a number of years ago. nothing came out of that. i can't go to the whole history, but there was a long history of mistrust. the whole context of the revolution out of which the regime comes. if we say no after saying in good faith we are here to negotiate will stop at the walk away, not because we chose to but you choose to, they one of who to deal with. i more importantly, he is not coming back. there was no way people say get a better deal. no way. when they believe they have given up things in good faith and made proclamations about no nuclear weapons. the npt is at the heart of nonproliferation. we have 189 nations that live by it.

that is part of what this vote would be. we don't trust that, it was no way iran could come under it. the consequences of this are even more than what you laid out. here is what else happens but better on politics long enough, i have a pretty good sense a lot of people were opposing this before it was announced before they read it. if this does not meet congresses approval, and iran goes back to enriching, you can hear the cry now. what are we going to do about it? you hear the prime minister of his rail calling me up it is time to bomb. what are we going to do? that is why learned people say

that is the alternative. when they are glitching like crazy, and the patched up diplomacy, and passed up the nonproliferation treaty, what is left? i know senators are uncomfortable that they may have an enrichment program, so what is your plan? knock out their entire capacity? erase the memory? totally go to war? i heard somebody mention iraq that we had a huge ability to know what happened there, that was after we invaded a country. then we had anywhere, anytime. it is the only place in the world you had it. no country has anywhere, anytime. i asked people to be reasonable. there are more consequences but

each one of the ones he laid out a pretty consequential. >> if i could just respond, i agree with you that they would fray. in addition, we had a lot of discussion about the reserves. we after member they are not sitting in the united states. if this agreement falls apart our ability to keep that money will also fall apart. the concern is they get their money, and there was no nuclear agreement. that is very real. th regard to your comment, i totally agree. if it is seen as a pretext, that violates the agreement. we reserve the ability to put sanctions back in place. >> there is some inherent fuzziness. >> it is a matter of

interpretation which is why people can say they have different views. it is not as if this was some accidental provision. >> at think the thought process you walk through was very helpful. i do want to say congress can put in place many of the sanctions that brought iran to the table. what i think is unfair is that the secretary afforded himself the ability to walk away from this deal and face all of the same consequences. you said that no deal was better than a bad deal. at many times you laid out the chances of this happening. you yourself had to be thinking about going down the very path that senator murphy just put out.

what you did by going to the un security council and delaying this out basically even the we put a in place that brought them to the table, you are trying to paint this picture that basically takes that choice away from us. i find that to be incredibly unfair. secretary kerry: mr. chairman, i can just say to you, the choice would have been the same whether or not the security council voted. it's the exact same choice. the great distinction, with all due respect, the great distinction is that when i was ready to walk away, everyone would've come with me. they understood the walk away was the intransigence of a ramp. we would've walked away and held the unity of the sanctions. we could have done more. or if we have to resort to military, people would've understood why. the problem is now, they won't understand why. they want walk away with anyone.

>> i don't want to put too much emphasis, but i'll go back to the other and say, again, the way you present the options. i think by the administration going to the united nations, and a good faith bipartisan manner we are showing the world we don't stand together. that is what this is all about. that is why we fought. we voted to go back to the balance. i'm encouraged that senator king is here sitting your for four hours this morning listening to this. people are involved in this.

i appreciate would you guys have done, this is a huge task, you played hard the last few months. thank you for all of your effort. i personally have tried to take a very measured approach in this to understand the issues, to understand what we are trying to achieve. but for the secretary of state say our goal is to preclude he ran from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state. i am very troubled today. i look at the somewhat skeptically -- i'm not sure what is it was humorous, let me just read you a couple of quotes. this agreement will help to achieve a long-standing american objective. president obama iran will never be allowed to develop a nuclear

weapon. wwhat we will do is set uopp a mechanism where inspectors to go anyplace. this agreement represents the first step on a road to a nuclear free korean peninsula. president obama, this framework would cut off every pathway that are red could possibly take to develop a nuclear weapon. i am unsettled because we have had bad experiences dealing with bad actors. if other do this today, using the link today -- you said something today we are guaranteeing they want of a nuclear weapon. i know that is our goal. i read every page of this document. i am very concerned that i read

this, i understand our objective is never allow iran to have a nuclear weapon. does this deal actually preclude them from becoming a nuclear weapons state. secretary kerry: senator, first of all, i really appreciate your approach to this. and i very much appreciate your comments. and i know you're taking this very seriously. i want to speak specifically to your several concerns. first of all, i believe, and a spent 29 years here in this committee back in the early days of the mx missile debates. this, i believe, it's one of the most extensive agreements with the most extensive access provisions and accountability standards i've seen in the time that i was here.

i believe we are put in place a highly distinguishable set of measures from north korea. first of all the really eight years of the clinton administration, they didn't gain one ounce of plutonium capacity. they started cheating. and the framework was put into place, and the administration changed. path. the framework was put in place and the administrations were changed. new administration came in with a different attitude about how to approach them but with the discovering of the cheating on the heu, they immediately shut down the diplomatic track and north korea pulled out of the ntp. fully pulled out of the ntp. there were no inspections. nothing else was happening. yes, they blew up several nuclear weapons and they developed their nuclear capacity. that should be a warning to everybody here.

unlike north korea the north korea experience is what gave birth to the additional protocol. >> senator kerry, i apologize -- >> i just want you to know senator, the additional protocol came into existence to remedy the deaf fit of what happened with nuclear. so, the access we have here, we never had in nuclear. we have unprecedented ability to hold iran accountable. i believe through the myriad 24/7 access to their declared facilities, we'll know instantaneously if they try to move -- >> i understand. i heard you say that last night. i appreciate that. if we do we'll know. but does in deal -- this agreement preclude iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. the deal itself? >> i believe if the agreement is fully implemented, and obviously if iran lives by it, yes. >> thank you. secretary lew, with regard to

the options, what brought iran to the negotiating table recently? what's their motive for coming to negotiate in the first place? >> senator i'm not sure i could tell you the specific thing but we look at the impact of the sanctions over the last number of years. it's crushed iran's economy. it's crushed it -- >> reduced it about 20%. >> yes. the size of the economy is down, exchange rate is terrible. inflation and unemployment rates are ohio -- >> the question i have is in the very beginning when they came to the table, we ceded to them the right to enrich, to bypass 18 countries who are good ang tors on the world stage and join an elite group of five countries that have civil nuclear programs but don't enrich. there are nine countries that actually have nuclear weapons. five in the ntp. four out of the ntp.

they obviously have civil programs. but the dlination between the countries that are good players, germany, brazil afghanistan -- i'm sorry, argentina, holland, gentleman. japan. we're putting iran into that group. what option i see to this is potentially doubling down on the sanctions that got them to the table in the first place. i'd like you to respond to that. we know it was crushing their economy. we know it was having tremendous impact on their regime. my question is is that not a viable option today? as we look at alternatives to the deal itself. >> the reason i think the sanctions have had the powerful effect is they're not just u.s. sanctions. they've been international sanctions. that requires keeping an international coalition together to impose the kinds of tough sanctions we've had. in past debates over u.s. sanctions, we've gone back and forth with the congress saying if you do more and it keeps other countries out, then we're in the end doing less. and i think we've come to a good

place on each of the rounds of discussions over sanctions to grow the coalition in the world. if this deal is rejected the other partners who have helped uts to impose those sanctions will not be of like mind. >> of $115 billion you identified. and i understand the nuances of the different categories of that cache, how much is that relative to our secondary sanctions on other countries dealing with iran compared to the eu and p5plus1. >> i'm trying to make the dlination between what are the sanctions -- what percentage of the 115 is due to u.s. sanctions, congressional sanctions -- >> it's hard todisaggregate.

we've had had for years now ongoing discussions where it's getting harder and harder to keep countries tied to the oil sanctions, for example, because it's hard on their economies. the goal of the sanctions was to get iran to the negotiating table. query, would they be willing to do it if iran came to the negotiating table and we rejected a deal that all the other countries in the have signed onto? that'sy our actions ability starts to fray. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. rebuilt the economy of germany after they had done two wars against the u.s. that was hard.

