senator cotton has anyone on your team read these agreements? secretary kerry: i believe one person may have read it at the facility, but doesn't have it, possess it. secretary cotton: what is that person's name? secretary kerry: it's possible i don't know for sure, but it's possible wendy sherman, but i don't know for sure. senator cotton: secretary moniz, have you read the text ofof>> these agreements? >> i have not seen them. >> have the you read any prior agreement? >> nope. >> has anyone on your team at the department of energy? >> i'm not sure. i'm not sure about that. i can ask in terms of the technical team, maybe someone saw something. >> please do, get back to us. >> ok. >> besides undersecretary sherman, has anyone else in the united states government reviewed the depth of these agreements? secretary kerry: i don't think so.

>> even if they are not in secretary sherman's possession, does that not undercut the claims of confidentiality? i think and i'm not sure, but i know that she's leaving the senate very shortly, editor. >> what congress would like is the text of these agreements by u.s. law. they say that the content of the side deal that discusses the military base where nuclear devices may have been rolled out for iran to collect their own samples and submit their samples to the iaea. can you confirm or deny that that is the content?

i cannot in this session, but i with the iaea and the team they made recommendations to them and i believe that satisfied whatever the process is that the process would be able to provide the answers that we need. >> white can we not confirm or deny the content of these? the ayatollah's know what they agreed to. because weerry: respect in the process of the iaea and we do not have permission to reveal. >> they will no but not the american people? secretary kerry: no, not exactly. because we will share with you in this classified briefing what we're -- understand the contents iaea under the united

nations, i don't even know at this point what the law says about the united states whatring something and that prohibits. we will have to see. u.s. law requires it to be submitted to congress before the clock begins to kick. with respect to the iaea, not supported by the member states, i would say that this deal is without precedent in south africa and cannot be cited. i would like to hunt to a second topic. can i have chart 1, please? general dempsey, this chart describes a powerful roadside bomb. can you explain what the bottom diagram shows? general dempsey: a copper cone is melted at superhigh temperatures.

and projected and essentially burns its way through armor plate. senator cotton: the copper disc troubles at about 6000 feet per second. can i have chart 2 to see what happens to a come the -- to a humvee when a ball of fire travels at 6000 seconds -- 6000 feet per second. do you know how many american troops were killed by such penetrators? general dempsey: several hundred. senator cowan: was iran a main supplier of these? general dempsey: yes. senator cotton: what should we say about the over 500 american troops killed by an iranian ball of fire traveling at 6000 per

second senator kerry we should tell them how extraordinary grateful we are for the service of their loved ones. we would also tell them that we lay out what we intend to do, to push back against iran's behavior, that we have a number of laws in place requirements by which we will be able to prevent iran from transferring these weapons. and we have already engaged in vary forward leaning initiatives to do that. we specifically turned around a convoy recently, in the last months, that was bringing weapons to yemen. we have been crystal clear and i will be more clear when i meet with the gulf states about our

united efforts to hold them accountable for these kinds of activities. senator ono: thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to ask this question of all the witnesses, on wednesday john kerry spoke at a speech in philadelphia area of senate is expected to begin debate on the it returns from recess this tuesday. this is just over one hour. >> friends, we think all of you for coming today for an historic

message from a brave american leader. let me just add that not too askedgo secretary kerry inand my partner, involved the property reduction act, to write an op-ed about the iran agreement. sowere eagle -- eager to do but at the same time the title of this is that there is no perfect nuclear agreement. the just is what happens next and how the implementation occurs. no perfect agreement. we said that that is the experience of dealing with , kazakhstanine governments.

there were treaties. even anyone in wet secretary kerry was the chairman of the foreign relations committee. with regard to the situation for 20 years at least once every year i got to kazakhstan and to ukraine. really attempting to visit with russians. attempting to make sure that the best is happening. that 20 yearse of many of the weapons were destroyed. they were on large missiles. several could go in different

directions. i was appalled one time to find that indianapolis was on the target list. i served as mayor for eight years oblivious to the fact that we could have been obliterated any time. why i took seriously and was very grateful to secretary of theas a member foreign relations committee, for being so supportive throughout those years of the efforts that we put in. we are in a new chapter. a very important one. this is an agreement that deserves the support of the american people. more immediately, the support of the united states congress. it comes after arduous negotiations involving the secretary of state. almost endless talks and

difficult arguments with iranian officials. likewise sometimes with our partners in this, the countries backing us up, including russia and china. germany, france, great britain. these are very important partners who have been involved in the sanctions against iran with other pressures placed against that country. secretary kerry, in arduous , helped to bring about a remarkable agreement. it comes after a lifetime of public service. some of the parallels in our lives are substantial, but one was that i volunteered for the navy and serve really most of my time as an intelligence briefer for the chief of operations. secretary kerry volunteered for the navy and he ended up out on

the mequon delta. he was awarded the silver star, bronze star award for three purple hearts from that very significant service. very early in his career. he was willing to give his life for his country. he served as the lieutenant governor of massachusetts under governor dukakis. and then he came to the united states senate. service.of magnificent the last four of them on the senate relations committee. throughout that time, one pursuit of foreign relations was vigorous. working in a nonpartisan way to bring about results, secretary biden as theed joe

chairman of the committee. i was ranking member or the chairman, whether republicans were in control or not. we worked together, secretary kerry and myself, to see we could get a 15 to zero vote from the foreign relations committee. us face inong america. this was a genuine pleasure, to be with secretary kerry today, to note that this is a man that not only served in the senate but was a candidate for president of the united states 2004. barely lost by a few electoral

vote. he came back in continue that service. it is a genuine honor and personal privilege to introduce to you today my friend secretary john evans carry. -- secretary john evans kerry. [applause] sec. kerry: thank you so much for that generous introduction. i want to say good morning to all of you here. it is great for me to be able to be here in philadelphia. i am delighted to see some a

young people with us. i know school has started. i know the choice between coming here and sitting in class was a tough one area [laughter] we are glad -- a tough one. [laughter] we are glad you made the choice you did. i am grateful that senator lugar chose to come here in order to introduce me and reaffirm his support for this agreement. but i am even more grateful to his service to our country over the course of a lifetime. as a former colleague of his on the foreign relations committee, i can wear witness -- i can bear witness that dick lugar has a long record of foreign-policy compliments. it has a lasting legacy of leaving this world safer. he is someone who has consistently placed our country's interest above any other consideration. and he has a very deep

understanding of how best to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands. he is one of our experts when it comes to that judgment. so it is appropriate that the senator is here with us this morning and i think everyone of us joins and saying thank you to you, dick, for your tremendous service. [applause] it's also fitting to be here in philadelphia, the homeground of this absolutely magnificent center to the constitution, the liberty bell, and one of our nation's most reveres founder -- revered founders, benjamin when. i must say i never quite anticipated that this is one of the great vistas of america and be able to look down and see independence hall. it's inspiring i think for all of us here. i would say a quick word about ben franklin. in addition to his many

