to the criminal act that they won't -- they want to commit. i think you will see that. meeting with ministers from across the world, it will be the anniversary of the passing of a united nations resolution, people are agreeing on a nothing else but the importance of the terrorist threat. one of the best practices discussed with our counterparts -- with 70 countries, how can they put on the books undercover operations? it is important that they are there to figure out who the terrorists are you actually kill people were go join the terrorist group, versus those who are just talking and inking. it is a sign of the carefulness applied.has

in the hundreds of cases, while we have prosecuted, there has not been one suspect that has successfully and lamented the entrapment defense. entrapmentted the defense. ken: we will wrap it up. [applause] [applause] >> on the next washington journal, a look at the donald trump campaign and his positions on key policy. and then the executive director of the young invincibles talks about impacting millennial voters. it features mark perry discussing his article in politico. washington journal, live every morning at 7 p.m., on c-span. you can join the conversation with your calls, and comments on

facebook and twitter. >> wednesday, bipartisan policy center looks at immigration policy and the positions of the 2006 8 candidates. it is -- 2016 presidential candidates. it is live on c-span. , institutey night -- policy studies was the , talking about the war on terrorism. >> who is isis, why are they so violent? these questions are in the book among the more important and something we can do about, what is the u.s. policy regarding isis and why is it not working? are we just doing the war wrong, or should there be a war against

terrorism at all? those are the most important and will be the most useful. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern. we continue our look at the forum with the discussion on special operations and intelligence ops. [applause] [applause] thanknk you, i want to clark for having us here. i also want to think mr. olson for stopping in. our other guests only got as far as denver last night, said he could not join us today. , dr. miketh us vickers.

former of special operations in the pentagon. who has held many senior roles in the pentagon. i will open on questions that have touched your careers. fightingall spent time extremist militants in your roles. .ith that it , looking at al qaeda and other threats thatis the national security is making it out to be to the u.s. public? and is al qaeda on the back burner for good, or are you just prepping for the next battle? since you are in the private sector now, feel free to share

anything with us at all. [laughter] michael: the threat of a terrorist attack remains a national security threat, clear and present danger along with cyber attack. policymakers'minds every day. threat -- a bigger isil is a bigger threat because they can inspire radical attacks across the world. but al qaeda is more sophisticated. so if an airliner blew up over the u.s., it would more likely than qaeda today ban -- isial. lossesa has suffered

come up and they are still in the game. they can come back in various ways. cap lane -- kathleen: i do think it is a significant threat. i do not think it has been blown up. , and is an area territorial region, that they have occupied and operated from. and they do operate worldwide. out,eda is not permanently but we can try to keep them there. it has degraded because of a lot of worldwide attention. not least of all the determined to my left and right. -- the two gentlemen to my left and right. qaeda, al-shabaab, you name

it, it takes them long-term tools that all the we have. kim did you expect: we would still be a nation in this fight now? i want to say that i am glad to be back in this forum. i apologize for not being michael lumpkin, but i am pleased to be on this stage. i spent most of my time in m,iform avoiding them -- ki but not for lack of respect for her tenacity. it is good to be with you. i left military service for years ago. l was not on our scope.

i cannot talk about them from my historical perspective. mike ande with kathleen. it is a real threat. scary too many. it is a real threat to us. speak of them as the next generation of al qaeda. army.er credit them as an group,a is a terrorist they are organized like an army, with military equipment, they seize hold territories, they do things -- it is just not an apples to apples comparison.

threads,e are other russia -- threats, russia in and hezbollah, on and on. are the national security efforts skewed by the fear of isis and al qaeda win they have not caused nearly as much damage in our country recently compared to other actors? we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. we need to learn how to. --o not think that we send a spend a disproportionate amount or taking away, from our ability to focus on longer-term challenges.

now, resources are limited. that is money, sequestration the it harder -- makes it harder. you will have challenges with money, people, and the vessels toolwe have -- full set -- set we have. we basically have a cold war tool set. it is a constant prioritization ools to usell -- t and to what end. it is a selective engagement energy. the u.s. has chosen for many -- it is just as satisfying to the public, because it is difficult to see from the public, to put resources here and not there. ofe: we are in a time

stability and we are accruing security threats, the one that you did not mention was the rise of china. it is really probably the focus .f economic competition ,hina, east asia, russia jihadists in the middle east and we need to deal with them all. and the capabilities that you need to do is her conflict with china. the competition with china is fundamentally economic, that is instability in the middle east, and vice versa. you need to have a poor olio of capabilities -- portfolio of capabilities to deal with these. i have never seen such a ride range -- wide range of threats to thee very high-end lower actors.

