essential and urgent and provides consequences for a finding of noncompliance. that's just on the side of the declared facilities. there's a whole set of requirements for access and inspection and accountability on the undeclared facilities. congressman, they are forever under enormous constraints here with respect to inspections and accountability. they have to provide accountability for all the nuclear research and development activities not involving nuclear material and manufacturing the production of technology, and construction of hot cells and useable for plutonium separation, and uranium mines and concentration camps and nuclear waste and all kinds of things. >> may i suggest this mr. secretary, we can respond for the record mr. secretary to the ranking member's questions

but if we can go -- the time has expired here and we will just get for the record. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. last week the "los angeles times" reported the iran's foreign minister told the parliament under the deal iran can deny access to military sites and the defense minister also stated that he would not allow international inspectors to enter iran's military cites and yet president obama said the organization responsible for the inspections will have access where necessary when necessary, end quote. can the iaea really have access to all and any military sites suspected and do they have the

power to access the sites, and dismantling iran's infrastructure used to be the administration's goal. the administration repeatedly told us that it would focus that sanctions only on the nuclear portfolio but in the deal we have over 60 pages of individuals, companies vessels that will be de-listed, specifically mentioned. many of these sanctions are not nuclear related. the administration has always stated that all provisions within this agreement has to be agreed upon by all parties which includes the eu to lift san shbg r -- sanctions. what do you think to the family of the wounded and killed due to

saul money's actions in iraq, and the u.s. agreed that the group responsible for countless deaths will be getting billions to support their accounts of terror throughout europe. i'm glad it's only $50 billion. i feel better already. secretary kerry, you will be in cuba soon. i remain extremely worried about allowing cuba a license to open here in d.c. every cuban official so-called diplomat that wants to come to washington and will we reject any cuban official that wished to be posted in d.c. if our law enforcement officials have information related to their espionage apparatus? finally, secretary kerry when

announcing the deal president obama said quote we will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen israel's security, and will you guarantee the u.s. will veto any measure at the u.n. security council on palestinian state hood that calls for anything except a two-state solution between israel and the palestinians and nothing else? >> so madam chair let me come back to you on the record on a bunch of those because, again it's more than we have time to answer but we will answer them all. i want earnie and jack to get in here on two things the money and highly enriched uranium. there's a confusion of the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program versus the nuclear program. it was never the goal by this

administration, not even the bush administration. the bush administration in 2008 -- >> mr. secretary, with all due respect -- >> i want to be very clear that we are achieving what we set out to do which is dismantling their capacity to make a nuclear weapon. with respect to the military sites, yes we will have access. >> we will have access to the military sites? >> if they don't provide that they will be in material breach of the agreement and the sanctions will snap back. >> we consult with iran before we get access? >> there's a procedure in place but it doesn't rely on iran or russia or china saying yes. >> so iran is wrong when they say we won't have access to

military sites? >> no they are taking care of a domestic constituency in the way they feel they need to -- >> thank you. >> what they say is not as important as what they do. >> i will remind the members, we have five members. ask the question and give enough time for a response. >> mr. chairman -- >> what we are going to do is have a response for the record. we are going to go to mr. brad sherman of california. >> we have to remember that this is not a binding deal. this is not a treaty. this is not binding on iran. this is not binding on the united states. it's not even an executive legislative agreement and these question here are not even asking for congress to approve the deal. i think they would appreciate it if we didn't pass a formal resolution of disapproval. it might be at most morally binding on this administration.

so what may be important for us is to look to see whether it's a good deal in the next couple of years, because i think the administration plans to follow it unless we prohibit that, and also try to see whether we will have congresss and administrations in the future that will take the action necessitated by our national interest. the deal may be opposed because that's the best thing they can do for congress to support the deal or maybe they genuinely oppose it. i want to focus on your remarks, secretary kerry about dealing with iran's nonnuclear behavior. you say we will be in a stronger position to deal with that. assad is killing 500 people a month at least and the blood is

on the hands of the men intphin tehran. you are not going to be able to persuade them to change just by charm, you will need to threaten them with new sanctions unless they change their behavior. we have seen sanctions cause iran to change behavior even on very important things to iran. i am not asking you whether you think new sanctions are a good or bad idea and whether europe will follow or not but i will only focus on what is legal under this agreement. you were asked about this in the senate and you said we will not violate the agreement if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism human rights, missiles or other nonnuclear reasons, and then the provision in paragraph 26 that

commits the united states to refrain from re-introducing or reimposing the sanctions specificed, which are the best sanctions we have got, although we could probably come up with new ones if you tell us the old ones are forbidden. so you were also asked if we reempose sanctions on the central bank of iran, would that violate the agreement and you said no. but i would like you to clarify. is congress and the united states free under this agreement to adopt new sanctions legislation that will remain in force as long as iran holds our hostages and supports assad? >> we're free to adopt additional sanctions as long as they are not a phoney excuse for just taking the whole pot of the past once and putting them back.

>> secretary kerry, it's my time and i have a lot of other questions. now p. we have got a number of entities listed on the -- for their nuclear activities that deserve to be listed for their terrorists activities, it's just you have not had time to put them on that second list. will you be putting entities that are on the list of sanctions for their terrorists -- for their nuclear activity on the terrorists list if they deserve it and can you get that job done before this agreement becomes effective? >> we have terrorists sanctions right now. we are free to add -- >> and we are free to add -- >> we added some 60 entities during the course of these negotiations. >> let me get to one other question. you strongly do not want us to

override a presidential veto but if we do that triggers certain american laws. i would like to give you an opportunity, you know, you don't want us to do it and you think it's terrible policy and you think the rest of the world would be against us, but let's say congress doesn't take you advice and we override a veto and the law that is triggered then imposes certain sanctions. will you follow the law even though you think it violates this agreement clearly and if you think it's absolute terrible policy? >> i can't begin to answer that at this point with only the president determining what the circumstances are. >> you are not committed to following the law? >> no i am not going to deal with a hypothetical. that's all. >> we're out of time. we're going to have to go to mr. chris smith of new jersey. for the record -- >> mr. chairman on the financial issues and sanction issues

there's a lot of responses to answer and we could answer. >> there's articles written by the assistant secretary of state back in 2003 make it clear that north korea is kau lab rating with iran. what happens if north korea conveys nuclear weapons to iran and other capabilities they have at their disposal? the issue of the arms race is real and this incentfies saudi arabia and egypt to acquire a bomb and the middle east becomes more of a powder keg. and the hostages, when are they going to be free? you said if they break out they have to design the bomb.

iran has been stonewalling the iae on this point for years, and inspectors have been denied to the military site where it's believed raup tested detonators for nuclear warheads and iran has refused inspectors access to the site for years in 2013 or even images showing bull dozing of buildings and removing roads. is the iaea being pressured to not accept full access? and yesterday at the t.i.p. report release you spoke eloquently and boldly about combating modern-day slavery and while the report is accurate, i am concerned that the designations for several countries missed the mark and a number of countries got absolutely unmerited upgrades including malaysia and cuba.

i went back and read the reports and in china there were 35 convictions of trafficking and that's a watch list country now, and cuba, 13 convictions for sex trafficking and if the narrative gets it right, none for labor trafficking, and they say it does not exist which is nuts, and a year ago there were ten conventions, and thailand by contrast had 151 convictions and they are still tier 3, and malaysia had three convictions for sex and labor trafficking a decrease of nine from last year and they were tier 3. did the narratives get it right? the designations miss it by a mile. >> i would be happy to sit down with you and talk that through. since time is so precious here i want to stay on iran and i want my colleague to be able to address a couple key issues.

