and also i would like inspector general roth to speak to that issue. i know you have been relentless in very good about this. in the past, there has been denial. i don't think we are hearing that from you mr. deat neffenger, but in the past there is a culture of denial. disaster on a major a commercial airline or train and we are not going to be able -- people will say, we did not see that coming, but we did. we had and we see it now. i wonder what our response is going to be to address that issue. let metrator neffenger: see if i can address a couple of the points you made with what we are doing. the last point on the insider people withrn,

badges in airports. there has been some concerned that security of the bad population. it should be a trusted population. how do you determine whether they are to be trusted? what safeguards do you put in place, inc. think there is work to be done there. i'm encouraged by secretary johnson's reach, earlier this year prior to my confirmation, he asked the aviation security thatory committee members advised the department and the administrator, they took a hard look and came up with 28 recommendations, with which tsa is fully concurrent, and they are looking for an implementation plan. that said, it was a challenge. having real-time access to the appropriate databases to screen people. that against the terrorist database.

it taking off a lot of time to give me a little answer. administrator neffenger: the 73 members, 69 discrete individuals were not actually on the terrorist watch list. in what had incomplete is called a terrorist information data environment. that information was not sufficient to raise the known or suspected terrorist data. it is clear they were not -- we don't make those determinations, that is the fbi. with respect to ensuring we pay attention to the evolving threat, i am directly connected to my counterparts across the intelligence community. i get a daily briefing that is the synthesis of what everyone is seeing. i'm very concerned about how complex and dynamic threat environment is, in some respect it is the most complex we have seen since 9/11.

silt makes groups like i particularly concerning his they are intending to inspire, and the intent and operation phase is compressing. >> can i ask the inspector general at it he could give his version? i still think we have a problem and i'm still worried about it, and i'm not hearing decisive action being taken. we are well over time, but if the inspector general will care to comment. thank you for your indulgence, mr. chairman. inspector gen. roth: this goes what i call beyond the checkpoint. our focus is in the check point but there is a lot of security risk the on the checkpoint. aviation worker vetting is one of them. we did an audit of tsa's job as a regulator, in other words the

airports have the duty to manage the restricted access badges. and adjudicate criminal histories of those workers. what we found in a recent audit as a regulator, tsa only examines perhaps 1% of all the adjudications that the airports do. anytime you have an issue or the airports have part of the responsibility and tsa has part of the responsibility, you have seams. that is what worries me. i think we will be paying more attention to that as time goes on. >> thank you. thank you mr. chairman. >> i recognize myself for five minutes. administrator, quick answers if we could. to bring a gun threat checkpoint and you get caught, what happens to that person? administrator neffenger: depends on the airport. but it's turned over to local law enforcement. >> do they

we have a study underway on that

issue right now. there are annual exams the screeners have to pass to keep their jobs. there are requirements for retraining if there are errors. >> maybe the inspector general can ask, the behavioral profiling part of this program, on how well that is being? implemented? ? >> this is about $200 million per year in the premise is the officers will be able to spot .ndividuals who pose a threat >> does it work? >> we don't know. >> inspector general, have you looked at this? >> we found the were no matches

that the tsa had provided as far as what success looks like. they had very poor data collection, insufficient training of the bodo's. the whole idea is that you can take the population and figure out who is the greatest risk. >> are they putting too many people into the tsa pre-line? >> that was our concern. based on several audits we did in the spring of this year, we believe that the administrator has taken significant and drastic action to reduce the number of individuals had not been individually vetted. here is that

behavioral profiling is an important part, but how to train and implement that is a critical component. there is a perception that the canine teams are able to detect things that would make someone very nervous. goingesence of a canine through a metal detector would be much more effective and efficient. that we need to pay keen attention to that. my time has expired and i will recognize miss kelly for five minutes. screening lanes designated as free tech lanes are available for more than 150 airports according to tsa's website. several ways that travelers can assess the recheck lanes. data on a fee, provided themselves and undergo background checks.

the applicant is enrolled in a pre-check program. tsa has been directing some travelers to the expedited lines even if they did not enroll in the program. specifically they can be directed through procedures called manage inclusion one and manage inclusion two. in your testimony you wrote that at your discretion they have phased out the practice known as manage inclusion two. can you discuss what this program was and why it has ended and what has been the impact? >> the manage inclusion to program that you referred to is a term given to the practice of randomly assigning people in a standard screening lane to the expedited screening lane. i was stunned with a random generator. was pushing at its peak

about 14% of average daily travelers. these are people who had not been through the pre-check. there were some things that were done that were intended to buy down the risk of some individuals. it was my opinion when they took over that it was an untenable risk area as of september 12, it was eliminated completely. on?ow long did that go >> i think it was 1.5 years or so. moving, another form of a much smaller number. the use of passenger sniffing assign someandomly

standards from passenger screening into the expedited lanes and using the canines and some additional measures that apply to each of them. i will get you the exact number. but i am a big fan and a big opponent of a fully vetted population. to the -- going back earlier comments about risk-based security, i want to know as much as i can about an individual traveling as they come through. goal is to significantly expand over the coming months and to completely eliminate the random assignment of anyone into the pre-check lane. >> do you feel that more people are going through the recheck program?- pre-check the last couple times i traveled, there were many more people at o'hare. >> we are seeing a huge spike in

an roland. -- in enrollments. tron's --efore the response to our recent request for proposals to expand the marketing opportunities up to three additional private sector vendors to look for more retail opportunities. i talked with the airline and the travel industry, if you have flown recently you may have seen on the in-flight screen advertisements for pre-checks that the industry is working hard to increase enrollment as well. younspector general roth, said you are pleased to report that we are making progress in getting concurrence and compliance with recommendation. that tsa is continuing to use some risk assessment tools and you have recommended that they discontinue.

