this is just over an mcinnis and trita parsi of the national for having us. host: mr. parsi, let's start with you. what's the significance of senate democrats signing on for president obama's deal and the ability to keep it veto proof. what does that signify. guest: it signifies that the deal avoids two disasters. the disaster of a war with an iran and the disaster of an iranian nuclear bomb. moreover, the more votes they get, the stronger the durability of the deal. the credibility of this deal had been damaged by the fact that this fight in congress erupted and became partisan as it is. so by the president being able to secure the veto it means the united states is in line the world consensus.

the entire world is behind this deal, with the exception of israel. guest: and what does this signify as far as the deal going forward? guest: we're in a situation of how much hesitation is in congress and the american people about this deal. it will be a challenge for perhaps the incoming president in 2017 to inherit a deal that has no majority of support in congress and frankly reflects a lot of the potential challenges and pitfalls with this deal. so for me it is something that is reflection. this is not a great deal. host: as far as the political aspects, there is an effort that will be made as far as attaching a resolution of disapproval to the deal. does that do anything long-term as far as the deal is concerned? guest: it doesn't do much now. but it sets -- this depends on what amendments or other things may be done to the deal, but it sets up the terms of how the deal is going to be overseen and

policed from either this congress, probably not terribly effectively from the congress, but the next president may have something of a blueprint to be able to use if they want to insure that the remaining sanctions on the -- on iran for terrorism and human rights violations are not being enforced and how effectively the deal is being overseen by the international community. i think it will give congress power to do so. guest: and mr. parsi, what do you think about the attachment of the resolution of disapproval. does it downgrade the deal? guest: it all depends on what the language is in these bills. unfortunately, it is very clear. some people are just dead set against it not because of the details of the deal or they think it is a bad deal but because of the politics in washington. almost everything is partisan. as a result. you see a complete republican consensus against us because it is president obama's deal, because it is a deal with iran and some people in the city are addicted to the idea of continuing to have iran as an

enemy, even at the expense of not resolving this nuclear issue. some of these languages being circulated on capitol hill are new sanctions that would be imposed after this deal. they seem to be made to deliberately try to insure that this deal is sabotaged in the implementation stage. they failed to stop the negotiations and failed to stop the deal. now the attempt is to make sure after the deal you have a chance to sabotage it. host: these are the thoughts of our guests. if you want to call in and give questions to the guests. there are two guests joining for this team. (202) 748-8000 for democrats, (202) 748-8001 for republicans, 202-748-8002 for independents. mr. parsi, at the end of the day, what do we get as far as specifics out of the deal.

guest: as i mentioned this deal is good for a clear reason. it avoids two disasters by only giving up what the united states ostensibly put in place to trade away, which are the sanctions. it avoids the disaster of going to war with iran and avoids the disaster of iran having a nuclear weapon. there are various details in all this. i looked through it. this is the best possible deal the united states could have gotten. those who constantly want to see a better deal, everyone would like to see a better deal, but you have to be realistic. this is not a deal in which the united states can decide everything on its own. it is a negotiation. the other side and also the u.s.'s partners had to agree to things. that's the nature of negotiations. those that have been critical of the administration and say they could have gotten a better deal say this with a peculiar background. they never negotiated with iran. they said no to every opportunity to negotiate with iran. on what basis of experience can they say they could have gotten a better deal. they never engaged in negotiations.

host: as far as avoiding a war and a weapon in the short and long-term, what are your thoughts and does this do that? guest: it actually kicks the can down the road a bit on the problem. i actually believe that within the first 10 years, maybe first 15 years of the deal, we will be able to restrain iran, iran's ability to pursue a nuclear well on. the problem is that it mortgages the issue to 2030. so whoever the president is at that point in time is going to be faced with a situation where iran is actually allowed to have, and will most likely build an industrial capacity for its nuclear program. if it wanted to pursue or have the capacity to pursue a nuclear arsenal, not just a couple bombs, it will have that capacity to do so. that's when the real challenges of the deal is. it doesn't solve the problem long-term. it contains the problem. it pushing the problem down the road. then you are in a situation of what is our leverage at that point to be able to manage iran. we will be back under the old

regime that was violating in the first place. so that is something i think is really concerning in that it just -- it delays the problem, it doesn't solve the problem. host: how does that get in place if you have certain types of facilities shut down. if you limit the number of centrifuges and limit the inspections. how does that happen if you have those conditions in place? guest: i think there would be limitations on the number of centrifuges, the advanced nature of the centrifuges, research and development, but iran will be allowed to push forward onsetter key issues when it comes to centrifuge research and development and frankly, once those restrictions are relaxed in eight years, and then in ten years, then 13 years and 15 years, it will have the ability to pursue what it wants to. without, you know -- it still can't violate or should not violate the nonproliferation treaty. it doesn't mean they will automatically go for a bomb.

it means it will have that type of capacity if it wants to. guest: once these conditions take place, then other things happen, what do you think about that idea? host: i think it solves it long-term for a simple reason. all the restrictions that are put in place through this deal, which would not come at all if this deal would have been rejected by congress, the most important aspect of it is the additional protocol, which gives the iaea the most intrusive inspections possible. that inspections regime is permanent. it is not something that goes away in year eight, year 10, year 13 or year 15. it never goes away. it gives them the ability to have cameras and other instruments inside of iran's nuclear program so if the iranians start to cheat, they will be able to notice this almost immediately because of the very high tech instruments they now have in place. that will always be there. so even in year 15, if the iranians expand the number of

centrifuges and do things they are not allowed to, if they do fishy things, they will find out right away. in the absence of this deal we don't have that capacity. they don't have the super intrusive inspections. in deal insures we will have it permanently. that's the best possible deal that could be achieved. host: so let's go to calls. we'll start with jim in irwin, pennsylvania. democrat line. good morning. caller: good morning. in 1938. chamberlain made a deal with a adolr hitler and that turned out very well. we know that's the same kind of deal. host: do you want to start? guest: i don't think it is that disastrous. i think this is a challenge for us to be able to, you know, look

back at periods of time when we thought we were achieving a certain degree of peace and in reality we were mortgaging the situation to later on. and it is a very bitter harvest at the end. so i think this is what the real challenge is with this deal, that we are going to have some capacity to be able to maintain, constrain iran for the first 10 or 15 years. in reality, once you are past the hurdles, iran, yes, the ability to breakthrough that regime, the inspections reseem is something that is going to be difficult for the international community to snap back all the sanctions, put back military pressure, because 15 years from now, this is a totally different world. host: mr. parsi. guest: these comparisons to munich is an example of the fear propaganda. there is absolutely no compare son between these situations. again, the inspections regime

will be permanent. the ability of the international community to react, if the iranians start to cheat, is so quick, so that the iranians would have no chance of cheating and getting away with it, meaning that they would have enough time to build a bomb before the international community would find out. if they start to cheat within hours, they will know about it and would have enough time to react to such a scenario. most importantly, i think that the issue to keep in mind is that the incentives structure of the iranians will change as a result of the deal. if it brings in the type of benefits they are looking for, the lifting of sanctions and reintegration in the global economy, that will raise the costs from the iranian perspective to cheat. because that means that everything that you have gained, you are going to lose if you go down that route. and whereas that route may have been somewhat attractive under circumstances where they were completely excluded from the world economy and had nothing to loose, not part of security

arrangements, not integrated in the political and economic structures of are the region or globally, that would be a different calculation when they are integrated because they will lose everything. that is an important component of the debate that's been forgotten. there is an assumption 15 years from now it will be the exact same iran, that everything is state particular, nothing changes. i don't think that is a fair assumption to be made. in fact many of those assumptions had they been true we would not be in a situation right now in which a deal would have been struck because the very same folks that had that type of analysis and made these assumptions believe that iran would never come to the table. iran would never negotiate or uphold an interim agreement or sign a deal. iran would never make any deal with the united statesment all of those assumptions made about iran have been proven to be false.

