have due diligence or due process, it really does not make for a sustainable deal. now let's get a look at another example. imagine that iran somehow accepts to get rid of all research and development. the single advanced centrifuge machines, they decide they don't want that. you have to remember that there are around a few hundred people if not a thousand people actually working in the research and development area of iran's nuclear program. these are scientists who already have that w's knowledge. if the program is totally shut down these people will be out of work and probably pushed underground and these are the kind of people you don't want to be unemployed and pushed underground.

it will also have another effect which is important to say and for people to remember, that we are talking about a proud nation which wrongly or for right reasons believes in this nuclear program as a symbol of national pride. an agreement that provides for unfettered access the same way you heard from our distinct panel implemented in a country that was vanquished and more, of course it will humiliate the radio nation. a hard time keeping up a deal like that in the next president will be in a difficult position. so the bottom line that i want to emphasize here is it is just not enough to get a good deal. a good deal is a sustainable deal, and it is only sustainable if it is sustainable for both sides. let me stop here.

[applause] >> there will be a question-and-answer period. >> i am happy to take questions after those excellent presentations. who wants to start? introduce yourself. who wants to ask the 1st question or comment? yes, in the back. >> it was mentioned that the iran nuclear program was at the top of his group's concern. where does israel rank in your scale of concern? >> there are three major threats that you face if your worried about a nuclear bomb going off someplace, worry about the new country trying to get it, worry

about a terrorist group that can get there hands on a bomb and then your worried about the nine countries that currently have nuclear weapons. there are about 16,000 in the world, and your worried that one could be used in anger of a miscalculation or accident. israel is one of those countries with an undeclared nuclear weapons program. people estimate somewhere between 10200 nuclear weapons. i think it's at the low end of the scale, so israel would be one of those countries where you worry that something can go terribly wrong, upon could go off whether they intended it to were not are that a conflict could arise where they might feel forced to use the weapon. it is not at the top of my list of countries. if i was to think about the country every about the most , that would be pakistan which for my money is the

most dangerous country in the world with already enough nuclear weapons, almost as many as israel, is racing past that, building nuclear weapons faster than any country on earth and is in an unstable situation internally and regionally. >> the ranking democrat on the foreign relations committee agonized long time and finally announced he would not support the deal but has said he is going to introduce a legislative package that will include more resources for israel in the event of additional terrorist activities on the part of a ran, aa pathway to additional sanctions if there are violations to the deal. one, do you think this is a good idea, and is there any

prospect that this could provide a different kind of coalition of support in the aftermath of acceptance of the deal that will move us away from what has become a sharply partisan issue. >> i think it is likely to have some other initiative. i think to be consistent with the treaty and does not initiate or trigger any provision of the treaty i personally have no problem with the. a number of those things are things the president has said are committed to. we'll be happy, but they have been instructed members when it gets to sanctions, i

noted i don't think further sanctions are going to be effective. let's stay on that for a 2nd. i don't think any other country in the world will for sanctions. calling in the ceo fae and saying thank you for the last several years. very strong. iran came to the table. we think it's terrific. the un approved this. we like to stay out of there for another three years. i can't imagine the conversation. in the sanctions area i doubt it will be effective. many folks are talking about what they call secondary sanctions.

you choose. you have access to iran. we have access to the united states. it is pretty powerful. i think that also is not sustainable. i cannot imagine the united states, german and chinese, indian companies and punishing them for violating sanctions that most of the world thinks are not legitimate and are inconsistent with the general global norms. could i see congress doing sanctions? yes. as long as it is not inconsistent with the agreement.

>> anthony garrett, thank you for your presentation. my question has to do with assuming the deal goes through, what are the implications in terms of the terrible tragedy right in the region with syria and iraq? >> let me start. >> specifically the implications of this deal. >> well, the easy answer is none. the administration's position has been that we are negotiating a nuclear deal and not going to mix and other issues,, and i think that was the right position for the negotiation we don't want either reality your perception that we dumb down the nuclear agreement because without syria might.

that has been the right position. i think it depends a bit on iran. as i said before, i am deeply suspicious of her on. iran can do things in both iraq and syria which would be very helpful. i don't see any evidence that iran has prepared to throw aside under the bus. if they want to be a constructive player, it would be enormously helpful. in iraq we have this strange little cat and mouse game in which we're fighting the same guys as the iraqi militia but don't go to the same restaurant. there we could have more cooperation on a tactical level.

