provided basic uses. specifically, the number of toert tests was not specific make a generalized assessment of all u.s. ports of entry. at 86nducted covert tests of the locations where testing could have been done. in addition, the decision on whether locations -- and which locations to test were not based on risk assessment. 31% of the tests were done it fixed locations. we recommend they use a risk form approach to tell whether and where to do the tests. we are in the process of doing just that. we also reviewed what they did with the result of their coverts

tests. these tests found problems with officer noncompliance with policy, equipment failures, an officer error due to lack of training. we followed up on systemic corrective make sure actions were taken. they did not consistently track to fix problems. we recommended that they do so, and they have actions underway to do that. mr. chairman, in some respects our findings mirror some of the themes we have seen over the past several years. in general, the u.s. has made significant process combating smuggling. we made great strides to sense 1998 when the u.s. began deploying radiation detection equipment. at the same time, many of these programs should of been implemented better. sometimes fail to assess whether the programs are working as intended.

agencies rushed to deploy technologies before they were ready. over the years, other agencies that implemented recommendations to address these problems. result, they strengthened their programs. looking ahead, other agencies face some tough decisions. the multilayered federal effort is complex and vital to our security and certainly not inexpensive. adapt,r agencies upgrade, and replaced it meant and enhance their capabilities, we will be there to provide congress independent oversight of this critically important omission. mr. chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. recognize members for questions. tookre satisfied that cbp into account what you found and they are making corrective action? >> yes, they took our findings

very seriously. toy put together a team address those recommendations and had actions underway. we are not all the way yet, but they have taken actions. >> let's start with the questions from my letter, with the numbers. what is the percentage of shipping containers inspected prior to arrival in the u.s. port? >> every container is assessed for risk. 124,000 of those were inspected overseas. >> that everything is analyzed and screened? depending entirely defined screening, there was confusion as to how those terms are used, we do look at the advanced data we see in terms of the manifest, and from the importer in terms of security filing. we compare that data to what we

have in our databases in terms of our automated targeting system. certainse reviews, containers will rise to the top causing us greater concern. those highest risk containers of the want to look at. >> what happens, they scan everything? made in san diego, those systems, but they have the system set up. manyat is correct, countries have employed radiation scanning equipment similar to what we have in the united states. the scanning is very doable from a technology standpoint. the challenge becomes the x-ray imaging of the containers, whether it is a high-energy or low energy system, it still takes human intervention to analyze the results of that scan. you have a radiation little monitor that will tell you if there is a source emanating from the container.

you then have to take it the second step of the x-ray technology see what is inside. that is the part of the process that slows things down. most countries use a risk lookach like we do in only at those highest areas of concern. >> what percentage are inspected after they get here? percentagehen what when it hit u.s. ports? top ofs about 2.7% on the 1%. we look at 3.7% overall in the maritime arena. down?t's a next level it's whatt level down we will inspect here in the u.s. seaports. again, that is in the maritime environment. the rates are approximately 28% on the mexican border. that is because of the narcotics threat.

you use the risk-based assessment, are there any ports in particular -- like mr. morris is said, when you were doing your own testing, did you not use your own risk-based approach? number one is, containers will be examined at whatever seaports they come into. a lot of that is determined on the shipping patterns. you will see those. findings were specific to the tests that we do ourselves. more on thoses ports that of finding that type of device as opposed to a more universal approach. we've taken those findings into building a new risk matrix that will allow operational testing to have a more likelihood of finding those types of containers. however, we will inspect high

risk containers whatever they enter. --"et me just get this 2007, 100%ven -- in of cargo would be inspected. so what happened was everyone said that is impossible, there was no way to do that? >> what happened was between 2007 and 2010 we ran some pilots around the world. honduras, korea, hong kong, and others, from those pilots, we were able to identify and clearly document all sorts of challenges from the technology, religious tickle in, the effect on the efficiencies, things down to whether -- weather. through our pilot, we were able to catalog all the challenges we have found. from that time, we did not move

forward in pursuing that further. since then, the department has reengaged it is now taking a look at what can be done from when these pilots last ended in terms of the technology available in relationship to those countries, and understanding what's technology now present in other locations. throughout these pilots we learned that it is something radiation screening that is troublesome, it is the x-raying of these containers. that requires both aspects, 100% scanning and screening. that becomes a troublesome piece. >> everyone's benefit, the next panel are a bunch of smart people who can tell us what can be seen, and what cannot be seen and as far as they can go. foress, that answers enough now. one last question, if something

did happen, and this is a general homeland security type of question, but if something did happen, can the coast guard talk to everybody? can you communicate with the sheriff, and the ports come all at the same time? areas inir, there are that pointed to the court stakeholders. -- port stakeholders. aey can bring to gather response. at the tactical level, there are ongoing communications among all stakeholders. single communication system that integrates all of federal, state, and local governments. >> there is not a system that

integrates everyone? tactical radio system that communicates across all of those entities. protocolscoordination , and the incident command system and allows each agency to communicate with others. operation interagency centers, some are virtual, some are brick and mortar facilities. thoseignificant incident entities would be brought together in a command structure so that the operational priorities for action would be taken and divvied up among the agencies. >> thank you, admiral.

>> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to go into the budget and the availability of money. it looks like you spent something like -- it looks like you spent to $4 billion on this $2.4 billionect -- 2. dollars, is that correct? the exactt have numbers at my fingertips, but it sounds correct. isce 1995, until 2014, that putting in place the technology. the question for the three of you is, is this a money issue? is there not enough money to get the job done? i'll start with the admiral.

>> sir, i say that one of our remains coordination. give a great thing going on within our department has pretty implemented the unity of effort to goals. one of the areas in which we are applying greater effort is to coordinate the acquisition of technology so that the physical devices we are using, any doctrine, and the tactics are similar and coordinated across multiple agencies. dndo has the lead in that. doin your budget request, you need more money or less money for the specific purpose? >> for this purpose, we run our requirements through the department and through dndo. >> thank you for that question. -- we are strategic

the strategic thrusting partners for this particular mission and department. what that means is we have the responsibility to bring in all the requirements while the operational components, and work with the department's, and allocate the right resources to meet the mission needs. very recently, we did something for the first time and altogether requirements are met across the agency and made a single purchase not just for the equipment itself, thereby standardizing the unit across to get abilities of the maintenance contract, in the long run this was a bit department a good deal of money. plug forut in a site your efforts to pass our budget. the continuing resolution would put a significant clamp on our ability to support to replace some of the aging radiation port monitors.