connect with the international community and that is the best chance the international community has to see that iran is far more moderate than it has been the last 15, 20, 30 years. host: mr. mcinnis. what was- guest: motivating president obama to pursue this deal was what i believe is the doctrine that he sees in cuba and in iran, which

is it is not about the details of the deal, but the ability to bring iran into the international community and iran will become more moderate. it is not about centrifuges, but about bringing iran into the rest of the world. it is an attractive idea. i understand that. there is a possibility that could happen. at the same time, this is a regime that is keenly aware that the challenge of integrating into the national -- international community is going to be. you see the supreme leader is very vocal about the fact that he believes president obama is pursuing the deal so he can infiltrate the country with western ideas, western political thought, western economic commitments and dependencies to eventually undermine the regime in tehran. this is a country that underwent the 2009 protests.

they are very capable of keeping a very tight lid on the country after that experience -- the initial failure of not been able to do so in 2009. i believe you are in a situation where the regime knows exactly what mr. parsi is describing and they are prepared for it. you are in a situation, given the international community, when it comes to financial markets, you have to understand so much of that money is going to go into the system with all the various companies owned by the revolutionary guard corps, personalpreme leader's company, and so much of that is tied into the pillars of repression of that regime where you can have a situation where an enriched iran is able to maintain its current state, current regime, current key players. they would be more entrenched. that is what i worry about. that thesis, as opposed to the

thesis the president has and mr. parsi has, that would be the more likely scenario. host: mike from munro, georgia. caller: hey, pedro. how are you all doing this morning? i have three questions. question number 1 -- if this is such a great deal that they negotiated, why are we trying to ur so much support from people in saudi arabia, missile defense support, and everything? they should not have to be worrying about anything. -- how farmber two will we let them g to we do something about it? and question number three, how does the average american know what is going on when they have the secret side deals? we are taking things at face value and i do not think that is fair for the american people to

make a judgment on. i would appreciate if you would answer all three questions. , do you want to start? guest: the first question is interesting with the deal with the saudi's. the saudi king came out expressing his support for the deal and he is satisfied with it. in return, he wants more weapons, and that is a typical demand. almost every time something happens, the saudi's want further guarantees from the united states that the u.s. will guarantee the survival of the saudi regime. neither weapons? the iranians only -- do they need the weapons? the iranians only spent about $15 billion last year. i do not think they need weapons at all. it is a common demand that some of the saudi's and israel make when anything happens. in reality, the deal is making

the region much more stable than making sure all paths for iran to seek a nuclear weapon have been closed off. as to the idea that the iranian have not paid for the violations of the sanctions, etc., is a fantasy. iran has faced some of the most crippling sanctions put on any state in modern time. they have paid a high price. the idea we have not been anything about it is incorrect. regard to the side deals, there are not any secret side deals. there are negotiations with the iaea and iran that have been going on for many years. clearly, iran did not want to strike a deal with iaea without having a deal with the p5 plus one. it is following the regular protocol. the most important thing to keep in mind, the only two states

that have expressed some opposition to this deal is israel and saudi arabia, and saudi arabia has now changed their position and is in support. the idea that it would be a bad idea because congress is fighting about it, brings the question, why is it the republican-controlled congress has found problems, while the entire international community minus israel has not? host: this was one of the topics that came up yesterday at the white house. mr. mcinnis? guest: considering that question -- one of the prices you pay with a deal, it will potentially feel a potential arms race in the region in addition to driving some of the clandestine proxy wars occurring already. iran has a huge network of groups it works with through the region. is concerned not only about the military

hardware, but the threat that iran poses to them and their allies throughout the region. they fear that iran is ultimately trying to undermine their own regime. this is something the u.s., or at least this president, does not fully appreciate, how threatened the key players feel toward iran's capabilities. this is one thing i fear is a real challenge for this president, for our country. we are in a situation where there is so much insecurity in the middle east and we are putting out the problem for a decade, maybe two, which can be a good thing, but in exchange we are getting a dicey situation that can explode in all sorts of other ways. now, when it comes to the issue of cheating, this is a very interesting question because you are in a situation where the international community is going to be very low that to come back in with immediate sections.

frankly, the iranians themselves have said this. they do not believe the snap back to can and will work. they are proud and boasting that this will not be effectively implemented and i actually agree with the iranians on this issue. it will be challenging to bring cheats.ctions if iran it is a mostly nuclear option -- keep going on the current path or bring everything back. you will have some of the graduated ability to react. people will be hesitant to possible for lever and throw everything back on, so they will let iran cheat quite a bit, i think, until a certain point. this is partly how the international atomic energy agency works. you have is confidential agreements. it is part of the challenge to be able to bring all of that in light. as someone who used to work in the classified world, it is difficult to do that -- to have the public did you probably should on these issues.

it also points to the concern a lot of people have -- a lot of americans have, a lot of people in congress have -- that there is not going to be accountability, or, at least, public accountability. what iran has been doing in the past on its nuclear weapons research program, and, frankly, having the confidence that iran is not pursuing those issues getting these site deals is a real challenge. guest: a quick response on two things -- first, the idea the threat that the saudis and arab allies see from iran, it is important to keep in mind what keep abilities are. the saudis spent $80 billion onpared to iran $15 billion weapons. they do not need more weapons. if there is an arms race it will be the result of the choice they make to buy more arms when they do not need it.

there are factors that have very little to do with iran. the fact that the united states is becoming so independent of saudi oil and oil in general because of their own discoveries , etc., is a threat to the saudis. the fact that they have not manage that well to react to the demand of their own citizens -- we have what happened in the arab spring, etc. -- is a real internal threat. they have spread money trying to get that out of their own kingdom, sending them outwards. it is also backfiring. you had a moment in which isis was quite popular on the saudi street until the declared they are putting together a caliphate and that was a challenge to saudi arabia. then the saudis started building walls against isis. those are the real challenges saudi arabia is faced with. challengevery minor in the larger picture. say the united states

has to come in, and for that, -- idea of the iranian is threat is valuable, but that is not the case. host: mr. mcinnis, do you want to respond? guest: part of the problem with mr. parsi's argument is you cannot compare dollar-four-dollar in the region. the iranian have become very adept at doing more with less. with saudi arabia, they have a long way to go before using the military power they acquired, despite with it spent on it. the iranians have become sophisticated. he does it matter the most modern air force and navy, they have found other ways to be a significant threat to the u.s. navy, the u.s. air force, as well as the largest missile .apacity there, in the region they found ways, that despite all of their limitations, they

