ad worse, even though it has been. congress should give this agreement the serious debate it deserves. window iran is a sponsor of terrorism -- we know iran is a sponsor of terrorism, we know it that is why western policymakers agreed to separate out and try to secure agreement on this issue. n iran with a nuclear weapon would be especially dangerous to us, israel, and the region. that was the single goal, to keep iran from getting a nuclear weapon. verification is a key. it is not a question of trust. of course, we have to understand how their case and will -- how verification will work. will our intelligent capabilities be able to detect cheating? will iran's breakout time extended from 2-3 months to one

year over the next 10 years mean we have time to respond politically, economically, and if necessary, militarily if iran makes a break for a weapon. finally, waxy happens if congress rejects the deal? how will we maintain effective enforcement of our sanctions without the support of our p5 plus one allies? whose ambassadors, again, have a clear to a large group of us yesterday, we will be isolated. what happens if a country like china walks away by establishing banks with no correspondent relationships in the u.s. and buying iranian oil? what would a rejection in congress do the reliability of the united states in the eyes of the world? joined many of i my colleagues in joining rounds and rounds of unilateral --

talks on unilateral sanctions. some thought that the gpo it would unravel the sanctions regimes, it has not. unusualy graven historic ity to assess the consequences of this agreement, and weigh the risks and benefits to a lower president to test iran's capability to comply with it. it is clear that we share the same goals to ensure that iran does not achieve a nuclear weapon. to do that diplomatically, if possible, and recognize the other alternatives remain on the table and are not precluded by this agreement.

ambassador sherman: good morning, chairman shelby, ranking members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss the joint comprehensive plan of action that the united states and our partners recently concluded with iran. to reserve as much time for questions, i will only highlight a few key points. by blocking each of iran's potential f ways to material required for a bomb, the deal ensures that iran's nuclear program will be useful over the long-term. must the provision, iran remove two thirds of its

installed centrifuges and remove its stockpile by 98% for 15 years, and tap uranium enrichment far below the dangerous point for 15 years. the core of iran's heavy water reactor in iraq will be removed and rendered unusable, and the facility, rebuilt, so it cannot create weapons grade plutonium. i emphasize, as both the chairman and the ranking member did, this deal is based on verification, and not trust. receiving any relief from stations, iran must meet its commitments. from uranium production to centrifuge manufacturing and operation -- and if there are suspicious sites -- no sites

will be off-limits. if iran fails to meet its responsibilities, we can be sure that sanctions will snap back in place, and no country can stop that from happening. if iran tries to break out of the deal altogether, the world will have more time, one year, to respond. at that point, all of the potential options that we have the table. remain on we would also have the moral authority and international support that comes from having exhausted all peaceful alternatives. this is also a long-term deal. some provisions will be in effect for 10 years, some for 15, some for 25, and some indefinitely. under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, iran is permanently prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon. the access provisions associated will remain a place for free

-- in place forever. the bottom line is that this deal does exactly what it was intended to do when we began formal negotiations nearly two years ago. at that point, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20%. growing rapidly building -- were the plan in vienna will shrink the facilities to medically put the entire program under microscope. some have expressed concerns but what might happen 15 years from now. without this agreement, as secretary kerry and secretary iz have said, your 15 would

begin today. if the united states wants the from the plan, which has been negotiated every step of the way with our partners, we would be left alone. that would be the worst of all worlds. iran could push ahead with this program and whatever direction it chooses. everything we have tried to prevent could occur. we have not enhanced transparency required to scrutinize every element of the program, and the multilateral sanctions regime, which the president congress worked so hard to put in place, led by this committee, would begin rapidly to unravel. as for iran's behavior, the united states is under no illusions. this agreement was never based on the expectation that it would transform the iranian regime, or ceasetehran to in the middle

east. that is why we will continue cooperation with israel. we will work closely with the gulf states to build their capacity to defend themselves and push back on the iranian influence to destabilize the region. we will continue to take action to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining weapons. we will continue to insist on the release of u.s. citizens unjustly detained in iran, and for information on the whereabouts of robert levinson, until anyone comes home. i'm almost done. we all know that the middle east today is undergoing severe threats due to violent extremism, challenge governments, and rivalries, but every one of those problems would be worse if iran were nuclear weapon. that is by the agreement in

vienna is so important. that if weaid double down on stations, we can force iran to dismantle its nuclear program, but quite .riendly, that is a fantasy the whole purpose of stations was to get iran to the bargaining table and create incentives for the kind of good agreement that we were able to achieve in vienna. over 90 countries have issued public statements in agreement with the deal, including all of the countries involved in the negotiations. everyone of these countries has made tough choices to keep the international sections regime in place. we need their support for implantation. it is important to remember that we tried for many years to get here, as was pointed out. on arked on this bipartisan basis. president obama and this push for stronger sanctions to keep the door open to negotiation.

those sanctions forced iran to pay a high price, but were not enough to make them change course. that require this diplomatic initiative. congress played a critical role in getting us to this point. sanctions achieved their goal by bringing about negotiations. now, congress has a chance to affirm a deal to make our country and our allies safer. a deal that will ensure the international community remains united and demanding that iran's nuclear to pass these remain peaceful. it is a good deal for america, for israel, for the world, and i say to you all respectively, it deserves your support. thank you. mr. szubin: it is a pleasure to appear alongside ambassador

sherman. the globalization's coalition, built in but by the united states, across administrations and with rod bipartisan support in congress -- with broad bipartisan support in congress gave us the leverage to achieve unprecedented sanctions against iran. from the start, the purpose was to build a leverage to receive concessions on the nuclear file. our secondary sanctions work meant to be a quaint for the d forar quote -- a qui the nuclear quo. poa obtained its purposes. on the sanctions part of the deal, i would like to touch on four points that have been much debated. the scope of relief. the snapback provisions. the campaign that is ongoing to combat iran support of terrorism

. and finally, our remaining leverage in the event that the united states walks away from this deal. first, we should be clear and describing what sanctions relief will and will not mean to iran. if iran completes the nuclear steps in this deal, which will take at least 6-9 months, the united states will lift our nuclear related secondary sanctions. the primary sections, our embargo, will still be in place and enforced aggressively. iran will be denied access to the world's markets and to deal in the most important currencies. left will remain expensive. we're not relieving sanctions against iran's revolutionary guard corps, or any of their subsidiaries. and sides, under the seal, more than 225 individuals and companies linked to iran will

remain designated, including their financial, engineering, and transportation sectors. it has been much discussion on the iranian foreign preserve that has to be released from foreign accounts on the deal. fulfills of commitment, they will receive a part, and the rest will remain inaccessible. to address an economic hole that is half $1 trillion the. p. dee this was president rouhani's promise to the people when he ran for office, and he now needs to meet that promise. second, snapback. we can probably snapback u.s. and united nations sanctions. our eu colleagues are positioned to do the same. for usa should, this can be done rapidly, in a matter of days.

a binary, on or off, snapback would not serve us well. , ithe sanctions snapback want to emphasize, there is no grandfather clause. no provision in the deal gives special status. third, as we neutralized the most acute threat posed by iran, its nuclear program, we need to be aggressive and capturing the array of iran's other niceties. -- activities. this means we will sustain and intensify our use of sanctions against iran's backing for terrorist groups like hezbollah. oppress those to

who are standing up for human rights in iran. we will be using our sanctions to block iran's attempts to know about their nuclear program. while negotiations were ongoing, we took action against war than 100 iranian linked targets. we will be accelerating network and the days and months ahead along with israel and our regional allies. i will personally be focused intensively on these efforts. fourth and finally, let me provide my perspective, as a stations official come on the implications of walking away from this deal. generatedns regime much of its force because the world's major powers, including trading partners, agreed on iran's nuclear threat on diplomacy. it would be a mistake for the united states to walk away from

this on the notion that we could unilaterally escalate pressure and obtain a broader capitulation from iran. u.s. sanctions are extremely powerful. i have seen a firsthand. they're not all-powerful. if the u.s. were to walk away and oscar partners to continue -- ask our partners to continue, the coalition we assembled would fray with unpredictable and risky results. it is difficult to see how a international consensus and less leverage would help us obtain a much better deal. instead, enforcing this deal, securing the far-reaching concessions that iran has made we capitalize on her pressure and deny iran access to a theifying capability for perceivable future. as we move forward, you have my commitment that the dedicated team at treasury will continue to pursue smart sanctions to address iran's remaining malign

