and the team and especially give a shout out to wendy sherman. i'd also like to just recognize -- i dopet think -- don't think he has been recognized yet our colleague from maine has been sitting here very conscientiously like i think many senators are either back in their offices or here in the audience to stay involved in this issue. secretary kerry and secretary lew and secretary moniz, this is a very important deal, one based on verification and sound science. those two areas are what i'd like to focus on today. as you know, the national labs in tennessee new mexico, and california have played an important role and i think it's important that we do the best job we can to explain to the american people why this deal meets the scientific rigors for

preventing iran from acquiring a bomb. so, secretary moniz, just as a baseline, can you tell the committee what the half life of uraniuim and plutonium are and what this means regarding how long we can detect its signature and nature and why that's important. >> you are creating the urge for a 15-minute lecture. >> i don't want that. >> the half life of uraniuim 238 which is the dominant is roughly the age of the earth 5 billion years and that's why we still have it in the ground. uraniuim 235 is maybe a factor at 10 less which is why it is a mineo isotope now. plutonium is much shorter. 20,000 years probably, which is why we don't have any of it naturally and we have to make it in reactors. >> okay.

iran cannot create a facility or enrich uraniuim or plutonium out of thin air. the laws of physics as you well know are clear. energy and mass must be con served and through the iaea we will be able to detect illicit use at declared sites due to extensive monitoring. do both of you believe that is correct, secretary kerry and secretary moniz? >> yes. >> mm-hmm. >> with regards to the worries about the 24-day requirement for undeclared sites, given the half life of uraniuim and plutonium and the resources needed to construct a parallel enrichment capability, would you say it is scientifically possible to hide such work within 24 days and do you believe we have the technical capabilities to determine if enrichment is being done outside the limits of the jcpoa? >> yes. once again we have the historical examples of 2003 of precisely that happening after six months easily finding

uraniuim despite major efforts to disguise it. and in addition we will have all of the containment and surveillance for 20 years of all of the sensitive parts of every machine that they make. >> so people that have used the analogy that like in a drug crime you flush it down a toilet and it's gone and we won't be able to find it that has been in fact proven out? >> if they try that we'll find it. >> good. secretary kerry and moniz our nuclear experts at oak ridge los alamos, lawrence livermore, they've given technical support throughout these negotiations. are they confident these verification measures both the enhanced measures and those in the additional protocol will enable the iaea to detect an attempt to break out or sneak out in time for the international community to react? >> first of all let me say that the national scientists were really heroic, on constant call for literally hours turn around

in the negotiating sessions. i've already alluded to the fact that your laboratory los alamos played a major role in the detection arena. so the answer is yes. in fact, those are the people who invented many of the safeguards, technologies that are going to be employed here. >> so it sounds to me like iran could break the rules of this agreement but they cannot break the rules of physics. and the international community has the know how and the expertise to determine whether or not iran is abiding by this deal and the nonproliferation treaty not only during this phased agreement but into perpetuity under the nonproliferation treaty and the additional protocol to the n.t.p. would you agree with this assessment and would the panel agree that if necessary the u.s. and the p 5 plus one would then have the ability to snap back sanctions and deal with the iranian violations as

appropriate in order to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon? >> well, yes. again, we will have much greater transparency from day one to forever than we would have without the agreement. that's a fact. and then the sanctions i think the answer i'll venture the answer is yes. >> thank you. and then just finally, secretary kerry, one of the keys here and you've heard all these questions is implementation. how are we going to do implementation. so i just ask in the broadest possible way, how it's going to be done. who's going to be in charge. how are we going to make sure when we get to the implementation phase that we really do what needs to be done to make sure this is the success? >> well, we already have created an office and we have somebody managing that at this point in time. it's teamed up.

