will see is typically what kind leaders is the occupation of what mattered to them. i am not saying that relationship to the united states is immaterial to them, but it never drove how they -- from theirheir standpoint, the one thing that was critical, especially those who would been friends with those in the region, was how reliable are we? would you pay this i demonstrate this in one relationship after the next. one of the things that i do throughout the book is show the echoes that reverberate over time. how you see the same behaviors on the outside.

it is one of the ways that i try to draw out the key lessons. even though this book is told from the american perspective, there are lessons here as well. >> this very brief overview does not even begin to do justice to gems, ofts, the historical insight in this book. historian and fascinated by the cycles of history, to see the repetition of the same words administration after administration area did mistake after mistake -- mistake it is truly fascinating area of

but for someone who made no mistakes i now turn to tom. some opening remarks about the book in your experience. about myd tell you mistakes but you are not cleared. [laughter] let me say couple of opening things and maybe four to five operations. great to be here in your new facilities and it is great to be here with a surprise from my counterpart. it's delightful to see you here today. we had a very terrific relationship. grateful that you asked me to come talk about this book. agolast book or two books that was 805 pages. but it is a little

bit more of a lift to get ready then your prior work. make fortified observations if i could. one is a general observation on the importance of the book. it is big history and we don't have enough of that. it is useful history. greateve that one of the failures of american policymakers is the lack of knowledge of history and the lack of attention to the understanding of history of the nations with whom we are dealing area we have a phrase in -- dealing. we have a phrase in america, "that is history." that is not how it works. what the drivers are, what the narratives are and the mythology.

it is really important. so neil ferguson in volume one of his biography of henry kissinger makes that point powerful. i gave a commencement address years ago and that was the one piece of advice i gave to history, readread a lot of it and read it up sus simply. great contribution to that and the work of future policymakers. a relationship with dennis goes back a long time. i spent a large part of my career trying to talk -- talk dennis into taking jobs. we have been more on the other side of each other. i prepared him and governor clinton for his debates in 2008. nonetheless, we asked or baked dennis to stay for three to six months. we turned that into eight years

including one scene where i was in a nato meeting and i said, dennis, you cannot leave. he said i promised the trustees and i have to come back and i said, i want you to do this. picture the scene. aam in a hotel room, on secure phone, and i am on my knees begging you to stay and dennis did and this country was all the better area i did the national security transition for then-president obama and try to recruit him to the white house and failed but got him about a year later. so thank you for this contribution to history. the second thing i wanted to say is to make a couple observations about various chapters. it, i was struck by

something that does not get enough notice. the durability of the contributions made his extraordinary. it does not get noted enough. the campaign accord is an important pillar of israeli security and remains so today. and was tested even during the muslim -- morsi muslim brotherhood.. though it did not embrace the campaign and would not engage on a political level with israel, they respected each other and remained in place then and today and has been one of the most important coordination relationships remains the egypt relationship.

also have a core part of our assistance regime. the security of economic assistance in egypt remains a core part of the region. i noted that in your book and wanted to pull that out as something that doesn't get commented on enough in my judgment. the third point i wanted to talk about is white leaders make the decision they make about engaging in that middle east peace process. point that there are a number of consistent assumptions that leaders embrace. responsivenessab and resolving the palestinian problem is a key to their consolidating their position which you call leakage. there are other things driving this which i want to talk about. that is a president seeing

context and opportunity. leadership context and the opportunity for achievement. that is what drove president clinton in 1992. the united states, after the fall of the soviet union and the gulf war, the united states had an unparalleled level of power. not looming as deeply, iran is nowhere near the threat it is today. it was virtually exhausted after that iran-iraq war. israeliou had the leader who decided as a matter of strategy he's expanding a circle of peace.

you, dennis, working with secretary baker had pushed away the taboo on direct talks between israel and arab nations for the madrid process. the historian makes his point which is martin index. if you put the current state of u.s. power and his intentions here, there is a real possibility of achieving four arab-israeli peace agreements. it was a context and the opportunity for achievement, as opposed to a cost-benefit analysis. thend, if you look at decisions that the bush 40 administration made, that was about perceived opportunity for

achievement as well. i think they rejected the clinton approach because there was a general anything but clinton view. and the situation that president , there was a set of circumstances very different from what president clinton faced. the peace camp greatly diminished in israel. it began reflecting back on it and people throw these phrases around. violent and highly impacting event. 1100 israelis killed and 3800 , at you had a 2006

parliamentary election which fractured the palestinian authority and you had a much more difficult and weaker partner to deal with. threat of iran was much different and a lot larger for president obama than it was for president clinton. he was running headlong toward the development of a nuclear weapon and israel, as you point out faced those committed to its destruction. it was a very different circumstance and u.s. relations were in a much more complicated and infter the iraq war the midst of us pursuing the most aggressive counterterrorism campaign against violent fundamentalist groups than the country had ever taken.

we can talk about the decisions that the president made. the fourth point i want to talk to -- talk about is personalities. decades working with that. a strategic sense. full of integrity. great strength. the really reliable -- thoroughly reliable. .ou could just feel it steel camet, but the through in his decisions and leadership. the important thing that came through very strongly was yasser arafat. given all of these positive conditions that i outlined that president clinton faced a decade almost of achievement.

why didn't it close? and think about what was on the table. forget about the clinton 2001, ars in january palestinian state in all of gaza . the capital of arab east jerusalem. a return to the new palestinian state and an end to the conflict and arafat walked away from this. another has been some debate. at the facts were really --

israel inagement with the approach that we have. we view israel as an ally. i certainly view them as part of an alliance system. no other nation in the world has the kind of partnership alliance system the united states has put together. it is the unique and important asset to be attended to constantly. in addition to the palestinian-israeli issues, we had the most important security issue in the world anyone facing us and the engagement we have was not just political level but at the professional level. say thatt is fair to the engagement between us and the military was critically important. why is that?

in a region with so much mythology it was absolutely get groundor us to troops and come as close as we could with respect to the analytics. i think it made a very big difference in terms of decision-making and reassurances. i wanted to make a couple of more personal observations. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> let me pose a series of questions to my friends on the panel. i would like to begin with one of my premises of the book.

