conclusion that i have already made but actually to help me in arriving at the right conclusion. i would like to set forth the questions, recognize you can answer some, and the others, if you would submit in writing i would appreciate. the first is on parcheen the agreement says that the iaea will provide progress reports by october 15th and then the final assessment by december 15th. we know obviously this is a site where there was nuclear testing of some kind. my first question is is it at all concerning that this final conclusion or the set of final conclusions might inform in a substantive way whether we should go forward and is there any concern there will be something revealed in this report that will impact whether or not iran is in compliance from the outset? that's the first question. because you'll be asked to vote on in the first round of sanctions relief will be provided before that december 15th date. second question is it's been argued that we're in the same position in 15 years with no

options off the table except the economy of iran will be fortified, they'll be able to withstand sanctions in an enhanced way, and that the ability to reassemble this international coalition will be very difficult as the countries will be doing business and re-engageing with iran. do you agree with that assessment? or do you conclude that that's a that some have suggested? third, you concluded mr. secretary this agreement makes our world, our allies, including israel, and the region safer. i have no doubt you have concluded that is correct based on your best assessment. if you would just provide for us kind of some thinking of why it is that the current israeli leadership does not see it that way. you know, as they obviously have sort of come to a different conclusion. why do you think that is? four, after 15 years, iran most have suggested, is a nuclear threshold state. but that they must negotiate

comprehensive safeguards again with the iaea. and whether or not i know there's been some discussion, have you seen those, but do we have some ability to influence what that agreement is? do we have any ability to influence its content or monitor their compliance going forward? that's between iran and the iaea. fifth, is the likelihood of an international consensus remaining if a deal is rejected? what happens if the deal is rejected? some have suggested actually some top level israeli officials suggested iran will comply with the terms of the agreement. we'll get relief from other partners, and the u.s. will be isolated. others have suggested iran will rush toward the development of a nuclear weapon with no constraints. is there any reason to believe iran would comply with the terms of the deal if it's rejected and not proceed quickly to a nuclear weapon?

if the weapons -- six, if weapons are transfers to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does not approve the agreement? do those remain enact? and the last question, secretary lew, they described the process in which noncompliance in the agreement might result in sanctions snapping back to the u.n., but this would only work in major violations. how would the administration treat minor violations? i invite, maybe to start with you, secretary lew. the ones you can't get to, i appreciate your answers and thank you for the work you have

done. >> i'll start with the snapback question. we have reserved the right for snapback in whole or part. obviously, if there's a small technical violation, that will not bring back the whole sanctions regime. the goal would be to get them back in compliance. if there's a need to make it clear that violations that are small will get a response we have the option of putting some of the smaller sanctions back into place. if there's a major violation, we have the option of putting, of course, all of our unilateral sanctions and ultimately going back to the u.n. for the international sanctions as well. we have all the authorities we need to do that. >> arizona. >> thank you. mr. secretary you said you said no country would accept anytime anywhere inspections, but i submit iran is not a normal country. iran is a terrorist state under a heavy international sanctions. it's neither got the moral nor the geopolitical equal of the

united states. or our negotiating partners and i think we have to stop treating it like one. it aspires to be a regional power, the u.s. right now is the only world superpower. and my question is this really the best deal we could get given the fact that we seem to have most of the cards? and we have had most of the cards since these sanctions were imposed. secretary moniz, you said the deal includes anytime anywhere in the sense of a well-defined process and a well-defined end date. but all that depends on iran acting in good faith. we shouldn't make the assumption because iran has been stonewalling the iaea on the military dimensions while claiming to cooperate for years. they're doing that as we speak. first, the process is not just 24 days. if iran balks, it's a minimum of 24 days. before the clock starts the

iaea has to tell iran about the concerns about a particular site and they have to provide an explanation. but there's no time limit. does anyone believe that iran will respond immediately for the back and forth discussion for negotiations won't take place? only after these delays in the high barriers are taken care of at best, maybe can the iaea make a formal request and start the 24-day clock. but at the end of the 24 days, there's no punishment if iran says no. instead, the matter goes to the dispute resolution mechanism which has lots of opportunities for delay and more barriers. does anybody believe that the p5 plus 1, not this administration and certainly not the europeans will derail the entire agreement by imposing sanctions and restarting iran's nuclear program just because iran is denying access to one sensitive site? more likely, there will be overwhelming pressure for a compromise. one that's no more substantive than what's in the final agreement. kicking the can down the road is

always one option. it's worked in iran for years. i think all of this led cia former director michael hayden to warn in front of this commitsy that the deal is taking inspections from the technical level and put it at the political level. and i just think that's a formula for chaos, obfuskcationobfuscation, ambiguity, and doubt. i think on the 24 days we're kidding ourselves if we they think that the 24 days is the total length of the deal. i think it could be much much longer. and i would like to know how ultimately we're going to deal once we do find infractions. my second question is of all the sanctions to be lifted in the iran nuclear agreement, few are more significant than those against a shadowy $100 billion organization belonging to the islamic supreme leader. the u.s. delisting the

