be addressed by the establishment of a common training program and engagement, a sense of belonging to something larger than you. i think it continues with a clearly defined sense of progression in the organization and understanding what your opportunities are, incentivizing performance, understanding that if i perform well, i will be rewarded for it. and a feeling of engagement with my leadership. ssell: thank you. what concerns do you have with cargo screening? neffenger: cargo, as you know, has been a concern for some time. there have been a number of procedures put in place for that. i think the question is recognition of the fact that this is a much larger system than just the checkpoint. even assuming you can get the checkpoint 100% right, there are many other potential vulnerabilities in the 80's and environment -- in aviation environment. we have a very robust set of

requirements for cargo on domestic aircraft and cargo coming inbound to the u.s. on foreign and domestic carriers coming from outside the u.s. that reaches all the way back to the individuals that are actually packing the cargo container for shipment. it is an ongoing challenge. it's an ongoing threat. it's one you can't take your eyes off at any point. russell: on the tsa preprogram, a lot of issues have been addressed with that. i understand the benefits of having low risk travelers set aside for expedited screening. you made it a point to, in your testimony today, to try to stop , whereaged inclusion people are benefiting from the program, but have no betting -- that he -- no vetting

whatsoever. how much of the managed inclusion -- neffenger: re: speaking of the covert testing failures -- are you speaking of the covert testing failures? it is the case that, without getting into detail, as d,spector general roth note some of the people coming into the system were diverted into it. that could have contributed to some of the failures. i felt that the managed inclusion, as i said before, injected unacceptable risk into the system. i did not know anything about these individuals. i thought they were best put back into standard screening until such time they presented themselves in a direct way for vetting into the program. rep. russell: thank you, mr. chairman, for your indulgence. chairman: the chair recognizes the gentlelady from new mexico. ms. grisham: thank you for your

testimony today. mr. neffenger, i'm a big supporter and proponent of ofluative testing and review large employee organizations, because it can be very difficult , particularly when it is so broad-based. to get at the heart of what is occurring on a day-to-day basis. they createdte, undercover or anonymous anonymousons of -- investigations of long-term care. doesnfirmed that not only the authority exist, but it should be encouraged, and you should undertake these anonymous care evaluations. i appreciate very much that your leadership recognized that this might be a way to either confirm

the data that you have, which, at the time suggested that things were operating fairly well, and you might have some complaints or an anomaly, or you would have the opposite, which is exactly what occurred here, is that you've identified the you got -- you have significant issues. in the course of your responses to questions and certainly in your testimony, and i appreciate that, you have accepted that there is a culture problem in the organization that needs to be addressed, and you have a 10 point plan. , evenally interested in implementing the plan, it is very difficult, challenging to create in large organizations, i think, the kind of top to bottom, bottom to top culture shift. too often, people believe that it is a temporary investment. it is easier to go back to the way that it was, particularly getting random efforts, looking at one region, one area, one

airport, one screening system versus another. it really depends on the leadership in that organization. what have you learned from this experience, that, a, we can help you with, in terms of really having a sustainable culture change shift with the leadership and rank-and-file employees? and what can we take from that and use it for other government entities that we have the same issues, secret service, the veterans administration, several others in federal government, that i think could really use this kind of approach? thank you. there is a lot in that question. i think it is really important. you've hit on a number of the key concerns and thoughts that i've had with respect to this. you're absolutely right that it's a challenging -- it is challenging to do cultural change, but we have one great benefit. we have a really, really important mission. and it's a very defined and very specific mission. pointt's a huge rallying

to begin cultural change, unlike the organization and mike have, you know, a couple of hundred different things to do. so i like that. it's a mission that people care passionately about. you can tie them to it. i never forget that everybody in this workforce raised their hand and took an oath of office. you can activate that. that's one great advantage you have. it's not enough. is not enough for me to say i want cultural change, because no one individual makes it happen, but is it for me to say because it has to start at the top. -- but it is important for me to say it because it has to start at the top. i have to say that out loud. then you have to build some institutional structures that access support it. i mentioned a couple today. i think it is critical that i begin to do new hire training in a consistent, standardized, singular way. and i think that that will do

great value in building kercher -- culture over time. i agree with that. and i think that's a great idea. but the accountability balance with incentivizing and creating long-term shifts, having an immediate shift that people believe is really taking place is the harder part, i think. i'm really interested to hear more about that. -- the othert the thing i did, a purely for the first time, i brought the entire leadership of the tsa -- the other thing i did, apparently for the first time ever, i brought the entire leadership of the tsa, all of the federal security directors, the regional directors, my regional directors in overseas locations, together, about 175 people. for the first time in the history of tsa, we have done that. i spent two days with them. it was two days of connection with culture. we talked about how we collectively define the culture of the organization.