>> mr. chairman, if i could respond to a couple issues that have been raised. congressman -- >> this is my time. i would really like to know -- >> mr. smith, we'll get answers here to everything. let's let -- >> on the question of the flow of money to iran there have been a range of estimates of why the money is locked up and it's locked up because the international partners worked with us to take iran's money and not let iran get it. the highest number that we see, there's $115 billion that is available. in reality 58 to 59 billion is unavailable, and roughly $20 billion is tied up in contracts like china and the balance is nonperforming loans. i am not going to say $56 billion is not a lot of money but it's not $150 billion and it cannot be all used because they need foreign reserves for the

economy, and if you look at the economy for the use of the money, we see at least $500 billion of demands for that $50 billion, so any kind of allocation of that resources and they managed with sanctions in place to put several million a year towards maligned purposes, and the order of magnitude is way, way smaller and it's in line with the kinds of spending they have been doing anyway. you compare that to to an iran with the nuclear weapon and the bigger threat is iran with a nuclear weapon having the same kinds of objectives. sul money is not delisted. there are few entities whose identity has changed over time and whose leadership has changed over time and privately we are happy to go through the individual cases but we kept in place our sanctions regime on

trpl terrorism. >> we have three answers you need to answer for the congressman from new jersey. >> congressman the greatest incentive for an arms race in the region or egypt or saudi arabia or one of the other countries to try and get a bomb is to be if this agreement is rejected and the reason will be iran will go back to enriching and we will not have inspection or incite, and they will say, oh, my god, now they are going for a bomb and now we have a reason to have to get one. they have, in fact, told us these countries, they are not going to chase a bomb provideing the implementation of the agreement continues and providing we are working with them on the other push back issues, and there will be access as appropriate under the agreement between the iaea and

iran and that is an agreement which is normally entered into con tpau -- >> that's the problem. americans held captive conveys a bomb to iran and what happens there? >> i believe i heard you say, congressman, that iran set off a nuclear explosive and that is incorrect. >> i didn't say that. >> really? at least get that right. >> on the americans being held captive, and what happens under the agreement? >> my last conversation with prime minister sau reef and the brother of the government was about the people being held and we are in direct conversations. that's all i am going to say here today and i hope they will

be returned to be with their families. >> north korea and obama and they convey bombs to them -- >> what? >> if north korea were to provide nuclear weapons to iran, what happens? >> they can't do that. iran and north korea would be in gross violation -- >> they tonight seem to care. >> we have the senator from new jersey. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for being here. there are deep divisions in iran evidenced by the comments made by the hardliners and the prime minister and the foreign minister and the supreme leader. there are these decisions likely to resurface and what are the consequences of these divisions for the implementation? i keep reading they are going

back and forth and i am concerned we get an agreement -- >> so congressman, that's a very, very good question and appropriate in understanding that dynamic here. we saw the exact same divisions of things that were being said regarding the interim agreement, if you recall. what we learned, it's not as important as what they say but what they do, and make sure their actions are held accountable. every aspect of the interim agreement has been lived up to, not withstanding denials that came out publicly from certain politicians or leaders and we have seen the same thing here, there was a red line and wouldn't be able to do it and etc., but the agreement is the agreement. that's why we have been so clear. mr. chairman, nothing in this agreement is based on trust. nothing is based on an expectation of some change of

behavior. this agreement is 100 and whatever pages nine pages because it's specific with its annexes in declaring what is expected of whom and when, and that precision is what gives us confidence that would be able to hold them accountable. >> thank you. secretary, you said it's only $56 billion for them to really -- >> that's accessible. >> accessible. but really, they don't need a lot of money for some of these groups to start it up again. they don't need billions. they can't absorb billions, some of these groups, and there's a lot of money to start problems. >> they are finding the relatively small sums of money that it takes terrible acts and support of terrorism so they are doing that now with the sanctions in place. what i am saying, i don't think you are going to see the shape of that support change, though

there will be some more resources available and it will be on the marchin and along the lines of what they are already doing and that puts the burden on us and our allies in the region to shut down the flow of money and the flow of material to align forces and what we discussed with the gulf allies when we met with them at camp david was to how to work more effectively together to shut down the flows of money and things happening today with the sanctions in place. the problem exists today with or without an agreement. the challenge on the money that is iran's money locked up overseas is it's not in the united states, and a lot of the money is in china and india and other places. the p5 plus one agreement, if it's rejected i don't think we can rely on the other countries keeping the money locked up so you could end up iran getting access to the money without the agreement, and we have to keep it in perspective and we made

the commitment to continue designating like we did last week, and we will to do that, and we have sacknctions in place, and that's not a reason to not have an agreement to keep them from getting a nuclear weapon. >> what they have been doing over the years so -- i think that our objective here was to make sure they can't have a nuclear weapon and secondly, to work with our allies and friends in the region to do a greater job, a much better job of pushing back against those activities. i will be going at the end of the week meeting with the gulf states and we are laying out within the very specific steps with regard to the pushback and what we can engage in for

security and bushback for the activities you are talking about, and it's hard to put them all in a pot at one time, and first step nuclear weapon and the next step we have time to push for changes if we want. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, mr. angle about the leadership. let me note that while you are receiving quite a grueling today, let us note we appreciate the hard work that you are making and you are looking to make it a more peaceful world, but some of us realize that in the past we have seen people are very sincere in seeking peace and creating a -- unfortunately, setting things off in a

direction of led to war and more refreshen and did not create a more peaceful world. one of the efforts i noted when i was part of this is how reagan ronald reagan succeeded in ending the cold war and during that time period we reached weapons agreements with the soviet union, and let me note while we were making those agreements with the soviet union to put a lid on nuclear weapons in europe and etc., we ratcheted up our support for the democratic elements in various parts of the world whether it was in the soviet union or nicaragua or afghanistan we were increasing our efforts to support those people. we also denied them hard currency, much less had any agreement that would have

bolstered the soviet economy. because we had that approach the soviet union fell apart and in the long run that's what made them a peaceful world, the elimination of that regime, and i am afraid this treaty you are talking about today and you are promoting will do the opposite of what we saw that succeeded and that is that it will empower them instead of making them more a peace regime. empowering them will create more chaos and the likelihood of war because they are the main proponents of terrorism and they have hate -- hatred for the

west. we have been aware of the refreshen and the brutal retreatment of people with iran and like the mek who are suffering and you noted this in the past yourself, the brutality that these people that oppose the regime have had to face. did you confer in any way with the democratic elements in iran or these other people who are struggling for a free iran and how this agreement will affect their long-term goal for a democratic iran and thus a more peaceful world? >> as you know, this was a nuclear negotiation but i have on many occasions and met with and had discussions with folks representing different interests and as spapirations within iran. you have to make a hard judgment about where iran is.

president hu -- >> your answer is no, you did not confer -- >> no, that's not what i said. i said i had plenty -- >> but you are conferring with their oppressors instead. >> i didn't say that at all. >> in the money, the fact is, part of the effort that worked under reagan was supporting the democratic element and undermining the economy of the soviet union. in the long run what will bring peace to this part of the world is not for us to have short-term arms deals with the regimes and the other people that hate the

west and are supporting terrorism but try to support the elements in those societies that want peace with the west and aren't preparing some sort of holy war against us. i am sorry, mr. secretary i appreciate your sincerity and what you guys are trying to do, but i believe this treaty will empower the mullah's and make power more likely. >> i find my friend from california, i find his words ironic, because ronald reagan was nothing if not a prag ma 'tis and was quite capable of compartmentalizing relationships for the greater good. it's exactly what is in front of us today. something is overriding. nuclear capability in the region. shall we deal with it or not?

samuel taylor described fiction of the willing suspension of disbelief. i must say i find a lot of fiction involved, the willing suspension of disbelief in some of the criticism of this agreement. it's not perfect. it will hurt israel. it will give them a nuclear capability some day. it doesn't do enough and it doesn't deal with horrendous behavior. who said it would? and here's the bottom line. valid those criticisms may be and imperfections we can find by the score. what's your program? you know what i have heard in a series of here hearings here let's go back to p5 plus one and say let's start over.

that was one of the most monumental naive statements for sure. let's stick to the facts. no, the willing suspension of disbelief is at work. it's alive and well here. including the issue of the threat to israel. walking away from this agreement, you need to take responsibility for the consequences of israel whether you are netanyahu or a member of congress, and you have to weigh it carefully. what risks am i willing to take before i make that vote on behalf of our country and our allies like israel? i think it's an extraordinary job you have done and i would like to give you the opportunity to talk about two problems, and you, too secretary, and if we

walk away from this agreement what is likely to happen and secretary moniz the 24-day problem, that's not the robust kind of inspection we hoped for. >> i will be quick because i want earnie to get in here. it's not speculation, it's clear. if congress rejects this, iran goes back to its enrichment and the ayatollah will not come back to the table. anybody that makes that judgment has not talked to the intel community. there is no way given his feelings already about the west and his mistrust of us and his reluctance to have engaged in this discussion that he will re-enter if we reject this and moreover the sanctions regime falls apart and the folks we

relied on to provide a united front and we will have set our folks back, folks. i don't know how i would go out to another country if that happens and said you ought to negotiate with us or you ought to talk to us about any issue whatever it is with the reliance that we could actually deliver, because they will sit there and say, well, you have 535 secretaries of state in the united states we don't know who we are negotiating with and whatever deal we make is at risk of being overturned and that's not the relationship that has been between the executive and the congress. iran will say we're free, and we can go about back to our program. what i said about earlier about bringing year 15 to today or year 20 or whatever and they will take their 19,000 centrifuges and can enrich.