discussextent, can you the recommendations are offices regarding access to expedited screening processes? >> thank you for that question. had as an overlay, we number of open recommendations or regarding recommendations tha did not agree with and those are set forth starting at page 20. one of the things that i wanted to do was to highlight in bold those that have changed in the last six months. disagreementst no between the tsa and the office of inspector general. narrow pointirly because this is an open setting, it is not possible to discuss it, that there is a certain risk profile or type of passenger that we believe should not be in expedited screening. these are good faith discussions as to what is an appropriate

level of risk and i am confident we will get to a place that text the american people and removes passengers in an expedited way. >> i have one more. am i passed my time? oh, i am sorry. i yield back. >> i know recognize mr. meadows. >> thank you for your testimony. you for your testimony. inspector general roth, i'm glad to hear you say a lot of the disagreement has disappeared. previously, that was a major the aig making recommendations and tsa somehow believe they had had on and they were figuring out what to anticipate. continuedcourage that partnership.

speaking of partnerships, i want to focus on the partnership for public service. to lowcally with regards employee morale. we have held hearings in this very room about some of the worst basis to work -- places to work, which perhaps that title was not the best to pick. but we have also found that there is a tremendous opportunity in terms of employee morale on how to encourage the workforce. consistently,s let's just say it is not something you would try to attain. do i have your commitment to date to reach out to some of those agencies that get good marks on that survey to i doubt the best actresses that they have -- practices that they have? nasa and particular gets high marks.

do i have your commitment? administrator neffenger: yes sir, and so does the workforce. >> director grover, let me go to you. it you could briefly summarize your concerns as it relates to the ait machines and procurement thereof, and some of the challenges we have had their. re. director grover: that's a really important issue, because it is one of the main technologies tsa relies on for screening passengers. what we originally found was tsa had consider the effectiveness of the technology in a laboratory, but had not consider the broader picture of employees who use them in the airport environment, and they have taken steps to address that in the procurement of the next version of the aip system. -- ait system. they have started measuring the effectiveness of the entire system and that is very important. one recommendation we start open is tsa should pay close

attention to its understanding rate offorce -- alarm weigh the machines. it has repercussions for security effectiveness because screeners are used to a high farc false alarm rate. it also has repercussions for financing, because every time that machine alarms, the person has to go pat down. if the false alarm rates would be reduced, it would have financial implications as well. that is something tsa is working on. they do not yet have systemwide understanding of the operational false alarm rates. >> administrator, i see you shaking your head. you are willing to work with that and make sure we come out with a matrix? here's one of the concerns i have. we want to work on it but we don't put parameters to judge whether we are successful or not. thatork on a matrix

satisfies gal as it relates to fox -- false marks. administrator neffenger: and not only death that we are working hard to restructure the process we use for this. i think director grover has raised important points, and they are the key challenges we face, but we can do it unless we change the way we do business. that has given us an opportunity to completely restructure the way we do business. >> when we talk about restructuring the way we do thatess, one of the things happens a lot is administrators come here and say, we need more money. in a bipartisan fashion, we are willing to give you the resources necessary to do it, if you are willing to look at not only the recommendations the ig and tao have looked at, but look at re-creating the way you do a businessom standpoint. the chairman mentioned a k-9 unit.

is there a plan to look at canines to bring them in during high peak, high times of travel? not 1:00 in the morning, when two tsa tsa -- personnel. but to alleviate the backlog, are you willing to come up with a proposal and submit to the committee on how you can implement that? administrator neffenger: i will, and i thing to have a good story with respect to the canines. i looked at the current disposition of canines across the nation, and repositioning a number of those from small, lesser traveled airports to the large high-volume airports, we are bringing a number of new teams onboard.i will get you a full report for the committee because i think it is a good we are and it shows moving, i believe, in the right direction with respect to the system.

that you havegree to take a systemic view. if you look at discrete elements all you do is look at discrete elements, and you will not think about how the internet -- interact for another. the entireng at aviation security and understanding all components interact and how effective they are. it speaks everything from false alarm rates to the proper use of canines, two other things. i'm happy to provide a much fuller brief at the committee's discussion on how we are doing that. >> field that. >> we recognize the gentlewoman from the district of columbia for five minutes. mr.hank you very much chairman, this is an important hearing. before i ask my question, administrator nothing your, this license. of the we have had to have the administrator in, because it

changes from washington dc, to saying district of columbia. this has befuddled screeners, and some of them have hassles the placeorts because where you are is not recognized. i want to provide you with a copy of this before you leave, so that periodic reminders can be made. i understand it was changed from washington dc. there was an attempt by the administrator, the deputy administrator works closely with me. i want to make sure this does not have to come up on your watch. --neffenger, i have set and seeing what is going on at the airport, for example at the r federal

people who know something about the human mind and how it operates. you will always get that they in fact don't have bonds or pistols. -- bombs or pistols. we need to learn more. we are getting the same results no matter where they are. whether they are magnetometers or tsa. for example, for tsa, we have had people do -- bring bombs in shoes to try to detonate their shoes. we've had a so-called underwear bomber. and it's interesting to note that, with respect to those went throughhey multiple layers of security and, , who, passengers, not tsa in fact, were called on to put

peopleose very dangerous . this leads me to ask whether or equipped, forlly example, to discover -- we have this matter before the congress, these plastic handguns. if they can't find ordinary ands like bombs and pistols they are, as you can see, very inventive, what i'm wondering is, does tsa have access to the intelligence to meet their adopted next, -- they are adaptivenessheir in light of emerging threats? they are not going to do the same in that passengers did before. do you have a intelligence, or

do you have to depend on some other agency? if so, how do they relate to you what the emerging intelligence reveals? neffenger: think you for that question. just to be clear, the underwear bomber and the shoe bomber, those were not screened by tsa because they came from overseas. it is one of the reasons that we became concerned about the nonmetallic threat. i do have access to intelligence. as i noted earlier, every morning, i get intelligence briefing. it is a compilation of thelligence from across intelligence community. i meet regularly with other members of the unity. we have people embedded in all of the major intelligence components, the national counterterrorism center, the csa -- cia, nsa. norton: do your screen yourselves?