back to sequestration, and continuing resolutions. similar to the coast guard, e define to the dod that will survey the available technology. >> most of this has been dealing with the dirty bombs. there was another whole aspect to this, radiological material control that is over in the defense budget. it has to do with the international transshipment and the adverse to address that. i noticed that in the house version we cut that budget, which would seem to be unwise. i understand the vetoed bill increased it at the senate level. i do note that we are spending

some $30 million this year on an east coast missile defense system to defend us from an iranian nuclear bomb. that is a 1.2 billion annual investment also. only more likely to see missile in coming, or a bomb in a tug boat, or fishing boat, or container? bomb, or otherwise, i likelihood is mitigated by several factors, beginning with the international factors. radiation detection is much higher, and the logistics aspect

of international shipping. if you have your hands on a dirty bomb, they will turn it over to truck drivers, port authorities, other ships, where it is offloaded, you lose control of your asset. i think the nature of that works against the supporting a dirty bomb in that container. detection,ch more and you would lose control of your asset for some time as it goes through the shipping channels. i think there are probably other scenarios where you retain control that may be a greater threat. >> for example? >> aviation, small boats. >> i tend to agree with mr. owen's assessment. the answer to your question would only better come from the intelligence community. in addition to the dirty bomb scenario and the challenges

associated, some of the other threats we faced were to be from smaller boats. whether radiological devices or other explosive devices, those are another area for security that we take very seriously. of this willst focus on other aspects, but i think that is important for us to look into. my time is over, i yield back. >> first of all, i want to thank you for all the work you do to protect our country. in shanghai, we saw a radiation semi's coming through there. i think they were probably didn't place in the early 2003. 9/11.3 period after

what is the status for monitoring their effectiveness? replace a plan to them? or --?ports in shanghai, >> i only saw that one. >> it was right around that time you would see this equipment going nationwide, or around the world. we anticipated a 10 or 15 year life cycle at that time. we did not know what to expect for this technology, but it is well.p really they're coming towards the end of that life cycle, we do need to replace them. there was better technology for the algorithms that support this technology and have advanced. the original equipment, just picking for los angeles/long 300 orit would receive

400 radiation alarms a day of the roughly 13,000 containers that enter on a given day. those are all non-threat materials, naturally occurring radioactive materials, medical isotopes, those types of non-threats. we have reduced that number to 35-50 alarms a day by having thence advanced and whrere rhythms are. >> is there a plan in place to replace those? the refresh of all algorithms behind the radiation portal monitors here in the states that have been taking place in the past year and a half, i would assume globally that same type of -- to ask you, there is a certified program of shippers. things like, china, where a lot of containers come from, if you have shippers that you work with

all the time that are credible, you can certify those containers? >> there is the customs trade partnership against terrorism where we work with importers and vessels, manufacturers, truckers, they adopt higher security protocols. as part of that, we validate that they have implemented but they said they would. we will treat them as lower risk than an unknown company. >> if someone can segregate -- >> that is the intention. a higher risk from unknowns, yes or. -- yes, sir. >> i guess, from the admiral, are intercepted, how often is that used? when you find something, do you shut it down, does it open later?

>> transnational criminal organizations are very resilient. they react when we are successful. they will move the geography of their smuggling, that will sometimes change the conveyance and the timing to try to thwart us. we combat that primarily with intelligence and intelligence-based operation so we can have their with limited offshore assets in the right place at the right time. i would say that a started my career as a boarding officer in the caribbean in the mid-1980's. we intercepted fishing vessels that go faster trying to get to puerto rico. criminal organizations, in my opinion, never completely give up on some that works for them. we continue to monitor those same threat pathways 30 years later. >> the real challenge is small aviation, and small boats showing up somewhere else in

getting through. i think that could be a real challenge. the you want to say something? >> when it comes to general aviation, i would mention that all incoming general aviation aircraft are met by our officers using radiation detectors. we have increased our capability of aviation in the general aviation environment thanks in large part to that effort. >> thank you, mr. chairman. dovetailing, while bad guys want send stuff on cargo ships, they would do it the way they are now with small boats coming up from central and south america. isn't that how they would get anything here? submersibles, do you think ripley too much priority on the shipping container portion when the bad guys send all the drugs

up in small boats that are hard to intercept in which we only percent?, 30 something is a fairly accurate statistic. 15-20-30% depending on your metric. however, those small vessels almost never attempt to make landfall in the united states, the era of a go fast vessel going towards south florida are long over. leavef the drugs that south america first make landfall somewhere in central america then take a land pathways to board the border in much smaller packages, more difficult to detect.

the success we have using offshore aircraft, offshore cutters, that really takes those big -- the multi ton loads out of circulation. because of the success we have had over the past decades, we see very few drug smuggling vessels actually arriving in the united states. small amounts of marijuana landing in california, relatively small amount of cocaine in the rico. that is not a particular pathway not a full maritime pathway. significante a threat of nuclear activity through the maritime. would have to make landfall somewhere in central america then move on land the u.s.. >> thank you. we're honored today to have the ranking member of the full committee who is recognized.

>> thanks. i served eight years on homeland security, and a lot of these programs were very much a work in progress. theao have you operated we foundately -- significant problems in the integrity of that program. >> we look at the program roughly in 2008. we have an ongoing review that just started, it is still underway and we are very far from having our final findings. >> that was a major vulnerability previously. , you sayin terms of that under the noa you have the registered owner of the vessel. the real owner, or a front? when i was in malta, discussing these issues, they said no way we could give you the ships because we will lose all of our

business. that is what they provide, cover. as that changed? we to think it corporate names and holding companies -- >> right, which are double-blind intra-line. >> what we scan against are not the names of all of the ownership entities associated with the vessel, with the crew members, and their hiring. those are some of the areas that we look at to try to see beyond the individual names of the people on board, or the company that is shipping a container. we try to look at all of the corporate entities and their history behind the vessel itself, its cargo, the ports that it has been in, and the hiring practices. ofsee some characteristics companies engaged in the hiring that may be more problematic than an individual mariner him or herself. >> thank you.

you mentioned the radiological monitoring of aircraft coming in , what are we doing in a maritime environment for ships or boats or large pleasure craft? >> so, as i mentioned, all coast guard boarding teams carry radiation sensors. worked with the coast guard partners to give them some capabilities to detect the standoff ranges for small vessel scanning. whether they're scanning a marina for the fourth of july, or they have some basis or reason to go out at sea to look at a particular small vessel, they now have capability not just of the can carry out on their back but in their boat as well. the coast guard also asked us to above.to detecting from

we have a very interesting research project where we're looking at the ability to have fixtures and rotary craft with detections so that they could scan and sea from above as well. >> admiral, what about an exchange at sea? you have maybe the containers have been scanned, but it exchanges a container. theoretically, if someone was watching every vehicle you inld know these chips came close proximity, but we are not doing that. rendezvous, but -- it ist would be something we see commonly in drug trafficking. we use systems try to do to act if a vessel lingers somewhere for a longer.

of time than expected, or deviates of an economically viable route. that aretems available, i think we would be able to detect if a container ship deviated from its track or significantly delayed a route in a non-economical way. we would be able to then decide how to target that vessel either offshore or once it arrived in port. >> thank you. >> mr. sanford is recognized. a couple of questions, one is i know you said that we monitor every container on the way out. who cares? why? we scan every container before it leaves the port of entry -- >> you set in reverse, on the

way out. >> no, on the way out of the seaport. radiation monitors are positioned at the exit the gates of the seaport before it leaves the seaport environment. >> to enter the united states. >> so we are not the monitoring on the way out, i misunderstood that. >> no, we are not screening exports. environment,t-9/11 i would not call it an over reaction, it was warranted, but what we all know from a civil liberties standpoint, and others, there was overreach because of operational things. in other cases, from a cost standpoint they did not prove effective in that they give us fear.

