this had the council to a meeting at camp david. that has been followed up with a hading that secretary kerry in which the dcc supported the plan of action, believing that it will bring more security to the region because iran will not be able to project power, have a nuclear weapon that acts as a deterrent. on themocused very much helping to improve capabilities, ,raining, intelligence sharing regional efforts, and working in

coalition. and we quite critical will be following up on a daily basis to make sure these strategies and efforts go forward. secretary carter was recently in israel. ady to discuss further enhancements to security assistance. >> we have a high degree of confidence that it is $50 billion. the reason the $100 billion figure has been out there is billion inare $100

foreign reserves that have been an excessive will. some of that has been due to the sanctions, some of it because it is obligated, and some of it has been spent. it on the books, but it is not there. the funds that have been spent and are not there can't be recovered, even when sanctions are lifted. what remains is about $50 billion to come back to iran. with that, one needs to keep the --spective that are regarding what they need. a final point that i want to add -- that $500 billion hole would be required to get

the oil sector up and producing so they could bring the wealth into the country that they aspire to? >> their oil minister has stated billion just$200 for the oil sector repairs alone. that is not to take their sector into the future. that is to take it back to the baseline. see a the economy, we seven year lag due to the sanctions. upon sanctions relief in the middle of next year, the major economic sanctions are brought that it will be seven years before iran comes back to where they ought to be today. invested theey money, it would take them that long? >> the oil repairs might happen in a shorter amount of time, 2-3

years. i need to get back to you on that. curve,look at their gdp and has a radical break due to the international sanctions, and it only gets back in seven years to where it ought to have been today. the whole that they are in cannot be overstated. back to themoming does not begin to meet the needs. that $50 billion is not spending money. is there freed up foreign reserves. no country is going to exhaust their foreign reserves down to zero, risking huge and stability to do so. they will useat it for their domestic economy and will need to leave some in reserve in the way any country would. >> last question. many of us have raised concerns about the prospects of the u.n. embargoes in iran being lifted.

of us would have preferred to retain these embargoes longer. russia and china felt differently. specificriefly what authorities remain in place to armst iran's conventional and missile efforts. be able to rely on other un security council revolutions -- resolutions that levy embargoes. all of those remain in place. to work withnue over 100 countries around the world that have signed the proliferation security initiative to limit imports or exports. initial technology control regime also remains in place and will play a critical role in net regard. -- the missile technology

control regime also remains in place and will play a critical role in that regard. we have ongoing sanctions in as adam has pointed out, executive orders which authorized u.s. sanctions on a foreign persons that contribute to the proliferation of missiles . we will make use of those executive orders. the iran, north korea, syria proliferation act connected to iranian ballistic and cruise missile activities and the sanctions of the 2006 provision of the fine assistant act, iran amended in the a ron proliferation arms act, all and impose sanctions on entities. the un security council resolution that was just recently passed has not let the program off the hook.

current prohibitions on the supply of ballistic missile and areitems in place still required to prevent transfers of missile related items. they are still required to irannt provision to technology, technical assistance, and other services. to preventred transfers of ballistic missile of items that happen to pass through their territory. i can go on. there are about 10 things that still requires states around the world to do. would we have liked them to go on forever? of course. we have kept them on far longer than iran, china, or russia wanted them to stay on. they are enforceable. we have other un security council resolutions and other

tools unilaterally to make sure where missiles are concerned that we can keep moving forward in every way we need to. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the witnesses for appearing today. i want to go back to the issue raised by senator corker. act ofn nuclear review 2015 is abundantly clear that congress is supposed to receive all the documentation, all of the agreement, annexes, related materials. ,he transmission of agreements the president shall transmit to the impersonal committees and leadership the agreement as defined in subsection h-one, including all materials. subsection h-one specifies that iis agreement includes -- and quote the last part of this -- any additional materials related

thereto, including annexes, implemented materials, guidance, or other understandings, and any related agreements. that thatat is clear is meant to be all encompassing. there is a secret side agreement , which strikes many of us as a very important information to have and evaluating whether or not future activities are in violation of this agreement or not. senator corker asks why you have not given us the documents. you said he could we don't have the documents. , the intent statute of the statute, and that the letter of this law, why did you not insist that this essential to enforcement document be disclosed? >> thank you very much for your question.

we don't have the document. has every single document that the united states government has. we did not insist is because we want to protect u.s. confidentiality. ons is a safeguard protocol of iaea protection confidential understandings and arrangements between the iaea. i know you will say this is a different situation. i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. in the development of where the iaea is going is that they came to us for technical expertise, as they came to every other member, and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will

share everything i know about this. also grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting . it is extreme he on usual, because every other country wonders why he is. >> you did not see the final document? >> i was shown documents, but whether there were other discussions -- you know, what is about the technical modalities that the iaea uses, and i will share with you this afternoon in a classified setting every single thing i know about that, and i think it will give you great confidence that the iaea is doing what it needs to. >> i look forward to that. me.s still disappointing to we are being asked to vote on an agreement in which the

enforcement of tens on a very important document that we are not allowed to see. it is not clear to me that you have read the final document, or anyone else in our government. you do not have it your possession. >> i have seen the document, as i said. as we were going to the technical discussions with the iaea, but what is important here is that ultimately what we are talking about is the credibility of the iaea, whether in fact we believe they are credible, independent, verifiable organization, which it is. they have done a support -- superb job on the joint plan of action. all of those reports have come up here. they have done a very fine job. i have trust and confidence in their ability to do a fine job on the joint conference plan. >> i'm glad you do. i think that is a document we ought to have.

paragraph 36 grants authority. either side can object to the other. if this objection is not result to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, then the complaining participant can submit walk away, either side. so i ran for any reason that iran deems sufficient can walk away from the agreement, after they have their $50 billion or $100 billion, or whatever the figure is. i am concerned that this dynamic -- this fact creates a very dangerous dynamic, one in which the administration will have a hard time enforcing anything other than a massive violation.

state scholzary of and kissinger wrote a widely read piece with a suggested that most likely if a violation occurs, it would not be a clear-cut event, but the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions. let's say we start to discover the gradual accumulation of ambiguous violations. if we were to take any measures at all, any enforcement mechanism of any kind, iran 36 andnvolve -- invoke say this is unacceptable. since this administration has told me that the alternative to this is war, and so we have to have this agreement, and we have to make all these concessions after concessions after concessions to get this believet, why should we that in the face of the accumulation of these small but accumulating evasions that the administration is going to risk

iran walking away from the table, because i suspect that that would be there threat. >> i appreciate that you believe irani ran will have -- will have gotten enormous sanctions relief and will be sitting in the driver seat, but you forget the other half of the equation. they will have to reduce their thirds,ges by two eliminate 98% of their stockpile , made the reactor and operable, allowed inspectors in their country to have 24/7 access to the facilities. >> 24 day access. , ther declared facilities iaea has 24/7 access every day of the week. >> the military sites. >> if the iaea believes there is justification for them going to

a site, the additional protocol allows them to give 24 hours notice to get into that site. says we think you should go to the site or we think you should have this document, under the additional protocol they are allowed to suggest alternatives. however, that debate about what the iaea can do can go on for quite some time. ,ith this agreement did different than any other arms control agreement ever negotiated, we put a clock on that debate. the iaea under the additional protocol wants to go to a site, it has to have access to that site. we said that you can debate with iran for two weeks, at the end of two weeks, the joint commission made up of all of us looks at that. onee believe that on day

that they ought to give access and we believe we were always have europe and the european union representative with his, iran has three days to provide access. it could be as short as 18 days. as has been testified again and again, nuclear material cannot be cleansed away. it will be found if it is there. quite frankly, senator, what we have negotiated in this agreement is unprecedented access when ever the iaea believes that it has a suspicious site that needs access to. permissible to address the snap aspect. >> at the discretion of the chairman. your next. you want to read? >> i will take my time and as

quickly. ofi wanted to speak to one the premises behind your questions on the snap back. the more likely scenario we see his small breach, testing, sticking a toe across a line. what we need to do is show them that those breaches have consequences, otherwise we are asking for larger breaches. we have to be very serious about that. we have been very clear with our partners about that. that i haveremise heard circulating that after the initial sanctions relief, iran can immunize itself to further pressure. therefore it will care about snap back. that is simple enough the case. iran's foreign reserves cannot be put in a vault in the form of gold or bills.

