this will number our use of financial tools against iran. the spirit and letter of the agreement may neuter u.s. agreement -- power in the future. from the start what the iranians wanted most was the ability to do business again unfettered and unplugged, back into the global system. the regime is needed access to banking, shipping, insurance and new technologies. that is what they lost over the past decade, that appears to be what they have gained in this deal. the u.s. really to amplify its use of financial measures aggressively against key measures of the iranian economy to deal with increased risks. it is not at all clear that this is well understood by all parties, or even part of our strategy. we have the ability to do so, unilaterally if needed. the u.s. has been shaping efforts to thousand five --

2005. iran's isolation has increased over time, and there has been increasing risk aversion to doing business with iran because of the conduct it takes place in. the responsible private sector actors will not rush and immediately, waiting to understand how the sanctions will unwind, and whether or not iran will adhere to the deal. the risks are real, and will increase these risks willk keep legitimate actors away for some time. the private sector will watch and listen to you and to congress which can affect the global environment and the reach of our financial power. there are three critical

principles -- congress should assure it was clarity in execution of the deal, it should ensure the u.s. maintains as much financial and economic power is possible, congress should mitigate the risks to an emboldened regime in tehran. these could create a new strategy. the u.s. should adopt an aggressive campaign focusing on the revolutionary guard that engage in terrorist financing. this could include the use of secondary sanctions. there should be a recommitment to nonproliferation, focused on iran. we can reinforce financial measures against irani and banks. it could be used extensively for those involved in gross human

rights violations. these are just some measures the could be taken that could shape a new sanctions framework. very quickly when the iranian president quebec the table, a diplomat shared with me -- came back to the table, a diplomat shared with me that they thought they won the war, but wondered if we could win the peace. it will require leveraging the same powers that helped bring the regime to the table. we must assure that this does not inadvertently empower the regime. >> members of the committee thank you for inviting me to testify with these three great experts. the iran nuclear deal is deeply

flawed i will address the sunset clause in the nuclear snapback. it admists -- admits, tehran simply has to comply to maintain near zero breakout time icmbs, access to heavy weaponry, and in an economy immunized against future economic pressure. as we learned today, the iaea will not get physical access toall military sites. as iran grows more powerful our ability to use economic leverage increases -- decreases. this provides iran with a nuclear snapback. iran will view that as grounds

to void the deal. it contains an explicit requirement to interfere with the normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. they will use these provisions to threaten to walk away from the deal and engage in nuclear escalation. iran will target the europeans to intimidate them. this is likely to provoke disagreements between washington and european allies on the credibility of the evidence, the seriousness of the infractions the appropriate response, and likely iranian retaliation. the administration assumes that even if russia and china were to take iran's side, the u.s. could count on the votes from the eu.

this assumes that one european vote will not change the face of iranian nuclear intimidation. the u.s. can move unilaterally, would it do so without european support? europe has a strong economic incentive not to join, as companies invested billions in iranian markets. the same dynamics applied to the reposition of a nonnuclear sanctions, including terrorism. they release a statement to the un security council that it may reconsider its commitment under the agreement if new sanctions are imposed irrespective of what they are based on. they could use this threat to prevent the snapback. in the face of iranian threats with the europe agree with the

u.s.? i am very doubtful, if the u.s. cannot use economic pressure to stop iran, military force a become the only option. as a result, i fear this agreement may make war more likely, not less likely. when that comes, iran will be stronger. there is an alternative. it is not war, or killing the deal, it is about a better deal. congress should require the administration to amend the sunset clause. one key amendment. the extra heavy weaponry should remain until the un security council to determine that iran's nuclear program is not a threat. one key amendment to stop the u.s. and europe should keep in mind some key parts of the economic sanctions so that we

don't need to snapback anything. that leverage will still be in place. there is ample precedent to amend this deal. congress has rejected 200 bilateral international agreements including significant cold war arms control agreements with the soviets. at a time when moscow had thousands of nuclear missiles aimed at our cities, if congress rejected this, china and russia might return to some iranian business am a but they are likely to stay at the table. europe however, is the big economic prize. the key will be accused of the not -- diplomatic persuasion to keep the u.s. ourt of iran. energy companies will find halfway into iran, and we will never have again the powerful secondary sanctions leverage as we have today. we should use it to get key amendments to this deal.

those will lower the risk of a future war against a much more powerful and dangerous iran. >> members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss nuclear agreements, and the challenge it poses to the future viability of u.s. sanctions. the administration is telling people privately that it interprets the deals in an aggressive way. it is not making that clear to the public. unfortunately, if we don't articulate the position that doing business still comes with risks, others will not perceive there being any risk at all level rush headlong into the iranian market. they say it enables them to do several things, including denying iran access to the u.s. dollar, and access to the u-turn

transaction mechanism and aggressively enforcing secondary sanctions on foreign entities that remain listed for terrorism and human rights issues. the problem is that these laudable positions have not been made public. they are only effective if aggressively publicized. the fact is, as u.s. officials will concede, the administration suffers from a trust deficit. whether one believes this is deserved or not, it is there. the fact is, not only are none of the positions listed clear within the deal, the deal could easily be read as prohibiting each and every one of them. failing to make these public, not only undermines the utility it makes a question whether the intention is to act on these going forward. these are critical issues which should not be open to interpretation. if you weeks ago, the task force

issued a statement identifying it as a place which creates risk. it presents ongoing money laundering and terrorist financing risks. countermeasures for the larger financial system, now, under the deal, much of the world will be looking to expand business with iran. a european journal asked me to write an article about what more europe can do to help iran reintegrate. specifically talks about parties refraining from actions that undermine normalization with iran. for years, u.s. officials appointed to the conduct aced -- based natuirre of sanctions.

today, iran's illicit conduct continues. if they do not take an, this could be the death knell of this. designating a person here or there is not enough. due to the massive business and gravitational risks inherent of doing business with iran, at the very time we need to be able to highlight the fact that iran is a risky jurisdiction, where human rights abuses are on the rise, and support of terrorism continue unabated, we are denied the ability to discourage business with iran. the best we can do is delineate the illicit conduct and remind there are some secondary sanctions, and maybe some reputational risk. the former depends on u.s. follow-through, while the latter depends on how the rest of the

international community perceive risk in the wake of an iran deal that encourages business with iran. how effective will it be once they have been removed? major international banks will be slow to move back, but non-us companies are likely to trip over one another in a rush to reenter the market which is being described as an el dorado and potential bonanza. we lose the balance of global multilateral sanctions. under the deal, sanctions largely disappear and what remained is only u.s. sanctions. it would impact behavior of other banks, and businesses, but this puts the onus solely on the u.s.. the deal is a multilateral one and a partnership be expected to do their part.