steve, do you have the tools you need to do the job? being donee, what is in ukraine to fight russian influence their -- there: pentagon officials talk about russian interference, but i do not hear what u.s. special operations is doing about it. they have spoken about the asymmetric warfare there. they do, what can they do? that will be here on friday, that could be a good question for him.

the first word in private sector is private, so i will not go someplace i should not go. but i will say that it was a classic special operation and they had gone to school on special operations concepts and executing. but what specifically special operations forces might do is amenable no caps off. surprise it was no that russia is a good at unconventional warfare. we know that that is something they invest in homilies on them execute that in chechnya -- we execute that in chechnya. that is deathly not something i would have foreseen --

definitely not something i would have foreseen. so what the u.s. is doing about it, special operations is a good question. particularly interested in working with nato allies to shore up the ability of those baltic states to withstand pressure. those little green men like approaches from russia. ukraine is much harder. i was asked about mozilla before, and asked moldova love, georgia, these are not new territories. the put forward a view that we would spend more time on partner the --coming out of summit, it is important to provide defensive weapons from the u.s. to the ukrainian forces.

and some special operations training should be a part of that. by and large, efforts should be on the future we can stick to the article with the nato states. kim: working through other , -- or mores direct? mike: russia does work through , and wherethey can those proxies on the verge of losing, the work with -- they work with conventional forces. the nation back to proxy war. oris not just in ukraine those around the former survey union -- former soviet union, it is in the middle east as well. steve: special operations across

the nato countries is unprecedented. there is actually a command within the native structure -- nato structure, there is a headquarters, people going to , fieldery day training training that takes place every day. and exercises that take place with a special operations flavor across nato countries. i want to make sure that their indirect vision of the level of operation -- cooperation. kim: so while we do not see the bootsood on the ground -- on the ground in terms of training the locals, there may helping themroops do the same thing, helping them train. what i'm saying is that the coordination, the sharing of tactics, the interrupt the equipment, the knowledge of

capabilities and limitations is at a high level. workof the challenge is to with partners, like the ukrainians, i spent some time there. -- robustt is the building tuitions -- institutions, winning influence, loving putin has done, he may have one in the short term, but he has turned the ukrainians into nationalist. fight --zenship to the so to shift to the fight against groups in syria, the u.s. has a choice, but they have now chosen to be a little hands off, working through the coalition. cominghere be a time

when the u.s. have to choose for more direct warfare? -- lighth the afghan likethe afghan team -- with the afghan team? mike: what we did with afghanistan was remarkable. i would not equate that with the same as what putin has done in ukraine. this is the marriage of precision warfare with non-precision warfare. if you compare to iraq maybe yes.media. -- kim: do you need to ramp up the number of u.s. advisers on the ,round, joint air controllers

things that would make the iraqi forces, the kurdish forces, more effective in the battlefield today? kathleen: i would say that there to grow. the u.s. contribution to include special operators on the training side, there is no doubt about that. but before you grow that out, there is absorption of a capacity issue, the ground forces that are there to work with. there ishere i think rightfully a lot of attention in making sure that we collectively get the iraqis, obviously their there is situation pressure there, but think it forces in-- to get there and give them capable to work with u.s. trainers.

where we haven't done that, kurdish forces is the most doneus -- where we have that, kurdish forces is the most obvious. it has worked well, we brought in firepower to match with their on the ground capabilities and then the training aspect. and i will add, i think that has sustained,ed, he -- you cannot do it limited and think it will take care of the situation. but before we jump in with a lot more, we need those ground forces to use her to come together. forces canground take years to grow, in the interim it seems that isis is growing faster and is doing things like planning plots against the u.s. homeland, said we have the luxury of this time it will take to bring forces up to speed?

