sanctions. >> i don't know who wants to respond to this but at the time we began negotiations, what was the best estimate of our intelligence community about the time for iran to break out with a nuclear weapon? >> the best estimate was two to three months. >> was there agreement among our intelligence agencies about that estimate? >> by -- yes pretty much. there was a disagreement with a couple of other countries but not disagreement inner intel community. >> and as we look at -- if this agreement goes into effect, is there an estimate from our intelligence community about how long it might take to get to a nuclear weapon at the end of this agreement if iran decides to pursue that option at the end of -- >> there's a distinction senator. the breakout time as it is used in this negotiation is a hybrid of the traditional understanding

of broadcasteakout time. breakout time in arms control is the time it takes to get a weapon. we have been dealing only with the amount of time it takes to get enough fissile material to produce one weapon. you still have to produce the weapon and most people don't guesstimate that a country is going to be satisfied with only one weapon and enough fissile material for one. there's a lot of time beyond that. we've been operating with a huge safety cushion here, and we'll have one year of broadcasteakout time for one fissile weapon for at least ten years and then it begins to tail down, but not as a cliff. it begins to tail down as we go through the next five years and thn we're arriving at a point where iran has, hopefully, achieved normal status in the npt. i say hopefully because if they

haven't, the agreement hasn't worked in the sense they've violated it and we go back to snapback and have the sanctions back in place. >> can you answer whether all of our intelligence agencies are agreed on that particular breakout period? or is there a difference of opinion? >> our intelligence community and the energy department and everybody worked this very, very hard. and it's a very precise formula which feeds in the most rapid possible rate by looking at the numbers of centrifuges. the amount of enrichment, the capacity for enrichment. all of the many factors that come into it. it's a complicated formula. and everybody is in agreement as to where we are. >> it also includes capacity to rebuild all the infrastructure they are taking out. i might just add beyond the 15 years where there are very severe constraints in terms of visibility, for 20 years there

is still the containment and surveillance activities for any centrifuge sensitive parts manufacturing. they'll all be tracked, labeled, tracked, et cetera. and for 25 years the iranian transparencey transparency. it's like follow the iranian and the centrifuges. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> the president was really clear in year 13 there's zero brack breakout and begin industrialization at -- >> i never heard that carc characterization, mr. chairman. >> i hope you'll take these questions in the spirit they are given. i've been supportive of these negotiations. i commendio all for the hard work that's been done. there's some disagreement here with the text of the agreement as we read it and the explanation that's given.

let me just cover a couple of these points. number airteight, on adoption date in the annex for the implementation plan, iran will inform the iaea that iran will apply the additional protocol pending its ratification by the parliament. the iranian parliament and will fully implement the code 3.1. we tacklked about the agreement, although it's voluntary to live by the additional protocol. what is the time table that's required for the parliament to address the additional protocol? >> they have, senator they have to live by the additional protocol for -- >> rndunderstood, but going forward -- >> they have eight years to adopt it formally. but they are in material breach

as of adoption day if they do not live by it. and it is fully understood by everybody that would be a material breach. >> but there is no time table where the parliament -- >> they have to do it within the eight years. >> that's the time table. >> which is before the sanctions are lifted. so you have the snapback capacity as a result of them not doing it or living by it. >> understood. december 2011 the president signed into law the ndaa that included sanctions on iran's central bank. these sankss penalized foreign financial institutions that were doing business with iran's central bank. these sanctions will ultimately be suspended because of the jcpoa. what i'm trying to understand, and this keys off a question asked by senator cardin and others, we -- according to the

agreement, the u.s. administration acting consistent with the respective roles of the president and congress will refrain from reintroducing the imposinge inginge inging saunkse inging sanctions in annex two. this is what a lot of us are having trouble reconciling here. what would constitute reintroduce, reimposing sanctions specified existing sanctions, if because iran didn't violate the nuclear part of the agreement but, for other reasons, committed edted terrorism abroad abducted citizens. could we impose sanksctions on iran's central bank because that would mimic or be similar to what was done before but in a different context. would that be allowed or would that lead to some violation on our part of the agreement?

secretary lew. >> i'm going to take a stab at this because we've been going around on it and i want to, if i can, answer it. first of all, we will not violate the jcpoa if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism, human rights missiles or any other non-nuclear reason. and the jcpoa does not provide iran any relief from the u.s. sanctions rnd any of those authorities or other authorities. and i'll go through some of those other authorities. what we have committed to do is quite specific. iran was fearful that having witnessed the hot desire in congress for more sanksctions, that even if we cut an agreement you folks might just turn around the day after and say, too bad.

we're coming back with all the sanctions and then the president is in veto status or over ride status. we're not going to reimpose the specific nuclear related sanction provisions as specified in annex two to the jcpoa contingent on them abiding by the commitments of the agreement. so it's really simply a clarification to them that we're not going to come back and just slap a bun again. that doesn't mean we're precluded from sanctioning iranian actors sectors or any actions if circumstances warrant. so all of our other sanctions remain in place. and iran only said if you read what it says that they would treat the imposition of nuclear-related sanctions as the

grounds to cease performing. but they are clear, and we are clear that we have all other kinds of authorities. it's specific for this whole debate to be clear. even with the lifting of sanctions after eight years of missiles or the u.n. sanctions it's only the u.n. sanctions. we still have sanctions. our primary embargo is still in place. we are still sanctioning them. and for those things that we want to deal with in terms of their behavior. hezbollah. there is a u.n. resolution 1701 that prevents the transfer of any weapons to hezbollah. that will continue and what we need to do is make sure we're enforcing it. >> i think we've got that. i want to make sure if we say, all right what was effective on iran. what's brought them to the table are these sanctions on the central bank because it's more

difficult for rshussia, china and other actors to help them evade these sanksctions. if we impose sanctions on their central bank that that won't be a material breach of the accord. >> it will not. >> one other question on a broader topic. assuming this goes into effect we're going to desperately need a regional security framework that you have touched on and some discussions are already going on. i would just encourage you that i understand the problem with 535 secretaries of state. can't have that. but i'd encourage you to reach out to the relative committees as the fromwork is put in place to make sure it can endure longer than just the first couple of years of the agreement. to have the international

fortitude to move ahead, it's best to have congress involved. and there's -- there are many points between 535 secretaries of state and proper consultation with the relevant committees, at least, of jurisdiction here. >> i couldn't concur more. i think you're dead on. we agree. and, by the way i think in the course of this negotiation prior to the passage of the requirement for the 60 days which we understand, and joined in with working with the chairman, and we're grateful to the chairman for the cooperation on that. but there were a huge number of briefings and hearings and telephone calls n meetings and so forth literally in the hundreds. i couldn't agree more about this new arrangement. we're tacking about arms transfers, special operations training, about counterterrorism counterin

counterinsurgency. we have a need to build capacity in many of those countries. the gulf states spend about $130 billion a year on their defense. iran spends $15 billion. yet you see a disparity in terms of what's happening in that region. that has to be addressed, and that's the purpose of our initiative. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator. i appreciate you joining in about an hour and a half before that vote on our agreement. senator udall. >> let me echo what everyone said. i appreciate the negotiators and the team and especially give a shoutdout to wendy sherman. i'd also like to recognize our colleague senator angus king who has been sitting here from the beginning. back in their office or here to

stay involved in this designation. this is a very important deal, one based on verification and sound science. those two areas are what i'd like to focus on today. the national labs in tennessee new mexico and california have played an important role, and i think it's important we do the best job we can to explain to the american people why this meets the scientific rigors for preventing iran from developing a bomb. secretary moniz, can you say what the half life of uranium and plutonium are and what this means about how long we can detect its signature in nature and why that's important. >> you are creating the need for a 50-minute lecture. the half life of uranium is

roughly the age of the earth 5 billion years. and that's why we still have it in the ground,ranium 235 is a factor of maybe ten less which is why it's a major isotope now. plutonium is much shorter. 20,000 years probably. which is why we don't have any of it naturally and have to make it in reactors. >> iran cannot create a facility or enrich uranium or plutonium out of the thin air. the laws of physics are clear. energy and math must be conserved and through the iaea we'll bible to detect illicit use due to extensive monitoring. do both of you believe that's correct? >> yes. >> yes. >> and with regard to the 24-day for undeclared sites. given the half life of uranium

and plutonium and a parallel enrichment capability, is it possible to hide such work within 24 days and do you believe we have the technical capabilities to determine if enrichment is being done outside the jcpoa? >> we have the historical example of 2003 of precisely that happening after six months, easily finding uranium despite efforts to disguise it. we'll have all the containment of all the sensitive parts of every machine they make. >> so people that have used the analogy in a drug crime you flush it down the toilet and it's gone and won't be able to find it, that has in fact been proven out? >> if they try that, we'll find it out. >> our experts at oak origin, los alamos lawrence livermore

have given technical support throughout these negotiations. are they confident these verification measures, both enhanced measures and those in the additional protocol will enable the iaea to detect and attempt to break out in time for the international community to react. >> the international lab scientists, they were heroic, on constant call for hours turn around in the negotiating sessions. i've alaudluded to the fact that los alamos played a huge role in the detection arena. those people have invented many of the safeguard technologies that will be employed here. >> so it sonds to me like iran could break the rules of this agreement but cannot break the rules of physics. the international community has the know-how and expertise to

determine whether iran is abiding by this deal and the nonproliferation treaty but into perpetuity under the nonproliferation treaty. would you agree with this assessment and would the panel agree if necessary the u.s. and p5+1 would have the ability to snap back sanctions and deal with the violations as appropriate in order to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon? >> yes. again, we'll have much greater transparency from day one to forever than we would have without the agreement. that's a fact. and then the sanctions i'll venture the answer is yes. >> thank you. and then just finally secretary kerry, one of the keys.