there were objections and no votes. president kennedy, nuclear test band treaty with the soviet union, during the bay of pig they were nlgtegotiating. it was hard and there were no votes. this is a deal in my review produces a dramatically better position for about 15 years than the status quo before negotiations started. when you started the negotiations right before -- enrichment level 20% and climb, you've knocked it back to 3.67%. a heavy water plutonium facility at iraq, they're dismantling. they were on a path where they had a huge program and it was growing for 15 years. this deal with the inspections

mechanisms, et cetera, produces a dramatically better status quo for the united states, for regional allies, for the world. my questions are after your 15. secretary moniz, various provisions start to come off certain elements of the program, certain inspections began your eight, 10 15, 300 kim gram cap comes off. when you get to your 25, this is how i read the deal. the deal basically is iran commits in the first paragraph of the agreement under no circumstances will iran seek to develop, purchase or acquire nuclear weapons. they've agreed to all the ntp obligations going forward and they agreed that any income program will be completely civil in nature. they make that commitment. the intelligence we have, the knowledge we gained through 25 years of enhanced inspections and the ongoing inspections under the ntp, especially the additional protocol.

is that level of knowledge sufficient at year 25 and thereafter to detect if iran tries to violate this deal and acquire nuclear weapons? >> i think it puts us in a far better position otherwise, and i think the risks on their part would be enormous to try to break their commitment. and i think you put your finger on a very important thing, which our intelligence community would support. we should not forget the tremendous knowledge of the program, what their doing, where they're doing it, over 25 years. we will have a lot of indicators to really amplify our national means. >> that's a good segue to the question i want to ask secretary kerry. you talked to senator murphy about them. i think those who objected to the negotiations starting in 2013. they were against that

diplomatic beginning. if we could go back to that status quo, it seems the status quo was we had sanctions they were punishing iran, hurting their economy, but they were racing ahead on their nuclear program. we were hurting their economy, but the nuclear program, 19000 centrifuges and climbing, 12 tou kilograms and climbing, iraq heavy water moving ahead, if we just had lived with that status quo, it seems to me one of two things was going to happen. either they were going to eventually ka pit late. there were two othds. i'm not going to ask you to assign odds to those two things but there was significant risk. had they not start diplomacy, they were going to get a nuclear program. you stalled that one. let me mention another alternative because it's been mentioned by members of this body. after the framework was

announced on april 2, a member of this body who has been a loud and influential voice in this issue, said bombing iran to end their program would only take a few days. mr. secretary, you've been at war. do you find that to be a realistic statement? >> well, it's a -- i find it to be a factual statement in the sense it would only take a few days but i don't find it to be a realistic statement in terms of a policy because the implications of that, if you're not at the end of your rope. in other words fitz not last resort, would be extraordinarily complicated for the united states. >> if we were to do that, that's an alternative. if we were to do that right now, would we have international support for that. >> not on your life no way. >> would we have an

international legal basis for doing it? we were in israel a number of us met with israeli officials who said, they are have concluded iran is trying to get to a threshold yet iran has not yet made a decision to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. if we were to initiate a war against iran, would they have not yet have made that decision would there be an international basis for war? >> no. furthermore, we would be proceeding without any allies, which is not a small consequence. >> let me flip it around on you. i want to talk about credible military threat. if this deal is done and if iran confirms to the entire global community in the u.n. iran confirms under no circumstances iran will seek or acquire nuclear weapons. they pledged that to the world. then they break toward a nuclear weapon, would we be more likely to have the support of international partners if we want to take military action to stop them from doing what they

pledge not to do? >> absolutely. >> would we have a greater legal basis to justify taking mill father action to stop them from doing what they have pledged not to do? >> yes. >> and would we have because of an inspections regime, plus existing intelligence, a lot more knowledge about how to target military action and increasing the threat of our military threat? >> yes. >> i don't have any other questions, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator isaacson. >> thank you, chairman corker and senator cardin for your opening statements and thank you for the way in which you handled the beginning of this debate. i'll be brief. i'm familiar with senate hearings when they enter their fourth hour but i want to make a couple things crystal clear on behalf of my constituents. and i speak for myself as well. secretary kerry, you said unprecedented transparency from a point of inspections and holding iran accountable. is that correct?

>> with the exception of the iraq war, yes. >> do you recall the debate on the new start treaty? >> somewhat. >> we were involved in that pretty heavily -- >> that was missiles. there's a distinction between missiles and nuclear program. i know we had shorter period. that's a different deal. >> but what got the two-thirds majority that ratified the new start treaty in the senate was satisfaction to the senate that the inspection regimen was quick, decisive and united states had -- >> i understand. >> this particular agreement, the iaea is the inspector. >> principle inspector. we are, obviously, sleuthing and all of our intelligence communities around the world would be following it but they're the principle and identified inspector. >> we pay 25% of the costs to

the iaea is that correct? >> yes, it is. >> the treaty specifically says none of the inspectors can be american, is that correct? >> in this particular thing, yes, that's correct. >> those two poipts that i've raised are why people raise questions in terms of the inspections and whether they are unprecedented in their transparency. i think you really have to deal with it deeper than you have today. >> well, i'm happy to -- there are a lot of reasons not the least of which we don't have diplomatic relations with iran, which is one of the principle reasons that we can't proceed to have inspectors and so forth. the s.t.a.r.t. treaty it specific locations identified in it, prelocations. this is for things we can't prelocate. this is for what we might suspect at some point in time or what we might have some evidence of at a point in time.

every. so what the s.t.a.r.t. inspections are analogous. what's unprecedented here, senator, which we negotiated in -- i was pleased we got it, is this ability for us to be able to close out the iaea process. the reason we are all here today is that the iaea could never get it finished. they would fight. they go back and forth. the years went by. nothing closed it out. we have an aability through the joint commission to vote, go to u.n. security council and mandate they give us access. if they haven't given us the access, they're in material breach and we get snapback of the sanctions. so there's an automaticity that

doesn't agree in other. >> one second, secretary moniz. thank you for the answer pcht the second thing that concerns a lot of people and senator menendez brought it up is negotiation of the five year when the u.n. embargo on conventional arms goes away. >> correct. >> it apdz to me that that appeared late in the negotiations and was not something that was on the table originally or even thought to be talked about because this is a nuclear deal. why and when did the expiration of that embargo get into the deal? >> the discussions of the embargo actually began on almost day one of the negotiations. and they went on for two years, 2 1/2 years. >> why in a hearing based on nuclear weapons and proceed hinting iranians get a nuclear weapon. why would that be part of the agreement to start with? >> it's a good question. let me answer it.

it was solid into u.n. resolution at the last minute. frankly -- >> the arms embargo? >> arms embargo. the arms embargo specifically was last minute. >> into nuclear resolution. >> right. then susan rice helped write that or wrote a good part of it and she put it in. iranians bitterly objected to it. felt it was being rammed at them and it had no business being part of a nuclear agreement. it's conventional arms and they thought they had every world in the right to do it. they have fundamentally ignored it for all these years. they made it clear from the get go that one of the primary red lines is they had to get all those sanctions lifted. we said, no, we're not going to

lift them. we're not going to do at this -- look what you're doing in yemen hezbollah. we're not going to lift it. the problem is we had three countries out of seven that were ready to lift it all together on day one and four countries that said, no, we need tokeep it. the compromise was ultimately recognizing that we had many different ways of coming at the enforcement of activities on missiles and arms with specific resolutions from no amplz to the houthi. no arms to libya, to north korea. all these are existing resolutions we have and can enforce. we didn't think we were losing anything. in fact, we won a victory to get the frooifive and the eight, to continue them in the context of a nuclear resolution where they believe they didn't belong in the first place. >> my time is almost up so i'm going to interrupt you.