inventions and his special status as america's first diplomat, franklin is actually credited with being the first arson known to have made a list of rosen cons, literally, dividing a page in two and writing all the resistance of order proposal on one side and all of the reasons to oppose it on the other. and this morning, i would like to invite you, all of you, those here and those listening through the media, to participate in just such an exercise. because two months ago, in vienna, the united states and five other nations, including permanent members of the un security council, reach agreement with iran on ensuring the peaceful nature of that country's nuclear program. as early as next week, congress will begin voting on whether to

support that plan. and the outcome will matter is much as any form policy decision in recent history area like sent -- history. like senator lugar, president obama and i are convinced, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the framework we have put forward will get the job done and in that assessment, we have excellent company. last month, 29 of our nations top nuclear physicist and nobel prize winners, scientists, from one end of the country to the other, congratulated the president for what they call "a technically sound, stringent, and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance that iran is not developing nuclear weapons. the scientists praised to the agreement for its creative approach to verification and for

the rigorous safeguards that will prevent iran from obtaining the fissile material for a bomb. today, i will lay out the fact that caused those scientists and many other experts to reach the favorable conclusions that they have. i will show why they of -- why the agreed plan will make the united states, israel, the gulf states and the world safer. i want to explain how he gives us the access we need to ensure that iran's nuclear program remains wholly peaceful while preserving every option to respond if iran fails to meet us. i will make clear that the key elements of the agreement will last not for 10 or 15 years, as some are trying to assert, or for 20 or 25, but they will last for the lifetime of iran's nuclear program. and i will dispel some of the

false information circulating about the proposal on which congress is soon going to vote. for this discussion, there is an inescapable starting point. a place where every argument made against the agreement must confront a stark reality. the reality of how advanced iran's nuclear program had become and where it was headed when presidents of obama and rouhani launched the diplomatic process that concluded this past july. two years ago, in september 2013, we were facing in iran that had already mastered the new field -- the nuclear fuel cycle, already stockpiled enough enriched uranium that, if further enriched, could arm 10 to 12 bombs. and iran was already enriching uranium to the level of 20%.

which is just below weapons grade. and in iran that had already installed 10,000 plus centrifuges and in iran that was moving rapidly to commission a heavy water reactor able to produce enough weapons grade plutonium for an additional bomber to a year -- bomb or two a year. that, my friends, is where we were when we already began our negotiations. a well remembered moment the previous fall, israeli prime minister netanyahu had held up a cartoon of a bomb to show just how dangerous iran's nuclear program had become. and in 2013, he returned to that

podium to warn that iran was positioning itself "to rush forward to build nuclear bombs before the international community can detect it and much less prevent it." the prime minister argued rightly that the so-called rake out time, the interval required for iran to produce enough fissile material for one bomb had bundled to as little as two months. even though it would take significantly longer to actually told the bomb itself using that fissile material, the prime

minister's message was clear. iran had successfully transformed itself into a nuclear threshold state. in the obama administration, we were well aware of that troubling fact. more importantly, we were already responding to it. the record is irrefutable that over the course of two american administrations, it was the united states that led the world against tehran, one of the toughest international sanctions regimes ever developed. we also had to face an obvious fact. sanctions alone were not getting the job done. not even close. they were failing to slow, let alone halt iran's relentless march towards a nuclear weapons capability. so president obama act did. he reaffirmed his vow that iran would have really not be emitted to have a nuclear weapon. he marshaled support for this principle from every owner of the international community.

he made clear his determination to build the on what sanctions could accomplish and find a way to not only stop but to throw into her verse iran's rapid expansion of its nuclear program. as we developed our strategy, we cast a very wide net to enlist the broadest critiques available. we sat down with the iaea and with our own intelligence community to ensure that the verification standards that we sought on paper would be effective in reality. we consulted with congress and our international allies and friends. we examined carefully every step that we might take to close off each of iran's potential pathways to a bomb. and of course, we were well aware that every proposal, every provision, every detail would have to withstand the most

painstaking scrutiny. we knew that. and so we made clear from the outset that we would not settle for anything less than an agreement that was comprehensive, verifiable, effect of, and of lasting duration. we began with an interim agreement, reached in geneva. the joint plan of action. in a clamp -- it accomplished diplomatically what sanctions alone could never have done or did. it halted the advance of iran's nuclear activities. and it is critical to note -- you never hear much about it, but it is critical to note that for more than 19 months now, iran has complied with every requirement of that land. -- that plan.

but this is just the first step. from that moment, we pushed ahead, seeking a broad and enduring agreement, sticking to our core positions, maintaining unity among a diverse negotiating group of partners. and we arrived at the good and effective deal that we have sought. and i ask you today and in the days ahead, as we have asked members of congress over the course of these last months -- consider the facts of what we achieved and judge for yourself the difference between where we were two years ago and where we are now and where we can be in the future. without this agreement, iran's so-called breakout time was about two months. with this agreement, it will increase by a factor of six to at least a year and it will remain at that level for a decade or more.

without this agreement, iran could double the number of its operating centrifuges almost overnight and continue expanding with ever more efficient designs . with this agreement, iran's centrifuges will be refused by two thirds for 10 years. without this agreement, iran could continue expanding its stockpile of enriched uranium, which is now more than 12,000 kilograms, and enough if further in raced for multiple bombs. with this agreement, that stock mile -- that stockpile will shrink and shrink s'more, a reduction of some 98 sent, to no more than 300 kilograms for 15 years. without this agreement, iran's heavywater reactor will soon be able to produce enough weapons grade of plutonium each year to fuel one or two nuclear weapons. with this agreement, the core of that reactor will be removed and filled with concrete. and iran will never be permitted

to produce any weapons grade plutonium. without this agreement, the iaea would not have assured access to undeclared locations in iran where sex is -- were suspicious activities might be taking place. the agency could seek access but, if iran objected, there would be no sure method for resolving a dispute in a finite period, which is exactly what has led us to where we are today. that standoff. with this agreement, the iaea can go wherever the evidence leads. no facility, declared or undeclared, will be off-limits and there is a time certain for assuring access. there is no other country to which such a requirement

applies. this arrangement is both unprecedented and unique. in addition, the iaea will have more inspectors working in iran, using modern technology, such as real-time enrichment monitoring, high-tech electronic seals, and cameras that are always watching, 24/7, 365. further, iran has agreed never to pursue key technologies that would be necessary to develop a nuclear explosive device. so the agreement deals not only with the production of fissile material, but also with the critical issue of weaponization. because of all of these limitations and guarantees, we can sum up by saying that without this agreement the iranians would have several potential pathways to a bomb. with it, they won't have any. iran's plutonium pathway will be

blocked because it won't have a reactor producing plutonium for a weapon. and it won't build any new heavywater reactors are engaged in reprocessing for at least 15 years. and after that, we have the ability to watch and know precisely what they are doing. the iranian pathway will be blocked because of the deep reductions in iran's uranium enrichment capacity and because, for 15 years, the country will not enrich uranium to a level higher than 3.67%. let me be clear. no one can build a bomb from a stock mile of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched only to 3.67%. it is just not possible. finally, iran's covert pathway to a bomb will also be blocked.