-- that particular sphere. i guess, there is not enough radiation to kill people. ability of at them the year -- improbability of use toou look at alternatives masking where one would come from. it becomes a relatively low , but a wey vehicle are couple billion dollars a year on these different programs. is it overplayed relatively to the degree of risk that we are really confronting as a nation? congressman, the way we theulate risk is couple

likelihood with the consequences. the consequence of a nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that we cannot afford to take our eye off this ball. we need to remain bejewel it to make sure we have significant capabilities. ultimately preventable catastrophe, we can't stop doing it. a 1% ine looking at real check rate, maybe you bump that up to may be close to 4%. the reality is, papers in pakistan or other places around the globe can be relatively mixed, that is what we are checking in about 95% of the cases. we are looking at that of triggering further inspection. that further inspection is less than a 5% rate.

the consequences are catastrophic, but we already realized we can't scan every container, so we are expecting less than 5%. we are still spending a couple billion dollars a year. >> i was thinking about the nuclear strike at large, we do need -- i cannot agree with you more, we need to level our investments across all the pathways and he layers so that we are not over strengthening any one element of our transportation system. eye on them one minute, let me come at you from a different angle. if you look at the port of charleston, the overwhelming majority of our inspection seems to be at the container level, not the break bulk level. back to what one of my colleagues was raising with if you hadl boat,

for fort pierce, you are not inspected by an officer until after you dr. that the boat. at that point, you could have hopped off and let the boat to inspection is coming after the put of entry. if he really wants to do harm it seems to me there are a whole porousariety of vehicles to do so. again, spending a couple billion dollars a year on an overlay that gives us i think a false sense of security. could not agree with you more, which is why we work with our interagency partners to begin with nuclear security and build their own section architecture -- detection

architecture. can be aware when materials come out of regulatory control and we can stop them before they become any form of conveyance to the united states. we will continue to work with our partners to do that. >> tagger, gentlemen. -- thank you, gentlemen. >> your testimony describes the review of the operational field testing covert task. you found several areas in which they could do a better job of targeting the covert testing resources. do you believe that it has taken steps necessary to identify systemic trends and weaknesses and to resolve them in a timely manner? let me say why i am asking this

question, i found it so often, as in katrina, we are talking to each other, then when the weber meets the road, discover there is no road. so, where are we? >> sure, we have three recommendations in our report last year. they have taken actions to address all of those recommendations. they're trying to target their limited resources for covert testing in areas that are of higher risk. they have also done a better job

of following up on the recommendations of the findings of the prior covert tests. when they found problems in the past, we want to make sure those problems have been recognized and fixed. they made improvements in that area as well. we don't consider those recommendations closed, but we are pleased with the process -- progress they have made. >> the deployment ofdhs's acrossng capabilities the seaports that is specific to the threat levels that each port, or is it based on a single standard that all ports are to mee, and are they all meeting the standard? detected --ment is itemyed to make sure every

is scanned before it enters the united states. dhs is making decisions to make sure everything is looked at before it enters into the united states. >> can you please discuss the steps being taken to counter the smuggling of people on board vessels arriving at u.s. ports. what are you observing in terms of human smuggling on board vessels? >> thank you for that question, sir. i will address this in two different ways. we had for quite a while a problem with stowaways on commercial vessels. since the implementation of the urityity code, -- port sec stowawaysnumber of has dropped dramatically over the past decade. pere down to single digits month of stowaways on commercial vessels arriving in the united states as compared to what had been hundreds in the early 2000.

the fiscal responsibility for the repatriation of the stowaways it's on the shippers, so the shippers and their ship captains are highly incentivized to prevent stowaways from coming on board. that problem has been mitigated substantially with a combination of international standards and appropriate financial incentives. with regard to migrants on towards thepathways united states including puerto rico and the virgin islands, we do have a nationality and threat screening process in the case of puerto rico and the virgin islands that involves many of the people that are attempting to get in. we have maritime repatriation agreement with haiti, the dominican republic, the bahamas, and cuba to make sure that they are in the high percentages returned to their country of origin. testimony your

cited pakistan as a strong work with our foreign partners. it was being implemented in several foreign ports, is that correct? >> secure freight was our other program to test 100% screening. i assume my time is expired. >> thank you, chairman. thank you for holding this hearing. this has been a huge concern for me really sense 9/11. when i came to congress, i started the ports caucus because i thnk -- think they are so

important to this country, but i had a sense that we spent more time on securing our airports than we did our ports. when people ask me what keeps me up at night it is a dirty bomb at the court of los angeles, or long beach. make 50,000 calls a year. they carry 2 billion tons of freight. they are incredibly important, and one dirty bomb at long beach/la would be disastrous. we were able to quantify what those parts it meant to our economy in 2002 when there was a labor dispute and the workers were locked out for 10 days. everyone finally figured out

that the closure of the west aast port accounted for billion dollars a day. applaudedrned, and i congress when they passed the 2006 act and wanted 100% scanning of all cargo containers, and we are around 3% of scanning, screening is different. deadline, nog that one seems to believe we can do 100% scanning, so that deadline keeps being bumped, and it makes me nervous. all of the scenarios you say could never happen, we had a

boat a land not too far from where i lived, and do you all remember in 2002 and 2003 when smuggled depleted uranium through the port of new york and long beach, no one detected it. it was shielded by material brought off the shelf. no one detected that in either port. thisget that we are doing risk based approach, but i am concerned that we are not scanning. there is a big gap between when they come into port and scanning them before they leave on a truck. i thought this was what could

happen at a port, a dirty bomb exploding. and women thatn work in the docs of long beach/los angeles everything obey. i am extremely concerned. i'm going to see if we can talk about technology that actually could stand 100% without slowing down commerce. i think part of why our ports are vulnerable to this kind of terrorist attack is because of the disruption it would cause to our national and global economy. i'm not convinced that all of our ports have good recovery plans. admiraling to ask the what are you doing to work with ports in their recovery plan? if you imagine the port of los

angeles, or a couple ships overturned in the main channel, folks would not be able to get there to work or rebuild a ship, what are you doing that would convince us, and the terrorists, that it would not be a effective target? >> i would have to go overtime to answer it because it is fairly complex. one of the things i would say is that to the security committee aocess, part of that is nectar size program that we call amstap. they can prioritize for itself what scenarios they think are the most important security-related scenarios. different parts around the

country have done over a dozen -- two dozen, actually, exercises that address dirty bomb scenarios. one of those exercises is recovery. we have learned through real-world events that the resiliency of maritime security systems is vitally important to our population and our economy. we developed a process called maritime transportation systems that we have used in response to superstorm sandy, we used it actually in the response of the haiti earthquake. helping to recover that port from containers in the water and sunken vessels have all informed our processes so that we engage with industry, the army corps of engineers, the navy, and the

supervisor of salvage another federal partners as well to put recovery of the maritime transportation system on the fast track to priority. >> i know my time is up, i know los angeles had a port recovery program. are you convinced every port has a recovery plan? >> i could not tell you every one has one as robust as la/long beach, but it is a significant part of every port's responsibility. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. i just have a few questions, number one do you have any information on the percentages all the vessels that are expected to come into u.s. ports?

