sanctions on a rant for support of terrorism, human rights abuses and against the ballistic missile pressed -- program. no one expects their bad behavior to change. we know who we are dealing with. the we be able to use powers we have used in the past, and build upon them to take action against iran, particularly in light that they will have additional resources. can we do that? and can congress work with the administration to strengthen those tools without violating the jc poa? i want to know how the administration is updating its regional deterrence strategy against the stabilizing iranian activities and how we can work with partners to build capacity to counter iran, especially israel. the chairman mentioned the lifting of the international arms embargo. that is a great concern, as to how low will have impact on our

regional partners. how will it impact in arms race? these are questions we need to get the best information we can in making our decisions. lastly, let me mention this. i think it is critically important. what are our options if we walk away from this? how will be be received internationally? will we be able to maintain sanctions with international partners? and will iran come back to the negotiating table with a country that has walked away from an agreement? these are questions we need to understand. we need to know that the options are right now, do we go forward and what are the options, what are the consequences if we don't? mr. chairman, we have a full plate, and i look forward to hearing from the witnesses. i hope the members of this committee will use the information we get today to debate the issue, take the time we have, and do what is right for the american people, and ultimately make the decision that we think is best to prevent

iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power. senator corker: thank you senator cardin, i appreciate so much the way we have worked together in the entire committee. with that, i know that our witnesses here today need no introduction. they are well-known not only here but around the world in spite of our policy differences, i think each of us deeply appreciate them that make this. we deeply appreciate the tremendous effort that you have put out on behalf of the country. we thank you for being here today. we thank you for being willing to be here today as long as it takes for everybody to get their answers. and with that, i would like to introduce electively, that's collectively, secretary john kerry. moniz, who hast

been understanding the technical aspects of the deal. -- who has been affirmedle positionsl,ew the entire time, we thank you in spite of some of these concerns. i think you all understand the drill. take five minutes or so to explain. as i looked at your testimony, i know it is brief. to warn people in advance, i'm going to defer my questions and move to you immediately thereafter and use my time to interject as things move on. with that, secretary kerry. secretary kerry: thank you, mr. chairman and ranking member cardin. we really do appreciate the chance to discuss with you the comprehensive plan that we and

our partners have developed with therein regarding the future of this nuclear program. let me emphasize everybody, this is just the united states of america. these are other nuclear powers. friends -- france, britain, russia, china. they have a pretty good understanding of this field and of the challenges. i have appreciated the way in which they and germany, which is the plus one, all came together, all contributed, all work part of this. thisre not just looking at table negotiating. you are looking at what the international community, the p5 was one, -- plus one, negotiated. they are experts. every one of them, and nuclear technology, and ratification, and verification. they are smart people who have spent a lifetime doing this. they have signed off on this agreement.

i am joined by two cabinet secretaries, who's helped was absolutely invaluable. i think all of you for the role that congress plays. i was privileged to be the chairman of this committee when we passed the sanctions effort. debate.emember the we passed it unanimously. it played a very significant the in bringing her into table and helping to make it clear that we needed to bring about a serious and productive negotiations with iran. from the day that those talks began, we were crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal. we defined it up front. as a deal that closed off for pathways to a bomb. uranium, plutonium, and the covert. and weour standard believed we have achieved that. after almost two years of intensive talks, the facts are

crystal clear. the plan that was announced last week in vienna is in fact a deal that doesn't shut off those pathways. -- doesides us with shut off those pathways and provides us with guarantees with a lifetime and the participation of brand that we know what they are doing. -- of a random we know what they are doing. they already have what they want. they got it 10 years ago or more. they already conquered the fuel cycle. when we began our negotiations, iran had enough fissile material for 10-12 arms. -- bombs. they had 19,000 centrifuges. up from the 163 they had back in 2003, when the prior administration was engaged with

them on this very topic. this is not a question of giving them what they want. it's a question of how do you hold the program that? -- back? how do you dismantle the weapons program? let's understand what was really on the table. dismantle their ability to be able to build a nuclear weapon, and we have achieved that. nobody has ever talked about actually dismantling their entire program, because when that was talked about, that is to they went from 163 19,000. everybody here knows what the options are for actually stopping that. it is called military action. they are not going to stop it otherwise. they have already proven that. they proved it all of those years. under the terms of this agreement, iran has agreed now to remove 98% of its stockpile.

voluntarily. of their destroy 98% stockpile of enriched uranium. they will dismantle two thirds of their installed centrifuges, and take out the existing core of a heavy reactor and fill it with concrete. -- iran has agreed to refrain from producing highly enriched uranium, and weapons grade plutonium for at least 15 years. and if they began to do that, moniz looked at you, we will know it immediately. agreed to accept additional protocol. that is outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience, which put in additional access requirements, precisely so we do know what iran is doing. they have to ratify it before the un's sanctions are lifted at

the end of this process. they have to have passed it. they have agreed to live by it from day one. they are going to live by the additional protocol. in addition, there are additional transparency measures. if iran fails to comply, we will know it. and we will know it quickly and we will be able to respond accordingly. sanctions oning the way up to the most draconian options we have today. none of them are off the table in time.int many of the measures that are in this agreement are therefore not just 10 years, not just 15 years, not just 20 years. of which there are measures for each of those times. life, forever.r as long as iran was within the

npt. north korea has pulled out, but iran has not. two years ago when negotiations began, we faced and around that was enriching uranium of the 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground. they were rapidly stockpiling hadched uranium and installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges. they were building a heavywater reactor that could produce weapons grade for tony amador the rate to produce one or two bombs per year. experts assess the breakout time then as a result, the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon was about 23 -- two have been three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. except for the diplomatic support we have built with other

countries, that we have accumulated, we pass that would disappear overnight. deal we haveve to reached is not what i have seen ads on tv suggesting disingenuously. it is a better deal. it is not some kind of unicorn arrangement involving iran's complete situation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple. our own intelligence community will tell you. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that to you. the choice we face is between an agreement that will ensure the nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and completely peaceful. or no deal at all. that is the choice. the fact is that there are 189 nations that live id npt -- by the npt. five of them are, as we know, the main nuclear powers of the

u.n.. nonnuclear ine power. but they live by it. and we have lived by what the iaea does by assuring what all of those nations are doing, including 12 that enbridge -- enr ifi thec u.s. moves to unilaterallyh. be the the result will united states will walking away from all the restrictions we have received -- achieved. and a great big green light for a rented double enrichment, -- for a run to double enrichment, install more efficient center patients, and do it all -- centrifuges and do it all without transparency measures we have secured. prevented we have will then start taking place. all the voluntary rollbacks of their program will be undone.

u.s., after the laboriously negotiating with five other partners were to walk away, we are on our own. our partners will not walk away with us. instead, they will walk away a sanctions regime they helped to put in place. we will have squandered the best chance we have to solve this problem peacefully. make no mistake, president obama has made it crystal clear we will never accept a nuclear armed iran. he's only person who has developed a weapon capable of guaranteeing that. he has not only develop it, he has depleted. the fact -- deployed it. has,act is, iran now whether we like it or not, they have developed experience with a nuclear fuel cycle. developed the ability

to produce fissile material for bombs. we cannot bomb that knowledge away. nor can we sanction the knowledge away. remember, sanctions did not stop the nuclear program from growing steadily to the point that it had accumulated enough this material to produce those 10 nuclear weapons. by the way, they did not choose to produce them. unlike north korea, they created a nuclear weapon and exploded one, and pulled out of the npt. iran has done none of that. the truth is, the vienna plan will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, lasting means of limiting the nuclear program than any alternative that has been spoken of. and to those who are thinking about opposing the deal because of what might happen in the year 15 or 16 or 20. we walk away, year 15 or 16 or 20 starts tomorrow.