>> thank you for the opportunity to testify. you have my testimony, i will just make a few quick points. i had the pleasure to appear before your committe before. and i come to you as a supporter of this agreement. i think it has many benefits for our country, this is my first point. it will arrest the forward movement in iran's nuclear program that began 10 years ago. it will make sure iran does not have the potential to produce a missile for the next 10-15 years. it will narrow the breakout time there will be significantly

strengthened inspections of the nuclear supply for 25 years. sanctions will not be lifted until iran complies with the letter of the agreement. the administration will remain sanctions for terrorism and human rights violations. it has been discussed that we have an opportunity to stop iran tofrom becoming a power without having to resort to war. that is not the cfase -- case now. i think both president obama, and president bush. diplomacy should be tried first. i congratulate the administration on the account. there are risks here, i hacve outline some of the benefits. the most important is that the

superstructure of iran's program will remain in mothballs, it can be rebuilt 10-15 years from now i gfully expect the radians two decades from now, the problem then will be that they could build a covert program on the facility. that is a problem for the united states at that time. we will have to because the dude regime, but i don't minimize the difficulty of doing that. i worked with trying to establish that regime. finally, i would like to say the global embargoes and iran's ballistic missile programs that will end, i wish they had not

been agreed to, the end of the embargoes. i was the administration had held the line. i wish we weren't in the position of having to reconstitute sanctions later. third point if you weigh the benefits and risks i think the benefits outweigh the risks. we are going to freeze this program for 10-15 years. if congress disapproves, i think three things will happen -- the global coalition will reagan -- weaken. it will atrophy, and most importantly, the iranians want feel constrained to abide by the restrictions that were negotiated. they will be unshackled, and

able to move forward to becoming nuclear threshold. that would be a weakening of american strategic interest. i do think we are often caught up in the conventional wisdom's, just two quick examples. i don't believe the congressional defeat of this nuclear deal will lead inevitably to war. i don't think that is right. i think iran would be careful but not to vro -- cross the line . i don't believe that approving the deal lead inevitably to an arabian nuclear weapon. the next president, the president after that, that is what congress should be thinking about. how do we strengthen strategic policy to effectively deter the arabians as we have let the nuclear deal -- iranians as we implement the nuclear deal?

we will close the big gap right now between the united states and israel. we should continue the effort to strengthen the gulf countries militarily. but we should also say the, the american president should say that he would use force should it come close to a nuclear weapon or violate this deal. there are things both democrats and republicans can agree to, perhaps an accompanying statement. mr. chairman, i support this agreement, i held that congress will approve this agreement and strengthen the ability of our country to move ahead both to pursue the nuclear deal and contain iranian power. sen. shelby: secondary

sanctions are sanctioned the place restrictions not directly on iran, but those that would deal with iranian entities. i pose this question, even if the europeans were to completely lift restrictions on dealings with iran, would u.s. secondary sanctions still keep the major global companies from doing business in and with iran? >> u.s. secondary sanctions would apply, it has enormous impact and reach, and does affect which countries do and what these countries decide to invest in. i think the general answer is yes, it depends on the environment and the nature of the secondary sanctions. whether or not they are proven

to be legitimate. it would depend on the sense of enforcement of those sanctions will stop if there is a sense that the sanctions are on the books they will not work. but of the effectiveness over the past 10 years has been not only as the sanctions were seem -- regime been put in place they were enforced by the u.s. in the u.s. alone. mr. dubowitz: i don't think major financial institutions are rushing back in any way. i think the have deep concerns about risk, most importantly deep concerns over political risks with respect to the next president is, and how vigorously we will enforce this. if congress were to disapprove

the deal, even more reason why they would not rush in. that extends the mud of time it would take to enter the market. the congressional disapproval i don't think will lead to the collapse of the sanctions the power of the sanctions are going to make major financial institutions very reticent about reentering the market, whether you approve or disapprove. sen. shelby: the integrity of the u.s. financial system is a major concern to this committee. the financial action task force fouond iran to present a grave risk to the financial system due to the lack of money laundering safeguards. is there, sir, reason to believe that the problems that gave rise to the task force will go away anytime soon? is it safe for non-us persons to

do business with iranian banks? would you explain? dr. levitt: the short answer is no. it has nothing to do with proliferation. take those activities off the table, all of these things remain in force. the next report will be issued in october. it is very important, and it sh ould be held to cliams t -- claims the problem is how the world interprets risk is going to change. when it is just the united states the secondary sections apply only if you want to have business here. for a small company, a place doing arm's-length business, they might be able to do

business. when the entities come off the list, there is a fisher -- fissure, the eu doesn't seem to think is a list of bullet that these. there is some risk, how long? will it be 8 years? no one can fully answer that question. it is no longer a consensus. sen shelby: the pathway to a bomb, that is outlying all of our thinking here. you describe are this is fundamentally flawed because even if iran abides by the deal, it can reopen and expand each pathway to a bomb whne -- that the agreement seeks to shut down. can you describe how this will work?

how they would have to stop iran from achieving up after a bomb? mr. dubowitz: the restrictions and act as a heavy weaponry, will go away. they go away in your five and eight. in year ten they can install unlimited centrifuges. after 15 years iran can enrich uranium up to 60%. that is as close to weapons grade as you can get. they can easily do that, and multiple heavywater reactors. what that implies is a patient multi-pathway to a bomb.

that second part is what do you do about that? when they have a program with near-zero breakout, my concern in terms of sanctions is that there is nothing you can do about it. at that point you've is a binary choice which is accept that you now have the nuclear threshold iran with unlimited enrichment capacity and the capability to build a bomb quickly, or use military force. we will not have a peaceful option left. then iran will be a much stronger country. the consequences to american security will be much more grave. sen shelkby: i pose this question to all of you.

sanctions are crucial u.s. policy, i am concerned that the u.s. government is not taken maximum advantage of this. if any part of the u.s. government task force is any one tasks with doing contingency planning for sanctioned equivalent to the pentagon does with operational plans? what improvements could we make? i wiould start with you. >> that is the work command for financial powers and tools. it is a question as to whether or not we are doing enough for the preservation of those tools and use them aggressively enough. the use of these tools by other nations to not only extend their

reach, but to exploit our vulnerabilities. i would say that responsibility lies at the treasury department in concert with the intelligence committee -- community. perhaps we need to be more forward leaving in terms of the use of this power. one of my concerns is it is not clear that we considered fully the long-term implications for the use of our power. >> i would ask who is an incredibly talented professional, to provide the 10-15 year contingency plan when it has near zero breakout. that plan should be in place today. that fundamentally is something that everyone is concerned about stop. we will use a economic power over time, and to have that in

place. dr. levitt: i will just echo that i used to be the deputy secretary for intelligence, the only finance ministry that has its own intelligence component. it is quite vigorous. we were both there, and would have thesemeetings. i believe nad hope they are having these meetings now. it is unclear how far these conversations are going and wht ether we are taking into consideration the immediate impact of this deal on the long-term efficacy of our sanctions. they are a tool to be used, we should use them forever. we will always have goals we want to reach.