there will be 24/7 monitoring of iran's key nuclear facilities. as soon as we start the implementation, inspectors will be able to track iran's uranium as it is mind, then mailed, then turned -- as it is mined, then milled, then turned into yellowcake. for a quarter of a century at least, every activity throughout the nuclear fuel change will receive added scrutiny. after 20 years, the a iaea will review the central components in iran to ensure that none are diverted to a covert program. so if iran did decide to cheat, its technicians will have to do more than bury a processing facility deep beneath the ground. they would have to come up with a complete -- complete and completely secret -- nuclear supply chain, a secret source of

uranium, a secret milling facility, a secret conversion facility, a secret enrichment facility. and our nuclear management department agree iran could never get away with such a deception. and if we have even a shadow of doubt that illegal activities are going on, either the iaea will be given access required to uncover the truth or iran will be in violation and the nuclear-related sanctions can snap back into place. we will also have other options to ensure compliance if necessary. given all of these requirements, it is no wonder that this plan has been endorsed by so many

leading american scientists. experts on nuclear nonproliferation and others. more than 60 former national security officials, more than 100 retired ambassadors, people who served under democratic and republican presidents alike are backing the proposal as our retired generals and admirals from all five of our uniform services. ben scowcroft, one of the great names in american security and

evers -- endeavors of the last century and now, served as a national security advisor to two republican presidents. he is among the many respected diggers who support it. the agreement is being backed with one exception by each of the more the more than 100 countries that have taken a formal position. the agreement was also endorsed by the united nations security council on a vote of 15-0. this not only said something very significant about the quality of the plan. particularly when you consider that five of those countries are permanent members and they are all nuclear powers. it should also invite reflection from those who believe the united states can walk away from this without causing grave harm to our international reputation to relationships and to interests. you probably heard the claim that, because of our strength, because of the power of our banks, all we americans have to do if congress rejects this plan is return to the bargaining table, puff out our chests and

demand a better deal. i heard one critic say he would use sanctions to give iran a choice between having an economy or having a nuclear program. well, folks, that is a very punchy sound bite. but it has no basis in any reality. as dick said, i was chair of the foreign policy committee. remember, even the toughest restrictions didn't stop iran's nuclear program from speeding ahead, from a couple of hundred centrifuges to 5000 to 19,000 or a we have already been there. if this agreement is voted down, those who vote no will not be able to tell you how many centrifuges iran will have next year or the year after. if it is approved, we will be able to tell you exactly what the limits on iran's program will be. the fact is that it wasn't either sanctions or threats that actually stopped the expansion

of iran's nuclear activities. the sanctions brought people to the table, but it was the start of the negotiating process and the negotiations themselves recently concluded in vienna that actually stopped it. only with the nose -- with of those negotiations that iran begin to get rid of it stockpile of 27% enriched negotiation, did it stop installing more centrifuges and ceased advancing the iraq reactor. only then did it commit to be more forthcoming about iaea access and negotiate a special arrangement to break the deadlock. so just apply your common sense. what do you think will happen if we say to iran now, hey, forget it, the deal is off? let's go back to square one. how do you think an negotiating partners, all who have embraced this deal, will react? all of whom were prepared to go forward with it, how will they react? what do think will happen to that multilateral actions regime

that brought iran to the are getting table in the first place? the answers pretty simple. the answer is straightforward. not only will we lose the momentum we have else up in pressing iran to limit its nuclear activities. we will almost surely start moving in the opposite direction. we need to remember sanctions don't just staying -- don't just sting in one direction. they also produce costs and those who forgo the commercial opportunities. it is a tribute to president obama's diplomacy and the for that to president george w. bush that we were able to commence countries to accept economic faculty's and sacrifices and the together the competence of sanctions regime that we did. many nations that would like to

do business with iran agreed to hold back because of the sanctions and -- and this is vital -- and because they wanted to prevent iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. they have as much interest in it as we do. and that is why they hope the negotiations will succeed. and that's why they will join us. in insisting that iran live up to its obligations. but they will not join us if we unilaterally walk away from the very deal that the sanctions were designed to bring about. and they will not join us if we are demanding even greater sacrifices and threatening their businesses and banks because of a choice we made and they opposed. so while it may not happen all at once, it is clear that, if we reject this plan, the multilateral sanctions regime will start to unravel. the pressure on iran will

lessen. and our negotiating leverage will diminish if not disappear. obviously, that is not the path, as some critics would have us believe, to a so-called better deal. it is a path to a much weaker position for the united states of america and to a much more dangerous middle east. and this is by no means a partisan point of view that i just expressed. henry paulson, the secretary of pressuring under george -- of treasury under george w. bush, he held designed the early steps. he said the other day "it would be totally unrealistic to believe, if we walk back out of this deal, that the sanctions will remain in place. and all volcker said, "this agreement is as good as you can get. to think we can unilaterally maintain sanctions doesn't make any sense."

we should pause for a minute to contemplate what voting down this agreement might mean for iran's cadre of hardliners, for those people in iran who lead the chance of "death to america" and "death to israel" and even "death to the honey death -- "death to rouhani." the ones who want this agreement to fall apart are the most extreme factions in iran. there opposition should tell you all you need to know. from the very beginning, these extremists have warranted that dealing with the united states would be the worst thing of all time. why would we now take a step that would prove them right? let me be clear. reject in this agreement would not be sending a signal a resolve to iran.

it would be rude -- it would be broadcasting a message so puzzling that most people across the globe would find it impossible to company and. after all, -- to comprehend. after all, they listened when we spoke of the dangers of a nuclear iran. they watched as we spent four years forging an agreement to rein in that program. they nodded their heads and support as we explained that the program we have arranged will make the world safer. who would understand it if we suddenly reject the a very -- the very outcome we have worked so hard to obtain? and not by offering some new and viable alternative, but by

offering no alternative at all. it is hard to conceive of a quicker or more self-destructive blow to our nation's credibility in leadership, not only with respect to this one issue, but i'm telling you look ross the board -- but i'm telling you across the board. we would pay an immeasurable price for this unilateral versal. friends, as dick mentioned, i have been in public service for many years. and i have been called on to make some difficult choices in that time. there are those who believe decided whether or not to support the iran agreement is just such a choice.

and i respect that. and i respect them. but i also believe that, because of the stringent limitations on iran's program that are included in this agreement that i just described, because of where that program was headed before our negotiations began and will head again if we walk away, because of the utter absence of a viable alternative to this plan that we have devised, the benefits of this agreement far outweigh any potential drawbacks. certainly, the goal of preventing iran from having a nuclear weapon is supported across our political set -- political spectrum. and a has the backing of

countries on every continent. so what then explains the controversy that has persisted in this debate? a big part of the answer, i think, is that even before the ink on the agreement was dry, we were bombarded by miss of what the agreement will and won't do -- by the myths of what the agreement will and what do. the first is that somehow the deal is based on trust or naive expectation that iran will reverse course and many of the policies it has been pursuing internationally. critics tell us over and over again -- you can't trust iran. well, guess what. there is not a single sentence, not a single paragraph in this whole agreement that depends on promises or trust. not one. the arrangement that we worked out with tehran is basics lucidly on verification and proof. that is why the agreement is structured the way it is.