activities. they give a much and i look forward to answering your questions. senator corker: thank you very much. i want to start by addressing the ranking members comments. i could not agree more that this should not be a partisan effort. i met with senator reid on monday, just to talk a little bit about how this debate will take place in september. i can say to everyone of my colleagues on both side of the aisle, regardless of how people vote on this, you will not hear me making comments either way. i think this is a very important vote. what we have tried to do in the foreign relations committee is make sure people fully understand the ramifications. i cannot agree more. i do want to say that one of the details you left out in your letter, regarding the bush

was that they would not agree to enrichment. that is a detail that has been kind of left out. i think that is the rubicon that has been past year -- passed here. we have three state sponsors of terror -- sudan, syria, and iran. what this agreement does is it codifies, with our approval, the industrialization of the nuclear program. that is a fact. that has not been debated. i want to say that i think senator donnelly, senator heitkamp, senator warner, center schumer, senator menendez all know that i have to supporting an agreement. i had one of the few conversations with secretary think heen i

actually was listening to what i was saying. i emphasized the importance of the last pieces. i'm talking about the the previous military dimensions -- we all know they are involved militarily -- and how important that is not just from the standpoint of what it said, but the indication to us that we are really going to apply this thing. when i got the documents -- and i have been through all of them extensively -- i have to say, my temperature rose heavily. when i saw that we were lifting the conventional ban in five eight the missile ban in years, and on the front end, the missile test ban, and on top of what these agreements said, i was very troubled. i want to get the sanctions relief and perspective -- in perspective. i know you said 50 -- most are

saying 56 -- overall it is 100. in fairness, it is about 100 million. to put that in perspective, their economy is $4.6 billion. $100 million would be like us getting in the next nine months, $4 trillion. relative to our economy. they have all said that over the next 10 years, they will get $400 million-six hundred million dollars. that would be like us getting $17.5 trillion in our coffers over the next 10 years. here is the question i have. i was very discouraged with the final round. i work with senator cardin, my friend. i began with senator menendez to

make sure that the way this works -- we got the documents. we got them in a way that was acceptable. he's been all weekend with you, the white house, and others on this review act. we were to get all agreements, including the site agreements -- side agreements. now, the entity we are counting on to do the inspection, we cannot get a copy of the side agreement that lays out how we i have to say, -- if you have not been down to the gontel area, you should look at it. we cannot even see the agreement as it relates to pmd. by the way, all sanctions relief occurs -- all you have to do is writes a report,

sanctions relief still occurs. ambassadort as, sherman, you knew the protocols, why now will you not give us the documents that exist that are so important to all of us relative of the integrity of the struggle why not? thank you sherman: very much for all of your hard work along with senator menendez and senator cardin on this deal. let me answer your question, but then i want to come back to one other point you made. he made this decision on his own because the iaea is an independent agency. you made a bipartisan invitation

to him, and he agreed to come. i found out at about the same time that you found out. he did this on his own. we do not have the documents in the first instance. we don't have them. we don't have them to give to you. the reason we don't have them is because they are safeguarded confidential. the director general explain this to you, and what that means. the iaea does safeguard protocols with united states. they don't share them with anyone else, so they don't want to share iran's with anyone else. you, i'm sure, will say to me, but, investor sherman, they told you about them. did.eepika -- indeed, they the reason they did is because it was in the middle of the negotiation and they wanted to go over with some of our experts the technical details. i did see the provisional documents. i did not see the final documents. documents.rovisional

there will be a classified all senate briefing this afternoon. i will go over in detail, in a classified setting, everything i know about these arrangements. corker: again, i want to say, we spent four days going over every detail would be administration to make sure the documents we were asking for that can be cou delivered. entity we are depending on for this integrity of the deal -- we don't have an agreement. let me ask you this. do you have any understanding as to whether there are limitations or the iaea will have physical access inside parching to take the samples themselves? ibassador sherman:

would be glad to discuss all of settinga classified this afternoon. the united states is already -- has already made its own judgment. it in investment that was made public some years ago. that said that we did believe they had military provisions of the program up to 2003. united states has artie made its judgment. be standby that judgment. what this deal is most focused on is where the program is and where it is headed. i quite agree that getting access is important because it says something about access in the future. establishing the credibility of the iaea is also important to

this. i'm very glad that the director general is coming to see you. i would add one other point. as the that sanctions, acting undersecretary said, are absolutely crucial to having brought iran to the table. sections never stopped iran's program. when the obama administration began, there were about 5000 centrifuges. sanctions were the most extensive ever during the obama administration, and yet, iran to 19,000, 200 centrifuges. sanctions will not stop the program. i will just say in closing, and i did not want to take as much time -- i would say to every senator here, this is a big decision. kerry,and secretary every other country, including iran, new that because we

drafted the iran review act, regardless of what is being said, we were going to have the opportunity to weigh in. we were going to have eighrtunities to win -- wa in. when people say it is this verse -- this verse is that, it away.iate us needs to make her own decision based on whether we think this is going to keep iran from getting a nuclear weapon, regardless of where we are. i hope, at some point, on the grandfathering issue, and i will documente sent out a

to help everybody. it was nine pages long. we asked the administration for .ed lights i had staff and others to go through the agreement. i sent out a cliff's notes to everybody. there is one question about the gold rush, we are all concerned about, will occur. that is people going into iran, immediately, to sign contracts. we used the word grandfather contracts. i guess the question i have, and is still unanswered -- and by the way, our friends in britain, germany, france, and the eu have all told me that contracts are grandfathered. they have backed off a little bit. by the way, i want to say, there is confusion. i think iran views it, the way we have it in this document. if someone spends $1 billion wendy sanctions are left --

facility bp on an oil -- and sanctions snapback. by the way, you realize that in nine months, iran has the .uclear snapback the agreement clearly states that they can walk away. they have all their sanctions relieved, and they can walk away. they have a nuclear snapback. we have a sanctions snapback. the question is that if someone enters into a contract in the next year, when the sanctions are relieved, everyone expects be relieved -- can that contract continue on. in other words, it was put in place in the free time. can it continue on if sanctions are put in place afterwards? that is a great area -- grey area. i realize it is not the biggest issue. it does great concerns about

people rushing in now to establish contracts, which we see happening now with europe. mr. szubin: if you are talking about snapback and the leverage if countries to enter into contracts, and then have them protected by snapback, we would have a very weak snapback indeed. what we have, and is not gr obviously,clear -- when sections are lifted, the business that is allowed by that lifting can occur. if sanctions are snapped back, sanctionable. are if there's any doubt, i want to remove it here today.

have a corker: can we letter from the other parties that agreed to that? if you can get the other parties, including china and russia to agree that that is the case -- i think it would just help us to some degree. at least some people who may still be on the bubble about the issue. sherman: if i may i spoke with the u.k. vassar to the united states this morning. i don't he has talked to many of you. he shared with me an e-mail that i believe you sent to your office about this. he said, i want to clarify on our position to apply sanctions to iran for other activities and for snapback, and said that in fact, he is committed in europe is committed to snapback and the eu retains the freedom of ability to apply sanctions

for unacceptable i city. he also said to me on the phone this morning that he understands, all europeans understand, and the deputy of the european union just had a meeting with all of the services of the european union to affirm this very fact that you question which is indeed, companies that have -- companies have no grandfather clause. >> senator corker, thank you. senator brown. >> it's important as we appreciate a seriousness and gravitas about this issue and thoroughness that he talks the sanctions that fact and the military is always on the table. i appreciate the comments. i don't know the analogy of what these versatile discussions on 50 versus 100 plus. i want to get into that.