therefore, it is important to maintain that. sen i went to answer your question. i would say the most important thing for us, the united states, is to have effective treasury state, and white house corporation with what we are trying to do with sanctions and to persist over the long term first. second, we have to marry what we do with our allies around the world and i think that is the problem. if congress disapproves the deal. we lose the potency of sanctions . third, i would say objectively president bush and president obama will the pursuit a sanctions regime. they submitted to negotiations and the deal has been made.

chair: i asked it earlier to each one of you. do you believe any agreement with iran, can you trust iran do you trust iran not to cheap if they get a chance? >> absolutely not. that is why any deal of any sort has to have effective monitoring , effective enforcement, and we have to have tools that deal with all of the other risks which will go up because of an enriched regime in tehran. i do not think we have done that. i do not think the deal has that in mind. i have not heard from the administration a plan to do with those increased risk and that is

the challenge with the regime in toronto -- tehran. speaker will not have physical access to all military sites. this deal is a bit on the -- bet on the iaea. this deal is a fundamental exit -- existential bet. the iraqis have been saying for years now we will not allow the u.s. or the iaea into our military sites. if we cannot get physical access, boots on the ground access to all military sites and i am deeply concerned about the efficacy of the inspection regime. if we do not trust our this section -- inspection regime, we have a serious problem. dr. levitt: we can trust iran to

engage in more new various activity. beyond that we cannot trust iran. the verification regime is critically and orton -- important. there are some holes big enough to drive a truck through. the question is not so much is it fair that the people who do not have a vote get to read these agreements and others do. why was that agreed to? it is absolutely true that we want those provisions to be made kept secret so that our information is not made public either but why was that agreed to in the deal? that is what i do not understand. the question is how strong these verification tools will be. ambassador burns: president reagan said of the soviets

trust but verify. we must not trust but we must verify. if this agreement is implemented and two or three years down the road, we suspect there are covert facilities and if the iranians deny ultimately after this managed inspection process they will be in violation of the deal. in that eventuality, it will not be what mr. burns was talking about. we will not have a way to press the iranians. speaker: thank you for the work you did. i think neither you to nor secretary clinton or secretary kerry or president obama nor president bush kept the credit for weaving together these six countries, the p5 us one against all odds holding them together. the historical context and the difficult diplomatic maneuvers

and accomplishments that you made, we should all thank you for and that should be the historical context of all of that area you said a number of things. you're not saying -- seeing an alternative that would give the u.s. a greater probability of preventing a iranian nuclear weapon. if congress rejects this agreement, you mentioned global coalition would weaken, sanctions would atrophy and shackles on iran undone or loosened. talk to us if you would what would happen if we reject this especially in light of what our p-5 plus one allies would do what their reaction would be, and what about other countries in europe and asia, japan and italy, what might their reactions be is to mark -- reactions he?

speaker: i think this is a combination of benefit and risk. i do not see one right now. if you work through the logic train, if congress to fix the president, if the u.s. cannot increment the deal, if we cannot a move the sanctions and get the benefit of iran complying, a couple of things happened i number one, part of the value of the sanctions regime, not just the eu -- [no audio] some of the banks are not going to go back into business but some of the corporations will. we dashed the regime will begin to believe that political unity we have had, it is very powerful when you have well over 170 country -- countries sanctioning . that is the first thing that will go. the europeans will be in a

difficult place. all their time ministers and parliament support this deal. so they will not want to hurt the u.s. if we implement -- if we asked them not to move forward but there will not be unity in the eu. the eu will have to reauthorize sanctions at some point. i can think of three or four european members who will not want to reauthorize. the ones that are closer to russia and the russians would love to embarrass the u.s. that is the problem. the biggest problem that i see in congress defeating the president is than this deal will not go into effect. iran will be unfettered. and unshackled. it will not have their restriction the deal promises. it will not he if frozen country in terms of its nuclear capacity. it will be a nuclear threshold state again.

it is hard to say exactly what would happen because we are talking about hypotheticals. i do not want to be too doctrinaire area -- doctrinaire. two things would happen. the iranians would be strengthened and we would be weakened in a long-range struggle that we are in with them. competing for power in the middle east, we need to win over the next 20 to 25 years and despite my misgivings about part of the deal and i enumerated them, what we get is we stop them for the next 10 or 15 years and that means a lot area that is why i support the deal. >> people that are undecided like a number of us on this committee all believe that the president -- military option should be available. you mentioned that in your testimony.

when you said that we should provide more concrete assurance that the u.s. would take military action. should the president say that again? should the person who wants to be the next president make that clear? is it something we reiterate in the next 18 months? what you mean by that? speaker: it needs to be credible. it cannot be credible if they do not think we mean what we say. this is going to have to be for president obama and his successor and the successor's successor over the next 25 years so i would hope that every presidential candidate, both already's but also president obama would say unequivocally unambiguously, if iran violates the agreement and we see iran racing toward a nuclear weapon, we would have a little bit of time to react. the u.s. president would use

force to prevent that from happening. it would knock them back for a couple of years. if we bomb the heavy water reactor. that would be substantial. we would have to have another negotiation down the line. i cannot see the u.s. succeeding in containing iran if we are not willing to use force and be credible about it. i would say with the greatest respect, i respect president obama of course. he needs to say that. in the middle of this debate to reassure congress and the american people, reassure people at me that that is a credible threat of force and i have not seen this speech he just cave -- gave. perhaps he said it in that each. >> you described in your testimony -- it congress does not reject the deal, are there ways that treasury should be

using these bank sanctions in a more robust way to mitigate the problems you have identified the deal? speaker: the secondary sanctions are powerful. they would remain under nonproliferation activities. dr. levitt: it is never the case that the bank was not involved in the proliferation of terrorism. it will be a question of political will as mark said, if you have something like the central tank of iran, will there be the will to put forth sanctions on those types of major entities or even smaller ones if we think that might annoy the iranians. it will deter the major financial institutions and some major corporations from doing business in iran at least for some time.

the banks only for a long period of time. by virtue of being limited to certain types of illicit activities, we are no longer talking about iran is a risky jurisdiction when it is becoming even more risky jurisdiction. that toolkit which was in some ways the most effective, not the formal sanctions of any kind but the informal sanctions that brought to bear the reputational and business risks, those are going to begin to fade very quickly. >> thank you. this list includes -- if we deliver over $100 billion to

iran, what do you suspect would happen against iranian terror? speaker: we have a habit of doing this. could you give us the source of his list? speaker: this was the u.s. range killed in 1980 -- marines that were killed in 1983. >> thank you. >> it is well-known who of the victims are. there have been multiple lawsuits. and $20 million in outstanding reparations. there is a [inaudible] i think the purpose of that injunction is to prevent future victims of iranian terrorism.