it combines our presidents into two groups. sharedup who prioritized values between the united states and israel. a group that included truman, reagan, bush 43 and steve hadley. bill clinton. and then a group of presidents to what yousrael would call a competitive lens. almost a zero-sum lens between thisl and arab allies area includes eisenhower, neck and, bush 41. it seems that barack obama leans toward the latter group. where would you place him on this spectrum? >> the way that i described him

in the chapter is he is in many ways a hybrid. when it came to security, he was very clear that security was something he walled off. index i say we are checking politics at the door. i recall having meetings where he said whatever the differences are -- even within the administration he had a constituency that reflected what i call the traditional mindset of seeing israel through a more competitive lens but more collaborative. he tilted toward those with collaboration and partnership. a look at thessue palestinians as being strong. when it came to the peace issue, the instinct was the more competitive one. and it was driven by a sense

israel'show it was in best interest that understood the peace issue was headed toward a cliff. where china suggests in the chapter is that here the president needed to create a connection with the israelis and waited too long to do that. so in a sense he was a collaborationist. meaning he viewed israel for the partnership lens and found himself very strongly committed to israel, and yet when it came to the peace issue he saw himself there a different kind of lens. the previous presidents are you identified who consciously made a decision to distance. eisenhower for sure. if you read the chapter, the link to which he goes is extraordinary. he contemplates the use of

american forces against the israelis and when they requested arms throughout this period. iraq, the recommendation frequently was to the israelis that you should be a good neighbor to all of those around you who completely reject you. yearsin, the first two when he meets with golda marr he presented different picture but his actual posture, nixon believed the 1969 war was a defeat. this is someone who actually made the decision to suspend phantoms at the very moment that the soviets are sending military arsenal and military forces to egypt and he is doing it because he wants to reach out to nasser.

see nassercision to right after the decision to suspend. and the response that he gets is not the one he had hoped for. carter, and this is an with whatg contrast tom was saying about the notion of opportunity and a threat. it's interesting that carter pursues peace about a great fear if you do not achieve it. clinton pursues it because it is an opportunity and carter's instincts, when you read his diaries, his attitude toward israel comes get in a very tough-minded way. bush believes that you live up to commitments but does not look at israel as a special state. he thinks we have obligations but does not feel it is a special state. and i think obama does feel it

is a special state but is worried somehow that israel is not living up to those values. >> tom, what do you think about the spectrum and where the president is? >> three to four things. number one, the contours of the debate and policy approaches are changed dramatically. in certain assessments have been made but u.s. efforts which have been very different. changeduideposts have pretty genetically since then. and number two, the president made it clear that he has an absolute commitment to israel's indeed, if we were going to pursue a peace effort that was absolutely essential.

that israel cannot be expected to take the steps toward peace required absent the united states providing that clear assurance and to see it manifested concretely across a range of projects. theer three, i do think president feels a real emotional attachment to israel. i think it may have been a mistake not to travel to israel earlier in his term. to express that and have the israeli public see that think therenext, i really was a view that israel could do better. in terms of its process and there were disagreements on this. this is a complicated matter including politics.

we also have the competition of a week palestinian authority as well. iran loomed over this relationship. in that respect, and we expressed it quite clearly, a shared commitment to preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. the united states took an endorsement of time in exploring a full range of steps to pressure iran. that thetive is president came into office working with allies and friends. it was clear if we would have them along would have to make a bona fide effort to engage in diplomacy. but with the rest of the world if we did this bona fide effort to engage, they wouldn't or couldn't engage and we undertook one of the most under pressure campaigns in diplomacy.

it led to the negotiations. it was a comprehensive simultaneous set of pressures that included economic pressures but also a lot of other things. building up pressure to a substantial level where when we said we can implement that commitment. think that from the outset, president obama had a commitment to is really just a israel's -- a commitment to security. there were personality issues as well that were clear to anyone who has seen this. but he did through all that disagreements protect the security commitment. dennis's point is fair

that we probably should put more emphasis on interaction between president obama and the israeli public and political leadership. one of the things that you will recall. you asked me during the transition to write a memo on where the president's outreach speech to muslims should be. i made the case that it should and if it's cairo that he has to go to israel because if he doesn't, the outrage will be received by the israeli public. and he asked me to do a briefing , and i outlined where we stood and one of the conclusions that said isident drew -- he

draw two lessons from this, we should at put it in context and number two, should've gone to israel after the cairo speech. >> let me see the question of personality this way. sometimes the relationship gets between the leaders on the two sides. 43, who see the world in more or less the same way. sometimes you have that strategic convergence. figured out a way with netanyahu to reach a peace agreement. what was so different about that relationship then that wasn't in the relationship tween obama and netanyahu in which there was in retrospect no progress.

>> i think there are two distinct points that i would make. fair ist one, to be what i will call the more tactical one the personality and perspective one, arafat was prepared to do limited agreements. in the end, we were able to get there. after we did the have run accord , from the time that was 97,luded which was january we were involved in a period that was quite difficult and through that period, the relationship between the president and the prime minister was not easy at all. but the key difference was that clinton had a strong feeling that when you had differences

with israel it was better to keep them private. his perspective was, just to give you a sense of how difficult things were personally, bibi netanyahu came to the country and the president didn't see him or talk to him on the phone in her parked next which other in l.a.. not to was very careful be publicly saying things construed as being critical. the reason was clinton operated and said the u.s. was israel only real friend in the world. them privatekeep because he felt that israel's enemies would see that as encouragement and it would weaken israel's deterrent. president obama came in and he had a different perspective. i described this in the chapter, because he felt a genuinely strong commitment to israeli security, he felt that gave him

a license to be openly critical and he did believe that it could create some benefit for us and a time when we were reaching out to the muslims and he worried. i have a quote in the chapter where he says in a meeting have malcolm says to him if you want israel to take certain risks, they need to know you will be standing right next to them and he comes back and says to them, for eight years the bush admin straight allowed no dealing at all and look where we are. wasrew that lesson but it in a lot of ways a misplaced lesson. -- edward all marked almart drew --

i'm sotinct was, because good with security and because i mean it, that makes it easier for me to establish some distance and clinton's attitude was different. the view of the world was different. the view of israel and its place in the world was different. it didn't mean that president obama didn't feel that it was in israel's interest to the isolated but he also saw at times a benefit of being prepared to establish some difference when he felt that there were disagreements. i do think that the context was entirely different. wase minister netanyahu --ceeded by simone parish in receipted -- preceded.