actually have the capacity to really, you know, threat saudi arabia, the emirates, and other key states there, and, of course, israel, and this is what people underestimate by eating simply at the numbers. at the same time, mr. parsi is absolutely right that saudi arabia has a lot of problems, as does iran. they both have a lot of internal issues. they both are dealing with a situation in the region where there is a huge competition for who is going to lead the islamic world and whose narrative is going to be the dominant islamic narrative there. is it iran, saudi arabia, isis -- everyone is being challenged by not. he is actually right, we really should have bigger fish to fry here, but at the same time, given the history between iran and saudi arabia, and given the fact that iran is still a revolutionary state, still a state looking to export its revolution from 1979. certainly, the best geordie the pointsion, as mr. parsi

out, is not that ideological, but the regime is. it is critical for their own security. they still feed the need to bring the revolution to the rest of the islamic world and the saudi arabians are absolutely right to be afraid of that. host: we're talking about the iranian nuclear deal with two guest. you just heard from matthew mcinnis and treated parsi --trita vet --parsi. go ahead with your comments for our guests. caller: i have several comments on why the iranian deal is very dangerous for the united states and a very, very bad one. first of all, you cannot negotiate with people, who at the same time they are negotiating, say they want to destroy your country and people.

and they are destroying many areas of the middle east. the recent disasters in the result of iran a . the fact that negotiations did not link any agreement with iran 's general policy of disrupting and creating chaos in the middle east is ridiculous. ok. negotiators the have a non-verifiable agreement. we can't really verify what is going on. there is a 24-day delay in inspections, and that is after theu.n. decides whether inspections are justified. so, we have given up our power

to see, to verify any location at any time. host: peter, thank you. i will pick up one point. this 24-day idea. mr. mcinnis, what you think about that? can something be done in 24 days to hide what is going on in iran ? guest: there is the potential. certain activities will be very --d to hide in 24 days certainly the ability to become radiological capability is something we in the international community, the intelligence community in our country, and in europe, are able to do most of that. but, it is a real challenge that certain activity does not have radiological signatures. other types of research that might be going on -- say, for example, how to actually detonate a nuclear weapon, those are things that are a little bit more challenging to be able to pick up. that is what i am worried about. on certain things, 24 days may

be enough. of course, that is an issue -- 24 days, all sorts of delays can be thrown into the process through the political process. if the russians want to help delay the process, the chinese want to, the iranians have a certain say unit itself. that is what i would be concerned about. host: mr. parsi guest: not that concerned about that at all because there are a couple of things to keep in mind. the inspections are 24/7 on all iranian declared sites. that is important to point out. people think there is a 24-day delay on everything taking place. that is not the case. is present on all aspects and inspecting constantly. that say evidence emerges there is suspicion that the iranians are doing something secret at a different site.

those countries that have the evidence have to protect -- present it to the iaea iaea, --iaea, and then there is 24 days to assess whether the evidence is credible enough. what you do not want to do is have a short period that constantly has the iaea to seek inspections based on flimsy evidence because that undermines the authority of the iaea and puts the iranians in a strong position. once you have the credibility, the iranians cannot stop it. the way the vote structure has been put in place, the night state and the europeans will always win the vote, and within the 24 days, the iranians cannot hide anything that has nuclear keep abilities -- even when it comes to -- nuclear capabilities. even when it comes to detonators. radiation would be present.

it is important to keep in mind, you have some criticism against this deal, but the entire international community, including some of the most hard-line states, such as france, germany, britain, are all in line with this agreement. you only have some opposition coming from the israelis and the republican i think controlled congress. that does not mean some criticism -- republican-controlled times. that is not mean some criticisms does not have validity. host: from louisiana. byron. hello. good morning. caller: thank you, pedro, for letting me talk. i would like to ask mr. mcinnis a few questions. number one, could he tell me how many people were killed off of ontradent reagan iran c deal.

i am glad you brought up missiles. we sold missiles to iran so we can get -- could go get money to go fight the people in nicaragua. plus, could you tell me when was the last time the iaea inspected pakistan, india, china, for nuclear activity? can you tell me, he americans the communist chinese killed in north korea. four,tainly was more than like at benghazi. they killed thousands of our marines, but they tend to forget about this as long as it happens to their advantage. think you very much for letting me talk. caller: yeah -- thank you very much for letting me talk. caller: yeah, that is an interesting question. what i would say for the americans that have been killed due to the iran contra deal, it is hard to assess. with the fighting that happened,

the additional weapons going to iran, obviously it helps to fuel -iraqran-a rock war --iran war during that period where thousands died. the question of what is being fueled in a situation where we will have some form of a conventional arms race. will pursueiranians just as much as the gulf states. when it comes to inspections, this is one of the key issues that all signatures are subject to certain restrictions and observation, and i think these are situations, when it comes to replace like pakistan, india, china, those are all problematic at some point in time. they were all violators at some point in time, it we have, kind of, come to learn to live with it, unfortunately. when it comes to the americans

killed in situations like the korean war, obviously thousands of americans died in that situation. so, these are all some of the real concerns that all of us should have about preventing war. actually, this is something i am clear and firm against -- going to war against iran. it never turns out well when you game it out. it is something that, i think, we should be looking for ways to avoid conflict in these resolutions. it is something that, at the same time, i fear you are creating an environment with this deal that will fuel conventional and proxy wars for decades to come. host: go ahead. caller: if i could make some quick comments -- i think the caller is an important point about contra because that is a situation where the united states provided weapons to the iranians, done under a republican administration, which

was completely illegal -- it was illegal under the laws of the united states at the time. it was also something that truly upset some of the arab allies of the united states, which some of the critics raise these days. be mindful, the u.s. was also post -- supporting saddam hussein at the time simultaneously. they felt that this meant they could not trust the united states because the united states had been encouraging an arms embargo against the iranians and secretly selling arms to the iranians. this deal prevents the iranians from getting weapons, not just missiles, but nuclear weapons. so, it was quite different in that sense. with not provide iranians weapons. it is important to keep in mind what was raised when going to war with iraq. you have two models of foreign policy. you have the bush model where they did not build consensus for going into iraq.