rep. grisham: i'm out of time. i applaud your efforts. i would encourage you to balance accountability with incentivizing and creating a clear operating system, because i don't believe it is sustainable unless you do. thank you very much for your leadership. chairman: thank you. the chair recognizes mr. palmer. rep. palmer: we've had a lot of discussion about equivalent, technology -- equipment, technology, and personnel. the inspector general has stated that the tsa's problems come, i think, largely from a lack of training. is that correct? i.g. roth: that's one aspect of it. rep. palmer: mr. neffenger, how do you plan to address the training issues? neffenger: we did immediately address the current results. we did what were called mission

central training. it was an eight hour block of training across the entire workforce, starting with the frontline workforce. we do this in august and september. we trained every single screener. we are in the process of doing the same for the leadership of the organization. that was designed specifically to talk about what were the nature the failures, then to talk about systemically why those failures existed and how they existed across the organization. we have two go back and measure the effectiveness of the training. we are in the process of doing that now. we will do that going forward. that's a program we are putting in place on a routine basis now. we are going to do quarterly mission essential training. then we are looking at, across the organization at all levels, what are the progressive levels --development training develop mental training and repeated training that has to be trainingevelopmental and repeated training that has to be done to identify problems before they are systemic, before you get into massive failures like we saw earlier?

i think time will tell as to how effective it is, but i'm encouraged by some initial anecdotal results that show some significantly improve performance in those areas where we were recently tested. rep. palmer: is this your training for front-line people? neffenger: it is one aspect of that training. we used it to bring all of our trainers and during the month of july, turning -- to train them, and then pushed them out to on-the-job training for our workforce. what i would like to do at the federal law enforcement training center is move our new hire academy full-time to there beginning in 2016 and then develop additional training opportunities and developmental training throughout someone's career in the tsa. rep. palmer: mr. roth and ms. grover, do you believe this basic training will help? is it going to get us where we need to be? i.g. roth: it absolutely will help, both in the sense of

mission and community that community -- that mr. neffenger referenced, but also, some of the basics we found one being followed -- we found were not being followed. i'm a firm believer in training. that is one of our recommendations. we are gratified that the administrator is following through on that. bothgrover: it is necessary and critical to the development of an appropriate culture and enhancing knowledge support security effectiveness, but it is not sufficient. administrator neffenger mentioned the plan to follow-up to make sure the training itself was getting the desired results, and that is critical. mr. russell of oklahoma asks a question about targeted security. i want to ask about checked bags. mr. neffenger are you aware -- mr. neffenger, are you aware of the leak that occurred earlier where the travel keys were released to the public?

neffenger: think i -- i think you are referring to the photograph of the key that was published in a major newspaper? rep. palmer: are you aware they can reproduce that? neffenger: i am. rep. palmer: can you provide any link between your agency and the memorandum? neffenger: i will see if we have one. rep. palmer: my last question will be, how do you plan or will you be able to address this issue of baggage locks if these travel century keys have been compromised? neffenger: well, the first thing i would say, it is clearly a compromise for potential for locking that bag outside of the aviation environment. those bags are still -- they go through screening and into the aviation. i don't see it as a threat to the aviation security system, but it is clearly a potential

theft issue outside of the aviation environment. i think i need to see what the potential solution is from the , and thentry folks look to see what we can institute in the future. clearly, we have to address that as a problem. rep. palmer: that's in the context of my question, you have travelers were not using locks, because you use both partners -- you use both cutters -- you use boltcutters. they want to know their luggage is secure. chairman: the gentleman from wisconsin. >> thank you for coming over here. i know it's a tough job. it's got a be a difficult thing to work. i assume you can work there for 30 years and never catch somebody who has no intent. intent, so you must wonder if what you're doing is worthwhile. by dealing with the public that does not consider this a wonderful thing -- you are dealing with a public that does not consider this a wonderful thing and are not happy to have

you there. in the last five years, have you folks caught anybody who you not somebody who is axially slipping in a fingernail -- who was accidentally slipping in a fingernail clipper, but somebody who had bad intent in the last six or seven years, you feel? neffenger: within the entire system, yes. there is a security environment in which you enter when you first put your name into a reservation system. we have repeatedly identified people with connections to known or suspected terrorists over the years. rep. grothman: people you believe who, at the airport, if you did not stop them, they were going to try and do a bad thing, not somebody on a terrorist watch list. somebody you believe, if you were not there, they would have done bad things. neffenger: we've had a few instances that i've been aware of. i hope the vast majority are