neffenger: we do. and then continuous recurrent vetting of individuals who are in the trusted traveler programs. norton: is understand the screeners often pass their own tests when you do your own internal vetting. when someone has to stand in the same place, doing the same thing, seeing the same thing, don't they need to know more about the human brain operates, so that we can better equip screeners to do this, frankly, very boring job? r: i think that is a key point. one of the things we look at is what are the repeated causes -- holmes norton: who is looking at that? neffenger: it is the root cause

analysis team. now that i have found these causes, can we correct them ourselves? rep. holmes norton: when you consider getting an outside study from people equipped -- would you consider getting an outside study from people who understand how the human brain works, so that we can get a hold of this? neffenger: i think it is important to look at human factors, so i would look at it. >> we now recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. carter. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. i understand some of the information may be classified and, certainly, if i overstepped my downs -- if i bounds, iy understand. would ask more detailed questions. it has been reported that the undercover investigators were --

what areas where they, specifically, looking at? wasn't the typical area that a passenger goes through? the typical area that a passenger goes through? it is a typical area that a passenger goes through and tries to get items through the checkpoint. for example, if they were part of managed inclusion through no action of their own, but sent through a magnetometer, going through that way as well. they acted like normal passengers, except they had things hidden on them. r: it did not look at where employees are going. it was typical passenger? covertth: we did some testing gw's ago, trying -- testing two years ago, trying to get into those areas. the results were disappointing.

carter: you mentioned the imaging machines. were their guns or simulated bombs you were able to get through? did they get through the imaging machine as well? i.g. roth: i cannot talk about the specifics unfortunately. we did test the machine. the results were disappointing. carter: as well as the x-ray machines? i.g. roth: correct. carter: earlier this year, you testified before the homeland committee. you said that your testing found layers of security something missing. and then you seemed to indicate .hose results were expected is that true? i.g. roth: yes. the results were expected. the degree of the results were i think a bit surprising to us. we have done covert testing over the years with very similar

results to the ones we did this year. and i would add that once we get the results this year, we discovered that tsa itself had done covert testing with very similar results. so everything had been consistently poor for a number of years, which, of course, was both exasperating and troubling to us. neffenger, given these results and these findings, what do you plan to do to address what has been called missing layers of security? neffenger: first, it is a full system review. it started with understanding the nature of the failures that existed, to look at how those were similar to other andoveries in past years, as i mentioned before, to really figure out what is the systemic recent for this. because if you assume you have a generally talented workforce that really wants to do a good job, but they are failing, then he tells me there is something else going on.

and i do think we have a generally talented workforce that wants to do a good job, that once to come to work -- wants to come to work to protect this nation on a daily basis. so, there must be a reason for failures systemwide. it is recognizing it is a system that operates, not just a point of failure at a given airport were a number of airports. second, it is looking back over the way in which you -- what is with theership organization, what are the environmental influences, so on and so forth, then beginning to core, essential mission facts. what is it we are supposed to do? do we understand the mission the way we should? carter: all of that is good and fine, but what about specifics. can you tell me something specifically, we changed this or that? neffenger: properties use of the technology. we dramatically changed the way people use that. we had not taught them how

important it was to use it properly. without getting into classified details, i would be happy to provide those in a closed session, i could tell you specifically why some of those failures existed. we fixed that. we told them how the equipment worked. that is something we had not done before. we streamlined the number of procedures that we expected them to memorize. i mentioned there were 3100 separate tasks and 88 different forms of pat down. no one can do that. we have now streamlined that down to about 25-gauge quick quickse guide -- 25-page response guide. we have significantly improved our ability. we trained specifically to do things very differently at the checkpoint. carter: my time has expired, mr. chairman. i yield back. chairman: the chair recognizes mr. cartwright from pennsylvania for five minutes. thank you, mr.

chairman. tsa is a front-line counterterrorism organization, and it is transportation -- and its transportation security officers, the tso's we have been talking about, they have to get it right every time. you forenger, thank being here. do tso's receive annual review testing? neffenger: they do. knowright: do the tso's when they are going to be tested for their annual performance reviews? neffenger: typically, yes. cartwright: on average, how do they perform? neffenger: on average, they perform well. cartwright: but what we find out is the covert tests conducted by the inspector general, jl, and your own internal teams -- , and yourgeneral, gao

own internal teams, they bring their a game when they know the sot is coming, but not much at other times. inspector general roth, would you say covert tests there out the concern -- covert tests bear out the concern i'm talking about? i.g. roth: yes. majority havee been focused on wait times for passengers, rather than safety concerns. i want to ask all of our witnesses, including you, director grover, would you agree that, if tsa employees are being told they are being judged, at least in part on how expeditiously they move passengers through the system, this may signal to screeners that speed takes priority over other considerations? you are absolutely right.

i could not agree with you more. that's exactly what i found in the course of our analysis of the issue. cartwright: under tsa's new plan, it appears to put the focus back on security. am i correct? >> you are correct. thewright: responding to new safety before speed goals, was ts -- one tsa employee reported to be glad that "the agency finally is going back to basics, emphasizing security over customer service and wait times," but another employee did doubt that the new plans would be implement it. he or she thought that management will still be very focused on wait times and throughput. i want to ask you, mr. neffenger, how will you convince front-line employees that the metric on which they will be evaluated will be security? you have to get a little trust upfront. you teach them over time.