apologize for -- >> no that's fine. >> correct me on one thing. you said although the beginning it was on the table from almost the beginning? >> well, the point -- no. >> let me finish. >> their demand was on the table. we said no from the beginning. frankly, we knew this was going to come down to probably be the last issue. >> then you said quite frankly, was slid in at the end. >> at the u.n. by susan rice. when she first wrotes resolution 19-29, the arms resolution came into that at the very last minute. >> i'm sorry i'm cutting you off. the inspection and transparency of those inspections -- is aa serious question that needs to be objected to. senator menendez? >> i was going to add a small foot note to the issue of countries without diplomatic relations not being part of the inspection team. i want to point out again for

decades now all inspectors have training here in the united states. we're very confident in a very, very broad set of confident people. in addition -- i could get you the exact number but right now i think we have a dozen americans in the safegardz efforts at iaea and they play a very critical role. >> i would love it if you would get me that information specifically. >> senator, i'll get you a list of all the mcnichls we have to prevent arms flowing. >> those are critical questions to me and the american public. thank you for service to our country. >> thank you, senator. we're going to take a break when we have the second round start. can you make it through three more senators? thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for your service to our country. we very much appreciate all your great work. sblgt moniz, one of the assertions which is made is that

in 20 -- after 15 years that all bets are off and that iran can then begin to enrich theoretically, up to 90% if they want. which is bomb-grade material. could you deal with that issue? that is, what happens in 15 years? what happens in wh iran announces it would go past 3% 5%, 20% in terms of its enrichment of uranium? what is the law, the regulation the sense of -- the sense of the world community what they could do at that point to make sure there was not a bomb-making program that was now put in place in iran?

>>. >> senator, first of all, whether it's 15 years 20 years or whenever, they will be required to report all their nuclear activity. clearly, if they were to report they were enriching to 90% every alarm bell in the world would go off because there's no reason to do that. >> when the alarm bell went off what then would happen? >> i would imagine there would be, first of all, extraordinarily strong and i would imagine cohesive international pressure, perhaps sanctions and perhaps military response. >> for example, what would russia's response be in 15 years if iran started enriching to 50, 60, 80, 90%? >> everything i saw in the last month of negotiation is they would be solidly with us in very strong opposition to that. >> secretary kerry, do you agree with that? >> they and china were welcoming and deeply committed to this

effort and antiany nuclear women. >> go ahead. >> if they declare this, alarm bells would go off. furthermore f they didn't declare it which would be a more likely deal, frankly, we have through 25 years the containment and surveillance on any manufacturing of centrifuges, the uranium. once again, they would need the entire supply chain covertly, which would be an extraordinarily difficult thing to car off. >> in the early years secretary moniz, if iran decided they wanted to violate the agreement after dismantling their program, how long would it take for them to take their rotors their components out of moth balls and to reconstitute their program if we were successful in watching this dismantlement in the early years? >> i would say in rough terms, two to three years, probably, to do that. that would depend a lot upon

conditions of their machines, et cetera. that's a ballpark. >> secretary kerry? >> senator, i just wanted to add something. you're dealing with this 15-year concept, but the truth is, because of the 25-year tracking of their uranium, it would be impossible for them to have a separate covert track. so the only track by which they might begin to enrich would be through the declared facility and we would know it instantaneously. >> and the world would say, stop? >> exactly. >> so, let me ask you this, secretary kerry. you spoke earlier about 9 the iranian foreign minister visiting the emirates this weekend. can you talk about that and what your hopes are for the unfolding diplomatic opportunities that

may be possible in that region. >> i will, senator mark y but i would preface it by saying to all my colleagues, nothing that we've done in here is predicated on some change or something that's unanticipatable. can one hope that this kind of opportunity, perhaps provides a moment for possibilities in change? yes, absolutely. and in fact president rouhani and vice president both in their public statements embracing this arrangement talked about how it could open a new moment in the middle east and come together and resolve the differences that have separated them. i know for a fact the foreign minister of iran wants to engage with the gcc countries. that this is not the only country he plans to visit. he wants to sit down with them. the saudis have indicated a

willingness to sit down. who knows where that dialogue goes. i can guarantee you the united states will do everything we can to encourage it it and to try to help it find some kind of specific steps that might be able to begin to deal with yemen, houthi, others we face. >> you spoke earlier about the saudis. you have talked to them in the last week. could you expansion upon that a little bit more in terms of what you feel is a possibility going forward. >> generally what i would say, senator, is, of course all the countries in the region are apprehensive because they see iran engaged with the houthi and yemen. they see them also fighting against isil. they also see them in syria where they made the most out of supporting assad and supporting hezbollah over the years.

hezbollah is obviously a threat to the region, not to mention there's been support for hamas lately. these things concern us deeply. and it concerns them. that is precisely why we have come together and are working on what i talked about earlier with senator gardner, about the evolution of the camp david process that begins to fill out a new security arrangement and a new understanding of how together we can push back against these activities. >> thank you. secretary moniz did you want to add anything there could be a breakout against the legal regime in order for them to be an international response? >> no. i think a breakout would be very, very quickly detected and then it's a question of the response. essentialpecially in the first decade or so, we have -- and beyond the

first decade i think we have a very comfortable period of time to do diplomatic and/or other responses. >> thank you, mr. secretary. thank all of you for your work. >> thank you senator. senator paul. >> thank you for your testimony. i continue to support a negotiated solution and think it preferable to war. i think military solution in all likelihood will accelerate the possibility of them having nuclear weapons of ending inspections, et cetera. however, it does have to be a good deal. and i think that's the debate we have. secretary kerry, i guess i would ask, in general, how would you describe iran's history of intins with international agreements? would you say they're generally trustworthy or generally untrustworthy? >> there's no trust built into this deal at all. it's not based on any concept of trust. >> i agree. i think everybody sort of understands that. the ayatollah's recent comments where he said the americans say they stopped iran from acquiring

a nuclear weapon, they know it's not true. so, we have the history of untrustworthiness. we have a lot of verbiage coming from the ayatollah already saying, well you know this really isn't any limitation on our ability to make a weapon. really it comes down to a good agreement. will this stop them from having a nuclear weapon? if they comply. the question then becomes compliance. my question, and my -- i guess my problem is that there's a great deal of credence being given to snapback you know, sanctions as this way -- as this lever to get them to comply. secretary lew talked about there being a phased reduction in sanctions. that's not exactly the way i read the agreement, though, because they do have to do some things. i think they're significant things. reducing the amount of enriched

uranium, et cetera to a low level and getting rid of centrifuges, et cetera. the problem is is that the wording of the agreement then says the sanctions are simultaneously withdrawn. the vast majority are. there's some compliance. to me it's the initiation of compliance. i'm more worried about the continuing compliance after that. and i think the argument would be that snapback sanctions will be that lever. i guess my preference would be there would be a step -- in the negotiations, was there discussion was there ever our position we shouldn't have simultaneous release of all sanctions but more stepwise or gradual reduction in sanctions to ensure. >> this was at the heart of the negotiation, which is why we drove such a -- what we consider to be a very hard bargain with

respect to what though needed to do. that is -- look, it was always the fundamental equation of this negotiation. you folksed passed sanctions. we passed sanctions. our passage of sanctions was specifically to bring them to the table to negotiate. so if that was the negotiating lever, clearly when they came to the table, they wanted the lever taken away. so the quid pro quo here was always what restraints will we get? what insight to their program? what long-term commitments can we get? they can't get a bomb. how do we fulfill president obama's pledge to close off the four pathways to a bomb? that's the exchange. they get some relief from sanctions. now, their insistence for two years was obviously this notion and all the way to the end, actually, has to all go away at once.