what iran needs with its foreign reserves is to have them in centers,ancial imports, boost currency, a whole host of things. will have toey keep them in foreign jurisdictions where they are subject to snap back. if anything, the more iran begins to benefit from the deal, the more vulnerable they are to this pressure. i agree with your question in that respect, that the consequences to iran will remain very serious, very severe, throughout this agreement. >> thank you very much. time, youallotted have testified that you don't expect iran to stop funding has lot -- -- has a terrorist groups, so what do you expect? >> i do expect them to continue

funding their violent proxies. of myne of the goals career. we have a lot of that our disposal. one of the most powerful is the one that congress has given us, which is when we sanction iranian terror supporters, our designation is amplified internationally. namei mean is that when we a financier, a money launder, any bank worldwide, that facilitates transactions for that designated entity, it faces very severe sanctions from the united states, sanctions that no bank once the face. what we have seen as a practical matter thanks to those congressional sanctions is that our sanctions against their proxies carries international weight, and those designated entities come -- become pariahs worldwide.

we have to do more. it is incumbent upon us to do more. to identify the money launderers, facilitators, and funders, and muster a coalition of countries to cut it off to shut it down. >> thank you. let me go to a very critical point here. regime is in place today. if we reject this deal, some have argued that it will make a difference, the sanctions will stay in place. you have been working on this for 10 years. how would our partners react if we said we walk away from the deal? >> from my perspective, and i would certainly defer to ambassador sherman on the domestic aspect, we have tremendous clout and influence as the world's most awful

economy -- most powerful economy. been a privilege of exercising that for the last 10 years and i have seen how effective it can be. as i mentioned in my opening statement, it is not all powerful. we do not get to dictate to dictate the major economies whether foreign policy will be. we need to harness shared concerns. when it comes to iran, we have a shared concern, for you and resolutions have called out their program as being a threat, so when we went to china, india, japan, india, we want you to work with us. you agree with us that iran's nuclear program is a threat. they said yes, we do agree. we said here is the way to address it. join us and let's test it. to use our sanctions

leverage to obtain the concessions we need from iran. they worked with us and it succeeded. in the event that we walk away, it is a very different and much bleaker scenario. international consensus is behind this deal, 90 countries have endorsed this deal. we would be alone and walking away from it. asking them to take costly economic sacrifices in the hope of a future better, tougher deal, i think we would have a weak prospects for that. >> thank you. i will stop. you, mr. chairman. good morning to the witnesses. thank you for being here. >> i am concerned about this deal, not supportive of it whatsoever. the more i read of the deal, the less i like it, and that does

not include the site agreements. said ador, you have couple of conflicting things this morning. i can see your notebooks. i can't read what is in it. , have you seenal it and read it? >> let me be very clear. seen the documents that the iaea and iran have discussed to create the final arrangements for the modalities that underpin the roadmap document, the public document that congress has a copy of, but i was not allowed to keep any of the documents arrangements on the modalities that underpin the public roadmap. however, i told the iaea that given our constitution that if

to brief oned me the details that i understood, i would do so in a classified session, and i will do so this afternoon in a classified session. i will give you all the details of which i am aware. >> have you read the final agreement? arrangements. of >> have you read it? >> i have. theou stated earlier that regime continues to fund terrorism and bad behavior. at the same time, we are that the more money the iranian regime has, the more they will fund terrorist activity. in spite of the fact that they have a crumbling economy, infrastructure needs, ability to sell more oil, yet they are

still fighting terrorism. it seems like to me that you would agree with susan rice when she says that we should expect so portion of the money from sexed relief -- from sanctions relief will go to the military and will be used to fund more bad behavior and terrorist behavior in the region and spite of the state of their economy. >> i do agree with the premise of your question. i do agree with the statement --t you quote from former susan rice. groupsthem fund these during the iran-iraq war. i expect we will continue to see that. the question is, what do we do about it? responsibilityd is to ramp up our effort and go

after this funding streams. the alternative that is put out there does not make sense to me strategically, which is we don't inter-into a nuclear agreement, , thenhem back their money what? we will continue to combat their support for terrorism, but we will have the prospect of iran to to three months away from breakout. when you talk about a state sponsor of terrorism, that is a terrifying prospect. >> strategically speaking according to the agreement, five years from the start of the agreement, more access to weapons, eight years, ballistic missiles, and they will be able to move ford with advanced research on nuclear technology, and then we know for certain at

the end of the 10th year that we are looking out a breakout phase. the reality of the agreement is that we will be able to mark on a calendar when the iranians will have an opportunity for nuclear weapons? >> know, as ambassador sherman has said, at no future date does iran have the ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. in fact, the agreement locks in the contrary. it has varying durations with respect to enrichment limits, 10-15cted in the first years and then reduce, but at no point do they have the right to pursue or obtain a nuclear weapon. we will have to respectfully disagree. i have one final question. 25 seems to suggest that there would be an effort to

preempt state laws and other states to pass laws that prohibit companies from investing in iran. how is this not a violation of state's writes and have you read that paragraph? >> there is nothing to my knowledge about preemption in the joint plan of action. all it says is that we will make sure that state authorities who have enacted legislation with respect to iran are informed of the developments, which i think are pretty key to be aware of, when it comes to the iraq nuclear deal, and that will encourage them to take this into account as they consider it. how would you enforce them? in some cases those laws were predicated on the nuclear case. any authority looking at divestment laws based on their nuclear program, you would have to take into account the historic developments that we

are talking about today. >> thank you. >> senator schumer. >> i want to thank you. under secretary sherman, i've appreciated your thoughtfulness, intelligence, your candor, your availability in our past meetings. i thank you for your multiple years -- laudable years of service. for yourin, thank you service as well. i hope to have you for the daunting challenges we face not only with iran, but around the world. i read and reread the agreement. i've had many meetings with both people on sides of the issue. more meetings to come this week. i'm carefully analyzing the proposed deal, because it implications are profound and far-reaching.

i've had many questions answered. i'm not get reached a conclusion. this is one of the most important votes i've had to take takey of us will have to in our legislative career. i owe it to my constituents to make an informed decision. i will let party pressure politics in form what i think is right. i want to judge the deal on its merits and demerits alone. in that spirit, i want to ask you a question today. one of the questions i had is this, to both of you. where will iran be tenures from now? -- 10 years from now? i am interested in where i run will be. -- where iran will be. some will say, look at the people of iran, they tend to be secular. they will push iran in a direction that is more moderate, more welcoming to the world, etc. some say, we've had that

population for a long time and this dictatorship, a very totalitarian, evil dictatorship shuddered has barely even with one transition of power. so let me ask you how you see these two elements competing. i want your judgment, because this is only a judgment question, but i think in very important one as to where iran will be 10 years from now. i would ask you each to answer that question. undersec. sherman: thank you senator schumer. i think all numbers for the enormous diligence of looking at this deal and trying to ask and answer incredibly ethical questions. the u.s. senate has been united behind democratic and republican presidents for war, and i

appreciate that we can perhaps come united together behind peace. where iran will be in the future, i don't know, senator. i really don't. i don't think anyone does. our intelligence community probably has given you an assessment of what they believe, but quite frankly, it is a very common gated situation. the people who turn out on the streets tended to be the young people who are desperate, not only for a better life and a job, but they want to end their isolation. we live in a technologically connected world. no matter what the iranian regime does, indeed, they get on the internet. they read twitter. they use all of the devices all of our kids use. and they know what is going on in the world and they want to be part of it. i think the u.s. senate for their support of programs which have helped break through the internet so that they can get on.