i will assure you that one of the first things i did was to eliminate wait time as a primary measurement. it is not that wait time is not important. there are some issues associated with people packing up outside of a sterile area. but if effectiveness in security is a primary measure -- not just myid to -- leadership team, but everybody in the organization, through direct contact, through video messages, through weekly messages from me, i said, your number one job is to screen effectively. management's responsibility to work with the airports and airlines and others to do queue management. we were putting that burden on the backs of the screeners. it is no surprise to me that if you hold them accountable for moving people more efficiently through the line, they are going to do just that. you get what you measure. you get what you emphasize. it is no surprise they do well on the performance test and do poorly in other areas, because

that is about keeping their job. it tells me they are capable of doing the job well. we have to back them in that score 100%. cartwright: all right, fine. let me ask you this, administrator, when will performance assessments using the new metrics against the used and will -- metrics begin to be used and will the performance evaluation process be changed to track performance over time rather than performance honesty will test? in other words, how will you and short tso's are at the top of their game every day, not just tso's are at the top of their game every day, not just when performance reviews are happening? neffenger: those changes have already been made and expand -- explained to the workforce. cartwright: how you balance increased wait times with a focus on security and ensure that security considerations don't give way when balanced against increased weight times -- increased wait times,

particularly during times like the holiday season? neffenger: we are seeing times, notwait significant. two things. -- i want to to grow the trusted traveler population in a smart way. we are working very hard with both the current vendor, who you may have seen some of the opportunities in the airports. we are looking to expand it considerably through a request for proposal that is out, also working with the industry itself to look for opportunities to market it more effectively. we are seeing a significant increase in enrollment. the second is to provide search staffing to the airports under the greatest pressure during the upcoming travel season. at the same time, not to put any of that burden on the backs of the screeners, but to move that into the management chain where it belongs. cartwright: i'm out of time. i yield back. you.man: thank

the gentleman's time has expired. hice: thank you for being with us today. in my short time in congress, i have already seen and heard far too many reports, be it from the office of inspector general or csaor wherever, detailing -- tsa's prohibitively expensive technology. either not working to properly screen passengers or the tsa thets not properly reading technology, one way or the other, in the various red test -- red team tests that have taken place. as you well know, hartsfield-jackson, atlanta international airport, hundreds of thousands of people flying out of there every day, one of the busiest airports in the world -- i fly in and out of there myself

every week. i could not agree anymore with my colleagues here today that the recommendations that come is just vitally critical for these to be implemented. and you, mr. neffenger, just being in this position four to you.have -- hats off i thank you for your comments here today and your willingness to admit the problems you are facing and willingness to attack those head-on. as some of the results have come back from some of the various tests, a word was used earlier describing those results as pathetic, and you yourself i think are fully aware of that. earlierword that hit me is the word "culture." it has been within tsa. and i believe inspector roth said that the culture is the most important issue that you saw that means to change

immediately. so, that being said, what have to done to this point transform the culture at tsa in such a way that the vulnerabilities are adequately addressed? neffenger: mr. hice, thank you for that question. that is a key point. as i looked at tsa, i tried to understand. i come from an agency with 225 years of culture, the coast guard. that's a lot of time to build an identity and a sense of who you are. tsa is still largely an amalgam of the places that everybody came from. it has not had time to grow a leadership core from within. so you have this combination of people. what do you do to jumpstart culture? there are a couple of key things that you can do from both the top and the bottom. let me start with the bottom. first, i think one of the greatest challenges tsa has amongst its workforce is that we train on the job across 75 different job -- 75 different

airports. if you hire into tsa right now, if you hire into atlanta, you just joined the atlanta hartsfield workforce. it's not. there is a real engagement with the broader sense of who you are part of. havef the things i proposed for and asked for in the fy 2016 budget is to begin almost like the boot camp training at the federal law enforcement training center in glencoe, georgia, so that all new hire training is conducted there. that's one way to connect to the larger organization and a sense of culture. takes top level, it somebody at the very top of the organization, and that's mean right now, saying, this is important -- saying the word "culture" out loud and identifying where the culture is not connected, then identifying what you expect that culture to be. i'm about to issue my administrator's intent, in which i very clearly, in a very few sustain pages -- in a few succinct pages outline what our

culture is, what i intended to be, and how we intend to work towards that. so, there is a series of efforts that i have planned over the coming months to begin to talk and training the culture that you expect -- top and train culture that you expect. it takes tenuous attention. this will fade away if you don't pay attention to it. hice: it is a huge task. in the middle of that, you have both safety and the efficiency issue. you mentioned some metrics you are currently implementing. mr. ross and mr. grover, do you believe those metrics are adequate -- mr. roth and mr. grover, you believe those metrics are adequate to provide the safety and security and efficiency we need? i.g. roth: i agree that you get what you measure.

it is part of our audit process. 90 days after the completion of our report, we will look back on it in a rigorous, systematic way to determine whether or not these metrics are going to work. until then, we are going to be skeptical about it, because that is our job, to be skeptical. we will keep congress informed as we go forward. grover: time will tell. our biggest task will be to make sure they put in place a systematic, coherent approach to measuring outcomes that they want to achieve and then monitoring them and following up on them with the workforce, because that's the only way to make sure they get improved. for yournk each of you accountability, working, partnering together. mr. chairman, thank you for the time. i yield back. >> mr. neffenger, let me just say how encouraging it is to hear your forthrightness and

also your comments about knowing the root cause and human factors . when we look at human factors, and i talk to people in my studies on human factors in different environments, and all they are learning from narrow signs, one of the things that comes up is making sure those individuals can focus on what their jobs are . that also reinforces the things you say about culture, that you are trying to eliminate things that are distracting them. individuals are not getting paid a lot of money, but healing in her stressful retail environment, where -- but dealing in a stressful retail environment. i want to ask of your relationship with the airline industry. it strikes me that, having been a frequent traveler for years, going through the experience, you don't go to tsa to find out what's the best way for you as a customer to go through wherever you're going, whether it is the general customers going through pj -- through pre-check -- the more we continuously