all sanctions the u.n., everybody's sanctions. we resisted that. we didn't do that. that's not what happened. what we did was we wound up securing the one-year breakout time going from two months to one year. securing the safety of reducing their operable centrifuges and reducing the research they could do on the next advanced wave of centrifuges. reducing the stockpile. locking it in at a low level that couldn't produce a bomb. locking in their enrichment level that can't produce a bomb. in exchange for all the things we required them to do, pitt senator, are genuinely extensive. they have to undo their piping. they have to undo their electrical. they have to move things. there's a huge amount of work -- >> i guess -- >> when that is done, i don't know if it's six months or a year, but when it's done we lift the fundamental component

of financial and banking sanctions that were the heart of what brought them to the table. >> but i guess the point is, is that everybody that's for the agreement, yourself included are saying this will prevent them from having a nuclear weapon and the ayatollah saying exactly the opposite. >> no. the ayatollah has actually -- and the intel community i urge you to connect with them. there's no decision whatsoever. what he's doing is protecting his dough necessarytic turf. >> he's saying the opposite. he's saying this is not true. this is not stop us from acquiring a nuclear weapon. that troubles us. zareef was saying the same thing in march. it troubles us -- >> here, let me -- >> i want a negotiated settlement. i want to believe we can have an agreement but it troubles us that immediately the iranians say the opposite -- >> no, he's not saying the opposite of this. the supreme leader's quote is in this document that iran will never go after a nuclear weapon

and the iranians happily put that in. the intel community will tell you, they have made zero decision -- >> light, but you dispute what he said this week. >> i know what he said. >> they stopped americans from acquiring a nuclear weapon. they know it's not true. >> do you know why he's saying that? he doesn't believe the americans stopped them. he believes he stopped them because he issued a fatwa. so he is as a matter of sovereignty and pride, making a true statement. he doesn't believe the americans stopped them. he said he didn't want to get one in the first place. >> thank you. >> thank you. senator kuhns. >> thank you for convening this important hearing. i would like to thank all three of our witnesses for your testimony here today. i think we all share a basic premise, which is the united states must not allow iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. a nuclear armed iran would threaten our national security our vital ally israel and the

stability of the entire middle east. in the next two months i will review the details of this nuclear agreement and consider its ramifications for our nation and for the region. i'll compare it to the alternatives and support it only if i'm convinced it sufficiently freezes every iranian pathway to a nuclear weapon. in my years as an attorney for a corporation, i would often get handed a big complex deal by optimistic business units that believed they'd launched a new marriage, a new partnership, and my job was to review it. not with the wedding bells ringing in my ears but with the likely divorce day in the picture before me. because frankly no one ever pulled those agreements out again unless there was a violation, there was a disappointment, there was a breakdown in the relationship. and i'll say as i look not at the spin or the politics of this agreement but as i dig into the substance of it, it is an agreement built on distrust. it is a wedding day where the bride is shouting i hate you and your family and the groom is shouting i distrust you and you've always cheated on me. and each is announcing their

distrust really at the outset. and i do wonder what the alternative is given the disagreement here seems inevitable. so let me turn to the wedding guests and a question about how that may play out. a key piece of this agreement is the joint commission. a joint commission that has eight representatives, p5+1 and the european union and iran. and they will resolve access disputes. they are a key piece of how we would get access to undisclosed sites. and if iran doesn't sufficiently answer iaea concerns about a suspect facility within a certain number of days there's a consensus vote and so forth, but our confidence about our ability to resolve disputes under this agreement depends on the reliability of those votes. and i don't mean to impugn the partnership of our vital allies who've gotten us to this point but i am concerned that ceos from many european nations are already winging to tehran and

talking about significant economic relationships. should we be nervous about the votes in the future on that joint commission of the eu or our other allies given what will be i suspect significant economic interests that might inspire them to either direct the eu to vote against access or block access for us? how confident can we be of our allies enduring support of our interests in the, i think, likely event of cheating? >> i think we can be very confident. here's the reason why. the access issue goes to the core, absolute core, of this agreement which is preventing them from getting a weapon. and if we have sufficient information, intelligence, input, shared among us by the way. we share all this information. and by the way israel will be feeding into that.

the gulf states will be feeding into that. when we have any indicator that there is a site we need to get into and we're all shared that amongst each other, this goes to the entire agreement. they will prosecute that. and by the way there's a converse, you know, there's another side to that coin about the economic interests. you have a young generation of iranians thirsty for the world. they want jobs a future. iran has a huge stake in making sure there isn't an interruption in that business and that they are living up to this agreement. so if in fact even when you're way beyond the 15 years, if we find there's a reason for us to have suspicion under the additional protocol and we can't get in the united states alone for the duration of the agreement has the ability to snap back in the u.n. by ourselves. we always have the ability to put our sanctions back in place.

and given our position in the world and that's not going to change in the next 10 15 years economically. we're still the most powerful economy in the world. we will have an ability to have an impact on their transactions and ability to do business. so we believe we are very well protected here, senator kuhns because we created a one-nation stability to have snapback. >> if i can follow up on that mr. secretary. the snapback functions, are they the broad sweeping financial sector sanctions we worked on together that brought iran to the table? or are they a paler version of that? >> oh, no, they're the full monty. >> because, you know we've had debate among some of the colleagues on this committee whether or not this agreement prevents -- >> well, we have some discretion. i mean language is in there that says in whole or in part.

now, if we find there's some minor something and we want to slap the wrist we can fine in part. >> so in your view we have the ability to ratchet back sanctions in pieces or in whole? >> if needed or in whole. >> let me if i might turn to secretary moniz in the time i have left about centrifuge development. if you would just -- i'll articulate the question and then if you'd have an answer for me. how long did it take iran to master the centrifuge? what's the difference in performance between the ir-1 and ir-8? and how long do you think it will take iran give p the restrictions of this agreement if observed to master the ir-6 and 8 and then what would the impact be on their ability to enrich after years 10 to 15? >> so, senator kuhns first of all of course they've been working on it for quite some time. they have some challenges still.

in terms of the r and d in the more advanced machines of course first of all the program does substantially shift back in time, their program plans. where they are today is the ir-6 that you mentioned is let's say seven or eight times more powerful than the ir-1. and they are already spinning small cascades of that with uranium. the ir-8, which is projected to be maybe 15 times more powerful is at the mechanical testing stage only. that's what got frozen in in the interim agreement. >> so if i might in closing, mr. chairman, it would be perfectly reasonable to expect that on a ten-year time horizon the ir-6 and 8, which they're already testing cascades of the 6, they've already got mechanical testing of the 8 under way, it would be reasonable to suspect from a decade from now they'd be

15 times better faster at their enrichment? >> no, we don't believe they will have -- with this schedule we don't think they will be anywhere near ready for industrial scale deployment of those machines certainly not in the decade and for some years thereafter. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> senator brasso. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. secretary kerry you mentioned a "the washington post" story related to israelis who know what they're talking about. i'd like to point out to you that wasn't even in the newspaper. that was a blog post. and it was written by someone who's been described as a left wing political activist. and if i have to choose between them and the prime minister of israel prime minister netanyahu, i'm going to stand with the prime minister of israel. but if you want to start talking about the newspaper let's look at yesterday's "new york times" a real news story. some experts questioned

verification process in iran accord. first paragraph, the obama administration's claim that the iran nuclear accord provides for airtight verification procedures is coming under challenge from nuclear exports with long experience in monitoring tehran's program. several experts including a former high ranking official at the iaea said a provision that gives iran up to 24 days to grant access to inspectors might enable it to escape detection. quote, a 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces detection probabilities exactly where the system is weakest, detecting undeclared facilities and materials. so i would just say to all three of you, i find it very telling and very disturbing that the president of the united states decided to go to the united nations on monday before coming to the american people. i think the american people have a right to have their voices heard. we expect to hear from them in august as we head home and

listen in town hall meetings across the country. i think congress has the right and the responsibility to provide oversight. secretary kerry, our nation's highest military commanders have very clearly warned the president, have warned you, have warned congress that lifting the arms embargo and current restrictions on ballistic missile technologies to iran would be wrong. on july 7th this year, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, martin dempsey testified before the senate armed services committee. he was unequivocal. he said under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking. under no circumstances. that's what he said. defense secretary ash carter also testified about iran. he said, we want them to continue to be isolated as a military and limited in terms of the kinds of equipment and materials they're able to get. and just seven days later you did the complete opposite of

what our military advisers very clearly warned against. you disregarded the views and the advice of our top military commanders, negotiated away these important restrictions on iran getting deadly military technologies. u.s. negotiators i believe capitulated, surrendered, agreed to lift the arms embargo to get this deal. and russia, i must point out, can gain about $7 billion from arms sales to iran. this administration repeatedly ignores the advice of our military leaders when it comes to important national security decisions. the administration ignored general odearno's recommendations to keep u.s. troops in iraq after 2011. president obama withdrew all of the troops. the administration ignored secretary leon panetta's chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and martin dempseys recommendations to arm vetted syrian rebels. the administration is now coming

