latter case, trying to push innovation and stretching the technological envelope, if you will, are the areas where i'd put a lot of emphasis. john: thank you very much for this discussion which resulted from these questions. i understand, director clapper, that before we conclude this session, that you have announcement for -- james: thanks. it's more an issue of commercial. first, thanks for having me. kick this off. i did want to announce at 9:45 that bonita, who is the national counterintelligence executive and also the now director of, as we call it, the national counterintelligence securi center, will be here to roll out a counterintelligence seminar,

awareness seminar. prompted at least in part by o.p.m. breaches. 9:45. thanks for that. john: let's give director clapper -- express our appreciation to him. [applause] that concludes the first session of our summit. we'll now have a coffee break in the exhibit hall and please enjoy the refreshments. the breakout sessions will start at 10:15 a.m. 10:15 on the lower level where you all came in. and then remember, director clapper just mentioned the 9:45 event. thank you.

[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> up next, former national security adviser sandy berger on the iran nuclear agreement. after that, a house hearing on a toxic rivers bill in colorado. and live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on washington journal. >> all persons having business before the honorable supreme court of the united states are admonished to draw near and give their attention. number 759. ernest, petitioner, versus arizona. barbara madison is probably the most famous case this court ever decided. judge and harriet existed as laypeople here on land where slavery was not legally

recognized. >> putting the brown decision into effect would take presidential orders in the presence of federal troops and marshals and the courage of children. to take cases that changed the direction of the court in society and also changed society. >> so she told them that they would have to have a search warrant. papers. map conceded the to read what it was. once they refused to do so, she grabbed it out of his stance to look at it and thereafter, the police officer handcuffed her. >> i cannot imagine a better way to bring the constitution to like that by telling the human stories behind great supreme court cases. opposed the forced

internment of japanese americans during world war ii. after being convicted for failing to report for relocation, mr. carr matsuo took his case all the way to the supreme court. >> quite often, in some of our most important decisions, ones that the court took an unpopular position. >> if you had to pick one freedom that was the most essential to the functioning of the democracy it has to be freedom of speech. through a few cases that illustrate very dramatically and visually what ofmeans to live in a society 310 million different people who stick together because they believe in a rule of law. landmark cases, an exploration of 12 historic supreme court decisions and the human stories behind them. a new series on c-span, produced in cooperation with the national

constitution center. debuting on monday, october 5, at 9:00 p.m. on tuesday, sandy berger, the former national security advisor for president clinton, call the iran nuclear agreement a starlight. he is among the nuclear experts on a panel hosted by the international crisis group. this is an hour and 40 minutes. pleasedam particularly to be here this afternoon to with thesevent experts. the issue we will discuss today is among the most important that a in in the diplomatic for the last 20 years. when i think of the complexity

of this agreement, i think it compares only to those arms control agreements that were negotiated in the 1970's and in the 1980's. and the reason why it compares to those is because it is not an areement which is just statement of intentions. a statement of generalities. diplomatic niceties. , not a complex contract based on trust, but on verification, on details -- on detailed arrangements and that is what makes it comparable to what we saw in the salt and in the major arms control agreements decades ago. i think that comparison stops there and i would want to share with you before i introduce our speakers, i want to share two thatht with you that make

agreement very different actually from the arms control agreements of the 1970's or 1980's. the first and major difference is that those agreements were that werey bilateral bilateral agreements between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between the united states and the soviet union. signatoriesween the of the agreements and iran. , i difference is that today say signatories. this is an international agreement and this is the final in the way of four years of negotiations, but more accurately some 12 years of engagements. in 2003 and the

date is interesting because that war andyear of the iraq deep worries that saddam hussein could have weapons of mass destruction. that was the year when north korea withdrew from the npt. there was a sense that the whole nonproliferation regime could unravel and that the only possible response was war. hence, the initiative at the time of the u.k., france, and germany to engage iran diplomatically. an initiative that then became leading thetive and engagement with the iranians. that came to nothing. leader becoming the

president in 2005 and in 2006, you had the second stage in the internationalization of the issue with the security council being brought in. and the security council had means of legal course and that did not exist before. and so what we see today is the their he intense diplomatic engagement of the united states with iran. it is also in a way the product of intense diplomatic negotiation of a range of actors, the europeans, the members of the security council, the non-european members of the security council beside the united date. china and russia. quites what is behind remarkable becauseakes it, in ae remarkable because today what we think of the international community, the word that most come to one's mind are