right, succeeded by barack. the context was different. position in the middle east was entirely different. i think that's a fair point. barack succeeding netanyahu so moving toward camp david the politics were very different. it was much diminished. of the coalition that prime minister netanyahu at put together. it came in 1992. the kind of progress that president obama tried to make. i think that beating an

yahoo!'s govern -- bibi netanyahu's government was a narrow-based, right wing government. the government that bibi centershes in 1999 has a in it. the difference is, arafat is prepared to do limited deals between 1997 and 1999. in 2009, it is clearly the whole deal and not a limited deal. in every chapter, i showed the context. the context does affect choices. andinstincts of presidents their point of departure is very important in terms of the key assumptions they make about that context. >> let me ask you about the

context of no daylight and no prizes. back 60 years, the idea that it would be defined by no daylight and knows a prizes is otherworldly. the idea that truman and eisenhower are very far away from each other. last two decades, it has entered the lexicon. .s this a reasonable standard is it something that could be implemented? how would you execute that sort of approach? >> it is a principle that undergirds the relationship and it is and lamented a deep and consistent engagement. that is not to say you won't have differences, but i do think

it is a fair assumption to have. too.do, , andor thrust of the book i point out that tom is an exemplar of this. relationshipn the even on the issues where we have differences. the title of the book is called doomed to succeed. what binds us is much stronger than what divides us. the key is having those people in key positions who are perceived as the israelis as when they ask israel to do something, their understanding israel's predicament and doing it because there is a genuine leaf that what we asking is the right thing to do, not because

it will gain us something with the arabs. that is something i point out overtime. israelis to doe something difficult from them, they need to know where you're coming from. when you are perceived as genuinely having israel's best interest at heart, you are more likely to draw that response. going back to the first bush administration, we would constantly talk about what we would do and when we would do it. in complicated circumstances. i try to point out that having those kinds of relationships by senior people, it makes a big difference not only in terms of , andverall relationship

they had a very good example on an issue like iran where they have the same objectives, but often we might look to a different lens. distinction between, no daylight's and no surprises. if you manage it the right way you can have differences without daylight. -- and it to this is does not happen in diplomacy as much as you might think. to have a complete and thorough understanding of the other side's perspective. in-depth. but senior leaders take positions for a reason. is really critical in a relationship with her are summit

moving parts to understand it as well. that background i need to ask you about the iranian agreement and the new world in which the u.s.'s relationship is 14, with up until july the approval of the iran nuclear agreement, we were essentially partners with the israelis. we may have had disagreements but we were essentially partners. in a detailed agreement, to which the israelis not only are not partners, but are the humanly opposed -- then mentally opposed -- vehemently opposed. when he think of the relationship in dealing with the complex issue and the implications of the history ofund the region, what sort

new understandings or procedures or new approaches to the alliance do you think need to be put in place to manage this totally new and uncertain moment? tom, let me start with you. israelt is that, we and have a deep joint interest in the implementation. prevent iran will from acquiring nuclear weapons. implementations. it has to be the case that having a decade and a half of a roll back and freeze on the

iranian nuclear program has to be in the interest of the united states. implementation is critical. atre should be understanding what the consequences are of violations of the agreement and those are important among the between thealso united states and israel. third, the agreement is properly seen as transactional and focused on a nonproliferation security problem. given iranian behavior, some kind of transformational. which means that the united states needs to pursue in detail affectingsively iran's behavior and other aspects of it in the middle east.

it means that the united states needs to put in place in detail a set of deterrent steps to ensure that iran complies with the agreement and if it doesn't, that stays with the cost is going to be. the deterrent steps include our capabilities and declaratory possibilities. but also things like a much deep and set of relationships and assurance. david a start at the camp meeting where we need to work much harder with respect to the insurance is there including thinking hard about things like extended insurance. i think that the united states and israel would agree on all those things going forward. there is honestly been a disagreement between the united states and israel but i don't

think that negates the five or six points i laid out here. whatvery much agree with tom said and i would amplify it in the following ways. deal buys you 15 years, so the focus now should be, what can the united states and israel due to take advantage of those 15 years. see i would really like to emerge from the president's meeting with the prime minister is the ability to create a joint consultative committee. where we could focus very much on the kind of things that have to be done to enhance deterrence and bolster deterrence both at understandingran and that there is a firewall between iran moving.

and i would like to have the city the committee focus on the issue of implantation area in 2009 we had very extensive discussions on how to plug the holes on the sanctions regime in many of the suggestions we enacted on. that ifmaking sure there are any transitions -- transgressions that they are caught and we should have discussions about what they should be and what you do about it. the other thing that is very that israel is now facing what is a very different kind of threat in syria. the russians reduce their freedom of action. channels thatome we have aarti seen with israel complaining about it they said

the syrians have no interest and pooh-poohed that kind of threat from their. i would like to see a discussion ifween us and the israelis they crossed that redline with hezbollah, what is our position about that. if we have a revolutionary guard. if that becomes more of a threat what is our position. that is something the united states and israel should be talking about. allou think about it, we along have the same objective as a related to a ran -- to iran not having nuclear weapons. destabilizing weapons in the region need to be counted.

it happens to be our mutual interest and the cooperation council. if anything, there are more reasons to be working closely together, not fewer. conclude why the title was doomed to succeed, if anything, the relationship is bound to be closer in the coming years if you look at the region. the region -- the nature of conflict is over who defines and controls identity. nothing is more basic in terms of that. their problems are real, but to deal with their problems is israel. at a time when the region is unraveling. >> before i turn to your concerns some of

the headlines that emerge both from the book and op-ed's. that's for your own concern for the future and the white house where it has been written that with your departure there was an increase in the white house with suspicion about israel. but don'that we give get from the israelis. in this true strategic dialogue with counterparts in the israeli security establishment. i know this was a great complement that dennis paid to you. but i would appreciate your observations on the impact of their own departure. >> the principle impact is that i get a lot more sleep. service at the white house included morning briefings for the president.

so that is the principle impact. , therespect to israel principles that undergird the relationship come from the president and the president's axiomatic,ttom line, commitment to israel has no question. i think the united states has aired on that at all. my own approach was to have intensive engagement, not to set the political level but the professional level among the professional intelligence and defense counterparts in israel. letpproach was not to things fester, but to engage. if there seemed to be misunderstandings at the political level, to engage those and address them. as quickly as possible.