i mean,, this could be interesting drama to watch unfold. what is the evolution of serious approach to the world? the hardliners would say syria is a revolutionary country is basically still embodying the view that it should dominate the region. i think the president believes that it is possible that iran will evolve and that this agreement to the extent it opens up the wrong will contribute to the evolution. that's a very important question. >> may i just add? this is not an agreement that solves all of our problems with iran. it does not cure cancer.

it will not help you shed those unwanted pounds. it does one thing, stocks iran from getting a bomb, but it does that very well. and that isand that is the position that the us and the european partners took at the beginning. russia and china agreed. this is what israel wanted. this is what saudi arabia wanted. if we're going to have a negotiation about regional issues some of our regional partners want to be in that discussion. real quick what it does do is, it is a gateway to those discussions. the biggest difference you had opens the way to conversations about these other issues, areas where you have overlapping strategic objectives. they both have an interest in stabilizing the region,

and interest in stopping the war in syria. can you get to those conversations? we don't no. if you did not solve the issue was no possibility of even entering the room. >> one thing, you come to the hill and breathe the air and start filibustering. [laughter] i don't mean to do that. a that. a very important point. the argument that we cannot enter into this agreement because they are causing trouble, sponsoring hezbollah and sponsoring us on and causing both to me is illogical. you have to flip that argument on its head because to the extent we can take the nuclear issue and while it off, put it out, were in a better position to deal with those things if iran is

not able to intimidate its neighbors. if iran is not able to intimidate other countries with nuclear threat i think we're in a better position to stabilize the region. >> the europeans are mostly supportive of the deal precisely because they feel they are on the receiving end of what is happening in the middle east at the moment. and they believe that, as was said, that deal does not solve that all the problems of the middle east. they have there own dynamic, but it opens the possibility and then we have the possibility of a more rational conversation between the powers of the middle east and the powers of the middle east and the outside powers. of course there will be a balance of power to mention, and one of the questions is

whether the balance he ran, it's all about more weapons, more firepower for the gcc countries or whether that has to be accompanied by diplomatic framework of engagement between iran and the gcc countries. at the moment, talking about the diplomatic framework seems a bit like pie-in-the-sky because considering the rhetoric on both sides, it's difficult to see that engagement, but it is even more difficult to see that engagement of tomorrow your talking to a nuclear iran. in that sense, frankly, the answer to your question, question, the implications of the deal will be what we make them. that is our responsibility and why i think your going to see a great flurry of diplomatic activity in the middle east.

everyone knows that the deal is not the answer to all the problems, but everyone knows this is now the time to work very aggressively to begin to build the diplomatic framework in the middle east that the moment doesn't really exist. >> one last. >> very good question. i just want to add a point about the money issue because i think i always like to look at data, and this is a case where we have data. if you look at 2011 to 2013, that is when the sanctions regime reached its apex. it was really hurting iran. 50 percent loss of value of the currency, 50 percent loss of oil exports. during that period of time iran we will have actually made the majority of its gains if you can call them gains.

it succeeded and popping up beside, and the beginning of the crisis, it succeeded in helping iraqi pushback isys. that is when there were reports of increased iranian presence in yemen. 2011 to 2013. now iran actually received about 15 billion as a result of the interim agreement, but during that same period of time aside started getting weaker and weaker and today is in his weakest position. a long-lost it's our in baghdad. it saw the islamic state taking over half of iraqis syria. it is not that money necessarily will empower iran or lack of money and sanctions and pressure will bring about a more moderate iran.

>> thank you. jim goodby from the hoover institution. i just wondered particularly what you thought of the possibility that the cooperation that is taking place now within the p5 plus one framework we will continue and perhaps expand and what does it mean for the relations among these countries that are in the group. this is a fairly important development where some potential nesting. >> i think it is true that this deal would not have happened without quite effective diplomatic cooperation between the united states and russia, which at the moment on ukraine and most issues are fundamentally on the

opposite side and likewise between the europeans and russia. and we have seen on this deal that the priority given to nonproliferation has meant that the countries have been able to coordinate their positions. and i would be cautious in suggesting that that is going to be expanded and can build on it for a broader cooperation. when there is a paramount goal like nonproliferation where the p5 fundamentally create, then they can come together, but when that goal isn't there is much less likely. there is a question of the fight against violent extremism against the islamic state, but that is fraught with difficulties

because when you read it from a russian perspective it is just a way to say, look, side is your best bet against violent extremism. so behind a superficial appearance of agreement as soon as you scratch the surface the divisions remain deep. and likewise, when there was the chemical weapons issue on syria and the security council for the 1st time in a long time was able to agree, there was hope that that agreement would lead to a more coordinated policy on syria. that did not really happened , and at the moment we see probably greater russian support to the