headquarters for the execution of the imam's order will pump 10s of billions of dollars into the supreme leteader's personal coffer bolstering iran's ability to promote its agenda abroad. it's estimated he'll gain access to as much as $95 billion. the u.s. treasury designated ico and 37 subsidiaries in june 2013 noting its purpose is to generate and control off the books investments shielded from the view of the iranian people and their regulators. explain why ico will be designated? >> congressman, i'm going to turn to ernie for the first part of that because it's important to understand the 24 days. you are, i say respectfully, misreading the 24 days. by the way, that's an outside period of time. it could be less than that. it's very possible it could be 18 days or something. but ernie, why don't you discuss

that? >> first you started out with the question of iran being unique in terms of verification. that's why we have the verification system in this agreement that is unparallels. this goes beyond what anyone else has accepted because of the distrust built up over iran. the iaea can cut that off any time by declaring their request for access, and then the 24-day clock runs. it is not the beginning of dispute resolution. it's the end of dispute resolution. in fact, at that point, they're in material breach. you asked about would there be a response if it was, quote, only one site? well, i'm going to turn it over to my colleagues, but i want to emphasize in the snapback it says in whole or in part. so a graded response is possible. >> going to go to mr. alan grayson. >> mr. secretary i have five minutes. i have ten short questions. i'm hoping for ten short answers. will implementation of the

agreement increase iran's support of terrorism? >> you want these? >> yes. >> we have no way to know. i presume in some places possibly. only in the sense that they are committed to certain things that we interpret as terrorism, they don't, and we're going to continue to conflict on those issues. >> all right. if the agreement is implemented, will iran in fact allow inspections at all its military sites? >> they have to. if they don't, they're in material breach of the agreement and we'll snap back the sanctions. or take other action if necessary. >> if the agreement is implemented, do you think there's a significant risk that iran will cheat on the agreement and develop a nuclear weapon secretly? >> i don't think they're able to develop a nuclear weapon secretly because our intelligence community tells us with the regime we have established here, it is physically impossible for them to create an entirely covert

secondary fuel cycle. and we have a sufficient intrusive inspection mechanism and capacity on their fuel cycle that they can't do it. you can't make a bomb at 3.67% enrichment for 15 years. you can't make a bomb with 300 kilograms of a stockpile for 15 years. you can't make a bomb if you can't go enrich and move forward without our knowing it. and we have submitted and we believe with clarity that we will know what they're doing before they can do that. >> if an agreement is implemented, is there a significant risk that iran will adhere to it for a year, let's say, then pocket the $50 billion and then violate the agreement and build a bomb? >> again they can't do that. because the red flags that would go off, the bells and whistles that would start chiming as a result of any movement away from what they have to do. they have to live for 15 years under this extraordinary constraint of a limitation on the number of centrifuges that can spin.

on a limitation, and there are indeed, on 24/7 inspections. on day-to-day accountability with live television with respect to their centrifuge production and so forth. so it is not possible for them during that period, in one year two years five years to sort of make this decision and stiff us. if they did, in some way if they just radically said, you know, we're going to change this whole deal and we're breaking out of here then we have snapback of all the sanctions with the full support of the international community, which would then be absolutely in agreement that they have to do it, and we have the military option if that was necessary. >> but briefly on a follow-up, isn't it true in that scenario they would then have $50 billion in their pockets they wouldn't have? >> no, i doubt after one or two years they would. they have investments in their economy and they would be moving, but you have to look at this in the real world. here they are trying to attract investment. frantz, germany, china, all

kinds of countries. is the your presumption that a country that has destroyed its stockpile, reduced its centrifuges by two thirds put concrete in its culand ria, totally stripped the ability to do fissile material, that that country and is now seeking investment and trying to build its economy, with a population of 50% of the country under the age of 30 who want jobs and a future, is it your presumption that they're just going to throw this all to the wind and go create a nuclear weapon after saying we'll strip our program down and won't? i don't think it's going to happen. >> what about after 15 years? if the agreement is implemented, is iran in fact likely to build a nuclear weapon after 15 years at the end of the deal? >> all i can say to you is that they can't do it without our knowing what they're doing. because after 15 years, they have to live by the additional protocol. they have to live by the