>> for my five months at the negotiating table i doubt our p5 plus one partners would be interests in going back to the table. the 24 days is a new tool in the sense there has never been any limit at all. so the key is in getting enough of a compressed process where we feel confident in being able to detect any use of nuclear materials, number one, over the time period, and in the classified environment we could provide more evidence than i already discussed today. >> thank you, mr. secretary. >> the congressman from ohio. >> thank you. the president specifically called isis famously the jv team, and that clearly was not true. this administration cited yemen as the model approach to u.s.

counterterrorism, and that was shortly before yemen's near collapse into chaos, so that was not true either. president obama declared al qaeda to be decimated on the run and broken apart and on their heels and weak, and those are all quotes, by the way and that may be wishful thinking but it certainly wasn't true and isn't true. why should the american people trust the administration now on this deal? >> we're not asking them to trust but look at the deal and look at the components. like i said, nothing in this deal is built on trust. nothing. it's on very specific steps that have to be taken. for instance, iran gets zero relief from the sanctions until iran has implemented the one-year breakout time by destroying the clan diaw and

undoing the electrical and piping and they have to do -- >> as you know i have limited time. i will move on. when you say it's not depending on trust and that strains credibility, and there has to be trust in a deal. you said, i quote, this is a term that honestly i never heard in the four years that we were negotiating, now, in fact in april of this year deputy secretary rhodes said the anatomic energy agency would have immediate access, immediate access, to any site the agency wants to inspect. immediate access sure sounds like anytime to me. also in april energy secretary moniz, the gentleman sitting next to you there, he said, and i quote, we expect to have

anywhere anytime access to places that are suspected of out-of-bounds activities unquote. there's that anywhere anytime once again. so again why should the american people trust what they are being told by this administration about this deal? >> may i say, my quotes have not been anytime anywhere in the sense of a well-defined process scale and that's what we have. >> that really clears things up mr. secretary. thank you. go ahead mr. secretary. >> we never had a discussion in the context of these negotiation negotiations that talked about anywhere anytime. nowhere on the planet earth does any country anywhere under the mpt have anything called anywhere anytime. what we have is called managed access and it's a process by which we get in. >> this proper days -- >> please, let me answer.

>> 24 days is an outside -- for 24 years or longer 2400 years they would not be able to hide the remanence of the nuclear material, and ernie moniz will tell you that. >> i only have five minutes. if this is such a good deal why is israel so opposed to it? >> well first of all, i understand when you say israel. there are people in israel who support it. >> the prime minister, okay he is the representative, like president obama is the representative of our country on these types of things -- >> you will agree president obama always talks for everybody in the country. >> he is sure speaking for us in this agreement and he seems bound and determined to go forward with this thing whether the people elected by the

american people are for it or not. >> as i said earlier, we fully understand every israeli has concerns and fears and there are concerns about the region they live in, about the nature of the rhetoric that is used, death to israel and death to america. everybody is concerned which is why this is not based on some element of a dream they are going to change or some element of trust. but, i will tell you there are people in israel who -- >> you are going to name a couple people. the prime minister is against it and i am almost out of time. this is one of the main reasons as a representative of the american people i am concerned because israel could be directly affected but with the icbms and the technology that could be coming the whole -- >> excuse me. we have to do to mr. ted deutsch of florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to all the witnesses

for being here, and mr. secretary kerry thank you as well for continuing to raise the polite and that of three other americans as well, and i agree it's time for them to come home. i want to talk specifically about pmd if we don't discuss that it's impossible for us to believe the iaea can go forward. the nuclear related activities set forth in order for there to be sanctions relief, they leave out the most important point which is the one that the iaea has to have final resolution of pmd. i have two questions. the first question is, will we have access -- will the iaea have access to per cheng.

am i right, the satisfaction of pmd will not be a prerequisite to iran's getting sanctions relief? >> it is. it is a prerequisite. if they have not complied and lived up to the dates in the program, august and october, they will not get relief. >> mr. secretary i acknowledge that. by october 15th they have to have activities where they need to set out what they are going to do but it's december 15th by which the director and the board of governors will assess whether they complied and that's not -- >> they will be in breach. >> i understand. i would just point out it's specifically omitted in the list of past and present concerns. it's not a requirement. >> the outcome, if you are talking about the outcome, it's not dependant on the outcome

because the outcome we have no way of knowing which way -- >> that's the issue mr. secretary. >> no it's whether they comply or not. we know what they were doing. we have drawn our conclusion about 2003. we know they were engaged in trying to make a weapon. it's not the -- >> you are saying that if they comply with the iaea and the iaea ultimately concludes that they have not -- they are not satisfied on pmd because they don't have access or didn't get access to the sites -- >> they are not in compliance. that would be a breach. we would not do sanctions relief. they know that. >> i respectfully suggest it's not at all clear in the agreement. we can talk about that, but i would like to move on to the issue of specifically the sanctions. this has been brought up by a number of my colleagues. the annex to the lists, lots and

lots of individuals and entities getting sanctions relief under the deal and many of them are involved in not just proliferation activities but also involved in terrorism, support for terrorism and human rights and they went on the list because it was easier to get the european allies to go along with the proliferation sanctions. secretary lew i appreciate that we will continue to sanction hezbollah, but will be be able to and are we going through the process of scouring the list for banks and shipping lines to re-impose sanctions -- >> we have not listed for relief many entities. >> i understand. i am asking about this list. >> there are institutions that were designated for their acts of terrorism that have not been relieved. >> mr. secretary i understand that. i have a very specific question.

>> will we be under this agreement to reimpose sanctions on all of these entities if we find -- >> we have retained all rights to designate -- >> including everybody listed here. >> what we cannot do and this is what secretary kerry was saying a few minutes ago we can't put in place the nuclear sanctions -- we have given up no ability to target -- >> i hope we are going through the list and scouring it right now. i have a few seconds left. i would just -- i just ask for some acknowledgment when we say iran is engaged in all of these terrible activities now and it doesn't cost much money, and it has been reported that $200 million a year is the amount they use to fund hezbollah. so if only $1 billion of the 56 were to go to hezbollah we would double the amount of support for five years at which time the arms embargo comes off

and they are considerably more dangerous. we have to acknowledge -- >> congressman, we can put the arms -- there are plenty of opportunities to deal with the arms. there's a resolution preventing them from sending weapons to iraq -- >> at this time we have to go to joe wilson of south carolina. thank you. >> thank you for hosting this hearing and i appreciate the panel being here today. secretary kerry i share the concerns of an op ed by david hoar wits of the time of israel where he says the nuke deal is a catastrophe for the western world. we need this as a response for the american people so as we vote in september the american people will know as you stated a few minutes ago, the correct

facts. one, was the iranian regime required to disclose the previous military dimensions of its military nuclear program to in order to insure inspections of all relevant facilities? no. two, have been been made to halt the enrichment facility. >> have they been required to shut down the plutonium production plant? no. four has the iranian regime been able to shut down the even richment facility regime been required to halt its ongoing missile development? no. six, has the iranian regime been required to halt research and development of the faster centrifuges which will enable it to break out a bomb far more

rapidly than is currently the case? no. seven, has the iranian regime been required to submits to anywhere anytime inspections of any and all facilities suspected of engaging in rogue nuclear-related activity? no. eight, has the international community established procedures setting out how it will respond to difrtferent classes of violations to insure the community can react with sufficient speed efficiency to prevent the break out of a bomb? no. has the iranian regime been required to halt the test army in lebanon? no. tens, has the iranian regime been made to surrender for trial for the alleged involvement in the bombing by hezbollah suicide bomber of the amia jewish community center in buenos

aires, argentina in 1994 resulting in the deaths of 84 people? no. 11 has the iranian regime undertaken to close its 80 estimated cultural centers in south america from which it allegedly fosters terrorist networks? no. 12, has the iranian leadership agreed to stopping hatred among its people against israel and the united states and stop its relentless calls for the a annihilation of israel? no. has it halted the production of three a day, the highest rate in 20 years? no. 14, does the nuclear deal shatter the painstakingly construct ed constructed regime that forced them to the table? yes, 15, will the deal usher in a new era of global commercial interaction with iran reviving the community and releasing

resources iran will use to bolster its military forces and terrorist networks? yes. 16 does the nuclear deal further cement iran's repressive regime in power? yes. i'm going to be submitting these for the record. i look forward to receiving them during the next month. in the meantime the american people need to know there's bipartisan opposition to this deal. i was really grateful two weeks ago. we had senator joe lieberman here, who addressed my concern and that is that the secretary of state designate iran a state sponsor of terrorism over 30 years ago in response to the hundreds of marines who were killed at the marine marebarracks. i asked senator lieberman, has there been a change in course. his quote, directly this iranian government, the islamic republic of iran has the blood of a lot of americans on its hands. marines alt ss at the barracks ipbeirut, and i would go on. incidentally, hundreds of

american soldiers were killed in iraq by shia militias that were trained in iran by the irgc. so your question is a good one. has the government changed? there's no evidence of change. mr. secretary has there been evidence of change? >> yes. in that the president of iran sent his foreign minister to negotiate an agreement to which i could pose you a lot of questions that i can give you an answer to that are yes, too. does iran have to give up two thirds of its centrifuges? yes. >> mr. secretary those are words -- >> if the gentleman -- if the gentleman will suspend your time has expired. >> yes. >> i have suggested to the members, ask the questions and leave time for response. we're going to brian higgens of new york. >> thank you mr. chairman. the snapback provisions in this agreement are real and powerful.