i find it surprising we have not required the iranians to satisfy the judgment it we are willing to give them billions of dollars to find what everyone agrees would be future acts of terrorism against americans and others. i also nerd -- note whenever -- one other thing. when we talk about where the money will be spent, people have said it is not a lot of money. low cost and low tech. i looked into the iranian budget for 2015. the quds force will get $6 billion. the president is instituting [inaudible] representing over 25% of the defense budget and 10% of the total public legit. the iranians will spend almost 10% of their total public budget supporting their revolutionary

guard of the quds force who are the entities primarily responsible for acts of terrorism. it gives you a sense of where the the regime is highlighting its own priorities. dr. levitt: a district me as odd that we have assumed as a country that the cost of the deal is simply that the money will flow back to iran in an unfettered, uncontrolled way and that we are doing nothing at least in the immediate term to deal with the very real risk that terrorist financing will flow in the international system through the revolutionary guard or the quds force. it strikes me as odd that we have accepted almost as a principal shrugging her shoulders that this is the cost of the deal when i do not think it should be. it is remarkable that the

administration has described the walk away plan here is if we will be the isolated party internationally when in fact the iranians continue to engage in a range of negotiated conduct. suddenly we are being told at the moment of fruition that if we do not accept a deal, we are going to be the isolated party internationally. that is a remarkable turn of the tables. i do not think the cost of the deal as described is acceptable and we should be mitigating against that. there are ways of doing that and i have not heard from the administration. i said one of the issues is the marines they killed and the

embassy personnel that died in 1983. the president of the american university of beirut gunned down . it is one of the issues. some are in federal court. i would not advise making this conditional on the nuclear deal but i would make it conditional in the future. on balance we will be able to contain better this problem of iran if they are nonnuclear. it is another reason why i support the agreement. speaker: breaking apart proliferation does not exactly work. last year david cohen, then undersecretary of the treasury, now deputy rector of the cia

touted the collateral counterterrorism benefit of counter proliferation sanctions targeting iran's banking and oil sectors. the success of our unprecedented iran sanctions regime including sanctions on iranian financial institutions and the ability to sell its oil has had the collateral benefit of squeezing to ron's ability to fund terrorism groups such as has blood that will no longer be the case. -- hezbollah that will no longer be the case. >> according to crs, there support is 100 to $200 million a year. support for the assad regime in syria is $16 billion to $15 billion year.

, tens of millions of dollars. it is between -- the key question to follow up on is should they get $100 billion in sanctions relief, what would become of the situation? speaker: they would be enriched they would be emboldened, they would add to the budget that they have allocated for these groups. hearing from them direct the the secretary-general from hezbollah expects more support from the iranians. we should take the iranians and proxies from -- at their word. we have to do things to mitigate the risk of that if this deal moves forward. i think shrugging our soldier -- soldiers shoulders is not good enough. >> the u.s. treasury department will be lifting sanctions.

this is the holding company of the supreme leader of iran. it is a 95 and dollar holding company that would be d e-designated allowing the supreme leader to move $95 million to the formal -- former financial system. it is 95 ilion dollars in a hold code that the supreme leader has. one point of clarification. the administration is trying to have an argument both ways. that money will be spent on the economy and not on terrorism than that $56 billion includes 25 ilion dollars that the chinese will spend on upstream energy investments. it will include another 20

billion dollars secured against nonperforming loans. if it is iran's economy, it is $100 billion. if the argument is that the iranians will spend that money on terrorism, the administration is right for it 100 dollars is not available or terrorism. only $56 billion is rate -- available. $100 billion is available for iran's economy. $95 billion is sitting in the supreme leader us holding company. and the revolutionary guards will get x $.5 billion, almost 10% of their public budget and they are the entity in control of iran's overseas expansionism and it's terrorism activities. dr. levitt: let's listen to what the secretary-general of hezbollah said.

they have been meeting to see about furthering their cooperation. even under sanctions it anticipates a rich and powerful iran would be able to do more. iran will be able to stand by its allies and the people in the region and the resistance in palestine and the palestinian people more than at any time in the past. this is what the others are afraid of. investor burns: some of this is going to have to go to contracts as explained in the last channel. some will go to revive the iranian economy given the population's frustration with sanctions and some will go to the irgc and you're right about that. i do think that if there is congressional disapproval and we cannot fulfill the agreement and it becomes a threshold state there are more -- they are a

more powerful force. if we can freeze them and we can them just thinking strategically, we have to combat this force and set up a containment regime. but if they are weakened by the nuclear agreement, we will have better success in doing that. >> thank all of you for your patience. the committee is adjourned. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> coming up, middle east correspondents discuss the iran nuclear agreement. president obama argues for the iranian deal at a speech at american university in washington. officials testify about the lifting of iranian sanctions at a senate banking committee hearing. >> on the next washington journal, police chief tom manger on the recent rise in violent crime in cities. he is president of the major cities chiefs association. and then carol rosenberg on the latest white house moves to shut down the guantanamo bay prison. join the conversation by calling in or by posting to twitter and our facebook page. living warning at 7 a.m. and on c-span. >> this month, c-span radio

takes you to the movies. here the supreme court oral argument from four cases. from this summer's woman in gold to the free speech case from the 1996 movie "the people versus larry flynt." and the 2011 drama, "the loving story." invalidating the laws prohibiting interracial marriage . here the oral argument from four cases that played a part in popular movies. saturdays in august at 6 p.m. eastern on c-span radio. listen to c-span radio at 90.1 fm in the washington, d.c. area. online at c-span.org or download our radio app. >> we will look at how the iran nuclear agreement will affect iranian politics and relations with its neighbors. journalists who cover the region spoke at the johns hopkins

school of international studies. this is one hour. >> welcome. it is an honor and a pleasure to present this. i will leave the former -- formal introductions. i want to give you another programming note. we are doing more on the iran deal next monday, august 10 at a panel called -- with a

powerhouse lineup. and our senior fellow on iran. moderated i call salem. they will examine expectations across the region and changing security relationships and implications for u.s. policy. these go home and register. it is my pleasure to hand off the lead or today's event to our host. he will introduce today's speakers and moderate the discussion. over to you. thank you. daniel: i will do this very quickly because we are pressed for time. we have some competition from the president of the united states. the want to welcome all of you here who have chosen so wisely.

to hear roy over the president. i do not do very formal introductions. normally you have their bios but it does not say in their bios that we went to undergraduate school together. a very small undergraduate school where we did not know each other. we first in bosnia. less than 25 years ago. he is a sterling correspondent that is the only way to describe him and i am looking forward to his views and i will have some questions for him afterwards. first we will hear from joyce karam. i know joyce for much shorter time but we see each other on

the circuit and i always enjoy talking with her because she has such a keen appreciation for the nuances of what is really going on. i did not know, however, and i note from her bio that she has an ma in international peace and conflict resolution. we call that con man here. conflict management. i am glad that we share the interest in the master's degree in conflict management. roy: ink you for mentioning the old-school type. i cannot think of too many people here who were in that exalted position. i wanted to first to do two things. one was to describe the trip to tehran. it was just a journalists' trip.