they were pretty much going it alone. it was a war that was a disaster. i think mr. mcinnis is right, when you game it out -- it would have ended up dead if they gamed it out properly and it did. thousands of american soldiers killed, a complete depot station -- a complete destabilization of the middle east. that is one model. the other model is building an international consensus, which the obama administration has done by having the entire p5 plus one on board with this. that is important in light of the fact that while the u.s. was negotiating with iran, the u.s. and russia had some important problems, but they come -- compartmentalized the relationship so they could agree on iran. bombprevents the iranian and not a single american has

died because of the iran deal. en.t: ow you are on with our guests. good morning. caller: thank you for taking my call. i have a few questions. i haveng the deal -- heard on this broadcast before, previous guest, that on this deal, americans would be sponsoring conventional arms for iran. my understanding, otherwise, is we are releasing 100 plus billion. secondly, if we're talking about a nuclear-free middle east, it should be the middle east in its entirety. so, my question is does israel have a nuclear program? the third question is regarding the art of war, and your guest

addressed it, it seems the republican congress and israel is in contrast to the rest of the world. the countries would not accept a deal acceptable to the countries. i thought negotiations basically means you do not get everything that you need it. you give a little to get back something. host: ok. thanks, caller. mr. parsi, do you want to start? guest: ok, if i understand the first question, no, there are no conventional weapons going to iran from the nazis. now, they can bat -- from the united states. now, iran can buy weapons themselves. there is a nonproliferation treaty. you essentially pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, but that

does not mean you do not have the right to pursue other types of weapons, and iran certainly does have that. despite that, there will be an arms embargo for eight years, something the united states was lucky in getting, mindful that the missile component of the resolution was connected to potential weaponization in iran. when the weaponization has been canceled out, so should have the missile embargo, if you read it from the legal perspective. still, the united states managed, with the consensus of that theyp5 state have the arms embargo for another eight years. that is a major achievement that one should be surprised the u.s. could get in this area yes, the israelis -- this. yes, the israelis do have a nuclear program and they are believed to have 100 to 200 nuclear warheads. there are no inspections over there and that is a stark contrast here. we almost went to war with iran

over a program that was not weaponize in and had not been sinceize in -- weaponized 2003. ultimately, the goal should be to have a nuclear weapons-free middle east. beyond that, i think we should have much less weapons in the middle east period. i do not think we, in any way, shape, or form, should complain about an arms race in the middle east when we are the ones selling the weapons. host: mr. mcinnis? has a pointnk trita about the conventional weapons -- the ballistic missiles in -- the challenges -- they were written, sort of, softly, that the iranians can blow through those requirements. they brag about this frequent in the parliament and the press, that nothing will apply to them.

they will still have some estrogens on technology, but they have been very effective at finding ways around that -- they still have some estrogens on technology, but they have been effective at finding ways around that. they have become very good at building things on their own, friendly, stealing stuff from technologies from the chinese, and others, and making it better. guest: there is there is no armo that would ever stop them from getting good on her own, that is the issue. you could have the strongest language in that section and it would not change anything because the iranian clear program is domestically built with domestic technology. if anything they have from north korea who doesn't care about these laws anyway. you could complain about this language but it would not dissolve the problem you are raising. guest: there is a still the issue of how much the international community is going to enforce these issues very at at the risk of crisis i think there is still a nervousness on

the part of this administration to really go forward in pressing back on iran's support for terrorism, iran's pursuit of illegal technology. these are things i think we as a country have a vested interest in being very assertive. without necessarily -- i don't want to necessarily pursue war -- but it really puts us in a very difficult position long-term. i want you to mention israel's nuclear program because the caller asked. guest: most people understand that israel does have a nuclear program. it is something that is not subject to inspection. inis one of those conundrums international relations in the middle east. it is something that i am not quite sure will be resolved in this situation. but again, israel has a right to defend itself given how threatened it is. rsi?: mr. pa guest: on the issue of making

sure there is more pressure on other issues whether it is activity in the region, terrorism, etc., i think it is a order to keep in mind it was the choice of the united states and the entire p5+1 to look at various challenges they have and focus on the worst ones first. if the entire spectrum of things -- of challenges iran poses -- would have been part of the agenda then you would not have had a consensus. etc.,e view as terrorism, russia and china does not necessarily agree on. certainly when it comes to human rights you are not going to have an ally in china and russia when it comes to pressuring iran. realizing that the power in iran was so that you could only resolve this if you had a complete consensus within the p5, there was no other way to pursue this to only focus on nuclear proliferation. that does not mean that the other issues are going to be ignored or that the united states cannot pursue its own

1.licy outside of the p5+ the u.s. has been pursuing those issues for the last 35 years. you cannot have the expectation that one single deal will turn the middle east into some sort of a paradise or that it will resolve all problems with iran. the issue was that this program -- the nuclear program in iran -- was reaching that level of danger as a result of pressure from israel. there was so much pressure to resolve the issue in order to avoid what would be -- and i think mr. mcinnis has agreed with that, a disaster. no one is going to turn a blind eye to these problems. we areern is that talking about destabilizing activities and iran in the region, with i think we should look at. we have to look at it from a much larger perspective. there are plenty of states in the middle east that are decent life in the region. saudi arabia, for instance, whose king is in the city right now, is not innocent in all of this.

in fact much of the problems when it comes to the spread of radical islam is coming out of saudi arabia. to stabilizeant the middle east we have to address those issues as well and not single out one thing. of thehat is trita parsi national iranian american council. also joining us matthew mcinnis from the american enterprise institute. and a color from utah, good morning. caller: don't cut me off please i have been trying for six months to get this off. it all comes down to character. barack obama when he spoke in 2004 i thought hey, what a great guy. i voted for him -- i thought i would vote for him. then i started checking his background. his wife rand paul -- white grandpa was communist and he wanted a mentor for him who was black. giuliani thought this of

his upbringing. all celebrating the fourth of july, our independence, and he is over studying the koran. host: bring around to the iran deal. up bringing. your look at cuba, the communist. that is where barack obama comes from. and then next from north carolina. go ahead. caller: i have one comment and one question. whoomment is for mr. parsi says that only the republicans are trying to block this deal. the fact is, 75% of the american people are against it. they voted these republicans into office. this is a democratic society and that is the way things go. my question is -- and it is a

very big one -- how can the president of the united dates call this an agreement when it is actually a treaty, which is -- a treaty is described in webster's as an agreement between foreign nations. so it is a treaty and it should acquire two thirds of the senate's approval. host: and speaking of the senate, senator ben cardin of maryland said he would vote no. guest: yes. so you have three senators on the democratic side who have turned against it. one thathe only cardin,lly surprises -- and schumer, they were pretty much expected to be opposed to this. polls have shown that the support for the agreement

actually was some are closer to 60%. it has dropped somewhat. more than $40 million have been spent on tv ads, budget them being completely false and distorting the issue. but i think the point that the caller raised that i do like to address more in detail is the idea that this is a treaty. this is not a treaty. this is an agreement. 90% of the various agreements of the united states lines with other countries are executive agreements and do not need a two thirds majority in the senate. certain treaties do. start treaty, etc., then you do have to have a two thirds majority in the senate. the reality is that this is an executive agreement, but even with that, congress passed a bill that mandated that there would be a 60 day review of this , with a bunch of hearings that have taken place. countless briefings, closed and open briefings on this issue. and then that afterwards there would be an up or down vote which is going to take place in

the next couple of days here in washington as congress comes out of recess. that goes beyond what most executive agreement actually have. in that sense you actually have more involvement from congress on this issue than you would under normal circumstances. cinnis?r. m cardin's rejection -- rejection of the deal is very interesting. i think once you relieve the political pressure that the democrats have you may actually see some more in this situation because they would like to express their own concerns. cardin, menendez, those are individuals that have been deeply involved in the senate foreign relations committee. cardin is the current minority ranking member. they are the ones that are most involved in this issue. and i think it goes to show that just as you have seen some of the polls out for international security, government officials here in washington -- when you

actually start pulling those people that are closest to the actual problem of watching iran's terrorism, watching iran's proliferation concerns, human rights violation, that is when those individuals recognize there are a lot of problems with this deal. i think for me cardin is conscious and i think many other democratic senators would do that if they did not have the political pressure of bucking the white house. guest: i find that very peculiar because after the 34 votes you haves reached, democratic senators continuing to come in line and only one coming against. you could also say those other three worlds of both of can't just -- conscience -- both of conscience because there are members of congress who know what a's body was on their resume that they voted for the iraq war. they do not want to repeat that. that is despite all the political pressure they are

receiving. most of them are saying that they're getting nine out of 10 calls against the deal. in spite of all that they're coming out in favor of the deal when they don't have to any longer because the president only has a veto. i think that is the true vote of consciousness. host: debate in the senate starts as a temporary. you can watch it live on c-span two. supporting, 56 in opposition. six undecided. it must be voted by september 17. henry from oak ridge, tennessee. henry, good morning. you are on with our guest. good morning gentlemen. i have a couple questions. i first question is if we do go will-- to war with iran they show the bodies coming out with the american flags draped? don't hide them. host: we talk about military conflict.