and i think are born out of a deep distrust of iran. snapback provisions as i understand them, allows for any of the six powers to the deal to flag what it considers a violation. that concern would be submitted to dispute resolution panel. if those concerns remain unresolved, sanctions would resume or snap back after 30 days, preventing a resumption of sanctions would require a vote of the security council from which the united states and its western allies would have veto power. it's unprecedented, and i think very very powerful and speaks volumes to this deal. under this deal iuranium would be cut by 98%. a level of enrichment for what remains is 3.67% a long way from the 90% enrichment it would need to occur to achieve a weapons-grade material. centrifuges would be reduced

from 19,000 to a little over 6,100 for ten years. there would be no enrichment and only centrifuges permitted for use would be older first-generation centrifuges. plutonium, the iraq facility will be reconstituted so it can't make weapons-grade material. materials that do exist there today would be sent out of the country entirely. number four iran may try to build a nuclear weapon in secret. mr. secretary of energy, i would ask you through robust monitoring and verification and inspections, the deal would allow inspectors access to inspect any suspicious sites. i heard critics of this plan say, well that's why because of the 24-day period, it's like a police officer calling a drug dealer to say that we're going to raid your apartment in 24

days, so they can clear all the evidence. would you speak to that, within the context of physics and talk about the half life of both uranium and plutonium? >> i'll start with the last question, if i may. first of all technically, on the half life, the half life of the uranium isotope is roughly the age of the earth which is why it still exists in the earth. that of the uranium 235 which is the isotope that you would want to enrich for a nuclear weapon, is somewhat shorter and therefore is more rare in nature. however, the issue of the, first of all the analog to putting the drugs down the toilet is not very applicable to the use of nuclear materials, and as i have said, in both unclassified and classified regimes we have extraordinarily sensitive ways

of finding minuscule amounts that are left over from using nuclear materials, whether it's enrichment or in an explosive environment to understand the nuclear weapons behavior. on that, we're very, veer clear. in addition, we have other constraints on them, some of them forever, in terms of other parts of weaponization like nutron sources where we also have some interesting signatures should there be a suspicious activity. >> secretary lew, you had dealt with the issue of the projected amount of money that would be available to iran once the sanctions are lifted. iran's currency has lost -- my understand is most of the money is most of that money is iranian money in foreign accounts. frozen foreign accounts. in that iranians -- iran's currency has lost about half its

value over the past three years, was that factored into your estimate about the amount of money which will be available to iran once -- >> i was addressing the specific issue of their reserves that are tied up overseas because of sanctions. we have done enormous damage to their economy. it will take them years to get back to where they would have been if sanctions had not been put in place even if they got that money back. they're not looking at breaking out into a period of great growth. and i think the challenge here is, we have a pretty good understanding of what the pressures in iran are right now. we can't know with certainty what decisions they'll make. we know, for example, just to get their oil fields up and running properly would require an investment of $100 billion to $200 billion. i can't tell you how much of the $50 billion they'll apply to their oil fields, but you have to assume that one of the things they're going to want to do is get their economy moving. so that money will quickly be used for a lot of purposes. i wish i could say that zero,

not a nickel, would go to malign purposes, but even with the current sanctions regime, they're finding the money to put into malign purposes. the question is do they do it with or without a nuclear weapon. >> thank you. secretary kerry, the countries that know iran the best fear this agreement the most. and the reasons why are that for the following reasons. it lacks the necessary verification. measures to insure iran doesn't cheat. it lives the restrictions on their intercontinental ballistic missiles which the ayatollah himself said they would mass produce. international sanctions on iran's revolutionary guard corps, its terror arm, will be released, and the european sanctions. this deal could also in my judgment spark a nuclear arms race in the middle east as the saudis told me when i recently visited there. as chairman of the homeland security committee what concerns me the most is that the deal frees up hundreds of

billions of dollars to the leading state sponsor of terrorism. susan rice the president's national security adviser said, quote, we should expect some portion of the money will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior we have seen in the region. now, you're asking this congress to indorse an agreement that the president's own national security adviser admits will spread terror in the region. finally, iran's deputy foreign minister confirmed we will provide weapons to whomever whenever we deem appropriate and buy weapons from wherever we can. chairman royce and i sent a letter to you and the president of the united states asking you to submit this deal for consideration by the american people through their representatives, first, before this deal was submitted to the united nations. instead, you went around the congress and the american people submitted it to the united nations and then china russia, and venezuela got a chance to vote on this and approve this agreement before we

have had a chance to deliberate. my question is this. if the congress overrides the president's veto, what effect would that have on this deal? in other words would it kill the deal? >> yes. we said that many times. let me come back to your earlier comments. >> but, this is a very important point. will the u.n. and eu sanctions be lifted? and that will relieve iran of these burdens? or if we override the president's veto will it collapse the entire international deal? >> the -- the sanctions rely on the international community's participation to be able to enforce them. our sanctions alone did not do the job alone. it wasn't until we went out and worked with other countries diligently, china for instance in order to persuade them not to buy x-amount of oil countries in the middle east would thought

be trading underneath the table or otherwise. there were a lot of different things necessary to make these sanctions work. if the united states unilaterally through congressional decision pulls away from this deal, they're not going to continue to apply those sanctions. they have no reason to. they're gone. they have already said they're gone. and with respect to saudi arabia, there was an a.p. article the other day when ash carter visited saudi arabia. saudi arabia's foreign minister said iran's nuclear deal appears to have the provisions needed to curtail iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. >> i have heard otherwise but let me -- that's very important for us. >> that's a very public comment. >> for us and the congress to understand if we override the president's veto, it will stop this. that's is important for us. i have one more question. it's been debated by secretary lew and yourself that you did not approve the delisting of the kuds force commander, the

iranian terror arm from the european sanctions list. i'm looking at the agreement right here. they're taking off the list of the european list, which is an agreement that was approved by you that could force you -- they killed americans in iraq and afghanistan. what do i tell my gold star mothers back home whose children were killed by these iranian forces and tell them that this agreement will take them off the list? >> tell them that the united states of america will continue to keep the sanctions on him, specifically. he remains designated by our country, and we will not ever lift them, and that the united states will be pushing back on them. but look, here's what -- >> my final question. this secret deal between the iaea and iran -- >> there's no secret deal. >> we have never seen this. are you going to present that to the congress? >> there's no secret deal. there is an agreement which is the normal process of the iaea where they negotiate a confidential agreement, as they

do with all countries between them and the country. and that exists. we have briefed on it. >> are you going to present that to the congress? >> we don't have it. >> have you seen it? >> we have been briefed on it. i have not personally seen it. but can i say something? you know we hear these complaints. we hear, well this agreement doesn't do this, doesn't stop their terror. this agreement is going to give them money this agreement is going to do this. what this agreement is supposed to do is stop them from having a nuclear weapon. now, i want to hear somebody tell me how they're going to do that without this agreement. i would like to know how you're -- >> we're going to go to william keene of massachusetts. >> what's the next step for the united states? nobody is answering that question. >>. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank our witnesses for being here and their hard work. three threads i'm going to throw out there and one of them there have been reports in the media

that surfaced that among our european partners in this there was reluctance. those reports centered on france, in particular. i'm curious, and you can answer all three at the end. i'm curious what issues might have, that you can detail, they might have had guam qualms about, i want you to comment on those reports. number two, if you could, generally comment about the cooperative actions of north korea and iran and how this might be impacted. number three we have had witnesses before on this issue, and they really were forceful, including ambassador burns, forceful in saying it's important that we send a strong military message should any agreement go forward. and when it comes to sales and transfer of arms and other things, you began to speak to this. i want to give you the time to address, what military options, what are our strongest saupgzoptions