this is what you should expect, this is what you need to do." and on the back end, charges for checked baggage, which you stated that this trend in more checked baggage creates stressed environments. how do you deal with the airlines, so that when some of the airlines start checking for -- start charging for checked baggage, and we have people trying to carry on more and more, it seems as an observer to create more stress for screeners. how do you help with the airlines, so that we are going s, they are helping you reinforce how to get customers and educate customers on how they can be best prepared to get through the line? neffenger: thank you for that question. i'm still relatively new in the game, but i've met -- spent a lot of time over the last four

months meeting with most -- both industry and ceos of the major u.s. airlines. i have been very encouraged with their openness and their response. they recognize some of these same challenges. i think there is a great deal of work we can do to tie ourselves more closely together. there is nobody with a higher vested interest in security of the system than the people who are flying in the system. and i think that recognizing that, that gives you a lot of grounds -- we have the same objective in mind, even if we approach it from different motivations and different requirements. i'm encouraged that a number of airlines and travel associations that support them have begun to do more to advertise the trusted traveler programs, like global entry and pre-check. i think there is a lot we can do to signify the application procedures and to make them more common across the various programs that the government offers. i think that you can never market that enough, but i do

believe that it really comes down to understanding that we are all in the same system together. we have different roles to play, but we can play those roles in a complementary fashion. the airlines have been working very hard to enforce the one plus one rule, meaning one carry-on bag and one handbag or briefcase. they are challenged as well. it is not my business to address their business models, but i can tell you it is just a fact that a lot more stuff is arriving. it is packed more full of things. people have electronics in there. challenge for the screeners to deal with. they have to be very attentive. rep. desaulnier: you work with the airline industry. you new york -- you knew that it has the potential to put more pressure on the screeners when they were going to start charging for checked. neffenger: i think that would have been the expectation. rep. desaulnier: we have a mechanism for this going for? neffenger: both sides have to be aware of the impact of the

decisions they make. i'm interested in the decisions and the business models of the airline industry and how it affects our business. because we support that business. rep. desaulnier: also, they may be transferring costs that you might pick up that they might normally expect to be part of their costs. neffenger: at a minimum to let them know what the consequence of that decision will be, that it may indeed be to slower ,hroughput at checkpoints because we have to screen and clear these bags. rep. desaulnier: would there be some type of analysis that they are making more money by charging for checked bags, but it is costing us more money, either by putting more stress on the system, adding more people, working overtime? do you have a relationship with the revenue stream, should they compensate you? it shows there is a cost-benefit? neffenger: i would have to take that back for action. certainly, i want to know what the impact is on me, if it

requires me to have additional resources. rep. desaulnier: thank you, mr. neffenger. chairman: the chair recognizes mr. russell from oklahoma. russell: thank you for being here. thank you for your long and dedicated service. with regard to some of the issues on the screening partnership program, would you say that the partnerships have been better or worse performers than tsa, and what concerns do you have about that, if any? neffenger: in my initial look at the difference or the potential differences between private and thecreeners public, we have not seen any significant differences in performance, assuming they are trained appropriately.

if i have any concern, is that we have a clear set of standards and expectations and those are consistently maintained across that program. but again, i don't see any evidence that there is any particular performance differences between them. mr. russell: thank you. and with regard to the turnover, what percentage of new hires would you say turnover within one year or two years, just ballpark? neffenger: you know, i just saw these numbers. i will have to get you the exact number, but it's a fairly high turnover rate. it depends. part-time is different from full-time. in the full-time workforce, it's about 10%, i think. in the part-time workforce, i think it has been as high as 25%. rep. russell: you had mentioned some of the resources -- the reasons before. that has to be a drain on longtime personnel. you have the expense of the train up. these are dollars that are lost.

how will you mitigate that in the future? neffenger: some of that goes back to the overarching discussion we had about connection to mission, connection to agency. as i think about what is it that would make somebody decide that this is not for them, aside from the odd individual that just says this is not what i thought i was signing up for -- it is typically, the thing i thought i was going to do, is that what the agency expects me to do? am i connected to the mission, to the agency? i have a future in the agency -- do i have a future in the agency? are there opportunities for training? some of these are beginning to be addressed by the establishment of a common training program and engagement, a sense of belonging to something larger than you. i think it continues with a clearly defined sense of progression in the organization and understanding what your opportunities are, incentivizing

performance, understanding that if i perform well, i will be rewarded for it. and a feeling of engagement with my leadership. ssell: thank you. what concerns do you have with cargo screening? neffenger: cargo, as you know, has been a concern for some time. there have been a number of procedures put in place for that. i think the question is recognition of the fact that this is a much larger system than just the checkpoint. even assuming you can get the checkpoint 100% right, there are many other potential vulnerabilities in the 80's and environment -- in aviation environment. we have a very robust set of requirements for cargo on domestic aircraft and cargo coming inbound to the u.s. on foreign and domestic carriers coming from outside the u.s. that reaches all the way back to the individuals that are actually packing the cargo

container for shipment. it is an ongoing challenge. it's an ongoing threat. it's one you can't take your eyes off at any point. russell: on the tsa preprogram, a lot of issues have been addressed with that. i understand the benefits of having low risk travelers set aside for expedited screening. you made it a point to, in your testimony today, to try to stop , whereaged inclusion people are benefiting from the program, but have no betting -- that he -- no vetting whatsoever. how much of the managed inclusion -- neffenger: re: speaking of the covert testing failures -- are you speaking of the covert testing failures? it is the case that, without getting into detail, as

d,spector general roth note some of the people coming into the system were diverted into it. that could have contributed to some of the failures. i felt that the managed inclusion, as i said before, injected unacceptable risk into the system. i did not know anything about these individuals. i thought they were best put back into standard screening until such time they presented themselves in a direct way for vetting into the program. rep. russell: thank you, mr. chairman, for your indulgence. chairman: the chair recognizes the gentlelady from new mexico. ms. grisham: thank you for your testimony today. mr. neffenger, i'm a big supporter and proponent of ofluative testing and review large employee organizations,