s, if you want to take a tangent to that echo -- a tangent to that? iran: eight conflict with is something that may ultimately be necessary. i think we need to retain the military option as part of our within ourplomacy international relations. we would never have gotten iran to the table in the situation is iran was not worried about either israel or the u.s.. we would never have these negotiations achieve what they did. host: what is fourth in your mind in this case? -- what is force? guest: you mean how would we use a? if we actually see iran breaking the agreement, it would have to be an option. if we don't have that we are in a very difficult position. so yes, snap back sanctions with

iran, they don't care about sanctions. be only way it is going to able to stop them is a potential military strike. again, that should be a last resort, absolutely, that if it is not there we are going to be very hamstrung to be able to contain iran. si?t: mr. par i think you have to look -- guest: i think you have to look at the merits of the foreign policy options. i completely disagree that force got milk -- i ran to the table. option youit was an would have seen a much more extensive deal during the bush years when all options were on the table and that was constantly repeated. i think few people in this city doubted that there was a desire in the white house to go to war with iran. you did not see any of those negotiations. you didn't see that interest from iran in 2003 to do that? guest: in 2003 you had a

complete comprehensive negotiation proposal to the united states that included full transparency in the nuclear against collaboration terrorist organizations, above all, al qaeda, collaboration between the united states and iraq in order to ensure there would not be an authoritarian government in baghdad after the war. iran had less than 600 centrifuges. the budget ministration did not even respond to the offer. 2008 what president obama came into office, those hundred 16 centrifuges -- 160 centrifuges have grown. by the time this deal was struck iran had 22,000 centrifuges. that is the cost of not negotiating. iranians sent the last negotiation offer to the europeans. the person who was in charge is iran's current foreign miller -- minister.

that proposal suggested that the iranians with cap their enrichment program at 3000 centrifuges. as a result of this deal the iranians are now actually going to keep around 5000 visas. more than what they would have agreed to back in 2005. but the europeans did not even said the proposal onward to the united states because they knew that the position of the was administration -- of the bush administration was that we do not negotiate with iran and we don't accept any centerpieces. so yes, if we had negotiated much earlier we could have gotten much more because the iranians had much less. they did not have as many bargaining cards as they do today. the reason they have so many is because we refused negotiations for so long and thought the threat of military action would be effective, whereas in reality that threat only help them fuel their program. that is something to keep in mind.

to realize that yes, we actually could have gotten a deal if we had dropped this idea that we don't talked about people, we don't negotiate with evil, and actually pursued negotiations much earlier. iran has been relying on military threats. nis?: mr.mcin guest: i think you're misunderstanding what i am arguing. guest: i have say what you are arguing is wrong. guest: military action has to be in the background or frankly -- getting iran to the table is the first factor -- but if it is not there it is very difficult to achieve anything if you do not have some coercive power behind it or it i totally agree with opportunity to perhaps get a better deal earlier on -- i think there were a lot of missteps for a number of years. but the challenge is you point changed,were really

was the giving up on the idea that we can actually prevent .ran from enriching iran had this idea that they had a right under the nonproliferation treaty to be able to enrich on their own. this is something that we and all of the resolutions that imposed sanctions on them, all set this was something that had to stop. the shift that happened here in washington when the president said, yes, in the end i will let them in rich but -- and rich but we are going to contain them. can argue about whether that was good or bad, but we gave up a key nonproliferation tenant -- et.ant in order to -- ten guest: i agree with that. i think it's absolutely true. we gave up something that you call a nonproliferation tenet

but the reality is we gave up something that was absolutely unattainable. aswe were obtaining that -- we were pursuing that objective we sought the military enrichment expand. it is important to understand that affected the -- effective diplomacy needs to have coercive measures, -- measures, but you cannot assume that the other side does not have coercive measures. you cannot assume the other side is just doing nothing. as the united states build up its case with the international also built iranians up their negotiating cards by expanding their nuclear program. by the time the two sides met at the table, finally when we gave up the unachievable objective of zero enrichment, i am not so the the united states and international community had more leverage comparative to the amount the iranians had. they got 5000 centrifuges

whereas they would agree to only 3010 years ago. we lost time by pursuing unrealistic objectives. host: one more call. david from new jersey. you are on. caller: good morning. whatrst question is -- either of the gentleman if they were negotiating with the iranians and knowing that they were getting $100 billion, with they have given up the hostages? please don't say it has nothing to do with the negotiations. my second question is with most -- both gentlemen agreed there will never be any snap back because of russia and china have a complete different agenda. please tell me what is the icbm they want to build? host: because of time if we can please condense these thoughts. one hundred billion

dollars is the number that has been thrown out. i'm not sure if that is the exact amount. the last number i saw was $56 billion. keep in mind this was the money that was frozen in international bank account as a result of the sanctions. no one is giving iran money for this deal. as is their money that has been frozen that will be unfrozen this is therd -- money that has been unfrozen. setbacks, russia and china cannot control it. aey are not going to have veto. it has to be a majority vote. as long as the eu and the u.s. will be on the same side -- which only is it congress approved this deal -- as long as the europeans and the u.s. are on the same side they will always be able to override russia and china objections. last one on the missile program in iraq. again, i would like to see it region -- a region that has far less weapons.

but it is important to keep in mind what has motivated the iranian missile program. theng the iraq iran war iraqis had much more advanced weapons, similar to what you see in the region right now. missiles tod scud attack iranian cities. they had the iranian capital with ballistic missiles the iranians have to be deep inside of iraqi territory to be able to in their capital of baghdad retaliation because they simply did not have same capabilities. at the end of that war in 1988 both sides were convinced that would not-- peace last and that the other side would use weapons of mass destruction at their earliest convenience. been the driving force of the iranian missile program. would it be better if we lived in a world where they did not have one? absolutely. does this deal fuel their program? in the contrary, it keeps in

place the embargo for an additional eight years. and on that last point i want to know this is something that has always concerned me. but the the arms race fact that they were pursuing missiles that were beyond 2000 kilometers, which is beyond the range for israel. the fact that there is really only one reason why you pursue something that is basically an intercontinental ballistic missile, which they don't have yet and which would be several years from now. the only reason you do that is because you are going to put a nuclear weapon on it or it you don't fill it with explosives. it doesn't make any sense. the fact that iran is still pursuing that capabilities worries me. the historic footnote is actually interesting to see. it was the israelis back in the