there obviously was a significant disagreement over the iran accord but as we described it here i think we now need to look at what we have in common. and tols that we share do these very specific things between israel and the united states to ensure implementation, deterrence, accountability. to take into account the changed circumstances to have more shared interests. with the russian reentry into the middle east it is complicated and dangerous. it is dangerous from a very practical perspective and that is that you have combat air operations every day in a very thel space rife with

possibility of mistakes and accidents. i know we are having conversations with the russians but this also affects israel with respect to the threats it has from syria as well. i think the core fundamentals remain in place and those emanate from the president terry >> had a lot of experience before he came into this administration and brought that >> i wasn'tto trying to single anybody out although obvious that there was an interpretation that i was but what i was doing was highlighting the contrast between tom and his successful approach to dealing with the israelis including on the

i wanted to highlight the mindset that is as on the part of some mindset that is a very traditional one. it is not unique to this administration and it has been in every administration from truman until today and what i want to highlight in the book is that perspective that sees if you don't partner with israel, somehow you are better off and it is one that i try to show analytically and repeatedly doesn't serve your interests with the arabs. it doesn't benefit you there and it makes the israelis more suspicious and the very behavior is something that we don't want is the unease that the israelis will act unilaterally. the israelis have many more thets about you and about

nature of your readiness to work with them and what is striving you in the nation. embodied was an exemplar of how the most senior officials ought to be working with the israeli counterparts in the irony that i show is it also pays off in terms of the israelis affecting those haters you would prefer to see. >> lastly, this book is titled doomed to succeed. when you look at american politics and changes in american attitudes and changes in the middle east, is the relationship doomed to succeed? >> if you look at the fundamentals, yes. interest deep shared and share strategic goals. but there are political

circumstances which drive the relationship in different directions. there are personalities that come into play as well also with the history of the relationship. i do think that it was of late, way, driveo, in any the debate over iran into a partisan place. because one thing that has been consistent over the decades that dennis described is a bipartisan commitment to u.s. israeli relationships. thatw some damage to through the way the debate unfolded on the iran agreement. that should be corrected going forward, and i think we have an opportunity on november 9 to do that. >> there are a number of suggestions i make about where we go from here and one of those

suggestions is to reinforce what is been the key underpinning of this relationship. been an american issue not a republican or democratic. historically we've see can they take some swings. 11% -- 11% bush got of the jewish vote in that election and at the time we saw there was an effort on the part of democrats to exploit that now effort on the part of republicans to exploit it. when you do that, it is clear you have a political interest related to a party in mind but you don't have the israeli-u.s. interest in mind. and if you want this relationship to stay on solid footing has to be on a nonpartisan basis.

obama knowing president personally, he is a fiercely analytical person, as you know. the arguments that he makes on these issues, and the discussions on the peace process and those things he has are from two points. commitment coming from a deep consideration of the analytics and the facts. excellent point on which to end our conversation. the mics are right above you such a stand up and ask. >> fascinating conversation.

just to pick up on these last statements about how much you separate the overlay of the relationship between common strategic objectives and a -- going forward. he's quoted going forward in the wall street journal saying, israel was not informed about the talks. it was really a turning point in the u.s. relationship with iran. do you think that was a mistake? going forward, does that same distrust of netanyahu -- it's a common strategic objective. despite what dennis said about a common consulting group, you say the more i share with the israelis, who knows if it will be used to unravel the iran deal.

you could say the more they feel a part of it, the more they will be embedded and committed. but you could see that argument going forward that says, in the last year of obama, -- i'm not talking about hezbollah, but on iran nuclear implantation, i want to keep them at a certain distance because i am not sure where the prime minister is that. i want to encourage you to look back and look forward on these examples. and do you have some second thoughts on what happened in the past? >> with respect to moving it is in the interest of united states in my judgment to have the kind of consultancy group described to have an accurate, fact-based, solid,

analytical implementation. it should be the platform on which we continue to talk. that is my strong view in the think it should be done at the professional services level, as well as the political level. both countries, the political services are quite professional. they give their leaders the best analytical advice and instead of a common view, with respect to whether or not iran is complying or not or how bad the noncompliance is, to have these joint consultative allegiances. day they dof the have to look to their analytical teams to give them the information on which they might base serious decisions, with

respect to actions that they might or might not take. with respect to the negotiations, the line that was need and thet we united states needed to ensure that this would be held. once there was, we would certainly brief and engage with the israeli government on the substance. but was it real? because talksw, between the united states and iran -- it was absolutely incumbent on us to make sure the people we were talking to work authorized, that this was a real conversation, authorized not

just by the state government but with the authority of the supreme leader. prior to that, and prior to testing that, which we did with a lot of interactions, we kept it as a private channel. that,e line after substantive negotiations, the united states engaged in deep, consistent, and intense briefings and information sessions with the israeli government, including getting reaction with respect to positions that we might take in the negotiations. it wasfirst instance, important for us to test whether or not this was real. was it authorized. was it going to go anywhere? did the people reaching out have the kind of authorization, not

just from the governmental entities, but also from the supreme leader. ? having an extended conversation without substance by someone who may have been authorized by someone in the foreign ministry, with the supreme leader stacking -- stepping back and having complete deniability, would not have been a inductive path. that is a little bit of an insight into the mindset. >> peter, in the middle. the last year of a two-term administration can be a time of reduced energy and an opportunity to get things done and get difficult issues off the table in advance of the successor coming in. we have heard about the consultative idea.

are there other issues or problems that could be addressed in the waning days of the obama administration given the facts on the ground in the context of the relationship. things that we have not talked about that might be good to get off the table? letterpresident, in his to congressman nadler, made a commitment to finalizing the mo nice for the be next administration to inherit the same 10 year mo you. that would be a very good one to get off the table. , on the peace issue, that the approach of the administration is going to be rooted in what i call what's possible? it would be a big mistake to

adopt a posture that our choices are do nothing or solve the whole thing. nothing, you create vacuums. so if we are going to be doing something, we take a practical approach. we focus on how you restore calm. begin to try to restore believe between the two there is a level of disbelief that is so problematic. the fourth thing is we need to think about whether or not you can bring the arabs into this. all the other demands on the region, the palestinians are at a point where they are at such a weakness on their own, they have an umbrella where they might be able to do something, but certainly they might be able -- for israel to do something

without getting something from the arabs, might be minimal. there has to be at least a practical effort on this and i hope the administration will adopt a practical approach. one is that we should work to the next iteration of the defense understandings with the israelis. i am glad that dennis raced an issue of interim or partial steps versus trying to solve the whole problem. binary choice, at least the disengagement by the united states. the history is when the united states is disengaged things go in a negative direction. a set of ideas around the

to build horizon confidence and to show joint interest in continued calm and cooperation would be an important step. to have the mechanisms in place at the initial implementation -- we, which could take are in the beginning of november, this could take another 10 months to put this in place. concrete a number of things left to do and having that in place and the oversight mechanisms up and running is important for the administration to finish. next, i do think that the united states needs to develop and