then any breakdown of foreign vessels as opposed to domestic vessels? >> a specifice percentage breakdown because the is quiteon regime different for foreign and domestic vessels. for foreign vessels we have limited authority primarily related to safety and security. what we do our state examinations and they are risk-based based on the vessels history and the ownership, the cargo shippers, and someone. some vessels are examined every time based on a track record, for some they may go years without being examined. able to -- you can come back to the committee and provide information for the record, but would you know just off-the-cuff if we inspect more domestic or foreign vessels? >> i would ask my staff to do

some research. we would be happy to do that. vessels, weto u.s. are responsible not only for the safety and security but the safe operation on the vessel. they are subject to different inspection regime that could have more visits or less depending on the specific inspection regime. >> a second question, i'm curious about homeland security's response as well. i've seen data that show the percentage of vessels inspected being extraordinarily low and that raising concerns. can you talk about the work you suggest thatch may the actual percentage of vessels inspected at u.s. ports they be deceiving? does that make sense?

how does that relate to transnational criminal organizations? both securitys to with a dirty bomb, the main subject of this hearing, and also with regard to protecting our borders from other transnational threats, our operation is based on layer security. we attempt, and i described some of those partnerships with regard to particular to, to inspect port securities for their regime overseas. with regard to specifically be stranded zone for narcotics -- thatit zone for narcotics, allows us to board that they're flagged vessels on the high seas recognizing many of these nations don't have robust coast guards or navies with the offshore capabilities that we have. those partnerships allow us to detect drug shipments very far offshore. one, it was 1000

miles west of the galapagos islands with drugs that were destined for mexico but ultimately for the united states. we do, using our long-range aircraft, and our detection monitoring capabilities of the department of defense, we attempt to identify those targets as far away as possible. prosecuteever we can, in the united states so we not only take the drugs of the market, but the attack the criminal network behind though shipments. >> do any of you care to? >> in terms of your inspection question, every one is boarded by protection officers to take care of the immigration issues, there is a law enforcement presence on each one. not to the levels of inspection that the coast guard looks for

but to determine the admissibility of the crew. at the local look law enforcement, state, and federal all out there, in the state of louisiana particularly, taskforcemed a joint 7 that was made up of surrounding parrishes. what role do you see those playing? they have better coverage in some cases than your folks do. what role to you see them playinh? >> our presence is limited in some of the parts. i understand the parish system, and the important role the

county sheriffs will play in assisting us is that additional presence as to what is taking place. it will often come in contact with individuals that may be concerned. it will notify us, so some very strong working relationships particularly in small communities were all of the community needs to rely on each other because no single entity has the resources that they need. clearly, a strong role for that partnership. >> thank you. >> i would like to add that we certainly believe that state and local partnerships, and we have state andng also with local partners and law enforcement particularly in your backyard to build capabilities across the state. in fact, today, all 50 states of the evan gauged to build -- we have engaged to build those relationships.

>> thank you, i just want to i was told ahat while back that homeland security was no longer allowing the seven sheriffs to apply for homeland security grants jointly . i'm not sure the status of that, but i want to put that on your radar. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think my first question, i apresent a small port, but deep water port, and a lot of automobiles come through that sort. port. there are 6000 automobiles coming in, i was wondering if the gao had reviewed the screening procedures for that cargo versus containers. and if you had any specific recommendations for improving

screening for non-containerized cargo? >> most of our work has been focused on containerized cargo because that is for the bulk of the federal investment has been. from a larger perspective, we have been working in a much broader effort to make sure that terrorists and nationstates aren't getting their hands on radiological material that would allow them constructed device and bring it into the united states. one of the themes of our work has been the technology and screening a very important, but there are all these other programs that are designed to secure the material as the source or to ensure we have a robust intelligence community, or law enforcement presence. plots wellidentify before someone is able to constructed device and bring it into a port. >> can you talk a little bit

about the screening process? , depending onthat how the cargo is discharged, it may still pastor a radiation monitor. if it does not, the opposite will address that through handheld devices. to -- dohose vehicles pass through those detectors. the radiation monitors are a primary detection methodology, but we do have the handheld radiation isotope devices that we use on bulk, break bulk, and every cdc officer carries a page or on their belt that will alert them of the come into contact with any matter like that as well. >> do you think small parts are more vulnerable than large parts? >> i think they are less,

because everyone seems to know everyone. same vessels that call every three or four days. krugman, youme have known entities working these. in that environment, someone from the house died, on -- someone from the outside, unknown, they be noticed. when a notice on the net is a miss, they reached out to the federal or the police across the board. >> very good. to follow up on this line of questioning, if there was a port that went down, are there contingency plans to keep trade moving? >> that is a great question, partly since trade is not a federal responsibility, the private sector and their shipping networks would adapt to

any disruption. some of that could be directed response,by federal including the actions of the coast guard captains. they might need to shut down a port for certain activities to foride time investigation or recovery. we would have to see if we can expedite the adaptation of shippers to different ports. a each port is not aware of specific contingency plan? securityort has its but because of the disruption would be so dependent on the specific scenario, the vessel that happened to be in port, it would be impossible to prescribe ahead of time a specific recovery plan

for shipping and a particular port. >> we have a second panel now that we were just looking at their testimony. stress, we talked today about stuff coming in from known areas. wouldt question, why they not take the same routes as drugs for weapons? is that totally crazy talk? that they would ship it in and have the manifest be honest? is certainly one of the scenarios we consider when we analyze it. , ido look at multiple modes

would love to share with you the process by which we analyze 400 elements of the architecture based on defense capabilities, offense of options. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want one more clarification from the three of you. on this layered approach. the point of origin, when it leaves the port. our the three of you sitting here saying that you are 100% positive that a dirty bomb could not slip through and get to one of our ports under the security model? i do not think

anyone could give you a 100% guaranteed. based on the incredible resources of our law enforcement, and technical community we are bringing every resource we have to bear. if we did not use it all in our multifaceted approach we would be more vulnerable. we are better today than we were 10 years ago. in a classified session i would love to explain why we would probably not be. rep. hahn: rare admiral? concernse had several from a vessel overseas. when the motor process began, the maritime response interagency process, we were able to either board the vessel at sea and resolve the issue, or bring it to a safe place with a

minimal population to conduct the examination and resolve the issue. in one specific case, not regarding a bomb threat, but a possible terrorist threat, where it was ambiguous to let a vessel go into a united states or canadian port, we did this same level of interagency coordination with our canadian counterparts with good effect. i am confident the processes we for are effective recognizing and responding to these threats in a way that will mitigate a probable impacts. i cannot say with a 100% certainty that we could prevent a dirty bomb scenario. i would agree there is no one hundred percent certainty, but when you look at where it does make sense, like we are doing with qasim, pakistan, like what

we started in jordan in port of law where every container is scanned. i think that it is the right approach. >> we're not going to shake hands because we have half an hour with the next panel. thank you for your time and what you do. we will have more coming up. we will have classifieds upon hearing. >> if the next panel could, and

take their places. navan, charles potter, joe wallace, and stephen flynn.