deterred from trying in the first place. rep. grothman: right. you can forward to the committee later the examples where you really feel that you can't somebody who would have done the horrible thing if you had not happened. second question -- if you had not caught them. second question, and we had a hearing a while ago on this. what i took out of it is that, you know, maybe dogs would be a better way to go about this. there were slipups. have you done any work with dogs were used them as a trial -- dogs or used them as a trial? neffenger: we have quite a few canine teams deployed throughout the aviation system. i'm in the process of moving some of those teams from what i consider to be smaller, lower risk airports to the large airports. i don't know the exact -- i think the number is somewhere around 112 teams. i think dogs are a very important additional element of

security in the system. they provide a lot of capability, both for cargo screening as well as passenger screening. i'm a big proponent of the use of canine teams. rep. grothman: can you see the day when we use more dogs and less people? neffenger: i don't know that dogs will ever replace the people component. rep. grothman: not entirely. neffenger: but i think i can see a day for using more dogs, and we are doing that going forward. rep. grothman: would they ever release people -- replace people? rather than seeing a uniformed people, i see -- seeing eight uniformed people, ict to uniformed -- i see two uniformed people and a dog? neffenger: we are still largely dealing with the exception of the machine, the same kind of sad when we have had for the past decade or more -- the same kind of check point we have had the past decade or more.

i think we are looking at a very different checkpoint experience in the next five years. rep. grothman: a while back, there was a guy who felt it was a very top-heavy organization. you doing things to reduce the number -- are you doing things to reduce the number of administrative staff? neffenger: we have a total of about 6000 people in the tsa since spring of 2013. in the past two years, almost three years, we have reduced the workforce by about 200%. i think we will continue to do so. i have asked to hold steady for the coming year as we look at the impact of the elimination of managed inclusion and i look to correct what i see to be systemic issues in the organization, then we will revisit the staffing standards following this year. more do see that there are efficiencies to be gained, always, in an organization. i think you have to look at that continuously. rep. grothman: ok. what do you pay your people

starting? one of the guys or gals that i see, what is the compensation? neffenger: it varies by location. there is locality pay. it is roughly equivalent to the incoming level for -- rep. grothman: how much is it? neffenger: i think it runs somewhere around $28,000 to $30,000?- $28,000 to rep. grothman: do you have a hard time writing people? --fenger: it is a challenge hard time finding people? neffenger: it is a challenge. rep. grothman: there any reason people 65 couldn't do that job neffenger: -- that job? neffenger: not at all. we have quite a few people that age. rep. grothman: i ran into someone who had been on your

trouble list for a long peter -- period. he was not as mad about it as i would be. people called police on him. people came in with their guns drawn. if you look at the guy, you think, what? some little guy who lives in a town in wisconsin. how quickly does it take people to get off this list? how quickly should a mistake like this -=- neffenger: there is redress process that we partly manage its. -- manage. i'm not familiar with the specific. if i can get specifics, we can look at that case, but there is a process. if you think you have been inaccurately placed on the list, there is a redress process on the list. it is a pretty fast process as i understand it, but it is a process. rep. grothman: along time for this guy. -- a long time for this guy. neffenger: i will certainly take

a look if you have the details for me. chairman: thank you. miss maloney? maloney: tsa relies on many different pieces of equivalents to carry out its screening tasks. advanced imaging technology machines, walk through metal detectors, ask those of trace detection machines -- explosive trace detection machines, bottle liquid scanners, other pieces of equipment. the ig's office issued a report that said tsa is not overly managing the maintenance of its equipment -- not properly managing the maintenance of its screening equipment. it says the tsa relies on self-reported data provided by maintenance contractors and does not validate the data to confirm that required preventive actions have been taken. tsa also does not validate the corrective maintenance data reported by his contractors. my question is to the inspector

general. if tsa has not been validating the data reported by its contractors, can you be sure that all required maintenance has been performed and that its machines are operating correctly? they cannot., you accurately summarized what those reports are. the functional equivalent of giving your car to the mechanic but not checking to see whether or not they've changed the spark plugs. maloney: that is important. do any of the contractors as possible for the maintenance of tsa agreement have sole-source contracts? is it competitively bid or is it a sole-source contract? i.g. roth: my understanding is it is competitively bid, but i think i need to get back to you. maloney: can you get back to me and the chairman and ranking member? have any contractors ever been penalized for failing to perform any type of maintenance task? i.g. roth: i'm not aware of any,