but we'll be even more so as we go forward. this is going to be a full-time operation. it's not going to be left to a normal bureau. there will be a full-time iran agreement implementation effort with experienced and competent personnel staffing it. >> i would just add if i may that under that umbrella of the administration wide implementation team we will have our own implementation team and there will be major jobs. for example, in annex one you will see alluded to a working group of the -- on the iraq reactor redesign, etcetera. we anticipate playing a leading role obviously in that group and making sure that the new reactor does only what we have laid out and the parameters are in the material you have. >> good. and i just can't emphasize enough in terms of the national laboratories especially the

two in new mexico but all of them that they have worked on this, these kinds of activities and studied nuclear issues since the creation of the atomic bomb. that's why they're in such a position to be able to give the technical advice to make sure this is -- >> if i can say, if i can just reinforce that i think it's very important. this is a pitch now for the national labs that this is not the capability you invent overnight because you needed it for this negotiation. it's got to be a consistent investment in our core nuclear capacity and that's what we've been doing. >> by the way, let me just emphasize people like me who obviously don't have that background understood our limitations and there isn't any decision made in this agreement, none, where we didn't go to our teams. in fact, there were days where we were delayed because we had to go back to the laboratories get the laboratories' input,

get experts' input, and make a judgment as to whether it would result in what we were seeking and would be sustainable. there isn't one technical decision within this agreement that hasn't been worked through the entire system in that regard. >> thank you. >> i've visited the outstanding labs and they're playing a huge role in this. i thank you. >> senator gardner >> thank you, mr. chairman and to the secretaries today for your time and testimony. i wanted to start with you, secretary lew, talking about a number of individuals who will by 2023 and companies removed from u.s. sanctions list and i hope you could discuss several of them. what can you tell this committee about mr. fakarzady? is it correct to describe him as the father of the iran nuclear program? >> i would defer to secretary

moniz as to who is the father of the iranian nuclear program? >> that term certainly has been applied to him, yes. >> what about mr. abassi? was he black listed in 2009 for allegedly being an aide to fakarzady and working on the programs >> without commenting on each individual, if you go through the names of people who have been involved in iran's nuclear program, any step to remove sanctions that are related to the nuclear program will involve individuals and organizations that had been involved in iran's nuclear program. >> so german engineer who was convicted and sentenced to 18 years in prison by a south african court in 2007 for his role in supplying centrifuge components to the black market network, is that correct? >> yeah. i -- >> he receives release in 2023?

>> i am reluck and the to get into individuals' names. >> they are listed. why would you be reluctant? >> as a group they all have the same characteristic which is that they were designated because of nuclear activities. >> and now sanctions relief by 2023. >> to the extent iran keeps its agreement we will be relieving nuclear sanctions. if they don't keep their agreement we won't be relieving nuclear sanctions. >> what message is sent to other proliferators around the world? >> i think the message is if you violate the rules and develop nuclear weapons and we and the world take action against you it will have significant consequences. if you reach an agreement and you unwind your nuclear programs that will also have consequences. >> could you please provide a list or names of americans who have been released as they have, from sanctions or imprisonment as a result of these negotiations? there are none. >> we're happy to follow up

with you on lists you might want. >> thank you. to secretary lew again following up on i believe it was senator menendez's questions the iran sanctions act under the -- if that act were simply extended and the date changed to 2018 the national security waivers would still be in place by the president. is that something congress would pass changing the date, is that acceptable? >> we obviously have gone back and forth on that a few times. the reimposition of nuclear sanctions is something that if they comply with the nuclear agreement has a very different character than if they don't. i think that right now they've agreed to take serious actions. we need to work toward the implementation of the agreement. what i was trying to say after the back and forth with senator menendez, we have a host of very powerful sanctions and tools that are not --

>> i heard you explain that -- >> those are available. >> we're running out of time here if you don't mind. just to follow up if congress were to pass inextension to 2018 the national security waivers would still be in place. would the president veto that legislation? >> i think this is not the appropriate time to be discussing extending a law before we even had the implementation period begin under this agreement. >> do you think that makes the snap back provisions weaker or stronger? >> that's what i was trying to get at. i think the snap back provisions are extremely powerful with or without the iran sanctions act. our oil sanctions -- >> you are prepared to have a snap back without the iran sanctions act in place? >> i think it would be very powerful with or without it. >> secretary kerry you stated ballistics missiles will remain in place.