mike? is you trained forces, give them some support, but basically they will do the fighting. that takes a lot longer to get them ready man if you are willing -- than if you are willing to go with them on the front lines. if you combined power with the ground force -- kim: i meant afghanistan even now? mike: but even afghanistan in 2001, the reason is you have a ground force, big enough to be the world's greatest to execute the power. if you do not have someone with -- power, it just takes a lot of time. just like training takes time.

so that brings me to the question of the use of special operations, or maybe the overuse of agile operations, for every national security problem that this country faces. one could argue that this white house uses them like the ultimate swiss army knife of the pentagon. do you have the numbers you need to meet the missions that you face? i know you are a few years out, but it is something i can watch. you can go out and protect intelligence forces or engage. 9/11 -- nce mike: since 9/11, we had tripled quadrupled we have

the use of these forces 9/11. is dramatic growth. they are also integrated man. it is what you do with them. -- constitutes maybe 3% of the overall manpower. the definition of special operation is in operation conducted by forces or with other horses are not organized or trained or equipped to conduct. it is a negative definition. is notthe question should special operations forces be bigger, because growth management has been a challenge, but it is whether or not other forces should be equipped to do things that have fallen on special operations over the last few years. as operations were already there

responsive, but there is no reason that other forces cannot do much of what special operations does. , theeen: to make it clear issue is maintaining a high level of quality that is in special operations forces. doing that expansion of them makes the challenge greater, to look why it is time at the rate of forces to see how about training the regular forces. kathleen: -- mike: in 2006, at the height of the iraq war, we had six of vehicles, people call them drones, they are 60 today.

there is plenty of capacity. kim: on that subject, can you on the move tote -- and how you plan to grow to several thousand people to do the same kind of intelligence is different then cia operatives and what they do? mike: it is growing. it is an important initiative in terms of human intelligence. and the department of defense and the military had something to contribute to the overall national effort. that effort,er in it is a compliment. it is a junior partner, not rivaling the side of the cia.

we have support from the the and i -- dni. kim: and is still growing? mike: yes. us too that brings another subject. specials by which operations carried out its trade. sometimes guns, sometimes dreams -- drones. the targeted and usually get most headlines, but it could also give those in the white house a black and white solution to the problem. overused?eting we had 13 years in the middle of these targeted plans,

and yet we have the growth of a second militant that has now surpassed al qaeda, according to the fbi director. so is targeting overused? decade, the past fertilization -- the operation -- of our partners and that has made a different. operations --sm where these operations are really intelligence driven and the analyst are really at the center. strategic effects, al in then its heels pakistan border region, only one of the senior leaders who was there for the 9/11 attacks is less. it is a shadow of what it was

maybe 5-6 years ago. been an effective campaign over many years. kim: but did it pushed the alloon to yemen, because now qaeda has a sophisticated bomb making machine and they are relatively unchallenged. mike: it did open up new friends in syria and -- open up new front in syria and yemen. 90% inked down al qaeda syria. tartars --ust targeting, it is the united states for several years attacking them, and they still survive. it is because syria gave the menu lease on life. pot ofu can't help fight

the problem, but it was not your job to bring ability to the middle east? mike: we are still working on that. steve: there are some nails out there that need to be hammered. isnk that part of it tactical removal of confident leaders of my soul from their positions. isil from their positions. reminding everyone that i sold isil is vulnerable, they have weaknesses. and i think it damages their , to be ablefforts to reach in and with precision take out he leaders.

kathleen: i think it is important in this conversation to remember that we are operating under authorities. these are authorities given in time of conflict that include the ability to use targeted approaches for cash or, for intelligence gathering, and in some i just want to start there, because i do think that the drone debate has become unhelpful, to say the least. does it have a strategic effect? absolutely. as policy makers, we have to be mindful of that reality. but if you look at the progression over time, we do not raze villages. we by and large do not strategically bomb anymore. the fact that we have a toolset now that allows us to really reduce the number of civilian

casualties involved in a thelict, that, i think, is story that's important to tell. are there civilian casualties? yes. are there questions about transparency? yes. and i think we need to address both of those, but i think it has been a good tool in the toolkit, used well, and something we should look at. michael: back to the earlier point, i soul -- isis is different than an army. you need a different strategy than you do against al qaeda. and you defeat an army that's an army. yet, isn't every drone strike a potential recruiting bonanza for the opposition?