implementation. how are we going to do implementation. i ask in the broadest possible way, how is it going to be done? who is going to be in charge? how are we going to make sure that we really do what needs to be done to make sure this is a success? >> we already have created an implementation office. and we have somebody managing that at this point. it's teamed up. but will be even more so as we go forward. this will be a full-time operation. it's not going to be left to a normal bureau. there will be a full-time iran agreement implementation effort with experienced and competent personnel staffing it. >> and i would just add that under that umbrella of the administration, we will have our own implementation team and there will be some major jobs. in annex one you'll see alluded to a working group of the p5+1

on theu iraq reactor redesign. we anticipate obviously playing a leading role in that group and making sure that the new reactor does only what we have laid out. and the parameters are in the material you have. >> good. and i just -- i can't emphasize enough in terms of the national laboratories especially the two in new mexico but all of them, that they have worked on this these kinds of activities and studied nuclear issues since the creation of the atomic bomb. and that's why they are in such a position to be able to give the technical advice to make -- >> if i could just reinforce that, it's very important. this is a pitch for the national labs. this is not the capability you

invent overnight. it has to be a consistent investment in our core capability. >> people like me who obviously don't have that background, understood our limitations and there isn't any decision made in this agreement, none, where we didn't go to our teams. in fact there were days we were delayed because we had to go back to the laboratories. get the laboratories' inpult, our experts input and make a judgment as to, whether whatever judgment we made would result in what we were seeking and be sustainable. there isn't one technical decision within this agreement that hasn't been worked through the entire system in that regard. >> thank you. >> senator, i can be proud of your outstanding labs. i've visited them and they are playing a huge role in this. senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman and to the secretaries today for

your time and testimony. i wanted to start with the secretary lew talking about a number of individuals who will, by 2023, and companies removed from the u.s. saunksnctions list. what can you tell about mr. fakerzadi. is it correct to describe him as the father of the iranian nuclear program? >> i'd defer to secretary moniz who is the father of the iranian nuclear program. >> that term certainly has been applied to him. >> what about mr. abassi? they blacklisted him for allegedly being an aid to fakerzadi and working onu ran's nuclear and missile programs? >> senator without commenting on each individual if you go through the names of people involved in iran's nuclear program, any step to remove

sanctions that are related to the nuclear program will involve individuals and organizations that had been involved in iran's nuclear program. >> okay. and so a german engineer gerard weiser. he supplied to the aku khan black market? >> i'm reluctant to get into individual names. >> why they are listed in there. why would you be have the same characteristic. >> which is what? >> which is they were designate the because of nuclear activities. >> and now they have their sanctions relief by 2023? >> to the extent that iran keeps its agreement, we will be relieving nuclear sanctions, if they don't keep their agreement, we won't be relieving nuclear sanctions what messages do you see to end proliferators around the world? >> i think the message is, if you violate the rules and

develop nuclear weapons and we and the world take action against you, we'll have significant consequence. but if you reach an agreement and you unwind your nuclear program, that will also have consequence. >> so, cue please provide a list or names of americans who have been released as -- from sanctions or imprisonment as a result of these negotiations? there are none. >> we're happy to follow up with you on lists you might want. >> thank you. so secretary lew again, following up on, i believe senator menendez's questions if that act were simply to be extended, the date changed to 2018 the national security waivers would still be in place by the president. is that something that congress would pass changing the date to 2016, 2018? is that acceptable under the jcpoa? >> we've gone back on that a few times.

the reimposition of nuclear sanctions is if they comply with the nuclear agreement, has a very different character than if they don't comply. right now they've agreed to take serious actions. we need to work toward the implementation of the agreement. what i was trying to say after the back and forth with senator menendez we have a host of very powerful sanctions. we have tools that are not just -- >> i heard you explain that to secretary menendez -- or senator menendez. if you don't mind, we're running out of time. if congress were to pass an extension to 2018 obviously the national security waivers under this deal would still be in place. would the president veto that legislation? >> i think this is not appropriate time to be discussing extending a law before we've even had the implementation period begin on this agreement. >> do you think that makes the snapback provisions weaker or stronger -- >> that's what i was trying to

get at. i think the snap-back provisions are extremely powerful. our oil sanctions, financial sanctions, have independent -- >> you're prepared to have a snap back without the iran sanctions in place? >> i think the snapback would be very powerful with or without it. >> secretary kerry n your testimony, you stated that u.s. sanctions related to human rights terrorism, ballistic missiles will remain in place. how do our sanctions slow down their ballistic missiles program. >> regrettably they've been pure suing things without recourse and one of our determinations is to up -- i think the president said this in the east room during his press conference the other day, for instance, they've been transferring weapons for 20 years to lebanon, to hezbollah,

and there may be as many as 70,000 to 80,000 rockets. now, we all know that are a threat to israel. we need to, all of us be engaged in a stronger effort to prevent the movement of these weapons. >> by lifting -- >> no no. >> is israel safer under this with the ballistic embargo lifted? >> absolutely no question that israel is safer -- >> with the embargo lifted, israel is sacher? >> with the -- we're not lifting -- >> i can read you -- >> well, we still have the -- see, what you're not looking at, senator, and what everybody needs to take note of it is, we have separate u.n. resolutions that apply to all those other activities, and we have separate regimes that on reply to them. the security proliferation -- >> i understand.

i'm running out of time. >> i know. if you want a question without an answer -- >> with the united nations language, do you believe israel is safer eight years of the embargo lifted -- >> no question in my mind because we have the ability to put all kinds of other sanctions in place as well as enforce existing u.n. resolutions that apply to missiles and other things. >> you mentioned an article in the washington post, how the iran deal is good for israel. do you believe prime minister netanyahu is highly critical of this deal, knows what he's talking about? >> prime minister -- look i respect and know prime minister netanyahu very well. i consider him a friend. and he and i talk regularly. we're still talking even in the midst of this disagreement because we have a lot of things to talk about. i completely understand the prime minister of a state like israel which has been under siege and existentially threatened all of its life that this is also a big challenge.

i understand the expressions of concern he has voiced. we just happen to disagree about the impact of what is going to happen here. and our ability to be able to safeguard israel going forward through the mechanisms that have been put in place. there is absolutely no question, whatsoever, indisputable, you can't argue, that taking a breakout time from two months to a year, taking a 12,000 kilogram stockpile to zero -- >> secretary so you -- you did not include him in this list -- >> i mean, you've got look at that. maybe you have -- >> you believe prime minister netanyahu knows what he's talking about? >> i slumgts -- i disagree -- >> but he knows what he's talking about. >> he knows as prime minister the fear he's expressing, absolutely. >> secretary moniz, aillialihunanan,

we have talked about the agreement aiea has entered into the agreement not disclosed to the committee or the public with iran, he stated in "the new york times," quote, a 24-day adjudicateda adjudicate indicated timeline detecting undeclared facilities and materials. is he wrong? well the 24-day thing is explicitly for undeclared territories. i expressed use of nuclear materials in those facilities. we have to know where to look. that's the traditional role of intelligence, ours and those of our allies and friends. >> thank you. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much chairman. thank you for spending time with us here today. one comment on this issue of nonnuclear sanctions and then two questions.