that is why sanctions relief is tied strictly to performance. and it is why we have formulated the most far-reaching monitoring and transparency regime ever negotiated. those same critics point to the fact that, two decades ago, the united states reached a nuclear framework with north korea that didn't a congress what it set out to do. and we are told we should have learned a lesson from that. well, the truth is we did learn a lesson.

the agreement with north korea was four pages and only dealt with plutonium. our agreement with iran runs 159 detailed pages, applies to all of tehran's potential pathways to a bomb, and is specifically grounded in the transparency rules of the iaea's additional protocol, which didn't even exist two decades ago when the north korea deal was made because it was developed specifically with the north korea experience in mind. lesson learned. the reality is, if we trust that iran are thought it was about to

become more moderate, this agreement would be less necessary than it is. but we don't. we would like nothing more than to see iran act differently. but not for a minute are we counting on it. iran's support for terrorist groups and its contribution to sectarian violence are not recent policies. they reflect the perceptions of its leaders about iran's long-term national interests and there are no grounds for expecting those calculations to change in the near future. that is why we believe so strongly that every problem in the middle east, every threat to israel and to our friends in the region would be more dangerous if iran were permitted to have a nuclear weapon. that is the inescapable bottom line. that is also why we are working so hard and soap are actively to protect our interests and those of our allies. in part because of the challenge those by iran, we having gauged

in an unprecedented level of military intelligence and security cooperation with our friend and ally israel. we are determined to help our ally. we work with israel every day to enforce sanctions and prevent terrorist organizations such as hamas and hezbollah from obtaining financing in the weapons they seek, whether from iran or for merit -- or from any other source. and we will stand with israel to stop its adversaries while once again -- from launching deadly attacks against the israeli people. we have provided $20 billion in foreign military financing to israel, more than half of what we have given to nations worldwide. over and above that, we have invested some $3 billion in iron dome batteries and other missile programs and systems. and we saw how, in the last gaza war, lives were saved in israel because of it. we have given privileged access to military equipment. israel is the only nation in the middle east to which the united states has sold this fifth-generation aircraft. the president recently authorized a massive arms resupply package with penetrating munitions and air to

air missiles. and with hope to conclude a new memorandum of understanding, a military assistance plan that will guide our cooperation through the next decade. and diplomatically, our support for israel also remains rocksolid. as we continue to oppose every effort to delegitimize a jewish state or to pass biased resolutions against it in international bodies. i understand personally there is no way to overstate the concern in israel about iran and about the potential consequences that this agreement or rejecting this agreement might have on israel's security. the fragility of israel's is a should has been brought home to me on every one of the many trips i have made to that country. in fact, as secretary of state, i have already traveled to israel more than a dozen times, spending the equal length of a full month there. even ordering my plane to land at ben gurion airport when commercial aircraft had been halted during the last house a war, doing so specifically as a sign of support. over the years, i have walk through yap i showed, a living memorial to the 6 million lost, and i have felt in my bones the

unfathomable evil of the holocaust and the undying reminder never to forget. i have climbed inside a shelter where children were forced to leave their homes and classrooms to seek shelter from rockets. i witnessed of the shredded remains of homemade missiles from gaza, missiles fired with no other purpose than to sell fear -- to so fear in the hearts of israeli families. i piloted an israeli jet and observed firsthand the tiniest of israel airspace from which it is possible to see all of the country's neighbors at the same time. and i have bowed my head at the western wall and offered my prayer for peace, peace for israel, for the region and for the world. i take a backseat to no one in my commitment to the security of israel. a commitment i demonstrated through my 28 plus years in the

senate. and as secretary of state, i am fully conscious of the existential nature of the choice israel must make. i understand the conviction that israel, even more than any other country, simply cannot afford a mistake in defending its security. and while i respectfully disagree with benjamin netanyahu, i do not question for an instant the basis of his concern or that of any israeli. but i am also convinced, as is president obama, our senior defense and military leaders and even many former israeli military and intelligence officials that this agreement puts us on the right path to prevent iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon. the people of israel will be safer with a steel and the same is true for the people throughout the region. and to fully ensure that, we are also taking specific and

far-reaching steps to coordinate with our friends from the gulf states. president obama hosted their leaders at camp david earlier this year. i visited with them in doha last month. and this week, we will visit kim so hon from saudi arabia to washington. there -- they are alarmed by iran's nuclear program. we must and we will respond on both fronts. we will make certain that i ran lives up to its commitments under the nuclear agreement and we will continue strengthening our security partnerships. we are determined that are gulf friends will have the lyrical and the military support that

they need. to that end, we are working to develop a ballistic missile defense for the arabian peninsula, authorize urgently required arms transfer, strengthen cyber security, engage in large scale military exercises, and enhance maritime interdiction of illegal iranian shipments. we are deepening our cooperation and support in the fight against the threat posed to them, to us, and to all civilizations by the forces of international terror, including their surrogates and their proxies. through these steps and others, we will maintain international pressure on iran. the united states sanctions imposed because of tehran's support for terrorism and its human rights record, those will remain in place. as well or sanctions aimed at

preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and transfer of conventional arms. the un security council prohibitions on shipping weapons to hezbollah, the shiite militias in iraq, the booty rebels in yemen, all those will remain as well. we will continue to urge tehran to provide information regarding an american who disappeared in iran several years ago, and to release the u.s. citizens its government has unjustly imprisoned. we will do everything we can to see that our citizens are able to safely return to where they belong, at home and with their families. have no doubt. the united states will oppose iran's the stabilizing puzzle aziz with every international degree -- policies with every international security possible. i may clear the administration's willingness to work with them on legislation to address shared concerns about regional security , consistent with the agreement we have worked out with our

international earners. this brings us to a second piece of fiction. that this deal would somehow legitimize iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. i keep hearing this. well, yes, for years, iran has had a civilian nuclear program under the nonproliferation treaty. it was never a realistic option to change that. the recognizing this reality is not the same as legitimizing the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. in fact, this agreement does the exact opposite during under iaea safeguards, iran is prohibited from ever pursuing a nuclear weapon. this is an important point. i want to be sure that everyone understands.

the international community is not telling iran that it can have a nuclear weapon for 15 years. we are telling iran that it can't have a nuclear weapon period. there is no magic moment, 15, 20, to five years ago now -- years from now where iran gets a pass. in fact, iran is required by this agreement to sign up to and abide by the iaea additional protocol that i mentioned earlier that came out of the north korea experienced. and that requires inspections of all nuclear facilities. what does this mean? it means that iran's nuclear program will remain subject to regular inspections forever. iran will have to provide access to all of its nuclear facilities forever. iran will have to respond promptly to request for access

to any suspicious site forever. and if iran at any time -- at any time -- and parks nuclear activities that are incompatible with a wholly peaceful program, it will be in violation of the agreement forever. we will know that violation right away and we will retain every option we now have to respond, whether diplomatically or through a return to sanctions or by other means. in short, this agreement gives us unprecedented tools and all the time we need to hold iran accountable for its choices and actions. it's true some of the special additional restrictions that we successfully negotiated, those begin to ease after a period, in some cases 10 or 15 and others 20 or 25.