unraveling. it's not a time when we see the international community coming together. it's a time where we see international relations in a terrible shape being able to agree on most issues. the fact that this agreement is the one bearing exception to that trend toward an unraveling of the international community. so that is an important point when one considers this agreement. the second thought i would want want to share before introducing the panelists is not when you consider the arms control agreement they were achieved in the context of derivatives strategic ability where there was some implicit agreement on the status quo. this agreement, to put it in

political context, is profoundly different because it comes in a region that is the most volatile in the region where they certainly have no agreement on what the status quo should be. if you talk to their leaders, they they won't have the same answer. so in that context is why the europeans stand

it is normal to focus on the technicalities but in a way it should be on the context. know, and as will be explained, this agreement is a whole set of time frames. five years, at years. -- eight years. 10 years, 15 years, twice five years. there is a whole period of time that is opening before us. the question is how are we going to use that time? those years have

wee through, do -- did increase the stability or did we open a period of calm, or nonproliferation, it did not resolve the fundamental issue. that is the political work before us, which is a decade long effort that needs to be made. i think there is going to be quite important to focus on the politics of the region so that the intimidation -- in the implication -- implementation, on the one hand there is the politics, and the political context to make sure it is the foundation for a different middle east. not just a nonproliferation agreement. now, to discuss the agreement, we have an extraordinary panel. tom pickering unfortunately

missed the plane so is not with us this morning. he regrets it very much. but we have sandy berger. and the biographies of all of the art is a pence. national security visor for president clinton. who we will speak to the national security interest of the united states. i would add one point. he is a distinguished trusting, and we are pleased to have him on our board. the president coasting this event, and world not expert on nonproliferation command he will speak to the implications of this agreement for the broader context of nonproliferation. and our own international crisis group analyst who has

been engaged in the negotiation relentlessly, as relentlessly as the diplomats were conducting the negotiation in the last four years and playing a very important role behind the scenes, talking to the actors because he has the better quality of understanding the technicalities of the issues which are numerous and at the same time the politics of them. without further ado, i will ask sandy to get us started. >> thank you. i am pleased to be here. i am pleased to be here. in many ways this is the eyes and ears and conscience of the world and constant the world. and this has been at the heart of the groups that are working to see this

agreement adopted. i am pleased to be part of this. abraham lincoln used to tell the story of a man who was lost in a forest on a dark night. vicious storm. every minute that would be a funders or of thunder and the flash of lightning. finally hefinally he looked up and said, god, i would appreciate a lot more like a lot less noise. i think that is an admonition that we could bring to this debate so far, a lot more night more noise in the debate. if all you are doing was listening to the congressional discussion,

you would think the agreement is somewhere between horrible and just good enough. and i think that is misleading because those who think it's horrible, but if you are a democratic senator and you have made a very courageous judgment to before this, you also have to than deal with all of the folks who are against it. it is easier to say i heard your argument. they are good arguments. this is a close call. i am for this, but i recognize all of the things he said. you have a discussion here which is somewhat skewed, and not very many members of congress want to stand up and be a cheerleader for this.

we will see how the debate unfolds. i am not sure that this is an accurate reflection of how congress really feels. i will say i think it's a strong agreement. from an arms control perspective, national security perspective. it's very strong. i'll let my colleagues to the left are experts on this describe the pieces of this. my top lines here are, unbelievable prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years , perhaps more. it eliminates a key threat to the stability of the middle east, and i think

it's verifications provisions of our ability to know what is going on our stronger than any arms control agreement ever. so on the positive side, i think we have a strong, strong case. let me focus on three issues that would be opponents are talking about and address those three issues. one is that we should defeat this and get a better deal, put more pressure on iran and get a better deal. it won't happen. it can't happen. and it can't happen for a number of reasons. number one, our partners in this enterprise have no interest in further negotiations.

they think this is a pretty darn good deal, as does most of the world. they're not interested in more sanctions. so we're not going to have them as partners. the outer rim of the sanctions regime, which has been china and india and south korea and japan, which is what made these sanctions work, with great credit to president obama and secretary clinton, they have no interest in more sanctions. so they're won't pressure. in fact, existing sanctions will quickly erode. sanctions worked. sanctions did exactly what they were designed to do. i cannot think of another case, except south africa, where sanctions it worked as well as this.