the iranians are worried we're going to reimpose nuclear sanctions under the cover of some other excuse. thus your discussion about the sensitivity of when we may reauthorize the iran sanctions act. i just note that what we're talking about here is motive. whether or not we are genuine in imposing sanctions for a nonnuclear reeld activity or whether we are doing it under the cover of trying to get around the agreement. i don't think there's any way to avoid the fuzziness of that section of the agreement. but i think we all have to understand there is going to be a lack of clarity on that question, given the fact that the dispute ultimately is not going to be about the letter of the law that we pass, but about the motive that stands behind it. i think that we can certainly

defend instituting new sanctions on nonnuclear activity. but there's going to be a difficulty in trying to define that motive. my question, though, is -- first question is continuing on this subject of inspections. iranians made a commitment they're not going to engage in any research and development that quote under item 16 could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. we've talked about the eyes on ft. natan, the eyes on the full supply chain, but there are a host of nuclear-related research activities that could kir at other research sites that don't involve material that runs through the supply chain. how dough do we have an assurance there are no r&d activities occurring given the fact there are going to be sites

that we won't even be asking about, frankly, and there are research activities potentially that can happen that don't involve that nuclear material we see in the supply chain inspections? >> well, as i said, there are a number of activities that are listed there, which are out of bounds that will not involve nuclear materials. clearly, again, almost by definition for any undeclared site, it becomes a question of intelligence acquired in one way or another. and we have obviously nationally a lot of means as do others. once we have the right pointer, then it's a question of getting in there and there can be some smoking guns, in some cases. for example, around neutron initiators that we would detect. other cases it will be more in the context of the declared

activities don't kind of make sense with what we see in there. these all become additional indicators for our intelligence. but, you know i think our intelligence people will say very straight forwardly that clearly in the end these nonnuclear activities will be more of a challenge than the nuclear materials activities over which we'll have very, very strong handle. >> i want to ask secretary lew and secretary kerry about the consequences of congress voting down this deal. i heard senator risch's frustration the frustration made by the administration there's no choice. in fact, i hear you to say the very opposite. i hear to you say this is not, in fact, a referendum on this deal. this is a choice between two set of consequences. a set of consequences that flow forward if we approve the deal and then a different set of consequences that flow forward if congress rejects this deal.

so as i look at that second set of consequence we have to be fully cognizant of if the u.s. congress reject this is deal i see it in five parts. i want to give this analysis to you and then ask you both to tell me where i'm wrong or where i might be right. first, the sanctions are going to fray initially. russians and chinese likely won't continue to sign on, and likely will in substance fall apart. iran will resume its nuclear program as it gets closer and closer to the breakout time. three, the inspections we have disappear. we go blind again. inside iran. fourth, this administration's ability to do nuclear diplomacy frankly, ends for the next year and a half. there's no legitimacy with the clear indication that congress won't support any agreements that this administration enters into. and, fifth, the potential

internally this rejection of the deal will be a major victory for the hard liners, making it much less likely the moderates will win in the next election, meaning there may not be anyone to deal with should we get back to the table in the next administration. that's a pretty severe set of consequences but this isn't ultimately a referendum. this is a choice. if you reject this deal, then you've got to be pretty apocalyptic about how badly this deal will go down if you accept those broad parameters as the alternative. tell me if this is how you read the consequences of congress rejecting this deal. >> senator, i think you've hit the nail on the head with a series of absolutely clearly acceptable consequences. i would agree with what you have said. this is not a case of no choices. there's a choice.

as senator murphy said, each person can make the judgment about the consequences of their choice. but the choice is really between the assurances we have that come with this agreement, the certainty that comes with 98% reduction of the stack pile, the certainty that comes from the limitation of 3.6% enrichment for 15 yeeshgsz you can't make a bomb with just those two items. let alone the reduction of centrifuges, the limitation on what's spinning the intrusive inspections. all that goes away. i urge colleagues who haven't done it to spend time with our intel community and ask for the analysis of the supreme leader and state of politics in iran. the supreme leader highly

distrusts us. we highly distrust in return. there's nothing in agreement built on distrust. it's all a matter of verification. the supreme leader felt in the very beginning i can't deal with the west because i can't trugs them. i tried it before and nothing happened. and then there were some small discussions that took place in afrg a number of years ago with ambassadors. nothing came out of it. i can give you -- i'm not going to go through the whole history but there's a long history of mistrust and much deeper than that, the whole context of the revolution out of which the regime comes. so, if we say no after saying in good faith, we're here to negotiate and we can come to an agreement, but we walk away from it not because we chose to but you choose to, they won't know who to deal with. we certainly aren't going to be dealt with. a lot of other people won't be dealt with. more importantly, he's not coming back. there's no way people who say, get a better deal. no way.

when they believe they've given up things in good faith and made proclamations about no nuclear weapon forever and they're willing to be subject to the ntp. the ntp is at the heart of nonproliferation centers. we have 189 nations that live by it. we would be turning away from the nbt. that's what this vote would be. basically say we don't trust the ntp. there's no way iran could come under the ntp. we're not going to do this. so the consequences are even more than what you laid out, senator. and here's what happens. i know this will happen. been around politics long enough. have a pretty good sense -- i mean, a lot of people are out there opposing this agreement before it was announced. a lot of people were opposeing it before they read it. i know what we're going to hear in the context of this. if this agreement isn't passed -- isn't agreed to

doesn't meet congress's approval and the sanctions are gone and iran goes back to enriching you can hear the human cry right now. people are going to be say, what are we going to do about it? they'll enriching. the prime minister of israel calling me up, time to bomb. what are we going to do? that's why learned people who led security establishments in israel say, that's probably the alternative here. sew when they're enriching like crazy and we've passed up diplomacy and passed up the nonproliferation treaty what is left to us to enforce this? i know there are senators here who are unable with the idea they have an enrichment program. what's your plan? knock out their entire capacity? erase their memory of how to do a fuel cycle? totally go to war? i heard somebody mention iran earlier -- iraq, that we had huge ability to know what was

happening in iraq. folks, that was after we completely invaded the company. that's the only place in the world you've had it. no country in the world has anywhere any time. so, i just ask people to be reasonable. there are more consequences than those laid out by senator murphy, but each one of the ones he laid outer are pretty consequential consequential. >> i agree with you that sanctions would fray, but i think in addition, you know we've had a lot of discussion about iran's reserves. we have to remember that those reserves are not sitting in the united states. they're sitting around the world, in countries like india and china. if this agreement falls apart, our ability to keep that money from iran will also fall apart. so, i think the concern is they get their money and there's no nuclear agreement. with radar to your comment on our ability to reimpose sanctions, i totally agree with

you. if it's seen as a pretext for putting nuclear sanctions back in place then that violates the agreement. but we have reserved the ability to put sanctions back in place on terrorism and for other reasons. >> my only point on that, there's an inherent fuzziness. >> it's a matter of interpretation, which is why people can say they have different views. this was heavily discussed in the negotiation. it's not as if this was some accidental provision. >> i think the thought process you walked through was very helpful. i do want to say congress can put in place many of the sanctions that brought iran to the table. what i think is to a degree unfair about the presentation is the secretary himself afforded himself the ability to walk away from this deal and face all of these same consequences.

during the negotiations you said that no deal was better than a bad deal and many times you laid out the percentage chances of this happening. so you yourself, you yourself had to be thinking about going down the very path senator murphy put out. but what you did by going to the u.n. security council and by laying this out in the way you are, basically even though we put mandates in place that brought them to the table, you're trying to paint this picture that takes that choice away from us. i find that to be incredibly unfair. >> mr. chairman, i can just say to you, the choice would have been the same whether or not the security council voted. it's the exact same choice. the great distinction here is that when i was ready to walk away, everybody else would have come with me because they

understood the walk away was the intrans intransgence of iran. the problem is now, they won't understand why. and we won't walk away with anyone. >> i don't want to put too much emphasis on the u.n. security council, but i'll go back to the other and say, again the way you present the options you've but congress in the place of being pariah taking that away from iran being it. and i think the way you frame it, put congress in a very unfair light. >> thank you, chairman. i'll go one step further. i'm outraged. by the administration going to the united nations before we have a chance to read the document and read these discussions in a good faith, bipartisan manner, we're showing

the world we don't stand together right now. that's what this is all about. that's why we fought for the last few months in this committee. i'm encouraged we ended up to go back to the balance of power between legislative and executive branch. i'm encouraged senator king is sitting here for three hours -- four hours almost. people are involved in this senator, mr. secretary, and i appreciate what you guys have done. this is a yeoman's job you've had. a huge task. mr. secretary you've played hurt the last few months in this thing. thank you for all your effort. i personally have tried to take a very measured approach in this, to try to understand the issues. to try understand what we were trying to achieve. i heard secretary of state say our goal is to preclude iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapon state. but i'm very troubled today. i look at this somewhat skeptical because of the --

mr. lew, secretary, i'm not sure what i said was humorous, but -- this will help daushg an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation. 19 4, president bill clinton. president obama, iran will never be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon. president clinton compliance will be sortfied. president obama, what we're going to do is set up a mechanism whereby, yes iaea inspectors can go anyplace. president clib ton, this agreement represents the first step on a road to a nuclear-free korean peninsula. president obama, this framework would cut off every pathway that iran could possibly take to develop a nuclear weapon. i'm settled because we've had

bad experiences dealing with bad actors. if i look at this today i hear secretary of state -- i heard you say something i haven't heard you say before. i want to dial into this. we're guaranteeing they won't have a nuclear weapon. i know that's our goal. but i've read every page of this document. i've seen the classified documents. i'm concerned as i read this i understand our intebt, our commitment is to never allow iran to have a nuclear weapon. my question, secretary kerry does this deal actually preclude iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state? >> senator, first of all, i really appreciate your approach to this. and i very much appreciate your comments. and i know you're taking this very, very seriously, as are our other senators. i want to speak specifically to your several concerns. first of all i believe -- spent