i don't know that an advertising that is very compelling. what the sanctions really since this is the jurisdiction of the committee. i know that you posed a paper performance model on the agreement and i would like you to discuss generally the steps iran will have to go through before we receive any new sanctions relief on the implementation if you would walk through that with us. iran has has to install two thirds of its centrifuge and has to get the stockpile about 98% from 12,000 to 12,000 kilograms to 300. it must take the core of the

iraq reactor out and fill it with concrete so that it is rendered unusable. it could set up all of the verification processes and the iaea will have access to the declared facilities on a 24/mexican basis into their roles of the real-time data transmissions and there will also be of atomic fields. and they will know about it in real time and put in place a surveillance of the centrifuge productions which means they are the active parts of the centrifuge. the iaea will have eyes on uranium from the time it comes out of the ground to know to the mining to the conversion so that they will not be able won't be able to divert 1 ounce of

uranium so it always goes where it goes. so they would have to create a new supply chain covertly in order to get to a nuclear weapon. a nuclear weapon. in addition to all of these measures that have to be put in place, iran would take the steps that it requires a. on the implementation they even sooner all of these things have to take place in all of these are details and an annex five of the agreement before there is any sanctions relief whatsoever at that point, all sanctions relief is a is electing a determination. a lifting of the determination. the determination comes many years later or when the iaea reaches what is called the broad conclusion. the broad conclusions mean that they have no undeclared facilities and indeed they can certify that the program is

completely peaceful. >> if you would describe the sanctions remain in place that will help us manage, combat, eliminate as much as possible on the various activities and terrorism in the region, it was in that answer if you would talk about the $50 billion figure why it is 50 and about 100 in terms of obligations. using a $500 billion i think that you used the term hole in the iranian economy. what that means in terms of pressure on their government i assume you are implying to me to some domestic needs. >> the sanctions regime on the activities and the question that

there is support for the ongoing violence in yemen and support for the militants in iraq and support for the assault regime in syria. that fully remained in place it is a very expensive one so it's not just the companies that we have listed so far. but it's an ongoing authority that we have dot europeans maintain and that many of our allies maintained to go after these actors. you are confident that our allies stay with us on those sanctions unlike those that we hear from ambassadors and others at that china and russia won't be there with the broad deep sanctions that are still in place overall. >> one does need to distinguish when it comes to the activities there is a coalition of countries that are highly concerned that are working alongside us increasingly we are

seeing a lot of cooperation from the gulf countries who for understandable reasons are increasingly troubled by their own activities and i would note, and i think it deserves highlighting is all saudi arabia sanction a number of hezbollah leaders just a few months back, and in doing so, the terrorist organization is very high. but our concerns about hezbollah i don't want to mislead a our shared worldwide. we are not able to obtain a security council resolution with respect to the proxies in lebanon. and i don't think we will see china and russia are stepping up in the way that we have seen our allies in europe and israel and the gulf with respect to one of these regional interventions. >> the singular goal as we have discussed off the negotiation is to make sure that iran did not obtain a nuclear weapon. that many of the opponents of this agreement have talked about

the dollars that have been available because of the lifting of sanctions and was iran could put in the region. speak to the broad strategy outside of the nuclear issues in the middle east sort of where this money goes into the administration is doing to combat that. >> thank you very much senator. indeed, we share the concerns that this committee has into the senate hasn't the country has about iran's activities in the region. not only what we have will we have the sanctions and tools the undersecretary laid out, but as you know, president obama provided more security assistance to israel then any other president to be fair and he presented democratic or republican is built on the previous president. but this president has also

commissioned technology that allows us to take actions if we need to in iran and in a way that no president has before to deploy those options and in addition. to talk about how to develop the security in the regional strategy that's been followed up in which case they supported the plan of action. it will bring security to the region because iran will be able to project power and will not be able to have a nuclear weapon that acts as a deterrent. but we are focused very much on helping to better improve its capability whether that is in the special forces training,

intelligence sharing for having the right armament to deal with these regional efforts and working in the coalition. so i think that we are all in common cause. this is quite critical and we will be following up on a dalia basis to make sure that these new strategies and efforts go forward and finally as you know, the secretary of defense was recently in israel and we are ready whenever the prime minister of israel is red e. two discuss further enhancements to security assistance. >> on the last question. >> -- elected to answer. so the answer is and we have a high degree of confidence that it's about $50 billion. i can go into more details on the itemization and i know that we have a classified session with you and all members of the senate later this afternoon. >> that's important to do. thank you. >> the reason the 100 billion figure has been out. we have been speaking to for

several years is that there's $100 billion of the central bank of iran's foreign reserves have been inaccessible. some of it is due to the sanctions congress put in place and some of it is already obligated and some of it is because it is gone. it's been kind and so one can list it on the books but it's not fair. so obviously those funds that have been spent and are not a bear and are obligated and now in place of collateral can be recovered even when the sanctions were lifted. what remains is this about $50 million that can come back to iran. and with that, one needs to keep the perspective of the about $500 billion or more that iran needs to be able to meet fundamental needs in the unpaid military tensions in salary and in terms of the needed infrastructure in the oil sector which is crippled. the final point i want to add with respect -

>> how much of that would be required for them to get their oil sector up and produce so they can bring the world into the country that we all think about and worry about and they obviously aspire to. >> they've publicly estimated they require 160 to $200 billion just for the oil sector repairs alone. that's not to take the oil sector forward into the future it's the future it's to get it back to the baseline to undo the damage that was done by the sanctions over the last few years and across the economy rape large we see a seven-year lag due to the sanctions sanctions beating up on the sanctions relief would say the middle of next year the major economic sanctions of iran are believed it will be seven years before iran comes back to where they ought to be today. >> what happens if they invest 16,200,000,000,000 would take them that long.

>> that wasn't a comment on the oil repairs. it might have been in a shorter amount of time. i'm not certain i need to get back to you on that. but if you look at the gdp curve and where it ought to have been, it had a radical break and it only gets back into the nearest where not have been today. so i couldn't have been unstated and coming back to them doesn't begin to meet the needs. that's not spending money. it's all of the foreign reserves. in other words, no country is going to exhaust its foreign reserves down to zero. it's risking huge instability to do so. so, we estimate that iran is going to use that money for its domestic economy and it's going to need to leave some in reserves in the way that any country would.

on the un embargo in iran listed in the five years on the ballistic missiles in eight years i know all of us would have preferred to retain these embargo is much, much longer. outline of people briefly. first of all, we will still be able to rely on other resolutions that let tv arms embargoes against the areas of transparency in north korea. so all of those remain in place. the countries have re-signed the proliferation security initiative to help limit of the iranian missile imports or exports. it also remains in place and

will play a critical role in that regard. we have a lot of unilateral and bilateral cooperative tools. we have ongoing sanctions in place as add-on has pointed adam has pointed out we have executive orders 12938 and 1382 which authorized the sanctions on foreign persons that contribute to the proliferation of the nuclear capability weapons and we will make use of those executive orders. it is connected to the ballistic and cruise missile back to these on the arms proliferation act it all imposes the sanctions on the individual entities. i would also say that the un security council resolution that was just recently passed does

not let iran's ballistic missile program off the hook. the current prohibitions on the supply of the ballistic missile related items technology and assistance will remain in place under this prohibition in the states are still required to present transfers to iran of the ballistic missile territory or by their nationals created they are still required to present the provision to the technology technical assistance and other related services. they are still required to present transfers of the ballistic missile items that might have passed through their territory. they are still required and i could go on there are about ten things that still continues to require states around the world to do so would we like them to go one forever in the un security council resolution? of course. but we've kept them far longer than iran, russia or china wanted them to stay on. we have kept them on under article 41 after number seven

which means they are enforceable and more importantly, we have other un security council resolutions and other tools will utterly to make sure that we are armed with concerns and the missiles are concerned and we can keep moving forward in every way that we need to. >> thank you mr. chairman. and thank the witnesses were appearing today. i want to go back to the issue was raised that was raised by senator corker. ambassador sherman, the iran nuclear review act of 2015 is abundantly clear i think that the congress is supposed to receive all of the documentation and agreement and annexation and all of the related materials. it says in the beginning referring to the transmission of agreements president shall transmit to the leadership agreement as it is defined in the subsection number one in putting all of including all of the materials and at the subsection 81 specifies that this agreement includes, and i

quote the most part of this, any additional materials, the materials related thereto including annexes and agreements come implementing the materials, documents and guidance or understandings. yet we discovered that there is a secret agreement between the iaea which contemplates the previous dimensions of the iranian activities which strikes many of us as a very, very important information to have, to evaluate. whether or not the future activity is in violation of the agreement or not. >> senator corker asked why you haven't given us the document and if i understood correctly he said it's because we don't have the document. i question is knowing the statute and knowing the intent of the statute and the letter of the law why didn't you insist.