the international coalition was constructed, economic sanctions were imposed. it was a white coalition. the iranians came to the table. they negotiated a serious agreement. some people think that's wrong. but it's a serious agreement. the no one is interested. from the iranian.of view you have to imagine the following conversation because presumably during these negotiations for a better deal things have to at least freeze. you have to imagine president lonnie going in to see ayatollah and saying something later, i think that we should stay at this, continue to imply,

notwithstanding that the united states has no obligation, notwithstanding that horrible, the debate horrible, the debate you just heard for the last three weeks to five months. people take the high ground and stay with us. if you still in office, he then has to say, by the way, i think richard -- i think we should offer more concessions. i can't see how the iranians will do any better. i don't think there is a better deal. it is an illusion, a self-delusion, and we ought to get it off the table as quickly as possible. the 2nd proposition here is that iran, with all this new money that it gets will

increase its sponsorship for radical groups in the region , has below, hamas, and others, and that will cause turmoil in the region. i do believe that iran is a threat and region and that the intention is to gain influence over the region. one of the reasons i am for this agreement is because i would rather be dealing with enron it does not have a nuclear weapon rather than one that does and can use it to intimidate its neighbors, to try to keep outside powers for moving in to help that is the reason for the agreement.

iran we will have more money first is the vaunted hundred billion dollars. $56 billion. there are claims against it. some of it will come back. and presumably the iranian economy is healthier and will generate more revenue, and more revenue will be available to spend on external matters. this is just the concept. number one, this kids were demonstrating on the street not because they were happy to get rid of centrifuges but because they see an opportunity to have a better life. they see an opportunity.

suddenly the iranians ship all that money tucson. it is a repressive government. this is a very connected generation in terms of the internet. estimated to be half a trillion dollars of unmet domestic needs and iran as a result of the sanctions. if a lot of that money does not go to dealing with those needs, i think they will be in trouble. but they're we will be money , and we have to be aware of that and our regional strategy. president obama is moving in that direction to help our allies better determine defend themselves against iranian pressure. not only through arms

through other ways. the gulf countries now spend eight times what iran spends it is not really money that is giving iran an advantage. it's capabilities and other asymmetric amenities. we need to work with our friends to better position to push back a bit. the 3rd thing swirling around is that the verification provisions are not really effective because they said they would have anytime anywhere inspections and don't. joe probably knows he says that. i don't want to denounce something. it was unfortunate because no country anywhere would permit anytime anywhere. the only time that happened is in iraq after the

invasion. we were occupying. so it was kind of a false expectation,a false expectation, but i want to put it into bigger context. a big puzzle with a thousand pieces. we will have 247. monitoring of all of iran's nuclear program, stuff coming in, the mines where they mine uranium, the places where they make centrifuges and assemble the centrifuges. all of that will be viewed by cameras, seals, totally transparent. 99 percent, 98 percent is an

open book. this whole debate and discussion 24 days being too long is about a couple pieces of the puzzle. we don't no fair there, but we see something going on on a military base. the simple fact is that as we see it through our intelligence, and want to go in and see it. iea asked to. iran says now. we are talking about that subset of issues. in that case we can just go blaster way in. i don't think anyone is in favor of doing that. it's a process. it is a 24 day process. i actually think that is a

good time period because hopefully the pressure will build during that period to open it up involving the countries that negotiate and iran, but ultimately if iran does not open the site any country, any of the p5 plus one countries they go to the un and push a button and have the sanctions reimposed. we have the ability. that is the ultimate enforcement tool. the last thing i'll say, some of the critics say is too big of a tool, like having a nuclear bomb to do

traffic control. you will never use it. that is a pretty good argument. but there are alternatives. we have our own sanctions, our own unilateral sanctions we can impose if we can't get our allies to go along or think we're doing too much. we have a range of options to go after iran under those circumstances. i will stop there. there are a thousand questions and a thousand and one answers. >> thank you very much. it is our pleasure to join with the international crisis group and sponsoring this panel discussion. thank you for this opportunity to partner with you. we are dedicated to reducing and eliminating nuclear threats throughout the world this is why we got involved.

we don't do the middle east. we do nuclear. we saw iran is one of the greatest nuclear threats facing the world and tried to muster our resources to focus on this thread, to provide grants to groups working on this threat, to try to find a way diplomatically to stop iran from getting a bomb. a new war in the middle east. we are very close to achieving that goal. today we got 41 senators to say they were in support of the iran agreement painstakingly negotiated over these last few years. this brings us close to the possibility of being able to defeat, even without a veto, and a threat by the u.s. congress to kill this deal. we'll see how this plays out over the next few days. i am delighted that c-span is covering the panel.