>> the chairman is out of the room for a few moments, but asked me to begin your testimony . we do have a short time. we will begin. anavan -- mr. canavan: it is irish. >> that is a fine name. mr. canavan: i am greg canavan from lasala most. i submitted my testimony. the chairman does not want me to read the math, so i will summarize a you can have it for the record. i am honored to be here, thank you for inviting me. will not say the math, just a few words. i am listed as a senior fellow from los alamos, that is my daytime job.

this is not a los alamos project, it is something i've been working on since 9/11. on that day, the department of department of defense were kind enough to send an airplane to new mexico to here doctor to come back to pursue some projects that we have been looking into before to the unusual threats united states. one of which was a concern there might have been nuclear materials here in the capital, anhaps in the form of operational form. we spent some time looking into that. we were not looking for dirty bombs, we were looking for their big brothers.

the detection approaches are similar. also quite difficult, as ms. hahn pointed out earlier. groups have smuggled to pleaded uranium into the country .requently actual enriched uranium is harder to find, but not that much easier. find nuclearg to materials. i might say that as an air force colonel for the last 30 or 50 years or so, i worked on designing nuclear weapons, testing nuclear weapons, occasionally flying nuclear weapons. time i ever first had to worry about the problem of trying to detect nuclear materials. be a difficult and

challenging business. there's not much signature from them. they are harder to find than turkey bombs. quiteo found that we have good techniques for defeating nuclear weapons, defusing them, when you have found them. the business of trying to find them in the first place is very difficult. after 9/11, i continued to work with the department of defense for a couple of years to try to remedy this problem. it was very frustrating, it was quite difficult. in part because we went off on a wrong direction. we recognize that neutrons, tiny particles of matter, do not carry an electrical charge. they can go through anything. this building, ships, whatever. hiticularly when they

material that produces more neutrons and enhance the signature. tot makes them a good day work with, but we got off on the wrong setting in that we adopted the idea that did the trick was 2, 3, four-miles with a large particle accelerator and try to do the elimination from there. yourdoes not improve survivability of something went off. it just made everything more complicated. we got discouraged with that approach. anyhow, we went at that way. so, after a while we looked too hard, and we gave up. has not advanced much from 9/11 to today in terms of detecting actual nuclear weapons. so what has changed?

are 5 things that have changed. one is that a decade of development in nuclear sources and detectors has made more practical schemes and automated and evenossible, affordable. you can now have detector systems that can fit on ports, transporter vehicles, ships, whatever. and do an inspection of all the things that came through the port for nuclear weapons. a secondnd thing -- thing, what that leads to, in the testimony i handed in, it lives to a modular deployment. most of that moves today moves in a 20 foot equivalent

unit. 's,go ships are now in the 2t 40 foot units, that are wrapped up in the big ships. -- ify, if you use nuclea you use neutrons, they are well-suited to uniformly inspecting such creatures, either in port or transit. i found that very interesting. the second thing that hit me was that there was a mistake that we -- it to ignore countermeasures to the approaches that we were advancing for the tech should. we were asked to go against a adversary. someone that made life easy for us. not good,d out to be because we ignore the fact that there are absorbers, things like

cadmium and barium, that are powero control ordinary nuclear reactors. they gobble of neutrons very efficiently. 1/100th of an inch of cadmium can knock the signals women nuclear weapon down to almost nothing. , that past neutrons of the energy where they are born. they could easily get around these absorptions and produce big signals, they are relatively insensitive to the known countermeasures. there is the penalty that someone mentioned already in radiography. when you are x-raying something, most of your x-rays go places you are not interested in. tu's,stance, in these big

if you are looking at a bomb that is 10 centimeters across, six-meters or three-meters across, maybe 1% of the neutrons actually hit the core activators, and the rest of them act as noise. that is a problem you have to overcome. that i guess i realized after some thinking was that in the process of hitting of nuclear core neutrons -- hitting the nuclear core, neutrons identify themselves. they have a spectrum all the way from 10% to 90% of the neutrons are readilyident identified, and therefore filtered out and you can throw away the noise efficiently. since thely from theion of noise

specific andrly introduces not degrade much in the process of slowing down. therefore, you don't wind up with too many noise-neutrons where you in your bin are expecting your signal. those four things made life a lot easier, to the point where you can do very effective filtering on energy, which makes up more than for what you lose initially in the numbers of .eutrons that miss the target so, overall, you can get the signal-to-noise ratios at the appropriate energies, which are halfway through the slowing down process. signal-to-noise ratios of

100,000 or more, so you can have a confident detection of the nuclear materials with a low false alarm ratio of other materials. someone alluded to it in a previous talk that the tough thing about x-rays is that you never know what is going to be in one of these shipping containers. may axles, electronics, whatever -- even if you can radiograph one of these things 1% of the time, you have to go through a long screening process, or unpacking process, to figure out what it actually was. with a high signal-to-noise ratio, you have a fighting chance of passing everything through without having to go back and try to sort out what the heck the problem was in the first place.

it just seemed to have all of the characteristics that we even before for 9/11. i was on the advisory committees space,. space, air force and north command when it was first created. we were sitting down trying to figure out how to parcel out -- holy smoke, i'm sorry. i just jumped forward. i beg your pardon. it seemed to do everything that we hoped the coast guard would be able to do in its charter for being the service that would detect things before it got to the coast. to eradicate losses and false alarms on the spot, and execute the first line of defense of the country. i'm sorry i went over.