why wasn't this disclosed? >> thank you very much for the question. as you point out we don't have the document and the senate has every single document that the united states government has. secondly, the reason we did not insist is because we want to protect the u.s. confidentiality this is a safeguard protocol. the iaea protects or confidential understanding and/or confidential arrangements between the united states and the iaea. i know that you will see this as a different situation. and i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. so in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise as they came to every other member of the p5 plus one

and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will share with you everything i know about this. i'm also very grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting which is extremely unusual because they wonder why it is. did i understand you to say that you personally did not see the final document? >> what i said as i was shown documents that i believe to be the final document. but whether there are any further discussions, what this is about are the modalities, the technical modalities that the iaea uses. and i will share with you this afternoon in a classified setting every single thing i know about that and it will give you great confidence that the iaea is doing what it needs to do. >> i look forward to that but frankly it is still extremely

disappointing. we are being asked to vote in agreement that seems to me the enforcement of which depends in no small part on a very important document that not only are we not allowed to see, it's not clear to me that you've read the final document or anyone else in the government actually. and you don't have it in your possession. >> i've seen the document, as i've said. as we were going through the technical discussions with the iaea, but what is important here is, senator, ultimately what we are talking about here is the credibility of the international atomic energy agency, whether in fact we believe they are credible, independent verification organizations, which it is. they have done a superb job on the joint plan of action which is the interim step. all of those reports because we have had to report to congress under the compliance have come up here. they have a very fine job and i trust and confidence in their

ability to do a fine job of the joint comprehensive plan of action. >> i'm glad you do that is a document we ought to have before us. but we ask we ask a separate question thirty-six of the jcpoa grains to either party the opportunity to walk away from the agreement. anybody can raise an objection about what the other side is doing. and after him and adjudication process that seems to me that lasts about 35 days of this objection is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, the complaining participant can simply walk away. either side. so iran any reason they are deemed inefficient they can walk away from this and of course that would be after they have the 50 or $100 billion, whatever the figure is. ..

-- if we take any measures at all, any enforcement measures of any kind, iran could invoke paragraph 36 and decide this is unacceptable and there walking away. since this administration has told us so many times that the alternative to this is war and so we have debt this agreement, we have to make all of these concessions after concessions after concessions to get this agreement, why should we believe

that in the face of accumulation of these small, but accumulative evasions, that the administration is going to risk iran walking way from the table because i suspect that is pretty likely that that will be there threat? >> senator, i appreciate that you believe that iran will have gotten enormous sanctions relief. and they will be sitting in the driver's seat. but you seem to forget the other half of the equation. iran will have reduced the centrifuges by two thirds. they will have a limited 98% of their stockpile. -- will have made the iraq inoperable. they will have allowed inspectors in their country to have 20 for seven access -- >> 24 days access. ms. sherman: no. the iaea has access.

if they believe there is justification for them going to a site, the additional protocol allows them to give additional 20 for seven hours -- 24 hours notice to get into that site. if the country says, well, we think you should go to the site or we think you should have this document, under the additional protocol, they are allowed to suggest an alternative. under the additional protocol, that the baking go on for some .ime we put a clock on that debate. we said that if the iaea, under the additional protocol, wants to go to a site, it has to have access to that site. and so we said you can debate with iran for two weeks. at the end of those two weeks,

the joint commission, which is made up of all of us, looks at that. if we believe on day one of the seven days we have to consider the situation that they ought to give access, a five out of eight of us believe they should get access and we believe we will all is have europe and the european union representative with us, iran has three days to provide access. so at the most, it is 24 days, but it could be as short as 18 days. as secretary monix has testifiez -- secretary moniz has testified, it will be found if it is there. wete frankly, senator, what have negotiated in this agreement is unprecedented access whenever the iaea believes that it has a suspicious site that it needs access to. >> senator, would it be permissible to address the snapback aspect of your question? >> at the discretion of the chairman.

>> -- you are next. ask will take my time and quickly -- [indiscernible] -- very quickly. >> thank you, senator. i just want to speak to one of the questions. first, i absolutely agree that the more likely scenario we see is small breach. testing. what we need to do then is obviously it's ironic in a proportionate way, show them that those bridges have confidences, otherwise we are just asking for larger breaches. and we have to be very clear about that. at there was -- there is promise that i have heard after theg that initial sanctions relief, iran can somehow immunize itself to further pressure, and therefore it won't care about snapback. and that is simplyot the case.

iran's foreign reserves cannot be put in a vote or in a mattress in the form of older bills. if so, they are not liquid, they are not usable. what they need is what every country needs, which is to have them major financial centers, usable for imports, a whole host of things that countries do with their foreign reserves. that means they are going to have to keep them in foreign jurisdictions where they are subject to snapback. the more iran begins to benefit from a deal, the more vulnerable they are to this pressure. so we need to be very serious and i agree with your question in that respect, but the consequences to i run will meet in very serious throughout this agreement. >> thank you very much. youwithin my allotted time, have testified that you don't expect iran to stop funding hezbollah and other proxies, so what will you do to combat this activity? mr. szubin: unfortunately, i do

expect to see iran funding hezbollah. and it is extremely troubling. it is frankly what i have devoted the bulk of my career to combating. -- because of how serious of a threat of believe that to be. we have a lot of tools at our disposal here. one of the most powerful is one of the congress has given us, which is that when we sanction iranian terrorist supporters, our designation is amplified internationally. what i mean by that is when we name a hezbollah financier, a has the law money launder, any bank worldwide, not just american banks, that facilitates transactions for that designated entity faces very severe sanctions from the u.s. sanctions that no bank wants to face. so what we have seen, thanks to those congressional sanctions, is that our sanctions against iran's proxies carry this international weight.

and those designated entities become prized worldwide. and i think it is incumbent on us to do more, in terms of additional target intelligent -- additional intelligence targeting and then to muster the coalition of countries who care about this to cut it off to shut it down. mr. reed: thank you. let me just go to a very critical point here. the sanction regime is in place today. if we reject this arrangement, this deal, some have argued, well, it would make a difference. the sanctions will stay in place. you have been working on these four 10 years. how would our partners react if we said -- we walked away from the deal? mr. szubin: from my perspective, and i certainly would defer to ambassador sherman on the but wec perspective,

have tremendous clout, tremendous influence as the world's most powerful economy when it comes to our sanctions and economics. i do not underestimate that. i have had the privilege to be a part of exercising that clout for the last 10 years and i have seen firsthand how effective it can be. but as i mentioned in my opening statement, it is not all-powerful. we don't simply get to dictate to other countries what their foreign policy will be. we need to -- to harness shared concerns. when it comes to iran, we have a shared concern. four resolutions have called out iran's nuclear program as being a threat, so we went to china, india, south korea, japan to say we need you to work with us, but you agree with us that iran's nuclear program as a threat, they said, yes, we do agree with you. and we said, here is the way to

address it. we have a diplomatic asked for. let's test it. let's see if we can use our sanctions leverage to obtain the concessions we all need from iran. they worked with us and it succeeded heard it succeeded to a remarkable extent. in the event that we walk away, it is a very different and much bleaker scenario. international consensus is behind this deal. 90 countries came out and endorsed this deal. we would be alone walking away from it. in that event, going them and asking them to take very costly economic sacrifices in the hope of the future much better, much tougher deal better think they would doubt the capability of, i think we would have very weak prospects for that. thank you. -- mr. reed: thank you. >> senator scott? scott: thank you. i, like somebody of us, are very concerned about this deal.

the more i read of the deal, the less i like it. and that doesn't include the one part that i do not know about, the iaea side agreements. ambassador, you have said a couple of things this morning. sitting here, i can see your notebooks. i can't read what is in it. in the final deal from the iaea, have you seen it and read it? ms. sherman: let me be very clear. thate seen the documents the iaea and iran discussed to create the final arrangements for the modalities that underpin the roadmaps -- a public document that congress has a copy of. i was not allowed to keep any of the documents about the arrangements.