29 years here on this committee back in mx missile debates, s.a.l.t. and s.t.a.r.t. and so forth. this, i believe, is one of the most extensive agreements with the most extensive access provisions and accountability standards i've seen in the time that i was here. and i mrooe we have put in place a highly distinguishable set of measures from north korea. first of all, north korea during the eight years of the clinton administration, they didn't gain one ounce of plutonium capacity. what they did is they started cheating on the heu highly enriched uranium path. the framework was put in place and the administrations were changed. new administration came in with a different attitude about how to approach them but with the

discovering of the cheating on the heu, they immediately shut down the diplomatic track and north korea pulled out of the ntp. fully pulled out of the ntp. there were no inspections. nothing else was happening. yes, they blew up several nuclear weapons and they developed their nuclear capacity. that should be a warning to everybody here. unlike north korea the north korea experience is what gave birth to the additional protocol. >> senator kerry, i apologize -- >> i just want you to know senator, the additional protocol came into existence to remedy the deaf fit of what happened with nuclear. so, the access we have here, we never had in nuclear. we have unprecedented ability to hold iran accountable. i believe through the myriad 24/7 access to their declared

facilities, we'll know instantaneously if they try to move -- >> i understand. i heard you say that last night. i appreciate that. if we do we'll know. but does in deal -- this agreement preclude iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. the deal itself? >> i believe if the agreement is fully implemented, and obviously if iran lives by it, yes. >> thank you. secretary lew, with regard to the options, what brought iran to the negotiating table recently? what's their motive for coming to negotiate in the first place? >> senator i'm not sure i could tell you the specific thing but we look at the impact of the sanctions over the last number of years. it's crushed iran's economy. it's crushed it -- >> reduced it about 20%. >> yes. the size of the economy is down, exchange rate is terrible. inflation and unemployment rates are ohio -- >> the question i have is in the very beginning when they came to

the table, we ceded to them the right to enrich, to bypass 18 countries who are good ang tors on the world stage and join an elite group of five countries that have civil nuclear programs but don't enrich. there are nine countries that actually have nuclear weapons. five in the ntp. four out of the ntp. they obviously have civil programs. but the dlination between the countries that are good players, germany, brazil afghanistan -- i'm sorry, argentina, holland, gentleman. japan. we're putting iran into that group. what option i see to this is potentially doubling down on the sanctions that got them to the table in the first place. i'd like you to respond to that. we know it was crushing their economy. we know it was having tremendous impact on their regime. my question is is that not a viable option today? as we look at alternatives to the deal itself.

>> the reason i think the sanctions have had the powerful effect is they're not just u.s. sanctions. they've been international sanctions. that requires keeping an international coalition together to impose the kinds of tough sanctions we've had. in past debates over u.s. sanctions, we've gone back and forth with the congress saying if you do more and it keeps other countries out, then we're in the end doing less. and i think we've come to a good place on each of the rounds of discussions over sanctions to grow the coalition in the world. if this deal is rejected the other partners who have helped uts to impose those sanctions will not be of like mind. >> of $115 billion you identified. and i understand the nuances of the different categories of that cache, how much is that relative to our secondary sanctions on other countries dealing with iran compared to the eu and

p5plus1. >> i'm trying to make the dlination between what are the sanctions -- what percentage of the 115 is due to u.s. sanctions, congressional sanctions -- >> it's hard todisaggregate. we've had had for years now ongoing discussions where it's getting harder and harder to keep countries tied to the oil sanctions, for example, because it's hard on their economies. the goal of the sanctions was to get iran to the negotiating table. query, would they be willing to do it if iran came to the negotiating table and we rejected a deal that all the other countries in the have signed onto? that'sy our actions ability starts to fray. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman.

rebuilt the economy of germany after they had done two wars against the u.s. that was hard. there were objections and no votes. president kennedy, nuclear test band treaty with the soviet union, during the bay of pig they were nlgtegotiating. it was hard and there were no votes. this is a deal in my review produces a dramatically better position for about 15 years than the status quo before negotiations started. when you started the negotiations right before --

enrichment level 20% and climb, you've knocked it back to 3.67%. a heavy water plutonium facility at iraq, they're dismantling. they were on a path where they had a huge program and it was growing for 15 years. this deal with the inspections mechanisms, et cetera, produces a dramatically better status quo for the united states, for regional allies, for the world. my questions are after your 15. secretary moniz, various provisions start to come off certain elements of the program, certain inspections began your eight, 10 15, 300 kim gram cap comes off. when you get to your 25, this is how i read the deal. the deal basically is iran commits in the first paragraph of the agreement under no circumstances will iran seek to develop, purchase or acquire nuclear weapons. they've agreed to all the ntp

obligations going forward and they agreed that any income program will be completely civil in nature. they make that commitment. the intelligence we have, the knowledge we gained through 25 years of enhanced inspections and the ongoing inspections under the ntp, especially the additional protocol. is that level of knowledge sufficient at year 25 and thereafter to detect if iran tries to violate this deal and acquire nuclear weapons? >> i think it puts us in a far better position otherwise, and i think the risks on their part would be enormous to try to break their commitment. and i think you put your finger on a very important thing, which our intelligence community would support. we should not forget the tremendous knowledge of the program, what their doing, where

they're doing it, over 25 years. we will have a lot of indicators to really amplify our national means. >> that's a good segue to the question i want to ask secretary kerry. you talked to senator murphy about them. i think those who objected to the negotiations starting in 2013. they were against that diplomatic beginning. if we could go back to that status quo, it seems the status quo was we had sanctions they were punishing iran, hurting their economy, but they were racing ahead on their nuclear program. we were hurting their economy, but the nuclear program, 19000 centrifuges and climbing, 12 tou kilograms and climbing, iraq heavy water moving ahead, if we just had lived with that status quo, it seems to me one of two things was going to happen. either they were going to eventually ka pit late. there were two othds. i'm not going to ask you to

assign odds to those two things but there was significant risk. had they not start diplomacy, they were going to get a nuclear program. you stalled that one. let me mention another alternative because it's been mentioned by members of this body. after the framework was announced on april 2, a member of this body who has been a loud and influential voice in this issue, said bombing iran to end their program would only take a few days. mr. secretary, you've been at war. do you find that to be a realistic statement? >> well, it's a -- i find it to be a factual statement in the sense it would only take a few days but i don't find it to be a realistic statement in terms of a policy because the

implications of that, if you're not at the end of your rope. in other words fitz not last resort, would be extraordinarily complicated for the united states. >> if we were to do that, that's an alternative. if we were to do that right now, would we have international support for that. >> not on your life no way. >> would we have an international legal basis for doing it? we were in israel a number of us met with israeli officials who said, they are have concluded iran is trying to get to a threshold yet iran has not yet made a decision to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. if we were to initiate a war against iran, would they have not yet have made that decision would there be an international basis for war? >> no. furthermore, we would be proceeding without any allies, which is not a small consequence. >> let me flip it around on you. i want to talk about credible military threat. if this deal is done and if iran

confirms to the entire global community in the u.n. iran confirms under no circumstances iran will seek or acquire nuclear weapons. they pledged that to the world. then they break toward a nuclear weapon, would we be more likely to have the support of international partners if we want to take military action to stop them from doing what they pledge not to do? >> absolutely. >> would we have a greater legal basis to justify taking mill father action to stop them from doing what they have pledged not to do? >> yes. >> and would we have because of an inspections regime, plus existing intelligence, a lot more knowledge about how to target military action and increasing the threat of our military threat? >> yes. >> i don't have any other questions, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator isaacson. >> thank you, chairman corker and senator cardin for your opening statements and thank you for the way in which you handled

the beginning of this debate. i'll be brief. i'm familiar with senate hearings when they enter their fourth hour but i want to make a couple things crystal clear on behalf of my constituents. and i speak for myself as well. secretary kerry, you said unprecedented transparency from a point of inspections and holding iran accountable. is that correct? >> with the exception of the iraq war, yes. >> do you recall the debate on the new start treaty? >> somewhat. >> we were involved in that pretty heavily -- >> that was missiles. there's a distinction between missiles and nuclear program. i know we had shorter period. that's a different deal. >> but what got the two-thirds majority that ratified the new start treaty in the senate was satisfaction to the senate that the inspection regimen was quick, decisive and united states had --