that we still have and how we can act on this. i'm going to give all three of you the remainder of my time so you can answer some questions and i won't be interrupting you. >> thank you congressman. let me say quickly because i want my colleagues to have a chance to catch up here. but on the european partners, france in the final comments when they signed on to the agreement, it was bastille day. july 14th. and the foreign minister said that he thought this agreement was not only a strong agreement, but he hoped it would be remembered in the same way as having the positive impact for the world, the way bastille day was remembered as having the impact for the development of france. and they supported this agreement and voted for it. with respect to north korea and iran, this is a very different agreement from anything that ever existed with north korea. there are about seven or eight different major differences

between the north korean agreement, not the least of which north korea pulled out of the npp, and north korea had already exploded a nuclear weapon, and iran has not. and there are many differences. and we, i would rather lay them out on the record, if we can. but this covers all possible nuclear-related activities. the agreement with north korea did not. we also have consent to the process of inspections. north korea -- i mean, there are a whole series of things. finally, on the military option, i said it again and again. everybody has. ash carter has reiterated it. president obama is the only president who has actually commissioned the development of a weapon that can do what is necessary to deal with the facilities that are at risk. and he has not only commissioned its design. he has deployed it and he has made it clear that iran will not get a weapon. he's prepared to use any option necessary in order to achieve

that but his preferred option is the one he is pursuing here, which is a diplomatic solution. and which resolves this issue in a way that avoids the conflict that some people seem to be not even addressing, which would be almost inevitable as a consequence of not accepting this deal. ernie? >> in terms of the first question about the dynamics with the eu or the other partners in general, first of all on the nuclear dimensions side, i should emphasize i have talked about our team but every one of the six countries had technical experts involved. they had very robust discussions we did not share our own classified discussions, but made sure we were coming out in the same place. to be honest, in many areas we pushed the envelope. in some areas, they pushed the envelope. the good news is i think we all came out of this very satisfied with the technical dimensions

accomplished the job of blocking nuclear weapons' pathways. there are some specific examples one could give in terms of additional infrastructure removal from centrifuge places in terms of 20% uranium issues, but these were very robust. i think all six countries feel very, very confident in our conclusions. >> congressman, i think on the sanctions side, we have very different systems here in the united states and the eu. and the questions we're getting on irgc underscore we need to look at our system and their system and understand they're different. they're not enlisting the irgc for terrorist activities. if they do, at the end of phase two, the list for nuclear, the terrorist sanctions still stays in place. so i think people looking at the document ought to understand what is actually going to be in place after it's in effect. and i think the cooperation with the europeans requires we not

distort what they're doing. they're not taking the rgc off the terrorist list. >> >> thank you, gentlemen. i have received numerous questions from people in texas and i will submit those for the record. they're pretty simple questions, but i will submit those for you to answer. the secretary kerry, this question is for you. following up on chairman mccaul's comments about the secret deal, secretary rice said that she has seen this deal with the iaea and that it will be shared with congress. so if she's seen it have you seen it? >> i don't believe that susan rice, national security adviser, has seen it. i think -- >> she said she did six days ago. she said six days ago she had

seen it and reviewed it and that congress will get to see it in a classified section. my question is have you seen it? >> no, i haven't seen it. i have been briefed on it. >> but you haven't read it? you haven't seen it. let me ask you this -- >> it's in the possession of the iaea. >> are you going to read it? >> we don't have access to the actual agreement. >> secretary rice has access to it but you don't have access to it. >> i don't know about that. >> that's just what she said. i'm just going on what she said. is the policy of the united states still that iran will never have nuclear weapons? >> yes. >> is it the policy of the ayatollah, if you can answer for him, that iran wants to destroy the united states? that still their policy, as far as you know? >> i don't believe they have said that. i believe they said death to america in their chants, but i have not seen specifics. >> i kind of take that to mean that they want us dead.

that seems like it would be their policy. he said that. you don't think that's their policy. i'm not mincing words. do you think it's their policy to destroy us? >> i think they have a policy of opposition to us and a great emnity. i have no specific knowledge of the plan by iran to actually destroy us. i do know that the rhetoric is beyond objectionable. i know that we you know are deeply concerned with iran's behavior in the region. deeply concerned with their past activities. which is why president obama felt -- >> reclaiming my time. i got your answer. let me ask another question. i'm reclaiming my time, senator. thank you, secretary kerry. we heard a -- >> if they did want to destroy us, they have a much better shot of doing it if they had a nuclear weapon. >> you don't know if it's their policy. that's my question and that's your answer.

next question is it our policy or our belief that after the deal, whether the deal is approved or not, do we have a policy in the united states that we want expect, desire a regime change by the people of iran to have their own, say, free elections? weigh in on our policy toward a regime change in iran. >> well as you know congressman, president obama was very outspoken with respect to support for transformation in iran around the time of the elections. our policy today is specifically focused on pushing back on their activities when in the region that destabilized the reenggion threatened israel our friends and allies. that is specifically where we are gearing up to take a specific set of steps that will define a new security alliance with the region. >> okay so we want to push

back. we want them to stop their naughty ways. but regime change -- i mean, i personally think the best hope for the world for safety including in iran, is for the people of iran to have free elections and the people of iran really decide who their government should be in a free setting. let me ask you another question. secretary moniz. this might be my last question. if i understand the agreement the oil sanctions, which is prohinted iran from exporting oil, that's going to be lifted. is that correct? >> well sanctions are relieved. that would be among those relieved. under this deal, that's one of the ones that will be relieved? >> if the sanctions are relieved, yes. >> now being the secretary of energy, let me ask you this. why are -- why is the united states lifting the sanctions on

the exporting of oil on iran but we're not lifting its sanctions on america exporting crude oil like texas sweet crude? >> we don't have sanctions on our exports. we have a congressional law that in the 1970s restricted exports. >> do you support that law being changed? you know that's the question. do you support the law -- >> this time has expired. >> i'll put that in the record. >> we need to go to david sis illini. >> just a point of personal privilege. i wanted to make sure we knew what we were talking about on the record that properly reflects this. susan rice's quote is we know their contents and we're satisfied with them. we will share the contents of those briefings in full and classified sessions with congress. she has not seen them. she has been briefed on them. >> and that -- of course reclaiming my time. we are still looking forward to that briefing.

but now we must go to david of rhode island. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to the witnesses. not only for being here today but for the ongoing conversations, and i want to particularly thank the administration for really making sure that members have all the information that we need as we navigate through a very sober decisionmaking process with enormous consequences. i thank all three of the secretaries for their service. i have a series of questions that i'm not asking to support a conclusion that i have already made but actually to help me in arriving at the right conclusion. i would like to set forth the questions, recognize you can answer some, and the others, if you would submit in writing i would appreciate. the first is on parcheen the agreement says that the iaea will provide progress reports by october 15th and then the final assessment by december 15th. we know obviously this is a site where there was nuclear testing of some kind. my first question is is it at all concerning that this final conclusion or the set of final

conclusions might inform in a substantive way whether we should go forward and is there any concern there will be something revealed in this report that will impact whether or not iran is in compliance from the outset? that's the first question. because you'll be asked to vote on in the first round of sanctions relief will be provided before that december 15th date. second question is it's been argued that we're in the same position in 15 years with no options off the table except the economy of iran will be fortified, they'll be able to withstand sanctions in an enhanced way, and that the ability to reassemble this international coalition will be very difficult as the countries will be doing business and re-engageing with iran. do you agree with that assessment? or do you conclude that that's a sensible tradeoff that some have suggested? third, you concluded mr. secretary this agreement makes our world, our allies,

including israel, and the region safer. i have no doubt you have concluded that is correct based on your best assessment. if you would just provide for us kind of some thinking of why it is that the current israeli leadership does not see it that way. you know, as they obviously have sort of come to a different conclusion. why do you think that is? four, after 15 years, iran most have suggested, is a nuclear threshold state. but that they must negotiate comprehensive safeguards again with the iaea. and whether or not i know there's been some discussion, have you seen those, but do we have some ability to influence what that agreement is? do we have any ability to influence its content or monitor their compliance going forward? that's between iran and the iaea. fifth, is the likelihood of an international consensus remaining if a deal is rejected? what happens if the deal is rejected?

some have suggested actually some top level israeli officials suggested iran will comply with the terms of the agreement. we'll get relief from other partners, and the u.s. will be isolated. others have suggested iran will rush toward the development of a nuclear weapon with no constraints. is there any reason to believe iran would comply with the terms of the deal if it's rejected and not proceed quickly to a nuclear weapon? if the weapons -- six, if weapons are transfers to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does not approve the agreement?