>> thank you for being here. dr. potter, you are recognized. dr. gus potter. you are recognized. you for thenk opportunity to testify on the topic of preventing and responding to an attack. my name is dr. charles potter, i may systems analysis from albuquerque, new mexico, specializing in the threat and radiological nuclear architecture detection. the united states government and foreign partners have been working to reduce the risk of a radiological dispersion device attack. we define risk as the combination of a likelihood of an attack that decrease the degree of which an adversary has

-- degree, it is a multidimensional problem. the u.s. government has designed and implemented programs based on scientific studies by laboratories to reduce the likelihood of an attack by reducing the availability of material for exploitation and identifying and him p improbable pathways from device to target. the scientific understanding of the cost, time needed to clean up, and the psychological effects of an attack are less understood. no comprehensive standard has been established regarding what radiation limits would constitute a successful cleanup. release documentation by al qaeda represent their understanding of the public of the settlement and possible economic consequences from an attack. and in august of

this year were convicted of trying to use a dirty bomb in new york city, chicago, and elsewhere. they can be developed from a relatively low capability lone wolf, like these three individuals, to a highly capable and technologically competent adversary, like the attacks on the tokyo subway system in 1995. the more technologically capable and adversary, the more likely they would be to spread radioactive material over larger areas at higher levels. since the study at the ports of los angeles and long beach, many of policies and systems have addressed the threat likelihood, including nic regulations, the office of radiological programs on radiological securities of force and recovery, and a dhs offices detection

nuclear detection architecture to recognize nuclear material outside of control. if it is located prior to detonation many teams are ready for response. there may be some long-term effects to more exposed individuals. however, depending on the bomb involved, the economic consequences could be considerable. if it is removed from surfaces, the contaminated area could be off-limits if it is difficult to remove. this would result in business is being shuttered and residents relocated while the cost of decontamination efforts are undertaken. they would be interdependent he's quarantined area between residents and businesses. since there is no comprehensive policy for post-cleanup radiation levels, it is difficult to estimate the cost

associated. risk is real and multifaceted. the government has multiple programs to increase the difficulty of illicit movement of materials, reducing likelihood of an attack. there is uncertainty in our understanding of the costs after an event. the development of policies and capabilities for effective cleanup to allow for a resumption of normal operations would constitute an important element of the multidimensional solution for addressing the threat. thank you. >> thank you, dr. potter. chairmanwitness is the of the security committee for the american association of port authorities. be recognized. you.awless: thank wallace, theseph

director of maritime security at the port authority at boston. i'm here on the american association of board authorities security committee. it is the unified voice of the maritime industry in the americas. it empowers port authorities, maritime industry, and service providers to serve global customers to create economic and social value for communities. our activities, resources, and partnerships connect, inform, and unified seaport leaders and maritime professionals in all of the industries in the western hemisphere. priorityis our top for our members. the testimony is on behalf of u.s. members. security and ports and security from dirty bombs could not happen without strong partnerships. this means ongoing relationships

with port authorities, the federal government, specifically customs and border protection, the coast guard, the fbi, andpers, toward workers, state and local law enforcement play an important role in identifying threats, providing resources, and coordinating if a dirty bomb were to arrive. 30 pounds ending up in the hands of people who want to do was harm was underscored recently by an illicit smuggling operation. it was reported over the last five years there had been four attempts by criminals and eastern europe to sell radioactive materials to middle eastern extremists. if any of these were successful, these radioactive materials could have been used to construct a dirty bomb that could be used against us. the concern is that terrorists could exploit the maritime

transportation system to convey a dirty bomb into this country. stopping dirty bombs before they reach our shores is a priority, but we must have an effective system of detecting dirty bombs if they were to make it to our shores. staffedfunded and border protection agency is the first step in fighting dirty bombs. at thes meet the ships ports of entry to check the manifests and utilize radiation portal monitors. ports will lie on rpm's to detect dirty bombs in cargo shipped into the country. rpm's are detection devices providing cvp with a nonintrusive process to screen trucks and other movements of presence ofhe nuclear and radiological materials. they are mandated in the safe port act of 2006.

the 22 largest ports by value must have rpm's and containers must be screened for radiation. almost 10 years since they were mandated, but a decade into the program questions have been raised about who pays for the rpm's, who is responsible for expansion, and what is the long-term obligation for the next generation? a dhs inspector general in 2013 portal monitor had seaports the initials that estimates of deployed rpm's showed a useful life expectancy of 10 years. -- wee hit repeatedly hear repeatedly from port members the lack of clarity and funding in the rpm program. it has become a hindrance in how we protect our ports. there coming to the end of

first generation of rpm life expectancy. ports like tampa, jacksonville, long beach, new york/new jersey, complicatedreported discussions with their officers on the ongoing responsibility of rpm's. requested that jacksonville assume responsibility for the technological sustainment, hardware, software, and conductivity. this is a significant -- this is significant given the complex and critical nature of these federally owned and currently maintained systems. other reports are reporting similar disruptions in the rpm programs. there is too much at stake for officers to have to engage in policy and funding negotiations. the administration must set a clear path on the rpm program.

rpm detection is a federally .andated program cvp should request adequate federal funding to purchase, install, and maintain all of and ports throughout the united states. if this is not feasible, the department of homeland security should consider the creation of a standalone priority within the theme of port security grant program entitled grant, radiation, portal monitors. security grant funding, and support of the purchase and installation of radiation detection portals. regarding the port security detection program, many port authorities have utilized the port security grant program to obtain radiological detection equipment. personal detection devices that first responders where on their

belts is to determine the source of radiation alarms and sophisticated accpac detection devices are some items acquired through the program. thee only supplement efforts and help in the small vessel reduction program. funding for the grant program to the original level, and maintain the poor security grant program as a standalone homeland security grant program. are encouragede that whenever possible the grants go directly to the ports, so that the security facilities will have the necessary resources to fully implement the security programs. conclusion, we must provide law enforcement agencies, such as the cvp, and port security directors, with the tools and resources necessary to succeed.

i appreciate the opportunity to testify, and look forward to answering any questions you might have. >> thank you. the final witness is dr. stephen plan, the director for resilient studies with northeastern university. you are recognized. dr. flynn: you're going to hear back to back boston accents. currently at northeastern university where i went the support of the macarthur foundation looking at the growing risk of a managing the threat to our global supply the risk of radioactive materials and weapons of mass distraction. i'm honored to be here. it is my assessment that the threat of the dirty bomb at a u.s. port is a clear and present danger. current efforts are not of to the task to preventing a determined adversary to

exploiting the system and setting off a bomb in a u.s. port. it would not be so much a weapon of mass distraction as of mass disruption. they would be three of media consequences. local deaths and injuries associated with the blast and explosives. the environmental damage and extremely high cleanup costs, as dr. potter laid out, we do not have standards for coping with the aftermath. and then the morning-after problem. no way of determining where the compromise that led to the incident happened within the security system. we have 2 outcomes, the entire supply chain would be presumed to be potentially a risk of a follow-on attack. it will call into question all of the existing container port security initiatives the first panel talked about. and this is 2006,

my 29th time talking about this since congress 9/11, i outlined the hypothetical scenario formed by my own research and by carrie gilmore. -- and gary gilmore. i testified before the committee on investigations the following scenario. container of footwear from a namebrand company is loaded in indonesia. the container doors are shut and the mechanical seal is put on. tose sneakers are destined reach malls across america. the serial numbers are reported, a local truckdriver sympathetic to al qaeda picks up the can trainer. he turns into an alleyway and backs the truck into a warehouse where operatives pry loose one of the hinges to gain access to the shipment. some of this makers are removed, and in their place at dirty bomb wrapped in lead shielding, which will defeat the radiation portal