i want to thank them for the opportunity. one of the most pleasurable addictions many of us have that is still legal. and it has been a source of great information for and against the steel, as this drama is unfolded. there are lots of things to say, and they are all being said today. if you are involved, this is like new year's day. you're not sure which came to turn into. this may be one of the few where we will dig deeper into what disagreement -- what this agreement actually is. so much of the debate has been dominated by criticism, what is wrong with it, picking at this with that part and stretching it out and magnifying the flaws so that they seem to be somewhere between a terrible agreement and barely good enough.

the fact is, as a nonproliferation expert, this is by far the strongest nonproliferation agreement i've ever seen and is more to stop the country from getting nuclear weapons to stop the region from getting nuclear weapons and preventing the rest of the from pursuing nuclear weapons programs and any treaty i've ever seen, and i include in that the nonproliferation treaty, the mother of all nonproliferation agreements, the core of the regime. this deal is stronger than the nonproliferation treaty. it is certainly longer. it is much, much longer than the original nonproliferation treaty. it had a week verification regime. this has the strongest ever negotiated. the us would have to physically occupy iran to get a better verification deal than this.

let me explain a little bit about why i say that and why in the nuclear policy world this agreement is noncontroversial. there is an overwhelming consensus of nuclear policy experts in favor of this agreement. ii was pleased to sign a statement by 75 of the world's leading nonproliferation experts just released a couple weeks ago praising this agreement and urging congress to pass it. you have to search pretty far and wide to find a nonproliferation expert who is against the agreement. there are those who have criticisms want to work on the verification regime, but opposing it, hard to find a nuclear policy expert against this agreement. when the us entered into this we had three objectives

, block iran's pathway to a bomb, put in place a verification regime that could catch iran should it tried to cheat and keep together international coalition that had allowed the strongest sanction regime ever placed on a country outside of war to be put into effect and allow that if iran should cheap wicked snapback sanctions nearly instantaneously. we achieved every single goal. this agreement shrink-wrapped iran's nuclear program to a fraction of its current state car wraps it in the toughest inspection regime i have ever seen, and it then freezes it for 15 years, almost all of the restrictions, as you will

see any starts around me last at least 15 years. some start to come often. some, we set up a special procurement channel so everything that they buy has to go through this special procurement channel. what country does that? disagreement -- this agreement mandates that. stumps -- some start to come off, but some are like diamonds, they last forever. iran is never allowed to build a nuclear bomb. the inspection regime is never allowed to and. even as some of these are relaxed 15, 20, 25 years from now, and eternity in national security terms, those barriers remain. no nuclear weapons ever and a forever inspection regime. this, for me, has

implications far beyond iran the steel tackles the most difficult nonproliferation threat we faced. north korea is difficult, but this one threatened to unleash a nuclear arms race in the middle east. if iran got the bomb, there was a high probability that other countries would at least try to get a nuclear bomb. you were looking at the possibility of a middle east nuclear arms race and the possibility of the entire nonproliferation regime, the entire interlocking network unraveling. for me this would have been a disaster, a catastrophic failure of our effort to try to contain the bomb. but with this agreement we bottle up iran's nuclear program. you have to understand what your talking about. i know you heard a lot about

it taking 24 days to inspect or that iran will self inspect or other, tiny parts of the argument that have been picked out and exaggerated beyond all meeting, but you have to look at what actually happens. they have to rip out two thirds of their centrifuges and put them in locke and seal and warehouses under the monitoring of the international atomic energy agency, take 98 percent of their uranium stockpile. remember the cartoon bomb the benjamin netanyahu brought to the un podium where he warned iran was at the point of that red line with a might be able to build a bomb within weeks, the steel drains that. there is no uranium left. they go from -- they have to eliminate 98 percent of the uranium, not even by

diluting it but shipping it out of the country. they are left with about 300 ki. you know what you can do with that? squat. you cannot build a bomb, make fuel. it is a token amount that is left. some of the real news is gone uncommented on for most of the debate. this deal completely eliminates the plutonium pathway to a bomb. iran is building a research reactor at the wreck site. this was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. the problem was the fuel it was using would,, during the lifetime of the reactor, generate enough plutonium to make a bomb. as that reactor if that reactor were to go in place it will be producing approximately enough plutonium for two to three