>> i understand. >> this particular agreement, the iaea is the inspector. >> principle inspector. we are, obviously, sleuthing and all of our intelligence communities around the world would be following it but they're the principle and identified inspector. >> we pay 25% of the costs to the iaea is that correct? >> yes, it is. >> the treaty specifically says none of the inspectors can be american, is that correct? >> in this particular thing, yes, that's correct. >> those two poipts that i've raised are why people raise questions in terms of the inspections and whether they are unprecedented in their transparency. i think you really have to deal with it deeper than you have today. >> well, i'm happy to -- there are a lot of reasons not the least of which we don't have diplomatic relations with iran, which is one of the principle reasons that we can't proceed to

have inspectors and so forth. the s.t.a.r.t. treaty it specific locations identified in it, prelocations. this is for things we can't prelocate. this is for what we might suspect at some point in time or what we might have some evidence of at a point in time. every. so what the s.t.a.r.t. inspections are analogous. what's unprecedented here, senator, which we negotiated in -- i was pleased we got it, is this ability for us to be able to close out the iaea process. the reason we are all here today is that the iaea could never get it finished. they would fight. they go back and forth. the years went by. nothing closed it out.

we have an aability through the joint commission to vote, go to u.n. security council and mandate they give us access. if they haven't given us the access, they're in material breach and we get snapback of the sanctions. so there's an automaticity that doesn't agree in other. >> one second, secretary moniz. thank you for the answer pcht the second thing that concerns a lot of people and senator menendez brought it up is negotiation of the five year when the u.n. embargo on conventional arms goes away. >> correct. >> it apdz to me that that appeared late in the negotiations and was not something that was on the table originally or even thought to be talked about because this is a nuclear deal. why and when did the expiration of that embargo get into the deal? >> the discussions of the embargo actually began on almost

day one of the negotiations. and they went on for two years, 2 1/2 years. >> why in a hearing based on nuclear weapons and proceed hinting iranians get a nuclear weapon. why would that be part of the agreement to start with? >> it's a good question. let me answer it. it was solid into u.n. resolution at the last minute. frankly -- >> the arms embargo? >> arms embargo. the arms embargo specifically was last minute. >> into nuclear resolution. >> right. then susan rice helped write that or wrote a good part of it and she put it in. iranians bitterly objected to

it. felt it was being rammed at them and it had no business being part of a nuclear agreement. it's conventional arms and they thought they had every world in the right to do it. they have fundamentally ignored it for all these years. they made it clear from the get go that one of the primary red lines is they had to get all those sanctions lifted. we said, no, we're not going to lift them. we're not going to do at this -- look what you're doing in yemen hezbollah. we're not going to lift it. the problem is we had three countries out of seven that were ready to lift it all together on day one and four countries that said, no, we need tokeep it. the compromise was ultimately recognizing that we had many different ways of coming at the enforcement of activities on missiles and arms with specific resolutions from no amplz to the houthi. no arms to libya, to north

korea. all these are existing resolutions we have and can enforce. we didn't think we were losing anything. in fact, we won a victory to get the frooifive and the eight, to continue them in the context of a nuclear resolution where they believe they didn't belong in the first place. >> my time is almost up so i'm going to interrupt you. apologize for -- >> no that's fine. >> correct me on one thing. you said although the beginning it was on the table from almost the beginning? >> well, the point -- no. >> let me finish. >> their demand was on the table. we said no from the beginning. frankly, we knew this was going to come down to probably be the last issue. >> then you said quite frankly, was slid in at the end. >> at the u.n. by susan rice. when she first wrotes resolution 19-29, the arms resolution came into that at the very last minute. >> i'm sorry i'm cutting you off.

the inspection and transparency of those inspections -- is aa serious question that needs to be objected to. senator menendez? >> i was going to add a small foot note to the issue of countries without diplomatic relations not being part of the inspection team. i want to point out again for decades now all inspectors have training here in the united states. we're very confident in a very, very broad set of confident people. in addition -- i could get you the exact number but right now i think we have a dozen americans in the safegardz efforts at iaea and they play a very critical role. >> i would love it if you would get me that information specifically. >> senator, i'll get you a list of all the mcnichls we have to prevent arms flowing. >> those are critical questions to me and the american public.

thank you for service to our country. >> thank you, senator. we're going to take a break when we have the second round start. can you make it through three more senators? thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for your service to our country. we very much appreciate all your great work. sblgt moniz, one of the assertions which is made is that in 20 -- after 15 years that all bets are off and that iran can then begin to enrich theoretically, up to 90% if they want. which is bomb-grade material. could you deal with that issue? that is, what happens in 15 years? what happens in wh iran announces it would go past 3% 5%, 20% in terms of its

enrichment of uranium? what is the law, the regulation the sense of -- the sense of the world community what they could do at that point to make sure there was not a bomb-making program that was now put in place in iran? >>. >> senator, first of all, whether it's 15 years 20 years or whenever, they will be required to report all their nuclear activity. clearly, if they were to report they were enriching to 90% every alarm bell in the world would go off because there's no reason to do that. >> when the alarm bell went off what then would happen? >> i would imagine there would be, first of all, extraordinarily strong and i would imagine cohesive international pressure, perhaps sanctions and perhaps military response. >> for example, what would russia's response be in 15 years

if iran started enriching to 50, 60, 80, 90%? >> everything i saw in the last month of negotiation is they would be solidly with us in very strong opposition to that. >> secretary kerry, do you agree with that? >> they and china were welcoming and deeply committed to this effort and antiany nuclear women. >> go ahead. >> if they declare this, alarm bells would go off. furthermore f they didn't declare it which would be a more likely deal, frankly, we have through 25 years the containment and surveillance on any manufacturing of centrifuges, the uranium. once again, they would need the entire supply chain covertly, which would be an extraordinarily difficult thing to car off. >> in the early years secretary moniz, if iran decided they wanted to violate the agreement

after dismantling their program, how long would it take for them to take their rotors their components out of moth balls and to reconstitute their program if we were successful in watching this dismantlement in the early years? >> i would say in rough terms, two to three years, probably, to do that. that would depend a lot upon conditions of their machines, et cetera. that's a ballpark. >> secretary kerry? >> senator, i just wanted to add something. you're dealing with this 15-year concept, but the truth is, because of the 25-year tracking of their uranium, it would be impossible for them to have a separate covert track. so the only track by which they might begin to enrich would be through the declared facility and we would know it instantaneously. >> and the world would say, stop? >> exactly.

>> so, let me ask you this, secretary kerry. you spoke earlier about 9 the iranian foreign minister visiting the emirates this weekend. can you talk about that and what your hopes are for the unfolding diplomatic opportunities that may be possible in that region. >> i will, senator mark y but i would preface it by saying to all my colleagues, nothing that we've done in here is predicated on some change or something that's unanticipatable. can one hope that this kind of opportunity, perhaps provides a moment for possibilities in change? yes, absolutely. and in fact president rouhani and vice president both in their public statements embracing this arrangement talked about how it

could open a new moment in the middle east and come together and resolve the differences that have separated them. i know for a fact the foreign minister of iran wants to engage with the gcc countries. that this is not the only country he plans to visit. he wants to sit down with them. the saudis have indicated a willingness to sit down. who knows where that dialogue goes. i can guarantee you the united states will do everything we can to encourage it it and to try to help it find some kind of specific steps that might be able to begin to deal with yemen, houthi, others we face. >> you spoke earlier about the saudis. you have talked to them in the last week. could you expansion upon that a little bit more in terms of what you feel is a possibility going forward. >> generally what i would say, senator, is, of course all the countries in the region are

apprehensive because they see iran engaged with the houthi and yemen. they see them also fighting against isil. they also see them in syria where they made the most out of supporting assad and supporting hezbollah over the years. hezbollah is obviously a threat to the region, not to mention there's been support for hamas lately. these things concern us deeply. and it concerns them. that is precisely why we have come together and are working on what i talked about earlier with senator gardner, about the evolution of the camp david process that begins to fill out a new security arrangement and a new understanding of how together we can push back against these activities.

>> thank you. secretary moniz did you want to add anything there could be a breakout against the legal regime in order for them to be an international response? >> no. i think a breakout would be very, very quickly detected and then it's a question of the response. essentialpecially in the first decade or so, we have -- and beyond the first decade i think we have a very comfortable period of time to do diplomatic and/or other responses. >> thank you, mr. secretary. thank all of you for your work. >> thank you senator. senator paul. >> thank you for your testimony. i continue to support a negotiated solution and think it preferable to war. i think military solution in all likelihood will accelerate the possibility of them having nuclear weapons of ending inspections, et cetera. however, it does have to be a good deal. and i think that's the debate we

have. secretary kerry, i guess i would ask, in general, how would you describe iran's history of intins with international agreements? would you say they're generally trustworthy or generally untrustworthy? >> there's no trust built into this deal at all. it's not based on any concept of trust. >> i agree. i think everybody sort of understands that. the ayatollah's recent comments where he said the americans say they stopped iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, they know it's not true. so, we have the history of untrustworthiness. we have a lot of verbiage coming from the ayatollah already saying, well you know this really isn't any limitation on our ability to make a weapon. really it comes down to a good agreement. will this stop them from having a nuclear weapon? if they comply. the question then becomes compliance. my question, and my -- i guess my problem is that there's a great deal of credence being