how do our sanctions if they're ineffective if the united states stands alone slow down their ballistic missile programs? >> well, the fact is that regrettably they've been pursuing certain things without recourse and one of our determinations is to up, i think the president said in the east room in his press conference the other day -- for instance they've been transferring weapons for 20 years to lebanon, hezbollah, and there may be as many as 70,000 80,000 rockets. we all know that are a threat to israel. we need to all of us be engaged in a stronger effort to prevent the movement of these weapons. >> so is israel safer today under this provision with the ballistic missile embargo lifted? >> there is absolutely no question whatsoever that israel is safer because israel is --

>> with the embargo lifted israel is safer? >> we're not lifting the embargo. >> if i can read you -- >> oh, well, well, see what you're not looking at, senator, what everybody needs to take note of is we have separate u.n. resolutions that apply to all those other activities and we have separate regimes that apply to them. for instance the missile control technology regime is a very powerful instrument. the security proliferation -- >> let me -- i understand. i'm running out of time here. with this united nations -- >> without an answer we can all run out of time. >> with the united nations language do you believe israel is safer? >> there is no question in my mind because we have the ability to put all kinds of other sanctions in place as well as enforce existing u.n. resolutions that apply to missiles app other things. >> you mentioned an article in "the washington post" how the iran deal is good for israel according to israelis who know what they're talking about.

do you believe prime minister netanyahu who is highly critical of this deal knows what he is talking about? >> look. i respect and know prime minister netanyahu very well. i consider him a friend. he and i talk regularly. we're still talking even in the midst of this disagreement because we have a lot of things to talk about. i completely understand the prime minister of a state like israel which has been under siege and threatened all of its life. but this is also a big challenge. and i understand the expressions of concern he has voiced. we just happen to disagree about the impact of what is going to happen here and our ability to safeguard israel going forward through the mechanisms that have been put in place. there is absolutely no question whatsoever indisputeable. you can't argue. they're taking a break out time from two months to a year. taking a 12,000 kill gram

stockpile to zero. taking a centrifuge -- you've got to look at that. >> so you believe prime minister netanyahu knows what he is talking about? >> i disagree with him on his -- >> but he knows what he's talking about. >> he knows as prime minister the fear he is expressing. absolutely. >> secretary moniz, i hope i'm pronouncing this correct. ali hunanin former deputy director of the ieae today, we talked about the agreement they entered into that is not being disclosed to the committee or the public, with iran, he stated in the "new york times," "a 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces detection probabilities exactly where the system is weakest detecting undeclared facilities and materials." is he wrong? >> well, the 24-day thing is explicitly for undeclared facilities and i've already

expressed use of nuclear materials in those facilities we are very confident about detection. we have to know where to look and that is of course the traditional role of intelligence, ours and those of our allies and friends. >> mr. chairman? >> senator murphy? >> thank you very much. thank you all for spending so much time with us here today. one comment on the issue of nonnuclear sanctions and then two questions. the iranians are worried that we are going to reimpose nuclear sanctions under the cover of some other excuse. thus your discussion about the sensitivity of when we may reauthorize the iran sanctions act. i just note that what we're talking about here then is motive. whether or not we are genuine in imposing sanctions for a nonnuclear related activity or

whether we are doing it under the cover of trying to get around the agreement. i don't think there is any way to avoid the fuzziness of that section of the agreement because ultimately there can be a dispute over motive. i just think we all have to understand that there is going to be a lack of clarity on that question given the fact that the dispute ultimately is not going to be about the letter of the law that we pass but about the motive that stands behind it. i think that we can certainly defend instituting new sanctions on nonnuclear activity but there is going to be a difficulty in trying to define that motive. my question, though, is, first question is, continuing on this subject of inspections, secretary moniz, the iranians have made a commitment here that they are not going to engage in any research and development that, quote, under item 16 could contribute to the development of a nuclear