do those remain enact? and the last question, secretary lew, they described the process in which noncompliance in the agreement might result in sanctions snapping back to the u.n., but this would only work in major violations. how would the administration treat minor violations? i invite, maybe to start with you, secretary lew. the ones you can't get to, i appreciate your answers and thank you for the work you have done. >> i'll start with the snapback question. we have reserved the right for snapback in whole or part. obviously, if there's a small technical violation, that will not bring back the whole sanctions regime. the goal would be to get them back in compliance. if there's a need to make it clear that violations that are small will get a response we have the option of putting some of the smaller sanctions back into place. if there's a major violation, we have the option of putting, of course, all of our unilateral

sanctions and ultimately going back to the u.n. for the international sanctions as well. we have all the authorities we need to do that. >> arizona. >> thank you. mr. secretary you said you said no country would accept anytime anywhere inspections, but i submit iran is not a normal country. iran is a terrorist state under a heavy international sanctions. it's neither got the moral nor the geopolitical equal of the united states. or our negotiating partners and i think we have to stop treating it like one. it aspires to be a regional power, the u.s. right now is the only world superpower. and my question is this really the best deal we could get given the fact that we seem to have most of the cards? and we have had most of the cards since these sanctions were imposed. secretary moniz, you said the deal includes anytime anywhere

in the sense of a well-defined process and a well-defined end date. but all that depends on iran acting in good faith. we shouldn't make the assumption because iran has been stonewalling the iaea on the military dimensions while claiming to cooperate for years. they're doing that as we speak. first, the process is not just 24 days. if iran balks, it's a minimum of 24 days. before the clock starts the iaea has to tell iran about the concerns about a particular site and they have to provide an explanation. but there's no time limit. does anyone believe that iran will respond immediately for the back and forth discussion for negotiations won't take place? only after these delays in the high barriers are taken care of at best, maybe can the iaea make a formal request and start the 24-day clock. but at the end of the 24 days, there's no punishment if iran says no. instead, the matter goes to the

dispute resolution mechanism which has lots of opportunities for delay and more barriers. does anybody believe that the p5 plus 1, not this administration and certainly not the europeans will derail the entire agreement by imposing sanctions and restarting iran's nuclear program just because iran is denying access to one sensitive site? more likely, there will be overwhelming pressure for a compromise. one that's no more substantive than what's in the final agreement. kicking the can down the road is always one option. it's worked in iran for years. i think all of this led cia former director michael hayden to warn in front of this commitsy that the deal is taking inspections from the technical level and put it at the political level. and i just think that's a formula for chaos, obfuskcationobfuscation, ambiguity, and doubt. i think on the 24 days we're kidding ourselves if we they think that the 24 days is the

total length of the deal. i think it could be much much longer. and i would like to know how ultimately we're going to deal once we do find infractions. my second question is of all the sanctions to be lifted in the iran nuclear agreement, few are more significant than those against a shadowy $100 billion organization belonging to the islamic supreme leader. the u.s. delisting the headquarters for the execution of the imam's order will pump 10s of billions of dollars into the supreme leteader's personal coffer bolstering iran's ability to promote its agenda abroad. it's estimated he'll gain access to as much as $95 billion. the u.s. treasury designated ico and 37 subsidiaries in june 2013 noting its purpose is to generate and control off the

books investments shielded from the view of the iranian people and their regulators. explain why ico will be designated? >> congressman, i'm going to turn to ernie for the first part of that because it's important to understand the 24 days. you are, i say respectfully, misreading the 24 days. by the way, that's an outside period of time. it could be less than that. it's very possible it could be 18 days or something. but ernie, why don't you discuss that? >> first you started out with the question of iran being unique in terms of verification. that's why we have the verification system in this agreement that is unparallels. this goes beyond what anyone else has accepted because of the distrust built up over iran. the iaea can cut that off any time by declaring their request for access, and then the 24-day clock runs. it is not the beginning of dispute resolution. it's the end of dispute

resolution. in fact, at that point, they're in material breach. you asked about would there be a response if it was, quote, only one site? well, i'm going to turn it over to my colleagues, but i want to emphasize in the snapback it says in whole or in part. so a graded response is possible. >> going to go to mr. alan grayson. >> mr. secretary i have five minutes. i have ten short questions. i'm hoping for ten short answers. will implementation of the agreement increase iran's support of terrorism? >> you want these? >> yes. >> we have no way to know. i presume in some places possibly. only in the sense that they are committed to certain things that we interpret as terrorism, they don't, and we're going to continue to conflict on those issues. >> all right. if the agreement is implemented, will iran in fact allow inspections at all its military sites? >> they have to.

if they don't, they're in material breach of the agreement and we'll snap back the sanctions. or take other action if necessary. >> if the agreement is implemented, do you think there's a significant risk that iran will cheat on the agreement and develop a nuclear weapon secretly? >> i don't think they're able to develop a nuclear weapon secretly because our intelligence community tells us with the regime we have established here, it is physically impossible for them to create an entirely covert secondary fuel cycle. and we have a sufficient intrusive inspection mechanism and capacity on their fuel cycle that they can't do it. you can't make a bomb at 3.67% enrichment for 15 years. you can't make a bomb with 300 kilograms of a stockpile for 15 years. you can't make a bomb if you can't go enrich and move forward without our knowing it. and we have submitted and we believe with clarity that we will know what they're doing before they can do that.

>> if an agreement is implemented, is there a significant risk that iran will adhere to it for a year, let's say, then pocket the $50 billion and then violate the agreement and build a bomb? >> again they can't do that. because the red flags that would go off, the bells and whistles that would start chiming as a result of any movement away from what they have to do. they have to live for 15 years under this extraordinary constraint of a limitation on the number of centrifuges that can spin. on a limitation, and there are indeed, on 24/7 inspections. on day-to-day accountability with live television with respect to their centrifuge production and so forth. so it is not possible for them during that period, in one year two years five years to sort of make this decision and stiff us. if they did, in some way if they just radically said, you know, we're going to change this whole deal and we're breaking out of here then we have snapback of all the sanctions with the full support of the

international community, which would then be absolutely in agreement that they have to do it, and we have the military option if that was necessary. >> but briefly on a follow-up, isn't it true in that scenario they would then have $50 billion in their pockets they wouldn't have? >> no, i doubt after one or two years they would. they have investments in their economy and they would be moving, but you have to look at this in the real world. here they are trying to attract investment. frantz, germany, china, all kinds of countries. is the your presumption that a country that has destroyed its stockpile, reduced its centrifuges by two thirds put concrete in its culand ria, totally stripped the ability to do fissile material, that that country and is now seeking investment and trying to build its economy, with a population of 50% of the country under the age of 30 who want jobs and a future, is it your presumption

that they're just going to throw this all to the wind and go create a nuclear weapon after saying we'll strip our program down and won't? i don't think it's going to happen. >> what about after 15 years? if the agreement is implemented, is iran in fact likely to build a nuclear weapon after 15 years at the end of the deal? >> all i can say to you is that they can't do it without our knowing what they're doing. because after 15 years, they have to live by the additional protocol. they have to live by the modified coat 3.1. they have to live with inspectors, 150 additional inspectors are going to be going into iran as a consequence of this agreement. and those inspectors are going to be given 24/7 access to declared facilities. so if iran suddenly starts to enrich more, which we will know all of the bells and whistles go off. the international community would be all over that with questions and restraints. >> my time is almost up. i want to ask you this.

>> may i just -- this is the agreement that codifies a permanent ban on nuclear weapons in iran and we have to take -- >> thank you mr. secretary. i want to ask this one additional question, and i had one more, but that's the way it go. tell me exactly what you expect will happen if the agreement is rejected? specifically, there's been some suggestion that iran will adhere to it anyway. sanctions will remain in place anyway if the agreement is rejected. >> i heard that for the first time last night when i met with an israeli friend who suggested that might be possible. it's physically impossible. >> explain why. >> i'll tell you why, because in the legislation that you have passed, which you have given yourself the ability to vote you have also put in an inability for the president to waive the sanctions. so there will be no waivering of the sanctions. there's no way for deal to work because our lifting of sanctions is critical to the ability of

other countries to invest in work and critical obviously for iran to get any money. so nothing works for them unless this deal is accepted. >> we have a lot of members who still want to ask questions. we need to go to tom marino. >> mr. secretary of state, we all know what iran has done as far as giving weapons to terrorists. to do iran's dirty work. what will stop iran from giving nuclear material or even more weapons to terrorist organizations? and how is nuclear -- how is a nuclear iran going to make the world and the united states a safer place. more particular how is a nuclear iran going to make american citizens feel safer? >> well the opposite of your question is to suggest that somehow you or we can prevent them from having any nuclear

program at all. now, you all have a responsibility to show us how that's going to happen. >> i'm going to show you how -- i'm going to show you right now how it's going to happen, mr. secretary. you answered my question. i'm going to show you how that's going to happen. i'm going to take secretary lew's words. the sanctions have crippled iran. if we ratchet them up, and get our allies to ratchet those sanctions up, you can bring iran to its knees where it cannot financially function. that's how to do it -- >> let me just tell you, i suggest -- i really suggest very respectfully that you spend some time with the intel community. ask the people who have spent a lifetime following iran very closely whether or not they agree with your judgment that an increase in sanctions will in fact bring iran to its knees. they do not -- they do not believe there is a capitulation theory here.