we try to do it every so often. it takes months, in my case, two years to get a visa. i want to embed that discussion in some overview that i acquired. of what is going on in the region. it was early this last spring when i, like everyone else, was a witness to the chaos unfolding in the region i attempted to cover. there were multiple wars and in iraq as well. the islamic state controlled big swats of territory in both countries. no outside power or combination of powers seemed to be trying to dislodge them quickly. then egypt, a country in deep internal turmoil intervened in libya.

in an effort to get my bearings, i decided to do a tour of the region. speaking to experts in the government's -- governments to ask the question, what is driving events, how do they interact, what is -- where is this all leading? and as i undertook my tour, a fourth war broke out and that is when saudi arabia intervened in yemen which added another layer of complication. in israel, i quickly became convinced that the major national security concern was not iran's nuclear program or the outcome of negotiations. i spoke to a dozen scholars in the government. what they proclaimed as the

number one concern was iran's conventional threat. there was an arm's concern about the buildup of hezbollah's militia and its women into syria along israel's northern border. one referred to skype -- describe buildup. he said 100,000 rockets and missiles had been brought in since 2006. i heard the same judgment in jordan. there was great disappointment in israel that the u.s. to be leaving a security vacuum in syria and allowing iran to fill it. when there was a syrian alternative to the regime namely the secular, a good alternative to the assad regime, namely the secular opposition. a number of israelis voiced fears of a regional conflagration. the official word about the chaos and i going to influence. one of them that the situation.

we are the sick man of the world, he said. baffled of the american -- they thought it was a halfhearted response to god. -- asssaad. and the hands-off approach to the islamic state. and the killing, the incineration of the pilot. egypt is preoccupied with internal of people. secondarily with the rise of extremism among -- spurred by the islamic state in libya. an official told every country in the region's of said by

iran's growing role -- upset by iran's role. i collected criticism from nearly every stop. that turkey was failing to fight in syria, was allowing people through its borders, this is a story that i documented in february. officials spoke about collusion between the turkish government and the extremists. the turks had a ready response. we're not thing again. the islamic state is our enemy and they cast the controversy over their policy and terms of their lack of confidence in american leadership. first in syria and then against the islamic state. they saw american passivity in

the face of iran's glowing -- growing influence. the iranians feel a kind of re-hand in the region, one official told the. they know they do not have a determined counterpart. they know the u.s. will never act against them. the turks even used word appeasement. in the iranian view my said one official, appeasement is the major policy line in the u.s. line these are strong words from a vital ally in a time of calamity and upheaval. the conversation gave me the big picture i was seeking although i must tell you i was quite shaken by what it added up to. the violent struggles already underway cannot be contained or wished away and they have to be brought to a halt last they lead to something worse and that would be a regional war along sectarian lines where the u.s. might not even be playing in a role to try to bring it to a halt area president obama -- to

a halt. president obama would like to close his eyes and hope that syria will go away. two weeks ago, i traveled to iran -- tehran. do the iranians recognize how they are viewed in the region, particularly in the war in syria. they were the dominant outside layers in the levant.\ do they sense they had any role in the lives of islamic state in both countries? now, following the nuclear accords, what is iran, what kind of country is it? is it a status quo country or a revolution still unfolding question mark is change possible in the region and the fianna

accords make that a pressing question. i will give you my observations as a list and we can discuss them later if you have weston's. -- questions. there is a historic moment here that everybody knows about and has to be seized and i am not white sure how it will be done. the first thing is to say it has happened. iran has come in from the cold. after 36 years of isolation after its revolution, the nuclear agreement am assuming it is fully implemented, will put iran back in the mainstream of international life. it will be going to geneva talks about syria and many other issues in the region. iran has accumulated a lot of gauge in these decades -- baggage in these decades but so has the united states. iranians pointed out what they have injured from the u.s.

in the iran-iraq war in the 1980's, the u.s. assisted saddam hussein with intelligence as he was coming iran. giving them reports on where they were bombing and how they could improve their aim. there was the policy of dual containment of the clinton administration in the 1990's, followed i -- by the bush administration in the early years of this century after the 9/11 attacks which branded iran as art of the axis of evil. throughout most of its existence as -- iran has been the target for regime change. iranian scholars and officials point this out. as not quite an excuse but an alibi for some of the things that iran did, because many of the actions that are in them a program and the rest of the region, they say were the result of iran's feeling of insecurity

and a reaction to american and general western actions to assuage domestic security concerns. with the u.s., the army, the question -- enemy, the question was asked what could we do to hurt those interests. there is a lot of skeletons in the closet on both sides and it is one of the reasons why we have to be sober and realize that change is not going to happen fast. there is the basic question. i saw six or eight foreign affairs experts and deputy foreign minister's. the question i was asking is is iran a status quo country or a revolutionary country? the question -- answer has been given in public by the supreme

leader. three days after the vienna deal was announced. he gives the definitive word for the moment. he said iran's policy toward and arabic government would not change a bit. iran will not stop supporting our friends in the region. then he gave a list area he included the oppressed nation of palestine, yemen, the syrian nation and government, the iraqi nation and government, and the oppressed evil of iran. -- people of iran. several people pointed out the clause in the constitution which calls for iran to support the " just struggles of the downtrodden against the oppressors in every corner of the globe." i think article 155 is still alive. it is still current. one of the places where change is needed the most if you look at the entire region is in

lebanon. iran's support has turned hezbollah into a state within a state which is carrying out international, i would call them adventurers abroad in places like syria. they have become a major flight around the ground and possibly other places. someone mentioned to me that the supreme leader had not said a lot about hezbollah in the previous several months. is that a straw in the wind? we will have to see. iran's commitment to hezbollah goes back to a long time to the decision to create it in the early 1980's. i brought up the point to everybody i spoke to about the buildup of weapons by hezbollah that is a threat. israel sees it as a direct, major threat. i was assured by several people if you can call this reassuring that the trigger on the weapons

that hezbollah has acquired is in iranian hands. secondly, it will not be used -- hold against israel unless israel threatens iran or threatens lebanon. that still leaves the basic question, what is iran doing in lebanon in the first place why is it they have invested so heavily there? it needs the supply route and to supply hezbollah. one senior diplomat, long retired, had a very blunt response. he said iran has no vital interests in lebanon area to has no vital interest in the arab-israeli conflict. no vital interests in syria, for that matter. this is not the official line as you can be sure. another place where iran

seemingly has no vital interest but seems to be active is yemen. it has not sent advisers. as the supreme leader stated, it does have a strong ideological interest in yemen. it has a kinship with the rebels. it is a place where i think iran is somewhat -- iran's ambivalent attitude toward changes on display. one element of the involvement is that the rebels have many personal ties to iran. another reason that iran may be involved and it is not actively involved at it is certainly politically involved is the zero sum game that iran is engaged in these of be saudi arabia. the iranians are happy in a way to see the saudi's admired -- mired in a war that they say