modified coat 3.1. they have to live with inspectors, 150 additional inspectors are going to be going into iran as a consequence of this agreement. and those inspectors are going to be given 24/7 access to declared facilities. so if iran suddenly starts to enrich more, which we will know all of the bells and whistles go off. the international community would be all over that with questions and restraints. >> my time is almost up. i want to ask you this. >> may i just -- this is the agreement that codifies a permanent ban on nuclear weapons in iran and we have to take -- >> thank you mr. secretary. i want to ask this one additional question, and i had one more, but that's the way it go. tell me exactly what you expect will happen if the agreement is rejected? specifically, there's been some suggestion that iran will adhere to it anyway. sanctions will remain in place anyway if the agreement is

rejected. >> i heard that for the first time last night when i met with an israeli friend who suggested that might be possible. it's physically impossible. >> explain why. >> i'll tell you why, because in the legislation that you have passed, which you have given yourself the ability to vote you have also put in an inability for the president to waive the sanctions. so there will be no waivering of the sanctions. there's no way for deal to work because our lifting of sanctions is critical to the ability of other countries to invest in work and critical obviously for iran to get any money. so nothing works for them unless this deal is accepted. >> we have a lot of members who still want to ask questions. we need to go to tom marino. >> mr. secretary of state, we all know what iran has done as far as giving weapons to terrorists. to do iran's dirty work. what will stop iran from giving nuclear material or even more

weapons to terrorist organizations? and how is nuclear -- how is a nuclear iran going to make the world and the united states a safer place. more particular how is a nuclear iran going to make american citizens feel safer? >> well the opposite of your question is to suggest that somehow you or we can prevent them from having any nuclear program at all. now, you all have a responsibility to show us how that's going to happen. >> i'm going to show you how -- i'm going to show you right now how it's going to happen, mr. secretary. you answered my question. i'm going to show you how that's going to happen. i'm going to take secretary lew's words. the sanctions have crippled iran. if we ratchet them up, and get our allies to ratchet those sanctions up, you can bring iran to its knees where it cannot

financially function. that's how to do it -- >> let me just tell you, i suggest -- i really suggest very respectfully that you spend some time with the intel community. ask the people who have spent a closely whether or not they agree with your judgment that an increase in sanctions will in fact bring iran to its knees. they do not -- they do not believe there is a capitulation theory here. and you will not sanction iran out of its commitment to what it has a right to. iran is an npt country. there are 189 of them. >> and we have a right to protect the american citizens from this disaster, this country having nuclear power. sanctions have worked. are you going to retract any statements made by secretary lew and anyone else who has said it would cripple them, it would take them years to get servicing again. >> if you're going to quote me,

let me speak for myself. >> i quoted exactly what you said. cripple iran and it will take them years to recover. so if we up the sanctions -- >> the other part of what i said is the reason it was crippling is because we had international cooperation. we have worked very hard to get that international cooperation. the parties that we worked with reached an agreement here. >> look who we work with. we work with china and we work with russia. the people who want iran to be in that position because it jeopardizes the united states. >> the power of our sanctions is not going to have the affect -- >> i disagree with you. the economists disagree with you. individuals i have read article after article on disagree with you. >> congressman, as we have said again and again, and i want to repeat it now. we are absolutely committed that iran will never get the material for one bomb. not for one bomb. >> but you didn't answer my original question, mr. mr. secretary. my original question is, how is that going to make the united states citizens safer? >> let me tell you.

i'll tell you exactly how it makes the united states citizens safer. because if iran fully implements the agreement we have come to iran will not be able to make a nuclear weapon. and we have created an agreement which has sufficient level of intrusive inspection and verification. that we are confident in our ability to be able to deliver on preventing them from having enough fissile material for the one bomb. now, mind you we have started in a place where they already had enough fissile material for ten to 12 bombs. we have already rolled that back. and that made america safer. by the way, it also made israel and our friends and allies in the region safer. everything we have done thus far in the interim agreement, which has been enforced for two years has made the world safer. >> i'm going to reclaim my time. you're repeating -- i understand. i have 40 seconds left.

>> if you repeal this deal, that's not making america safer. >> i hope you're right, because if not, you, the executive branch in congress, is going to have a disaster on our hands, and we need to be accountable for the united states. i want to ask an important question. secretary kerry this is an extremely important topic for the future of this country's security and the safety of the american people as well as our allies in the middle east. i would first like to ask you a simple yes or no question. in accordance with the office of mampg management and budget as well as the national archives directive as well as state department policy, have you ever used a nongovernment and personal e-mail account to conduct official business? >> no. that's my business on a government account. >> we need to go to dr. ber era. >> i want to thank the wenlsz witnesses. i'm going to go through a series

of questions as i try to make my decision with regards to this deal. secretary kerry, in multiple times you have said this, the negotiations had one objective. to make sure they cannot get a nuclear weapon. secretary moniz, you're the expert here. would you, in your opinion do you believe this deal makes it less likely within the next decade, next 15 years. over a lifetime, for iran to obtain nuclear weapons? >> far less likely. >> okay, great. i don't trust iran. secretary kerry, you said multiple times there's nothing in this agreement that is based on trust. secretary lew, you have said there will be no immediate sanctions relief. is that an accurate statement? >> sanctions relief will only come after iran complies with all the measures to stop the nuclear program. >> in your estimation, is there enough in the verification regime, in this deal, that will