but let me take that back and be sure of the answer. maloney: what recommendations did you make to improve these? neffenger: -- i.g. roth: we did make a number of recommendations regarding the process that tsa uses to verify the maintenance. that is still in process. we allow them time to be able to institute changes. i will get back to you with the specifics. oney: administrator neffenger, are you confident that tsa now has a systems in place to hold its contractors accountable for providing proper maintenance of its equipment and are you confident tsa's equipment is being maintained and repaired properly? neffenger: thanks for that question. let me first say that i concur completely with the inspector general's findings, and i did find that we had -- not that the maintenance wasn't

being done, but that we had no way to verify it was appropriate and done. we put the process in place to do so. we have to measure whether those processes are adequate to do that. i'm confident that certainly i get it and that the person i understand with it the importance of having an auditable follow-up trail to everything that is done to ensure that equipment is maintained to standards. maloney: i know you feel the responsibility you have to the american people. we know there are many who want to harm our citizens and that they tried to do it, for some reason, through the airplanes, and they are continuing to break our system. i checked with the airlines in my area. they have incidents where they are trying to break through. having the oversight and the audit and making sure that this is happening is critically important. i look forward to you getting back to the committee, inspector general roth, on the answers

that you needed to review more for us. i think they are important questions. i look forward to seeing what your response is. i think you for your public service -- i thank you for your public service. thank you for being here today. i yield back. chairman: i will finish with a round of summary questions here. ,irst of all, mr. administrator we have discussed who poses a risk. it is less than 1% of the travelers that are examined, of the 660 million. is that still your position? put anfenger: i could not exact number on it. 20,000 toprobably 50,000 people on some sort of watchlist or no-fly list that we are looking to not board, who

may pose a risk. but we are spending about 95% of our resources, again, on folks who pose no risk. you talked about where you are going, and i saw some of your report. i was pleased to see that you are looking to the future. here is my boarding pass. i have been to europe last year. i was there twice, once in italy and once in germany. type screenersa at the entry point. i have pictures of it. i'd be glad to show you. you go up into -- go up and put your boarding pass on, and this guy will let you through. if it doesn't let you through, there is a person who would subject you to additional screening. that's almost commonplace now in europe in the domestic arena. maybe you saw that when you were there? neffenger: i did.

chairman: we have people going through this, some of the dumbest things i've ever seen. let me borrow your cell phone. you put your cell phone down, and they let you through. but then you've got another tsa, if you don't have it on your electronic device, then you have someone who takes time and they go through and circle each thing. there are just things like that and where we are not -- can you name any countries other than bulgaria, romania, or lend -- poland, sort of in the more sophisticated countries, that have all federal screening? neffenger: i will get back to you. chairman: there are none. it is -- israel. but it is under federal supervision. i have never said do away with tsa. i have said change your role, change the resources to

connecting the dots to security. that's what's going to get us. every time we have been successful in stopping someone, it is connecting the dots. but again, you said it may be five years before we could get to this. this should be tomorrow. neffenger: actually, i think we will get to that much faster. chairman: and we should be and betting the information -- should be and betting -- should be embedding the information here. i saw that in nürnberg in 2003. the systems exists. we just keep falling further behind, adding more people. if you aresaying training them, you are sending them back to basics. to a law enforcement training program? neffenger: no. it's at the federal law enforcement training center. it's not a law enforcement training program. chairman: we have to make it clear. some of my colleagues do not know that tsl personnel are not

sworn personnel -- tsa personnel are not sworn personnel. they are screeners. neffenger: that's correct. chairman: you have this huge bureaucracy trying to recruit, and maybe you have gotten better. i have disclosed we are hiring above --pizza box ads and above discount gas pump advertisements for screeners. hopefully, that has stopped. you have actually trained more people than you employ. do you know that? you have actually trained more people? they are gone. maturing -- your turnover has been in some places horrendous. granted, some markets are very difficult. we had equipment -- we have equipment, and this is about equipment. i heard about the failures to

maintain, to operate, to train people for it, advanced imaging technology. the deployment is a disaster. how many machines do we have? 700 and what? neffenger: about 750 machines currently. chairman: how many airports? about 400 -- 300, 290 about airports that don't even have an ait machine. i'm mr. dumb terrorist. where am i going to go? ait is the best system we have, but it can be thwarted. you have made some refinements to it, but personnel are human beings. they are going to fail. they're going to -- i will bet the staff a dollar they'll be