they cannot win. senior iranian officials were scathing about the new saudi leadership. they said they had land a 10 day intervention in yemen but they cannot conceivably win. iranian experts like to talk about how cool they are. they are not really actively engaged there. it is a gift that fell into their lap. i do not think they are that skillful. for example, one scholar told me that the decision in may not to send a small cargo ship into yemen, the decision to turn it around and have it unloaded in djibouti instead was an example of iranian pragmatism. it shows it is a status quo state. what preceded iran's decision to turn the boat into another

harbor was a strong warning from the u.s., a public running from the pentagon. do not do this. if you look act a month before that in april, the iranians had sent a small flotilla of cargo ships and they turned it around when the uss roosevelt was deployed to the area. it is hard to see yemen as an example of hartmut is him or of iran changing its ways. i have to say and this is something that i learned i did not know before is that iran is really a status quo country. of all places, that applies to iraq. the government in tehran is dead set against the breakup of iraq. they told the leadership in the kurdish -- curtis stand regional government as much. iran does not want three states on its western border. one expert in a think tank said

for the kurds -- they will take action as early as it -- next year, it is a fantasy. no one wants a change of orders. no one wants a state's collapse. a third observation. coming back to the nuclear agreement. i did not detect much loading -- gloating about the agreement. it was a balanced agreement, it was not perfect from the iranian perspective, it was not even necessary, but it was useful for all sides. it is a win-win for all states. what i did get was a sense that the poor and -- foreign policy elite think that with regard to the regional issues, iran is a -- in a very good position. they see themselves as the strongest state and the most stable in the region. they see that they are doing relatively well in syria and in iraq.

but what delights than the most and this comes back to a theme i picked up in my earlier tour is the judgment that the u.s., the only power they see can do them tremendous heart -- harm now accepts iran as a negotiating partner and as a serious player. they are delighted that the obama administration has shifted its emphasis away from the middle east or stated it and they endorse the region's call for the -- the call for the region to solve its own problems. this translates into iran, the gulf arabs and turkey will have to thrash things out for themselves. they do not see -- care much about the region said one think tank expert, and that policy is a good policy. they have one request as the u.s. makes what they hope is in a did from the region and that is as the u.s. lowers its profile, they hope it will try to convince all its arab allies

and turkey to collaborate with iran in finding regional solutions to the region's problems. the problem i see with this is that iran has its own narrative of events. that does not square with the fact as i know them. or that most other states summarize them. for example, go back to the fact that in the time after the american withdrawal from iraq there was a vacuum. vacuums always come about when a major player leaves a country that is pretty unstable. and who filled it but he was iran. -- it was iran. it was very active in coaching the government. officials came during 2011 regularly. it was also on iran's watch that the iraq he army collapsed and

the islamic state took over northern iraq. do you feel any responsibility for what happened? on your watch? and the answer was i could not find anyone who did. most of -- half of the experts i met with prescribed the rise of the islamic state entirely to other players. saudi arabia, cotter, the uae turkey. they also mentioned the u.s. was providing assistance to the rise of the islamic state. the iranians have a unique and hardly credible narrative of the origins of the war in syria. this is from the deputy foreign minister. "based on our information, the uprising began in the borders and from the early hours of the uprising, foreign forces entered

. demands turned violent and the government took measures to control it. -- to control it or go i asked for fact and documentation and nothing was forthcoming. he also refused to acknowledge bashar assad's role in encouraging terrorism. he emptied his prisons. i'm not sure how other countries are going to be able to negotiate including the resolution of any issues when -- what created the crisis in the first place. there was another statement i found equally amazing. why has hezbollah in fighting in syria? i have you sent them there -- why have you sent them there?

the answer came back lebanon backs the deployment of hezbollah in syria. has below forced to undertake operations and coordination with the government inside syrian borders create this was the deputy foreign minister. he said the people of lebanon be they muslims, sunni, shia, or christians are supporting hezbollah in this. clearly, there is a need of a real and -- reality check. i could find almost no one who took responsibility for the massive killing of civilians the u.s. has labeled crimes against community in syria. either people are not informed or they are in denial. it seems unlikely. there are hundreds of senior officers guiding if not directing the syrian armed

forces and also, many of the volunteer forces that iran has flown in their. thousands including from afghanistan. it is hard to believe they are reporting nothing of what they are observing. what i did find interesting about the issue of the humanitarian catastrophe in syria is that iran has drawn a red line on the issue. what is the red line? they are determined to prevent a safe area or a no-fly zone from coming about. something that, as you can imagine, in humanitarian terms would save a lot of lives and is distress. the deputy minister said we do not support the establishment of a no-fly zone or protected zone. we believe this would couple kate the situation more. iran is prepared to send

volunteers to syria. the flimsy idea they are talking about right now. the deputy minister did not dispute the assertion area -- assertion. this might -- made the why the obama administration is so reluctant to have a safe area. i would say there is a big gap in the understanding of iranians at every level on how iran has laid a role in the regional crisis. even experts do not seem to understand the humanitarian catastrophe that syria policy has helped to bring about. i am curious to know if the iranian objections to the area are indeed the reason that the u.s. refuses to supply a safe zone. in general, iran is a work in progress. it is not clear how things will come out. it is going to be over six months before any real change has -- will happen, i was told

that change will happen. they probably need to -- the cover of regional discussions in order to make that happen. in the meantime, there is no excuse for them not knowing the fact of what has happened in the region. i want to and on a slightly brighter note. i came up with a couple of interesting straws in the wind and these were things that were not told to me but to visiting foreign officials. iran may be ready to open a human rights dialogue with the community. it is probably high time. one of my colleagues from the washington post is in jail for no good reason and that is art of it. there is a plan to revise the criminal code under which nearly 600 people have been hanged in the first part of toy 15. the reason that so many people are being hanged is that the 80% of them are drug traffickers. changes in the kamal code will

reduce the numbers dramatically. these are straws in the wind but it is [indiscernible] thank you. posthost: there are two seats here for those in the back of the room. joyce: thank you everyone for putting this panel together. and speaking about the arab response, i would like to note beginning that there is no one arab response. there is no one arab response almost on any issue today. and also, you can bet that very few in the arab world are sitting today and reading the 150 pages of the iran deal.

on the government level, the arab responses has ranged. the iranian deal, these three countries have very good trade with iran and expect a boost after the deal. on the other hand, you saw saudi, qatar, and egypt to being more cautious. saudi arabia tied it to the limitation of the deal. qatar just said last week there is no better option. in that sense, we have to distinguish between who in the gcc and who in the arab world is talking about the deal. a saudi official two weeks before the deal told me that this is not a realignment. they do not see it as they are

going to iran and abandoning them. they are very concerned of iranian influence, iranian meddling increasing in the region and an outcome -- as an outcome of this deal. talking to the people or looking what people are tweeting, posting on facebook, saying on social media, the iranian problem in the middle east today is much bigger than centrifuges. it is also not just sectarian. it is not sunni versus shia. it is a geopolitical problem. if you look at the polls, there was a poll on iran in 2008 and back then, 80% of arabs viewed iran positively. six years later, 12% in the arab world viewed iran positively.