allow us to -- >> i would defer to secretary moniz, but i have been persuaded by everything i have read and seen that it is the toughest verification regime we have ever had. >> is that correct? >> and secretary lew there is no signing bonus? >> there is no signing bonus. >> okay, great. you know moving on then, secretary of defense ash carter is not here. but i'll direct this to secretary kerry. in your opinion would you say that secretary carter as well as our joint chiefs are satisfied with the icpm provision of no missiles for eight years as well as the arms embargo for five years? that they would be okay with that? >> yes. >> okay. >> moving on, secretary kerry, you pointed out in your time and history in the senate, you're a

very strong defender of israel and had a strong record of support of israel. in your opinion do you believe this deal makes israel safer or less safe? >> i am absolutely convinced beyond any doubt this deal makes israel safer, and the region. and the world. >> would you say that president obama shares that opinion? >> yes. >> secretary moniz we've talked a lot about the 24-hour framework. is it accurate that you believe as an expert here that within that 24-hour framework, we will be able to detect any activities, nuclear activities et cetera. >> 24 days. >> i'm sorry, 24 days. >> access to undeclared sites that work with nuclear material i feel quite confident we can detect it. >> that there will be no cheating, we can detect it in the 24-day period? >> i want to emphasize, i work

with nuclear materials, other work non-nuclear work might be more difficult. >> okay. secretary lew, if in fact there's no nuclear activity going on and iran is complying with the terms of this deal, i do have a serious reservation that they will continue to spend it on terror groups. fund organizations that destabilize the region. and that is worrisome obviously. in your opinion, do you believe that if we acted in a unilateral manner to impose new sanctions or reimpose existing sanctions, not based on breaking the nuclear deal, but based on other activities activities, that we would be able to impose sanctions strong enough that they result -- >> we totally agree that their actions on terrorism and regional destabealism are and

continue to be an area of concern. we have been putting actionsanctions in place. we have reserved the right to put parties on the list again if in fact they're violating terrorism or destabilization provisions. we have powerful tools. i think the world knows we mean to use them. i believe our credibility in doing it has to be for real. it has to be that we're listing people for reasons of terrorism and regional destabilization. >> you feel we have the tools if we have to work unilaterally. >> we definitely have powerful tools. >> great. i'll yield back the remainder of my time. >> wheal go to jeff duncan. >> thank you. secretary kerry, there's still three or four americans imprisoned in iran. i put their pictures here to remind you of them today. i understand not using them as pawns in negotiations but what should have been -- what should have happened is they should have been released as

preconditions before ever sitting down with iran for anything. with that, i yield to mr. dos santos wheres. >> thank you. secretary kerry, for these side agreements between the iaea and iran, can you at least confirm one of the agreements is about the military site the other about the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program? >> i believe there's just one basic agreement which contains the approach to the pmd. >> so can you confirm that the congress will not -- >> i think he's been more briefed on it than i have. there's two appendicize. >> congress will be briefed on the contents of the agreement per what we know. >> we will not be given the actual agreement. >> i don't believe we get the actual agreement. >> the problem with that is the

iran nuclear agreement act that congress passed and president obama signed required the executive branch to provide congress with all documents and specifically defined all documents to include any side agreements. so the executive branch has a binding legal obligation under the iran nuclear review act to provide those documents. >> actually we don't have a side agreement. so we are in compliance. gr doesn't matter. >> the iaea is an independent u.n. agency and it makes an independent agreement under standard procedures. >> the nuclear review act, with all due respect, applies taany agreement iran may have with any other parties, any other relations agreements to be entered into or implemented in the future. if there's an agreement between iran and the iaea under the iran nuclear agreement act, that needs to be provided to congress. so if you're not in compliance with that act, how is the clock even starting to run for the 60-day review period?

>> congressman i'm not sure legally the congress of the united states has the power powerful as it is, to be able to dictate to the iaea a change in its procedure. >> that's not what we're doing. we passed a bill the president signed it. laid out the conditions before we would then -- >> we don't have the agreement. >> you're not going to request the agreement and bring it so we can review it? >> congressman, we don't possess the agreement. >> these are protocols worked out to satisfy the iaea-iran agreement. >> which are very important issues because we need to know the pmd. we need to know more about the site. we need to evaluate the efficacy of the agreement. >> the iaea will then be providing its report on december 15th which summarizes all they have found. >> which is after the window congress has to review the agreement, so we're not going to be privy to that information, and we're going to be asked to cast a voes on this.