any of the long-term verification or transparency safeguards we have but in place. havethe past week, i spoken at length about what this deal is. i want to make their what this deal was never intended to be. first of all, as the chief negotiator, i can to you that i never uttered the words, anywhere, anytime, nor was it any part of the discussion we had with the radiance -- iranians. it was designed to discuss the nuclear issue and that alone. if we got caught up with all the other issues, we would never get where we needed to to stop the nuclear program. it would be staying there for account -- forever, negotiating one aspect after the other. the highest priority of president obama was to make sure they could not get a nuclear weapon. we were disciplined in that. we did not set out, even though

we don't like it, and i have extensive plans i will layout to you if you want them, about how we are going to push back against their other activities. against terrorism, contributions to violence, all of those are unacceptable. as much to us as they are to you. but i have news for you. can i runck against with a nuclear weapon is very different from pushing back without one. we are guaranteeing they won't have one. we are working very closely with the gulf states, today ashton carter was in saudi arabia. the foreign minister says that the nuclear deal appears to have all the provisions necessary to curtail the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. the mris are supportive, the foreign minister of iran is

going to be in the emirates this weekend. -- suggest wes are going to continue to press information about the missing american, the immediate release of americans who have been unjustly held, and there is not a challenge in the entire region that we want push back against -- one to push back against if they are involved. but i would tell you, none of those challenges would be enhanced if iran gets a nuclear weapon. the outcome cannot be guaranteed by sanctions alone. i wish it could. but it cannot be. by the way, it also can't be guaranteed by military action alone. our own military tells us that. only viable option here is a comprehensive diplomatic resolution of the type that is reached in vienna. in that deal, we believe we will show it to you today, and in the days ahead, we will make our

country and allies favor. it will ensure that the nuclear program remains under intense scrutiny forever, and we will know what they are doing. it will ensure that the world community is united in ensuring that iran's nuclear activities will remain peaceful, even as we also stay united in pushing back against its other activities in the region which we object to. we believe this is a good deal for the world, a good deal for america, a good deal for our allies and friends in the region, and we think it does deserve your support. senator corker: thank you. secretary moniz. secretary: thank you. i appreciate the chance to discuss the jcp oa. iran froment events getting a nuclear weapon, provide strong verification measures that gets us time to respond if they choose to

violate terms, and fundamentally takes none of our options off the table. i want to stress that america's leading nuclear experts in the department of energy were involved throughout negotiations. they all played important roles. these nuclear experts work essential to evaluating and developing technical proposals and support of the u.s. delegation. as a result of their work, i'm confident technical underpinnings of this deal are solid, the department of energy stands ready to assist in the implementation. the deal meets the president's objectives of verification of any nuclear program, that it is exclusively peaceful and sufficiently time to respond if it is otherwise. the jcp oa will extend for at least 10 years, the time it would take for around run to aoduce fissile material for

first explosive, to at least one year from the current rate at time of two or three months. the deal addresses the uranium industry -- enrichment, plutonium pathways. the luzon parameters, as the ranking member mentioned, are maintained and strengthened, not weaker, but strengthened in the final agreement. this means restricting the number, type and location of centrifuges, dialing the r and, reducing enriched uranium stockpile of low enriched uranium, and prohibiting introduction of any fissile material. excess infrastructure is also removed from fordham. all these reasons taken together, the one-year break out timeline for accumulating highly enriched uranium. something we have not stressed,

but i do want to add. at the end of these 10 years, iran will have far fewer than 19,000 centrifuges, because they ,cknowledge the breakage rate and they will not have a large replacement capacity because of the agreement. in addition, iran will have no source of weapons grade plutonium. underactor is transformed international oversight and participation to produce far less plutonium than the current design. no weapons grade plutonium in normal operation. and essentially immediate recognition if they tried to deviate from that practice. furthermore, all of the irradiated fuel from that reactor goes out of the country for life. goes beyond the parameters in luzon, and a number of ways.

one area is iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive. including multiple point explicit systems. and neutron sources. these commitments are indefinite . in addition to 15 years, iran will not pursue ternium or a ring him alley metal -- or uranium alley metallurgy. material for an explosive device, so an additional -- additional time will be needed for the break out timeline. to be clear, the deal is not built on trust. it is a hard-nosed requirement that will limit iran's activities and ensure inspections. i can assure you this is not what iran wanted. it is a substantial dialing back of their program. to preclude eating, international inspectors will be given unprecedented access to all of their nuclear facilities.

we could not make an exception if there were a military occupied operation, but that is not the case. as well as the entire nuclear supply chain from the uranium centrifuges patented manufacturing and operation. at this access, the supply chain comes with a 25 year commitment. beyond that, even after a quarter-century of compliance with it peaceful program, we still have, as we have said many times, additional protocol in place to monitor the nuclear activities. another thing that we have also in perpetuity is there adherence to modified code 3.1, which modify the iaea before they start building any facility. -- notify the iaea. this eliminates a loophole where one can do something covertly and then say, we were planning

to notify. they must do this in the planning stage. it is another thing we have the armed 25 years. -- beyond 25 years. the iaea will be prohibited from using advanced technologies. including real-time enrichment monitoring. if the international community suspects iran is trying to cheat, they can request access to any suspicious location. much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring iaea inspectors can get access. --ill say that i would like unlike secretary kerry, i did say the words anytime, anywhere and i am cleaved that yesterday and member of your caucus acknowledged that the full anytime, anywhere, in the sense of a well-designed process with a well-defined and time.

-- end time. i'm pleased we establish that. to iaea can request access any suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the additional protocol, which iran will implement. the deal does not change that baseline. the deal is -- the issue is the agreement is not reached, then when the iaea requests access, the 24 day clock will start. a finite new tool, time, a nude will for resolving disputes within what we think is a short period of time. short is defined because of our confidence in sampling, that we will then be able to implement and detect microscopic traces of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the evidence of activities with nuclear material. in fact, the history provides a example.

in february 2003, the iaea requested access to a suspicious facility in toronto -- tehran. it was the. negotiations dragged out for six months. even after samples revealed nuclear activity, even though they had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up the evidence. we have in addition, conducted our own experiments to verify the ability to detect very very small traces of the agreement will be incremented increases, -- in phases, 20, 25 years. transparency measures that stay beyond 25 years. npt,ey are not in the every alarm bell would go off all of the place and appropriate actions would be taken. in closing, i want to

acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team, led by my colleague, secretary kerry. the u.s. multi agency delegation worked together seamlessly. and the eu plus 3 displayed remarkable cohesion throughout this complex endeavor. he continued collaboration and cooperation between believing nations, including the p5 is crucial to ensuring that iran complies with the jcpoa to avoid the reposition of international sanctions and other responses as well. i am confident this is a good deal for allies insecurity.