at the same time we have a regime led by clerics who have been around for a very long time, had a very conservative views, more than conservative -- radical. or part of the revolution of 1979, and have not let go of that history of the depth of mistrust between us which is profound. i don't think there will be some magic transformation as a result of this deal.for me, this deal is about one thing and one thing only, making sure that this regime, which does do a lot of terrible things in the region and to its own people, will not have a nuclear weapon that could further terrorize the world and terabytes of the region. i am hopeful because i am a hopeful person that a transformation will take place in 10 years, but it may not. so we have to use every tool we have on all of the activities of concern that we have and work with israel, work with the region to stop those activities to make sure that those young

people have a future atoll. -- future at all. do you have anything to add, mr. szubin? sec. szubin: i don't. >> she is a very hard act to follow. i would like to talk about the grant monitoring of contracts. i want to give you a hypothetical. company,, a major oil government owned, signed a 10 year contract with iran immediately after sanctions are lifted because iran has complied with the long list of agreements. it then snapback, we find major violation. we go forward on that. it is now youear 4 of that contract. i understand that grandfathering will not affect 1, 2, and 3.

what they made in the first three years, they keep. if the contract terminated in year 4 for the next six years, or does the contract continue? this is a important question as senator corker said, not the most important question, but we need an answer. there was a new york times article about a different views. when it new york spokesman refused to give an answer. that is why i am glad you are here to clarify. 7,t happens in year 4, 5, 6, is that contract terminated? sec. szubin: i want to make sure i am exactly answering the question. sanctions don't terminate a contract. they don't have the authority to know a contract between parties. what u.s. sanctions a do in that circumstance you are describing is they say any furniture transactions, whether it is

future investment by wheel committees, future derivation of isfits, future expansion sanctionable. that is what the sanctions and do right now. >> you will have to explain what that means to me in layman's terms. tond i'm dueear send iran $1 billion for oil which i want. can i still send that oil? that's allowed? what does it mean it's sanctionable? is it in your view that the sections are severe enough that total will terminate the contract and risk being sued by iran? what does sanctionable mean in that situation. sec. szubin: it's exactly what the circumstances are right now and what the circumstances have been.

there were a lot of pre-existing contracts that were 10 year, 20 year contracts when we put them into place. what companies saw is that they faced the threat of these powerful u.s. sanctions-- >> so another words, total will not be able to do business in the u.s. if they continued in year 4, for instance. answer me that question. would they be able to do business in the u.s. in year 4 if they continued the contract? sec. szubin: total could face a menu of choices. a menu of penalties under the iranian sanctions act, which could include being cut off from the u.s. market. >> what could include mean? i just want to know this. sec. szubin: the iran sanctions act has a menu-- >> and who has the ability to determine what on the menu is chosen? is that the u.s. government unilaterally? undersec. sherman: if i may, i was in the private sector for a decade. at the time when these sanctions

came into place and total had to make a decision at that point whether to leave, the risks were too high for them. client at theer time. they had to leave. they had to unwind those investments. the risks were too high. >> what were those risks? sec. szubin: they didn't have access-- undersec. sherman: they did not have corresponding banking relationships. szubin, you said could, you didn't say will. who determines that? sec. szubin: in respect to your hypothetical, it is done at the state department. the penalties are imposed on the banks unilaterally by the u.s. government. the only reason i was putting in the copy edit at the top about the contract is that if a

contract is signed between a european company and a broad, the contract isn't invalidated by our sanctions. so that company would have to make a decision, doesn't risk the -- does it risk the suit for violating the iranian contract, given the heaviness of our sanctions? i appreciate the answer and i think you answered it. next question. i think undersecretary german, ambassador sherman, what is your title? whatever your name is. a british ambassador said it agreed with the that after vacation.

-- that interpretation. do we have that in writing somewhere that can, france, germany, and the eu agree with that interpretation? undersec. sherman: we do not have a letter to that. i will talk with them about it that possibility. i want to tell this committee, though, i've had extensive discussions during the 27 days i was in vienna with everyone of our partners. quite extensive. they'll have these concerns and we were extremely explicit. the explicitness is the following, which adam said and i will repeat. we said there is no validity towards snapback provisions if there is any form of grandfathering. then it renders snapback meaningless. and we will not agree to a deal, the u.s. will not agree to a deal where there is not a real snapback provision. that is what we insisted upon and that is what we got. >> there are other aspects to it that i understand. theresia and china, is

any indication they agree with this interpretation of it grandfathering? undersec. sherman: yes we had explicit discussions with them. there is light which in the documents that talks about prior contracts. if you read about language carefully, you will see there is no grandfathering whatsoever. >> okay. i suppose if it is a major contract to them, they could add that snapback not be put into effect, or pull out of the deal. that is speculation. undersec. sherman: snapback's cannot be brought by anyone country. -- by any one country. a contracty there is that is important to brush up. -- important to russia. thank you mr. chairman. >> i would like to address my first questions to you, mr.

szubin with regard to sanctions. has beenoint the jcpoa approved and submitted to the security council of the united nations, correct? what effect does that approval have on the sanctions regimes, both u.s. and u.n.? sec. szubin: it has no impact on the sanctions of the u.s. whatsoever. with respect to the u.n. sanctions regime, as i understand it, the endorsement by the un security council sets out a timetable in line with what ambassador sherman was describing, where iranian performance, when a verified, will lead to a listing of sanctions. that would lead to all of sections on iran? when enron has taken its initial steps in all of those key steps -- when iran

has taken those initial steps. the sanctions on their arms trade and acquisitions of ballistic missile knology remain in place for many years to come under the u.n.. >> in your opening statement, you made a point that it would be very hard for the u.s. to back out of the agreement that it has reached and then reimpose sanctions regime, correct? sec. szubin: when i was referring to is that if congress were to strike down the deal, would we of the u.s. be able to unilaterally course international pressure to secure a much better agreement? i wasn't talking about snapback. the key distinction between the two is that i run is in breach of the section. iran is defying the international community. i think we have good leverage in that case. >> that's the question we wanted to ask. if it's not possible for us to go back and re-implement and affection -- an effective

sanctions regime now, what about snapback? i understand that is based on an iranian violation of the agreement. but what about that makes you think, now that the sanctions have been essentially put into the process of being removed, what makes you think that the snapback will work? that's a question i spent the better part of two years working on. i appreciated very much. one of the things you hear about us talking about listing is for that exact reason, to make sure these authorities remain in place. that the structures of the un's sections resolution is still on the books. u.s. sanctions are still on the books so that they are hovering in suspense. we make very clear, not just symbolically, but legally that we are quickly in a position to restore that pressure. >> so you believe that the fact that we have five other nations agreeing that the violation of

the agreement would require a snapback of sanctions means that they would immediately join us if we said there was a violation of the agreement? sec. szubin: obviously if are talking about a scenario of the violation in the future, the key question would be, what is the violation? how material is it? but in the event that the u.s. views it as a significant breach, we retain the authority to do so unilaterally, including at the un, even if members of the security council are not with us. >> you believe in that case, we could effectively cause the other nations to read implement sanctions? sec. szubin: in the event of a serious breach, i do. what you're talking about then is the scenario we faced in 2012, where iran seems to be on the path towards a nuclear weapons capability. we won international agreement to impose tough sanctions to cut off contracts, to pull out of investments, all of those costly steps were taken because the

world frankly does not want iran to have that ability. lyat is not a u.s.-on priority. >> you're talking about a serious violation that would cause other nations of the world to believe that iran was building a nuclear weapon? sec. szubin: yes sir. >> it would have to get to that level of proof of a violation before we could see a effective rehabilitation of the sanctions? sec. szubin: no, we wants to respond in a proportional way. it is not in our strategic interest to respond to a small breach with scrapping the agreement and trying to put all of the sanctions back into place. i don't think that would have this affect that we had over the last few years. i don't think it would be in our interest to see this agreement scrapped. if we see a small breach, it's in our interest to see iran come back into full compliance in a way that we can verify. >> thank you mr. chairman. i see my time is up.