monitoring, and then they repass in the door. to where itakes it is loaded on a coastal leadership. then the container is transported to an inter-agency ship carrying 12 to 1400 to hong kong. it goes the hong kong where it is loaded on a super container carrying 8000 containers for the transpacific voyage. it is then off loaded in vancouver. then on to a rail car where it is shipped to chicago. the codes it is deployed -- those detections on the canadian border to not detect it. a triggering device attached to the door sets off the bomb. this is as realistic today as in 2000 six. it exploits a vulnerability of the global supply system that is

an addressed. they could target a containerized shipment transported by a local truck from the factory to a logistics center, where it originates from a local truck to the port where it is loaded upon a vessel. when the truck leaves the factory, there are few controls to prevent a shipment from being diverted before arriving at port . the driver has been recruited, arrived, or intimidated either terrorist group. the container doors are typically secured with a number of seals that can be purchased $1.50.me four hinges can be removed and the container's thin metal skin can be breached. terrorist group would purposely target a container from a known shipper. i did this for two reasons. it is extremely unlikely that object to the

container to security sensitive came from a well-known supplier. if it has no past record of smuggling, there is virtually no chance it will hit a radar container to be checked. a shipment from a trusted source would be low risk and unidentified for reportable loading inspection, or in vancouver when it is on a u.s. bound train. exploiting a container from a known shipper, they can generate the maximum amount of fear that all containers viewed as low risk would be judged as high risk. fanned by the inevitable sensational media coverage, the american people would place no arrestedthe regime since 9/11. this is why a laboratory would put a dirty bomb in a box. it is why the coal is not to get

the bomb into the u.s., it is to disrupt the global supply chain we would respond in the aftermath. what we see is that if we are spooked, if there is a bomb in a box there are other bombs in boxes, we would freeze the system to sort it out. not just one port closure, but all. we cannot check the boxes of old they are uploaded, but we cannot check them unless they are offloaded. this catch-22 would have them outside of our ports. new shapest send into the u.s. if it is backed up, and you could not receive new boxes from trains and trucks. the entire intermodal transportation system goes into gridlock. the impact is disruption of global commerce on a huge scale. what would we do? the real threat is not so much of the attack on the local

community, as significant as it is likely to be, but the risk of mass disruption of international commerce. my testimony. the u.s. government needs to focus primarily on policing u.s. bound cargo. to advance the overall security resilience to the global supply system at large. the rationale is that everyone prevent the proliferation of weapons and materials around the one planet, security the human resolution that requires nations take action to detect and intercept outbound shipments of illicit radiological material. we have the rationale to get on with it at a global scale. the u.s. government needs to focus on the active participation of private industry that operates ports and move supply chains. they have the rationale to do this that it is a significant

business continuity and business imperative. that it is a public sector responsibility, that is wrong. it is a public sector responsibility, but the private sector has a critical role to play. the foiled october 2010 tom plot with explosives in printer cartridges in yemen make the case. we saw european authorities significantly step up the scrutiny of their cargo. the maritime transportation system is highly concentrated with a few large port operators for the majority of cargo. these companies could take on a leadership role for deploying technology and tools on a global scale by providing visibility and accountability for all cargo . they would need the means to recover the associated costs for a fee through service

requirement to importers and exporters. the cost of putting the term of operations around the world is $3 billion to $5 billion. given there are millions of containers, it is $15 per box cost. less than the surcharge i had flying from boston to washington for this hearing. this applies to import a dirty bomb is clear and present, the disruption of such an attack would generate those well beyond the local port and rippled through the entire maritime transportation system and be disasters for global trade. the u.s. security and economic security threat could not be higher. there is a need to build upon post-9/11 initiatives to improve the security of the maritime transportation system. these global networks need trust to operate. we have to ensure we can survive

that trust in the event of a dirty bomb going off in part. thank you. >> thank you, doctor. and thanks to my colleagues. i want to let everyone get a question before they have to leave. my question is this. if you are going to have a nuclear weapon, dirty or not, i wouldl be shielded, recommend to our enemies they shield it, otherwise they would be easier to see. i would think smart people which shield it. can you still see it? dr. canavan: that is a good question. i covered that a little in my testimony. shielded not easily from inspection by neutrons. if you keep the neutrons fast enough, with high enough energy, they are not affected eye absorbers -- by absorbers.

neutrons can go through a whole ship without slowing down. is what ispart called moderators, things that reduce the energy of the neutrons. in a bunchas packed of moderator materials, carbon or something, it could slow neutrons. enough of it could slow the neutrons down enough to where not enough of them would penetrate into the core to give you a good nuclear signature. it is not a precise number, but a foot or so of carbon outside of the device may be could affect that sort of slowing down. there are 2 things to consider. one, by the time that you have a few feet of carbon on either side of the device, you have blocked the whole container it

is in. that it itself would be a signal that someone had tried to do this. it is not an easy thing to do. the other thing is a technical point, but when neutrons bounce off of a moderator by carbon they produce a spectrum of bands of energy that pop out and are easily detectable. the spacing of the energy bands are a good indicator of what kind of moderator the person is using to try to beat you, and the number of those bands tell you how six of moderator is. the moderator is. that is the game they will play, it is not an easy game or the adversary. to be in their system,

many cannot just scan stuff. it has to be one of the drive-through systems. it takes more than just a drive through. he takes a couple of seconds? dr. canavan: neutrons like to go through anything, particularly steel and lead. ordinary shielding, which is very affect his for dirty bombs -- very effective for dirty bombs and uranium in its natural state, as it is just emanating gamma rays, all of those things , which are effective otherwise, are not effective against the approach i'm using with neutrons . someone has to really, really go out of their way with a lot of wadding to try to knock the signal down too much. these hand-held detectors would not send something in carbon or lead. it would take an actual scanning system, right?

the handheld detectors will not detect stuff if it is in a teu? dr. canavan: the trick with the tundra t -- the trick with neutron detection of any kind is he put the signal in, it magnifies the signal, and the electrons come out. you are stimulating, very gently, the fiscal material to produce the signal that would if youthere in the case did not stimulate it. do thister: the way to through a drive-through system -- meaning it will not happen by handheld device someone is holding and walking around or a belt device? it only comes, the best we can do is a drive-through scanning system. where you can spray it with neutrons and have that read on the other side? butcanavan: that's right,

there is no free lunch. you have to produce the neutrons. they are not very hard to produce, the trick is knowing that you have to put them where you want them, and collect them in a smart way. i will yield my time. rep. garamendi: the bottom line a your testimony is that drive-through neutron detection can work, but we are not currently deploying them? a. canavan: we went off on tangent that wasn't productive. it has only been scratching my head for a long time that gave me the idea. teller, my old professor, used to say -- the hardest thing about doing something is our ing what -- is un-learn you thought. rep. garamendi: we will move this along. you think that domestic steps

need to be taken. a national academy study was done years ago pointing out the need to protect season chloride sources through the united states. rep. garamendi: you true our attention to that issue. we will avoid dealing with that problem, which is not a good solution. lawless, it comes down to money? who will pay for the detectors is talkingnavan about? ?ow much money do you need >> these drive-through portals

and gammact neurons at the same time. we are invested in many of the ports working within a company to develop a state-of-the-art detection system in the port of boston. there's definitely money needed to fund these programs. the clarity on who's paying for the systems, there are a federally mandated system. the ports believe the federal government should pay to fund these projects. if dr. flynn is willing to put $10 to $15 on each container, i assume you have an opinion on that? i will go back to where i started. we make choices. we are looking to spend $3.5 defensefor a missile

system for that east coast to the iran uranium from nuclear weapons, which presumably will not be available for decades. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield. hahn ister: ms. recognized. rep. hahn: i've read with your written. i represent the port of los angeles and am concerned. do you believe that scanning at the point of origin is effective , one hundred percent, or should we invest more in scanning at the domestic courts? -- domestic ports?