let me ask you this, secretary kerry. you had alluded to in previous questioning about the ability that if iran cheats, we can snap back the sanctions. the problem, though, i see is in the agreement itself, it says iran has stated if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its agreements. so if you have a situation where iran is doing incremental cheating and then there's a movement to have the sanctions reimposed, if you do that, iran is saying it's going to walk away from its agreements. it's structured in a way to let iran get away with small violations because the cost would be to blow up the deal you have spent so much time negotiating. >> congressman with all respect, that's a misread of the paragraph and a misread of what we have here. the paragraph was requested by iran because they were afraid because congress kept rattling

its saber about more sanctions, and so they said well, what guarantee do we have if we agree to this that congress isn't going to pass more sanctions on the same thing or, excuse me, not more just take the sanctions they had and bring them back after we made an agreement? so that paragraph merely says that we are not going to re-agree that we're not going to reimpose the sanctions and put them back. it does not, as secretary lew said, prevent us from bringing any other additional or inappropriate sanctions for other things. the sanctions language also says in whole or in part. so we're allowed for any minor infraction we're not facing this, bringing the whole thing and risking the whole deal. we could bring a small amount. also remember, the reason iran is coming to the table to make this agreement is they want the relief from the sanctions. and if indeed they were in flagrant violation, all of our friends who helped negotiate

this will be standing with us all in agreement, that we have to put sanctions back. >> we must go to new york. >> grace. >> thank you to all of you for being here for your time and dedication to this important issue and spending so much time with us here in congress on the hill to discuss so many of our concerns. i want to ask, during the negotiations, did this law of the land that iran's nuclear agreement review act signed by president obama and known to all parties of the negotiation, was it known to all the parties? >> well, obviously, the other parties became very aware of the fact that congress was requiring a review period. they were very concerned about it. >> and so i want it bring up one example of during the cold war, congress played a very important role in the development of nonproliferation

agreements dealing with nuclear weapons. specifically, the threshold test treaty, which i know is a treaty, but we also have our law here. the treaty was initially blocked by the senate because of concerns over soviet compliance. the treaty was not submitted to the senate for approval for two years after signing. and wasn't ratified until after the u.s. and soviet union reached agreement 14 years later on additional provisions to enhance america's ability to verify soviet compliance. so this all leads me to believe that congress should be, and we are, and we have the ability and authorities to compel a better deal should it choose to disapprove of this one. what are the key differences between the jcpoa here and the cold war examples other than the fact it was a treaty and there were multiple parties? >> well, one of the principle differences is that we have not

had any engagement or any dialogue with iran since 1979. and the lack of diplomatic relations even which is different from what lack of diplomatic relations, which is different than what we had with the soviet union, makes this a very, very complicated situation. so you have to take and analyze what is achievable here in the context of the threat, the nuclear program, and i believe given the nature of the political system in iran, the challenges with respect to their own politics, the notion that we're going to be able to go back to the table is just a -- it's a fantasy. there is no latitude here, because iran came to this table with enormous suspicions about

even engaging with the united states. there is a huge debate in the country about whether or not they should, whether or not we could be trusted, whether or not we thought this was worth the risk. and many people in the country suggested we did not act in good faith. in indeed, all of a sudden we stand up in vienna, seven nations strong embrace an agreement, the united nations has supported the agreement we turn around and say, we're not going to perform, i think the intelligence community will confirm to you resoundingly, we will not be back at the table. certainly in the near future, and i would think certainly not with this iranian government or leadership. one final question, you also asserted that if congress does disapprove, the international sanctions regime -- and iran goes back to two months breakout

time. i understand russia and china's top priorities may not be the views of congress here in the u.s., but if you can help me understand what is the basis for the view that these two countries would also just allow iran to fully violate the deal, why would they -- why wouldn't they hold iran to their nuclear commitments set forth in the agreement? and? they allow them to do that, why do we also believe they will be there with us in any sort of snap-back scenario? >> well i think that russia and china are very, very serious about the nonproliferation component of this, as we are. russia has agreed to export the spent fuel and process it in russia in order to help make this work. china to be the lead entity with

our co-chairmanship on a committee that will work to redesign the iraq reactor in away that is acceptable to all of us. they have taken on major responsibilities. they both have a huge interest in the nonproliferation piece of, this but they both belief that the other components of the resolution with respect to arms and missiles was thrown in as an add-on. not because it referred directly to the nuclear part of this -- of the resolution. the resolution was a nuclear agreement and in that regard i think they would have -- they did experience serious -- >> we'll go to darrell issa of california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i guess i have to be careful when i say mr. secretary, but secretary lew, let's start with you, were the sanctions -- or are the sanctions that are in