there is that theory. we have done a lot of surveys in pakistan. the closer you are to the strike, if you are local, the more in favor of it you generally are. the more you are removed from the fight, the more you complain about your sovereignty being violated and lots of other things. but it has been very supported by the governments. we could not do it without the support of governments. kathleen talked about important cases and the consent of the host nations. i don't buy the argument. business, butough it is a very effective one. a drone is an option, but when you consider a drone versus artillery, or

dropping a bomb, or putting forces on the ground, it is not that bad of an option. for one thing, it can linger. it provides the ability to be patient. it can be recalled without any effect at all. a drone is a far more of delivering a precision strike than some others might be. k. hicks: i want to say what i think this issue gets too, fundamentally, is an information campaign, which we are not great at. k. dozier: what do you mean by an information campaign? k. hicks: when the strike occurs, you point out that it is a recruiting tool. whether it is a recruiting tool or not can be debated. -- weto have attacks that used to have a tax that would be

ks thated as -- attac would be described as drone strikes to enable recruiting. isis has incredible recruiting and a low-tech way. twitter is extremely simple. follow taylor swift. i think we are safe, but we in the united states, we really have -- this is back to the toolset issue. this is not a challenge that is first in fundamentally by a government organization in the light of day trying to tweet out government positions. it has to be more organic than that, and there is a big intelligence support piece of that, and it has to be regional. m. vickers: and the best recruiting tool for these groups is success, successful attacks on the united states, successful conquest of territory.

you look at why people are flocking to isis. they have established a caliphate, and they are successful. k. dozier: that brings me to transparency. disclosure, discuss this before hand and it turns out we don't agree on this one. i believe when special operations forces are you so frequently and so often exposed /are used so frequently and so often exposed in social media -- are used so frequently and so often exposed in social media, ringleader benghazi in libya, that got exposed on social media. should there be a disclosure operation so that if it does become exposed, you can take part in the information campaign, instead of, what i

often encounter a spokesman or official saying, i have to check to see how much we can declassify or how much i can tell you on that? well, that's because we live in a fairly open world. you mentioned two ways of media. able to adapt rather rapidly to that, but there are also things we want to keep secret because we want to do these raids again. we don't want to tell exactly how we did it, who the forces were, or put them or their families at risk or anything else. k. dozier: but there's a difference between saying this unit carried out this raid by helicopters, etc., versus saying -- some of the news releases we are seeing from actions out of syria right now, for instance. thatentagon announced there was a drone strike the other day, or a strike the other day, that took out the us on group. asanind -- took at the hous

group. there it is, for all the reporters who would like to get the exclusive, it's the press release. why not have a plan like that for all operations? m. vickers: i think they do. not always's helpful to announce all of your successes. ,he kind of operation itself ,hen revealed, can disadvantage so it's always carefully considered what is said and when you say it. what about sharing

what you know with the press? this administration has had hot times and cold times in terms of groups ofll bring reporters in to give us briefings on what they are seeing. why not release the satellite images or the gerona images that show the movement of russian drone into uke -- or images that show the movement of russian forces into ukraine? m. vickers: that was done by ngos and others. k. dozier: i thought you are quoting dod. m. vickers: no, there is a lot of information out there. we did share information with .orces in ukraine that has been done throughout history, cuban missile crisis, grenada, a lot that i can think of, but we don't want to give

away high-end capabilities that will show an adversary exactly what we can do in certain cases. you have to think about what you are going to release and how. k. dozier: i don't see it very often. it is a tool the pentagon has employed in the past, such as when georgia was invaded and the press was being told one thing by the russian side. we had intelligence agencies show us here are the satellite images we are seeing. commercial to satellite groups and get independent verification. that gave me as a reporter a way to see what you all were seeing rather than just having to take it on faith. i think we did that with ukraine. i think we showed forces coming across the border. k. dozier: why not with isis? i will take the easy out. as special operations commander,

i refer all queries to the pentagon. [laughter] it was an up to decide the policy and revealing operational -- wasn't up to us to decide the policy in revealing operational information. just a couple more questions before i open it up to the audience. the new york times had an article out recently about navy seals and the joint special operations command. one of the officials quoted in the article, anonymously, as i recall, said jsoc investigates jsoc, and there was an holdation that they do not themselves to the same accountability standards as other armed forces. alleged drone strike allegedly hit a wedding party in