back here, we'll do it next september we'll do the same hearing. we'll have testing and maybe you'll improve slightly but it'll still be a disaster. it's been a disaster in every classified hearing i've sat in. if it was publicly known people would scream for some change. i want to get you out of the personnel business, which is that huge, again, not law enforcement, but screening. you need to be in intelligence and connecting the dots and security. setting the protocols shall the standard. seeing who is not performing. getting rid of them if it's a private firm that's operating. okay. so here's our ait's. we have 450 airports, at 160 locations. then you go to the locations when they put them out. it was mind boggling. and how are you going to change

that? it cost hundreds of thousands of dollars for the equipment. then it cost the airports and you a fortune to put them in place. you go to some concourses and they got two or three of them in one concourse. it was never intended for that. it was intended to be a secondary screening device. and then in other concourses even at the national you go to, one of our airports and some of the concourses have none. so you have started having, god bless you, trying to change a mess. but even the deployment of that important machine has been a disaster. when we spoke i asked you about reducing some of the overhead. you've got thousands of people in overhead. 46,000 screeners. it was up to 15,000 we found either within the 46,000 here in washington. one time there were 4,000 making 103 thousand dollars on

average just within 20 miles of where we're sitting. some of those may be important responsibilities, but, again, we have to, a public-private screening partnership. i am a firm believer. they probably, well i know they perform a little better than you because i've had that tested. they came back and told me. you know what the response was when there was a fair, open test? they said private screening performed under federal supervision private screening under federal supervision performed statistically significantly better. i don't care how polite your agents are. that's nice to have them polite. you've impressed some of the members. what i care is if they are able to deter a terrorist from getting through. and they are not law enforcement personnel. they are screening personnel. you've got your whole billions

of dollars focused on people who don't pose a risk. we need to get away from that model. a member of congress mr. wahlberg who testified, he's got an i.d. card. sometimes they don't even recognize a federal i.d. ask you for a driver's license. but i've had hearings here on driver's licenses and i.d.'s that can and have been duplicated. that's one of the easiest things you can do. i can take and make you the fanciest boarding pass i'll challenge you, be glad to go out and take one and i can get through any of your gates at national or anyplace else with st a little bit of work on a computer. so again, we've set up a system that is destined to fail. you'll be back here. maybe slight improvement, training some more folks, maybe a little bit better retention.

back to the partnerships. in rochester, one of several dozen public-private partnerships i told you they had at one time 15 to 18 people. most of them making between 60 and a hundred and some thousand dollars. they have 1.1 million passengers. i went to canada. looked at similar operations. they have one federal person. i think you need a federal person, someone charged with the intelligence and conducting the oversight audit on daily basis and making certain it works. is there any hope of getting a reduction of some of the people we don't need at these programs where we have the public/private partnership? >> as you know, we actually have reduced the number of oversight directly from the partnership but there is additional responsibility. there is a surface inspection in transportation so a number of those people are involved in

compliance examinations and the surface examinations. >> and is there anything that can't be done through a contract? okay. two, three, four people at an airport like rochester. not 15 or 16. again, i know the game. you pack it so it makes it look like it costs more or as much for private screening under federal supervision. we'll have a report that be released soon and show some of the -- at least that costs less under that. not that i'm trying to do it on the cheap. they're just more efficient. i support federal wages. no change in that. i support union membership. i put that in the bill in the beginning bill. in fact in the private screening in san francisco they had folks belonging to unions long before the most recent sign up of folks across the area. i have another question the

chairman wants me to get in. will you let the committee know today or within the period we a p the record open, we want complete response on when you will -- you will finish and address all of the recommendations that the i.g. and g.a.o. have put forward. could you give us that today do you think, or do you want to give it to us for the record? >> i'll give you a schedule for the record, but what i will tell you is what i told both the inspector general and director grover. and that is that i am committed to addressing all the remaining open recommendations as well as any that remain that are nonconcurs and getting those closed. >> if you can get the committee

in the next what are you going to leave this open, 10 days? 10 days, without objection, so we'll leave it open for 10 days? no i'm not finished. i was just leaving it open and making certain to comply with your wishes, too. but in any event, 10 days and we would like that made part of the official record and exact a date -- again, i'm going to hold a subcommittee hearing if we don't hold a full one within a year, give you a chance. you're here and i love your attitude, i love your willingness to be open with the committee. you've inherited one of the most difficult tasks. you're the what, sixth administrator i've dealt with them all. i think you're one of the most capable that we've been fortunate to have. we need to look at rerighting