iran will be farther from a nuclear capability all the time with, rather than without this agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here. i look forward to the discussion. >> thank you. secretary lew. sec. lew: members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to speak today about the joint comprehensive plan of action. the foreign policy decision of this significance deserves your review. i'm confident a fair debate on the merits will strengthen our national security and that of our allies. the powerful array of u.s. international sanctions on iran constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in history. these measures have clearly demonstrated to iran's leaders the cost of flouting international law, cutting them off from international markets. today, the iranian economy is 20% smaller than what it would have been if it maintained

pre-2020 growth. with the bipartisan support of congress in this committee. webther, we established a of the far-reaching international sanctions and ultimately persuaded iran's leadership after years of intransigence to come to the table to rollback its nuclear program. international consensus and corporation to achieve this pressure is vital. the world's major powers have been, and remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that unity of purpose produced four top un security council resolutions and national resolution sanctions and secured adherence to sanctions across the world. if the point of these sentient was to change iran's nuclear --havior without ea they revise that iran has taken keys cap's to

rollback its -- key steps to back its nuclear program, sanctions really put come into effect. there is no signing bonus. to be clear, there will be no immediate changes to u.n., eu, or u.s. sanctions, only if i ran the bills the successful -- if iran fulfills the conditions will sanctions be lifted on a phased-in basis. ones that target third-party bases doing part -- doing business with iran. if iran violates its commitments, once we have suspended the sanctions, we will be able to promptly snapped back at both u.s. and eu when sanctions. -- and un sanctions. since that requires an affirmative vote by the un security council, the u.s. has the ability to effectively force the reimposition of those sanctions. even as we face nuclear sanctions relief, we maintain

sanctions that fall outside the scope of the nuclear deal, including our primary u.s. trade embargo. with some exceptions, iran will have sanctions targeting its support for terrorist groups such as has blocked -- as h ezbollah, backing of the assad regime, and human rights abuses at home. just this week, several hezbh ollah leaders targeting the group's from leaders. some argue that sentence relief is premature until iran seizes these activities, and the funds iran recovers could be diverted for maligned purposes. i understand the concern. but iran's ties to terrorist groups is why we must prevent it

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those threats raise a nightmare scenario. a nuclear armed iran would be far more menacing a threat. if we cannot solve both concerns at once, we need to address them in turn. jcpoa will address the nuclear danger, freeing us and our allies to check iran's nuclear activities more aggressively. in contrast, walking away from the deal will leave the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a short and increasing nuclear breakout time. we must also be measured and realistic in understanding what sanctions relief would really mean to iran. iran's $100 billion in restricted or reserves, which would be directed for nefarious purposes, constitute the long-term savings, not the annual allowance. after sanctions relief, iran would only be able to freely assess around half of these reserves for about $50 billion. that is because over to the billion dollars is committed to

projects from china, where it cannot be spent, and tens of billions in additional funds in nonperforming loans in iran's energy and banking sector. iran can't simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to be an international payment obligation such as financing imports or external debt. moreover, president rouhani was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces an economic imperative to face the challenges. he faces over half $1 trillion in government obligations. iran is in a massive economic whole through which it will take years to climb out. ---economic hole. we will aggressively target any attempts to use funds gained from sex is really to support -- gained from sanctions support to support our partners in the gulf.

trying to obtain a broader capitulation from iran be a mistake. even if one believes that extending sections pressure was a better course then resolving the threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is not available. our partners agreed to pose costly sanctions for one reason, to put a stop to its illicit nuclear program. if we change our terms now and assistance countries, -- and assist in these sanctions, we would be left with neither a nuclear deal nor effective sanctions. it's unrealistic to think that additional functions pressure would force iran to totally capitulate. and impractical to believe that we can march a global coalition of partners after turning down a deal that our partners believe is a good one. the joint comprehensive plan of action is a strong deal, with phased relief only after iran fulfills its commit to rollback nuclear program in a powerful

snapback built in later, if they break the deal. its terms achieve the objective they were meant to achieve, blocking iran's path to a nuclear bomb. that is the overriding national security priority, and it should not be put at risk, not with the prospects of unconstrained iranian nuclear program presents such a threat to america and the world. thank you and we look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you all very much. senator cardin. sen. cardin: it's been stated many times that the u.s. maintains its ability to oppose sanctions relative to support of terrorism, human rights violations, and ballistic missile issues. i have read the juicy po, -- the jcpoa, and there are many paragraphs in that give me concern. let me just read one, paragraph 29. parties will refrain from any policy specifically intended to

directly or adversely affect normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. secretary lew, i want to get your assurance that we have full ability to use the tools of sanctions against iran for its support of terrorism and human rights and nonnuclear type of activities, which include congressional action that congress might want to take. it wasw: senator cardin, a matter of extensive discussion in the negotiations. we made clear in the negotiation that we retain the ability, and we will keep in place sanctions on terrorism, on regional destabilization, on human rights violations. in fact, we are not lifting sanctions that are based on those authorities. we are not designating entities that were designated for those reasons. we have also made clear we reserve the right to put additional sanctions in place to

address concerns about terrorism, human rights. "we,"r cardin: you saw does that include congress of the u.s.? sec. lew: there is legislation thing regarding hezbollah. we will work with you on that legislation. the thing we can do is just put them right back in place, everything that was of the nuclear sanctions, just a new label on it. we reserve our rights to put sanctions in place that address the continuing maligned activity. the iranardin: sections act expires at the end of 2016. we will still be in the jcpoa period, a time when snapback of sanctions is a viable hedge against iran cheating.

is that permitted under the jcpoa? sec. lew: if it's on expiration, that's one thing, it's in advance, that is another. coming out of the box right now is very different from what you do when it expires. cardin: the question is, why would that be? we would get to that. the 24 days that you referred to, and i appreciate her .xpiration they could be using nuclear material that is in violation. you have addressed that issue as far as the 24 days. it could involve weaponization or research not using nuclear material. with the 24 days delay, in those cases, they come for mice our ability to determine whether iran is in plants with the agreement. --c. lew: again,

thereoniz: again, even there is a spectrum. for example, working with uranium metal is something that would still involve nuclear material. i think we would have very very strong tools there. when we go to some other activities, not getting into too many specifics, there will be a variety of signatures. my second priority on the weaponization list would be explosively driven neutron sources. certainly telltale iaea inspectors would have access to that. when you get into areas like computer modeling, that is a different kind of detection.

cases, we are going to rely upon intelligence abilities, those of our partners to be able to point the iaea to seditious activities. -- two suspicious activities. it gets more, located. -- it gets more comp catered. complicated.e senator cardin: i understand they have obligations under the nonproliferation treaty. but could you tell us how much lead time we have after the 15 years and what assurances do we have that we will be able to detect that action before iran

becomes nuclear weapons ready? sec. kerry: throughout the entire life of the agreement, the additional protocol provides the right of access, that is where the 44 hours notices for access comes from. -- the t4 our notice -- 24 hour notice for access comes from. p5+1, israel, countries in the region, we have an incredible amount of sourcing. they have to respond to that. if they don't respond to that, convene,he ability to to vote, or to take other actions if we deem that appropriate. after 15 years.