articulate a comprehensive anti-isis strategy and implement the next phase of that and be done so and taken some concrete steps and i think int the effort underway northern syria is an important kind of step to break the that isisof success has. this is the recruiting tool that this organization has. took on the leaders of the region and the rest of the world successfully and it needs to be broken. if at all possible to work through a political next step. and i said in my earlier remarks that it is important to put in place the kind of reassurance that we need to have with the gulf council state. >> clearly we need to have a

strategy on syria. now is that if we are carrying out more attacks, which do make sense at one level, and the russians are attacking non-isis everywhere else, we run a grave risk of undercutting the thing we most want. one of the ways that you destroy the isis narrative is by having them be seen as on successful but they cannot appear to be the only ones protecting sunnis. there is a parallel where we are hitting isis and they are heading the non-isis sunni opposition, we run the risk that in a sense, we may add to their appeal. if you want the sunni to be part of the effort to discredit them, we need a better strategy for

syria then we have today. >> is its fair to say that neither of you think the last year of the obama administration will witness a major push to settle the conflict going from the white house? >> that last will fire is important. an enormous appetite within the white house to do a major push area but i don't want that lack of appetite to translate into it doing nothing. i worry that if you create a notry choice, the instinct to do a big push translates to doing nothing. i think at the state department there is a different instinct to be active and the key is to be active in the right way. what we don't need are more don't initiatives area we need failed initiatives between the israelis and palestinians

because there is already too high a level of disbelief. but we need to look more successful. one of the examples that i cite in the book, there are all these different echoes that you find from earlier periods. in 1969 thatcribes every single leader from an american friend in the region and every single arab friend sends a message to president nixon, in which they are basically saying, look, the radicals are on the rise. they are shifting the balance of power against your friends and you are being passive in the face of this. interestingly enough, the one thing that began to change things for us was the aftermath of black september. when the syrian sent 300 tanks

into jordan and they are getting them to mobilize them in the global heights. it doesn't commit the syrian air force and the jordanians are able to expel them and it looks like an american friend just did ok. but we need a manifestation of that right now and you get a disproportionate payoff. initiativeh a failed or let your fear of failure prevent you from doing something. >> the administration has a lot of things to do between now and the end of the term. in the middle east and elsewhere in the world. it is confronting in the middle east that dennis alluded to, the breakdown of the arab state. we have seen the reemergence of great power, competition, and disagreement. we have seen one of the great

powers move to a place of active hostility am a in terms of the russians. agente a lot to finish an -- asia. initiative a major it will be an assessment of what is possible between now and the end of the year. but dennis is exactly right. sure this is not where secretary kerry is, but it disengagement will lead to a vacuum and a worse situation facing the next president of the united states. when you get beyond this binary structure that we are in in the middle east and israeli palestinian context. >> susan gelman. >> congratulations on the publication of your new book. i want to ask you want to push it a little bit given the timing

of this convening. [inaudible] osloi mentioned is is dead? what will it take to revive it? talking about interim steps, or baby steps. there is a bigger picture that he was no longer bound by oslo in march. where areo 3000 feet, we in terms of the framework of having a substantive discussion. it doesn't feel like there is much will on either side right now. thanks, suzy.

i would say the following. the structure of oslo still exists. say that he is not bound by it but it does not mean he is not implementing on the issue of security cooperation. it goes on now. standpoint, they are still transferring revenues that they are collecting. you still have the designated areas of a, b, c. you don't have an active peace process right now, what you have instead is something that is a wave of terror violence. it isn't organize the way that it was. thosebeing carried out by who are 15 to 25-year-olds. it is being driven by consignment and social media.

love the videos go viral and a youngthe result after palestinian stabs and israeli and that palestinian is killed. they don't show the stabbing they show only the result. narrativehis false that israel is trying to do to hamas where -- it is completely untrue and you have an agreement that we contributed to. it is going to put cameras on a 20 47 basis as a way of showing that the status quo is not being changed and i would like to see more done in that regard in terms of spelling out again what the status quo is, repeating this over and over getting king abdulla and abu mazen technology what the reality is and to stop

taking on at now life of its own. because it is not organized it is the good and the bad news. because it is not organized it is hard to bring it to an end. so we have to find a way to calm things down. secondly, at the end of your comment you said, anyone who thinks a binational state is a otheription for anything than what you are seeing right now should look again in the mirror. there is no place in the middle east where there is more than one identity that is at peace. there is the worst form of bloodletting. the idea that a one state

outcome is anything other than a prescription for and during war is --for enduring more enduring war is an illusion. if you are a believer in the jewish chronic state, you need a two state outcome. i don't see how you produce it right now. on the palestinian side i don't see the capacity to make decisions. to bringk you'll have them into this. you have to create a context in the context is a change in reality on the ground. we start by creating calm. on all three sides they have been able to restore enthusiasm

for this idea. one of the problems that we face is, very few people in israel believe that the palestinians accept a two-state outcome. very few palestinians believe acceptraelis will ever an independent palestinian state. you need to conduct an approach where each side begins to take steps, maybe in response to us that demonstrate when we say -- the prime minister of israel said he is for two states for two peoples. it would be good to see actions that reflect that. one way to show it would be to declare, i will not build outside the box. i will not build in what would be a palestinian state. the border has to be negotiated at some point, but this is my demonstration that israel believes in two states for two

peoples. it would be nice on the palestinian side that would be a nice thing. that -- you don't want is a jewish state at least say two states for two peoples. is such ae that there thing as two states for two peoples. said one reason it is so hard for the palestinians to acknowledge, they don't want to acknowledgment the jews are a people and are entitled to a state. one way to demonstrate there is a commitment is for each side to take those actions that would do that. begin doing that, it will not transform things overnight but begins to be the basis to take a second look. if we were guided by a strategy designed to transform the situation so what is it possible

today can become possible tomorrow, that is something we would think. agreement or peace negotiation will be based on the structures. lots of practical things that go on or under the structures today. the second point is a question. path toward anhe alternate agreement. it's an important question to ask, why did it take the u.s. secretary to go to a monde for there to be concrete steps taken to reassure on both sides. why is that? >> it shouldn't. that is an important conversation for us to have with both sides. now,ven the climate right

even though there is the capacity to communicate directly, sometimes each side meets the excuse that the united states provides. now, it is a kind of umbrella for communication to take place. it is a reminder that we do have a role to play but we have to structure our role in a way that has a chance to succeed. in front. ask in light of prime minister netanyahu and the ,itter debate of the iran deal what do you make of [inaudible] in trying to heal the wounds that would have been created? >> what matters is what he says