play as of today effectively curtailing both the money flow and the economy of iran in a way that has brought them to the table. >> congressman, i think that the sanctions have been very effective at slowing the great of roet in iran's economy making inflation high and the exchange rate on their currency very unfavorable. i don't think it stopped them from doing a lot of other bad things around the world. and they've maintained even in a very difficult set of fiscal challenges blind activities, which we have to stay focused on stopping. >> the question, mr. secretary was did it bring them to the table, or did they just come out of goodwill? >> i believe the sanctions brought them to the table and the sanctions were, in fact, designed to bring them to the table. >> secretary kerry you'd agree with that? >> i do agree with that. i think the sanctions and other strategic designs but

essentially the sanctions are what crystalized -- >> classified annex, a long list of ships and aircraft and banks that were received relief under this. i'm sure you're both familiar with those 20, 30 pages. the question i really have here because i think we're all focusing on the nuclear deal, but i want to focus on iran an exporter of terrorism, directly of americans kidnappers directly and indirectly, of americans since 1979. all of those sanctions that we're agreeing to lift is there anyone that doesn't think those sanctions and more are appropriate as long as they continue to export terrorism kill americans and others?

i'll start with secretary lew from a standpoint of those tools that we're lifting. those 40 pages of whatever single space, a huge amount of things that will now be able to carry oil, move money and is so on. those are, equally effective in deterring or slowing their ability to export terrorism, aren't they? >> congressman, as a class we are listing for relief from sanctions entities and individuals who were violating the nuclear -- >> but those entities -- those entities are banks in many cases. >> a bank that was designated as a nuclear violator -- so bank sadarat stays on the list. if there are institutions delisted that are relisted subsequently under authorizes that deal with terrorism, we right to do that. i think the delisting of nuclear

parties is what you would expect if there's a nuclear agreement. the nuclear sanctions would go away, but other sanctions stay in place. >> and they can be again congressman, i want to emphasize we hair with everybody the concern about iran's behavior around the region. we have ability -- >> let me give you a hypothetical. what if at the same time as we don't reject this plan, we bring you a package of new sanctions. what if in fact, congress determines the only way we can accept this risk is if we can truly snap back now relative to their promise, just the day after you signed this, they

agreed to stabilize bahrain, continue what they're doing in yemen. obviously their support for hezbollah and hamas, the assad regime and taking of lebanon and syria. so with that real threat with that goal, with that continued activity is there any reason we should not either reject this agreement or -- and/or include further sanctions in order to keep them from expanding their support for the murder of americans and our allies around the world and the destabilizing of the middle east one that is leading to an arms race? >> congressman, we have powerful tools to snap back sanctions -- >> no, not snap back. i'm saying today. today they are, in fact, doing all of this. what would you say -- >> the gentleman suspend. we need to go to -- >> i just want -- >> simply because these junior members do not have sufficient

time. so, lois. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, gentlemen. some quick follow-up questions and then some new ones. if there is a -- if new enrichment sites are detected under that 24-day rule, will those sites then become under a constant inspection? >> if a new site emerges in this? >> absolutely. >> and could you tell me how many countries, other than the p5+1 are currently engaged in sanctions and how much would you say did it take to have all these sanctions in place to get them to the table? >> can congressman, i would have to check but our sanctions and international sanctions are being honored around the world, so it's many, many countries. it's taken us years to put that regime in place. i'd have to underscore two points. one is our unilateral sanctions are powerful, but the ability

for them to really have an effect still requires cooperation. and the international sanctions wouldn't exist without cooperation. we have spent a lot of effort with countries for whom it is substantial economic cost, they have cooperated to try to stop iran from getting a nuclear weapon. >> so, how would a snap-back affect all those countries? it concerns me how you could actually get the snap-back -- >> i think as secretary kerry said earlier there is enormous unity in the gold of keeping iran from getting nuclear weapons. if they violate the agreement, if, in fact, a snapback is warranted because of nuclear issues, i think that both the international and the u.s. unilateral sanctions would, in fact, snap back. we are going to continue to prosecute our unilateral sanctions on things like terrorism, on things like regional destabilization, but -- >> and human rights. >> and human rights. but they're obviously different regimes. >> once congress -- if we don't

disapprove this agreement, if it goes forward, will the congress -- u.s. congress have any role -- any further role in this agreement number one? number two can any president alter this agreement or refuse to abide by it in the future? >> well, congress will always have a role, obviously, and you've made that crystal clear in the context of what we're doing here now. so, yes, there will be an ongoing role with respect to the enforcement, the implementation, our -- >> do we have to vote on anything? >> afterwards? >> to repeal sanctions or -- >> ultimately, yes. ultimately the iran sanctions act itself. there is the lifting of sanctions. ultimately you would have to vote. >> if we don't do that pursuant to the agreement are there any penalties on our part? >> actually, iran is fry to