1970's were trying to convince the shah of iran that iran would never be a modern state if they did not have nuclear weapons. they actually provided them with the technology that the u.s. refused to provide. host: i have to stop you there. two gentlemen joining us to talk about it. of the national iranian american council and matthew mcinnis of the michael o'brien examines what he calls the u.s. military and litical failures in iraq. and nelson schwartz talks about the august jobs report and a possible hike in interest rates from the federal reserve. your calls and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter.

now panelists at the center for strategic and international studies discuss growing military relationships between china and russia, specifically the impact contribution to china's warfare capabilities. this is an hour 25 minutes. hopefully you got a copy on the way in, russia's contribution to china warfare capabilities. where at a moment relations with both russia and china are in a difficult spot. i think a lot of us have been watching what that means.

and that cooperation is accelerated in recent months thanks to the crises in the china sea and ukraine. there are some structural features of this that goes back thet of ways to before start of these outbursts. of the ways this cooperation has manifested itself is increased military cooperation. areas that lot of were happening a decade ago and then dropped off for a while. it is only in the last couple of years we have really seen it resuming. been wonderful for us to have paul schwartz on board to work on the nuts and bolts of russian military cooperation. histhe first fruit of

affiliation with us is this report here. i look forward to the discussion we are going to have here today. i think we will have all discuss the report for about 15 to 20 go through some of the data and conclusions. we are going to have a discussion here. the director of the missile-defense project here. zack cooper is a fellow who went to japan share. tom is going to talk about some political aspects that affects the united states and that is going to get a little bit more of a regional perspective, how asia views

russian cooperation. hopefully we will have a good back-and-forth with those of you here in the room. please turn off your ringing devices. i'm going to turn the floor over to paul schwartz. paul: thanks a lot. in 1996 taiwan's current president was up for reelection. he had previously made state and's indicating he favored greater independence for taiwan, statements that had greatly disturbed china's leaders, fearing that china may declare outright independence. they needed to send a strong signal that taiwan was heading down a dangerous path. they began discussing a series

of live fire missiles -- live fire missile exercises. two carrier task forces were dispatched to the region. lacking the means to effectively counter it, china's leaders were forced to back down to accept a humiliating defeat. it was no accident a few short months later they entered their first contract. designedremedy being specifically to attack and destroy u.s. aircraft carriers. nor would this proved to be a one-time event. russiane cold war defense assistance has been crucial to the development of china's surface and anti-surface warfare capabilities. recently over the last several years in a few cases, russian defense assistance has continued to play an important

role in the development of china's maritime forces. out them going to lay case for this claim by addressing three related questions. what kind of russian defense system has russia provided for china's maritime forces? how have those forces benefited from such a system? what has been the impact on any access strategy? there have either been transferred out right from russia to china or develop by china using russian technology. let's start with background on china's anti-access strategy. of essentials will help set the context and explain the role in that strategy. over the past 200 years china has faced the persistent threat of attack from the sea.

powersrom the colonial and most recently from the u.s. navy. lackedt of that china effective means to counter those threats. ordered its fleet to his as queue abilities to defend china's interests. why? until recently china's fleet has suffered. airacked the maritime naval defense systems needed to adequately protect the fleet against air and missile strikes from a superior adversary such as the u.s. navy. this forced the fleet to operate close to shore where it can be protected by land-based air defense platforms. the fleet also lack the modern missiles needed to defend itself against well armed u.s. warships.

without them its fleet could have no hope in setting up against a force on force engagement. fully -- the fleet last test fleets lacked a robust anti-warfare capability. address the threat of u.s. intervention china developed its famous anti-access strategy. the strategy is a designed to keep u.s. forces outside of contested maritime regions in time of war. thealls for the fighting western pacific into two distinct tiers. a distance of approximately 200 not a call miles. extends thatr perimeter out for a total distance of 1200 nautical miles from china's coast out to the second island chain. china's fleet is assigned different missions.

in the inner tier the mission is to prevent u.s. forces from intervening in a future maritime conflict, such as one involving taiwan. tasked toleet is seize and maintain local seat control to allow for the conduct of military operations within those waters, such as would be needed to conduct an amphibious invasion of taiwan. the fleet's mission is primarily to be one of denial. at least for the moment, although that is starting to change. china is starting to develop its bluewater capability. its mission to keep the u.s. forces from the using that area as a base. getting the fleet of a point where he could carry out such missions has been a long and arduous process and required near total all of the fleet.

when a new strategy was first adopted the china defense industry remained technologically backward, capable of dividing the kind of advanced military weapons needed to properly upgrade the fleet. tona was forced to turn external suppliers and russia emerged as china's principal supplier. due to the tiananmen square crisis, china has been considering contents of arms embargo. fortunately at the same time russia's defense companies found itself cut off from state defense orders that followed the collapse of the soviet union and had become desperate for revenues from arms sales to sustain their very existence. the net result, a long and sustained arms trading relationship that continues to this day. you can see this on the chart. russia has transferred over $30 billion in lee terry equipment to china.

that significantly understates the amount, primarily the larger transactions. let's take a closer look at russian contribution. about antiship missile systems and then close with air defense platforms. taken, theirst steps -- it immediately provided several important benefits. withemedies came equipped russian sunburn anti-cruiseship initials. -- cruiseship missiles. they could strike targets in long range up to 244 kilometers. their proposed transfer created something of an uproar in congress.

they were unsuccessful in doing so. the sole remedies came equipped with bandstand radar systems. these provided over the horizon targeting capabilities for the sunburn and ken surveilled targets for a range of two 450 kilometers. they also came equipped with advanced russian systems, which was china's worst true air defense platform. the chinese build all of their warships domestically, which is a testament to the industry. for example, according to naval

frigate, russia's reported lee -- reportedly benefited from systems. china's maritime forces also technologyively on for a long range position strike. let's examine these contributions slower. we talked about the bandstand radar system. they are widely distributed across china's fleet. addition to the sunburn, several other advanced missiles have been transferred to china. hosted on russian kilo class submarines that were transferred

to china. is a long-range cruise missile, has a unique flight trajectory. of its flight path it travels at subsonic speeds to conserve fuel. making it very difficult to intercept. in sources have implemented whether it has means to intercept this missile or flight. this is a long-range supersonic missile, perfect from launching attacks from the air to -- from the air. the chinese have purchased these and continue to produce them under license from russia. is developing a new generation of supersonic anti-cruiseship missiles of its own. experts, they all

appeared to be based on formally transferred russian cruise missiles. clearly a copy of the club sizzler. profile.nic flight ons has just been deployed 2014. a continuing testament to russia's ongoing influence in china's fleet. the second is the y j 12. this appears to be an extended version of the government assile i just spoke about you long-range strategic bomber,

giving the naval air force extended reach out into the far seas. a new generation of anti-cruiseship missiles based on russian technology, it is an ominous development. as china starts to substitute these missiles for some of its existing inferior missiles it will result in significantly increase tracking power for the fleet. been equally impressive. it is an upgraded version of the remedies flying. it is a variant of the boot missile system. more importantly russia transferred the gargoyle.