and not where he says it. so i hope that the prime minister will take account of this has been a very partisan issue and should the area i hope he reaches out in a way that is unmistakable, to democrats and republicans alike emphasizing the nonpartisan nature of their relationship. i would expect that this meeting will go well. i think the prime minister has an interest in having it go well and the president. do i think that in the aftermath of this they will be as close as friends? that the chemistry will be perfect? no. i think they have different worldviews but they do recognize the points of convergence and the common niche right now and both have an interest in elevating that at this point. and again, it comes back to think about those things that

bind us and particularly on the issue that divided us. one of the things that we used to always say even when there are points of disagreement, we knew that our objectives were the same. the tactics might not always be the same but the objectives are the same. there is an agreement that will be implemented. the critical question is, how will it be implemented. there is a certainty and he 's mind that ifn they transgress there will be a price. the key done the road is when there are no longer limitations that they understand there are thresholds that if they cross it produces a price they don't want to pay. >> it depends on what the prime minister says. there is a constructive conversation to be had here. you have an agreement put in

place with the support of virtually the entire international community and and limitation accountability and deterrence should be the topic of discussion. >> very professional. that is what the topics of discussion should be. ladies and gentlemen, please try me and thinking them for a fascinating discussion. [applause] get them while they are here. thank you for being with us. touchy business being the son or daughter of a dictator. you would not wish this life on most people so it is a collection of interesting and sometimes lurid stories. but there are points about tyranny and sun ship, daughter

s, even democracy. "q&a," the author on his book "children of monsters." mussolini, maon, zedong, and saddam hussein. >> i was able to talk to knowledgeable people but i could not talk to any family members. which is usually the case. there are only some of the around and only so many willing to say what they know at all. i was digging around for any scrap that i possibly could daughtersese sons and -- some of them are famous and important. most of them are footnotes and asides. you really have to dig to find out about them. >> tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern and pacific on c-span's "q&a." weekly address

president obama outlines his plans for reforming the criminal justice system. lisa murkowski has the republican response. she talks about u.s. energy policy. are 2.2ama: today there million people behind bars in america and millions more on parole or probation. every year we spend $80 billion in taxpayer dollars to keep people incarcerated. many are nonviolent offenders. i believe that we can disrupt the pipeline from underfunded schools to overcrowded jails. i believe we can addressed the disparate -- disparities and i believe we can help those who have served their time and earned a second chance to get the support they need to become productive members of society. that's why, over the course of this year i have been talking to

folks run the country about reforming our criminal justice system. february i sat down with oval officers and police officers from across the country. in the spring i met with police officers and young people where they are using community policing and data to drive down crime. i visited a prison in oklahoma to talk with inmates and correctional officers about rehabilitating prisoners. visited west, i virginia to meet with families telling prescription drug and heroine abuse as well as people working on new treatments for rehabilitation. last week, i traveled to chicago to thank police chiefs across the country for all that they do to protect americans. to make sure they get the resources they need to get the job study -- jobs done. ofknow that having millions

people in the criminal justice system without any ability to find a job after release is unsustainable. it is bad for communities and our economy. so on monday i will travel to newark, new jersey to find ways to help americans who have paid their debt to society to reintegrate back into their communities. working with people in both parties to get criminal justice reform bills to my desk, including a bipartisan bill that would reduce mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders and reward prisoners with shorter sentences that reward them if they are less likely to commit a repeat offense. it is not about holiday. it is about whether we as a nation live up to our founding ideal of liberty and justice for all. living together, we can

make sure that we do. have a great weekend and a safe and happy halloween. >> i am lisa murkowski. i am honored to represent alaska in the u.s. senate. it has been a good week in congress with the house of the present lives welcoming a new speaker and the senate passing a major bill to protect our nations cyber security. what i want to talk about today is another key national security issue. energy. i want to highlight what is happening in my home state because it foreshadows challenges to come across the nation. since taking office, the obama administration has repeatedly denied alaska the best opportunities to produce energy for our nation and the world. this block production and half of our petroleum deserve which was specifically designated for

energy development. it is locking away the non-wilderness portion of and mark where an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil could be produced from just 2000 acres. constantly shifting regulatory environment recently forced a company to abandon seven years of work and $7 billion in investments. instead of recognizing that as a significant loss, the administration doubled down by canceling offshore sales in the region. all of these decisions and ignore the will of hard-working alaskans who overwhelmingly support new production. the administration is opening the door for a rainy and oil production but closing it on alaskan oil. while the consequences are not yet evident, they will be. these decisions mean fewer jobs and more of our dollars going overseas. they threaten the safe operation

pipeline, aatlantic national security asset that is just one third full. it is only a matter of time until the administration applies this shortsighted strategy to the rest of our nation. we need to open the areas where it is most cost-effective, we to modernize policies and open the market and we need to avoid overly burdensome regulations. unfortunately, the administration is charting a different course. the epa and other industries are issuing a barrage of regulations that will have limited environmental benefit but will absolutely reduce our ability to have a benefit here at home. the new standards will provide little in the way of health benefits while costing billions to comply. the climate regulations will plants, andr

threatening the ability of our grid. and the waters of the united allowing the epa to regulate even drainage ditches. there is a better path. there is no reason why our energy policy should be so divisive as white i am working bipartisans legislation that will keep the policy affordable as it becomes cleaner and cleaner area to give you one promising example those of us on the energy committee are working on a broad bill that will invest in critical infrastructure and boost our energy trade. it passed out of our committee with a strong bipartisan vote. we also gathered bipartisan

support to end the outdated been untrue oil exports. hope that president obama will work with congress on policies like these that can draw bipartisan support. that is the best way to help states like alaska and it is the best way to protect our future, security, and our environment. >> next, a house hearing on port safety. live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on washington journal. brady, asmakers, kevin member of the ways and means committee talks about his interest in replacing paul ryan as chair of the committee. 10:00 a.m.today at and 6 p.m. eastern on c-span.