let me just fill out for you -- we also have a 20 year component that allows us to track centrifuge production of the rotors and bellows. sight, which year in is an access and monitoring of their life, of the iranian cycle. from the mining, the mills, the yellowcake production, the gasification, the centrifuge, out into waste. we will have an ability, iaea, what have the ability to appropriately monitor that every step of the way. if we have x amount of roger radium coming out -- raw urate -- x amount of raw uranium humming out, we don't see it going into the place, we are going to have extraordinary

insight into this. in addition to that, under the additional protocol for civil nuclear programs, all of the facilities are declared. it is a civil nuclear program. as such, there is literally before seven visitation -- literally 24/7 visitation in those sites. it's only for the undeclared facility about which you have a suspicion that you have to go through the other process. we are going to have amazing insight, because they are living by the npd, or allegedly they will. that is what we have to make sure they are doing. we have day-to-day insight into that. i might add, our colleagues, under the interim agreement, which by the way a number of people called an historic mistake, a tragedy, you heard all the same rhetoric you are hearing now -- those same people asked for us to keep that in place to years later because it

has worked. -- 2 years later because it has worked. iran has lived up to every component of that over the course of the last year. they produced 20% uranium, they undid iraq, so on and so forth. we will have this level of insight, which i think is not being examined enough or understood enough. nothing ends at 15 years. simply the size of the stockpile, the limitation, and enrichment, they can enrich further, but we have insight into that enrichment. requiresuclear program enrichment at 5% or so, that is the high end of it. if you start to enrich higher, around 20%, you are talking about the tehran research reactor. no pressure for research about that. we would have insight into that program and instantly know if

they are beginning to go somewhere else. red flags go off everywhere and we would be all over with it. we would have months to respond, to be honest. the breakout team never goes down to level below which we have the ability to respond. mr. chairman, may i ask one note, it could be a collateral benefit. uranium supply chain, i want to add this is something that the iaea wants to have much more broadly. this would be a first in moving towards cradle-to-grave safeguards. >> i would say to mr. secretary, theypeople have said that

would keep it in place then moved to something worse. that doesn't mean people to delete -- people parti

>> julie appleby looks at the cadillac tax which will take effect in 2018. she will explain the tax and its effect on health care cost and coverage and buddhist means for employees. peter grier of the christian science monitor talks about his cover article on how people choose a candidate during a presidential campaign. "washington journal" is light wednesday at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. secretary of state john kerry speaks about the nuclear agreement at the philadelphia constitution center. you can see it live here on c-span. a signature feature of book tv

is our coverage of book fairs and festivals across the country. beginning this weekend we are live from the 15th national festival. in early october, it is the southern festival of books in nashville. the weekend after that we are live from austin for the texas book festival. here the end of the month we are going to be covering to book festivals over the same weekend. then, we have the book festival in medicine. these closed we have the boston book festival. this will be followed by the national awards in new york city. it will be live for the atp or in a row for the miami book fair international. >> secretary of state kerry, and

treasury secretary lew testified before the house foreign affairs committee. six democrats and republicans have come up against the deal. this is about one hour. >> today we continue our review of the nuclear agreement that the obama administration reached with iran. this is a critical hearing on one of the most sweeping diplomatic initiatives in years.

it demands the committee's thorough review. the global threat from iran has been a focus of this committee for as long as i can remember. must congress we' passed by a vote of 400-20. it would have given the iranian supreme leader a choice between his nuclear program or economic collapse. the administration was successful in blocking that. instead of us considering a verifiable, enforceable, and accountable agreement, we are being asked to consider an agreement that gives iran permanent sanctions relief for temporary nuclear restrictions. should iran be given the special deal. in september committee members will face the important decision of a proving or disproving this agreement.

the have this food only because of the iranian nuclear review act, passed in may. the administration did not want. to be frank, the administration's purpose has been to sideline america's representatives. i was not entirely surprised when the administration went against bipartisan calls and gave russia and china and others at the un security council a vote on this agreement before the american public. that is backwards and wrong. we have heard serious concerns from experts about the substance from this agreement. first, iran isn't required to dismantle key bomb making technology. does that make the world safer? second, it is permitted if in fast enrichment capacity. does that make the region more stable?

and third, i've been is allowed to continue its research and development to gain an industrial scale nuclear program once the agreement begins to expire in as little as 10 years. 10 at years. that is a flash in time. and then iranian obligations begin to unwind. does this make the world more secure? we appreciate president obama's effort. it came up short. instead, there is managed access with iran, russia, and china having a say in where international inspectors can and cannot go. the 2014 process is a far cry from anywhere, anytime. this provision expires two. the administration has processed absolute knowledge about the iranian program, but it is a

fact that we have been surprised by most every major nuclear development in the iranian history. i ran has cheated on every agreement they have signed. so i ask, mr. secretary, have they earned the right to be trusted? this deal does the sanctions web being sanctions on iran. where does all that money go? to the largest terror network on earth. can't are the sanctions on the iranian nuclear program that also supported the list of missile development. to our dismay, iran won a late concession to remove concessions on the ballistic missile program and conventional arms securing the region. if this agreement goes through,

i wrong gets , iran gets a lighh toward nuclear weapons. with sleeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge the conduct across the board. as they grow stronger, we will be weaker to respond. the u.s. would broil the diplomatic waters if congress rejects this deal. i run desperately needs relief. i understand the effort the administration has put into the agreement. these are about as high-stakes as it gets. the committee must ask if we made the most of our pretty strong hand, or are we willing

to bet, as the administration has, that this is the beginning of a changed iran? these are complex issues in i look forward to an extremely informative hearing and i turn to the ranking member. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this hearing. welcome to the foreign affairs committee. thank you all for your dedicated service, no matter what side of the issue anybody is on. i don't think anyone here doubts your commitment to the united states and your good intentions on this deal. thank you for the time you have taken over the past week to engage with members of congress on the proposed deal. you for your testimony today. congress gave itself 60 days to renew the deal. i sincerely hope my colleagues take advantage of this time to study the agreement and ask questions and to make an informed decision when the time

comes. we have had many months and many hearings to discuss the nuclear agreement. at this point, we are no longer dealing with hypotheticals. we have a specific deal on the table and we have to decide if that deal advances the national security interest of the united states and our allies. to answer that question to be fair, we have to ask ourselvesfs what is the alternative? absence this deal with the international sanctions regime and the coalition, if this deal fails, how would we get the iranians back to the table? would new sanctions have to be coupled with military action? as i continue to review the deal, there are a number issue f issues i find troubling. i continue to have concern that inter national inspectors will not have immediate access to undeclared sites.

under the agreement iran has 14 days to allow access. if they refuse access after that time, members of the joint commission could take another week to resolve the iaea's concerns. after that, they have three more days to provide access. we are already nearly one month after inspectors first wanted access, but if they continue to say no, another month could go by. that potential length of time gives me pause. i would like to know how we can be sure that iran cannot use the delays to sanitize sites and get away with breaking the rules. already we are saying the leadership declare that military sites will be off-limits to inspectors. if this is their version of transparency during the implementation of the agreement, we are getting off to a bad start. i am also troubled by reports about how the arrangement reached between iran and the

iaea. secondly, i've concerns about the advanced conventional weapons. my understanding was that these were not on the table during the talks. i was disappointed to learn that after a maximum of 5-8 years respectively, they will be terminated. i would like to understand why we allow this to happen and what we loo could do to ensure the situation does not get worse. i am concerned about what the iranians leaders will do when sanctions are phased out. we are talking about tens of billions of dollars. of course, i would like to see the iranian at leaders use this money to help their people. even with tough international sanctions in place iran has shiite villagers militia and thd

regime. if this goes through, how would you propose to keep the newfound wealth out of terrorists and tyrants? well i'm glad they will be limited in their development of advanced centrifuges for eight years, i worry about what will happen down the road. they could quickly move towards the next stage of its enrichment activities. i would like to know what other provisions will mitigate the risk. finally, i have a fundamental concern that 15 years from now iran will be off the hook. if they choose, the leaders could produce weapons with highly enriched uranium without limitation. they could use advanced centrifuges to speed the progress even further. this amounts to them being a legitimized nuclear threshold state in the year 2030. my big question is this. what happens then?