regime of president aside. so i think one should not overstate the possibility of convergence, but i stand to be contradicted and hope i will be wrong. but i think the fact at the moment does not support a very optimistic thesis on the convergence in the security council. the experienced diplomats at the table must have an opinion. >> okay. yes. >> hi. just a quick question. you mentioned the pressures and articulated very well the pressure put on iran to put them in the negotiations on. and i understand who is the state, the spoilers of the

negotiations. my question is, why do you think israel and the gulf area, i feel the other spoiler in my opinion and also why do you think that this is the optimal plan for negotiation knowing what we know, what iran is doing in syria and iraq? why you are releasing the pressure now and you think this is the optimal plan. although i understand the preface, but if i take a holistic approach and i see you are releasing the pressure, giving them a chance, why do you think this is the optimum point of negotiation? thank you. >> i make two points. first is the question of, was this pressure of sanctions putting us in a

better situation in terms of iran's regional policy? he will continue a policy only if it is successful. if it is not working there is no point and continuing it. we could have another 50 years of sanctions on cuba. and that is also the question of what happens with iran in the region. there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what iran seeks which is why people think the pressure of sanctions else. i would argue that as long as these fundamentals don't change, iran foreign policy will remain the same. number one, it is encircled by the us. number two, it is inferior inand conventional military capability to almost everyone else around. the uae which is the size of

a suburb of jurong has a more powerful air force that iran. number three, it is completely excluded of the regional security architecture. that is why it needs the former defense policy of supporting proxies command as long as those factors don't change coming iranian policy remain the same because those are the three elements that inform policy. number two, i think we should be careful about moving the goalposts. there arethere are not a lot of tools in the foreign-policy toolkit. one of them is sanctions. and if we come to the conclusion the sanctions were useful in bringing iran to the table. they were at the table the majority of the time, but making them to negotiate seriously, if we move the goalposts now and say you

also have to change your regional policy or foreign-policy or domestic policy, the sanctions as a tool of statecraft will lose their credibility and it will be hard to go and marshall international support to you sanctions for narrow, specific objective that people start thinking at the last minute we change the goal post. >> let me come back. it is hard for me to accept the analysis which says iran is a victim of the rest of the world. it is encircled and weekend and therefore must support aside who has killed 250,000 people. it supports hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization. you flip the logic on its head. i don't think it is black and white. iran has its own internal dynamic. it does feel insecure, but

you take it for these purposes, postulating on the other side that iran is a reactive country in the region. i think iran would be able to integrate itself more if it dealt with some of these broader issues, and i think that this agreement is a kind of steppingstone to that kind of integration. >> what makes the situation dangerous is that all countries have a deep sense of insecurity, and when the narrative in each country is fundamentally different from the narrative in another country the situation gets even more dangerous when you add to the sense of insecurity nuclear weapons, but that does not mean that without nuclear weapons you have aa stable situation.

you do not. that is why you need diplomatic engagement. certainly the narrative into round will be our push forward to enhance security that narrative will see in saudi arabia and other gulf countries the sense that they are under attack. that perception is perfectly legitimate. that is a strong reason why the region will not achieve stability without some kind of a diplomatic engagement from outside powers because left to its own devices that dynamic of insecurity will only feed escalation in confrontation. i think there was a question over there. >> the administration and the supporters of the deal insist that this deal is based and focused on iran's nuclear and is all based on trust.

but many critics say that if it is not based on trust is based on hope to achieve a certain goal in tackling the questions in the middle east but it is difficult to see that. even if behavior changes and harmonies and if it is not, if it was based on the nuclear, why did the negotiation team and the administration agreed to giving more and more incentive to iran doing a negotiation, like on purchases and missile systems and reduced periods. some of the experts like nicholas burns and michael hayden have expressed worry about this concern. >> let me start with an answer to that. ithat. i do not think the us made a series of concessions. this is a bargaining process

, negotiation. we went and with strong positions. would have preferred iran give up its nuclear program entirely. the safest outcome is that there is no enrichment facility, no nuclear activity of any kind. that was the position of the us back in 202,003 and 2005. that failed. iran built up a nuclear complex that in 2003 had about 164 centrifuges to something that had 20,000. now you trying to get them to go all the way down. it is not a freebie if iran is going to cut two thirds of the centrifuges what are we going to do? that is what the us and its partners started putting it sanctions relief on the table. these are the kind of things we do.