yemen. i found out that to general had ordered an investigation into that, even ordered to investigations into that, and as a reporter trying to report to the american public, that showed soc was trying to investigate itself. why not publish more of this? number one, in a particular case, the investigation was actually done by centcom. theink that disproves thesis that our special operations forces are grading their own homework. i don't give much credibility to an anonymous source. many of the other sources in that article had not served anytime lately. time,say that most of the almost all of the time, special operations forces are a support

team for a bigger operation. special operations is almost always in support, always operating under the approval of an ambassador under the command of a commander. in almost every special operation, runways have to be provided, airspace has to be cleared, medical support, iselligence analysts, this not a secret society or a set that operates independently. operates with full transparency within the military. k. dozier: not to me. , butmpkin: no, not to you for transparency within the chain of command and within the structure provided to do that. as a matteray that , a chain of command

cannot investigate within its own chain. it takes an outsider to do an investigation. it may be that within the , weial operations community appoint an air force component leader to investigate something that happens in the navy component, but to think that there is some sort of secret, , there has never, to my knowledge, been any sort of revelation of some type of cover-up of a special operation investigation. k. dozier: what is the track record of investigations within the force? m. lumpkin: there are multiple investigations. , thereg historically were multiple investigations under way every day looking at things that did not seem right to commanders or other leaders in response to allegations that

had been made in some way against the force. adjudicated, and many actions have taken place. as you don't know about the investigations, you also don't know about the actions that have taken place, sometimes to protect the individual or some other aspect of force capability. it has all been quite well disciplined. i don't see secrecy is necessary to protect an individual who might have committed a crime. well, those things become a matter of record. ms. dozier: not openly available record. mr. lumpkin: if it's a military record, it is. ms. dozier: last question, iran.

if the deal goes through and iran is allowed to ramp up its energy only nuclear enterprise, intelligence community know if they have cheated? i have high confidence in the ability of the u.s. intelligence community to iran.r lots of things in there are always challenges with their vacation but the structure the deal -- we know a lot about iran. one of the generals from special operations who is serving on the ground right now, at a conference recently in tampa, said that the head of the force inside iraq right now honestly believes that the u.s. and theyting isis learned this through intercepted communications, etc.

in this deal with iran anyway foster some sort of understanding between u.s. forces and the iranian forces such that those kind of misunderstandings go away? ms. hicks: i think you can look with some hope to the fact that we have been able to sit down in negotiation with the iranians, not just in the u.s., obviously, but with our european partners and others. you can look with some hope to improvements in understanding, but i think it is an extremely long road. conspiracy theories in the middle east run every which way. if you were to have that conversation with somebody in the uae, they would probably tell you they think the u.s. and iran have struck a deal together to devise the middle east. the reality is, we are in for a very long era of instability in crossddle east with

currents running every which way and the u.s. will have to be able to talk to parties in the region and reassure them as best they can about u.s. interest. there are a lot of conflict points between the united states and iran that haven't changed because of this deal. removal of power in syria. we are supporting the cooties in yemen. we are so -- hootie in yemen. s in yemen. there is a whole range of activity that is unlikely to be made whole. ms. dozier: one last follow-up. -- quickly did we know weeks, months, days? it depends what

they are doing. it just depends. some could be hours. .thers could be a week you cannot just cheat like that. whole scale, large-scale cheating takes some time. some might literally be hours. others might be a week, others something else. the question is then what do you ?o about it ms. dozier: does the opening with iran mean the u.s. or other intelligence services could have greater visibility to what's going on? mr. vickers: the deal structure is to give us greater access. access is usually a good thing, but we are not fully dependent on it. ms. dozier: to be continued.