we back to square one? are we just missing the part -- are we just pushing the pause button? there was trepidation nearly one week after they signed the deal with us. the supreme leader of the ayatollah was chanting, death to america, death to israel. you would think there would be a modicum of goodwill. how can we trust them when this type of thing happens? it is very disconcerting. i am looking for to hearing from our distinguished witnesses on the issues. i thank you for your service and homework and i yield back to the chairman. chairman: this morning we are pleased to be joined by john kerry, moniz, and secretary of the treasury.

before being appointed secretary of energy dr.moniz was the professor of engineering at m.i.t.. from the director of the office of management and budget, secretary lou now serves as the 76 secretary of the treasury. welcome and without objection, the full statements will be made part of the record. members will have five days to submit statements and questions and materials for the record. the four turning to the testimony, we have the members here. i know we all recognize the gravity of this issue. we want everyone to have a chance to question the secretaries. to accomplish that, i would ask everyone, members and witnesses to respect the time limit. leave them in appropriate amount of time to answer.

we will begin with a summary of secretary kerry's testimony. secretary kerry: chairman, and all of the members of the committee, thank you very much. we appreciate the opportunity to be here. to frankly, clear up a lot of misinterpretations. some element of public distortion that exists out there. there is one at i have seen on tv that has three or four major incorrect facts on which it bases the advertisement. with respect to the chairman and the ranking member, there are conclusions that have been drawn that do not, in fact match with the reality that this deal sets forth. we happily look forward to clarifying that in the course of this hearing. we welcome the opportunity. we are convinced that the plan

we have developed with five other nations accomplishes the task that president obama set out. that is to close out the pathways to a bomb. i think as you listen to armie moneys -- ernest moniz, i think it is a conclusion everyone will come to. i am joined by two cabinet secretaries, both ernie and jack are critical of our ability to do this. the treasury department's knowledge of the sanctions and application of the sanctions has been exemplary. i have helped us understand the implications of the sanctions. as jack will let you know, we are not talking about 100 and $50 billion, -- we are not

talking $150 billion. from the day the negotiations began, we were crystal clear that we would not except anything less than a good deal. one that would shut off the pathways toward fissile material for a nuclear weapon. after 18 months of intensive talks, the facts are pretty clear. the plan was announced this month by six nations. it encompasses that. all of the nations have nuclear power or nuclear weapons. all are extremely knowledgeable in this challenge of perforation. -- proliferation. iran has agreed to remove 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. they will dismantle two thirds

of its installed centrifuges. they will destroy, by filling it with concrete, the existing core of its heavy water plutonium reactor. iran has agreed to refrain from producing, or acquiring highly enriched uranium or plutonium forever. how do we enforce or verify? particularly, to speak to the ranking member's question, what happens after 15 years? this deal applies to forever. we have an extremely rigorous inspection regime. iran has agreed to accept, and full ratify, prior to the conclusion of the agreement. if they do not, it is a material breach of the agreement to ratify the additional protocol.

that requires extensive access, as well as significant additional transparency measures. this includes cradle to grave accountability for the country's uranium from mining to milling through the centrifuge production to the waste for 25 years. the bottom line? if they fail to comply with the terms of the terms of the agreement, our intel community, our energy department of that is responsible for nuclear weaponry, are absolutely clear that we will quickly know it and we will be able to respond accordingly with every option available to us today. when it comes to verification and monitoring, there is absolutely no sunset in the agreement. not in 10 years, not in 15 years, not in 20 years, not in 25 fears. no sunset, ever.

remember, two years ago when we began these negotiations, a luck to people are today. people are saying, oh my gosh this is going to happen in 15 years. iran will have the ability to be a capable nuclear power. when we begin the negotiations, we faced in iran that was already enriching uranium up to 15%. they already had a facility built underground in secret that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when i began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium before 10-12 bombs already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges. they had nearly finished building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons grade plutonium at a rate of one or

two involves a year. experts put the breakup time when we began, which remember, is not the old breakout time that we used to refer to in the context of arms control. that is the time to be able to deploy a weapon. breakout time as we have applied it is extremely conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile materials for one bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. when we say babel have one year to a certain amount of -- when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of material, they still havethey still have e bomb and do a bunch of other things. you will agree, no nation will consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. if this deal is rejected, folks, by the way the existing, when we started the existing breakout

time was about two months. we will take it down to one year and then it goes down slowly. i will point out that provides us with guarantees. if this deal is rejected, we immediately go back to the reality i just described. without any viable alternatives. except that the unified diplomatic support that produce the agreement will disappear overnight. let me underscore. the alternative to the deal we have reached is not some kind of unicorn fantasy that contemplates iran's complete comfort to a. he will have talked about dismantling their program. that did not happen under president bush when they had a policy of no enrichment and 163 centrifuges. they went up to the 19,000's. our intelligence community confirms.

they will tell you that is not going to happen. in the real world we have two options. either we move ahead with the agreement to ensure that the iran nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and peaceful. or, we have no agreement at all with no inspections, restraints, no sanctions, no knowledge of what they are doing, and they start to enrich. to be clear, if congress rejects what was agreed to in the anna, you will not only be rejecting every one of the restrictions we put in place. nobody is counting the two years that iran has already complied with the interim agreement. complied completely and totally. we have already rolled their program back. we reduce their 20% enriched uranium to zero. that has been accomplished already. if this is rejected, we go back down the road.

he will not only be giving i ran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to build a heavy water reactor, to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the unprecedented inspections that we have secured. everything we have tried to prevent will now happen. what is worse? if we walk away, we walk away a loan. -- away alone. our partners will not be with us. we will have squandered the best chance that we have to solve this problem through peaceful means. make no mistake. from the very first day in office president obama has made it clear he will never accept a nuclear armed iran. he is the only president who has asked for and commissioned a

design of a weapon that has the ability to take of the facilities and he was actually deployed that weapon. the fact is, iran has already mastered the fuel cycle. they have mastered the ability to produce significant stockpiles of material. you have to have that to make the nuclear weapon. you cannot bomb away that knowledge anymore than you can section it away. i was chair of the relations committee when a lot of us joined together and put omost of the iran sanctions and plays. the whole point was to bring them to the negotiating table. even the toughest sanctions previously did not stop their program from growing from 163, two 300, two 5000, to more than