to congress once again ignoring the advice and recommendations of our military leaders. this time it's about iran. mr. secretary how can you justify ignoring this advice and the judgment of military commanders responsible for securing the safety of the american people? >> well, senator, we didn't. i work with marty dempsey, i have great respect for him. we heard what he said very clearly. and i respect what he said, which is why we have the eight years and why we have the five years. in fact, we held out very, very strongly to keep them. and the fact is senator during those five years and those eight years we have all the options available to us in the world to strengthen or find other means or deal with those very issues. so they're not gone. they're there. we respected his advice. moreover, we have additional capacities to be able to deal with missiles. we have the lethal military equipment sanctions provision in

the foreign assistance act. we have iran's 1996 iran's action act. we have the iran and arms proliferation act. those are unilateral tools, by the way. we have a bunch of multilateral tools, proliferation security initiative with a hundred countries which works to help limit iranian missile-related imports and exports. we have the missile control technology regime, which does a lot to prevent the growth of any missile capacity. so there are many things we will continue to do but it didn't go away. we actually kept it. and we kept it notwithstanding the fact that three out of seven of the negotiating parties wanted to get rid of it altogether. we can i want. next thing on the u.n. you know we fought for the prerogatives of the congress.

but you know, six of the seven countries we were negotiating with are not beholden to the united states congress. if their parliaments pass something and said you got to do this or that and you were being told what to do, you'd be pretty furious. they were negotiating under the united nations. and their attitude was we finish negotiation, we ought to be able to conclude our agreement and put it before the u.n. and we said wait a minute, our congress needs to be able to review this. so we got them to accept a 90-day provision in the agreement for nonimplementation. they're respecting our desire and we're respecting your desire. for 90 days there's no implementation of this. if they had their way they'd be implementing it now. immediately. but they're not. so i respectfully suggest that we have to have a balancing here of interests and equities. i think we have preserved the

prerogative of congress. the same consequences will apply if you refuse to do this deal with the u.n. vote as without it. same consequences. and none of us have sat here and thrown the u.n. vote at you. we're simply saying this is a multilateral agreement that's been negotiated by seven countries. i'd say the same thing if i was here without the u.n. vote. >> you know, it's interesting secretary lew you said a deal our partners believe is a good one. and secretary kerry, you had talked about the p5+1 and you said and they're not dumb. well, i agree with that. they're not dumb. and it makes me though wonder if russia truly is our partner in this. we've pressed the reset button. we saw how that failed. we sue putin's belligerence around the world. i believe russia and tehran teamed up against the united states during these negotiations. >> actually, the iranians were furious at the russians on any number of accounts. the russians they felt were not cooperative with them and didn't

help them. you're exactly wrong. >> well, that's -- time will judge us on all of that. but just coming back from ukraine and seeing what's happening as well as from astonia, and i can see the be belligerence and aggression of russia. thank you. mr. chairman, my time has expired. >> it's my understanding you guys want to keep rolling for a while and not take a break. is that correct? >> i didn't know that. i don't know. >> that's what julia mentioned to us. but if you want to -- why don't we take a five-minute break. y'all are -- five minute break taken. >> i have to be over at the house is my problem. they don't have to be there, i have to be at the house. you have to be at the house

also. supposed to be at the house in 20 minutes. >> you want to keep going then? >> well, i'm happy to try to get whatever we can in those 15 20 minutes if you'll allow me to hobble over there for a minute and then come back. i'd appreciate it. >> hobble away. thank you. >> you guys go ahead. >> we'll take a break. accidentally transferred to several labs across the u.s. now we'll take you back live to the hearing room. senate foreign relations committee secretary kerry coming back into the room.

>> -- each of us i think will be very brief to try to finish up before you go over to the house. i want to make just a couple points and move to senator card in in. on the pmd issue, it's my belief whether that is resolved in an a-plus fashion or d-minus fashion, the sanctions relief will continue. and i will say that salahi today stated by december 15th at the end of the year the issue of pmd should be decided. the iaea will submit its report it will only submit it joint comprehensive plan of action will continue independently as a result of this report. that's exactly the way that i read the agreement. i don't see any debate there. secondly again i believe that the secretary continues to create a false narrative about

where we are. i would just like to remind him of the letter from secretary geithner to senator levin on december 1st 2011, when senator menendez had an amendment to the ndaa regarding the cbi sanctions. and here's what he said. however it's currently conceived this amendment threatens severe sanctions against any commercial bank or central bank if they engage in certain transactions with the cbi. this could affect negatively affect many of our closest allies and largest trading partners. and highlighted rather than motivating these countries to join us in increasing pressure on iran they are more likely to resent our actions and resist following our lead. a consequence in that would serve the iranians more than it harms. and obviously that wasn't the case. obviously through u.s. leadership it actually calls them to come to the table.

again, i think that you unfairly characterized where we are in that i do believe with your leadership and others if congress were to decide this was not something worth alleviating the con gregsly mandated sanctions a different outcome could occur. but with that senator carden. >> i want to follow up on that point with secretary lew. because i'm in agreement that we have in congress been the strongest on sanction-type of legislation whether it relates to the nuclear activityies of iran or whether it relates to terrorism or the missile program. and whether it's the obama administration or the bush administration or any previous administration, they'd prefer to act on their own rather than having congress provide the framework. in reality it's worked to america's advantage. and what's given us a strong position to go internationally to get sanctions imposed. so it's worked.

bottom line the system has worked for u.s. leadership. so secretary lew, i am concerned. and i started with this question, i'm going to come back to it. paragraph 26 says we will refrain from re-introducing or reimposing the sanctions that have been terminated. you've gone through some of the things we can do for nonnuclear related activities, but if it's an institution say the central bank of iran that is getting relief fund under this jcpoa, and we have clear evidence that they've been involved in sanctionable activities that are nonnuclear related can we sanction them under this agreement? >> absolutely. >> senator carden i've tried to be clear. if there are nonnuclear sanctions being imposed, we have retained all of our -- >> including an institution -- >> including institutions that are delisted.

it can't put pretext -- >> i understand. if we have clear evidence that iran has used its crude oil sales in a way that has furthered nonnuclear sanctionable type of activities can we go back to the crude oil issue if we have clear evidence that that would further provide relief in regards to a nonnuclear activity? >> i think in principle we have not taken any of the means that we have of applying economic pressure off the table for nonnuclear purposes. >> so it could be sectorial to the types of relief they receive under this agreement? >> it would have to be justified based on a nonnuclear basis. >> okay. that's very helpful. so we are going to be free to have some interesting discussions as we move forward. second point and this is secretary kerry, quickly. i'm very happy to hear you say about our strong commitment in the region.

these security issues are changing. they're changing for israel. they're changing for our allies. no question with isis and north africa, in syria, in addition to iran. if you'll just quickly, how we are committed to making sure that israel is secure in that region with a true and trusted partnership with the united states to meet any challenge that they may confront as a result of the changing circumstances? >> thank you, senator. first of all i begin by saying that i'm proud i had 100% voting record for 29 years here on the subject of israel. and i have worked as hard as anybody here. i think you know over the last years to try to meet theeds needs with respect to peace and stability demands for israel. we are completely -- i mean i think it's fair to say that even

with this disagreement we are constantly in touch and working with the intel community with their folks. and we continue to dialogue about the threats of israel. we understand those threats. they are real. they're existential. and there's no debate in this administration whatsoever about our willingness to commit anything and everything necessary to be able to provide for the security of israel. now, we believe that security of israel will also be enhanced by not only this agreement but by bringing the gulf states together in a way that can deal with some of the problems of the region and particularly dash, assad, syria and so forth. that's very much on our agenda at this point in time. >> thank you. i'll yield back my time. >> i do want to say there's a significant disagreement among our allies and iran over the issue that was answered relative to reapplying nuclear sanctions in other areas. i'd love for you to develop a

letter. i'm sure iran wouldn't sign it but one where great britain, france and germany and the eu agree with the statement you just made. because i just met with them and my impression, maybe i don't understand things correctly was they are in strong disagreement with the statement that you just made. senator johnson. >> thank you mr. chairman. i think it's abundantly clear from this hearing is that this is obviously complex. this agreement is subject to different interpretations. which kind of leads me to believe, and i'm not blaming you or the administration, i blame iran, i just believe this is going to end like our sanctions and the program against north korea. i think in the end iran will have nuclear weapon with ballistic missile technology. so that's why i want to quick go back to secretary moniz. i was surprised, i'd say disappointed, that you weren't aware of the recommendations from the 2008 emp commission report. by the way -- again, i guess i caught you by surprise.