>> let me thank you both for your service. regardless of my questions, i thank you both for your service. this agreement, is as it a simple yes or no? if you can't give me a simple yes or no that if it is this agreement or war. if you had not struck agreement with a run, we would be at work -- with iran, we would be at war with iran? undersec. sherman: i believe the chances that we would be at war would go up exponentially. compared toaying other witnesses who observed indian ministration in the past, who support the agreement and have been asked the same question, they have unequivocally, easley said no, it's not this or war. undersec. sherman:, i just said to you it is not binary,

senator. >> two years now, three years from now? undersec. sherman: i don't think any of us can predict the future in that way. >> the secretary of state has come before various members of the senate and said it's either this or war. that is a binary statement. undersec. sherman: and the reason, senator, is because sanctions have never gotten rid of their nuclear program. it's only brought them to the table. it hais an created war -- sn't created war, either. undersec. sherman: if we abandon the steel, they will continue this program further. >> i think there is real doubt, including if you got an intelligence briefing. i think there is real doubt that iran believes a credible military forces on the table. on page 26 of the agreement, it says the u.s. will make its best

efforts in good faith to sustain the agreement and to prevent interference with the realization of the full benefit by iran on the sanctions lifting specified in annex 2, which is basically the u.s. section. acting. administration, consistent with the respective roles of the president and the congress, will refrain from or re-imposing the sanctions specified in annex 2 under the joint apprehensive plan of action. i tried to get this from the treasury secretary, and he didn't give me an answer. do the iran sentience act that i was one of the authors of expires next year, do we have the right to reauthorize those sanctions now or at any given time? yes or no? undersec. sherman: i believe that it doesn't expire until the end of next year and it's

premature to have that discussion. >> so here we go again. we either have the right or we do not have the right. having a question of maturely discussing something doesn't answer the question. do you understand that we have the right or don't have the right? undersec. sherman: we said in this document that it recognizes the constitution of the u.s. the u.s. congress has the right to do whatever it wants to do in its authority. so it not case you do have the right. what we are saying, we urge that it is premature to make that decision. >> given a snapback, you have to snapback to something. the iran pensions act, which this administration on various occasions has credited as one of the significant elements of getting iran to the negotiating table. if they don't exist after next year, there is nothing to snap back to in that context. undersec. sherman: we believe there is a way forward in that regard. >> let me just read to you what

your partner in this deal said in a letter to the security council, dated july 20, 2015. the iranians said it was clearly spelled out in the joint comprehensive plan of action that both the eu and the u.s. will refrain from reintroducing or reimposing the sanctions and restrictive measures listed under the joint company has a plan of action. it is understood that reintroduction or reimposition, including through extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance, which would believe iran from its commitments in part or in whole. your partner in this regard believes that if we were, if congress were to go ahead and reauthorize -- which i think most members believe is still going to exist. numbers believes

that the iran sanctions act is going to exist. something will be reverted back to if the iranians violate? that is a form of deterrence. either sanctions work or they don't. either they are a deterrent, where they are not. and if they are not, then the agreement is really based on the hope over the course of 10 years, or 13 of the president said in his npr interview, that there will be performance by the iranians, that they won't violate, and then with no section in place, -- sanctions in place, the only choice you have is a very limited window in which you will have to act possibly militarily. mr. szubin, let me ask you this. is it true that when we have imposed sentience, we have given companies and individuals sufficient notice for them to

divest themselves of the sanctionable activity? wouldzubin: no, what i say senator is that when we impose major sections that affect sexual behavior or major investments -- sectoral behavior or major investments, there is a wind down. cases, 6 months or lo nger. >> if it is six months, and you have a one-year break out time. david albright, in testimony before the senate foreign relations committee, said that they believe their calculation of the potential breakout time under one scenario, 677 months/ -- 6-7 months. the time for potential reenactment of sentience -- reenactment of sanctions. it is either one or the other.

we have thehow wherewithal under this agreement. your partner says there is no way that they will respect that. zero.l be back to point are reluctant to acknowledge that there should be a reauthorization of the iran sanctions act because then they may very well walk away. if they are going to walk away simply by the existence of sanctions that don't go into effect unless there is a violation in the future, you have to worry that what they are doing is buying for time. the last point i want to make. sometimes what is past is prologue. i want to read some excerpts from a hearing when i was pursuing the iran sanctions act when did the then-chairman, now the secretary of state was

arguing against the sanctions. i guess to not respect things have not changed. motivating these countries to join us and increasing pressure on iran, they are more likely to present our actions and resist following our lead. a consequent that would serve the iranians more than it hamrrs them. he could have the opposite effect and increase the iranian regime's revenue. sherman, you were recorded as also buying into that point of view. if you look at the transcript of the hearing, basically what it talks about is everything that we have heard here. that we will break the coalition. that we will be isolated. that we will be alone, and therefore, we will not have the consequences against iran.

when you cry wolf too many times, it really is problematic. based upon the history which says no, those sanctions should not be imposed because if they do we will lose the coalition, now listening to this agreement. unwilling to say that the iran sanctions act should be reauthorized, which i think every member believes will exist as a deterrent. that is hard to understand. the final point i would make, mr. chairman, this iranian regime cares about two things. preserving the regime of the revolution. they are not going to enter into any agreement that does not resume -- preserve the regime. they would think this is a good agreement for them to accomplish that goal. that is worrisome. i understand the hope that the agreement implies in that they will perform. but when they don't perform, i

don't think we are going to be in a better position at that time. that's my concern. sherman, i'mer wondering if you can help me what you think congress is actually voting on. whether or not congress would kill the deal, does that matter in any way to the iranians, or are they guaranteed all the benefits of what is then initiated today? undersec. sherman: of course they are not. the u.s. congress has the authority and the right under to in factution review and vote a resolution of disapproval. the president of the u.s. then has the right and the authority to exercise his veto, if you wants, and i would expect that he would. then the u.s. congress has the right to override that veto. that's how our system works. i would hope the u.s. congress

cannot override that veto, because i believe that this plan is the most profound, the most far-reaching arms agreement ever negotiated and that will keep his country, israel, and our allies safer. >> if the congress did override that veto, why would it matter to the iranians? what would they lose? undersec. sherman: they would lose an opportunity to have sanctions relief. they would have the opportunity to lose their isolation from the rest of the world. they would lose their opportunity to come into the community of nations. they may not care about that. and what i would expect is that the u.s. congress overwrites a presidential veto, which i would not expect that to happen, because i believe this congress has united behind democratic and republican residents for war, and i believe they would unite behind them for peace. that is what this deal is about, not having to go to war, but

ensuring that iran does not get a nuclear weapon. >> i agree this should not be a partisan issue. administration are going that we already lost the international community? so that if we do not go forward with the deal, the iranians will get this relief anyway? if no, isn't that an answer to senator menendez's question? what secretary kerry was saying 3-4 weeks before, it isn't a choice between this deal and war, but there are other scenarios where sentience could have an effect? undersec. sherman: yes, i understand that. it is what kind of effect, and whether that will stop their nuclear program. is it true that our unilateral sentience could be put back in place and continue on? is it possible that the rest of the world, maybe not europe, europe may follow through because they are allies, but other parts of the world that have taken huge economic costs

by stopping their importation of iranian oil or taken huge costs by ending trade with iran would not pay attention to our sanctions? yes, that is indeed the case. our sentience regime would not be as effective as it would be. the international community has come together behind the steel. -- this deal. the u.s. will be in a weaker position, not only on this, senator, but on many other things we are trying to do internationally. clear, it is your position that if the congress would kill this deal, the u.s. sanctions regime could still have some significant effect? undersec. sherman: it would have some effect, i would suspect so. but not to the effect that it does today. everyone has to remember that iran will then move forward with its program. -- asanctions, at stated

devastating as they have been, and i would say to senator menendez, that indeed this administration has enforced both unilateral and multilateral sanctions than every previous administration. each of which has tried to do a very good and credible job. the we have intensified that. that is what president obama set out to do, intensify sentient rusher. -- intensified that sanctions pressure, so that iran would come to the table. >> thank you. i do appreciate your advocacy for the agreement. i think this was a yes or no question that you just gave. you don't believe that it is war or this deal. you just outlined a third scenario. you wouldn't answer yes or no for him. undersec. sherman: even though our sections would have some bite, iran would move

forward with its nuclear program. because why wouldn't they? they wouldn't get all the relief they wanted. they would keep marching forward with their program. it would force us into a choice. where we allow them to have a nuclear weapon? president obama is resolute he will not allow that to happen. that leads us down a road heading to war. i'd likeary szubin, to ask you a question. i know that we have mutual affection for one of your predecessors. he said that the irgc receives no sentience -- receives no sanctions under this deal.