break the agreement because we will have broken it and then all bets are off in terms of compliance. >> can a future president refuse to abide by the agreement? >> absolutely. a future president can but it's our judgment if the agreement is fully implemented and is working well, no further president is going to choose to do that because the implications. if it's working, it's achieveing of our goal of not having a nuclear weapon in iran. >> the appeal would be way down the road. it's not something that happens in the next year or two. it's many, many years in the future. probably eight or more years. >> i want to get, again, to this this -- to the troubling issue of the inspections. are you saying there is no limit to inspections by the iaea that it will go on forever? did you say that? >> yes. what i'm saying is there is a

process, congresswoman -- >> who pays for that? >> it's paid for -- we pay a certain element of the budget. it's a u.n. agency. we represent certain percentage of that budget, about 25% and others contribute to it. we train all the inspectors. it's one thing we do and do very effectively. but it's an independent entity. >> excuse me. is it a separate, secret agreement that we don't see that's going to allow this continuation of inspections? that's what's not clear. >> no. the continuation of inspections surnd what is called the additional protocol. the addition at protocol is exactly that. >> that's what we don't get to see? >> absolutely, you see that you can read every component of it. i was sharing some thoughts with the committee earlier about the things that it empowers the iaea

to do. the accountability is very indepth and significant. this is not some light set of requirements. >> we'll go to mr. mo brooks of ambassador ambassador. >> thank you, chairman. three months ago brigadier general said erasing israel off the the. >> some people's rhetoric and some peoples attitude -- >> in the iranian government? >> i don't think it's possible for iran to do that. i think israel has enormous capacity. >> i didn't ask for all that other. i'm just asking if you have a judgment as to -- >> my judgment is it is not a employmentable policy by iran.

and death to israel. do you believe his comments accurately reflect iranian government roles? yes, no or i don't know? >> i think they reflect an attitude and rhetorical excess but i see no evidence they have a policy employmented against us at this point in time. >> to kill americans or israelis? >> well, they may. they may. we have, as you know, responded to that from 1979 when they took over our embassy forward. we have put sanctions in place specifically because of their support for terror because of their abuse -- >> i understand that. you answered my question when you said yes, they may. next, is the obama administration willing to use military force to prevent iran

from obtaining building, testing or using nuclear weapons? >> yes. >> and what has iran done in the past couple of years that causes to you believe iran will abide by the iran nuclear treaty or wants to become a responsible member of the international community? >> the only thing that indicates to us a willingness to try to comply with this agreement is the fact they have complied fully with the interim agreement for the last two years and that we have put in place such a strict set of consequences that it is deeply in their interest to comply if they have reduced two-thirds of their centrifuges stripped their stockpile put -- emptied out fordah, so there's a lot of -- >> that focuses to a large degree on the nuclear side. what about the use of the conventional weapons and whether they will maintain their status as the world's foremost -- >> we have serious concerns, which is precisely why we're

engaged with our friends in the region. it's why i will be in doha in a few days to meet with them, as we lay out the plans for pushing back against those opportunities. we'll be in special forces training, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterfinance, a whole series of steps in order to empower all of us to do a better job of reducing those activities. >> september 1 11th 14 years ago shows their desire to kill non-muslims and other foes. given religious zealously how confident are you that iran will not use nuclear weapons to further death to america or death to israel if iran obts nuclear weapons? >> they won't obtain a nuclear weapon. i'm confident under this agreement and with president obama's commitment they're not going to secure a nuclear weapon. >> is that in part because of your statement that this administration is willing to use whatever means are necessary of

a military nature to prevent iran from having nuclear weapons? >> that is certainly the final backup to it. i believe all the elements of this agreement will -- -- if it's implemented fully, again, if it's employmented will prevent them from even getting near that possibility. >> on occasion you've used the phrase, all options are on the table. do those options to prevent iran from having nuclear weapons? >> i've never asked that. i know of no president of the united states who have ever taken all military options available to them off the table. i also don't know of any realistic situation in which that can present a very feasible strategy given the proximity of friends from iran and the consequences of that. but i don't think the president has taken any -- there's no option that's been discussed. >> when you talk about the use of military force, is it fair to

infer that we're really talking solely about conventional alal weaponry? >> what the president has laid out is -- and what the military has designed is an approach and i'm not going to discuss that plan in open session here but a plan that sufficiently meets the task of preventing them from having a nuclear weapon. that's the goal. that's the objective. and our current set of options accomplish that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. joaquin castro of texas. >> thank you, chairman. thank you, gentlemen for your work and diplomacy on behalf of the nation. i want to imagine for a moment another scenario. a scenario we don't take a deal, we walk away from it and there is military action against iran. can you imagine for me for a moment, what would the fallout be from a destabilized iran? we've seen other nations, libya,