were these shia and converted to sunnis? no. were they enchanted by the nuclear program and all of a sudden became disenchanted? no. did they like iranian kabob more before and they were exporting more iranian carpets and all of a sudden going to afghanistan or other places to eat kabob? also no. the response i see from the people is very suspicious of the deal. they do not understand what it is the u.s. government and particularly the messaging to the arab government prior to the deal, they had seven months to prepare that the deal will be coming. when it came to the people, when it came to explaining the iranian negotiations to the arab world, we saw nothing.

prior to the deal, there was one interview that precedent obama gave to al-arabia in 2009. this is the level of messaging that is happening in the arab street today. what arabs what drives suspicion in the arab street is iranian behavior as roy put it eloquently. funding a force in the region. what is iran doing fighting syrians and seven donnie -- zebadani? what is has blood doing in yemen question -- has blood doing and yemen? what is iran doing in saddam's town of tikrit?

these are questions being raised a air abuse, by average people -- air abuse by average people who do not understand the number of centrifuges or enrichment but are concerned that this deal would play out badly in i brought with me some cartoons -- sorry, my ink color cartridges ran out. this is of and iranian or rouhani standing on parties of syrians coming in minis, and holding up metal that says agreement. this is on call sam and an iranian mullah running over the

corpse of a middle east nuclear agreement. this is another one that gets to the issue of why -- what arabs are seeing. this is a nuclear agreement the nuclear agreement generating money to terrorism. this is the perception today in the arab world. there's a big question over where is the hundred billion dollars that iran will get from sanctions relief. is he going to go to iranian students? nobody seems to have the answer to that.

in may, and arab official, a high-level official who met the people at the white house was told that the iranian sanctions relief will go to universities and bridges. many arabs certainly hope that this is the case, but looking at the responses from the aside regime and others, there is concerned that it might go more toward barrel bomb score --, more hezbollah fighters and mercenaries coming to the regime. there is a real urgency that the u.s. he complains the deal better to the arab world. , not just to the government. there is an urgency that you

would ask about the camp david commitment. more proactive at home, it is wished by many in combating iranian meddling, whether in syria or lebanon or yemen without that i would just conclude by saying the nuclear deal, while it could be historic in reframing u.s. iranian relationships, it would be just another event, another landmark without transforming the regional confrontation that roy also pointed to. [applause]

>> let me open with the question that will go soon to the audience as well. i am a little puzzled what the appropriate american reaction is to a problem that both of you have pointed at, which is the gulf. there is this huge difference between iranian and saudi iranian and all perceptions of what is going on in the neighboring countries, of who started this, where security lies for one country or the other. so what is the right response? as joyce was suggesting, to push back on iran wherever the u.s. can, or should we be doing what

some iranians are proposing, and also some other people, which is creating some kind of regional security framework in which the turks, the saudi's, the iranians and others can work out their differences. what is the best game here? >> i think a regional security framework is sometime in the distant future, because i think the in mentees and the issues are so great right now -- the enmities cannot be resolved around the table right now. some issues have to be resolved on the ground. that is to say i think in syria the administration hopes to have a conference to which they will invite iran and the great powers like has happened in history.

they will sit around and decide we divided up and so on. that doesn't take much account of the people who have staged the uprisings from the ground up and are still out there fighting for years later. i don't think that's going to bring stability unless someone is being forced to bring results. some problems are not going to resolve quickly. in a case like syria, there needs to be a policy for syria. the president said the united states does not have a policy for syria. it leaves a vacuum, somebody else is going to fill it. it's one of the characteristics of the iranians, they have not managed the crisis with the

outside layer very well. in fact, things have gotten worse, and they don't acknowledge it. i would say the u.s. ought to develop a policy for each of these conflict zones and then try to carry it out. and another thing i also mentioned at the end was, it's important to have at least the u.s. official version of what really happened, because you are not going to be able to discuss things with iran whatsoever if you're operating off to completely different sheets of music where they have almost invented a version of history that does not accord with what anybody else thinks actually happened. pushback, dialogue, or both? >> i think they have to find a balance, they did not get many commitments out of camp david. maritime security, financing

oil shipments. everything we see in washington, we go to a conference, they take a big photo op and then nothing gets implemented. what would resonate would result in syria would be getting everyone to the table. at the moment, sadly, i don't think we are at that stage. those in the opposition still think they can win. as long as we have that, it's hard to see anything happening anytime soon. as roy wrote a few weeks ago you now have 50 group rebels in

syria. >> 54, a couple of days ago. >> i think there are now 12. so the urs is more or less four years behind syria in getting a strategy in place which would greatly help in shaping this debate. >> i will turn to the audience and start right here. have we got a microphone? >> my name is tyler thompson. i'm so happy there's a panel here with three people i deeply admire and whose opinions i deeply trust. roy, what effect does the syrian war have on the domestic iranian politics, and does the deal and the sanctions relief related with the deal have an effect on the domestic impact of the

syrian war? you mentioned if iran won't even admit to the existence of atrocities being committed in syria, what hope is there that the iranians and future syrian negotiations would have a productive role in ending those atrocities in which they are complicit? thank you. >> on the second question, i think there is a real problem here, that the iranians don't grasp what has happened in syria . there is state media there and access to international media. they are fed a diet of success in syria, things going well, the policy being fulfilled and supported. i personally see syria as a catastrophe, not just in the

humanitarian sense but i don't see where it's going, i don't see how it's going to end in any peaceful way anytime soon. it always happens with the war of this type where there is a huge popular rebellion. tensions rising out of it that are unpredictable. they don't see the complexity of it. they don't see what their role has really been. it's a huge problem when you try to sit down if you want to sit around the table and you have a completely different understanding of the events that occurred. as for the view on the street, i found it surprisingly ordered of the official policy. what is the view on the street? a journalist walks up to me at the university and tells me why i should be ignoring anything that is going on right in front

of me. death to america death to israel, and so on. that it is not what the iranians really think. i have an immediate report with this reporter. because we are always looking for the other side of the story. i was talking to him about syria and i said, are you aware of what has happened in syria on the ground? are you aware of the role of your government and the horrific results on the ground? and he said i think syria is part of the state policy and is a justified part of the state policy. it's part of our interest, we have to stay there. here is somebody who is an informed journalist. they need a reality check, and nobody is giving it to them. i don't know how to going to come about, but somebody has to do that.