however, i told the iaea that given our constitution, that if congress asked me to brief on the details that i understood, i would do so in a classified session and i will do so this afternoon from the authentic classified session. i'll give you all of the details of which i am aware. mr. scott: have you read the final agreement? ms. sherman: it is not in agreement. it is a set of arrangements. mr. scott: have you read it? ms. sherman: i have. mr. scott: ok good question for you. you stated earlier that the regime continues to fund terrorism and that behavior. at the same time, we are concerned that -- at least those of us have commented on the side that we are concerned that the more money the iranian regime has come of the more they will fund terrorist activities. in spite of the fact that they have a crumbling economy, they

have infrastructure needs, they have needs to repair their ability to sell more oil, that in spite of all of that, there is still funding for terrorism. so it seems like to me that you would agree with national security advisers went to said that some portion of the money from sanctions relief will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used, as you said, will be used, to find more bad behavior and terrorist behavior in the region in spite of their state of their funding. mr. szubin: thank you, senator. i do agree with the premises of your question. we have seen iran fund terrorism before the sanctions, through the toughest period of the sanctions. and i expect we will continue to see that. the question is, what do we do about it. and it is my office's

responsibility to ramp up our efforts to be able to go after those funding streams. the alternative, though, that i think is put out there doesn't make sense to me strategically, which is that we don't enter into a nuclear agreement, we don't give them back their money , and other winter don't do this exchange of securing nuclear agreement in exchange for sanctions relief. and then, what? will continue to combat iran's support for terrorism, but will have the prospect for iran to three months away from breakup. to me, we are talking about a state sponsor of terrorism, that is a terrifying prospect. so we had decided we to address the nuclear threat and then turn to the terrorism. mr. scott: so strategically speaking, five years from the start of the agreement, they will have more access to weapons. eight years, there access to ballistic missiles and they will

be able to move forward and advanced research on nuclear technology. and then we know for certain at the end of the 10th year, we are looking at a breakout phase. so the reality of the agreement is that we will with certainty be able to mark on a calendar when the iranians will have an opportunity for nuclear weapon. mr. szubin: no. as ambassador sherman has said repeatedly, and no point, and no future date, not 25 years, not 50 years does iran have the ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. the agreement has varying durations with respect to iran's enrichment limits on those are strictest in the first 10 and 15 years. and then are reduced. but at no point does iran have the right to pursue or obtain a nuclear weapon. mr. scott: we will just have to respectfully disagree. let me ask one final question. 25, it seems to

suggest there will be an effort made to preempt state laws and state who have otherwise passed laws that prohibit companies from investing in iran. how is this not a violation of the states' rights and how do you read paragraph 25 of the agreement? mr. szubin: there is nothing, to my knowledge, about preemption. all it says is that we will make sure that the state authorities who have enacted legislation with respect to iran are informed of the developments, or just take a pretty key to be aware of when it comes to the area nuclear deal, and that will encourage them to take those into account as they consider their -- mr. scott: and how will you encourage them? mr. szubin: simply by setting forth what this deal is, what it is not. in some cases, those laws were predicated by the nuclear case. for any state authority who is

looking at the investment laws based on iran's nuclear program, you have to take into account the historic development that we are talking about today. >> thank you. >> senator schumer. >> i want to thank you ranking member brown and thank undersecretary sherman acting under secretary szubin. i have appreciated through this process your thoughtfulness, intelligence, your candor and your availability in our past meetings and i thank you for your many years of laudable service to our country and acting undersecretary szubin thank you for being here as well. i look forward to removing acting from your title so that we can heavy officially at the helm for the daunting challenges our country faces not only in iran and around the world. i have read and reread the agreement. i have had many meetings with people on both sides of the issues. several classified briefings and more meetings to come this week.

i'm carefully analyzing the proposed deal because its implications are profound and far-reaching. i have had many questions answered and i've not yet reached the conclusion. this is one of the most important votes i have had to take, any of us will have to take in our legislative career as senator brown mentioned. aiello to my constituents to make an informed decision. i won't let party, pressure, politics interfere with doing what i think is right. i want to judge the deal on the merits on the merits alone and in that spirit i want to ask you questions today. one of the questions i have is this, to both of you. where will iran be for 10 years on now and i know you will say no matter what there you have a very good agreement. i am interested in where iran will be. some say well look at the people of iran. they tend to be secular. they have economic needs.

they will push iran in a direction that is more moderate, more welcoming to the world etc.. some say we have had that population for a long time, and this dictatorship of very totalitarian evil dictatorship of mullahs has barely shuddered even with one transition of power. so, let me ask you how you see these two elements competing. i want your judgment because this is only a judgment question but i think a very important one as to where iran will be 10 years from now. and i would ask you each answer that question in your respective spheres. >> thank you senator schumer and thank you and i thank all members for the enormous diligence of looking at this deal and trying to ask and answer incredibly difficult questions. the united states senate has

been united between behind democratic and republican presidents for war and i appreciate that perhaps we can become united together behind peace. where iran will be in the future i don't know senator. i really don't. i don't think anyone does. our intelligence community i think has given you an assessment of what they believe, but quite frankly it is a very complicated situation. the people who turn out on the street tend to be the young people who are desperate not only for a better life and a stronger reality and a job that they want in their isolation. we live in a technologically connected world. no matter what the iranian mission -- regime does indeed they get on the internet. they see twitter. they use all of the devices that all of our kids use and they know what's going on in the world and they want to be part of it. i thank the united states senate

for their support of programs which have helped break through the internet so they can get on. and at the same time we have for regime led by clerics who have been around for very long time and have very conservative views, more than conservative, radical. they're part of their revolution of 1949 enough not let go of that history of the depth of mistrust between us is profound. i do not believe there will be some magic transformation as a result of this deal. for me this deal is about one thing and one thing only and that is making sure that this regime which does do a lot of terrible things in the region and to its own people will not have a nuclear weapon that could further terrorize the world and terrorize the region. i am hopeful because i'm a hopeful person data transformation will take place in 10 years but it may not so we have to use every tool we have on all of the activities of concern that we have an work

with israel, work with the region to stop those activities and make sure that those young people have a future at all. >> do you have anything to add mr. szubin? >> i don't. sydney. >> she's a hard act to follow. >> let me ask a question. it relates to what senator corker talked about a massar retroactivity -- or the grandfathering of activities. let me give an example, major oil companies may be government-owned maybe not signed a 10 year contract with iran immediately after snap back, immediately after sanctions are lifted as iran has a complied with a long list and then we go into snap back. we find a major violation we go forward on snap back. it is now year for that

contract. i understand that grandfathering will not prevent one, two and three. the problem is example is made in those first few years a key. is the contract terminated in year four for the next six years or does the contract continue and this is an important question is senator corker said. it's not the most important question that we need a yes or no answer. there was a "new york times" article where people have different views and they asked a u.s. government spokesmen and they refuse to give an answer so that made me worry so that's why i'm glad you were here to clarify. what happens in year four, five, six and seven is that contract terminate? >> i want to be clear and be very careful of my words to make sure i'm exactly answering the questions. sanctions don't terminated contract. they don't have the authority to an all a contract between

parties. sanctions did, what u.s. sanctions do in the circumstance that you are describing as they say in the future transaction whether it's future investment by the foreign oil companies future generation of profit future expansion -- understood purchases sanctionable. that's what the sanctions do right now create. >> you'll have to explain what that means to me in layman's terms. it's my fourth year and i am due to send iran a billion dollars for oil which i want. can i still send that oil? that's allowed? >> no. >> what does it mean it's sanctionable? is it your view that sanctions are severe enough that total will terminate the contract and risk being sued by rand? what to sanctionable mean in

that situation? >> it's exactly what the circumstances are right now but the circumstances have been when you put these tough sanctions into place. there were lot of agreements and contracts they were 10 and 20 year contract and we put aside into place. let the companies as they face the threat of these powerful u.s. sanctions. >> in other words total wouldn't be able to do business in the united states if it continued in year four for instance. >> there are all sorts of -- >> would the totaled be able to do business in the united states in year four if they continue they contract? >> total could face a number of sanctions, a number of penalties under the iran sanctions act which could include being cut off from u.s. market. >> what this could include main? >> iran sanctions act as a menu. >> who has the ability to determine which of those, which on the menu was chosen plexus that the u.s. government

unilaterally? >> if i may was in the year and when the time the sanctions came into place and total had made the decision at that point about whether to leave the risks were too high for them. the same or siemens proved to be of her frank was a client of mine at the time and they had to leave. they had to unwind those investments. they had to see if there was a majority that would allow them to come out that the risks were too high. the risks are they don't have access to u.s. secondary markets. they don't have corresponding banking relationships. >> mr. szubin you said could come you didn't say will. who would determine if they could? >> the selection of the penalties in your hypothetical is done at the state department and the penalties imposed -- >> was totally unilaterally by the u.s. government? >> that's right.