19,000 now. it did not stop them from accumulating a stockpile of enriched uranium. sanctions are not an end to themselves. they are a diplomatic tool that has enabled us to do what sanctions could not. that is to rein in the nuclear program that was headed in a very dangerous direction and to put limits on it. to shine a spotlight on it. to watch it like no other nuclear program has been watched before. we have secured the ability to do things that exist in no other agreement. to those who think of opposing the deal because what might happen in here 15 or year 20, i ask you to focus on this. if you walk away, youyear 15 and 20 starts tomorrow. what is the alternative?

what will you do with a start to enrich. they will feel they have a right to if we walk away from the deal. what will you do when the sanctions cannot be reconstituted because we walked away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i have heard people ask if the vienna agreement will legitimize their nuclear program. that is nonsense. under the agreement the iranian leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon. there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that. i underscore. if they try to evade the obligation, we will know it. a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7. it requires full documentation and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before good. the iaea will be monitoring

their centrifuge production. they cannot be diverted to a covert facility. for the next 25 years, the iaea will be monitoring uranium from the point it is produced, all the way through production so it cannot be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement, however long i ran remains in the npt and is living up to their obligations, they must live up to the additional protocol. that additional protocol greatly expands the iaea's capacity. this gives us a far stronger detection and capability with more time to respond to any attempt to break out with a bomb and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without.

i had a one should present voting record -- i had a 100% voting record for israel. i understand the fear. i understand the concerns that our friends have. we believe that what we have laid out here is a way of making israel, and the region in fact, safer. i emphasize, we do not lose any

option in 15 years, 10 years, five years that we have available to us today. we will push back against iran's other activities. we have laid out a very detailed policy for working with the gulf states. we look forward to working with israel and the effort to do that. it is why we have a robust military presence in the region and his wife we are working -- and it is why we are working so closely with the gulf states. mr. chairman, we will continue to push back against iran on every front available. the fact is, it is a lot easier to push back against an iran that does not have a nuclear weapon, as compared to one that does. that has been our objective.

you with the nuclear weapon, and then you will have an easier time dealing with the other issues. we believe the deal makes our countries and our ally safer. it will guarantee that the iranian program is under intense scrutiny. it will ensure the world community is unified in backing this up. in the end, it will guarantee iran's program has to be peaceful and therefore, is a good deal for the world, a good deal for america, a good deal for our allies and friends. we believe it deserves your support. chairman: secretary kerry has been very thorough. will recognize you at this point. >> thanks for the opportunity to discuss the iran agreement. the jcpoa prevents iran from

getting a nuclear weapon, provide strong but verification measures to give us time to respond if they violate the terms and take our options off the table. i want to stress that i was backed up in the negotiations by this congress. the leading nuclear experts in america at doe labs engaged throughout the negotiations nine labs and sites in seven states took part in supporting our negotiating position. these experts were a central. as a result of their work, i am confident that the underpinnings of this deal iare solid. the jcp oh it will extend for at least 10 years the time it would take for iran to produce its own material.

fissile material will be reduced. will be stringent constraints on the enriched uranium stockpile for 15 years. there will be a strong containment and surveillance measures on all centrifuge manufacturing. the uranium supply chain will also have containment and surveillance for 25 years. we are forever stronger with the agreement than it would be without. it is not a plutonium factory anymore. it is to tony of bearing radiated fuel sent out of the entire life of the reactor. the parameters are maintained and all paths to a bombs worth of nuclear weapons material are addressed. one important area of that

strengthening is that iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. that includes multiple point detonation services. iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium for 15 years. weaponization requirements, a specialty for missile launch added to the breakout timeline. mr. chairman, i cannot agree that they do not dismantle the iranian technology efforts, relevancy to nuclear weapons. every aspect is bold back -- is rolled back. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies that d oe laboratories have developed. much has been made of a 24 day process to ensure that iaea

inspectors get access to undeclared sites. the iaea can request access to any suspicious location under the additional protocol that iran will implement under the deal. the deal does not change the baseline. the jcpoa goes beyond that baseline. it provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a short. t period of time. this is the first time there is a cut off in time. environmental sampling provides extreme the sensitive measurements of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the material. the 2003 example found undeclared material even after iran delayed access for six months. combination of the agreements

technical measures and the coherence of the vienna deal dramatically increase the risk to iran for any attempts to move to nuclear weapons capability. any attempt to get an rich to uranium will earn a sharp response from necessary means. a steep response must be clear from the start for any violation of the agreement. blocking the covert path, i will emphasize will always rely on the work of the american intelligence community, and those of our friends and allies. the deal is based on science and analysis. the cousin of its deep grounding and exhaustive technical analysis carried out by our scientists and engineers, i am confident it is a good deal for america, our allies, and our global security. this is summarized in the letter

to congressional leadership by seven ambassadors to israel and secretaries of state. they are dedicated to strengthening the bonds between israel and the united states. i quote briefly. this agreement remove the threat that a nuclear armed iran. we sedo fatal flaws that full call for the rejection of this agreement and have not heard any viable alternatives. as has been stated by many analysts, the biggest gamble would come in turning away from the agreement, rather than implementing the agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here. chairman: we go to the secretary of the treasury. >> this is an important issue. the full discussion we are having will make it clear this

will strengthen our national security. the powerful array of u.s. and international sanctions on iran is the most successful regime in history. we cut them off from world markets and crippled their economy. today their economy is about 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on the 2012 growth path. the united states government stood at the forefront of this effort across two administrations and with the bipartisan support of congress. we have established a web of far-reaching u.s. and international sanctions that allowed them leadership afte afr rolling back their international program. the world's major powers have been able to remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that produced for tough resolutions and sanctions in many companies.

countries. the point of the sanctions is to change their behavior. accordingly, once the iaea confirms that they have completed steps to rollback the nuclear program and extends the breakout time to one year, sanctions relief will come into effect. there is no signing bonus in the agreement. to be clear, there will be no immediate changes to the u.n., eu, or u.s. actions. only if they fulfill the necessary conditions will the u.s. begin suspending secondary sanctions on a phased in basis. sanctions that target third country party doing business with iran. regard against the possibility that they do not uphold their side of the deal. that is why if they violate their commitments, once we have suspended sanctions, we will be

able to snap back both u.s. and you and sanctions. says preventing the u.n. snapback requires an affirmative book from the un security council, the united states have the ability to reinforce the addition of those sanctions. even as we face the sanctions relief, we will maintain sanctions that fall outside the scope of the deal, including the trade embargo and other measures. with very little exception, iran will continue to be denied access to the world's largest market and we will remain powerful sanctions targeting their support for terrorist groups, its destabilizing role in yemen, it's backing of the assad regime, its missile program, and its human rights abuses at home. just this week, we will not be reg sanctions on the guard corps.