because it can be very difficult , particularly when it is so broad-based. to get at the heart of what is occurring on a day-to-day basis. they createdte, undercover or anonymous anonymousons of -- investigations of long-term care. doesnfirmed that not only the authority exist, but it should be encouraged, and you should undertake these anonymous care evaluations. i appreciate very much that your leadership recognized that this might be a way to either confirm the data that you have, which, at the time suggested that things were operating fairly well, and you might have some complaints or an anomaly, or you would have the opposite, which is exactly what occurred here, is that you've identified the you got -- you have significant

issues. in the course of your responses to questions and certainly in your testimony, and i appreciate that, you have accepted that there is a culture problem in the organization that needs to be addressed, and you have a 10 point plan. , evenally interested in implementing the plan, it is very difficult, challenging to create in large organizations, i think, the kind of top to bottom, bottom to top culture shift. too often, people believe that it is a temporary investment. it is easier to go back to the way that it was, particularly getting random efforts, looking at one region, one area, one airport, one screening system versus another. it really depends on the leadership in that organization. what have you learned from this experience, that, a, we can help you with, in terms of really having a sustainable culture change shift with the leadership

and rank-and-file employees? and what can we take from that and use it for other government entities that we have the same issues, secret service, the veterans administration, several others in federal government, that i think could really use this kind of approach? thank you. there is a lot in that question. i think it is really important. you've hit on a number of the key concerns and thoughts that i've had with respect to this. you're absolutely right that it's a challenging -- it is challenging to do cultural change, but we have one great benefit. we have a really, really important mission. and it's a very defined and very specific mission. pointt's a huge rallying to begin cultural change, unlike the organization and mike have, you know, a couple of hundred different things to do. so i like that. it's a mission that people care passionately about. you can tie them to it. i never forget that everybody in this workforce raised their hand

and took an oath of office. you can activate that. that's one great advantage you have. it's not enough. is not enough for me to say i want cultural change, because no one individual makes it say it because it has to start at the very top of the organization. the organization they raise their hand and took the oath has to believe that they care about it. you have to say that out loud and then you have to build the structures that actually supported. i mentioned today i think it is critical that i began to do new hire training in a consistent, way.ardized, singular i think that that will do great value in building cultural oversight. i agree with that. balance, withlity a -- incentivizing it, having an

immediate shift so that people take part -- >> so one of the things that i did is i brought the entire leadership together. adership of the tsa -- the other thing i did, apparently for the first time ever, i brought the entire leadership of the tsa, all of the federal security directors, the regional directors, my regional directors in overseas locations, together, about 175 people. for the first time in the history of tsa, we have done that. i spent two days with them. it was two days of connection with culture. we talked about how we collectively define the culture of the organization. rep. grisham: i'm out of time. i applaud your efforts. i would encourage you to balance accountability with incentivizing and creating a clear operating system, because i don't believe it is sustainable unless you do. thank you very much for your leadership.

chairman: thank you. the chair recognizes mr. palmer. rep. palmer: we've had a lot of discussion about equivalent, technology -- equipment, technology, and personnel. the inspector general has stated that the tsa's problems come, i think, largely from a lack of training. is that correct? i.g. roth: that's one aspect of it. rep. palmer: mr. neffenger, how do you plan to address the training issues? neffenger: we did immediately address the current results. we did what were called mission central training. it was an eight hour block of training across the entire workforce, starting with the frontline workforce. we do this in august and september. we trained every single screener. we are in the process of doing the same for the leadership of the organization. that was designed specifically to talk about what were the nature the failures, then to

talk about systemically why those failures existed and how they existed across the organization. we have two go back and measure the effectiveness of the training. we are in the process of doing that now. we will do that going forward. that's a program we are putting in place on a routine basis now. we are going to do quarterly mission essential training. then we are looking at, across the organization at all levels, what are the progressive levels --development training develop mental training and repeated training that has to be trainingevelopmental and repeated training that has to be done to identify problems before they are systemic, before you get into massive failures like we saw earlier? i think time will tell as to how effective it is, but i'm encouraged by some initial anecdotal results that show some significantly improve performance in those areas where we were recently tested. rep. palmer: is this your training for front-line people? neffenger: it is one aspect of

that training. we used it to bring all of our trainers and during the month of july, turning -- to train them, and then pushed them out to on-the-job training for our workforce. what i would like to do at the federal law enforcement training center is move our new hire academy full-time to there beginning in 2016 and then develop additional training opportunities and developmental training throughout someone's career in the tsa. rep. palmer: mr. roth and ms. grover, do you believe this basic training will help? is it going to get us where we need to be? i.g. roth: it absolutely will help, both in the sense of mission and community that community -- that mr. neffenger referenced, but also, some of the basics we found one being followed -- we found were not being followed. i'm a firm believer in training. that is one of our recommendations. we are gratified that the

administrator is following through on that. bothgrover: it is necessary and critical to the development of an appropriate culture and enhancing knowledge support security effectiveness, but it is not sufficient. administrator neffenger mentioned the plan to follow-up to make sure the training itself was getting the desired results, and that is critical. mr. russell of oklahoma asks a question about targeted security. i want to ask about checked bags. mr. neffenger are you aware -- mr. neffenger, are you aware of the leak that occurred earlier where the travel keys were released to the public? neffenger: think i -- i think you are referring to the photograph of the key that was published in a major newspaper? rep. palmer: are you aware they can reproduce that? neffenger: i am. rep. palmer: can you provide any link between your agency and the

memorandum? neffenger: i will see if we have one. rep. palmer: my last question will be, how do you plan or will you be able to address this issue of baggage locks if these travel century keys have been compromised? neffenger: well, the first thing i would say, it is clearly a compromise for potential for locking that bag outside of the aviation environment. those bags are still -- they go through screening and into the aviation. i don't see it as a threat to the aviation security system, but it is clearly a potential theft issue outside of the aviation environment. i think i need to see what the potential solution is from the , and thentry folks look to see what we can institute in the future. clearly, we have to address that as a problem. rep. palmer: that's in the