the only reason i was putting in the copy of the top about the contract is of course of the contract is signed between a european company and i rammed the contract is validated by u.s. sanctions. what are sanctions do is deter deter --. >> to use an example total would have to make a decision does it risk a sued suit by the iranians because they are violating their contract given the heaviness of our sanctions? >> that's exactly right. >> i appreciate the answer and i think you have answered. now for the next question. that is our interpretation what you just gave up what grandfathering means. i think secretary what's your tidal? undersecretary, ambassador sherman. >> whatever. >> okay, you are good by me whatever your title is. you said the british ambassador

said britain agreed with that interpretation. do we have that in writing somewhere that written france germany and the e.u. agree with that interpretation since they are members of the group of eight? >> we do not have a letter to that. i will talk to them about that possibility. i want to tell this committee i had extensive discussions at 27 days i was in vienna towards the end of this with every single one of our partners, quite expensive because they all had these concerns and we were extremely explicit and explicitness is the following which adam said and i will repeat, we said there is no validity for the snapback provision if there is any form of grandfathering. that renders snapback work meaningless and we will not agree to a deal. the united states of america will not agree to a deal where there is not a real snapback

provision. that is what we insist upon and that is what we got. >> snapback has other aspects to it is understand. i just want to ask you to russia and china do have indication that they agree with this interpretation of grandfathering? >> yes we have explicit discussions with them. there's there is language in the document that talks about prior contracts but if you read that language carefully you will see there is no grandfathering whatsoever. >> okay, one other point to make. i suppose it's a major contract to them they could just ask that snapback not be put into effect or they could pull out of the deal but that's just speculative. >> snapback cannot be stopped by any one country. >> but let's say there's a huge contract of importance to the soviets and russia and they could say you go for the snapback and you have the unilateral power. who knows if they would but they could. thank you mr. chairman.

>> senator crapo. >> thank you mr. chairman that i'd like to address my first questions to you mr. szubin. with regards to sanctions at this point jcpoa has been approved and submitted to the security council and approved by the security council of the united nations, correct? what impact is that approval have on sanctions regimes of the u.n. sanctions regimes in the sanctions regimes of united states? >> it would have no impact on the impact -- sanctions on the united states. and i understand it by the u.n. security council on a timetable in line with what ambassador sherman was describing where iranian performance when verified will lead to delisting of u.n. sanctions. >> that would be all of the u.n. sanctions on iran and? >> now, what it would mean on

implementation day when when iran has taken official steps and opposed the nuclear steps that ambassador sherman described would mean that economic sanctions in the united states -- united nations security council would be really. the sanctions on arms. and ballistic missile technology remain in place for many years to come under the u.n.. >> and your opening statement you made some point about the fact that it would be hard right now for the united states's to back out the agreement is has reached henry imposed the sanctions regime, correct? >> senator would i was referring to in congress -- as congress were to strike down the deal would we be able to unilaterally coerce international pressure to be able to secure a much better agreement? i wasn't talking there about snapback in the key distinction between those two is obviously iran has been breached. iran is defying the international community and i think we have good leverage in that case.

>> that's the question i wanted to ask because if it's not possible for us to go back and re-implements an effective sanctions regime now, what about snapback? i understand the snapback is based on an iranian violation of the agreement. what about that takes you think that now that the sanctions have been essentially put into the process of being removed, what makes you think the snapback will work? >> that's a question i spent the better part of two years working on and i appreciate it very much senator. one of the reasons you hear us talking about listing terminating sanctions as for that exact reason to ensure that these authorities remain in place. the structure of the u.n. sanctions resolution is still on the books, that the e.u. sanctions are still on the books in the u.s. sanctions are still on the books so they are hovering in suspense and we make very clear not just symbolically but legally that we are in a position very quickly to restore

that pressure. >> so you believe the fact that we have five other nations agreeing that a violation of the agreement would require a snapback of sanctions means that they would immediately join us if there's a violation of the agreement? >> obviously if we are talking about a scenario in the future of a violation the key question would be with what is the violation and how material is it that in the event where we have united states view it as a significant breach we retained the authority to do so unilaterally including at the united nations even if the other member security council's aren't with. >> and you believe in that case we could effectively cause the other nations to reimplement sanctions? >> in the event of a serious breach i do. what you were talking about than as a scenario we were facing in 2012 where iran seemed to be on the path towards a nuclear weapons capability and we want international agreement to impose tough sanctions to cut

off contracts, to pull out of investments. all of those costly steps were taken as the world frankly does not want iraq to have that capability. that's not the u.s. only priority. >> what i'm getting at though is you are talking about extremely serious violation that would cause other nations of the world to believe that iran was in fact developing or had have developed a nuclear weapon. so we have to get to that level of proof of a violation of four we can see an effective reimplementation of sanctions? >> no what i am saying is we will obviously want to respond in a proportional way. it's not in our strategic interest to respond to a small breach for scrapping the agreement and trying to put all the sanctions back into place. i don't think that would have the success that we had over the last few years and i something you would be in our best interest to see the agreement straps. this -- scrapped.

>> thank you mr. chairman i see my time is up. >> thank you. senator menendez. >> thank you mr. chairman thank you both for your service. regardless of my questions i certainly appreciate your service. madam secretary this agreement, is that the choice a simple yes or no. >> i don't think the simple yes or no. >> if you can't give me a simple yes or no to if it's disagreement or warren since i don't have limited time if you have not struck agreement with iran would we be at war with iran? >> i believe that the chances that we would be down the war to war would go up exponentially. >> you are saying compared to other witnesses who have served in the administration of the past to support the agreement before the senate foreign relations committee and have been asked the same question

they have unequivocally easily said no it's not this board. >> i just met you it's not why nouri senator. it is not binary. >> a year from now, two years from now, three years from now? >> i don't think any of us can predict the future in that way. >> the secretary of state has come before various members of the senate and said it's either this or war. that is a binary statement. >> the reason senators because sanctions have never gotten rid of their nuclear program. it's only brought them to the table. >> it hasn't created for either. >> abu walk away from this deal and will begin marching forward with their programs further as they have done over the years in and the president of the united states has said he will not allow us to obtain a nuclear weapon. that leaves only one option. >> that leaves real doubt including in the intelligence briefing. i think there's a real doubt that iran believes incredible

military threat of force is on the table. on page 26 of the agreement says the united states will make its best efforts in good faith to sustain the agreement to prevent interference with the realization of a full benefit by iran of the sanctions listed, listing specified which is basically the u.s. sanction. the u.s. administration acting consistent with the respective roles of the president and the congress will refrain from reintroducing, reintroducing a re-imposing the sanctions specified in annex two under the joint comprehensive plan of action. now i try to get this from the treasury secretary and he didn't give me an answer so that iran sanctions act that was one of the authors of expires next year. do we have the right to reauthorize those sanctions now or at any given time, yes or no?