most of those and -- most of those entities receive sentience relief under this deal. this point, in respectfully beg to differ. the business and for -- empire irgc will remain under sanctions. to congress, that will have international effect. construction engineering firm in iran we have designated for being controlled by the irgc. it is not coming off. 15 at five years, 8 years, years under this deal. they will be cut off from the

u.s. financial system. those all remain in place. who have companies done what i would call arms transactions with the irgc which we have designated conducting business with the irgc. they are due to receive relief under various phases. but the business empire as you described it remains intact. undersec. sherman: and the irgc does not support this deal. that should tell you something. >> my understanding is that the benefitsrols smuggling very handsomely. that is one of the reasons they are opposed to that. is that a correct impression? engagedbin: the irgc is in a lot of nefarious activity within iran's activity. -- within iran's economy. we have heard and credible

allegations of profiteering and black markets, including goods going to the help of the iranian people. >> i submitted a series of questions to this administration. iran has committed indefinitely to not engage in specific activities that could intervene to the design and develop a nuclear weapon. in this context, does "i ndefinitely" meaning that the time period has not been established, or does it mean indefinitely? undersec. sherman: it means i run is prohibited -- iran is prohibited from acquiring or obtaining a nuclear weapon, ever. >> soybeans perpetually. -- so it means perpetually. undersec. sherman: yes. >> does iran have the right to

enrich weapons grade uranium after the enrichment cap? undersec. sherman: no, because if they indeed move to enriching, what we would consider weapons grade, it would raise a red flag to the iaea. there are very few circumstances aboveiran needs to enrich 5% for peaceful purposes. one could argue for submarine fuel perhaps. but if they went to weapons grade, it would raise red flags immediately and we would see it as a major noncompliance. >> so enrichment over 5% starts to essentially raise this red flag with the exception of submarine fuel? undersec. sherman: there may be one or other two things. there may be other instances, but they are very few. bewhat would submarine fuel

near? undersec. sherman: it could be 20%. >> that is a big distention between 5% and 20%. that ifbasically saying the amount of fuel enriched didn't specifically meet the quantity profile of the nuclear submarines, that that would be a red flag? so most purposes it is 5%. undersec. sherman: yes, 5% or less. the one other distinction i should make is for the tehran research reactor, which helps to make medical isotopes for cancer treatment in iran. it uses 20%, but this agreement says that we will provide fabricated fuel for that tehran research reactor overtime. we put controls on that so that it cannot be used for other purposes.

how much enriched uranium above 5% could iran store without creating a red flag? undersec. sherman: two point acting under secretary sbuzin, hopefully reminds me. for 15 years, iran is not allowed to enrich beyond 3.67%. the concern you raised only begins to raise those red flags after those 15 years. they are allowed for those 15 years to only have a stockpile of hundred kilograms. that 300 kilograms is not enough to provide enough physical material or a nuclear weapon. >> after those 15 years, they can have more than 300 kilograms? there is no limit? undersec. sherman: there is no limit, but again, we would look at it ever increasing stockpile. we have centrifuged reduction

for 20 years. they have to make a declaration to the iaea of their additional per call and -- additional protocol. there will be many metrics for measuring what they are doing with their program for a very long time. >> my last question is, when you look at snapback, it is kind of a sledgehammer approach. given the scale of the violations, is there a scalable response? sec. szubin: yes, senator. we reserve the right to snapback in full or in part. that is a quote from the agreement. we can do that with you when sections or unilateral sections. the eu has reserved a similar right. whether it is on a category transactions all the way to full snapback's. >> thank you. >> senator cowatton. >> i too noted with some astonishment there was an eight

minute exchange between the meeting of the grandfather clause. i think we got some kind of answer out of it. administration officials have said repeatedly that iran will exploit every ambiguity in the text of this agreement to their advantage. i can only imagine what they will say about that clause should it come to pass. moving on, secretary sherman. there's a lot of commentary about access. access to iran's nuclear sites, their military sites. and moniz talked about access. can you assure us that this access will be physical access, iaea inspectors will be physically walking into these sites and taking samples for installing equipment? i think everyman: situation is different. the iaea has the capability, the expert knowledge to make sure that whatever they do can be

technically authenticated. i can't through every hypothetical situation. i know the director general working ask these questions i your colleagues in this informal meeting. i would rely on his answers more than my answers. what i am assured of is that whatever they do in every circumstance where they believe the need to have access, it will be technically authenticated and will meet the standards that they must have and they require for ensuring verification. sen. cotton: it sounds like the answer is no we cannot verify that iaea inspectors will be physically present on every site. undersec. sherman: you don't have to be present on every site in his technological world to get done what is necessary. cotton: who will decide what is and what is not a military site? undersec. sherman: the better

way to respond to your question, if the iaea has justification to have access to a site, we have a process to make sure they get access, whether that is military or nonmilitary. if they have justification to enter any site, regardless of what it is, and the axis agreement, they will get access. the u.s. would not have agreed to an agreement where access was not assured if the iaea believed it had to happen. sen. cotton: are you aware of any actions iran has taken it to sanitize any sites? undersec. sherman: there is an all senate briefing this afternoon. that is classified information. we will be prepared to answer these questions. sen. cotton: was moved to the side deals for iaea and iran.

you acknowledged to senator scott that you read the side agreement between the iaea and iran. did anyone else read these side agreements? undersec. sherman: some of her experts at it as well. as it all of the p5+1. sen. cotton: can you give me an estimate? undersec. sherman: a handful. sen. cotton: you said earlier to senator corker that we have to technologies agreement between iaea and iran. undersec. sherman: it is the iaea in every country with safeguards protocol. sen. cotton: the fact that you read them, doesn't that undermined the supposed evidence reality? -- supposed confidentiality? undersec. sherman: we were shown it in a private setting. i will share my confidential understanding and keep it in a classified setting.

sen. cotton: how long are these doctorates? --these documents? undersec. sherman: very short. sen. cotton: why are these documents classified? it's not a u.s. covert document. it's not sensitive to the methods of our intelligence community. you know what's in it. why are these classified? undersec. sherman: the reason is that they are called safeguard confidential. under the company has of safeguards agreement, to which we are also a party, we have confidential documents and protocol with the iaea, as do all of the countries that are under the csa. the iaea has committed to keeping them confidential. and so therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under csa confidential

as well. i'm aware that is the statement you also gave to senator corker. i assume you're not implying any kind of moral equivalence. undersec. sherman: i indeed senator, that it understood that this was a very different circumstance in the sense that we are trying to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and that this was a international understanding negotiated amongst 6 parties and iran. so yes, i understand this is a different circumstance. which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangements, understanding they would be classified. and i made clear to the iaea under our system, i would be required to share, in a classified cover initial setting, with members of the u.s. congress what i had seen. and i will do so this afternoon. sen. cotton: did you make

clear to iran that these laws required commerce to receive it -- required congress to receive all of the texts? undersec. sherman: our understanding of the legislation passed by the house and senate is that we must give you every document that we have. and we have given you every document that thwe have. sen. cotton: it says it doesn't matter whether the u.s. government has it in its possession. undersec. sherman: it's very difficult to give you something that we don't have. iran and the iaea are well aware of our legislation. i can assure you they follow what you do every cycle day. cotton: fascinating new interview from secretary kerry today. secretary kerry says that if

congress rejects video, it would show iran "america is not going to negotiate in good faith. that would be the ayatollah's point." thatade it clear to iran covers would have to confirm on this deal before he could move forward. undersec. sherman: of course they knew that congress was going to vote on this. everything was very public. everything that happens here in our country is transparent, democratic, and public. cotton: are you concerned about congress screwing the ayatollah? undersec. sherman: i will not comment on that. i can say that secretary kerry, secretary moniz, myself, the negotiating team that has been working diligently on this for over two years, having briefed the u.s. senate and congress countless times, hundreds of times quite frankly, did everything they could to ensure the safety and security of the u.s.. that is our solemn obligation.