iraq egypt where there have been destabilized regimes, secular leaders who have been replaced by fundamentalists and terrorism that has now been franchised almost across the world. . what would happen if iran was destabilized in the same way? >> you know, congressman it's very hard for me to get into this speculative game here. there's too much talk about military option and this and that when we have in front of us a plan that accomplishes the task of preventing iran from achieving a nuclear weapon, which they say they don't want to do anyway, and have made very strong affirments about their commitment not to do. it seems to be focused on the destabilized side of it and the military side of it is not the right focus. the right focus is on this

agreement that accomplishes the goal of preventing them from having a weapon. the region is obviously destabilized, in flames and that's another reason why i think we should think really carefully about the consequences of turning away from this deal. >> i guess, let me point out, secretary kerry, that you know i'm not coy to support the deal. one of the questions i have is a concern that we find out that they are cheating and at that point a position has to be made, which is we're not going to let them have a nuclear weapon. >> frankly congressman, that's the easiest decision in the world for this president, and for all of us here. >> but here's my question mr. secretary. what is the tipping point where sanctions will no longer work and you have to take military action if, in fact, you're going to keep them from not having -- >> the tipping point is a clarity with respect to what

effort is being put into breaking out if that's the choice they've made and where they are in that process. the tipping point is how much time you make a judgment that you have -- >> sure. >> -- with respect to where they're starting and where they can wind up. but we are convinced that with the -- we will have enormous tip-off to this. that's why a year was built into this agreement for the first ten years, and even after that. there's a lengthy enough period of time that our interest the interest of the region our friends, israel, others, is protected. and we're confident about our ability to have accountability in that process going forward. but i would say to everybody if this is rejected, then you have no inspections, you don't have a regime in place, you don't have

sanctions, iran may undertake, not, immediately, but they've considered themselves free to do so. and as they do it what are the options that are then available to us? it seems to me when you get those two scenarios, this becomes not that complicated of a choice. >> to put this in context, can you go over again -- i missed some of the discussion but can you go over again the deal offered in 2003 by the bush administration. >> in 2008 is when -- >> in 2003 there was discussion about 163 centrifuges, but the p5+1, the same p5+1, made an offer to iran for their suspension of enrichment and reprocessing that the united states and the p5+1, excuse me, would then recognize iran's

right -- treat iran's nuclear program in the same as that of any nonnuclear weapon state part to the ntp once confidence had been built. provide technical and financial ability including state-of-the-art power reactors support for r&d and legally binding fuel supply guarantees, improved relations with iran and support iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs work with iran and others in the region on confidence-building measures and regional security, reaffirmation of the obligation to remain from the threat or use of force cooperation on afghanistan, steps towards normalization of trade and economic relations and it goes on. all of these things were offered in exchange for suspending enrichment. now, they didn't suspend. they went up to 19,000 centrifuges. and that fact is one of the driving factors in our coming to the conclusion, the president

coming to the conclusion, that we needed to arrive at an agreement, which recognized their ability to have nuclear power under safeguards agreement, under the ntp, with our ability to know what they are doing. >> randy webber of texas. >> thank you, mr. kerry. appreciate you being here. i hope that you will -- you say we're going to be briefed on that side agreement that the iaea has with iran. is that correct? >> yes that is correct. >> i want to implore you to use your power to make sure we're not briefed by the same staff that briefed susan rice and hillary clinton on benghazi or sergeant bowe bergdahl. make sure we get a briefing there. you say frequently this is the strongest negotiation you could get, you feel like it was. the president said he would walk away from a bad deal. and i would submit this, now, you come to us and you say there's not 535 secretaries of state and other countries don't

appreciate that congress is weighing in. but if you were going to get a strong deal i have said from the get g i think there's a lot stronger position you should have taken, so i'm going to lay out some preclusions and you tell me if you operated between that basis. i agree with jeff duncan when he said american hostages should have been released first and foremost. number two. the demand should have been for iran to dismantle all of its centrifuges. number three, give the iaea unfettered 24/7/365 day access. number four, stop the exporting of terror to syria to iraq and everywhere else. number five, denounce terrorism and prosecute those who perpetrate it restore civil rights in their own country, number six. stop the death chant to america and israel. and they need to recognize israel's right to exist even as a jewish state, i might add.

number seven, secretary kerry they've been a bad actor going back to 1979. so, if this is not based on trust, if this is based on actions, shouldn't we have required them to show by their own actions, i don't know say for half of the time since 1979, say, 18 years or a fourth of the time, nine years how about just two years shouldn't we have required them to show with their actions? you said in your exchange with grace mentiong said earlier me and my colleague were up here thinking, who cares? we're not the bad actors here. they're the one exporting terrorism. did you start from that basis of strength? if you did how did we get here? you consider this to be a good deal. >> well, congressman, plain and simple. all the things you just listed there never would have been a negotiation. >> oh, my heart pains for them.