but it would defy logic to vote to kill the whole agreement with all the permanent npt restrictions by which iran has to live for that reason. after all, if your house is on fire, if it is going up in flames, would you refuse to extinction because of the chance that there might be another fire in 15 years? obviously not. you put out the fire and you take advantage of the extra time to prepare for the future. my friends, doesn't make sense to conclude that we should vote no now because of what might happen in 15 years, thereby guaranteeing that what might happen in 15 years will actually begin to happen now. because if this agreement is rejected, every possible reason for worry in the future would have to be confronted now, immediately, in the months ahead. once again, and soon, iran will begin advancing his nuclear program. we will lose the benefit of the agreement that contains all these restrictions and it would

give a green light to everything that we are trying to prevent. needless to say, that is not the outcome that we want. it is not an outcome that would be good for our country during nor for our allies -- for our country nor for our allies or for the world. there is a third myth, a more technical one, that iran could get away with building a covert nuclear facility. in truth, there is no way in 24 days or 24 months or 24 years for that matter to destroy all the evidence of illegal activity that has been taking place regarding fissile material area because of the nature of fissile materials and their relevant precursors, you can't eliminate the evidence by shoving it under a mattress, flushing it down a toilet, carting it off in the middle of the night.

the materials may go, but the telltale traces remain year after year after year. and the 24 days is the outside. of time -- outside period of time during which they must allow access. if there is a dispute to access in any location, the united states and our european allies have the votes to decide the issue. once we identify the site the raises russians, we will be watching it and tenuously until the inspectors are allowed in. let me underscore that. the united states and the international community will be monitoring iran nonstop. and you can bet, if we see something, we will do something. the agreement gives us a wide range of enforcement tools and we will use them. and the standard we will apply can be summed up in two words. zero tolerance. there is no way to guarantee that iran will keep its word and

that's why this isn't waste on promise or trust. but we can guarantee that, if iran decides to break the agreement, it will regret breaking any promise that it has made. there are many other myths circulating about the agreement, but the last one i will highlight is economic and it's important. the myth that sanctions relief, that iran will receive will be too generous and too dangerous. like any serious negotiation, this involved quid pro quo. iran wanted sanctions relief. the world wanted -- without the trade-off, there could have been no deal and no agreement by iran to the constraints that it has accepted , very important constraints.

but there are some who point to sanctions relief as grounds to oppose the agreement. and the logic is faulty for several reasons and the first and most important is that absent new violations by iran, the sanctions will erode regardless of what we do. it's an illusion for members of congress to think that they can vote this plan down and then turn around and still persuade countries like china, japan, south korea, turkey, india, iran's major oil customers. that they ought to continue support sanctions that are costing them billions of dollars every year. is not going to happen. and a forget that the money that has been locked up as the result of sanctions is not sitting in some american bank under u.s. control. the money is frozen and being held in escrow by countries with which iran has had commercial dealings. we don't have that money. we can't control that.

it will begin to be released anyway if we walk away from this agreement. remember as well that the bulk of the fans iran will receive under this actions relief are already spoken for. and they are dwarfed by the country's unmet economic needs. iran has a crippled infrastructure, energy infrastructure. it has to rebuild it to be able to pump oil. it has an agriculture sector that has been starved for investment. massive pension obligations, significant foreign reserves that are already allocated to a foreign projects. and a civilian population that is sitting there expecting that the lifting of sanctions is going to result in a tangible improvement in the quality of their lives. the sanctions relief is not going to make a significant difference in what iran can do internationally. never been based on money. make no mistake.

the important thing about this agreement is not what it will enable iran to do, but what it will stop iran from doing. and that is the building of a nuclear weapon. before closing, i want to comment on the nature of the debate which we are currently engaged in. some have accused advocates of the iran agreement coming rooting me, of conjuring up frightening scenarios to scare listeners into supporting it. curiously, this allegation comes most often from the very folks who have been raising alarms about one year another for years. the truth is that, if this plan -- this plan is voted down, we cannot predict with certainty what iran will do. but we do know what iran says it will do. and that is begin again to expand its nuclear activities. and we know that the strict limitations iran has accepted

will no longer apply because there will no longer be any agreement. iran will then be free to begin operating thousands of other advanced and other centrifuges that would otherwise have been mothballed. they will be free to expand their stock bull -- stockpile of enriched uranium, move ahead with weapons grade plutonium. and who do you think will be held responsible for all of this? not iran. because iran was preparing to implement the agreement and we will have no reason to return to the bargaining table. the world will hold accountable the people who broke with consensus, turned their backs on negotiating partners and in council and ignored the

and blame the united states. in those same voices that accuse us of scaremongering now begin suddenly to warn that iran must nuclear activities are out of control and must at all costs be stopped, what do you think is going to happen? .he question will build the question will build for military action, it will build for the united states to hold its unique capabilities to disrupt iran's capabilities because negotiating is not going to work because we just tried it. crystalt obama has been clear that we will do whatever is necessary to prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but the big different is, at that point, we won't have the world behind us the way we do today. because we rejected the fruits of diplomacy, we will be held accountable for a crisis that could have been avoided but deemed to beill be

agreeing. why would we want to put ourselves in that position of having to make that choice, especially when there's a better choice, a much more broadly supported choice, a choice that sets us on the road to greater stability but that doesn't require us to give up any option at all today. here is the decision we are called on to make, to vote down this agreement is to solve nothing because none of the problems we are to learn about will be made easier if it is rejected. none of them. not iran has a clear program, not theirs for terrorism or sectarian activities, and not its opposition to israel. to oppose this agreement is, whether intended or not, to recommend national paralysis.

it is to take us back directly to the varied dangerous spot we were in only to go back there, devoid of any realistic plan or option. by contrast, the adoption and implementation of this agreement will cement the support of the international community behind the plan to ensure iran does not ever require or possess a nuclear weapon. in doing so, it removes a looming threafrom a fragile region and discourage others from trying to develop nuclear arms and make our citizens and allies safer and reassure the world the hardest problems can be addressed successfully by diplomatic needs. best, american foreign-policy, the policy of the united states combined immense power and clarity of

purpose, relying on reason and persuasion whenever possible as has been demonstrated many times. our country does not shy from the necessary use of force our hope and values push us to explore every avenue for peace. the iran deal reflects our determination to protect the interests of our citizens and shield the world from greater harm. it reflects as well our knowledge of firmest foundation of security is built on countries across the globe to defend actively and bravely the rule of law. september, 228 years ago, benjamin franklin rose in the great city of philadelphia write down there to close debate on the proposed draft of the constitution of the united dates.