that is what we did. sen. cotton: thank you. >> one, i appreciate what you have been doing. many of us have concerns about components of the deal. i find it remarkable that some webers seem to impugn that are doing the best deal for the u.s. and prospects into the region. i may agree or not a great with -- or not agree with what you have negotiated, but i would never a question the approach or dedication that you have taken in this process. szubin, your actions

towards the ministration brings a lot of history and commitment. i absolutely believe that you want to make sure that we follow-up, particularly on iranian actions in the region. there are some who put forward a theory that if the u.s. congress turns this agreement down, that still have an interest to go through with implication -- with implementation. they would do this so that they could still obtained the 50 isolateplus dollars and themselves from the rest of the world. that has been speculated on a lot.

could you comment on that? sec. szubin: it's always dangerous to speculate about highly complex international scenarios like the one you are describing. but the point ambassadors for minute maid is important in this respect. -- the point ambassador sherman made is important in this aspect. we would implement the sanctions as it is in our obligation to do. we would still see some international enforcement, whether it is on the oil side or reserve outside. that enforcement would begin to erode, especially in the scenario you were describing, where i ran actually goes through -- where iran goes through to isolate us. to show that they through with their convention and the u.s. is the one that walks away. that would be terrible for us in terms of our credibility. authority,rcise our

we need to be able to do so in a way that is meaningful. i very much hope it doesn't come to that. it certainly would be a situation of weakened leverage. it is not going to be zero or 100%, but it will be weakened leverage. the question is, could be turned weakened leverage into a much stronger deal? my assessment is no. >undersec. sherman: i could not agree more. my assessment would be no, if we walk away, even if we retain some sentience capability. -- some sanctions capability, the rest of the world will go in another direction. more importantly, iran will go in another direction. and the president of the u.s., whether it is president obama or the next one, will receive this challenge. >> would they walk away or go through with the implementation? undersec. sherman: i doubt very seriously if the u.s. sanctions remain in place, iran will

perceive that we have walked away from the deal and they no longer have to stick with it. >> two more questions. one concern we have had is that mentionedstration swift system, there was great reluctance in taking that step. in retrospect, that was important in helping taken down the sanctions. i do wonder, if we don't move we be prepared to move forward with those same sections, particularly as we look at the banks of indian, korea, japan. comments on that? it is a very stark scenario you are depicting.

the institutions you're talking about are some of the most significant and fundamental institutions in the international financial sector, whether it is swift, the leading secure messaging company for banks worldwide. whether it's the largest commercial banks in korea, india, the central bank of japan. the prospects of us having to use our sentience authority is against those -- our sanctions authority against those entities are frightening. it would be threatening those institutions unless they come along with the u.s. approach. >> let me just get my last question in. one of the statements you made , i would like further expiration on how you got to the 24 days. butl i have some concerns, at least i have a little more clarification. i think it is an artful process you accreted -- you have

created. what kind of assurance can we really have that our current eu partners and friends in the u.k., if they have engaged with iran on a business basis, that they will stick with us, had we get more comfortable rock that? -- comfort around that? undersec. sherman: in the, we were in the same circumstance. -- in 2012, we were in the same circumstance. europe had a lot of business with iran. they were very concerned about iran having a nuclear weapon and moving down that pathway. so they joined us in enforcement of unilateral sentience and their own sanctions. they enforce them.

i would like to hear more from our european allies on that matter. undersec. sherman: i would urge you to speak with them directly. i will think you will think you'll get the right answer you are looking for. >> senator warren? warren: i like to yield to senator donnelly and come back when it is my turn. donnelly: thank you both for your hard work. in regards to the iaea agreement and moving forward -- and this has been asked by others, but i want to clarify. moving ahead in every other facility, is it your understanding that the iaea can get into every facility, that if they choose to, they can go in there physically themselves as opposed to having iran turnover

materials? that they have physical access? undersec. sherman: i be happy to get into this in greater detail in a classified session. what i can tell you is that whatever the iaea believes that it needs to do to have a technically authenticated result for whatever access they believe they need to have, they will get it. >> so if they believe they need to have physical access to a place, that will not be denied? undersec. sherman: as i said, whatever they believe they need for a technically authenticated process, they will get under the agreements that we have negotiated here. and i will be glad to discuss this in greater and more exquisite detail in a classified seven. >> that would be fine. we can talk this afternoon, but it sounds like yes to me. is there any reason to believe

there are any other documents out there? undersec. sherman: no. or i do not know about them. >> have you asked the iaea if there are any other doctorates out there? -- other documents out there? undersec. sherman: i talked with the director yesterday, i asked him questions about where we were with various things. i had no reason to believe there were any other documents. >> have you asked the iranians, who you have had these discussions with, do you have any other agreements with anybody else at this time that we don't know about? undersec. sherman: i have not asked that question explicitly, but given the hours and hours we have spent together, i do not believe there are any other documents. >> i think that is question well worth asking. the alternative theory, or one of the alternative scenarios is that and then we,s away

in effect go country by country, saying make a choice economically. don't deal with iran or else we will section -- we will not deal with your economy. what is the likeliness of that kind of scenario? sec. szubin: in the event of us walking away from this deal, i think we would be very much swimming against the tide. the cooperation we have obtained to date in going around the world, just as you have described, saying we need to pressure iran, was predicated on a diplomatic path. china, india, south korea could see here's a way to test a run to see if they are ready to make a deal. -- test iran. >> so in this context, we are walking away from that?

so if we walk away, what is left in terms of strength of the sanctions? some folks have said we have some a significant impact still on iran. what other global effects will take place? undersec. szubin: the u.s., as you know, senator, would maintain sanctions. that is true that she either way, our embargo is going to remain in place. the eu has sanctions with respect to iran's bad activity outside the nuclear file. severe economic sanctions that we have spent time talking about today and this congress helped to put in place affects things like sales of crude oil, tetra chemicals, and access of the central bank of iran, the banking system internationally.

those are all built on the threat of u.s. sanctions with international acquiescence. it is that acquiescence -- sen. crapo: the alternative suggestion is for countries who aren't willing to also continued their sanctions come if we walk away, we go to them and say make . choice how realistic is that? undersec. szubin: i think it would be a very tough conversation and when you go to a country like china or india and told them we will dictate where you filed -- by your oil from, which is what we have been doing the past few years, they will say with an eye on what? if they think that our bar, , theg moved the goalposts bar is unrealistically high, we will have a hard time securing that cooperation and that means that the sanctions leverage will

the road considerably. sen. crapo: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. chairman, thank you, undersecretary szubin, and ambassador for your work. i think everyone understands that a nuclear-armed iran threatens the united states, threatens israel, threatens the entire world. the only question before congress is whether the nuclear agreement negotiated alongside other countries represents our best available option for preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. i'm wondering if you can pull these pieces together and evaluate the option. what happens if we go forward with a deal versus if we back out? let's start with the tough sanctions imposed by the united states with the cooperation of other countries around the world, such as the u.k., france, china, germany, the eu. deal, we needhis

our international partners to continue the tough sanctions, block iran's access in order to be effective. ambassador sherman, if we walk away, do you believe that all the other nations that have endorsed this deal are likely to continue working with us to impose strong sanctions against iran? no, becauseerman: as acting undersecretary szubin said, the reason they cooperated is because they believe we were pursuing a diplomat excision and they thought that was worth trying to accomplish. accomplished. they believe it was worth taking the economic hit they did it to do that, but if we walk away from what they consider to be a good deal -- 90 countries have spoken out in support of that deal -- they will believe we have changed the equation, we have not operated in good faith, and we are on our own. sen. warren: let's look at what

happens if we are on our own. if the united states continues sanctions on our own while other nations resume trade with iran, how effective will our sanctions likely be? undersec. szubin: they will be less effective than they are today and were when we negotiated this agreement. sen. warren: thank you. now let's consider the roughly $50 billion of iran money that is frozen and could be granted as part of sanctions relief if iran complies with the deal. is mostretary szubin, or even a very significant part of this $50 billion held in the united states? undersec. szubin: no. sen. warren: if we walk away, do you believe the other countries who hold this money will continue to keep it out of iran's hands? undersec. szubin: i think we will begin to see those funds be released if iran starts meeting its commitments under the deal.