some argue the sanctions relief is premature and till bases their activities. the funds iran recovers could be diverted from malign purposes. i understand that concern. their ties to terrorist groups are why we must keep them from obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those threats will raise a nightmare scenario. a nuclear armed iran will be far more menacing. if we cannot solve both concerns that once, we need to address them in turn. the jcpoa will free us to check the nuclear activities more aggressively. i contrast, walking away from the deal believed the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a short nuclear breakout time. we must also be measured and realistic and what the sanctions mean to iran. many fear they will be

redirected for nefarious purposes. we estimate that after sanctions relief, i ran will only be able to freely access around half of these resources, or just over $50 billion. that is because over $20 billion is committed to projects with china, where it cannot be spent. tens of billions of additional funds are in nonperforming loans to their energy and banking sector. iran can simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to meet international payment obligations such as financing for imports. moreover, the president was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces a political imperative to start meeting those promises. he faces trillions of dollars in investment and obligations. they are in a massive hole that

will take years to climb out of. backing away from the deal to escalate economic pressure and try to obtain a broader capitulation from iran will be a mistake. even if one belief that extending sections pressure was a better course than resolving the threat of their nuclear program, that choice is not available. we agreed to impose costly sanctions on iran to put a stop to the nuclear program. if we apply them to all of the objectionable activities, they would not do it. we would be left with neither a nuclear deal, nor effective sanctions. it is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions pressure put force iran to totally

capitulate. it is impractical to believe that we could marshal a global coalition of partners to impose such pressure after turning down a deal our partners believed is a good one. the joint comprehensive land of action is a strong deal with phase relief after iran the phils its commitments to rollback the nuclear program and a powerful snapback built in if they break the deal. the terms achieve the objective they were meant to achieve, blocking the path to a nuclear bomb. there is an overriding priority and it should not be put at risk when the prospect of an unconstrained nuclear program presents as a threat to america and the world. thank you again and we look forward to answering your questions. chairman: thank you secretary. to get to a point that i read. the 24 day suspect process does expire in 15 years. the iaea additional protocol

alone would not stop them alone aced obased on our past experience. in the secretary defense's testimony about the i in icbm stands for intercontinental. simply countries develop icbm's to develop a nuclear forehead. these would be aimed at us, not at moscow. at the same time that these missile restrictions are coming off, sanctions on the iranian scientists involved in the bomb for our coming off. how is that making us safer? it seems to me the winner here is russia. they demanded and onwon on

the lifting of the sanctions. why did we concede on that? secretary kerry: we did not concede on that. we had seven nations negotiating. three of the seven thought the sanctions ought to be lifted immediately -- iran, russia, and china. four of them thought they should not. what we succeeded in doing was keeping both the arms embargo and the missile component. the missiles for eight years and the arms for five years. not withstanding the fact that iran has a legitimate argument they are making that the u.s. resolution 1929, that created the sanctions and the structure we were negotiating under. it said that if iran comes to

the table and negotiates, all the sanctions would be lifted. they did not just come to the table to negotiate. they came to make a deal. a signed an agreement. they felt they were in comply iance with the u.n. resolution. we felt it would be unconscionable, notwithstanding to lift. we don't feel we lost anything whatsoever in that, mr. chairman. the u.n. resolution of 1929 is a nuclear resolution. susan rice was at the u.n. and put the arms peace in at the last minute. it was a thrill and at the last moment into the nuclear resolution. the nuclear resolution always

contemplated that if the iaea came to its broad conclusion that iran was not engaged in any illicit activities in any illicit activities and its declared or undeclared activities, then all the sanctions are lifted. no matter what is going to happen here, we were going to lose both the missiles and the arms under the u.n. component. but here is what we have done in the meantime that we believe actually takes care of the issue. first of all -- chairman: mr. secretary, i follow the arguments you made about the laws that we have to defend against the iranian missile program. i understand the steps. i am just saying, big picture, when we end up with a bottom line when in eight years they get the missile.

it does not look like a victory to me. they may not get the missile at that time, but they can buy the technology at that time. secretary kerry: actually, they cannot. we have several other protocols that prevent that from happening . specifically the missile control technology regime prevents that from taking place. we have an executive order by the president of the united states that in fact, prevents the transfer -- chairman: there is a reason why russia pushed it. secretary kerry: they did not want the u.n. component of this. they know we have separate capacities. chairman: i would hope we can strengthen our hand in this as we go along. the bottom line is iran is getting a financial windfall. they increase their support for terrorist proxies. they announced that

recently. they upgrade their conventional weapons and i think, their ballistic and missile program over the time of this agreement. it has an industrial sized nuclear program in 10 years. that is the timeframe, only if they don't cheat. when i look at this, and i see that their neighbors that know it's the best, trusted the least, i just ask, we are presuming that they will change their behavior. that behavior did not change last weekend when they were chanting again, death to america. secretary kerry: chairman, with all due respect, we are not presuming any such thing. there is no presumption on what iran will or will not do. there was one objective, make sure they do not get a nuclear weapon. on the backside of that, we have a very robust initiative that will push back against their

other activities. let me be very specific -- it authorizes u.s. sections on foreign persons that contribute to the proliferation of missiles, including efforts to develop or transfer them by any person or foreign country or proliferation concerned. that is just one of about four or five. secretary kerry: -- chairman: i am going to go to mr.engel. eliot engel: thank you, mr. chairman. i want to go back to 10 years. after the 15 years, they are a legitimized state. that means they can produce weapons grade enriched uranium without limitation. you can say they are already at

that point now. why would we not try to negotiate a deal where they cannot have those things in 15 years. i also want to mention that a nuclear agreement does not whitewash the fact that iran continues to maintain a destabilizing sector in the region and continues to contribute to terrorism across the globe. the concern is that the funding of terrorism will continue to affect them in a existential way. one of the issues i have had with this agreement was from day one, it limits to their nuclear program. with this agreement, how i look at it, the financing of terrorism will continue and could become much worse. the ride many in revolutionary guard corps could take advantage of any sanctions relief. simply put, money is fudgable.

how specifically will we work with our allies to limit the windfall and to protect our allies like israel. the other issue i want to raise is, the lifting of the arms embargo and the sanctions, the chairman mentioned some of this. the sanctions around the missile program destabilizes the region. i was disappointed that the sanctions will be lifted. we had been told that the iranian weapons transfers and the ballistic missile program were outside of the scope of the negotiations. in my opinion, the changes to the sanctions should have been outside the scope as well. that means when the arms embargo expires, iran will be able to legally ship weapons to president assad so he can continue to torture and kill his own people. how will u.s. sanctions work to address this issue? will the administration be open to further congressional

sanctions on the ballistic missile program? the sanctions are not specifically mentioned in the jcpoa. with violations of the arms embargo be considered violations of the jcpoa. if iran were continue to ship weapons before the arms embargo expires, will they be in violation of the jcpoa? secretary kerry: there are so many questions in there. i want to answer every single one of them. let me try to take on the biggest ones, first of all. let me call to everybody's attention. the irgc opposes this agreement. they are not sitting there thinking they will get the whole

world and be able to do what they want to do. they oppose this agreement, and talk to the intel community about that. they see themselves as losing the cover of the nuclear umbrella that they had hoped to have for their nefarious activities. there is nothing here to prevent us from pushing back against the irgc pushing forward. congress and others, we are all free to work together to push back against the destabilizing activities. let me ask you a question. are they empowered more with a nuclear weapon, or stripped of that ability with a international agreement to have to live up to and then us coming in underneath with a whole set of other security arrangements and push back? the answer to that is crystal clear. you asked the question of what

happens with respect to year 15. under the additional protocol in the modified code, please focus on what happens. there is not some sudden break off at the end of 15 years. they are under remarkable restraints, specifically, the comprehensive safeguards agreement that they have to negotiate with the iaea, which goes on forever. it provides the iaea with the right and obligation to provide safeguards in iran to ensure the material is not converted to nuclear weapons. all non-nuclear weapons states parties under the treaty have to bring this into agreement. the company has of safeguard agreement requires iran to maintain detailed accounting records on all material subject to the safeguards. they have to maintain operating records, subject to the safeguards. all public facilities within their program are subject to the

safeguards. it' provides for a range of iaea inspections. they have to verify the identity, location, and composition. it requires the board of governors to take action without delay. in a situation when it is essential and urgent and provides consequences for finding of noncompliance. that is just on the side of the declared facilities. there is a whole set of requirements on the undeclared facilities. congressman, they are forever under enormous constraints here, with respect to inspections and accountability. they have to provide accountability for all the nuclear research and development activities not involving nuclear mattila t material.