the ship on this whole security thing. get you out of the business that gives you the headaches. i know you'll go back and say mica is full of it and don't listen to him. as long as you keep trying to manage a $46,000 department you are going to have problems with recruiting, with training, with retaining, with managing. you will never get it right. i can assure you. not that it's your fault. you're dealing with human beings. and then using all of that resource to go after 99% of the people who don't pose a risk, not expediting their passage and not redirecting those resources toward the bad guys connecting the dots, security, making certain that you set the standards. then as the inspector general and director grover have said, that you bear down on those that are not meeting the standards that you have. you kick their butts out. you fire them. you terminate their contract.

that's your, i believe, your role. so again, welcome. isn't this great? you want to reconsider? no. you are a true hero to come forward. i have the greatest respect for you and what you're going to try to do. i'm trying to get you to see a year from now what you're going to face when you come back here and where we'll be. with that, thank you. and i want to yield to the ranking member. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to thank all of you for your patience. i know it has already been a long morning. i only have a few questions. as all of you know, our nation as one standard for merchant mariners and employees who need access to secure areas of ports. it is called a quick card. use of the quick was required by the maritime transportation

security act and each quisi bryan is issued by the t.s.a. administrator neffenger, i'm curious given your background with the coast guard which model do you think is better? should credentials for access to facilities and secure areas be issued by each individual facility or should they be issued by a national entity like t.s.a.? >> i don't know if i have a good, direct answer to that. by that i mean this. when you have a nationally issued i.d. card that creates a lot of challenge in managing it and issuing it. and it introduces some concerns with respect to its viability across a large organization. that said, i think that both systems have -- can work effectively if the oversight is what it should be.

i think as i look at the environment in the airports, airports would argue that they like the fact that the badges are different because it means you can't move from one airport to another and show up and get access. you have to have something that says your airport on it. i think we can do a lot more to ensure the security of those badges and to ensure the accountability of those badges as we move forward. there is an awful lot of information that came out of what the aviation security advisory committee study told about the way to manage and ensure the integrity of those badges going forward as well as to look at the oversight of those. the inspector general has pointed out some important areas for us to consider so i don't really know which approach is better. i think both approaches can work very effectively but they need a lot of oversight no matter which way you take it. as you know there have been some challenges in the quick program as well.

>> are you confident that full implementation of your plans will ensure t.s.a.'s screening systems will pass future cove ert tests by the inspector general and t.s.a.'s own combt testing teams? >> well, testing will tell. i'm confident we're on the right track. i hope it means we will see dramatic improvement in the future. i believe it will but i don't believe we can just declare it done and move forward. i think this is a continuous process and a continuous attention. this is one of these things that as i said before you can't just fix this and assume you've got it right. this is -- what it's allowed us to do is see that this is an ongoing attention that needs throughout the entire life of the organization. there is no fixing it. there is addressing the challenges, learning from what you've addressed, testing yourself, learning from those testings, and that continuous improvement as we go forward. what i will tell you is that

certainly for the duration of my tenure i will never take my focus off continuing to test this system, evaluating the processs and training we put in place, continuing to adjust them as we discover whether they work or don't work and then looking how to distribute the best practices across the whole system. that includes looking to our international partners for anything that they might be doing that can inform the way we do business. this global system relies on global standards and global consistency. >> now, as you've heard g.a.o. state today, t.s.a. has not always established performance measures that clearly aligned with its goals. how will you know if you have altered the pervasive cultural problems in t.s.a.? and what performance metrics will confirm it? >> we took a look at the entire measurement system. i took a look at it.

and essentially said, look. the current way we're measuring isn't leading us to improving the system. there's a readiness component. i want to know if the work force is ready. are they trained? do they know the mission? do they have the support of leadership? is there ongoing attention to that? i want to look at their performance and test them. did all that stuff work? did what i think about their readiness actually show itself in their performance? the system has to have same sort of measures. you need to know is the system ready meaning have we maintained it appropriately? can we verify we have maintained it appropriately? is it meeting the standards before we deploy it that we expect it to meet? all those other things that go into does it work. then the second piece is how well does it perform when you plug it into the system? then you have to go back and you test that as well. so you're testing the people, the processes, and the technology. both its readiness to do its mission as well as the actual production of that mission. it's a continuous process. i will tell you that right now i get a report on a weekly

basis directly to me on those measures. we have a ways to go yet. we're getting this organization used to a new way of thinking. it's measuring effectiveness, focusing on the security component, and the effectiveness of that, defining that mission in a very clear way. and then looking to see what we're learning as we're studying it. we've actually learned quite a bit already about system readiness. both in the work force as well as in the technology. and it's leading to some things that we have to do to improve that. on both scores. and it's also beginning to fight point the way toward how we'll effectively measure performance including working with the inspector general and g.a.o. as we go forward. i see this as a very valuable partnership even recognizing they have to be independent and they're skeptical and i want them to stay that way but they give me valuable information about how my system is working. >> let me say this.