sen. warren: but the question i ask is if we walk away from the deal, are you convinced that other countries that hold these funds are going to continue to withhold those funds from iran? undersec. szubin: i can't guarantee that they will. ren: all right, let's talk about iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. if we reject this deal and iran decides to build nuclear weapons, what would be iran's breakout time? how long do you estimate it would take iran to produce enough material for a nuclear weapon? the assessment -- undersec. sherman: the assessment today is 2-3 months. sen. warren: what would be iran's breakout? undersec. sherman: at least 10 years. sen. warren: let's talk about cheating. iran may try to build a nuclear bomb anyway.

ms or sherman, will it be easier or harder for us to detect secret iranian nuclear weapons program if we accept the deal or reject the deal? undersec. sherman: clearly if we accept the deal we will have many more eyes and the iaea will have access to declared sites in iraq and also have surveillance over uranium, the entire supply chain through the procurement channel, they will have eyes on centrifuge production, they will laugh access to undeclared sites -- that is, suspicious sites, if they police there is a justification. most of that, nearly all of that, will disappear if there is no deal. sen. warren: i have one more question on this. let's talk about war. i don't think americans want to be dragged to another war with the middle east, but let's face hard facts. if we reject this deal, the breakout time will go down and that will increase pressure to take military action very soon.

what i want to compare here is the effectiveness of these 2 options, negotiated option versus a military option. in the long-term, which action is likely to be more effective at preventing iran from developing a nuclear bomb? accepted the agreement and closely monitor iran's nuclear program, or rejected the agreement and if there is escalation, bomb iran? which one is more likely to be effective? undersec. sherman: clearly a long-term negotiated solution, which is what we have in the plan of action, is more effective. if we take military action, which the president of the united states will do if he has absolutely no choice, indeed, we will only set back their program as estimated by the intelligence community to-three years, toause iran has the know-how master the fuel cycle to create fissile material for a nuclear

weapon. although we could bomb away their facilities, they can reconstruct of them. you cannot bomb away knowledge, you cannot sanction away knowledge. ae only way to control it is solution that is highly monitored and verify. that is what we have negotiated. sen. warren: thank you. some have said they want a better deal, but that is not the choice that congress faces. the deal is the deal. congress has two choices, accepted or rejected. thate can say for certain this deal will prevent a nuclear-armed iran, and i won't say it. but no one has put a better or more realistic alternative on the table, and until i hear a better option, i intend to support this deal. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. senator shelby: senator heitkamp. thank you, mr.p: chairman, thank you for your patience today. i have watched you let members get to the heart of what they need to examine, and i wanted personally thank you for that.

we have a lot of attempt here to unbake the cake, right? i've been somebody engaged in multiparty negotiations, including some of the largest civil settlements that this country has seen, and i know how a cakelt it is to unbake and say that this could be better. i think elizabeth, senator warren, just took us through the paces in terms of what the real options are. i will tell you that one thing i don't believe has been talk a lot about is the fact of lifting the sanctions regime will in fact build a bigger, better, more economically stable iran into the future. as long as iran is on the terrorism list, creates incredible opportunity. as i think mr. secretary, you have so appropriately talked about the challenges that they have economically today, it is

-- if in fact the sanctions regime is lifted and we look 10 years in the future, iran will be much more stable economic power. i don't think there's any doubt about it. this might seem off-topic for some people, but it is certainly on-topic for me, which is the one thing we could do that would provide competition against an iran that has the ability to market their oil into the market and have the resulting economic growth as a result of marketing that oil, is actually exporting american oil to compete with the iranian oil. it is very difficult in my estate to explain why we should lift sanctions on iran when we are sanctioned in the united states of america in terms of our oil exports. i would like to hear from both the state department and the department of treasury your response to that statement, especially looking into the future in a 10 years when we know that that competition could in fact curtail the economic

might of an enemy that is pretty powerful. senator, thankn: you for the question. unfortunately, i am not the right treasury official the two jurisdictions on sales of american oil -- sen. heitkamp: what you do manage the sanctions, and that is a big part of it. as part of your job of managing the sanctions, is to look at how the sanctions have an impact on the viability economically of iran. you kind of are, for me, the right back to ask. undersec. szubin: well -- sen. heitkamp: no dodging. undersec. szubin: what i can say with respect to the sanctions is you are right. what is important is to relieve the secondary pressure internationally on iran's economy, and if iran adheres to all of its commitments, iran can expect some economic recovery. i think it will be many, many years in the making before iran gets to where it ought to otherwise have been today -- sen. heitkamp: but you do

understand that there is a lot of concern about an economically empowered iran and what it means for stability in the region. undersec. szubin: i understand it to my very core. sen. heitkamp: i don't have a lot of time and i think the chairman has been externally generous, so i would turn to you, ambassador sherman. senator, sherman: neither adam nor myself can comment on u.s. to mr. policy, although we -- u.s. domestic policy, although we understand how it has a profound impact on international relations and the international market. i am sure that particular interest that you have, that we all have come in american economic security and independence when it comes to oil and gas, is something that has to be resolved here. sen. heitkamp: but there has been a lot written about the ability to provide some kind of energy security into europe that could be one of those soft power measures. undersec. sherman: absolutely. sen. heitkamp: i understand that it might be above your a

great or whatever it is, but i want and a knowledge than oil of moving into international markets has the effect of curtailing the economic power of iran, and economic power of russia, and a whole on able -- for a lot of people or nation states that really are not friends of this country, and this is an opportunity to give and thees step forward energy security that may in fact strengthen the sanctions regime if we ever snapped back. think no sherman: i one would disagree that energy security for our country, for the world, and, for that matter, dealing with issues of climate and how we manage that, will have a profound impact on the development of countries and america's continuing to be the preeminent economy in the world. no question. sen. heitkamp: thank you, mr. chairman. sen. shelby: senator vitter. sen. vitter: thank you, mr. chairman.

thanks to both of you for being here and for your service. i want to follow-up on a fairly important issues that -- a very important issue that my colleague senator scott got into, and that is these two iaea agreements. they are certainly significant in terms of enforcing this agreement, are they not? undersec. sherman: i would say they are important arrangements iaeae modalities that the will use, but the public roadmap, which you all have access to, lays out with the iaea requiring of iran in broad terms as one of the steps it must take in order to get sanctions relief along with all the other nuclear steps. although i agree that possible military dimensions are , the unitedhey are states has already made its judgment about it, but we are much more focused on where the program is today and where it is headed in the future, which is

what people of the joint -- what the bulk of the plan is about. sen. vitter: you said what is available to members of the senate and the public is laying in broad terms. on the real specific -- aren't the real specifics of verification very important with this agreement? undersec. sherman: of course, and that is white in a briefing -- why in a briefing is something i will share in a classified session the arrangements of the confidential protocols between iran and the iaea. sen. vitter: and you have read those secret agreements? undersec. sherman: i've read the safeguard confidential arrangements, yes. sen. vitter: ok, when do i get to read them? you know moreman: than any other country will get to read the confidential

protocols between united states and iaea. sen. vitter: do you have a vote on this agreement? undersec. sherman: i do not. sen. vitter: i do. you have read these agreements, and i think that is appropriate, i'm not arguing with that. i have to vote on this agreement. you don't think it is appropriate that i would get to read it? undersec. sherman: as i said to the iaea and all of my colleagues, i would have to in a the arrangements classified session with united states -- sen. vitter: that is not my question. do you think it is appropriate i don't get to read it when i have to vote on the matter? undersec. sherman: senator, you will have to make your own judgment about it -- not sen. vitter: i'm asking your opinion, do you think that is appropriate? undersec. sherman: my opinion is that it is in the united states national security interest for there to be a comprehensive safeguard protocol and that those remain confidential good that is in our national security interest. is. vitter: do you think it