>> if you look at the numbers it's becoming a more costly budget item for iran. estimates are $35 billion have been spent by iranians on keeping the regime afloat in damascus. has a lot has already lost -- has below has lost more fighters in syria that it has lost in syria in the last war. i don't know at which point will the iranian leadership see that this trend is not sustainable that assad cannot win in this. we are seeing some statements from iranian officials, that we know assad is not a president for life, but does that mean there will be a reverse in the

policy? i'm not so sure. hezbollah is more and more involved in syria today. as you remember in 2013 when hezbollah entered the war, they went to liberate a small town. now you move to other towns and it is not ending anytime soon. until that change in the mindset in iran happens that assad is too costly and unsustainable and that they can maintain -- the goal is to maintain its route to lebanon. if those are secure, maybe we will see a change.

>> thank you very much. i want to ask something more about the neighbors. you alluded a bit too death to israel cries, and of course we know that netanyahu is extremely angry at the policy, at the deal. i would like to hear what the arab press has been saying about this, given the various differences you alluded to. i would like to know about the response to catholics on which is right nearby. -- the response to on -- kaza kstan. >> maybe you could just sum it up for us. >> i don't know what it is.

>> thanks for your question. the error response -- again, i was not as -- it was not as monolithic as the israeli response. the story the it has taken a much different position than israel. the negotiations have been ongoing since bill burns started it in 2006 or 2007. in theory there is support for a deal that stops iran from getting a nuclear weapon. that definitely puts them in a different light than netanyahu. i think on regional behavior and countering iran's meddling, you do see similarities today

between israel and the arab world. >> i will come back to the point i made earlier in my remarks. the israeli position, the official rhetorical position is rather hard to understand because the professional position, and this goes for people in government and out of government we really care about the regional. the government does not mention much about the buildup. something has to be done to control this and diffuse it. if the deal does not go through -- the deal will go through, the only question is does the united date all doubt? i'm not sure there's any

advantage to that. it seems hard to grasp, at least on the facts. and the israeli foreign policy elite, they understand the different threat. it's not a nuclear threat. >> let me take two questions here and then we will have to wrap up because we are running out of time. >> thank you very much. [indiscernible] [indiscernible]

>> it seems to me there are two types, top-down wars, wars of state interest, and bottom-up wars based on fundamental hatreds. i'm struck by ms. karam's statement of public opinion polls that shows a very rapid movement toward animosity and hostility, the cartoons. are we seeing a growth of hatred, a desire for revenge? in that case, you mention the security architecture.

i don't see how security architecture could work if we are dealing with such fundamental hatreds that are developing from the bottom. >> let me turn back to joyce on fundamental hatred and the alternatives. >> if you see the trajectory of the coverage in the arab media, it is becoming much more alarming. there is a much bigger and tight iranian sentiment -- anti-iranian sentiment. i would trace that maybe to -- back then we started to see it change in how arabs view iran. but the climax of it all was syria, the iraq war for sure,

but this is totally a syria effect. i don't have numbers, i don't have data, how is this helping isis, or how is it helping other extremist groups recruit? a big slogan for them is anti-shia, angie has blog, and iran. -- anti-hezbollah. it does give more urgency to tackled these problems rather than let them pressed her. i'm not sure even how much you can keep syria together at a certain point. how are these people going to live together again, given the degree of animosity and hatred?

xo on the question of alternatives to the nuclear deal? >> i can't think of one. the regime has told the iranian public that it doesn't want a nuclear weapon, it never did. we're just doing this to appease the international community and restore our standing in the world, and it's a small price to pay after all this isolation. there is an issue in fact which i came upon that might come up in the parliament, assuming the government doesn't manage it out of existence. that is the additional protocol which iran is supposed to ratify

through the parliament as part of the nuclear deal. it is in the deal itself. there's a lot of objections certainly from the conservative side to this additional protocol because it does require all sorts of inspections that they think are unnecessary. inspections are one of the debate issues. they don't want sudden unannounced inspections. they say they are not necessary. they say if you have television cameras looking 24/7 at a location, do you really need to send in in specters on a no announcement basis? it's infringing on the sovereignty of iran and the dignity of iran. i don't think it is the end of the deal by any means. the government is going to do its best to prevent that from

happening. >> a very good question on the hard-liners in iran, where they stand. i'm not so sure they are that happy with the deal, to be honest. first of all, they are not happy about having all these inspectors come to iran and inspect military sites and nuclear facilities. iran has been insulated since 1979 from this kind of western officials going they are -- going there. they have made a lot of money evading sanctions and getting money from the black market to fund activities. so all of a sudden now you're seeing a new trend in iran and perhaps questions, where will this money go? the have to answer the iranian

public, and that does put the hard-liners in a bad spot to be >> the hard-liners really are the losers in this whole deal. they are being disempowered. all the people who have been engaged in smuggling, and that's probably a pretty big lobby, are going to be hurting because they will have no real role. we should not underestimate the impact of the hard-liners being dealt a bad hand here. but we should not overestimate the ability of the others to change things in the near term. it's a very dynamic discussion there in iran. it's not just over the nuclear deal. there are issues that everybody understands have to be worked out.

is the iranian government going to manage overseas operations of the revolutionary guard? r is it going to be a revolutionary guard their reports to the supreme leader? we know where the hard-liners come down on that discussion. it's a crucial thing and i would expect an immediate answer, but you can be sure it will be in the deal. >> there's a silver lining here of sorts. think about where we would be if iran were headed for a nuclear weapon. think of for we would be of two or three months from now, iran could be expected to have enough highly enriched uranium for least one nuclear weapon. that would be a much worse scenario for the region, for everybody than the current

situation. i want to thank joyce and roy, and i hope you will join me in doing so. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> were on c-span, the senate foreign relations committee holds a hearing on human trafficking. a state department official will testify about their annual report on the issue. like coverage begins at 10:00 a.m. eastern time. at 8:00 p.m. eastern time, a debate between canada's four main political parties. canadian government relations have been called for october 19. like coverage here on c-span, c-span radio, and www.c-span.org .

>> when the senate takes its break, we will feature book tv programming beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern. at the end of the summer, look for two special programs. we are live from our nations capital from the book festival. sunday, live in-depth program with lynne cheney. book tv on c-span2, television for serious readers. president obama -- obama delivers a speech at american university. stating that rejecting the deal would leave war is the only remaining option. he made reference to president kennedy's 19 63 speech at american university about negotiating with the soviet union. his remarks are about an hour. [applause]

pres. obama: thank you. thank you so much. thank you. thank you very much. thank you. everybody, please have a seat. thank you very much. i apologize for the slight delay. even presidents have a problem with toner. [laughter] it is a great honor to be back at american university, which has prepared generations of young people for service in public life. i want to thank president kerwin and the american university family for hosting us here today.

52 years ago, president kennedy, at the height of the the same university on the subject of peace. the berlin wall had just been built. the soviet union had tested the most powerful weapons ever developed. china was on the verge of acquiring the nuclear bomb. less than 20 years after the end of world war ii, the prospect of nuclear war was all too real. with all of the threats that we face today, it is hard to appreciate how much more dangerous the world was at that time. in light of these mounting threats, a number of strategists in the united states argued we had to take military action against the soviets, to hasten what they saw as inevitable confrontation. but the young president offered