bombs every year. if you remember a few years ago that was the reason. israel saw that reactor and said that as a threat to us. we cannot allow that to go operational. that is how israel made his palms. most countries use plutonium, not uranium. israel built a research reactor in their country many years ago and said it was for peaceful purposes and secretly used it to make plutonium. so when they syron doing the same thing, they understood what that meant. and this is a proliferation path, what north korea did. israel was justifiably concerned. this deal completely eliminates possibility. iran has to take out the core, what is called the

cauldron of its research reactor, drill it full of holes, and fill it with cement. they have to completely reconfigure it. the new configuration will produce less than a kilogram of plutonium every year. that is a quarter of what you need one bomb. and even that has to be shipped out of the country wants is taken out of the reactor, and iran promises not to build any reprocessing facilities to do what israel and north korea have done, take that plutonium out of the spent fuel and build a bomb. as a nonproliferation expert i am excited by the provisions that set a knew standard for countries. maybe you havemaybe you have heard that it might set off a nuclear arms race in the middle east. it was a former saudi official said we want whatever capability iran has which led to fears that if you let iran keep even a

token amount of uranium enrichment that saudi arabia would say, well now we want some two. as a nonproliferation expert i say okay. if you accept this package, this deal and go enrich uranium, go at it. this is the knew gold standard for nonproliferation for how you contain and monitor a nascent program, build in the maximum tools for assuring that a peaceful program stays peaceful. it is not an absolute guarantee. a country could still breakout. what this package gets you is years of warning, years of warning. under this deal for at least 15 years if iran were to break out you would know it,

and you would have a year of a year of warning before they were able to make enough material for one bomb that is just to make the material. itit would take another year or two afterwards to manufacture a weapon. no country has ever broken out with one bomb. you have to test it. when you look at this package you really see the incredible security that it gives you for the potential for becoming a standard for the nonproliferation regime. and here's the kicker, you often here the phrase countries like iran and north korea. well, there are no countries like iran and north korea. these are the last two countries with programs of this type, someone vicious that they could either get nuclear weapons like north korea has goneon the on the threshold of getting one, which is what you feared.

there is no one else with the program this large. if you can stop the program and try to apply some of the lessons north korea and in these last two, you could be looking at the end of proliferation, the way that began after hiroshima 70 years ago one country after another decided they had to get nuclear weapons. that crested about 25 years ago. more countriesmore countries have given up nuclear weapons that have tried to acquire them. more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs and tried to acquire them. we are down to these last two. you have just taken one off the list. you have just taken one off the list. for nonproliferation expert this is a deal that is an historic breakthrough, diplomatic triumph, something that can make not just the us safer, not just israel safer, but make the

world safer. thank you very much. [applause] >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for coming. you have heard a lot about this agreement in the past few weeks and will here a lot today. ii thought i would do something a bit different to make it more interesting. i will 1st visualize some of the things you have heard about the agreement in the past and then tell you something you have not heard hopefully that will make it a bit more interesting. so let's start with the visualization. as you heard from john sandy , this deal goes a long way in rolling back iran's nuclear capability. but what is difficult for some people to realize or

visualize is what happens if there is no deal, if we go to status quo ante? i want to show you a few graphs starting from that side, the number of centrifuges that iran had command i would like you to focus on three time frames. from the beginning to 2013 is what i call the period of escalation, and from 2013 to 2015 which was the period of negotiation, and from 2015 onward, that is the post deal scenario depending on if this deal survives or if it can no longer be killed at this point but is undermined in some way or another. if you look at the number of centrifuges, iran went pretty quickly from 2006 to 2009 president obama came to

office to around 7,000 centrifuges, and from that point until 2013 when the geneva agreement joint plan of action froze the program iran went up to 19,000 i are one centrifuges. so than the graph plateaus between 2013 and 2015. if this deal comes into force we know exactly what wap. it will come down to 5,060 centrifuges and will stay that way for ten years. and i would actually say for 12 years because the total enrichment capacity stays constant until your number 12. now,. now, if there is no deal it is harder to predict what will happen. let's take the critics at the word and believe that if

there is no deal the best alternative is to start ratcheting up sanctions in the hope that we would put enough pressure on to make more concessions. that will take is probably to status quo ante with the previous pattern which was escalation for escalation. in that scenario iran, you see how the graph just goes up and up and up. by the end of this ten year period we will get to about 60,000, 50,000 centrifuges. well, the same thing will happen in the facility that is under a mountain and has the capacity of 3,000 centrifuges. iran installed 3,000 centrifuges but 2010. it did not turn on all the machines but installed 3,000

and was operating around 800 if there is an agreement, this number comes down to 1,000 centrifuge machines installed the 350 operational and would only enrich stable isotopes which are not dangerous at all, and it will stay that way for ten years. if there is no agreement iran can turn on all the 3,000 centrifuges that it has. now, these are the old primitive machines that were talking about. they also have more sophisticated centrifuges. currently it has about 1,000 second-generation machines that are installed ready to go. they just have to turn them on. it has a smaller number of more advanced machines.