he told the audience that when all of opposed views and passions are together, compromised is essential and perfection from the above any single participant is not possible. he said after weighing carefully the pros and cons of that most historic debate, he said the following -- "i can send, sir, to this constitution because i expect no better and because i am not sure that it is not the best. my fellow citizens, i have had the privilege of serving our country in times of these and in times of war and peace is better. i have seen our leaders act with incredible foresight and i've seen them commit tragic errors by plunging into conflict without sufficient thought about the consequences. like ben franklin, i can claim

and to claim no monopoly on wisdom and certainly no can compare to the gravity of the debate of our founding fathers over our nation's founding documents. but, i believe based on a lifetime of experience that the iran nuclear agreement is a hugely positive step at a time when problem-solving and danger reduction have rarely in so urgent, especially in the middle east. the iran agreement is not a panacea release it. an extremist violence that has been ripping that region apart. that history may judge at a turning point, a moment when the builders seized the initiative from the destroyers of hope and when we were able to show as the generations before us, that when we demand the best for ourselves

and insist others adhere to a similar high standard that, when we do that, we have immense power to shape a safer and more humane world. that is what this is about and that is what i hope we will do in the days ahead. thank you very much. [applause] >> liam fox says he has concerns with the nuclear agreement. he outlined those concerned at the heritage foundation. this is just over one hour. >> good morning, welcome to the heritage foundation. i'm director of the center of freedom here at heritage. it's my pleasure to introduce the right honorable liam fox.

during which time he hasorked for special relationship between the united states and great britain. in fact, i can think of no stronger friend of the american people across the atlantic than liam fox, throughout political crier dr. fox has been a conservative dedicated to the principles of limited government and strong national defense and robust life. liam is a member parliament since 1992 and served as defense secretary of the united kingdom from 2010-2011. he also served as co-chairman of the conservative party. most recent book is rising tides

facing the challenges of a new era. today dr. fox will address the great posted to the united states and allies fri iran nuclear ambitions with iran as the largest explorer. please join me in welcoming me our dear friend liam fox. >> it's a pleasure to be back here at heritage and talk about a subject dominance media which is almost absent in great

britain media. any deal that genuinely proving acquisition beyond the reach of iran will be a good thing. it would be good for the region, global security because if iran were ever to achieve such an objective, it would be the trigger for a destabilizing with catastrophic results. before i turn to the deal itself, lets briefly look at the background of the negotiations. the election as iranian president in june 2013 by sections of the western and landmark moment. here we would be able to do business with. a government that would bring iran from the cold. it calls for caution from seasoned iran observers were

lost in the all too familiar now triumph of wishful thinking over critical analysis and obsession with media-friendly projection. fast-forward to 2015, the country has not changed direction. it was never going to. those who expect to change fundamentally misunderstood the structure of iranian power. president was destined to only ever have a limited influence in a state dominated by the supreme leader and the revolutionary guard, an amazing ability the wirn politicians would dream of. he's never waiver or believe about the purity of islamic revolution and cultural threats from outside. critics are only half joking when they say he's more afraid

of mcdonald's than fat. in 2014, iran was the world's leader in executions per cap tea. freedoms that we in the west take for granted continue to be aggressively, continues relentlessly, and the western media seemed curiously detached from or even indifferent to their repressed iranian colleagues. iran remains a sponsor of state terrorism providing financial, logistical and material support to islamist terrorist groups across the region including those who target british and american forces. it is just not possible, nor is it responsible to see iran's nuclear ambitions outside the

context of its support for terror proxies. and anxiety over iran's nuclear intentions are not in the realms of pra -- paranoya. many require to facilitate production of nuclear weapon. possession of enriched materials, convert enriched materials in weponizedded form and plans to deliver mechanism in form of ballistic missiles. iran should be given the benefit of the doubt. let me say this, the country has a long history of nuclear work.

are the center of international community's concerns but constructed secretly of iran obligations under the mpt. for years iran hassed these facilities to enrich uranium to levels and quantities beyond those required for a legitimate and civil nuclear program. iran routinely neglects operations to cooperate with the iaea repeatedly denying access to inspections to nuclear facilities. this facility is suspected of having previous taken that triggers nuclear weapons. it is logical to assume that iran's intentions have been and are to develop a nuclear weapon's capability at some point in the future.

lets turn to the deal that has been agreed, in particular measured against the time-scale set and perhaps most importantly verification. let's remember at the outset that the original aim of the international community was to ensure that iran would never have the ability to po assess a nuclear weapon. now we find ourselves in the position where these original aims have somehow mother or moro an agreement. it also seems to be predicated inhe belief that internal change in iran will produce a government that wl ultimately

lead the lsh -- leave the nation's to rest. there's no grant -- guarantee, second that even amongst many of the reformers there is a belief that iran is not entitled to just a civil nuclear program but a deterrent. they would argue but not without setting justification assuming r capability. the reality of these arguments is not going to c at some of thr issues.

we all know how they will manipulate any weakness of the towns of iaea access. instead of clear to access, we have in this agreement rather bizarre committee structure and you can only get access when when the iaea is as suspects. then we come to the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of uranium assets, rather than a graduated lifting of sanctions as a reward for full cooperation of the implementation of the group, it seems to have caved in to the supreme leade dand

that sanctions be lifted completely and immediately. likewise the infreezing of $150 billion of uranium in assets seems to be surrender to the demands. the money will not necessarily be available to iran since a substantial proportion will be use today pay off the debts it already has. in other words, it's not real money. i could tell you that if someone paid my bank overdraft, i will definitely think it was real money, something other than the debt repayment. the same holds for iran. we've also been told that the money will not exacerbate hezbollah and other proxies. it would be exactly the opposite. if they regarded them as a

priority for funding when they've already been tightly squeezed by financial sanctions, they are likely to see them as prime candidates for the tsunami of unfrozen assets hits them in the future. next we come to the lifting of the arms embargo and the issue of ballistic missile technology. if i remember correctly, it wasn't in the nuclear agreement, iranian supplied arms have been used against our own forces directly and against our allies through the violent proxies that are supported by iran to make such a concession without any guarantees. it seems extraordinary to the point of being incomprehensible. in terms of ballistic missile technology, why would you want to develop such a capability when you claim that you have nothing that you wish to deliver

by such a system in the first place. all of these seem fulfillment of the iranian wish list based upon the need to improve regional and global security. that rather begs the question as to why such a deal took so long to negotiate at all, so what rational is given for this approach? we're told these measures will help iran to become embedded in the economic holder, encourage reform and through economic interdependence become less of a threat to our neighbors and ourselves. i would like to point out that bringing russia into the g-8 did not exactly make it less aggressive. if anything it fed to putin's pretensions. there's no guaranty it will

produce the desired behavior. after 1945 europe became interdependent. my reply to that is that we are nations with outlooks, similar democratic systems and similar values in relation to the law and rights. it's a very different thing when you are playing with someone who has very different rules. russia, i believe, has taught us an example of that and i suggest iran is another. if any proof of required, the supreme leader said that one of the supports the deal, that iranian government was 180-degrees different to us. we're told that the deal had to be accepted because there was no

other approach available. i simply do not believe this to be true. iran came to the table because sawngses were becoming an enormous budget economically. maintaining sanctions until such time as iran was willing to expect a tougher deal. it was simply not the option that was chosen. lick weiss we are told that the snapback is flaws within the agreement. this merits the least extreme skepticism. one iranian assets are unfrozen, iran will make rapid progress to repair and update their aging infrastructure in both civil and military fields. not only will effectiveness potentially of any subsequent sanctions be diminished with