you weren't expecting that for this hearing. just so you know that was commissioned by the 2001 national defense authorization act. they reported in 2004 and 2008. and this is something certainly i'd heard about before i ever came here and this is "star wars" stuff and couldn't possibly happen. but again you've acknowledged knowing dr. richard garwin correct? a brilliant man. >> yes. >> worked with enrico referred to as one of the true geniuses he'd ever known. >> dick is a national resource. >> he testified. and my ranking member during the hearing said he looked into this and somebody said it was it's a growing threat when you have north korea, potentially a state like iran if this thing turns out like north korea, we have multiple threats of this. particularly in light of the fact we know iran has been

testing a potential emp attack using a scud missile off of a ship. which would be one of our threats particularly on the southern border where we have no defense or particularly a satellite orbiting. so i want to make sure you're fully aware of that because the 2008 emp commission pretty well tasked dhs and department of energy as the two lead departments to enact their 15 recommendations. again, they're pretty basic recommendations. evaluate and implement quick fixes, assure availability of equipment, replacement equipment. again, what dr. garwin report -- and this is what i thought was actually pretty encouraging, is if we would just protect 700 transformers to the tune of about $100,000 per transformer, that's only $70 million. but again it's been seven years, seven years since that recommendation and the secretary department of energy didn't really know anything about it. i'm just asking you -- >> can i clarify though,

senator? >> go ahead. >> i know something about emp. i don't know that specific report. and including the effects and as i said -- and also by the way i will dick garwin also does a lot of work with our osdp, i will talk with dr. holden the president's adviser maybe this is an administration wide thing we can do and consult with you on that but i want to emphasize in april we did our energy infrastructure report. and the issues of transformers and emp and other threats were there. and furthermore we have made a recommendation about going forward in a public-private partnership to potentially establish a transformer reserve in addition. so i would love to discuss this. i just don't know that particular report. i know the issues. >> we'll probably call you in for a hearing in front of my committee homeland security. these remgcommendations issued in 2008, it's seven years later.

of the 15 remgcommendations we've done virtually nothing. this is a real threat. america needs to understand certainly the secretary of department of energy needs to be aware of these recommendations and working toward their implementation. and there's a relatively quick fix quite honestly add is an amendment to authorize spending $70 million -- it's imperfect, but it goes a long way toward protecting some of those transformers. i hope you'll be supportive of that. >> senator menendez. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. secretary lew, i basically understood your answers to my previous question. that you have no intention of seeking reauthorization of the iran sanctions act, an act that in october 3rd of 2013 entitled -- in a hearing entitled reversing iran's nuclear program heralded as

critical. negotiation on iran's nuclear program, another hearing, they both said the same thing and talked about the important congressional sanctions. so seems to me that if you want a deterrent, iran has to know consequences. maybe it will never be called into play. that's fine. that's good. hopefully they won't be called into play. but they need to know what the consequences are. and so as far as i'm concerned i think we should be moving to reauthorize the sanctions that congress passed. and that expire next year. and let the iranians know that if they violate those are one of the things they're going to have to go back to. so i'm going to move to reauthorize them because i think it needs to be part of the deter deterrant. do you believe iran will be and should be a regional power? >> do i believe that they should be in the future or something?

>> will be and should be a regional power? >> well, i think to some degree there's an element of power in what they're doing now. i don't know about the will be. do i want them to be? not in the way that they behaved today. no. >> i'm glad to hear that because, you know, the president in the column with tom friedman said that the truth of the matter is that iran will be and should be a regional power. but that's a pretty bold statement about a country that is the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world as defined by our government. it would have to be a dramatically different iran to have any aspirations. >> and the president knows that. >> let me ask you one final thing. you're an excellent, excellent lawyer. and when you can get to argue something both ways, if you can achieve that that's great. so i've heard you argue we will have everything on the table that we have today. we will have the sanctions.

we will have a military option. then i've also heard you say sanctions is not going to get iran to stop its nuclear program in terms of -- and a military option will only deter them for three years. so isn't really what you're saying that at the end of the day we hope that iran will change its course over the next ten to 15 years? that if they violate we'll get notice from three months that we had to 12 months, a year. but at the end of the day neither sanctions nor military option is going to if i listen to you your arguments, no military option is going to ultimately deter iran if they decide to do so. so doesn't that in essence say to us that we are reconciled at the end of the day if they want to? to accept iran as a nuclear weapon? >> absolutely, positively not.

not in the closest of imagination. i'll tell you why. they're not going to be sanctioned into submission. we've seen that. they have what is called their resistance economy. there are limits to what our friends and allies are able and willing to do. you know the challenge we've had in just bringing people along on ukraine. bringing people along particularly the russians and chinese over a length of time is going to be very very difficult. they're sort of a half-life if you will to keep the sanctions pressure in place. in addition to that on the military option we all know as it's described to us by the military it's a two or three-year deal. now, that option that is real. it's a last resort option. if you can't make diplomacy work, if you can't succeed in putting together a protocol they

have to follow which by which they live, guarantees they won't have a weapon that's sort of your last resort. but it shouldn't be the first resort. it shouldn't be the place you force yourself to go to. given the structure of this agreement we have a much better option. because whatever it is, 15 years, 20 years whatever the moment is that the alarm bells go off on a civil nuclear program which has 24/7 access, which has inspectors which we will know has suddenly moved from 5% to 10% to 20% enrichment, all the alarm bells go off. we'll have the ability to bring those nations back together. the question is do you have the sort of readiness and willingness of those countries to come together because you've honored the process and worked through a process? or are you start pushing them away -- sanctions obviously brought them to the table. >> or come together for a

military option, which at the end of the day will deter but not end it? i just don't understand the proposition. sounds like your proposition will be there whether it is today or whether there's a violation in the future. >> no, senator because i believe this deal in fact achieves what we need to achieve now. we wouldn't have come to you. we wouldn't have signed this. i assure you, germany, france, britain, would not have signed this agreement all of us together on the same day if we didn't have a sense of confidence that this is doing the things we need to do shutting off the iranian path shutting off the plutonium path, shutting off the covert path and so forth. and we believe it does that. that's why we're here. we believe it does that. now, the proof will be in the implementation. we all know that. but we have a sufficient cushion here of those years because of the very dramatic steps iran has agreed to take and to implement.

we have a very real cushion during which time we have a chance of building up confidence. i'm not going to sit here and tell you that's absolutely going to work 100%. i believe it will. but if they don't comply i do have confidence we're going to knownoncompliance, and then we have the options available to us that we have today. >> mr. chairman i know secretary kerry said he had to leave at 2:30. >> we do i'm afraid. >> we have a couple more witnesses. so if that's a hard time i think -- >> it is a hard time. i actually have to be at the house right now. >> okay. listen, obviously this is a serious matter that the three of you spent a tremendous amount of time over the last two years. we appreciate your patience with us today in testifying the way you have. we appreciate your service to our country. julia, who i know is having a heart attack as staffer we thank you and hope you have a good meeting with the house of representatives. thank you. >> thank you very much.