one of the things i pushed with the coast guard, with the secret service, and the city police, is i've said that i want them to create an organization which is the elite of the elite. in other words, a feeling that we are the best. and that our standards are high. and i believe that when you have, you get there, the people who are caught up in the culture of made yock ritty will fall off because they don't feel like they belong, period. you won't have to fire them. they'll leave. some you may have to fire but most will just back off. as i've heard the testimony today, one of the things that it just gnaws at me is the idea that we have now an agency that's willing to accept the recommendations and director grover i keep going back to some of the things you said about accepting these

recommendations. nd then trying to do them. but we still have those gaps. as i was sitting here listening to all of this i was saying to myself, well maybe it's not just all the things you just said. but you have to add something else to it. i think that when you -- when we have recommendations, and then your agency looks at them and says, oh, yeah. we got to do this. yeah. we missed that. we fwot to do that. it may go back to that whole idea of trying to impress or get it done, but not concentrating on why we're doing it. you know, why that's important. and some kind of way i think to get to the elite of the elite i think full understanding of why it is and the fact that bad things can happen and perhaps if you're not on guard they will. and i keep -- for some reason i keep going back to katrina. i think about katrina almost every day.

because one of those situations, director grover, where we claimed we were ready. we couldn't even communicate across town. and like i said, when they said the rubber meets the road, we didn't have a road. our country is so much better than that. so i think one thing is leadership. another is metrics. i'm hoping that i'll talk to chairman chaffetz and he's been very open to accepting the model that we used in the coast guard subcommittee where we constantly brought folks back where uld actually see we were going. one thing as you heard me say many times, a lot of times agencies, and i'm not saying you did this, but agencies will wait out a congress and then so there is no real accountability. going back to what you said ks director grover. you got to have accountability. one of the best ways is set deadlines. then come back and report.

and it may be that you don't achieve every single thing you want to achieve but hopefully we can get in, you know, see our progress. by the way, i think when the agency sees its progress, that again helps them feel like the elite among the elite. finally, you know, i just thank all of you for working together. i thank you for having the attitude that you have. i think one of the biggest mistakes we make is sometimes we act like, you know, the inspector general and director grover, that we're on different teams. but what you're saying is we're all on the same team trying to lift up the american people and keep them safe. that's the team we're on. that's our team. and so if i've got a member of the team that can see things that i can't see, and can bring them to my attention, and help me become better and again become the elite of the elite, i think that's what we ought to

be about. i thank you for having that kind of attitude. because that's what's going to get us where we've got to go. i think that when -- i go back to what mr. goudie said a little earlier. i'll tell you, i have had nothing but good experiences with t.s.a. i mean, everywhere i go. ahn i know that we've got some great men and women working for that organization. and just at the same time inthey're also human. i think we have to constantly find those ways to keep it, you know, refreshing their skills and reminding them how important their job is and how we appreciate them. because i can tell you when you got somebody, you got hundreds of people every day trying to rush to get to a flight, some of them are very upset. they got the kids, got the stroller. all of this and then they got to be checked. an sure that's just

opportunity for people's frustrations to get out of hand, but yet i've seen over nd over again where t.s.a. officers have just been very patient, understanding, and trying to do the right thing at all times and at the same time protect us. again, i thank you all. we look forward to seeing you again. your testimony has been extremely meaningful and i think it can lead us into effectiveness and efficiency. i've often said that there's nothing like having motion, commotion, and emotion and no results. we have to have results. nd i think we can get there. i think you've given us a road map to get there. >> i thank the members for participating. we've gone through all the membership and you all have been most accommodating. realize the task you have about

a -- i particularly want to thank the inspector general and also the director. you have an important role with your oversight. the committee conducts some oversight. we rely on you and your independence in going forward and the goal here is to keep the american public safe to make certain that we don't have another 9/11 and that we do the the that we can with resources given to us by the taxpayers. that being said there being no further business before the committee i will mention to the staff that we will be submitting to you all as witnesses additional questions in this interim time for a response. so we want you to know those responses will also be made part of the record. there being no further business, this hearing of the government reform and oversight committee is adjourned. thank you.