time but western governments will face increased pressure from their own domestic industrial interest while contracts are being signed, projects have been started and profits at risk. we know that and the iranians know that. perhaps those of us who don't believe all this are just being cynical. maybe there will be political change in iran by the time the ten-year envelope has passed. maybe iran will offer free and open access to international inspectors, maybe they will be completely honest and transparent with us, maybe they will follow their own religion structures, maybe they won't try

to manipulate the terms of the treaty in the way to suit their interest, maybe they won't improve with oil and gas and at some point utilize ability to breakouts with little as seven months. but it's a lot of maybe's. the hallmark of western security has been a triumph of wishful thinking over critical analysis. policymakers to make assessments based on how the world really is and not on how they would like the world to be. wishful thinking is not a great approach to life, it's a dangerous foreign policy and it's a potentially catastrophic security policy. let us hope that those of us who have the reservations and who believe this is pushing a difficult -- louis wouldn't put

much money on it. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much for your perfect remarks. i would like to open the floor for questions. request i take the liberty of asking the first question, and it's regarding the perception of iran deal in the united kingdom. the obama administration has given the impression that outside of washington and outside of israel that there was no opposition to the iran deal, what is the -- what is the situation on the ground, british governors and strong support e of the deal, but i understand that there are a number of mp's who are opposed to the deal. is there any prospect of

parliamentary debate taking place in the iran agreement in september? >> it's rather extraordinary. i was speaking to the excellent hugh hewitt last night. there's a great deal of anxiety in the united kingdom. it's quite wrong to portray before the deal was actually -- there was a debate in parliament and a very large number of my colleagues attended and spoke very forcibly about the potential problems that it might create. we've had, because of parliamentary tame table, we had very little opportunity to discuss it, but i would find it very unlikely that there were no

parliamentary debate on the subject and if the debate doesn't occur in government time, it can happen in back benches time. parliamentary time is not determined. i would mention that there will be a high of such a debate. again, i just make the point that i open with that it's extremely disappointing that this whole issue has had so little coverage in the british media, where arriving on the u.s. it's on virtually on every political program. that's something that i intend to help to override. >> first question from the audience. >> thank you very much. i have -- [inaudible] >> my question is that the

debate on this issue f you -- if you compare it on this issue in usa and european union, do you find any difference, number one? number two, in this negotiation do you think iran outsmarted all the other five, and the last thing is if you could say -- what were the other options other than negotiations? >> well, i think there is agreement politically in europe. i think it's part like it seems to be in the united states which brings greater focus here. i think the iranians -- well,

lets put it this way, look at the agreements itself and compare to our initial demands and iran's initial demands and see who it ends up being closer to, and that for me that the iranians managed to get a great deal of what they wanted. i'm not sure that we got what we wanted. iran will never be able to build a nuclear wep. -- weapon. there's nothing to ensure that the money on oil and gas, unfreezing of assets with capability that they would turn around, now we are going to get the weapon. at that point, we have left ourselves with no leaders except the implementation of sanctions which at that point will be less of a threat. that's what worries me.

they have got more than we have frankly from this particular negotiation. and so the third point? >> the third point what was the other option. >> well, the other option was to continue with sanctions until iran was willing to accept an agreement that we thought was much more bullet proof in terms of original aims to start from getting nuclear weapon capability. we had to somehow accept an agreement that we thought was at best below expectations, lets put it that way, that we had to accept it right now rather than continue with sanctions and see if we can get a better view. right now, why date it have to be right now, why did we accept

a deal that was well bellow -- below than we actually asked for. i think it's about politics. that is not a good way to set priorities. [inaudible] >> i want to complement you for saying it's about politics. we were talking about how the mainstream media has kept information away from the general public and it's even for the u.k. it was classified a few years by do iaea that iran played a role in the bombing and if people knew that, they would be against this deal. the mainstream media refuses to report that because they're embarrassed. i don't know if what i heard is correct, but what i'd like to know, in the u.k. they are not

even having the dialogue, at least in america we are having the dialogue, but the issue is that who's monitoring the enrichment and it needs to be indicated and the people can't understand it because of the complexity. any comments you had-i believe like you said is the mainstream media not reporting it to people and it's politics. thank you very much. >> now that you mention the book that i wrote which contains large section on iran, part of the problem contemporary politics and political discussion as you might i will say often has very little historical context around it. you'd be hard pressed to hear anyone talking about iran pre1979. it doesn't have any history before that. what i wanted to say iran has

replied to the question, has sophisticated diplomatic capability. it always has. it's been well known for running opponents over time. iran has a very long record of involvement in all sorts of terror groups and proxies in the regular oib -- region and beyond. but i do think that we need to educate our public much more about these issues. you don't simply walk in and look at a blood test and make make a diagnosis, you want to see the patient and ask about past history, you want to ask about family history, you want to know some context and too much about politics is discussed in two mentions rather than three. one of the duties of politicians

to educate as well as make policy, i think. >> thank you for the excellent talk, here in the united states, listing of sanctions up front and essentially no gradual way to address iran's potentially cheating, what is your take on -- could you take -- how that provision is not effective in bringing iran to compliance with the terms of the agreement? >> well, i think that you put it very well, because what happened in the agreement is iran gets all the rewards immediately and we are left with fewer and fewer

potential sanctions. should they not stick the agreement. they get unfreezing and lifting sanctions very early on. after that, when they have access to money, when they have access to western contracts and capabilities to be able to bring their economy back up to shape and repair their damage infrastructure, what sanctions are we going to be able to apply? and if we are able to apply them, how effective will they be. we have the second problem which i also mentioned, once sanctions western companies going into are lifted, once you have iran doing business, it will be more and more difficult for democratic governments in the west to reapply sanctions even if they're justified. we are making it very difficult for ourselves, we are losing the deal very heavily on the iranian

side leaving ourselves with leaders should iran go back to old behavior of trying to manipulate the agreement and behaving what i can most likely describe as an untransparent way. iran gets rewarded for maintaining clear implementation of the deal and access and they have to graduate to prove us of having assets unfrozen and sanctions lifted. that seems to me a much more sensible approach but it seems to be given everything in the outside. it's all predicated on hope. we hope that they will change. >> yes. gentlemen here in the front. and if anyone -- if you can identify themselves or any

institutional affiliation, thank you. [inaudible] >> the administration says enough time -- not enough time for iran to cheat, gets access to the facility, however, according to of the agreement, iran has to answer but in other words, all they want us to do is drag out the time until it answers about not because facilities. 24 days. the verification is reasonable