>> pentagon officials released a report showing that a laboratory

accidentally sent live anthrax to other labs. we will have donald trump's remarks later. and the house appealed a measure to approve law enforcement grants. >> the national governor's association is meeting in white sulfur springs am a west virginia on our next washington journal. we will talk to gary herbert of utah about some of his priorities. then a conversation on so-called sanctuary cities and the benefit they offer to undocumented immigrants in the u.s.. our guest is gregory chen. later, sarah ferris of the hill will join us to talk about the release of two videos of planned parenthood officials and the reaction from capitol hill. it's live each morning at 7:00

eastern on c-span and we also take calls. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. we will have live coverage of the national governor's association opening session tomorrow starting at 12:45 eastern with the current chair of colorado and the next chair, gary herbert of utah. later in the afternoon, a panel will look at tourism and economic development and we will have more lives nga coverage on saturday here on c-span. >> the pentagon released a review of the department safety practices after a bio lab accidentally shipped live anthrax spores to laboratories. this is 40 minutes.

>> i want to give you an update on the investigation into the shipment of live anthrax spores within the united states and overseas. since 2003, the department has periodically shipped what it thought was inactivated or killed samples of bacillus and braces -- anthrasis to selected laboratory. we do this to create medical and physical countermeasures to protect our troops allies, partners, and the american public from the threat of biological attacks.

we do this because we know that in the past, some nations have pursued biological weapons, and we can't be certain they will not be used in the future. on may 22 of this year, the center for disease control and prevention notified dod that a commercial research facility had received supposedly an activated sample that contained live anthrax spores. we quickly determined that this sample originated from utah and it was shipped through the army edgewood chemical biological center in maryland. two days later, after consultation with the cdc, all shipments of inactivated biological agents from dugway and the edgewood facility were halted. the very next day, we expanded that to include a moratorium on all shipments of inactivated anthrax material to and from all

dod laboratories. on 26 may, cdc began an investigation into what happened at dugway and edgewood and three days later, i initiated a broader review of dod laboratory procedures and protocols associated with in activating anthrax spores to determine if this was a one-time procedural failure or if it was a more systematic problem in the department's biohazard safety procedures. i would like to -- i looked to frank to assemble a team. this was an expertise team that included representatives from the department of agriculture, energy defense, homeland security, the federal bureau of investigation, academia, and industry. they conducted a comprehensive

review of all procedures processes, and protocols on the four laboratories that work with inactivated anthrax spores, and particularly, those procedures that were associated with the inactivation of live spores and the viability testing to determine if they were indeed killed. while this review was underway, the department and cdc worked together to test and then retest every single inactivated anthrax batch that we retained in our inventory. the review team reported their findings and recommendations to frank on the 13th of july. after his thorough review, and i have to say thorough review, i received his endorsement yesterday. in the meantime, secretary carter and i discussed the findings of the report, its implications, and i would like to share with you some of the

findings and recommendations of the review. the review showed that since 2003, i work for dod laboratories have radiated a total of 149 batches of live anthrax spores and reported them as inactivated and safe for subsequent testing. every one of those batches have been accounted for and either tested or destroyed. 53 of the 149 batches are no longer in dod inventory. we have been doing this since 2003. they were available -- they were not available for testing. any recipients of those batches who still have any samples on hand were told to destroy them. that left us with 96 batches to test.

17 of those 96 tested positive for the regrowth or presence of live anthrax. everyone originated from dugway. of the total batches in dugway's inventory, more than half tested positive. 17 of 33 batches at dugway. obviously, when over half of those anthrax batches that were presumed to be inactivated proved to contain live spores, we have a major problem. the numbers confirm this judgment. at this point, we know that over the last 12 years, 86 laboratories in 20 states, the district of columbia, and seven foreign

>> they come in liquid form. extremely small amounts. they were handled in laboratory environments like technicians that were used to handling hazardous material. they were extremely low concentrations of spores and these stamp -- and these samples. this helps explain why over a 12 year. , there has never been a single incident of infection. the -- we are very confident that because of these unique circumstances, there were nok known risks to the public. the person would have to purposely drink or inject the sample several times for them to

become infected. secretary carter, myself, and the leadership of the department take no comfort in this fact. by any measure, by any measure. this was a massive institutional failure with a potentially dangerous biotoxins. they first thing we had to know, was why did it happen? the review concluded there were three main causes to the failure. the first and most broad, and the one that surprised me the most is, there is no national standard at all to guide us through the development of the quality insurance measures in the preparation of anthrax issues.

there is no national standard. each of the labs had to make their own protocols. they had to test them for their viability. obviously, in the other labs it seemed it to work. and that way, it did not. there is a large production volume, low sampling volume on the testing for an activation material for viability testing and a very short. of time from the time the sample was irradiated and declared dead. that is why there was a very high likelihood at that location for a problem to occur. the numbers seem to confirm this. there were no biosafety procedures that were standardized. that is another

thing that surprised me. that is because the laboratories are under different chains of command. given these findings, we as a department, have a lot of work to do. a lot of work is cut out for us. the american public expects more from the department of defense and we expect much more of ourselves. secretary carter has made it plain to me and the senior leadership that he expects these issues to be dealt with swiftly and comprehensively to us or that a failure of this sort never happens again. i am taking the following actions. i have directed undersecretary kindle to work with the dod stakeholders and the cdc to work with the u.s. government to development testing protocols

for all department of defense labs that work with spores like anthrax. i made sure there is enough funding to develop these protocols. if he feels that is not enough money, he can bring it to me through the deputy management action group and we will take action to make sure the funds are made available. i have asked him to review and advise those necessary policies to ensure consistent application of cross our -- across our four laboratories. in addition, i have directed the secretary army to direct a full accountability assessment for those responsible.

to include initiating a formal investigation of the specific actions that contributed to the unintended shipment of live anthrax spores within 30 days, the secretary of the army and navy, three of the labs report under the army, and one report under the navy. they will develop an implementation plan for addressing the specific recommendations of this report. particularly on program management and quality management. laboratory missions and chains of command will provide policy recommendations to ensure there is a consistent appleman -- consistent implementation. they worked across two military departments and across four chains of command. we need standardization across all four.

finally, i have designated the secretary of the army as the dod secretary agent for the biosafety program. as the dod executive agent the secretary of the army will be responsible for the technical review and the establishment of these biosafety protocols and procedures. he will have the authority to ensure their strict and fermentation. i have asked the army to this and gave a strict of us or to execute this responsibility for him. in till all of these recommendations are put in place, undersecretary kendall has told me they have been addressed. i have directed a moratorium -- a continued moratorium on the

testing and shipment of the activated threat of anthrax. these activated protocols will address the threatening spores sent. we were surprised by this. failures that we need to address were made present. we were shocked by these failures. the dod takes full responsibility by these failures and we are implementing changes and recommending the establishment of procedures, processes, and methods that will prevent such a failure happening again. in fact, we hope the lessons we are learning will encourage the development and establishment of a national inactivation

viability testing standard for every lap in the united states. before closing, i want to reiterate there is no known risk to the general public -- or to our allies and partners. or to the servicemen and women. there have been zero cases of anthrax infection over the past 12 years and we continue to partner with the cdc. once again, the statement in no way, is meant to minimize the severity of this failure. it was inexcusable. in closing, let me say that secretary carter myself and the senior leadership of the department want to commend the laboratory that first notified the cdc of this problem. they set this review in motion. it was because of their

notification that the department was able to take immediate action and stop all shipping of the activated anthrax. we then assessed our procedures and protocols and instituted the needed changes that were so obviously called for. in doing so, they helped ensure nobody was infected by anthrax. with that, i would like toa question? >> i think i heard you mention the fbi. why would you bring the fbi into this? although you have this accountability review, it was an army review, if i understand you correctly. if this had gone on for years, with no one recognizing it, why do you believe that the army can do a competent review?