given to snapback you know, sanctions as this way -- as this lever to get them to comply. secretary lew talked about there being a phased reduction in sanctions. that's not exactly the way i read the agreement, though, because they do have to do some things. i think they're significant things. reducing the amount of enriched uranium, et cetera to a low level and getting rid of centrifuges, et cetera. the problem is is that the wording of the agreement then says the sanctions are simultaneously withdrawn. the vast majority are. there's some compliance. to me it's the initiation of compliance. i'm more worried about the continuing compliance after that. and i think the argument would be that snapback sanctions will be that lever. i guess my preference would be there would be a step -- in the

negotiations, was there discussion was there ever our position we shouldn't have simultaneous release of all sanctions but more stepwise or gradual reduction in sanctions to ensure. >> this was at the heart of the negotiation, which is why we drove such a -- what we consider to be a very hard bargain with respect to what though needed to do. that is -- look, it was always the fundamental equation of this negotiation. you folksed passed sanctions. we passed sanctions. our passage of sanctions was specifically to bring them to the table to negotiate. so if that was the negotiating lever, clearly when they came to the table, they wanted the lever taken away. so the quid pro quo here was always what restraints will we get? what insight to their program? what long-term commitments can

we get? they can't get a bomb. how do we fulfill president obama's pledge to close off the four pathways to a bomb? that's the exchange. they get some relief from sanctions. now, their insistence for two years was obviously this notion and all the way to the end, actually, has to all go away at once. all sanctions the u.n., everybody's sanctions. we resisted that. we didn't do that. that's not what happened. what we did was we wound up securing the one-year breakout time going from two months to one year. securing the safety of reducing their operable centrifuges and reducing the research they could do on the next advanced wave of centrifuges. reducing the stockpile. locking it in at a low level that couldn't produce a bomb. locking in their enrichment level that can't produce a bomb. in exchange for all the things

we required them to do, pitt senator, are genuinely extensive. they have to undo their piping. they have to undo their electrical. they have to move things. there's a huge amount of work -- >> i guess -- >> when that is done, i don't know if it's six months or a year, but when it's done we lift the fundamental component of financial and banking sanctions that were the heart of what brought them to the table. >> but i guess the point is, is that everybody that's for the agreement, yourself included are saying this will prevent them from having a nuclear weapon and the ayatollah saying exactly the opposite. >> no. the ayatollah has actually -- and the intel community i urge you to connect with them. there's no decision whatsoever. what he's doing is protecting his dough necessarytic turf. >> he's saying the opposite. he's saying this is not true. this is not stop us from acquiring a nuclear weapon. that troubles us.

zareef was saying the same thing in march. it troubles us -- >> here, let me -- >> i want a negotiated settlement. i want to believe we can have an agreement but it troubles us that immediately the iranians say the opposite -- >> no, he's not saying the opposite of this. the supreme leader's quote is in this document that iran will never go after a nuclear weapon and the iranians happily put that in. the intel community will tell you, they have made zero decision -- >> light, but you dispute what he said this week. >> i know what he said. >> they stopped americans from acquiring a nuclear weapon. they know it's not true. >> do you know why he's saying that? he doesn't believe the americans stopped them. he believes he stopped them because he issued a fatwa. so he is as a matter of sovereignty and pride, making a true statement. he doesn't believe the americans stopped them. he said he didn't want to get one in the first place. >> thank you.

>> thank you. senator kuhns. >> thank you for convening this important hearing. i would like to thank all three of our witnesses for your testimony here today. i think we all share a basic premise, which is the united states must not allow iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. a nuclear armed iran would threaten our national security our vital ally israel and the stability of the entire middle east. in the next two months i will review the details of this nuclear agreement and consider its ramifications for our nation and for the region. i'll compare it to the alternatives and support it only if i'm convinced it sufficiently freezes every iranian pathway to a nuclear weapon. in my years as an attorney for a corporation, i would often get handed a big complex deal by optimistic business units that believed they'd launched a new marriage, a new partnership, and my job was to review it. not with the wedding bells ringing in my ears but with the likely divorce day in the

picture before me. because frankly no one ever pulled those agreements out again unless there was a violation, there was a disappointment, there was a breakdown in the relationship. and i'll say as i look not at the spin or the politics of this agreement but as i dig into the substance of it, it is an agreement built on distrust. it is a wedding day where the bride is shouting i hate you and your family and the groom is shouting i distrust you and you've always cheated on me. and each is announcing their distrust really at the outset. and i do wonder what the alternative is given the disagreement here seems inevitable. so let me turn to the wedding guests and a question about how that may play out. a key piece of this agreement is the joint commission. a joint commission that has eight representatives, p5+1 and the european union and iran. and they will resolve access disputes. they are a key piece of how we would get access to undisclosed sites. and if iran doesn't sufficiently answer iaea concerns about a suspect facility within a

certain number of days there's a consensus vote and so forth, but our confidence about our ability to resolve disputes under this agreement depends on the reliability of those votes. and i don't mean to impugn the partnership of our vital allies who've gotten us to this point but i am concerned that ceos from many european nations are already winging to tehran and talking about significant economic relationships. should we be nervous about the votes in the future on that joint commission of the eu or our other allies given what will be i suspect significant economic interests that might inspire them to either direct the eu to vote against access or block access for us? how confident can we be of our allies enduring support of our interests in the, i think, likely event of cheating? >> i think we can be very confident. here's the reason why.

the access issue goes to the core, absolute core, of this agreement which is preventing them from getting a weapon. and if we have sufficient information, intelligence, input, shared among us by the way. we share all this information. and by the way israel will be feeding into that. the gulf states will be feeding into that. when we have any indicator that there is a site we need to get into and we're all shared that amongst each other, this goes to the entire agreement. they will prosecute that. and by the way there's a converse, you know, there's another side to that coin about the economic interests. you have a young generation of iranians thirsty for the world. they want jobs a future. iran has a huge stake in making sure there isn't an interruption in that business and that they

are living up to this agreement. so if in fact even when you're way beyond the 15 years, if we find there's a reason for us to have suspicion under the additional protocol and we can't get in the united states alone for the duration of the agreement has the ability to snap back in the u.n. by ourselves. we always have the ability to put our sanctions back in place. and given our position in the world and that's not going to change in the next 10 15 years economically. we're still the most powerful economy in the world. we will have an ability to have an impact on their transactions and ability to do business. so we believe we are very well protected here, senator kuhns because we created a one-nation stability to have snapback. >> if i can follow up on that mr. secretary. the snapback functions, are they the broad sweeping financial

sector sanctions we worked on together that brought iran to the table? or are they a paler version of that? >> oh, no, they're the full monty. >> because, you know we've had debate among some of the colleagues on this committee whether or not this agreement prevents -- >> well, we have some discretion. i mean language is in there that says in whole or in part. now, if we find there's some minor something and we want to slap the wrist we can fine in part. >> so in your view we have the ability to ratchet back sanctions in pieces or in whole? >> if needed or in whole. >> let me if i might turn to secretary moniz in the time i have left about centrifuge development. if you would just -- i'll articulate the question and then if you'd have an answer for me. how long did it take iran to master the centrifuge? what's the difference in performance between the ir-1 and ir-8? and how long do you think it

will take iran give p the restrictions of this agreement if observed to master the ir-6 and 8 and then what would the impact be on their ability to enrich after years 10 to 15? >> so, senator kuhns first of all of course they've been working on it for quite some time. they have some challenges still. in terms of the r and d in the more advanced machines of course first of all the program does substantially shift back in time, their program plans. where they are today is the ir-6 that you mentioned is let's say seven or eight times more powerful than the ir-1. and they are already spinning small cascades of that with uranium. the ir-8, which is projected to be maybe 15 times more powerful

is at the mechanical testing stage only. that's what got frozen in in the interim agreement. >> so if i might in closing, mr. chairman, it would be perfectly reasonable to expect that on a ten-year time horizon the ir-6 and 8, which they're already testing cascades of the 6, they've already got mechanical testing of the 8 under way, it would be reasonable to suspect from a decade from now they'd be 15 times better faster at their enrichment? >> no, we don't believe they will have -- with this schedule we don't think they will be anywhere near ready for industrial scale deployment of those machines certainly not in the decade and for some years thereafter. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> senator brasso. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. secretary kerry you mentioned a "the washington post" story related to israelis who know what they're talking about. i'd like to point out to you that wasn't even in the

newspaper. that was a blog post. and it was written by someone who's been described as a left wing political activist. and if i have to choose between them and the prime minister of israel prime minister netanyahu, i'm going to stand with the prime minister of israel. but if you want to start talking about the newspaper let's look at yesterday's "new york times" a real news story. some experts questioned verification process in iran accord. first paragraph, the obama administration's claim that the iran nuclear accord provides for airtight verification procedures is coming under challenge from nuclear exports with long experience in monitoring tehran's program. several experts including a former high ranking official at the iaea said a provision that gives iran up to 24 days to grant access to inspectors might enable it to escape detection. quote, a 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces detection probabilities exactly where the system is weakest, detecting