now, if the agreement comes into force, that number goes down to one. for eight and a half years. from that point on iran can operate 30 machines. a huge reduction compared to where we are whereas if there is no deal they can turn at least 1,000 people to machines on overnight. let's come here to the side of the room and look at the stockpiles of enriched material. the stockpile 5 percent enriched material grew quickly from 2007 and went up to around 10,000 kilograms before the ga poa came into force. if there is a deal, this

will be significantly reduced to 300 kilograms, but if there is no deal the stockpile is there. if you project based upon the previous pattern it can grow pretty quickly, and instead of staying at 300 kilograms, it can grow up to 30,000 kilograms by 2030. of the same pattern with 20 percent enriched uranium, it went up to around 190 kilograms. by the way, prime minister netanyahu's redline was drawn at 250 kilograms. actually, the j poa already got rid of the stockpile or drained the cartoon bomb the prime minister netanyahu held up the un. it is already gone, but iran has the capacity of again producing it and based on the previous pattern if

there is no deal by 2030 iran will be able to have not 250 kilograms but 900 kilograms of 20 percent enriched material. and this contributes to the breakout time than the amount of time needed to produce enough fissile material for nuclear weapons the breakout time came down quickly from 2007 to 2013 from 18 months all the way down to two months. since thesince the obama administration is come to office it has been below six months, and the joint plan of action already increased to around three and half of four months. if the agreement comes into force breakout time will go up to 12 months and remain they're for 15 to thought between ten and 15 years.

and if there is no deal, breakout time can actually shrink significantly almost overnight depending on which of these steps iran decides to implement to match the escalation it comes from ratcheting up the sanctions. by the end of 2016 we could go down to one month by the end of 2016 to zero, almost zero. now, i'm not using this as a scare tactic to say if there is no deal that will be a doomsday scenario, but it is important to understand the logic behind this mutual pattern of escalation. the iranians believe that if as a weaker country dealing with six world powers they change or are seen as changing their nuclear policy as a result of sanctions, than thethen the west can put pressure on

them to change everything else, all the other strategic decisions that they have to make as well. they want to make sure that the west does not get the signal that sanctions actually will change iranian policy which is why they try to match the leverage that the united states was trying to build with ratcheting up there own nuclear capability which is why i believe that they will escalate if there is no agreement. of course we don't know exactly how or if they would remain below the bedliner not, but if you compare the deal to no deal scenario we will be in a much more difficult situation. now, this gets me to the 2nd point that i wanted to make. imagine we come to the conclusion that we don't like these downward trends in the certainty that we give the deal and we decide we want to take the risk of escalation and see if we can

get a better deal. i would argue a better deal is more dangerous. imagine this famous provision with some miracle iran comes back to the table and goes down to a two hour notice for inspection of suspect sites, not 24 days as a challenge. let's imagine how that will work in practice. as soon as there is some kind of intelligence about suspect activity they have to show up, get access almost immediately without the iranians having an opportunity to study the evidence, discuss ways and means of making sure that the legitimate commercial or confidential information is safeguarded, and of course

we are mostly talking about military sites that are under the control of the revolutionary guard and the revolutionary guards are not a big fan of the agreement which threatens already the economic bracket that they have acquired in the sanctions economy during the past few years, and they are concerned about infiltration by western intelligence as a result of doubling the number of inspectors on the ground at any day and any time. so this will make the revolutionary guard which is already resentful very sensitive, very, even more opposed and it yesterday which does not make for a sustainable agreement in the long run. ifif you have every day of witchhunt somewhere in the country because we did not

have due diligence or due process, it really does not make for a sustainable deal. now let's get a look at another example. imagine that iran somehow accepts to get rid of all research and development. the single advanced centrifuge machines, they decide they don't want that. you have to remember that there are around a few hundred people if not a thousand people actually working in the research and development area of iran's nuclear program. these are scientists who already have that w's knowledge. if the program is totally shut down these people will be out of work and probably pushed underground and these are the kind of people you don't want to be unemployed and pushed underground.