being baby-like does not require silence. job, orld my husband's yours prevent us from being ourselves. i do not believe that being first lady should prevent me from expressing my ideas. [applause] [applause] mind,ty ford spoke her was pro-choice, and a supporter of the equal rights amendment. she and president gerald ford openly discussed her battle with breast cancer. she struggled with alcohol and drug dependency. betty ford this sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on first ladies. influence and image down -- examining the public and private

lives of the women who fill the position of first lady. from martha washington to michelle obama. so that it :00 p.m. eastern on c-span three. >> now, security and transportation officials testify at a hearing on port safety. the associated press recently reported that the fbi had transport -- invented for attempts to transport radioactive material to terrorist groups. this is just under 2.5 hours. >> good morning, the

subcommittee will come to order. myant to indicate displeasure at the lack of response from the secretary of homeland security regarding a letter i sent for this hearing asking for information related to today and what we will talk about. i specifically asked about the number of containers inspected prior to arrival at a u.s. port, the percentage inspected after the arrival, the different criteria used to determine the screening. so i asked them how many containers do you screen? how do you screen them or scan them? you would think they would have those numbers in front of them. their efforts to meet the 100% container scanning requirement. is information requested relevant to today's hearings and the department should have been able to provide a response within a three-week leadtime, roughly the same amount of time taken to develop the testimony

we were here today area are any of you aware of the status of the secretary's response to my letter. the letterre that has cleared the agency and is waiting for final approval at the department level. >> yes i haveers? the numbers for today. >> let me say one less thing. we will not hear from anybody from south, or north,. because they refused to send witnesses from southcom or north com. i'm not sure if that was them saying this is a home in security issue only, worth it did not care enough to send somebody.

the subcommittee is meeting to discuss the implication of a dirty bomb. there are measures that can be taken to deter, detect, and interject -- interdict a security threat. with 95,000tates miles of open shoreline number three heard 60 ports across the country. uniqueitime border is due to its sheer size and the potential is a moving large quantities of materials undetected. understanding the pathways used by smugglers is a critical part of the process. pathways used for drugs today could be used to bring in anything.

if you can carry thousands of pounds of something, you can carry thousands of pounds of anything else. 9/11, security measures were enacted to better protect our homeland by expanding efforts to detect threats overseas. it's much better to find things not on u.s. shorelines. these cargo containers were loaded onto a u.s. bound ship. knowing where the ship and its cargo have been before in the vessel has seen it prevented entry into the u.s. port. we'll see how they provide the whole of government later including law enforcement, technology and intelligence to detect it and enter potential threats. these internal measures are combined with cds to conduct cooperative enforcement efforts

overseas. in early october the associated press reported on the fbi and eastern authorities efforts to disrupt attempts by criminal gangs which tech did ties to sell cesium. it is not the most dangerous stuff but it is still bad stuff. to desire of our adversaries materials for a nuclear weapon are growing. the iranian deal, no matter what you think about it one way or another and the reaction the other countries will have to iran having nuclear facilities is there will be more nuclear material on the market. years youext 10 to 25 will have more countries with more nuclear capability and we

have probably ever seen in the world and i think that is one of the reasons we will start the series of hearings because the interdiction efforts will be paramount. that is the only line of defense not just the first line of defense. it's concerning the united states whole government approach does not have foreign policies. whereheading to a path our adversaries will have greater access to nuclear material. it is important to be aware of how foreign policies may completely disrupt enforcement measures to keep our country safe. chairman, thank you very much for the hearing. when you first notice it i was saying wait a minute, i have been here. a national we did

meeting on natural disaster insurance. included on the three things we was hurricane up the east coast. and terrorism. a dirty bomb at the port of long beach. a study a really wanted to get in time for this. in any case this is a subject we need to pay attention to. nuclear dirty bombs arriving at a u.s. port is sobering. in 2005 one wes did that national review of disaster insurance. it is now a primary focus involving multiple federal

agencies including the u.s. coast guard. by most accounts it would a clear -- it would appear that the detection and activities implemented to fulfill the strategy seem to be meeting the challenge of keeping radiological or other threats outside the u.s. homeland. something want to be grateful for and i appreciate made byause the effort thousands of federal employees every day to protect us and it would cannot let our guard down. smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the country and shipping containers, it may be low, but the consequences would be catastrophic. that is what we learned in 2005. because the risks are potentially catastrophic, we must do everything possible to make sure it doesn't happen.

adequately testing and validating our technologies? procedures and training to make sure that they remain relevant given the current threats and circumstances. second, are we making sure today that we will have the technologies and capabilities to quickly and effectively respond to such an attack area i know on the insurance i the answer in 2005 was no and today i'm sure it is also no. considering that a future terrorist maybe homegrown are we doing everything we can to track as theitor within you trade makes sure vessels operating in u.s. to mystic are not a potential conduit for those seeking -- i would be interested in hearing.

thank you for the panels and i am looking forward to the testimony. >> i will introduce everybody really quick. where the coast guard's assistant commandant for policy. and the department of homeland security's director of detection office. the assistant commissioner for the office of field operations for customs and border protection, and mr. david moore the united states director of law enforcement issues for homeland security and justice. >> thank you and good morning chairman hunter and distinguished members of the subcommittee. i am honored to be here today to discuss the coast guard's role in response to the arrival of a radiological dispersion of a dirty bomb into a u.s. port.

thank you to the coast guard and our men and women in uniform. it is a pleasure to be here today and a domestic nuclear detection office. the nation is safer in no small part through the partnerships we have to these organizations and i would like to personally thank the doctor and commissioner owen for their ongoing support and leadership. my complete statement has been provided and i ask that it be entered into the record. the coast guard pushes border and port security well beyond the nations shoreline by fostering strategic relationships with partner nations to detect threats as early and as far from u.s. short as possible in order to prevent an attack on the homeland. it begins overseas with robust international partnerships that

provide access to maritime ports of origin. performs guard overseas port assessments to confirm that foreign trading partners meet international standards for security and antiterrorism. since inception of this program to visit more than 150 countries and port facilities. the counter these threats in the offshore region and the coast guard maintains more than 40 bilateral law enforcement agreements and 11 initiatives for psi and ship boarding agreements which allow coast guard teams to board vessels suggested of caring illicit amounts of materials for mass destruction far from shore. the coast guard membership within the intelligence immunity provides global awareness for various areas including the cia,

national intelligence and others. through the maritime transportation security act we provide inspections for maritime facilities and vessels in this reduces the vulnerability to terror attacks in and around our ports. it also brings mobility to our protection regime with the ability to deliver protection abilities anywhere in the maritime domain. their examinations and law enforcement boardings every day. vices toy detection alert the users to the presence of radiation. developed the protection program and have since maintain a close relationship. national capacity for protection with multiple levels of capability, including the ability to reach back to scientific experts for more

information. we do this in conjunction with -- many of our units, our ,eployable specialized forces and major cutters are equipped with these devices that can thatify specific isotopes can reach back to interagency efforts for assistance. specifically the maritime security response team provides unique maritime capabilities for nuclear and radiological detection, and to vacation, self decontamination. the ms rt is specifically designed in exercised to integrate with other agencies or dod response forces. at the national level, the coast ships, cruise and passenger information for what