>> i believe senator that it doesn't expire until the end of next year and we can have that discussion. >> so here we go again. we either have the right or we do not have the right. having a question of prematurely discussing something doesn't answer the question. do you understand the agreement is that we have the right or we don't have the right? >> we set in this document that it recognizes the constitution of the united states. the united states congress has the right to do whatever it wants to do within its authority so in that case you do have the right. what we are saying is we would urge that it's premature to make that decision. >> if you are going to snapback you have a snapback do something and the iran sanctions act which this at the station on various occasions has credited as one of the significant elements of getting iran to the negotiating table. if they don't exist after next year there is nothing to

snapback to. >> we believe there's a way forward in that regard. >> let me read to you what your partner in the steel said in a letter to the security council dated july 20, 2015. the iranians said it's clearly spelled out in the joint conference of plan of action that both the european union and the united states will refrain from reintroducing a re-imposing the sanctions and the strict measures on the joint plan of action. it's understood that reintroduction or reimposition including two extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance which would relieve iran from its investments in part or in holes or your partner in this regard believes that in fact if we were , if congress were to go ahead and reauthorize, which i think most members believe it's

still going to exist, and most members in this agreement believe the iran sanctions act is still going to exist. with all the waivers of president has, something that in fact will be reverted back to if the iranians violate and it is a form of deterrence. and so either sanctions work or they don't. either they are or they are not. if they are not the agreement is based on the hope over the course of 10 years or 13 s. the president said in an npr interview. that they won't violate and then with no sanctions in place that in fact the only choice you have is a limited window in which you will have to add militarily for the next president of the united states. mr. szubin let me ask you is the

true whatever -- whenever we have imposed sanctions we have given countries and companies and individuals sufficient notice for them to divest themselves of the sanctionable activity? >> now, what i would say senator we have imposed major sanctions that affect major and vestments. we typically get a short period. it could be 60 days or 90 days. >> gets it's in six months is it not? >> typically it's longer. >> if it's six months, and you have a one year breakout time although in testimony before the senate foreign relations committee weapons inspector and they had at the institute for science said that they believe their calculation of potential breakout time under one scenario of six to seven months. that's a heck of a lot less than one years of the time period of potential reenactment of sanctions which the

administration argues both ways. it won't get iran to do what they wanted soon at the same time you say it's a snapback. it's either one of the other. i just don't see how in fact we have the wherewithal under this agreement, your partner says in fact there is no way that they will respect that and they will be able to get out of the agreement and we will be back to .0. when they choose to do that which is why you are reluctant to go ahead and it knowledge that there should be a reauthorization of the iran sanctions act because then they very well walk away and if in fact they are going to walk away simply by the existence of sanctions but then -- don't go into effect unless there's a violation the future. you have to worry that what they are doing is buying time in the last point i want to make, sometimes what is past is prologue and i just want to read some excerpts from the hearing

when i was pursuing the iran sanctions act when the then chairman of the senate or in relations committee madam secretary of state was actually arguing against the sanctions. i guess in that respect things haven't changed. he went on to say that rather than motivating the country to join us in increasing -- iran they are most likely to resent actions and resist following our lead. a consequence i would serve the iranians more than it harms them. they could have the opposite effect than it was intended and increase the iranian regime's revenue. and then you were quoted secretary sherman as in fact also buying into that point if you and if you look at the transcript of the hearing basically what it talks about is everything we have heard here that we will break the coalition and that in fact we will be

isolated, that in fact we will be alone and that therefore we will not have the consequences against iran and the problem is when you cry wolf one too many times it really is problematic. so based upon the history here which says no sanctions should not be imposed because if they do we will lose the coalition now listening to this agreement we will lose the coalition. unwilling to say that the iran sanctions act should be authorized and i think every ember believes is going to exist as a deterrence. there is a deterrence or no deterrence, that's hard to understand in the final point i would make mr. chairman, this iranian regime cares about two things, preserving the regime of the revolution. they're not going to enter into any agreement that doesn't preserve the regime of the revolution so they must think this is a good agreement for them ultimately to accomplish that goal. that is worrisome so i understand the hope that the

agreement applies and they will perform but when they don't perform i don't think we are going to be in a better position at that time. thank you mr. chairman. >> senator sasse. >> ambassador sherman i'm wondering if you can help me understand what the congress is actually voting on. whether or not congress would kill the deal does that matter in any way to the iranians or are they guaranteed all the methods of would have been negotiated today? >> of course they are not, senator. the united states congress has the authority and the right under our constitution under the corker cardin legislation to in fact review and vote a resolution of disapproval. the president of the united states then ask the right in the authority to exercise his veto if he wants and i would expect that he would and then the united states congress has the

right to try to override that veto. that's our system works. i would hope that the united states congress would not override that veto because i believe the joint conference of plan of action is the most profound most far-reaching arms control agreement ever negotiated and it will indeed keep this country israel our allies safer. >> pinky but what i'm asking you is if the congress did override the veto why would it matter to the iranians? what would they lose? >> they would lose an opportunity to have sanctions relief. they would lose the opportunity to have isolation from the rest of the world. they would lose their opportunity to come to the community of nations. they may not care about that and what what i would expect if the united states congress overrides his presidential veto was which i would not expect to happen because i believe this congress has united behind democratic and republican presidents for war and i would expect in the end they would unite behind the democratic president or a

republican president for peace and that is what this deal is about, not having to go to war but ensuring iran does not get a nuclear weapon. >> i agree that this shouldn't be a partisan issue but isn't that the case the administration is arguing that we have lost the international community so if the u.s. doesn't act, if we don't go forward with your deal the iranians are going to get this relief anyway. if not isn't that an answer to senator menendez's question frankly it's what the president secretary kerry were saying three or four weeks before july july 1 that it isn't a choice between this deal and war but there are other scenarios where sanctions could have an effect. i think you can't have it both ways. >> i understand that. the issue is what kind of effect and how far-reaching effect and whether we'll stop their program. is it true that a unilateral sanctions could be put back in place and continue on? is it possible the rest of the world maybe not europe, they are

allies and partners of ours but other parts of the world that have taken huge economic costs by stopping the importation of iranian oil are taking huge costs by other ending of trade with iran would not pay attention to our unilateral bilateral sanctions? that is indeed the case or sanctions regime would not be as effective as it would be. the international committee has come together behind this deal. they will not stay together between our loan rejecting this deal at the congress overrides the veto. the united states will be in a weaker position not only on this senator that on many other things we are trying to do internationally in the world. >> just to be cleared is your your position that if the congress would kill this deal the u.s. sanctions regime could still have some significant effect. >> it would have some effect i would say so yes but it would not have they affected us today and everyone has to remember

that iran will then move forward with it program. sanctions as devastating as they have been and as i would say to senator menendez and i hope it shows in the record that indeed this administration has enforced a unilateral and multilateral sections and more found ways in every previous administration nature which is try to do a very good incredible job but we have intensified that. that's what president obama set out to do was to intensify the sanctions pressure so iran would come to the negotiating table in a serious way to get the most profound and far-reaching agreement that has ever been negotiated. >> thank you and i do appreciate your advocacy for the agreement but i think this was a yes or no question that you just gave to the question that senator menendez asked. you don't believe that the war or this deal? you wouldn't answer yes or no for him.

>> the third scenario is even though her sanctions would -- iran would move forward with its nuclear program because why wouldn't they? they wouldn't be getting the relief, all the relief they wanted. they would keep marching forward with their program and it would force us into a choice. are we going to laugh and have a nuclear weapon and president obama is resolute he will not allow that to happen and that is heading down the road to war. >> secretary szubin i want to ask you one question. you and i have had previous discussions and i appreciate the work that you do and i know we have mutual affection for one of your predecessors as president zarate. i won't quote the length of it but you said in your opening statement the irgc receives no sanctions from under this deal, is that correct? >> secretary in his testimony in

the second panel is going to outline much of what he calls the business empire that is driven by the irgc. most of those entities to receive sanctions relief under this deal so isn't your point really fairly meaningless that they don't receive sanctions relief when all the entities that they get their money from due? >> no senator and i would respectfully beg to differ with former assistant secretary zarate. the irgc will remain under sanctions and that means the companies that is deriving revenue from oil remain under sanctions and obviously the senior officers will remain under sanctions as well. congress will have international effect. and international bank, and let me give a specific example here. the largest construction and engineering firm in iran we designated for being owner controlled by the irgc. it's revenue source to the irgc is not coming out. five years, eight years, 15

years under this deal. an international bank that hosts the accounts for it will face cut off from the u.s. financial system. those are tough progressive sanctions and those are remaining place. there are companies who have done what i would call arm's length transactions with the irgc overtime that we had decimated for conducting business for the irgc. we have companies like that are due to receive relief at varying stages of the deal but the empire remains intact. >> thank you mr. chairman. senator merkley. >> thank you mr. chairman. and my regard my understanding is the irgc -- the sanctions in that regard and that's one of

>>ilimaechos -- it means that under this agreement, iran --

it's me that under this agreement, iran is permitted from ever happening in lebanon. >> does iran have the right to enrich to demonstrate uranium after the expiration? ms. sherman: no because if the is -- is a deep groove to weapon grade, it would raise a red flag in the international immunity and to the iaea. there are very few could circumstances -- very few circumstances in which iran would need to enrich above 5%. indeed, if they went to weapons grade, it would raise instantaneous red flags and we would see it as a major non-compliance. >> so enrichment over 5% starts to essentially raised this red flag with the exception of submarine fuel deco ms. sherman: submarine fuel and there may be one or two other things.