this is china's first true long-range naval defense platform. it is quite deadly against a variety of aerial targets. china has begun producing its own naval defense system. nine is the first long-range defense system. it has a range of 100 kilometers, 120 for the upgraded version. it reportedly draws heavily on russian air defense technology. these powerful new systems are installed in both the -- developed ana has medium-range air naval system.

and only does it rely on russian technology, but it is also the product of a joint development project. it is china's liggett -- china's latest frigate. considering this to be a direct result of russia's defense existence. it is not always possible to tell when a system has been produced under license or produced illicitly. russia's continuing willingness to sell advanced military engineering --te it is considered part of the working relationship and part of doing business.

at china'sa look anti-axis capability. according to the office of naval , the best antiship cruise missile was the y g -- was a subsonic missile with a range of 65 nalco miles. the state striking power has been radically improved and rush defense system has been crucial to the russia technology is giving china major boost in its ability to strike u.s. warships that's -- fc. according to naval experts, analysis of past naval engagement goes all the way back to the battle of midway, demonstrating the side but it strikes effectively first usually prevails. initial vote will reduce the size of the enemy fleet, and all the attacker has to do is sustain a firepower until the

enemy either withdraws or is destroyed. the attacker can launch standoff defensesrom the umbrella with impunity. it's like bringing a gun to a knife fight. this advantage is precisely what russia has given the chinese. chinese antiship cruise missiles , like the song burn, you can see the outer circle on the left have a greater range than comparable u.s. systems. the russian defense system has been crucial to helping the chinese overcome the first of the three major decisions that i spoke about earlier did it is disparity in nt should striking power. russian defense assistance has had a similarly large impact on china's naval air defense capabilities.

2000 according to the department of defense. possessing only a handful of surface to air missiles. today the story is quite different. a 2009 office for naval intelligence report, russia air defense radar platform has been key to improving the naval defense capability. air defense platforms and a new chinese derivatives thegreatly in priest capability and range of china's air defense platforms. it complicates the task of u.s. pilots seeking to strike chinese warships at sea. either entering their engagement zone or firing from greater range, which greatly impedes the effectiveness.

can see china has been catching up rapidly to the terms of nail defense capabilities. while the u.s. maintains the advantage, china has narrowed the gap considerably. the longest range legacy platform would barely show up on the chart. russian defense has been crucial to helping china overcome the second of the three major deficiencies. itself ability to defend adequately against long-range air and missile strikes. let's now re-examine my original claims. if i have done my job correctly it should be quite evidence that quite evident -- the transfer of remedy destroyers have led to a major upgrade in china's precision strike capability.

it gave china its first true long-range air defense capability. they represented a great leap forward. the development of new supersonic anti-cruiseship missiles represents further gains for the fleet precision strike capability. china is still in the process of absorbing the vast amount of russian technology previously transferred to it. the systems are making a competitionn the for naval supremacy in the western pacific. i don't mean to imply that the chinese remain totally dependent on russia, far from it. no one would disagree the chinese have made a considerable ground in self-sufficiency. i would contend the chinese still have a ways to go.

antisubmarine warfare capabilities still remain deficient. russia, with its long history of developing anti-submarine chinae could help overcome this third and remaining deficiency. s 400 is the latest in russia's long-range air defense platforms. a near further doubling of the range of china's fleet and air defense system. russia is reportedly developing a high supersonic anti-ship , a third missile

that wasn't reportedly transferred to the chinese, capable of achieving seed beads -- achieving speeds up to mock .or -- up to mach 4 bear said it's tuff to -- it's tough to make decisions. thank you. >> i'm going to turn the floor over to tom. tom: a very thoughtful and detailed analysis of a really important problem. including tension to hardware matters.

think it is easy to glide over these details. is this analysis that needs to be a lot more of. making historical references to the 1990's, i was thinking an even larger scale. these are the kinds of systems, that just doesn't get a lot of attention. they are not quite as exotic as talking about the latest df five. matterse in which they is the technological, commercial, and geopolitical fords that conspired increased global supply and demand of high precision, high

velocity, missile-based strike delivery systems. in 1959 bernard wrote the book strategy in the missile age. the proliferation as a matter of policy in this case, the proliferation of the systems that is can treating to a new missile age. paul had a number of these systems in particular. notrecognize there are just that many folks out there talking about these things, which is part of the problem. let me give some context and comments about systems at the edges, which go beyond the self-conscious scope of the report. zach is going more into the

regional. the question of what russia's intentions are, in his there a stopping point? tipping point before russia goes too far? or is it the case of surface warfare for the chinese navy? point to russia's self-conscious limitations? these are precisely the capabilities they don't mind countering the u.s. navy. russia is selling china the rope to help hang the u.s. navy. some of the systems, whether it is the rs 26 for land-based concerns, of course you are russia looking to the east.

i think the question does russia need the money that bad? do you see this as irresponsible and shortsighted? or is it a strategic partnership? admittedly a limited one for these kinds of systems. another take away from this is we talk about anti-axis air and denial. this is going to be a missile rich environment. is missile-based. of thesepursuing a lot things. it appears they are doing so for three reasons. being able to target u.s. allies and u.s. bases.

this is admittedly getting beyond the scope of this report. the kind of systems paulist means of course the u.s. is going to have to invest in more standoff and penetration weapons. both presumably enough to saturate. this means the conversation for lrs so for the next budget cycle. the second point would be the anti-crew missiles and anti-ballistic missiles. it means we are going to have to lotinue to invest and to a more for fleet and point missile defenses. chinesedefense versus

threats. mostis not necessarily the exotic long-range strategic system. report throughout the the word nuclear wasn't mentioned. we are talking about conventional threats. being willing to have the to pursue as a matter of a line of effort, to have the defenses against chinese missile threats, that is something we should hear more about. deploying anddy continue to test for standard missile six. that is a piece of it. a lot of interest in directed energy. you need a lot of shots and

quick shots. one of those things is a laser. those are probably the whole solution. the safer thing to talk about us this bright shiny object of directed energy. even a couple of weeks ago in alabama, for the foreseeable future we are probably going to need rockets to kill rockets. directing the energy or rail guns as the replacement for those probably isn't the right away to think about it. edge of this is chinese investment in missile-based and missile boosted hypersonic's. the chinese are testing about every three months.