explosive device. we talked about the eyes we have -- we know we have eyes on the full supply chain. but there are a host of nuclear related research activities that could occur at other research sites that don't involve material that runs through the supply chain. how do we have an assurance that there are no r&d activities occurring given the fact that there are going to be sites that we won't even be asking about frankly, and there are research activities potentially that can happen that don't involve that nuclear material that we see in the supply chain inspections? >> well, as i said, the -- there are a number of activities that are listed there which are out of bounds that will not involve nuclear materials. clearly, again, almost by

definition, for any undeclared site, it becomes a question of intelligence acquired in one way or another. we have obviously nationally a lot of means as do others. so once we have the right pointer then it's a question of getting in there and there can be some smoking guns in some cases. for example iran neutron initiators that we would detect it will be more in the context of the declared activities don't kind of make sense with what we see in there and these all become then additional indicators for our intelligence but i think our intelligence people will say that clearly in the end these nonnuclear activities will be more of a challenge than the nuclear material activities over which we'll have a very, very strong handle. >> i want to ask secretary lew

and secretary kerry about the consequences of congress voting down this deal. i heard the senator's frustration that he thinks the suggestions made by the administration is that there is no choice. i hear you say the very opposite. i hear you say that this is not a referendum on this deal. this is a choice between two set of consequences. a set of consequences that flow forward if we approve the deal and a different set that flow forward if congress rejects this deal. so as i look at the second set of consequences that we have to be fully cognizant of if the united states congress rejects this deal, i sort of see it in five parts. i want to give this analysis to you and then ask you both to tell me where i'm wrong or where i might be right. first, the sanctions are going to fray initially. the russians and chinese likely won't continue to sign on. and over time, likely will in substance fall apart.

second iran is going to be able to resume full operation of its nuclear program, gets closer and closer to break out time. three, the inspections that we have disappear. we go blind again inside iran. fourth, this administration's ability to do nuclear diplomacy frankly ends for the next year and a half. there is no legitimacy with the clear indication that congress won't support any agreements that this administration enters into. and, fifth, the potential that internally this rejection of the deal will be a major victory for the hard liners making it much less likely that the moderates are going to win in the next election meaning that there may not be anyone to deal with should we get back to the table in the next administration. that's a pretty severe set of consequences but this isn't ultimately a referendum. if you reject this deal you have to be pretty apocalyptic

about how badly this deal will go down if you accept the broad parameters as the alternative. so tell me if this is how you read the consequences of congress rejecting this deal. >> well, senator, i think you hit the nail on the head with a series of absolutely clearly anticipateable consequences. and i would agree with what you have said. this is not a case of no choices. there is a choice. and as senator murphy has said there is a, you know, each person can make the judgment about the consequences of their choice. but the choice is really between the assurances we have that come with this agreement, the certainty that comes with the 98% reduction of the stockpile, the certainty that comes from the limitation of 3.67% of enrichment for 15 years.

you can't make a bomb with just those two items let alone the reduction of centrifuges, limitation on what's spinning, the intrusive inspections. all of that goes away. so that's the choice. you want to wipe all that out. what else happens as a result of that? well, i urge colleagues who haven't done it to spend time with our intel community and ask for the analysis of the supreme leader and the state of politics in iran. the supreme leader highly -- there is nothing in this agreement built on trust. it is all a matter of verification. the supreme leader has felt in the very beginning i can't deal with the west because i can't trust them. i tried it before. i tried it before, and nothing happened. the number small discussions that took place a number of years ago. nothing came out of that.

i can't go to the whole history, but there was a long history of mistrust. the whole context of the revolution out of which the regime comes. if we say no after saying in good faith we are here to negotiate will stop at the walk away, not because we chose to but you choose to, they one of who to deal with. i more importantly, he is not coming back. there was no way people say get a better deal. no way. when they believe they have given up things in good faith and made proclamations about no nuclear weapons. the npt is at the heart of nonproliferation. we have 189 nations that live by it.