undeclared facilities and materials. so i would just say to all three of you, i find it very telling and very disturbing that the president of the united states decided to go to the united nations on monday before coming to the american people. i think the american people have a right to have their voices heard. we expect to hear from them in august as we head home and listen in town hall meetings across the country. i think congress has the right and the responsibility to provide oversight. secretary kerry, our nation's highest military commanders have very clearly warned the president, have warned you, have warned congress that lifting the arms embargo and current restrictions on ballistic missile technologies to iran would be wrong. on july 7th this year, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, martin dempsey testified before the senate armed services committee. he was unequivocal. he said under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on

iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking. under no circumstances. that's what he said. defense secretary ash carter also testified about iran. he said, we want them to continue to be isolated as a military and limited in terms of the kinds of equipment and materials they're able to get. and just seven days later you did the complete opposite of what our military advisers very clearly warned against. you disregarded the views and the advice of our top military commanders, negotiated away these important restrictions on iran getting deadly military technologies. u.s. negotiators i believe capitulated, surrendered, agreed to lift the arms embargo to get this deal. and russia, i must point out, can gain about $7 billion from arms sales to iran. this administration repeatedly ignores the advice of our military leaders when it comes to important national security decisions. the administration ignored

general odearno's recommendations to keep u.s. troops in iraq after 2011. president obama withdrew all of the troops. the administration ignored secretary leon panetta's chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and martin dempseys recommendations to arm vetted syrian rebels. the administration is now coming to congress once again ignoring the advice and recommendations of our military leaders. this time it's about iran. mr. secretary how can you justify ignoring this advice and the judgment of military commanders responsible for securing the safety of the american people? >> well, senator, we didn't. i work with marty dempsey, i have great respect for him. we heard what he said very clearly. and i respect what he said, which is why we have the eight years and why we have the five years. in fact, we held out very, very strongly to keep them. and the fact is senator during

those five years and those eight years we have all the options available to us in the world to strengthen or find other means or deal with those very issues. so they're not gone. they're there. we respected his advice. moreover, we have additional capacities to be able to deal with missiles. we have the lethal military equipment sanctions provision in the foreign assistance act. we have iran's 1996 iran's action act. we have the iran and arms proliferation act. those are unilateral tools, by the way. we have a bunch of multilateral tools, proliferation security initiative with a hundred countries which works to help limit iranian missile-related imports and exports. we have the missile control technology regime, which does a lot to prevent the growth of any missile capacity. so there are many things we will continue to do but it didn't go away.

we actually kept it. and we kept it notwithstanding the fact that three out of seven of the negotiating parties wanted to get rid of it altogether. we can i want. next thing on the u.n. you know we fought for the prerogatives of the congress. but you know, six of the seven countries we were negotiating with are not beholden to the united states congress. if their parliaments pass something and said you got to do this or that and you were being told what to do, you'd be pretty furious. they were negotiating under the united nations. and their attitude was we finish negotiation, we ought to be able to conclude our agreement and put it before the u.n. and we said wait a minute, our congress needs to be able to review this. so we got them to accept a 90-day provision in the

agreement for nonimplementation. they're respecting our desire and we're respecting your desire. for 90 days there's no implementation of this. if they had their way they'd be implementing it now. immediately. but they're not. so i respectfully suggest that we have to have a balancing here of interests and equities. i think we have preserved the prerogative of congress. the same consequences will apply if you refuse to do this deal with the u.n. vote as without it. same consequences. and none of us have sat here and thrown the u.n. vote at you. we're simply saying this is a multilateral agreement that's been negotiated by seven countries. i'd say the same thing if i was here without the u.n. vote. >> you know, it's interesting secretary lew you said a deal our partners believe is a good one. and secretary kerry, you had talked about the p5+1 and you said and they're not dumb. well, i agree with that. they're not dumb. and it makes me though wonder if

russia truly is our partner in this. we've pressed the reset button. we saw how that failed. we sue putin's belligerence around the world. i believe russia and tehran teamed up against the united states during these negotiations. >> actually, the iranians were furious at the russians on any number of accounts. the russians they felt were not cooperative with them and didn't help them. you're exactly wrong. >> well, that's -- time will judge us on all of that. but just coming back from ukraine and seeing what's happening as well as from astonia, and i can see the be belligerence and aggression of russia. thank you. mr. chairman, my time has expired. >> it's my understanding you guys want to keep rolling for a while and not take a break. is that correct? >> i didn't know that. i don't know. >> that's what julia mentioned to us. but if you want to -- why don't

we take a five-minute break. y'all are -- five minute break taken. >> i have to be over at the house is my problem. they don't have to be there, i have to be at the house. you have to be at the house also. supposed to be at the house in 20 minutes. >> you want to keep going then? >> well, i'm happy to try to get whatever we can in those 15 20 minutes if you'll allow me to hobble over there for a minute and then come back. i'd appreciate it. >> hobble away. thank you. >> you guys go ahead. >> we'll take a break.

accidentally transferred to several labs across the u.s. now we'll take you back live to the hearing room. senate foreign relations committee secretary kerry coming back into the room. >> -- each of us i think will be very brief to try to finish up before you go over to the house. i want to make just a couple points and move to senator card in in. on the pmd issue, it's my belief whether that is resolved in an a-plus fashion or d-minus fashion, the sanctions relief will continue. and i will say that salahi today stated by december 15th at the

end of the year the issue of pmd should be decided. the iaea will submit its report it will only submit it joint comprehensive plan of action will continue independently as a result of this report. that's exactly the way that i read the agreement. i don't see any debate there. secondly again i believe that the secretary continues to create a false narrative about where we are. i would just like to remind him of the letter from secretary geithner to senator levin on december 1st 2011, when senator menendez had an amendment to the ndaa regarding the cbi sanctions. and here's what he said. however it's currently conceived this amendment threatens severe sanctions against any commercial bank or central bank if they engage in certain transactions with the cbi. this could affect negatively affect many of our closest allies and largest trading

partners. and highlighted rather than motivating these countries to join us in increasing pressure on iran they are more likely to resent our actions and resist following our lead. a consequence in that would serve the iranians more than it harms. and obviously that wasn't the case. obviously through u.s. leadership it actually calls them to come to the table. again, i think that you unfairly characterized where we are in that i do believe with your leadership and others if congress were to decide this was not something worth alleviating the con gregsly mandated sanctions a different outcome could occur. but with that senator carden. >> i want to follow up on that point with secretary lew. because i'm in agreement that we have in congress been the strongest on sanction-type of

legislation whether it relates to the nuclear activityies of iran or whether it relates to terrorism or the missile program. and whether it's the obama administration or the bush administration or any previous administration, they'd prefer to act on their own rather than having congress provide the framework. in reality it's worked to america's advantage. and what's given us a strong position to go internationally to get sanctions imposed. so it's worked. bottom line the system has worked for u.s. leadership. so secretary lew, i am concerned. and i started with this question, i'm going to come back to it. paragraph 26 says we will refrain from re-introducing or reimposing the sanctions that have been terminated. you've gone through some of the things we can do for nonnuclear related activities, but if it's an institution say the central bank of iran that is getting relief fund under this jcpoa, and we have clear evidence that they've been involved in

sanctionable activities that are nonnuclear related can we sanction them under this agreement? >> absolutely. >> senator carden i've tried to be clear. if there are nonnuclear sanctions being imposed, we have retained all of our -- >> including an institution -- >> including institutions that are delisted. it can't put pretext -- >> i understand. if we have clear evidence that iran has used its crude oil sales in a way that has furthered nonnuclear sanctionable type of activities can we go back to the crude oil issue if we have clear evidence that that would further provide relief in regards to a nonnuclear activity? >> i think in principle we have not taken any of the means that we have of applying economic pressure off the table for nonnuclear purposes. >> so it could be sectorial to

the types of relief they receive under this agreement? >> it would have to be justified based on a nonnuclear basis. >> okay. that's very helpful. so we are going to be free to have some interesting discussions as we move forward. second point and this is secretary kerry, quickly. i'm very happy to hear you say about our strong commitment in the region. these security issues are changing. they're changing for israel. they're changing for our allies. no question with isis and north africa, in syria, in addition to iran. if you'll just quickly, how we are committed to making sure that israel is secure in that region with a true and trusted partnership with the united states to meet any challenge that they may confront as a result of the changing circumstances? >> thank you, senator. first of all i begin by saying that i'm proud i had 100% voting

record for 29 years here on the subject of israel. and i have worked as hard as anybody here. i think you know over the last years to try to meet theeds needs with respect to peace and stability demands for israel. we are completely -- i mean i think it's fair to say that even with this disagreement we are constantly in touch and working with the intel community with their folks. and we continue to dialogue about the threats of israel. we understand those threats. they are real. they're existential. and there's no debate in this administration whatsoever about our willingness to commit anything and everything necessary to be able to provide for the security of israel. now, we believe that security of israel will also be enhanced by not only this agreement but by bringing the gulf states together in a way that can deal