but i don't see outside of the sanctions relief package any other concessions that the us made. it did not lack nonproliferation standards or have a lucid verification regime. it does not legitimize the behavior. we are not dropping sanctions on terrorist activity, human rights activities. although stay in place. at the last minute you may remember, at the last minute they tried to get us to drop the sanctions on conventional arms transfers and on the missile program, and they had a pretty good case because the sanctions were adopted by the un security council because of the nuclear program. it was part of the package, the pressure that was put on

to try to get iran to come to the table and negotiate a deal. lift the sanctions. we did not want to do that. in this final agreement the ban on conventional arms states for another five years in the ban on missile trade stays for another eight years. this is a complete ban. we have other restrictions. they don't get a free pass to start importing the equipment to build intercontinental ballistic missile. so i'm sorry. i basically disagree with the premise of your question , that there were concessions made. this looks like a pretty good deal, and you have to understand, this is negotiation. for negotiation to succeed, whether it is labor and management, players and owners poor countries everyone has to be able to leave the table and declare victory which is what is

happening now. we may not like the sound of victory, and they certainly don't like it coming from us , but that is what makes it a strong agreement, a lasting agreement. all sides feel like they one. >> one quick comment. because diplomats never get credit for anything. this is a remarkable achievement. they sat in the hotel room 17 days and took a tough line. john is better than i for most of the critics a year ago he suddenly you take this deal they would say it's unachievable. so the negotiating team really didn't extraordinary job. both of us happen to no the negotiators involved. for example, wendy sherman.

she cleaned my clock. these were tough people. you see the smiles on tv, but behind that there teeth of steel. the only thing that prevents us in the us from seeing what our european allies see , with the conservative government in the uk and france and germany see, this is a remarkable diplomatic achievement. we have a better, partisan divide in the city where the republican party has decided they will not let the democratic president get anything. if he came up with a cure for cancer it would be rejected. if a republican president negotiated this agreement would have already named an airport after him. [laughter] >> and i would add, speaking

as a frenchman, as francis a difficult relationship over the years, and an ethnic occasion, france was on the top side. when it failed that verification provision or this or that was not tough enough, it made its voice heard very strongly, sometimes almost creating some worry that it could torpedo the negotiation. he did not have one country taking a tough position but a group of countries. that i would single out because it took a strong position wanting to have an agreement that would be really based on very strong verification because there was no trust, they had the experience of terrorism originating against french interests, on french territory.

a sense thata sense that you had to have a very solid, rocksolid deal was part of the dynamic of the negotiation. >> yes. >> american security project. the success of the deal will rely primarily on the ability of the iaea to verify the provisions. so what does the iaea need for the us and international community in order to assure its operating units for potential given that we know american inspectors won't participate in the inspections. what can the us and the rest of the international community contribute? >> money. the iaea is chronically short of money. one of the pieces of legislation that some of us have seen that i think should be supported by all of congress is to increase the donation to the international atomic energy agency. they will be applying

state-of-the-art technologies. if your idea of inspections is what happened in iraq in 1991 where you shut inspectors out in the parking lot for days, our friend sat they're looking for water. you don't understand what modern inspections like. this is, we will have cameras and sensors and seals everywhere, not game of thrown seals on parchment, fiber-optic seals with radio links to headquarters. if they are broken we will know instantly and have inspectors with 247 access. the entire sprawling complex , that whole thing is covered by the iaea. this agreement doubles the amount of inspectors now. we are setting up a special procurement channel so that everything iran buys they

have to buy through the special procurement channel. if you see a company in northern iran buying which is a, people will find that out. we will track the iranian the time it leaves the mine to the processing facility until it is stored. unprecedented. we don't do that anywhere else. you have to back up the iaea with money, with support, and one of the sticks you have to carry into this is making the threat of snapback sanctions real. there is a role that congress can play in helping to implement this agreement, fund the necessary inspection tools and keep your powder dry on sanctions and show the us is going to snap these in place koran keep the unity because it is not unilateral sanctions that matter, not what we say

but what japan and south korea and india and china and russia say. >> let me pick up on something you said about the next phase and how this is where we have to engage diplomatically. in new york last week and said several times that, yes, it is possible we can deal after the agreement with the united states, but it will depend on whether you continue to bully us and whether you treat us with respect. and i guess i would say, it looks to me like after the deal the combination of loading on of legislation which will restrict the president of the united