i could ask if there are other instances, but there are very few. mr. merkley: in what instance -- ms. sherman: i think it is 20 -- >> [indiscernible] ms. sherman: could be 20, some are higher. mr. merkley: so, that is a big distinction between five and 20. but are you basically saying that if the amount of fuel enriched didn't specifically meet the quantity profile of the nuclear submarines that that would be a red flag? so for most purposes, it is 5%. ms. sherman: it is 5% or less. mr. merkley: ok. and in terms of after -- ms. sherman: the one other distinction i should make is for the tehran research reactor, which helps make medical isotopes for cancer treatment in iran, uses 20%, but this agreement says that we will provide fabricated fuel for that research reactor over time.

and we have put controls on that so that it cannot be used for other purposes. how merkley: so, what -- much enriched uranium above 5% could iran store without creating a red flag? ms. sherman: two points. for 15 years, iran is not allowed under this agreement to enrich be on its 3.67%. so the concern you raised only begins to raise those red flags after this 15 years. they are a lot for those 15 years to have a stockpile of 300 kilograms. that 300 kilograms is not allowed -- is not enough to provide material for a nuclear weapon. mr. merkley: -- so there is no particular limit at that point? ms. sherman: there is not a limit, but, again, we would look at an ever-increasing stockpile

and want to understand the reasons and uses of it. veryf the things that is clear here because we have uranium accountancy for 25 years, centrifuge production for 20 years, they have to make a declaration to the iaea of their additional protocols over the long-term that they there will be many, many metrics for measuring what they are doing with their programs for a very, very large time. mr. merkley: because my time is expiring, i last question is -- when you look at snapback, that is kind of a sledgehammer approach. given the scale of violations, is there a scalable response? mr. szubin: yes, senator. we have reserved the right to snapback in whole or in part, and we can do that without little radel sanctions -- with our unilateral sanctions for the u.n. sanctions. all the way through to full snapback. mr. merkley: thank you. >> senator cotton.

mr. cotton: thank you, mr. chairman. there was an eight minute exchange between senator schumer and the witnesses about the meaning of the grandfather clause. i think we got some sort of answer out of that, but officials have said repeatedly that iran will support -- exploit every ambiguity, so i can only imagine what they will say about that cause. shermanng on, secretary , there is a lot of commentary about access. access to iran's nuclear sites, the military sites. they have frequently talked about managed access. can you assure us that this access will actually be physical access? iaea inspectors will be physically walking into the sides and taking samples or installing equipment? ms. sherman: i think that every situation is different, senator. and that the iaea has the

capability, the expert knowledge to make sure that whatever they do can be technically authenticated. so i can't go through every hypothetical situation. i know that the director general , who i am sure will be asked these questions by these colleagues -- your colleagues, so i would rely on his answers more than on my answers. but what i am assured of is that whatever they do it every circumstance were they believed they need to have access, it will be technically authenticated and it will be -- meet the standards they must have and that they require for ensuring verification. mr. cotton: the answer than it sounds like his, no, we cannot be ensured that inspectors were physically and personally be present on every side. ms. sherman: you don't have to be physically present on every site in this technological world to get done what is necessary. our labs can walk you through

those parameters. mr. cotton: who will decide what is and is not a military site? ms. sherman: well, i think the better way to respond to your question is to say if the iaea believes it has justification to have access to a site, we have a process to ensure they give -- get access. mr. cotton: can iran research its -- deep its research facilities -- ms. sherman: if they have justification to enter any site, regardless of what is, and the access agreement provides, they will get access. the united states of america would not have agreed to an agreement where access was not assured. that is what we have in this agreement. mr. cotton: are you aware of any actions the government of iran is taking to sanitize any sites? ms. sherman: i am not going to discuss anything that would be considered classified, but there is a briefing this afternoon. the national intelligence manager will be there. mr. cotton: let's move to this

ideal -- these sided deals. you mentioned, senator scott, that you read beside agreements. did anyone else in the united states government we these sided agreements? ms. sherman: yes, some of our experts did, as did all of the p5+1. mr. cotton: can you give me an estimate? ms. sherman: i would have to stop and think. mr. cotton: you said earlier to senator corker that we have to honor the confidentiality of these agreements. but if you read -- ms. sherman: actually, it is the iaea and every country with which it does safeguard -- mr. cotton: i will come to that in a moment. but the fact that you have read them and other officials have read them, doesn't that undermine the claim of supposing confidentiality? ms. sherman: we were shown them in a confidential setting and i will share with united states

senate, as i have done with house leadership chairs and making, my confidential -- ran king, my confidential understanding. mr. cotton: how long are these documents? ms. sherman: very short. mr. cotton: like the roadmap itself. ms. sherman: i would have to stop and think back. mr. cotton: why other documents classified? it is not a covert action, is not subject to sensitive collection method. iran knows what they agreed to. you know what is in it. why are these classified? ms. sherman: so, the reason is they are what are called safeguard confidential. under the agreement, to which we are also a party, we have confidential safeguards, confidential documents and protocols with the iaea between united states and the iaea, as do all of the countries that are under the csa. committed to keeping them confidential.

and so therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under csa confidential, as well. mr. cotton: yes, i am aware that is the statement you get to senator corker. i assume you are not apply -- implying any moral equivalence -- ms. sherman: indeed, not. you're not here yet, senator cotton. i understood this was a very different circumstance in the sense that we are trying to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and this was an international understanding that had been negotiated among six parties and iran. i understand this is different circumstances, which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangement, understanding they would be classified and i made clear to the iaea under our system i would be required to share in a classified, confidential setting with

members of the united states congress what i had seen. and i will do so this afternoon. mr. cotton: did you make way to iran that the u.s. law that was signed in the middle of these negotiations required congress to receive the text of all agreements to which the united states was not a party to echo -- party? ms. sherman: indeed, our understanding of the legislation that was passed by the house and senate is that we must give your every document that we have. and we have given you every document that we have. mr. cotton: the legislation says all agreement, it doesn't matter whether the united states government has in its possession. ms. sherman: it is very difficult to give you something we do not have. mr. cotton: they do make that clear to iran and iaea at the time? ms. sherman: you are quite aware of our registration -- legislation. mr. cotton: one final question. a fascinating new interview today from secretary kerry and jeffrey goldberg says that a congress were to vote no, it

would be screwing the ayatollah. and then secretary kerry says that if congress rejects with you, it would to iran, quote, america is not going to negotiate in good faith. and that would be the ayatollah's point. surely, you make the to iran that congress had to vote on this deal before it could go forward and therefore they should not be operating under such a misperception. ms. sherman: of course they knew that congress was going to vote on this. everything was very public. everything that happens here in our country is transparent and democratic and public. mr. cotton: are you concerned about congress screwing the ayatollah? ms. sherman: i have not seen this interview, i will not comment on it, senator. secretary kerry, secretary moniz, myself, the negotiating team who have been working diligently on this for over two years, having briefed the united states senate and the counters -- congress several times, did

everything to ensure the safety and security of the united states. that is what we did. mr. cotton: thank you. announcer: both the house and the senate returned tuesday. both bodies of debate the iran nuclear agreement. the senate plans to begin debate tuesday on a resolution of the proposed agreement. at the moment, six senators have yet to announce whether they will support the deal. i've of them are democrats. the lone republican senator susan collins of maine. the house will likely begin debate on the iran deal wednesday, with a foot expected by the end of the week. watch the house life here on c-span. you can watch the senate on c-span2. the future of the iran nuclear agreement was also a topic of conversation on "washington journal" this morning. this is just over an hour. host: our guests are here to talk

this is just over an mcinnis and trita parsi of the national for having us. host: mr. parsi, let's start with you. what's the significance of senate democrats signing on for president obama's deal and the ability to keep it veto proof. what does that signify. guest: it signifies that the deal avoids two disasters. the disaster of a war with an iran and the disaster of an iranian nuclear bomb. moreover, the more votes they get, the stronger the durability of the deal. the credibility of this deal had been damaged by the fact that this fight in congress erupted and became partisan as it is. so by the president being able to secure the veto it means the united states is in line the wo