and you will not sanction iran out of its commitment to what it has a right to. iran is an npt country. there are 189 of them. >> and we have a right to protect the american citizens from this disaster, this country having nuclear power. sanctions have worked. are you going to retract any statements made by secretary lew and anyone else who has said it would cripple them, it would take them years to get servicing again. >> if you're going to quote me, let me speak for myself. >> i quoted exactly what you said. cripple iran and it will take them years to recover. so if we up the sanctions -- >> the other part of what i said is the reason it was crippling is because we had international cooperation. we have worked very hard to get that international cooperation. the parties that we worked with reached an agreement here. >> look who we work with. we work with china and we work with russia. the people who want iran to be in that position because it jeopardizes the united states. >> the power of our sanctions is

not going to have the affect -- >> i disagree with you. the economists disagree with you. individuals i have read article after article on disagree with you. >> congressman, as we have said again and again, and i want to repeat it now. we are absolutely committed that iran will never get the material for one bomb. not for one bomb. >> but you didn't answer my original question, mr. mr. secretary. my original question is, how is that going to make the united states citizens safer? >> let me tell you. i'll tell you exactly how it makes the united states citizens safer. because if iran fully implements the agreement we have come to iran will not be able to make a nuclear weapon. and we have created an agreement which has sufficient level of intrusive inspection and verification. that we are confident in our ability to be able to deliver on preventing them from having enough fissile material for the one bomb.

now, mind you we have started in a place where they already had enough fissile material for ten to 12 bombs. we have already rolled that back. and that made america safer. by the way, it also made israel and our friends and allies in the region safer. everything we have done thus far in the interim agreement, which has been enforced for two years has made the world safer. >> i'm going to reclaim my time. you're repeating -- i understand. i have 40 seconds left. >> if you repeal this deal, that's not making america safer. >> i hope you're right, because if not, you, the executive branch in congress, is going to have a disaster on our hands, and we need to be accountable for the united states. i want to ask an important question. secretary kerry this is an extremely important topic for the future of this country's security and the safety of the american people as well as our allies in the middle east. i would first like to ask you a simple yes or no question.

in accordance with the office of mampg management and budget as well as the national archives directive as well as state department policy, have you ever used a nongovernment and personal e-mail account to conduct official business? >> no. that's my business on a government account. >> we need to go to dr. ber era. >> i want to thank the wenlsz witnesses. i'm going to go through a series of questions as i try to make my decision with regards to this deal. secretary kerry, in multiple times you have said this, the negotiations had one objective. to make sure they cannot get a nuclear weapon. secretary moniz, you're the expert here. would you, in your opinion do you believe this deal makes it less likely within the next decade, next 15 years. over a lifetime, for iran to obtain nuclear weapons?

>> far less likely. >> okay, great. i don't trust iran. secretary kerry, you said multiple times there's nothing in this agreement that is based on trust. secretary lew, you have said there will be no immediate sanctions relief. is that an accurate statement? >> sanctions relief will only come after iran complies with all the measures to stop the nuclear program. >> in your estimation, is there enough in the verification regime, in this deal, that will allow us to -- >> i would defer to secretary moniz, but i have been persuaded by everything i have read and seen that it is the toughest verification regime we have ever had. >> is that correct? >> and secretary lew there is no signing bonus? >> there is no signing bonus. >> okay, great. you know moving on then, secretary of defense ash carter is not here. but i'll direct this to

secretary kerry. in your opinion would you say that secretary carter as well as our joint chiefs are satisfied with the icpm provision of no missiles for eight years as well as the arms embargo for five years? that they would be okay with that? >> yes. >> okay. >> moving on, secretary kerry, you pointed out in your time and history in the senate, you're a very strong defender of israel and had a strong record of support of israel. in your opinion do you >> i am absolutely convinced beyond of -- any doubt this deal makes israel favor. and the region. and the world. >> would you say president obama shows that opinion? >> yes. >> secretary moneys -- moniz

we've talked a lot about the framework. is it fair to say you believe that within that 24 hour framework we will be able to detect any nuclear activities? >> 24 days. >> 24 days. i apologize. >> i feel quite confident we can detect, yes. >> i wants to emphasize work with nuclear materials. other work not nuclear work, might be more difficult. >> secretary lew, if in fact there is no nuclear activity going on, and iran is complying with the terms of this deal, i do have serious reservations that they will continue to fund terror groups. fund organizations that destabilize the region. that is worrisome, obviously.

in your opinion do you believe that if we acted in a unilateral manner to impose new sanctions not based on breaking the nuclear deal, but based on other activities, would we be able to impose sanctions strong enough? >> congressman, we totally agree that their actions on regional destabilization are and continue to be an airy of concern -- and area of concern. we have reserved the right to put them on the list again if they are dilating bit -- violating the destabilization rules. i believe our credibility in doing it has to be for real. it has to be that we aren't listing people for reasons of terrorism. >> and you feel we have the tools? >> yes.

we definitely have powerful tools. >> i will yield back the remainder of my time. >> we go to jeff duncan of south carolina. >> there are still three or four americans in prison in iran. i put their pictures here to remind you of them today. what should have happened is they should have been released as a precondition, but for ever sitting down with iran for anything. with that i yield to mr. desantis from florida. >> thank you. secretary kerry, for these side agreements between the ieaaea and iran, can you confirm that the other one is about iran's nuclear program? >> i believe there is just one basic agreement which contains the approach to the dmv. -- dmd.

>> i advised there are two appendices. >> two appendices. is it your testimony that congress will not get to review this agreement before voting? >> congress will be briefed on the contents of those agreements before voting. >> but we will not be given the actual agreements to review. >> i don't believe so. >> the problem with that is that the nuclear -- iran nuclear agreement -- the executive branch has a binding legal obligation under the iran nuclear review act to provide all documents. >> actually we don't have a signed agreement. >> it doesn't matter. >> the iaea is an independent iran -- u.n. agency. >> the nuclear review act, with

all due respect, applies to any agreement iran may have with any other party. any related agreement, whether entered into or is limited in the future. that there is an agreement between iran and the iaea under a brand and the iran nuclear agreement act, that needs to be provided to congress. if you are not in compliance with that act, how is the clock even starting to run with the 60 day review. w period? >> congressman, i'm not sure legally that the congress of the united states has the power -- powerful as it is, to be able to dictate to the iea a change of procedures. >> that is not what we are doing. we passed a bill that would require us to see the conditions. >> we don't have the agreement. >> you're not going to request the agreement and bring it to us so that we can review it? these are the protocols works

out to satisfy the iaea agreement. >> we need to know -- we need to be able to evaluate the efficacy of the agreement. >> the iaea will be providing its report on december the 16th. >> after the window that congress has to review the agreement. we are not going to be privy to that information and we are asked to pass a vote on this. let me ask you this, secretary kerry, you had eluded to the possibility -- alluded to the possibility that if iran cheats we can snap them back. iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part it will use that as cause to step out of its commitments. if you have a situation where iran is doing incremental cheating and you have the sanctions reimposed, iran is

saying well, ok, it's going to want away from its commitments. to me, it is structured in a way to allow iran to get away with small violations, it is the cost of actually imposing the sanctions would be to blow up the deal that you guys have spent so much time negotiating. >> congressman with all respect, that is a misread of the paragraph. a misreading of what we have here. was requested by iran because they are afraid, has congress kept rattling its saber about more sanctions. they said, what guarantee do we have the congress will not pass more sanctions? or excuse meet not more. just take the sanctions they had and bring them back. the paragraph said that we are not going to just reimpose sanctions and put them back. it does not, as secretary lew has said prevent us from bringing any other sanctions for

appropriate rings. -- appropriate things. we are not facing mr. coney and a choice of bringing the whole thing and risking the whole deal. we could bring a small amount. also remember the reason iran is coming to the agreement is they want to the relief from the sanctions. if indeed they were in freight -- flagrant violation, all of our friends will be standing with us, all in agreement that we have to put the sanctions back. >> we must go to -- new york. >> thank you to all of you for being here, for your time and dedication, and for spending so much time with us to discuss so many of our concerns. i want to ask, during the negotiations did this law of the land that -- the iran nuclear