states effort to provide all that israel and the gulf states want, the political dynamics in this country and our own narrative combined with the narratives that we will here from iran could possibly make it a very long and difficult time before the discussions, the diplomatic discussions are really possible. so i guess i wonder how you think we can manage this next period or help the administration manage it in ways that will minimize the anger that will arise in both countries, certainly in both parliaments after this deal is done. >> first of all, turn off

his radio and television for the next three weeks. this debate is going to be ugly. we are sophisticated enough to understand. i think you make a really excellent point. as i was listening to you, 1st of all, thank you for all you have done in terms of putting together support. the triggers in my mind, start thinking about how we deal with this. so focused on the agreement, getting the agreement done, supporting the agreement, i think we need to think about the period you were talking about. hopefully the administration is because you can undo. there are some people in the

opposition who believe the affordable health care act strategy, which is introducing various things which will try to undermine the agreement will fail a series of amendments that put supporting senators in a difficult position. if you are democrat and decide to vote for this, which goes against a lot of your most serious constituents, and a month from now you get a piece of legislation, tough legislation which mandates sanctions against iran, supporters on, which would be logical. so they're could be a strategy here of kind of legislative harassment as one piece of this. but i think you are right.

there needs to be a broader process in terms of how we slide back. >> i was glad that sandy was answering your question. it is a tough one. i do think that over the long term it is really about building a narrative in the middle east that would not be the same in riyadh in tehran. but nevertheless that will allow for a discussion, and engagement between those countries. as i said earlier, i think that because of the regional dynamic region will not come to that conversation without strong outside engagement, and i think speaking as a european, it will be important for the united

states not to think that we have the deal now, monitor the technical implementation and of course that will be important, but that is not -- let's be as little involved in the rest as possible. i think it is essential on the country to be diplomatically engaged with the region so that the measure of reassurance comes from the united states because ultimately when you look iran is a big country. a much weaker military than saudi arabia or maybe the united arab emirates, but nevertheless when you look at the population it is the big country in the region. it will be hard to build that sense of self-confidence in the countries of the region if they don't have some kind of

external reassurance. the diplomatic challenges, you don't want that reassurance to build the kind of escalation. you wanted to be a path to diplomacy in conversation rather than a path to -- and that is a very fine balance defined. >> thank you. they and a perlman. read the statement endorsing the deal as an opening for improved relations. following up, there's a question about whether this deal can have a moderating effect on whether it can be

transformational command i would like to propose that it's up to us and having a more dynamic cause-and-effect understanding of how our relationship with iran and also just to say what we have been talking about, that it is irrational. ..

>> >> to reassure each other we will not attack each other because if we reduce tension and then in 50 years we don't have to worry about that? >> that is an ambitious way to start. [laughter] first of all, i think it is a test of both parties not just united states but the iranians are great at casting themselves as the victim without regard to

what they're doing in the region is causing problems. so i agree on your premise we need to find ways to take a different path but that is not only what will come from you macy's son in this administration after the deal is done i think the country is not ready for a cuba or for a big step. this is a big step right now. sold to see if we can engage

with syria or iran en some fashion with an effort to stop the massacre in syria? that is question number one because everything that we talk about, we're focused on iran, but in midsummer of turmoil and at the epicenter is a civil war in syria which 11 million syria refugees from lebanon and jordan and elsewhere and a world that has been more less indifferent to that. so the way to deal with syria is to step back from a side.

>> one last question. >> i want to do congratulate the panel it is extraordinary work you have done to organize this has been extraordinary. i will complement the perception that will happen politically and raise the concern and i agree this will look very much like the affordable care act with constant amendment so the challenge going forward to have a remarkable job to have 41 senators and nancy

policy has done an extraordinary job in the house of representatives bader villages and - - vigilance in work have to continue because we can see this undone by a thousand cuts if we're not careful and we have to be very mindful of that. >> we shouldn't on that note. thank all of you for your questions and senator reid and the armed services committee for offering thi >> next, a house hearing on a toxic river spill in colorado. york --some :00 a.m., life at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on "washington journal." representative"

jim jordan. he will discuss a planned parenthood shutdown and what he expects from secretary clinton's testimony. "newsmakers," today on c-span. lou and herbert hoover came to the white house has geologists, successful in both of public and private sector. just months before his term the financial market crashed. first lady lou hoover user office for charity -- used her office for charity. but their rain ended after one term. on "first lady's: influence and image." privateg the public and lives of the women who fill the position of first lady and their influence on the presidency. from martha