with that, i open it up to the audience. have a question about sequestration. saw a largeo, we announcement by the army coming down, 40,000 troops. sequestration could take that down another 30,000. that doesn't include cuts to the national guard and reserves. given that we depend so much on military forces for enablers in recruiting, what kind of impact is that going to have given that we are doing more with our special ops forces? ms. hicks: thank you for that softball. i had the pleasure of being in cuts werethe day the announced. it is definitely going to have an effect on special operations

forces. it is going to have an effect overall. the united states has made a decision to reduce the amount is going to spend on defense, at least in the base budget, and that's a national level decision. that's a political decision that has to do with what we spend, how we tax, what we spend on entitlements, what we spend on domestic programs, and national security. defenses the tail on the dog. those of us who live in the defense community, it boggles our minds. we are the fleas in the tail, if i keep going with the analogy, but the rest of the public is not focused on that. whether it is the army drawdown, up tempo to find, the that forces are feeling and -- in several key areas, whatever it is going to be, it is going to be lagging,

unfortunately, and that is what we have to live with. the telltale signs that we have underinvested in our military to come too late to fix some of the problems, and then we will be back in our usual mode of trying to catch up. we do have a release valve, if you will. --h of so calm happen witht sequestration. we will continue to live withoutyear for socom an ability to plan long-term. when it comes to the threats of the high-end where we are trying build outs, it is extremely challenging to do that in a world in which we don't know from year-to-year what the budget is going to look like. so, just predictability, even if it is a low level of funding, just predictability will help us

plan for the kind of defense we need for the challenges we face. sequestration is also particularly mindless. it cuts your least effective program by the same amount it cuts your most affection. -- most effective. it is an abdication of responsibility. how our services prioritized? i think i have used a biological analogy before. organisms shrink to protect the core. special operations forces are not at the core of any big service capabilities, so the services, and they have the luxury of doing it, provide the in the budgets special operations needs. most of the special operations community in the last decade has not been in the core fighting community. it has been intelligence analyst , technical controls, these

kinds of things. special operations has driven itself. i think what sequestration will on eacht more pressure of the services to find room in their reduced budget to invest [no audio]of well publicized that between communication al qaeda south and al qaeda central about the brutality of isis.

i would term at an impotent international response to this. has there been anything concrete, in your mind, directed toward isis to the incentivize the kind of brutality? mr. vickers: we are certainly trying 2-d incentivize it by dlling as many -- to de-incentivizeto it by killing as many of them as we can. on theow, we are focused west. he didn't pay attention to that kerry did isis makes war on anything, and it has been -- he didn't pay attention to that. isis makes war on anything. at some point, it is going to

backfire on them as well. -- if sunni areas of iraq you try to look at it in straight military terms and say -- guys2000 vehicles and vehicles defeat an army of 50,000 that we had spent training, itollars was because of politics, frustration to the state, loyalty to the central state, etc., and that will turn at some point on isis as well. >> jennifer griffin, fox news. i have a question for admiral olson. do you see a time when women can serve in special operations forces, delta force, rangers, navy seals, and if you think you be asking for an

extension sometime this year? for the panel as a whole, do you bynk the u.s. created isis invading iraq in 2003? mr. vickers: i will answer the first question and let the panel get the rest of it. [laughter] have been female operators in the special operations community for a long time. they have lived under the same conditions as the men. they have served in military information support roles, civil affairs rules, have performed with great distinction, sometimes quite heroically. and there is much more opportunity, i think, for women to serve across the special operations community. i do see increased roles for --en because of special or

across special operations. that does not mean i am a proponent of all specialties being open to all women all the time, but i do think there is much more women can do in very important roles in combat environments. and i will -- ms. dozier: i just wanted to follow. had the physical attributes to join a navy seal team, what do you think it would unit cohesion to have her on the team? mr. lumpkin: there are women who have served as attachments to platoons and marine corps teams at very small levels . of a dozen people, two of them might be women. ms. dozier: but that is everyone onan entr

that team relying on that woman to drag them out of a firefighter risking getting shot. mr. lumpkin: yes, if it is a question of what it will do to unicode using, i don't think that is the right question. it is what -- unit cohesion, i don't think that is the right question. it is what will it do tactically in the field? the question is how tactical will respond to women being the first to take a bullet on a target. i will just remind you that their role on target was to be women, not to be combat soldiers, and the first thing they did was take the helmet

off, let their hair down, corralled the women and children and have a very important the target that only women could do. i think expanding that kind of thatthat women can perform men cannot is something we have to take every opportunity to do. ms. dozier: but you would be more comfortable with that than having them be first through the door in a combat role. mr. lumpkin: if you're asking me as an american male, yes, but i don't want to sound like an old white guy. i think we are only having part of the discussion about women in combat, and this wasn't supposed to be about that. but if we are willing to put women on the front line to take willingt bullet, are we to cause women