who do you think, is responsible. my third question is, how can you be certain that there are no other germ or biological chemical hazardous agents that are not facing the same problem? >> there were a lot of questions and that one, barbara. the fbi -- we wanted to make sure this was not the result of a purposeful attack. we were able to determine that was not the case. second thing, this responsibility. the first review was designed primarily. when i asked the question on the 29th, i thought, how in the world can this happen? i want to do fine because of the problem. that was the initial focus of the review. after the review frank made the recommendation that although we did not know the viability

standards were false, we need to get to this. still, there were things happening in dugway that we need to read -- review more closely. that is why we did not ask the secretary of the army to execute the investigation into what happened. >> why do you think they're not -- there does not need to be an independent review? for some reason, the army has not noticed in years. why not an independent review to assure yourselves a full and independent investigation? >> i full confidence in the secretary. i expect him to review in great detail and provide recommendations to us on exactly , if there is, and who is responsible for these lapses at dugway. >> how are you sure there are no

other agents out there with the same thinking? have you know it is just anthrax? >> i might ask frank to do this. we were looking at all sport-producing organisms. we -- all spore-producing organisms. we had high confidence in the shipment of the material and had high confidence it was handled and laboratories by trained people. the protocols themselves must be examined themselves. that are standards must be made. i have high confidence, at this point, that there are no issues we are unaware of. >> what was so different about the articles and procedures at dugway, as compared to the other installations? in this investigation, did you

find any evidence of negligence or malfeasance in those responsible for the testing? >> there was no findings of malfeasance. or misuse of protocols. it was the protocols themselves that were at fault. the protocols at dugway were particularly problematic. it is a production facility. 86 of the 149 batches were created at dugway. they made large concentrations -- large vat -- batch sizes. the other facilities worked with small samples. their radiation procedures obviously, did not work. the time between the time they

irradiated they samples and tested it for viability was too short. the combination of these factors, we believe was the reason why there batches proved to be "live." >> what or who was responsible for that? >> the technical director >> anthrax is a very unique organism. there is no organism like it. because it exists within the spores. well, it is harder than a bacteria virus to kill and know exactly where you are in that process. the processes at dugway were not as rigorous as other places -- not by an enormous margin however. the tee -- the team that

looked at this found factors that could have contributed to the fact they were not as successful at killing the anthrax. the thing that stood out at dugway was that a very large portion of the samples that had been irradiated turned out to be positive. that should have been a clear indication to those at dugway that something was wrong. there are other things at the way -- including something that happened in their history. it should be assessed by a formal investigation by an appropriate investigation body. the army has those investigating bodies. the review we did was a 30 day review and was not an in-depth investigating review of the kind

you want to have it you find somebody culpable and take directive action. that is what the army will do now. >> i think you all do understand the concept of undue influence. it is not appropriate for any of us to speculate on who might be responsible. we believe that to the investigation to inform us and then we will take action, if necessary. yes sir? >> what kind of deadlines are -- is if the secretary dealing with now with the work you have given him? and, there must be some doubt that nobody is at fault otherwise, why conducts the internal investigation? you slightly contradicted

yourself. you said you did not know that was the personnel or not. please expand on that. >> dugway followed the procedures that were in place at dugway. as frank said, what happened was, the procedures were the culprit. we believe they were indicators that people should have known there was a problem. that is why we can say there is nobody that was doing it on purpose. they were following what they believed to be the correct protocol. it was responsible -- it was the responsibility of the laboratory to identify the problem. i do not believe there is any contradiction in our testimony here. as i said, there were different procedures in each of the facilities. they were all in different chains of command.

one of the findings was, that we need to standardize and activation protocol across all four of the laboratories in that is what secretary kendall will have to do. there is no deadline. frank kendall has as much time to do this and the moratorium will stay in place for as long as is needed. at some point, if it becomes clear that it is interfering with our biological defense program, secretary kendall will take that into account. his first requirement is to establish the standardized for the calls and implement them across the department. he will tell me if they are scientifically sound. we have to have a high confidence that they will prevent problems like this from happening in the future.

in the meantime, the moratorium will continue and we will work with the cvc. everything is contained inside more liberal or tories. in the meantime -- inside more laborde tories. -- laboratories. people come to me and he will make a recommendation on monday moratorium will be lifted. if we make this decision based on science and using the experts within the department of defense, it will go smoothly. i will turn this over to those who conducted the review. frank is aware of all of the details. the doctor compose the report.

if you have any specific questions, you can ask them. >> did you ever suggest that they not be involved in anthrax identification? there were minimal testing viability. they are standards that can be done. you know i'm the approximate spores are in a batch and how much radiation needs to be used. we have all asked repeatedly, where was that decision made? you used unusually low standards and unusually high batches. i don't understand who made that decision. if dugway did this systematically for decades, why should dugway still continue to produce anthrax at all? >> dugway have stopped. the moratorium applies to them

as well as the other locations. i will turn this over to frank. this is a failure and the department of defense full responsibility for. we need to understand and establish proceeds -- procedures that will ensure this will never happen again. frank will take us to a point where we can tell you and the american public that we have solved this problem, and it will not happen ever again. thank you. frank: he is the chief michael officer at the bio medical program. the deprecating -- the deputy secretary asked me to conduct this. i want to clarify some things about the dugway procedures. they did not depart dramatically from what others are doing. they used roughly, the same

level of radiation. there has been a report that is available to you now. there are the details of what each laboratory did. a used a smaller testing sized to verify the activation was successful. that in itself might not have been enough to cause them to miss, at least with the frequency they did miss, the fact that there were still live anthrax in the radiated samples. they did testing more quickly he goes of a process they were doing more work and this area. also their samples were contaminated. the other samples were more and for used for research, as opposed to field testing. the differences are understandable and existed for a reason. in general dugway's processes

were different. they were not dramatically so. they did not find there was any negligence or gross negligence. this is a deeper problem than that. when i read the reports of the review group, what struck me was that there were indicators that the technical leadership at dugway should have seen. it should've indicated to them that something was wrong. they need to look more closely at the procedure. too high of a percentage of their batches tested positive. when the review team asked them what their problem was the initial answer was 2% or 3%. the review team checked and found it to between the present. that is a -- found it to be 20%. that is a significant difference. when you are factoring a statistical progress, the

implications are important. my recommended to the secretary -- what a recommended to the secretary is as follows. the team of command needs to be investigated at dugwya. -- at dugway. >> can you ask line the moratorium process? >> in the short-term, it will not have much of an effect. basically, it is closing down research for a short. of time. some of the testing we do to verify that laboratories have the capabilities to test anthrax successfully.

proper protections are in place for live anthrax. this special category of an activated anthrax will be ceased until we get this sorted out. there is going to be a scientific body of research that will fully characterize and understand how anthrax response to radiation and how the testing will verify the inactivated sample on a higher percentage. that is what we need to do the research on. i will not hesitate to guess on how long that research will take but it will not be done instantaneously. it will take a while. >> can you explain what the verification test it was and explain the discrepancy between the 2% and 20%? as the 2% something the lab had said to you? was it a lie? >> i would not call it a lie, at this point.

the team was asked the question, how often to your samples fail the verification test. the answer was 2%. they checked the records and found it to be much higher than that. >> the entire dialogue at the facilities -- you can see what the actual dialogue was. it was a simple misunderstanding on their part on what the failure rate was. when we asked for the data, it showed that it was significantly higher. >> a live sample had gone through their process at dugway -- and it was not detected. they had earlier indications that there might be a problem as well. basically, after you do the radiation, you take a sample and attempt to grow it. if it is alive, and has not been

inactivated, it will grow. one of the differences and procedures is how the degree of nutrition, are the type of solution or material that you put the spores and after they have been radiated. some of the labs use a b roth. others use a more common substance. >> deputy secretary says the maryland lab that first brought the problem to the attention of the cdc -- my understanding from previous reporting is one they try to grow anthrax culture anthrax perhaps, they were surprised. why would a lab getting what it has been told anthrax data

scores why would any lab try to grow anthrax? >> i think what happened in this case was, when anthrax is shipped in an inactivated form it is accompanied by a certificate that says it is inactivated. because the did not have the certificate, they went ahead and did the test. >> to test the laboratories to see if their systems work again they were sent blind inactivated samples. they do not know the identity of the sample. in this case, they did not receive the certificate. because they did not receive the certificate, they assumed it was live. then, the culture came out as positive. >> it was not issued with the sample that was sent. >> in this case. >> yes.

>> can you repeat that? >> should it have had a death certificate, or should it not have? >> it did not have a death certificate. can they identify -- >> the samples went to something like 86 select labs. how select is this? process -- is this process? ken this happen again -- can this happen again where dangerous substances are shipped to places all over the country? >>