they call an and away. screenedthat process over 124,000 notices of arrival and over 32 million crew and passenger records. the coast guard response to a dirty bomb threat would be part of a coordinated interagency effort to bring the most capable and appropriate resources to bear. it is suspected origin a fight port, the.s. interagency threat response protocol or motor would be employed to achieve the best solution. with that come a thank you. >> good morning chairman hunter and distinguished members of the subcommittee. thank you for the invitation to testify with my

colleagues areas on our efforts to prevent and respond to the introduction of a dirty bomb into the maritime port. an attack would have profound and prolonged impacts to our nation and the world. at the advanced nuclear detection office we have a singular focus, defending nuclear -- preventing nuclear terrorism. it takes a whole enterprise approach and so with the liberty was established as an interagency office. in both our nuclear detection and forensic emissions we work closely with our several states, local and international orders. my testimony today focuses on their work to strengthen the operational readiness of our maritime partners to detect radioactive materials. we are responsible for the

domestic implementation of the architecture. detecting,mework for analyzing and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. the tendency can be to place great focus on the technology alone but it is more effective to introduce law enforcement and technical capabilities to improve it. indeed our collie captured it well saying detection technology is an important part of the overall effort to keep a nuclear device out of the u.s. but is not the only one. he said if the u.s. ever has to the on the monitor to stop smuggling of a nuclear device a lot of things have already gone wrong. it means the intelligence community missed it, our allies missed it, risk-based screening missed it and nonproliferation programs failed.

keeping his words in mind, our strategy is to provide effective technology to law enforcement as they conduct intelligence driven operations. multilayermenting a approach it is our objective to make nuclear terrorism of vehicle -- a difficult vehicle for the adversary. overseas relying largely on foreign partners that own national detection programs. the work closely with the agency and multilateral partners to develop best practices and training. interdictedbe before they arrive at our shores. the approach continues at our borders. along our land and maritime quarters and within the united states.

indio has also acquired detection systems for the coast guard and border protection to scan small vessels before they reach our shores. the incoming time provides cargo -- cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. capacityoperational across the state and local enterprise is critical. so we're descriptively working with security committees sharing information and intelligence, assisting with the law adjudication, and providing technical support. attack or the interdiction of a nuclear -- nuclear threat, they will need action a son sound evidence. , support thosecs determinations.

-- dndo works -- the united states remains committed to holding fully accountable any terrorist group that supports efforts to maintain or use efforts of mass destruction. we will continue to work with our partners to counter nuclear terrorism and improve our overall collaboration. we sincerely appreciate the committee's support of our efforts. the opportunity to be here today and i look forward to your question. >> my next witnesses mr. todd 01. your recognized. >> good morning. hunter and esteemed members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the role of u.s. customs and border detection on preventing and responding to a radioactive effort and an important responsibility with -- we share with our partners today. we work closely with the domestic and international partners to protect the nation from a variety of dynamic threats including those posed by cargo arriving at our air, land, and seaports. i served as the director of field operations at the los angeles long beach seaport and serves time as the director is possible for all of the security programs. i know firsthand how complex the cargo security operations are and how valuable the partnerships are to national security. since the september 11 attacks that have establish secure partnerships and invested in , allced technology

essential elements of our multilayered approach to protecting us from element such as a dirty bomb. there are several key programs that enhance our ability to assess cargo for risk and increase the security of the supply chain. i would like to highlight a few of these efforts today. since 2002 we have received advance information on every cargo ship vessel and crewmen before they arrive. this information and been received one of four hours prior to laying in cargo at the seaport. this information is run through the targeting system which will compare the data against multiple law enforcement and trade databases. those shipments identified as high risk will be identified. they may be examined overseas before being laden onto the

vessel heading for the united states as part of the security initiative. places u.s. officers and 64 and seaports and 35 countries around the world. these overseas officers have the ability to reach 80% of the maritime cargo headed to the united states. all overseas examinations are performed at the assistance of our host country counterparts. scanning for radiation as well as subjecting the shipment to a nonintrusive inspection. x-ray origh-energy gamma race to look in for anomalies that may be of concern. in 2014 we performed over 124,000 overseas examinations of cargo before it was placed on a vessel destined for the united states. if the exam is not performed overseas, the shipment will be

inspected upon arrival at a u.s. port of entry. they also deploy the same large-scale not improve -- nonintrusive inspection systems to quickly examine cargo for the presence of anomalies which may indicate a threat. those containers are physically searched that warehouse is located in the seaport. lastly, every shipment leaving the seaport is scanned for radiation and has been since 2010. there are over a hundred 20 radiation detection monitors at our border crossing allowing for nearly 100% radiation screening. >> you just said 100% of cargo? leaving u.s. ports >> yes, sir. 1280 radiation monitors allow us to scan the containers and passenger vehicles arriving from canada and mexico well --

as well as shipments in the mail. most americans are unaware of this critically important security measure in place at u.s. ports throughout the country. the detection technology and partnerships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival of a dangerous weapon like a dirty bomb. but however if such an event were to occur we have a contingency plan in standard processes to ensure coordinated and effective response. trainedonnel are insecure, isolate and notify protocols. cvp sciences has a tele-friends ask center in northern virginia that will confirm with the department of energy and when necessary refer it to the fbi. thank you for the opportunity to

testify and i'm here to answer your questions. >> our last witnesses mr. david moore. director of law enforcement issues for homeland security. your recognized. >> good morning chairman hunter and other members of the staff. i am pleased to be here to efforts to prevent a dirty bomb on the port. smuggling a nuclear device into the u.s. is understandably and deservedly a top national priority and as we heard from other witnesses there is a wide array of programs and activities to help address and mitigate the threat. my statement today focuses on one key aspect of this larger effort. the covert operations to detect and interdict the smuggling of new materials into the u.s.. over the years they have

invested billions. l equip and train dhs arson and how to use this personality -- technology. period,ecent five-year we spent $1 million with covert testing which covered all types of covert testing not just nuclear and radiological. it is important to give them credit because through much of that period and much of the present day they were only required to do a single test per year. they took it upon themselves to do more than that roughly two dozen per year. while they did more than required it meant they could not test every port of entry. in the covert basically, this is a real-world test of the personnel using the equipment. we found that the testing

provided basic uses. specifically, the number of toert tests was not specific make a generalized assessment of all u.s. ports of entry. at 86nducted covert tests of the locations where testing could have been done. in addition, the decision on whether locations -- and which locations to test were not based on risk assessment. 31% of the tests were done it fixed locations. we recommend they use a risk form approach to tell whether and where to do the tests. we are in the process of doing just that. we also reviewed what they did with the result