appropriate that i as a sitting u.s. senator representing a significant number of americans who has to vote on this do not get to read those agreements? i'm not talking about putting them on the internet, i'm not talking about handing out -- undersec. sherman: i don't have those agreements to give to you, sir. sen. vitter:. my question. please answer my question. do you think it is appropriate i don't get to read them? undersec. sherman: i think the system that has been put in place that maintains these as confidential documents between the iaea and the countries which operate under the coverings secret agreement is appropriate. sen. vitter: under the appropriate system, you get to read it, although you don't have a phone. i don't get to read it, although i do have a vote. ok, let me move on. president obama earlier said 14, 15, they," meaning iran, "have centrifuges

that have grown rapidly and the breaker time has shrunk close to zero." is that accurate? undersec. sherman: what is accurate -- sen. vitter: is that quote accurate? undersec. sherman: in those years it will not come down to zero, no. sen. vitter: what will it come down to? undersec. sherman: we can discuss those in a classified session. sen. vitter: his quotation was down to zero. undersec. sherman: it is not close to zero. sen. vitter: so he was wrong. undersec. sherman: it is technically impossible for enrichment to go down to literally zero. it is just not possible. that is why today it is 2-3 months. sen. vitter: 2-3 months. ok, maybe it is something comparable to that. in that context, do you think other middle eastern countries will strongly consider developing nuclear weapons? undersec. sherman: i do not, and it is the intelligence community's assessment that they

will not. ayperson,er: and to a l that makes no sense. to a layperson, when you have a radical, dangerous regime, just the capability of within months having nuclear weapons, it is not credible that everybody's just going to sit on their hands. explain to me why that judgment would be credible. undersec. sherman: first of all, to build a nuclear weapon, you not only need it for some material, which today the breakout time is 2-3 months, under this agreement it would be a year to 10 years, which would to takeplenty of time action could you also have to weaponize that material and you have to have a delivery system. it is the assessment of our community that even if iran were able to enrich the highly enriched uranium to have for some material for a bomb, which he does not have today, and would take some time for them to --, they would indeed still

maybe as much as a year or two away from getting a nuclear weapon, if in fact they had a program to weaponize and the delivery system to carry it. sen. vitter: well, again, i'm not talking about today. i'm talking about assuming they live under the agreement -- in the later years, those timeframes considerably shorten. undersec. sherman: well, the fissile material time frames shorten. we would have to ask intelligence -- i am not aware of the current weaponization program be i'm not aware of a current program that marries a bomb with a delivery system in iran. i expect that they could do that should they make the decision to do that. but your question was about other countries, and i didn't get to that, and i apologize. i believe other countries will not go there because it is expensive, very expensive. secondly, we would know about it. they would find themselves under the intense sanctions that iran has been under, because some of

the countries that you are our partners or allies of hours and are trying to deal with aspects of state sponsorship of terrorism of iran, and they want to work with us to do that and we are working with them to do that. i believe that any number of incentives or disincentives for those countries to choose not to move in the direction that iran has moved in. sen. vitter: ok, thank you, mr. chairman. y: this is been a long hearing, an interesting hearing. i have a few observations and will forgo the question. what is and what is not in the agreement is very important, is not, mr. szubin? but if you don't have all the information, it is hard to discern what is in the agreement . my question to both of you, we know the history of iran. we know what is at stake here.

ambassador sherman, do you trust iran? undersec. sherman: of course not. sen. shelby: ok. mr. szubin? undersec. szubin: no, senator. sen. shelby: so we are entered into an agreement of great importance with a country we don't trust that we have reason to believe is going to cheat or do whatever they have to because , they are inrmined pursuit of nuclear weapons, and as you have said, they are close correctght now, is that undersec. sherman: actually, they are not close to it right now. they are a year or two away from a nuclear weapon, should they decide to pursue one, and it is that the supreme leader has made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. two to three months for fissile material. sen. shelby: fissile material. undersec. sherman: under this agreement that would change to a year. that the supreme leader has made the decision to which is a hugesen. shelby:

step. , do you trust iran to forgo their terrorist activity not -- and if we say $50 billion on promoting terrorism and unrest all over the world? undersec. szubin: mr. chairman, i do not trust iran, and we can be fairly certain that iran will continue to sponsor terrorism force.ups like the quds it is incumbent on us to intensify the campaign against that. sen. shelby: strange agreement. thank you for your appearance before the committee. >> the c-span cities to her visits literary and historic sites around the country to hear from historians and civic leaders every other weekend on c-span2's book tv and c-span3's american history tv. this month, with congress on august recess, we featured the cities tour each day on c-span. ating up on c-span, we look

the literary life of austin, the capital of texas. tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we nearlypresident obama's hour-long speech urging congress to pass the iran nuclear agreement. here is some of what the president had to say. now, because my sections won't produce the results the critics want, we have to be honest. congressional rejection of this deal with any u.s. leaves anyion -- u.s. administration that is committed to preventing iran from getting a nuclear weapon with one option, another war in the middle east. i say this not to be provocative. i am stating a fact. without this deal, iran will be in opposition, however tough it

may the, to steadily advance its capabilities. it's breakout time, which is already fairly small, could shrink to near zero. does anyone really doubt that the same voices now race against this deal won's be demanding that whoever is president bomb those nuclear facilities? and as someone who does firmly believe that iran must not get a nuclear weapon and who has wrestled with this issue since the beginning of my presidency, i can tell you that alternatives to military action will have been exhausted once we reject a hard-won diplomatic solution of the world almost unanimously supports. let's not mince words. the choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war. maybe not tomorrow, maybe not

--ough months from now maybe not three months from now, but soon. >> the president spoke at american university in of a 1963, d.c., site speech by president kennedy on the soviet union. you can see president obama's entire speech tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern. sunday night on "q&a," former emergency manager of detroit kevyn orr talks about detroit's financial issues and overseeing the largest bankruptcy in u.s. history. kevyn orr: detroit had taken that $1.5 billion in 2005 and 2006, and it just invested in an index fund, dow jones industrial index, standard & poor's, istever -- the stock market trading 18,000, almost three times what it was -- it not only would have tripled the money,

but they could have paid attentions in -- hated the pensions inaid the full and given the pensioners a 13 to check at the end of the year in addition to the 12 they are due. they could've fixed themselves if there had been some sort of server management, just like any organization. if there had been strong leadership and focused leadership, you can resolve these problems, but it takes a lot of effort. c-span's night on "q&a." this month, c-span radio takes you to the movies. four supreme court cases that have played a part in popular movies, from this summer's "woman in gold." >> there is concern by the chief justice of the can of worms are committed we recommend opening they can. -- we recommend opening the can.

>> to the free-speech case from the 1996 movie "the people vs. larry flynt." >> if jerry followed consume purely on the lightless speech, suit purely onn a lightless speech, imagine suits on garry trudeau or johnny carson from what he says on "the tonight show." >> the watergate case from "all the president's men." >> these two are appointed to the case. >> the burglars have their own counsel? >> that's right. rather unusual, wouldn't you say? >> for burglars, it is unusual. lovinghe 2011 drama "the story," about the civil rights cases invalidating the law preventing interracial marriage. and say we ourselves

are handling a major civil rights case. right of richard and mildred loving to wake up in the morning and go to sleep at night knowing that the sheriff will not be knocking on their door or shining a light in their face in the privacy of their bedroom. >> four supreme court cases that have played a part in popular movies, saturdays in august at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span radio. 1isten to c-span radio on 90. fm in the washington, d.c. area come online at cspan.org, or download the c-span radio app. >> when the senate takes its august break, we will feature book tv programming weeknights in prime time on c-span2 beginning at 8:00 eastern, and at the end of the summer, look for two book tv programs.

we are live from the nation's capital for the 15th annual national book festival, followed on sunday with our live "in depth" program with former second lady visitsc-span cities tour literary and historic sites across the nation to hear from local historians, authors, and civic leaders every other weekend on c-span2's booktv and tv.an3's american history with congress on summer recess, on c-span eachs day at 6:00 p.m. eastern. welcome to austin, texas on booktv, located in the central part of the state, austin has been the capital since 1839, 3 years after texas won its independence froxi