context of my question, you have travelers were not using locks, because you use both partners -- you use both cutters -- you use boltcutters. they want to know their luggage is secure. chairman: the gentleman from wisconsin. >> thank you for coming over here. i know it's a tough job. it's got a be a difficult thing to work. i assume you can work there for 30 years and never catch somebody who has no intent. intent, so you must wonder if what you're doing is worthwhile. by dealing with the public that does not consider this a wonderful thing -- you are dealing with a public that does not consider this a wonderful thing and are not happy to have you there. in the last five years, have you folks caught anybody who you not somebody who is axially slipping in a fingernail -- who was accidentally slipping in a fingernail clipper, but

somebody who had bad intent in the last six or seven years, you feel? neffenger: within the entire system, yes. there is a security environment in which you enter when you first put your name into a reservation system. we have repeatedly identified people with connections to known or suspected terrorists over the years. rep. grothman: people you believe who, at the airport, if you did not stop them, they were going to try and do a bad thing, not somebody on a terrorist watch list. somebody you believe, if you were not there, they would have done bad things. neffenger: we've had a few instances that i've been aware of. i hope the vast majority are deterred from trying in the first place. rep. grothman: right. you can forward to the committee later the examples where you really feel that you can't somebody who would have done the horrible thing if you had not happened. second question -- if you had not caught them. second question, and we had a

hearing a while ago on this. what i took out of it is that, you know, maybe dogs would be a better way to go about this. there were slipups. have you done any work with dogs were used them as a trial -- dogs or used them as a trial? neffenger: we have quite a few canine teams deployed throughout the aviation system. i'm in the process of moving some of those teams from what i consider to be smaller, lower risk airports to the large airports. i don't know the exact -- i think the number is somewhere around 112 teams. i think dogs are a very important additional element of security in the system. they provide a lot of capability, both for cargo screening as well as passenger screening. i'm a big proponent of the use of canine teams. rep. grothman: can you see the day when we use more dogs and less people? neffenger: i don't know that dogs will ever replace the people component. rep. grothman: not entirely.

neffenger: but i think i can see a day for using more dogs, and we are doing that going forward. rep. grothman: would they ever release people -- replace people? rather than seeing a uniformed people, i see -- seeing eight uniformed people, ict to uniformed -- i see two uniformed people and a dog? neffenger: we are still largely dealing with the exception of the machine, the same kind of sad when we have had for the past decade or more -- the same kind of check point we have had the past decade or more. i think we are looking at a very different checkpoint experience in the next five years. rep. grothman: a while back, there was a guy who felt it was a very top-heavy organization. you doing things to reduce the number -- are you doing things to reduce the number of administrative staff? neffenger: we have a total of

about 6000 people in the tsa since spring of 2013. in the past two years, almost three years, we have reduced the workforce by about 200%. i think we will continue to do so. i have asked to hold steady for the coming year as we look at the impact of the elimination of managed inclusion and i look to correct what i see to be systemic issues in the organization, then we will revisit the staffing standards following this year. more do see that there are efficiencies to be gained, always, in an organization. i think you have to look at that continuously. rep. grothman: ok. what do you pay your people starting? one of the guys or gals that i see, what is the compensation? neffenger: it varies by location. there is locality pay. it is roughly equivalent to the incoming level for -- rep. grothman: how much is it?

neffenger: i think it runs somewhere around $28,000 to $30,000?- $28,000 to rep. grothman: do you have a hard time writing people? --fenger: it is a challenge hard time finding people? neffenger: it is a challenge. rep. grothman: there any reason people 65 couldn't do that job neffenger: -- that job? neffenger: not at all. we have quite a few people that age. rep. grothman: i ran into someone who had been on your trouble list for a long peter -- period. he was not as mad about it as i would be. people called police on him. people came in with their guns drawn. if you look at the guy, you think, what? some little guy who lives in a

town in wisconsin. how quickly does it take people to get off this list? how quickly should a mistake like this -=- neffenger: there is redress process that we partly manage its. -- manage. i'm not familiar with the specific. if i can get specifics, we can look at that case, but there is a process. if you think you have been inaccurately placed on the list, there is a redress process on the list. it is a pretty fast process as i understand it, but it is a process. rep. grothman: along time for this guy. -- a long time for this guy. neffenger: i will certainly take a look if you have the details for me. chairman: thank you. miss maloney? maloney: tsa relies on many different pieces of equivalents to carry out its screening tasks.

advanced imaging technology machines, walk through metal detectors, ask those of trace detection machines -- explosive trace detection machines, bottle liquid scanners, other pieces of equipment. the ig's office issued a report that said tsa is not overly managing the maintenance of its equipment -- not properly managing the maintenance of its screening equipment. it says the tsa relies on self-reported data provided by maintenance contractors and does not validate the data to confirm that required preventive actions have been taken. tsa also does not validate the corrective maintenance data reported by his contractors. my question is to the inspector general. if tsa has not been validating the data reported by its contractors, can you be sure that all required maintenance has been performed and that its machines are operating correctly? they cannot., you accurately summarized what

those reports are. the functional equivalent of giving your car to the mechanic but not checking to see whether or not they've changed the spark plugs. maloney: that is important. do any of the contractors as possible for the maintenance of tsa agreement have sole-source contracts? is it competitively bid or is it a sole-source contract? i.g. roth: my understanding is it is competitively bid, but i think i need to get back to you. maloney: can you get back to me and the chairman and ranking member? have any contractors ever been penalized for failing to perform any type of maintenance task? i.g. roth: i'm not aware of any, but let me take that back and be sure of the answer. maloney: what recommendations did you make to improve these? neffenger: -- i.g. roth: we did make a number of recommendations regarding the