that is going to require some kind of counter. beyond active defense, passive measures. a piece of that is going to be distributed defense. the idea you are going to be able to hit these things are that you would want to plan on striking these things. i think we are going to need to do this for our allies and partners in the region. .roliferating counters to those

not building their own part of cassidy but to avail -- to alleviate strain on our forces. degree of which the u.s. navy and army is stressed in terms of defense capabilities in particular is normally going to get worse. requirements are here. what we have now are down here. we are at four right now. they don't have any plans to get beyond seven. that tension is not going to get any better. i will leave it off there and turn it over. >> let me join incongruent -- in

congratulating you on every important report on a subject that doesn't get as much attention as it should. the airorward to seeing version and the land diversion within the next couple of months. i want to talk about the political aspects. i think we all like to delve into those shiny objects. on the political side we have a real difficult question. there are many of you i see in the audience who have deep expertise in these issues. hopefully we can have a discussion with you about them. seen evidence of growing ties for some time. exercisesmilitary

between the two militaries recently. russia and china might be attempting to create some sort of joint base of u.s. intelligence operatives. there is clear evidence there are growing ties between russia and china. the question that many of them are asking is is this the sign of a stronger strategic's choice? that is a core question on how we deal on a policy side with both countries. the long-term logic is fairly clear. certainly we are seeing this

with highway construction in the south china sea on the chinese side. states appear to satisfy element of the status quo. historically the satisfied states often work together. they clumped together to oppose the existing hedge fund. surprise twobe a autocratic states are finding differences with a large united states. both russian and chinese leaders have openly called for an end to u.s. alliances in those regions. the alignment makes a great deal of sense. we also see great long-term differences in the outlooks for russia and china. china is a growing country. would -- most would

expect the growth rates to continue. that is going to be a big challenge. so to our more focused regional issues. how have they worked together in the russian far east where moscow is worried about a aging and influence? is there going to be growing tension as china tries to steal russian technology? will that eventually create a bit of a break? there is this conundrum. russia and china are using similar techniques. are trying to escalate just

below those levels. to responddesire similarly to russia and china and eastern europe. for example there have been recently of the potential washington might use economic sanctions as a response to economic espionage in the cyber domain. would it forced them to work together to develop countermeasures? it is not a question only applicable to the united states. many of my japanese friends have been struggling with this. manage a russia were looks to engage in many ways were tries to allow the isopeans to believe it

walking away from its commitment to upholding the status quo? if japan doesn't stand a firmly enough to what russia's doing in eastern europe, would that have any effect on the european chinesent to opposing efforts in the east china sea? i don't think we know the answers. we are reaching an important inflection point. the chineset technological proficiency will start to outpace the russian -- outpace the russian proficiency in some areas. you can only believe that will mean a strong strategic rationale for the relationship. we see tensions start to grow, i think that means this is more of a short-term marriage of which for many of us in washington would be our preference.

i think they are important questions to ask and i look forward to having a robust discussion with that. >> fro military cooperation to a wide-angle. at that i think the best thing to do is open the floor up to discussions. have two requests, please identify ourselves and please ask a question. we have microphones.

>> in addition to p.r.c. reverse engineering, no doubt about it. you mentioned the two motives for russia. perhaps a geopolitical strategy. i wonder perhaps if there is a third motivation and an increased interest in russia. are there quid pro quos going from china to russia in addition to the intel exchange you mentioned?

>> the chinese have attempted to sell russia their latest frigate , which is quite a capable of system with advanced missile desist -- advanced missile defense systems on board. russia has been struggling to because of theps shipbuilding industry. russia was highly dependent on the buildup of its navy. the chinese took one of those ships over to the black seed. we don't know if they are going to buy. also to give some quid pro quo to strengthen the bilateral arms trading relationship.

the chinese are actually head of the russians in some areas. drone technology is a big area. the chinese have embraced principles of centric warfare more than this -- more than the russians have. you could see the russians ultimately transferring those as well. thing, joint research development and production between russia and china. recently created a project for inner propulsion systems. these are some marine-based systems which allow a whereclear submarine states emerge from an extended period of time.

they have been introduced to the western navies. the germans are advanced in this area. the chinese also reportedly use an ip for one of their new diesel subs. the russians have not been able to crack the code. we could well see joint develop and projects to develop a new systems. thehe chinese required -- russians have very highly developed tactics for the u.s. navy.

they don't intend to use it the same way. >> they have studied the russian doctrine approache developed during the cold war. at how the soviets, when ,aced with the same problem they wanted to study how others have overcome that problem. with highly powerful supersonic cruise missiles, coupled with summaries and to launchrships

strikes against u.s. carrier to prevent the u.s. that point from launching nuclear weapons strikes against the soviet mainland's. we have developed submarine launch missiles. also developed to a much greater extent land-based missile andems able to supplement complement the air systems the soviets relied upon. intermediate range, hair ballistic missile systems in basesthat can hit naval impact.o impact -- the we see new weapons like this ballistic missile, which extends

the reach of a ground-based 1214le off way up to nautical miles. the catamaran, which is a small missile boat, many people think this will be used try merely for operations to the coast. have mass numbers of multi axis,ing multi-vectored attacks against u.s. or other allied warships by firing missiles from all kinds

of different directions, different altitudes, to overwhelm u.s. missile defense systems. and -- thank you. >> i run a small consulting company in virginia. maybe they are not playing the same game we are used to. asians talk about go, where it is not connecticut but the continued spread of influence. that maybe the games the indians are playing as well as the technologyso sharing with north koreans. objective theyy want. talk about the

non-kinetic aspects of strategies? >> that is a wonderful point. national coalition is not from these anti-axis areas. it is from much limited power projection types of capabilities. require an anti-axis area to now capability at all. maybe it made it somewhat less likely that the united states our partners and would operate in the region. the real challenges is if they want to change the status quo they need to change the military power they have.

i think it is one of the more interesting elements in the report. of russian lot of them are, some suited for this, a lot of them are not. him -- it just isn't applicable. i think that is a real challenge. most folks in washington have been surprised by the risk-taking and that the administration takes that challenge to respond and deter those kinds of actio. whether the united states has , thed back, like in april

chinese intended to pull back. the chinese have seen a lot of success. richard: related to the previous questions, have you seen any evidence of increased interoperability due to these transfers? through multilateral exercises? degree you are seeing interoperability between russia and chinese horses. you see this primarily in two areas.

a quasimilitary security alliance. providing some level of security in central asia. years they have conducted a peace mission allowed, which has fairly small-scale exercises to the degree of counterterrorism to shore up a favorite regime. it is like nothing that -- nothing like you at the u.s. does with their nato allies and true interoperable systems.

chinese and russian has conducted a series of military exercises every year. large influx and russian technology to the chinese navy, especially around systems like the bandstand radar using data links, data networks and combat management systems. russian and chinese naval ships paired off. the few chinese ships along with the russian ships. they were able to reconnect networks very quickly to interoperate. we haven't seen that level of effort yet.

>> i just came from a 34's -- 24 plus year stint with the u.s. navy. is, iple question with economice sustainable development. i report to a general who understands these things. in look my heart having one classmate die in the first quarter. how do we now match around the philippines that the ordinary

, at least they provide food on the table? ideologies.e the it is more of a comic relief. >> my question is do we see signs of russian cooperation on any strategic front? there was an article that began to see signs of this in pakistan with shift in russian policy

toward indian ocean cooperation with china. do we see it towards japan in any way or towards north korea? are there signs that their plans to work together to deal with various challenges? >> i would like to turn the response back to you. people are looking for those types of connections. the japanese has released data that shows the number of air scrambles. it is an operational challenge to meet all of these requirements.

i think one question is whether there is actually about when the russians and chinese happen to do these operations. i don't think we have answers yet on those types of issues. i don't know if anyone else wants to say any thing. >> you see some level of cooperation in certain areas in russia and china, although they have conflicting interests in central asia, they came together useecent years to try to their influence to get some of the central asian countries to call for the ending of basing rise for u.s. military forces located in the region. they did join together to limit the u.s.