the senate floor which is usually an issue reserved for the most important issues. but if they can overcome a filibuster led by democrats, then it will go to the house. if it passes through their it

will go to the president's desk where he will likely veto it and back down to congress. he really wants to see this deal go through, and he has promised to veto legislation. >> we started with negotiations in march of 2013, and the deadline is september 17. >> the deadline is for legislation that passed earlier this year, the review act. it allows two months for congress to review the deal. monthld originally be one . they are giving themselves through the august recess, then they can vote to kill the deal or not and they will be off to the races. there will be a long series of debates. ealyour article says, iran d

will survive the senate, talking about the number of democrats supporting the deal. what about the whole process of a filibuster? are there enough votes to even presented -- prevented from getting to the president's desk? >> that is a possibility. they said it will probably be enacted. democratshance that can marshal enough forces to filibuster the deal or the bill from getting in the first place. they need 41 to do that. they don't have it yet, but the numbers say it could be a possibility. has our viewers watch the debate, a reminder that they can keep track of where members are by looking at the count on thehill.com. what options do opponents have

in the unlikely event that the president vetoes this resolution. upheld, does, and it is there are other things. they can renew sanctions on iran that don't necessarily deal with the nuclear program, but to try to punish the government for supporting terror groups throughout the region. that is something lawmakers have said they will already get started on. this is an agreement that could largely be undone by the next president. say, ifbio promised to i am elected i would not fulfill the obligations of the steel. -- of this deal. there is potential damage that could be done there depending on next november. >> there is also the university of maryland poll that shows the

majority of americans want congress to approve the deal. explain the breakdown in congress. it has become a more and more partisan debate as we go forward. pretty much, as a block republicans say they do not like the deal. a chance for one into republicans. they think this will empower a and terror groups in the region. many democrats have disagreed and say they support the deal but there are a couple of key democrats. they say the deal is bad, they are siding with republicans. some bipartisan opposition but the question is whether or not there is enough democratic support. iran turning into a

campaign issue in the race? >> absolutely. republicans running for the white house have uniformly come out and said this is an awful deal. democrats, hillary clinton and bernie sanders, have supported the agreement. those are key issues already playing out right now. and look at the congressional races. there is pressure on the democrats up for reelection. >> julian haddam, follow him on twitter. thank you for joining us. >> pennsylvania senator bob casey has come out in support of the deal. he released a statement saying, this agreement will substantially constrain the iranian nuclear program for its duration and compared with all

realistic alternatives it is the best option available to us at this time. we will have the debate when members return. up, afl cio president richard trumka. then from the housing and urban development care housing conference, a discussing on the passage of the 1968 fair housing act. that is coming from another -- segregated communities. on today's "washington colby," bob bolby -- will talk about his organization's role as a non-governmental regulator of the securities industry. appleby talks about the cadillac tax.

we will talk about it with her of kaiser health news. in our spotlight magazine series, christian greer of the " christian science monitor" discusses his article on how to vote for president. washington journal's live every morning at 7:00 a.m. et. c-span cities tour. this weekend we are joined by charter communications to learn more about the history and literary life of grand junction, colorado. >> all over the colorado plateau, and here in mesa county, we are surrounded by morrison rock. within the morrison we find dinosaur bones and fossils. that has really intrigue scientists for a long time.

the other thing we find is a rock called carnetite. it contains three different elements. it contains radium, which was used by marie curie to fight cancer, and also an element used to strengthen steel. during world war ii, it was of extreme value. carnetite also contains uranium. one of the best sources for atomic power in atomic weapons. >> colorado congressman wayne aspenol was largely responsible for the ledges -- water legislation. >> he fought the battle took reserve water for western colorado by making sure that we got our fair share. how did he do that? beginning in his state career, then going to his federal ladder of climbed the

seniority and was able to exercise more power than you might normally have. certainly, in the united states congress where he was able to make sure colorado and western colorado would be treated fairly in any divisions of water. was thet major success passage of the colorado river storage project in 1956. >> see all of our programs on c-span 2'book tv and sunday afternoon at 2:00 on c-span3. richardio president trumka spoke with reporters tuesday about the u.s. labor movement, his organization's role in the primaries and the 20 16th presidential election --

2016 presidential election. the christian science monitor posted this event. >> here we go. thank you for coming, everyone. wow, we will have some people joining us in progress as they say. we want to keep to our schedule. i am dave cook. my guest today is richard trumka. this is his seventh visit and we thank them for coming back. he worked his way through penn state university and earned a

law degree from villanova in 1974. at age 33, he was elected president of the united mine workers of america, the youngest person in history to hold that position. he served three terms as president and brought them into the cio. he was the secretary treasurer of the afl cio, and became the youngest person to hold that position where he served for 15 years. he was elected president in 2009 and reelected in 2013. that is the biographical portion. now onto breakfast mechanics. many of you work with my colleague, on capitol hill, and his successor is christina mazda standing by the door. she has two masters degrees, speaks four languages, and organizes event for the london

school of economics. it is great to have her here. please know live blogging or tweeting of any kind while the breakfast is underway. there is no embargo when the session ends. will e-mail several pictures of the session to all reporters as soon as the breakfast and. -- ends. if you would like to ask a question to the traditional thing and send me a subtle, nonthreatening signal and i will gladly call on one and all. thanks for doing this.

we reflect on all of the work we do every day in the challenges that remain. it is also not a bad day for a barbecue. every labor day, there is a .uick nod i have to tell you it is time to retire that old chestnut because it's just not true. in had 2015, there's an untold story about the rising tide of working people finding new and innovative ways to create a better life. ways to create a better life. this in face of the corporate opposition, archaic labor laws and gridlock in washington. it's a story that's taken place and towns around the

factories offices and and among ordinary people who decided they could stand together to make a difference. quite frankly, the momentum hasn't gone unnoticed completely. a recent poll shows support for highest, sinces 2008, with 58% of people expressions approval, 63% of women and the really good news to 34 is workers from 18 support unions by 66%. we have the obama administration that's preparing to host a white voicesummit on workers' in the fall so from main street to the white house, our country taking notice of the different ways working people are on the rise. and so with that, having said aat, i want to wish everybody happy labor day but more working lifea safe

year.st of the >> let me be knee-jerk, as you say. talk about what you're path of change the laborship, the latest department report showed that union membership was down just .2%, from the previous the, at 11.1%, and that number of workers in union was little changed. newre you expecting this and innovative ways and the rise to actually impact your membership numbers, sir? or do you see it accomplishing need to accomplish without necessarily needing to grow membership? some ofka: i think it's both, david. you have workers are finding innovative ways to come together to raise wages and this, by the way, 2015 is going to be a