agreement review act signed by president obama and known to all parties of the negotiation, was a known to all the parties? >> obviously the other parties became very aware of the fact that congress was requiring a review. . period. >> i watch to bring up -- one example of the cold war. congress played a very important development in nuclear nonproliferation. this treaty was initially blocked by the senate because of concerns over soviet compliance. the treaty was not committed to the senate for approval for two years after signing, and was not ratified until after the u.s. and soviet union reached agreement, 14 years later, on additional provisions to enhance

america's ability to verify soviet compliance. this all leads me to believe that congress should be, and we are, and we have the ability and authority -- to compel a deal should it choose to disapprove of this one. what are the key differences between this and the cold war examples other than the fact that it was a treaty? >> one of the principal differences is that we have not had any engagement, or any dialogue, with iran since 1979. the lack of diplomatic relations , which is different from what we had with the soviet union makes this a very very confiscated situation -- . complicated situation. you have to analyze what is achievable here, in the context of the threat of the nuclear

program. i believe given the nature of the political system in iran challenges with respect to their own politics, the notion that we are going to be able to go back to the table is just a fantasy. there is no latitude here because iran came to this table with enormous suspicions about even in gauging with the united states. there was a huge debate in the country about whether or not they should. whether or not we could be trusted. whether or not any of this was worth the risk. many people in the country suggested that we would not act in good faith. if indeed, all of a sudden, we stand up indiana -- in vienna, seven nations strong, indoors and agreement, and we turn around and say we are not going to perform. i think the intelligence committee -- community will

confirm to you resoundingly, we will not end up back at the table certainly in the near future. and i would think, certainly, not with this iranian government or leadership. >> one final question. you also obviously asserted that if congress does not approve international -- the international sanctions regime will fall apart. i understand that russia and china's top priorities and interests may not be the views of congress here in the u.s., but if you can help me understand what is the basis for the view that these two countries would also just allow iran to fully violate the deal -- why wouldn't they hold iran to their nuclear commitments set forth in the agreement? if they allow them to do that, then why do we also believe that they will be there with us in any sort of snap back scenario? >> i think that iran, that

russia, that china are very very serious about the nonproliferation component of this. as serious as we are. russia has agreed to export the spent fuel and process it in russia in order to help make this work. china has accepted major responsibility to be the lead entity with our co-chairmanship on a committee that will work to redesign the iraq reactor in a way that is accessible to all of us. they have taken on major responsibilities. they both have a huge interest in the nonproliferation piece of this. they both believe that the other components of the resolution, with expect -- respect to arms and missiles, was thrown in as a punishment. the resolution of the u.n. was a

nuclear agreement, and did not regard i think they would have serious reservations -- they did express serious reservations. >> we go to darrell of california. >> thank you mr. chairman. i guess i will be careful when i say mr. secretary, that secretary lew, let's start with you. are the sanctions that are in place as of today effectively curtailing both the money flow and the economy of iran in a way that has brought them to the table? >> congressman, i think that the sections have been very effective in slowing the rate of growth in iran's economy. it makes unemployment high, the exchange rate on their currency very unfavorable. i don't think it is stop them from doing a lot of other bad things around the world. they have maintained even in a very difficult set of fiscal

challenges, activities which we have to stay focused on stopping. >> the question though, was did it bring them to the table or did they come out of goodwill? >> i believe that the sanctions brought them to the table, and the sanctions were designed to bring them to the table. >> secretary kerry, you would agree with that? >> i do agree. i think sanctions and other strategic designs -- but essentially the sanctions are what crystallized their timing. >> when i look at the sanctions that would be listed -- lifted under this agreement i looked at classified, but it was not declassified portion. a long list of ships, and aircraft's, and banks that will receive relief under this. i'm sure you are both familiar with those 20 or 30 pages. the question i really have your, because i think we all are focusing on the nuclear deal but i want to focus on iran.

a kidnapper, indirectly and directly of americans since 1979 . all of those sanctions that we are agreeing to lift -- is there anyone that does not think that those sanctions and more are appropriate as long as they continue to export terrorism kill americans and others, and destabilize not one not to, not three, but at least five countries throughout the middle east? i will start with secretary lew from a standpoint of those tools that we are lifting those 30 pages or whatever, i huge amount of things that will now be able to carry oil, move money and so on. those are, most of them, he equally effective in deterring or slowing their ability to export terrorism. aren't they? >> we are looking for a release of sanctions --

>> but those entities are banks. >> a bank that was desiccated -- designated as a nuclear violator stays on. if there are institutions that are listed -- delisted that are relisted subsequently, we have every right to do that. but i think that the delisting of nuclear parties is what you would expect if there is a nuclear agreement. the other sanctions in place. >>and i want to emphasize that we share with everybody the concern about iran's hader within the region, and we have the ability to bring sanctions with respect to that behavior. >> let me just give you a hypothetical. it is not a hypothetical without some thought.

what if, at the same time, as we don't reject this plan, we bring you a package of new sanctions. what if, in fact, congress determines that the only way we can accept this risk is if we can truly essentially snap back now? just days after you signed this they promised to destabilize bahrain, to continue what they are doing in yemen. obviously the support for hezbollah and hamas, their support for the assad regime, without real threat -- with that continued activity, is there any reason that we should not either reject this agreement and/or include further sanctions in order to prevent them from expanding their support for the

murder of americans and our allies throughout the world? >> congressman, we have powerful tools to snap back sanctions. >> not sanctions. i'm saying today. what would you say about the fact that we should be doing? >> the gentleman was suspended we need to go to lois frankel of florida because these junior members do not have sufficient time. >> thank you gentlemen. it just some quick follow up questions and then some new ones. if new enrichment sites are detected under that 24 day rule will those sites then, under a constant inspection? >> is a new site >>? >> yes. >> absolutely. >> how many countries other than the p5+1 are currently engaged

in sanctions? how long did you think it would take to have all of these sanctions in place to get iran to the table? >> congresswoman i would have to check the numbers. but our sanctions and international sanctions are being honored around the world. it is many countries. it has taken us years to put that regime in place. i have to underscore, one, our unilateral sanctions are powerful, but the ability for them to have an effect still requires cooperation. the international sanctions would not exist without cooperation. we have spent a lot of effort with countries for whom it is at substantial economic cost that they have cooperated to try to stop iran from getting a nuclear weapon. >> how would a snap back in fact all those countries? >> i think as a secretary said earlier, there is enormous unity in the goal of keeping iran from getting a nuclear weapon. if they violate the agreement

if in fact the snap back is warranted because of nuclear issues, i think both the international and the u.s. unilateral sanctions would snap back. we are going to continue to prosecute our sanctions on things like terrorism and regional destabilization, and human rights. but they are obviously different regimes. >> once congress -- if we don't disapprove this agreement, if it goes forward, will the u.s. congress have any role, any further role in this agreement? number two, can any president alter this agreement or refuse to abide by in the future? >> congress will always have a role obviously, you've made that crystal-clear in the context of what we're doing here now. so yes. there will be an ongoing role with respect to the enforcement

and implementation. >> will we have to vote on anything? to repeal sanctions? >> ultimately yes. ultimately there are the iran sanctions, ultimately you would have to vote. >> if we don't do that pursuant to the agreement, are there any penalties on our part? >> actually, i ran is free to break the agreement because we will have broken it, and all bets are off. >> can a future president refused to abide by the agreement? >> absolutely. a future president can, but it is our judgment that it and is working well, no future president is going to choose to do that because of the applications. if this is working it is achieving our goal of not having a nuclear weapon in iran. >> just to be clear, the actual repeal of sanctions will be way

down the road. it's nothing to happens in the next year or two. it is many years in the future. >> i want to get again to the troubling issue of the inspections. are you saying that there is no limit to inspections by the iaea , that it will go on forever? >> yes. what i'm saying is there is a process, congresswoman. >> co-pays for that? -- who pays for that? >> we represent a certain percentage of that budget about 25%. others contribute to it. we actually train all the inspectors. that is one thing that we do, and do very effectively. but it is an independent entity. >> is it a separate secret agreements that we don't see what is going to allow this continuation of inspections? >> no.

the continuation of inspections is under what is called the additional protocol. the additional protocol is exactly that. >> that's what we don't get to see? >> absolutely. you see that, you can read every component of it. i was sharing some thoughts with the committee earlier about the things that it empowers the iaea to do. the kind of accountability is very in-depth and significant. that is what i was trying to point out. this is not some light set of requirements. >> we will go to mr. moberg of alabama. >> secretary kerry my questions require brief answers and i hope you will cooperate. three months ago iranian brigadier stated that a racing israel off the map is not -- erasing israel off the map is nonnegotiable