>> on the next "washington journal" congressman seth moulton of massachusetts talks about his four tours in iraq as a marine corps infantry officer. then congressman luke messer of indiana on upcoming fiscal dead lanse and how house republican leadership will change under speaker paul ryan. later our spotlight on magazines features katherine mangu-ward of "reason" magazine on plastic bags and what prohibitionists get wrong about them. "washington journal" is live every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. join the conversation with your calls and comments on facebook and twitter. >> wednesday in the house foreign affairs committee looks at russia's involvement in syria and u.s. policy in the region. live coverage beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern on espn3.

live coverage beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. >> about whom will you next write? i thought there is only one person about who whom i would write if i were to write a second biography. i remembered barnhoffer and of course i did write that book. i thought i'm going to be standing next to the president, speaking to 3,500 of the most important people in the world in this room here in d.c. who knows how i'll feel in the moment? i don't know. so i had the idea that i might do that. i thought maybe i'll give him the books later. but if i feel, you know, as a new yorker i'll use the word "chutzpah" but if i feel the chutzpah in the moment to be able to pull off the goofiness i'll do it. >> this sunday night on "q & a" author and radio host eric metaxes on his writing career and his crossover between religion and politics. >> i think it is important for everybody to take politics

seriously and at least to vote but never to make what we christians would call an idol of politics. there are people that have done that and they're sort of worshiping, you know, at that idol rather than the god who would cause them to care for the poor and i think that is a fine line and something i talked about fairly often. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's "q & ." >> c-span presents landmark cases, the book. a guide to our landmark cases series, which explores 12 historic supreme court decisions, including marbury s. madison, koremotsu vs. united states, brown vs. board of education, miranda vs. arizona, and roe vs. wade. landmark cases the book features introductions, background, highlights, and the

impact of each case. written by veteran supreme court journalist tony morrow and published by c-span in cooperation with c.q. press an imprint of sage publications incorporated. landmark cases is available for $8.95 plus shipping. get your copy today at c-span.org/landmark cases. >> the house rules committee considered amendments to the highway and transit bill on tuesday. the bill is a six-year authorization of highway transit programs and covers three years of shortfalls in the highway trust fund. the committee debated for just over three hours on amendments that will be considered on the house floor wednesday. >> thank you very much for joining us this afternoon. as promised, we were going to and as soon as bob goodlat walked in we'd get started. i'd like to advise our friends

and the number of members that we have here we're going to try and do these five at a time on a panel. i would encourage all of our members to feel free to be as succint as they choose, make their point, and the committee will try and work through these also. there are a number of people who have spent a good bit of time talking with me about their amendments and i expect and want them also to share with the committee so i don't want to try and tell anybody just come up and do nothing. but i think that we will remember we have several hundred amendments to go through today and please do remember as you're speaking about an amendment please give us that number and give us the ability to work through that. several people have several amendments. i'd like to call first if i can the gentleman from virginia mr. goodlatte, the gentleman from california, mr. denham, the gentleman from illinois mr. davis, the gentleman from illinois mr. lipinski and the gentleman from california, the agle scout in the crowd, mr.

armindi. anybody who has anything in writing please leave that for our stenographer. john, i'll have you move around. it is a better shot of you with the camera if we get you right next to bob. yeah. i know. it is if you're from california. before we get started i want to defer to my friend the gentleman from florida for any opening statement he'd like to make. [audio difficulty] >> the committee, our staff

spent a good deal of time going through the amendments but there is nothing better than having the real, live person behind the name come up and explain the importance of this. i want you to know that this committee is excited about getting this bill. we have been waiting for this rather than an extension for a long, long time. and we have seen many of you have been pushing some amendments on a lot of bills that go through. but this is the, i think the right day to try and make this work and i'm just very glad that you're here. mr. goodlatte, i'm going to let you go ahead and please be >> the first one is an amendment i have offered. it is amendment 42 to the non-transportation provision of related toery much transportation. it embodies a preconference resolution.

senator portman and senator mccaskill support this as well. this amendment will bridge the gap between these vital pieces of legislation. these bills have been companions for multiple terms in our effort to streamline the process by which federal agencies review and decide upon applications for federally funded and federally permitted objects. this reform is essential to create new, high paying jobs and strengthen our economy. it is a priority of the house, senate, and the president. 280 was incorporated into the amendment. it is so, included into the base bill in two of