with some of the problems of the region and particularly dash, assad, syria and so forth. that's very much on our agenda at this point in time. >> thank you. i'll yield back my time. >> i do want to say there's a significant disagreement among our allies and iran over the issue that was answered relative to reapplying nuclear sanctions in other areas. i'd love for you to develop a letter. i'm sure iran wouldn't sign it but one where great britain, france and germany and the eu agree with the statement you just made. because i just met with them and my impression, maybe i don't understand things correctly was they are in strong disagreement with the statement that you just made. senator johnson. >> thank you mr. chairman. i think it's abundantly clear from this hearing is that this is obviously complex. this agreement is subject to different interpretations. which kind of leads me to believe, and i'm not blaming you or the administration, i blame iran, i just believe this is

going to end like our sanctions and the program against north korea. i think in the end iran will have nuclear weapon with ballistic missile technology. so that's why i want to quick go back to secretary moniz. i was surprised, i'd say disappointed, that you weren't aware of the recommendations from the 2008 emp commission report. by the way -- again, i guess i caught you by surprise. you weren't expecting that for this hearing. just so you know that was commissioned by the 2001 national defense authorization act. they reported in 2004 and 2008. and this is something certainly i'd heard about before i ever came here and this is "star wars" stuff and couldn't possibly happen. but again you've acknowledged knowing dr. richard garwin correct? a brilliant man. >> yes. >> worked with enrico referred to as one of the true geniuses he'd ever known. >> dick is a national resource. >> he testified. and my ranking member during the

hearing said he looked into this and somebody said it was it's a growing threat when you have north korea, potentially a state like iran if this thing turns out like north korea, we have multiple threats of this. particularly in light of the fact we know iran has been testing a potential emp attack using a scud missile off of a ship. which would be one of our threats particularly on the southern border where we have no defense or particularly a satellite orbiting. so i want to make sure you're fully aware of that because the 2008 emp commission pretty well tasked dhs and department of energy as the two lead departments to enact their 15 recommendations. again, they're pretty basic recommendations. evaluate and implement quick fixes, assure availability of equipment, replacement

equipment. again, what dr. garwin report -- and this is what i thought was actually pretty encouraging, is if we would just protect 700 transformers to the tune of about $100,000 per transformer, that's only $70 million. but again it's been seven years, seven years since that recommendation and the secretary department of energy didn't really know anything about it. i'm just asking you -- >> can i clarify though, senator? >> go ahead. >> i know something about emp. i don't know that specific report. and including the effects and as i said -- and also by the way i will dick garwin also does a lot of work with our osdp, i will talk with dr. holden the president's adviser maybe this is an administration wide thing we can do and consult with you on that but i want to emphasize in april we did our energy infrastructure report. and the issues of transformers and emp and other threats were there.

and furthermore we have made a recommendation about going forward in a public-private partnership to potentially establish a transformer reserve in addition. so i would love to discuss this. i just don't know that particular report. i know the issues. >> we'll probably call you in for a hearing in front of my committee homeland security. these remgcommendations issued in 2008, it's seven years later. of the 15 remgcommendations we've done virtually nothing. this is a real threat. america needs to understand certainly the secretary of department of energy needs to be aware of these recommendations and working toward their implementation. and there's a relatively quick fix quite honestly add is an amendment to authorize spending $70 million -- it's imperfect, but it goes a long way toward protecting some of those transformers. i hope you'll be supportive of that. >> senator menendez. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. secretary lew, i basically

understood your answers to my previous question. that you have no intention of seeking reauthorization of the iran sanctions act, an act that in october 3rd of 2013 entitled -- in a hearing entitled reversing iran's nuclear program heralded as critical. negotiation on iran's nuclear program, another hearing, they both said the same thing and talked about the important congressional sanctions. so seems to me that if you want a deterrent, iran has to know consequences. maybe it will never be called into play. that's fine. that's good. hopefully they won't be called into play. but they need to know what the consequences are. and so as far as i'm concerned i think we should be moving to reauthorize the sanctions that congress passed. and that expire next year. and let the iranians know that if they violate those are one of

the things they're going to have to go back to. so i'm going to move to reauthorize them because i think it needs to be part of the deter deterrant. do you believe iran will be and should be a regional power? >> do i believe that they should be in the future or something? >> will be and should be a regional power? >> well, i think to some degree there's an element of power in what they're doing now. i don't know about the will be. do i want them to be? not in the way that they behaved today. no. >> i'm glad to hear that because, you know, the president in the column with tom friedman said that the truth of the matter is that iran will be and should be a regional power. but that's a pretty bold statement about a country that is the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world as defined by our government.

it would have to be a dramatically different iran to have any aspirations. >> and the president knows that. >> let me ask you one final thing. you're an excellent, excellent lawyer. and when you can get to argue something both ways, if you can achieve that that's great. so i've heard you argue we will have everything on the table that we have today. we will have the sanctions. we will have a military option. then i've also heard you say sanctions is not going to get iran to stop its nuclear program in terms of -- and a military option will only deter them for three years. so isn't really what you're saying that at the end of the day we hope that iran will change its course over the next ten to 15 years? that if they violate we'll get notice from three months that we had to 12 months, a year.

but at the end of the day neither sanctions nor military option is going to if i listen to you your arguments, no military option is going to ultimately deter iran if they decide to do so. so doesn't that in essence say to us that we are reconciled at the end of the day if they want to? to accept iran as a nuclear weapon? >> absolutely, positively not. not in the closest of imagination. i'll tell you why. they're not going to be sanctioned into submission. we've seen that. they have what is called their resistance economy. there are limits to what our friends and allies are able and willing to do. you know the challenge we've had in just bringing people along on ukraine. bringing people along particularly the russians and chinese over a length of time is going to be very very

difficult. they're sort of a half-life if you will to keep the sanctions pressure in place. in addition to that on the military option we all know as it's described to us by the military it's a two or three-year deal. now, that option that is real. it's a last resort option. if you can't make diplomacy work, if you can't succeed in putting together a protocol they have to follow which by which they live, guarantees they won't have a weapon that's sort of your last resort. but it shouldn't be the first resort. it shouldn't be the place you force yourself to go to. given the structure of this agreement we have a much better option. because whatever it is, 15 years, 20 years whatever the moment is that the alarm bells go off on a civil nuclear program which has 24/7 access, which has inspectors which we will know has suddenly moved from 5% to 10% to 20% enrichment, all the alarm bells

go off. we'll have the ability to bring those nations back together. the question is do you have the sort of readiness and willingness of those countries to come together because you've honored the process and worked through a process? or are you start pushing them away -- sanctions obviously brought them to the table. >> or come together for a military option, which at the end of the day will deter but not end it? i just don't understand the proposition. sounds like your proposition will be there whether it is today or whether there's a violation in the future. >> no, senator because i believe this deal in fact achieves what we need to achieve now. we wouldn't have come to you. we wouldn't have signed this. i assure you, germany, france, britain, would not have signed this agreement all of us together on the same day if we didn't have a sense of confidence that this is doing the things we need to do shutting off the iranian path

shutting off the plutonium path, shutting off the covert path and so forth. and we believe it does that. that's why we're here. we believe it does that. now, the proof will be in the implementation. we all know that. but we have a sufficient cushion here of those years because of the very dramatic steps iran has agreed to take and to implement. we have a very real cushion during which time we have a chance of building up confidence. i'm not going to sit here and tell you that's absolutely going to work 100%. i believe it will. but if they don't comply i do have confidence we're going to knownoncompliance, and then we have the options available to us that we have today. >> mr. chairman i know secretary kerry said he had to leave at 2:30. >> we do i'm afraid. >> we have a couple more witnesses. so if that's a hard time i think -- >> it is a hard time. i actually have to be at the house right now.

>> okay. listen, obviously this is a serious matter that the three of you spent a tremendous amount of time over the last two years. we appreciate your patience with us today in testifying the way you have. we appreciate your service to our country. julia, who i know is having a heart attack as staffer we thank you and hope you have a good meeting with the house of representatives. thank you. >> thank you very much.

>> washington journal's next. if there will be a look at today's news. it the nation's governors are meeting in west virginia today. it we will have coverage of the opening session up. a there will be a panel on the economy. it that is live on c-span. coming up, we will talk to the incoming national government associations chair of utah about his priorities and challenges. then a discussion on a sanctuary cities. are guest is gregory chen.

later, we will talk about the release of two videos of planned parenthood officials and the reaction it has had on capitol hill. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. host: the senate is back in today at 9:00 a.m. eastern time for more work on the highway bill. they might be in this weekend as well. funding runs out july 31. they have one more week before their august recess. the president, and route to kenya, with members of congress tagging along, and the national governors association is meeting in west virginia. we will talk to the incoming chair of the national governors association in about 20 minutes. for what is on your mind this morning public policy wise