>> it is not so high we should be looking at dealing with it across the board. this ranks up there to the consequences. i spent a good amount of time in the port of l.a. and long beach, and you get a sense of scale. what the problem would be in the dirty bomb scenario, how would it work in that port and neighbors in san pedro and so forth, it would be a challenge. in the face of this there is opportunity at the port of loading that even the largest terminals could scan cargo. what that would do, it should be baked into the terminal operations, just as the radiation is here. you cannot do it for just the u.s., you have to do it for everything. counter proliferation value. most of the stuff we are worried about is not going to the united states, but around. it is a national security

imperative to get visibility in what goes into the intermodal transportation system. let's be clear with the numbers. 2013, the numbers of cvp inspections overseas in the ports around the world was 100 3000. divided by 360 five days and 58 ports, we are talking five containers per port per day being examined under the csi system. if you have been to places like singapore, shanghai -- it may be of a little. why? the current approach will identify the risk and take the box to a government inspection facility. if you bake it into the operation of the terminal it is in real time. you would get the images and use a risk-based approach, but have a greater degree of confidence about deterring the risk and ultimately finding things when worsto wrong, or the

case, even isolating the incident afterwards so you do not shut down the whole system. there's so much that can, should -- can and should be done that is not being done. rep. hahn: i appreciate the warning. the threat to the global economy is significant. specifically if something beach and losng angeles. we know that impact on our national and global economy. .ne more of dr. canavan one of the biggest issue that everyone says we cannot have one hundred percent scanning is that would slow down commerce, and we cannot audit. it.nd we cannot afford i do have a bill that would provide grants to 2 ports in this country that would voluntarily decide to implement

100% scanning with the technology available -- i want to prove everybody wrong that we can do this and not impede commerce in a way that would impact the economy. is it a technology that you spoke about, which of those technologies could work and not impede commerce? there are 2 well, -- there is one technology i talked about that is interrogation with neutrons. i think it would go the requirements your setting. i always like to to have big cranes that moved things around. i would like to put my source on one leg of the thing and of the detector on the other, so while it is moving, that is plenty of time. it does its inspection in seconds or milliseconds. it is very fast.

i also like the thing i mentioned briefly, to mount the source and detector on the bulkheads of the ship and put one per canister so that you can keep track of what happens to that canister the whole time it is at sea. .ure, you could do that i have not proved it, ma'am. i'm just trying to tell you that i think the physics is ok. rep. hahn: thank you, very much. rep. brownley: thank you, mr. chairman. it is not just an attack on u.s. soil, but on trade and interrupting the movement of goods in our country. verywondering if you have specific recommendations for how

individual ports and businesses within the ports can really planre for a contingency in the event that we did have an and also specific recommendations for governmental agencies and what they should be doing for contingencies? >> i applaud the question and the focus. unless we assume this is a 0% chance, we should have a lan. it is a coordination and collaboration issue. challenge is that this is a global system running on steroids. cascadessrupt it as it across the system, there is a lot of choreography. the u.s. government has no plan on how to deal with it beyond the u.s. borders.

there is a global strategy the president put out. i think it is the world's strategy, four point five pages, saying we should have a plan, but not executing. specifics, clearly it is raising what the event would look like, and the mechanics of how to we deal with the immediacy of the dirty bomb, what is safe? this is something a community cannot solve. it is putting people back into the community. coordination between the industry that runs the system and the port authorities, local authorities, in the system, we have limited visibility of how it works. what makes this unique and challenging for infrastructure it is internationally owned.nd not u.s.

we have to coordinate with those key players. there are five terminal operators that move 80% of the goods in the u.s. you have to go to 180 nations .nd five countries you can work with 20 ceos. we have been looking at this as a government-government issue, and it is an international private system. in 2008, we managed the morning after. forave no such system managing a major disruptive event, and that transcends that is their job to do. it is a higher-level issue for us to wrestle with. you mentioned we

should be listening to industry and businesses clearly and in terms of what they believe what is the right direction and write plans for contingency. do you have any idea what they wanted suggest? in the earlier testimony they said if we had an incident industry would respond. that would be the contingency plan. mr. lawless: i worked on that and talked to ceos of the terminal operators. if there is a plan, they are willing to engage. it is a business continuity issue for them. i have 2 colleagues at the wharton school looking at 2 choices. one now where we would select a box out of the container and send it to be inspected at small percentages, and one where we scan all of them.

in some cases, it turns out that doing more is easier. the economics work better. in other places, in slower places, it will not have the in and you of buy- will not use that approach. it won't be a one-size-fits-all, but a conversation with industry is different than government to government. it is an engineering and operational problem, but not in unsolvable. we should not be throwing our hands in the air and saying, we hope it doesn't happen. rep. brownley: i will yield back, mr. chairman. rep. hunter: we have run out of members. this was not a bad showing for today. usually, it is just me and john. think you for what you do for the country and industry. thank you for being here. with that the hearing is adjourned.

>> next, your calls and comments journal."gton then "newsmakers" with kevin brady. then speeches by outgoing house speaker john boehner and newly elected house speaker paul ryan. it is a very touchy business being the son or daughter of a dictator. you would not wish this life on most people. it is a collection of interesting and sometimes lurid stories. sone are reports of trna, -- of tyranny sonship and daughtership and even on democracy. "children of monsters" looks at the children of 20 dictators,

including stalin, mao, and saddam hussein. to knowledgeable people, not family members. that was largely the case. there are only so many around, and only so many willing to say what they know or divulge feelings or information at all. i was looking for any scrap that i possibly could. daughters,and some of them are important and become dictators, but most of them are footnotes and you have to take to find out about them. >> on c-span's q&a. >> this morning, cbs reporter anddetails of the 2-year budget agreement passed by the house and senate. then the american enterprise into two and the executive

director of doctors for america examined health care as open enrollment for 2016 begins. we will take your calls and you can join the conversation on a spoke and twitter. washington journal is next. ♪ visit november 1. another enrollment period starts today for health care under the so-called obamacare bill. prices are rising, and so are penalties for not having insurance he recalled ryan begins his first full week as speaker of the house. the house in congress, expected to take up highway funding this bill, thisg-term time. the head of the fbi is making news, saying,he