-- [inaudible] >> the second thing that people need to pay attention, it's not a signed agreement. we should not bring this agreement to the for parliament then i have to sign it and if i sign it obligation. >> thank you. i think this is a developing story, and i think as debate becomes more substantial, not about the big picture but details, i think it will be greater public anxiety about this deal, which is why we need to start a again -- public debate and focus on what it says and what the implications and

how it would operate under the most adverse circumstances, not the most optimal circumstances, that's the debate we need to get to and the points you make are extremely valid to that. >> thank you for an excellent speech. cynthia, i'm rising panelsist in middle east forum. america has personal interest, so i was parished. i had to study for 12 years because it was the law of my country. nod -- not because i adhere to anyway. according to to islamic

jurisprudence it satisfies every single role, the jurisprudence of treaty and according to jurisprudence treaty, a temporary truth and the limitation is 10 years. after the ten years a ruler is obligated according to law and limited to voi -- violent attack in nation that they have treaty with or allies. that's what it says or as the muslim ruler was not being legitimate anymore and i don't think the iranians satisfy every law. i don't think they would sacrifice their rule to satisfy the united states or the west.

so my question is, is this taken into consideration of the political in europe or in the united states of america how the iranians are looking at it and thus the implications of it is -- iran doesn't, in fact, act upon itself progress of damage to america and israel and act upon it, their is this pushing the consideration? thank you, sir. >> i will not even attempt to get issues of iranian jurisprudence. what i think is very clear the mindset of the west in coming to the agreement with iran -- chances are iran will change in that time. chances are with a young population it become more liberal, chances are it will be

fundamentally altered. i don't know what guarantees are and what will happen. yet, this whole agreement is predicated on that. and i can see circumstances in which the successor is actually more fundment list than he is. there's nothing at all that suggests that any change will necessarily be more liberal and progress. i think it's a gamble and try to guess what the world would look like in a decade's time and the security policy upon it is really placing too much value on

hopeful experience. >> what about israel? a threat to israel because of this deal. >> clearly iran has a nuclear state poses a potential threat to israel. that has to be taken as red. i think that we need to understand the implications for regional security as a whole and global security implications as well. it's of great importance to see the threat that it imposes to israel. we should understand the complications far more widely of iran being able to get nuclear capability. it's not about iran getting nuclear capability and the threat it poses to israel, is

what it would trigger because in no time at all you can bet that you're at an arm's race where someone wants to get a nuclear weapon, egypt might want to get a nuclear weapon, turkey might want to get a nuclear weapon and surely after all that we did at the end of the cold war to try to prevent proliferation and all the measures that were put in place to try to stop that, we don't want to leave to the next generation a new nuclear armories in the world's unstable region. i'm the first to say. any agreement that stops iran from getting a nuclear weapon, general stops them is to be welcomed. i don't believe in my heart that this agreement gives the guarantee that we need. i'm almost sad to not be

supporting it. wishful thinking is not a good basis for national security, nor the security of our allies. >> hi, and drew overton in british embassy. just wanted to push back, i appreciate your comments greatly. i just want to push back on a couple of points you made about the sanctions. the iaea verify restrictions. on snapback, he would snapback sanctions if iran cheats. you mentioned that the alternative will be more sanctions to get iran back to the negotiating tables. do you really think china,

russia, the other people will sign up to that to more sanctions? would you think they would return to the negotiating table? >> my problem was that we didn't have to have an agreement now. iran was becoming more compliant because of the impacted sanctions we're already having. we had an option to continue with the sanctions until such times as iran was willing to accept and agreement more to our liking, but we decided not to do that and i i leave that open. if you look at the difficulty that there often is when sanctions are willing applied, in the same scale ahead, i think i made the two points, one is will sanctions have equal impact once iran has lifting of

restrictions on to the present time and the untreating of financial assets both sanctions be an effect in the future, and secondly, will western and other governments will be willing and democratic governments come under pressure that the chinese government and others don't come under. and when you have a large industrial interest, able to make profits from iran, there will be a lot of pressure not to close down again. that's the reality of what happens in western politics. i think we need to accept that. this idea that the snapback can happen very quickly or very easily, i think we have to question that because i don't actually believe it to be true. >> just a follow up on the point that you made. isn't hard to imagine the

russian and chinese supporting at least with the russian supplying weapons to iran and a close relationship between moscow and iran, so the snapback idea seems -- >> i think it's a real danger that some of the players who are required to make sanctions bite, would been unwilling in the past. adding to that is that the democratic western governments will have different pressures applied to that because of their industrial and commercial interests, so it is not as easy and it's not as clear, i think as it is being portrayed.

[inaudible] >> thank you for your comments. given russian sales from russia to iran, how do you think israelis strike in order to prevent -- >> i don't think it's likely, but you can never really anything out, instability to an unstable region. who knows what the final outcomes will be, impossible to say, but i think it was be unwise for anyone to rely. there might be military response by israel as increasing risk to their national security.

>> yes, sir, thank you for your point. retired navy. recent polls show that american don't approve the treaty and the british population is a bit enthusiastic towards the treaty. why is it that this disapproval for the treaty for the polls is not on media? >> one of the things that i never answered before is behavior of the media which i'm grateful. it's interesting the discrepancy between the two and the american population are less incline to support the deal than the british population. i hadn't seen the polls but i have no reason to doubt what you say. what's the difference between the two? motivated in the united states and the more people knew about

it, the less they like it. and the answer to the united kingdom is to open up a debate. trying to get on -- obstacles in the britain is so difficult. migrant crisis and not iran. i'm -- one of the reasons that i'm here today is to try through heritage to try to get that debate opened up in the united kingdom. it's important that we do so. it doesn't diminish its importance. just people don't want to hear something, doesn't mean politicians shouldn't say it. >> could you comment on the migrant crisis in europe, just

another one political issue across -- related to the current situation in the middle east. could you address how europe is responding to this crisis, what needs to be done in the big picture? >> first differentiate economic migrants that come from all over the region to try and get better living conditions by being in europe, that is understandable, but we are not simply there to be the recipients for everybody who wants a better life. i draw a distinction between those people and those poor souls who are fleeing one of the cruel and vicious organization isis that we have seen in our world for a vor -- very long time and it is pitiful to watch

them to bring their children not just where they can get more money but safe. we need to set up a safe zone. there needs to be a secure zone in syria where people with live without fear and cruelty and other thing that is we have seen from isis. that's going to require in some point. we'll need to have military action by international coalition in a no-fly zone and protected element. otherwise the flow will continue, and there's no point in simply saying we are not going to allow people to cross our borders, we need to deal with the cause of the problem, and the longer we wait, the more the cost in terms of human suffering will rise.

>> let me add this one. no acting is a policy and no acting brings consequences and you have to weigh the cost of action and the cost of inaction and for many people across the political spectrum the cost of inaction is rising too high. [inaudible] >> could you call it on how you see that debate ruling and also on what brings in terms of military action against isis?

>> well, first of all, that has been for reasons that i don't quite understand, confusion about response to the use of chemical weapons by syria and military action against isis. it seems to be absurd that we accept that it's okay to carry out military against isis in iraq and not isis in syria. you have to deal with it. and the idea that in effect should be obstruction to what we perceive and describe as the biggest threat to our generation, just leaves me for once speechless. what we require to do is -- is something else also, and that is to recognize that the battle against isis is not simply a

battle to be fought on the ground against a military force. this is an ideology call battle. we need to understand the scale of the challenge we face. in the cold war, we understood that we had to utilize not just a military capability against the soft -- soviet union, but our model case for our own superiority. we were willing to use world better, democracy was better, but nowadays i happen to believe