process that tsa uses to verify the maintenance. that is still in process. we allow them time to be able to institute changes. i will get back to you with the specifics. oney: administrator neffenger, are you confident that tsa now has a systems in place to hold its contractors accountable for providing proper maintenance of its equipment and are you confident tsa's equipment is being maintained and repaired properly? neffenger: thanks for that question. let me first say that i concur completely with the inspector general's findings, and i did find that we had -- not that the maintenance wasn't being done, but that we had no way to verify it was appropriate and done. we put the process in place to do so. we have to measure whether those processes are adequate to do that. i'm confident that certainly i get it and that the person i understand with it

the importance of having an auditable follow-up trail to everything that is done to ensure that equipment is maintained to standards. maloney: i know you feel the responsibility you have to the american people. we know there are many who want to harm our citizens and that they tried to do it, for some reason, through the airplanes, and they are continuing to break our system. i checked with the airlines in my area. they have incidents where they are trying to break through. having the oversight and the audit and making sure that this is happening is critically important. i look forward to you getting back to the committee, inspector general roth, on the answers that you needed to review more for us. i think they are important questions. i look forward to seeing what your response is. i think you for your public service -- i thank you for your public service. thank you for being here today. i yield back.

chairman: i will finish with a round of summary questions here. ,irst of all, mr. administrator we have discussed who poses a risk. it is less than 1% of the travelers that are examined, of the 660 million. is that still your position? put anfenger: i could not exact number on it. 20,000 toprobably 50,000 people on some sort of watchlist or no-fly list that we are looking to not board, who may pose a risk. but we are spending about 95% of our resources, again, on folks who pose no risk. you talked about where you are going, and i saw some of your report. i was pleased to see that you are looking to the future.

here is my boarding pass. i have been to europe last year. i was there twice, once in italy and once in germany. type screenersa at the entry point. i have pictures of it. i'd be glad to show you. you go up into -- go up and put your boarding pass on, and this guy will let you through. if it doesn't let you through, there is a person who would subject you to additional screening. that's almost commonplace now in europe in the domestic arena. maybe you saw that when you were there? neffenger: i did. chairman: we have people going through this, some of the dumbest things i've ever seen. let me borrow your cell phone. you put your cell phone down, and they let you through. but then you've got another tsa, if you don't have it on your

electronic device, then you have someone who takes time and they go through and circle each thing. there are just things like that and where we are not -- can you name any countries other than bulgaria, romania, or lend -- poland, sort of in the more sophisticated countries, that have all federal screening? neffenger: i will get back to you. chairman: there are none. it is -- israel. but it is under federal supervision. i have never said do away with tsa. i have said change your role, change the resources to connecting the dots to security. that's what's going to get us. every time we have been successful in stopping someone, it is connecting the dots. but again, you said it may be five years before we could get to this. this should be tomorrow. neffenger: actually, i think we

will get to that much faster. chairman: and we should be and betting the information -- should be and betting -- should be embedding the information here. i saw that in nürnberg in 2003. the systems exists. we just keep falling further behind, adding more people. if you aresaying training them, you are sending them back to basics. to a law enforcement training program? neffenger: no. it's at the federal law enforcement training center. it's not a law enforcement training program. chairman: we have to make it clear. some of my colleagues do not know that tsl personnel are not sworn personnel -- tsa personnel are not sworn personnel. they are screeners. neffenger: that's correct. chairman: you have this huge bureaucracy trying to recruit, and maybe you have gotten better.

i have disclosed we are hiring above --pizza box ads and above discount gas pump advertisements for screeners. hopefully, that has stopped. you have actually trained more people than you employ. do you know that? you have actually trained more people? they are gone. maturing -- your turnover has been in some places horrendous. granted, some markets are very difficult. we had equipment -- we have equipment, and this is about equipment. i heard about the failures to maintain, to operate, to train people for it, advanced imaging technology. the deployment is a disaster. how many machines do we have? 700 and what? neffenger: about 750 machines currently.

chairman: how many airports? about 400 -- 300, 290 about airports that don't even have an ait machine. i'm mr. dumb terrorist. where am i going to go? ait is the best system we have, but it can be thwarted. you have made some refinements to it, but personnel are human beings. they are going to fail. they're going to -- i will bet the staff a dollar they'll be back here, we'll do it next september we'll do the same hearing. we'll have testing and maybe you'll improve slightly but it'll still be a disaster. it's been a disaster in every classified hearing i've sat in.

if it was publicly known people would scream for some change. i want to get you out of the personnel business, which is that huge, again, not law enforcement, but screening. you need to be in intelligence and connecting the dots and security. setting the protocols shall the standard. seeing who is not performing. getting rid of them if it's a private firm that's operating. okay. so here's our ait's. we have 450 airports, at 160 locations. then you go to the locations when they put them out. it was mind boggling. and how are you going to change that? it cost hundreds of thousands of dollars for the equipment. then it cost the airports and you a fortune to put them in place. you go to some concourses and they got two or three of them in one concourse. it was never intended for that. it was intended to be a secondary screening device.

and then in other concourses even at the national you go to, one of our airports and some of the concourses have none. so you have started having, god bless you, trying to change a mess. but even the deployment of that important machine has been a disaster. when we spoke i asked you about reducing some of the overhead. you've got thousands of people in overhead. 46,000 screeners. it was up to 15,000 we found either within the 46,000 here in washington. one time there were 4,000 making 103 thousand dollars on average just within 20 miles of where we're sitting. some of those may be important responsibilities, but, again, we have to, a public-private screening partnership.

i am a firm believer. they probably, well i know they perform a little better than you because i've had that tested. they came back and told me. you know what the response was when there was a fair, open test? they said private screening performed under federal supervision private screening under federal supervision performed statistically significantly better. i don't care how polite your agents are. that's nice to have them polite. you've impressed some of the members. what i care is if they are able to deter a terrorist from getting through. and they are not law enforcement personnel. they are screening personnel. you've got your whole billions of dollars focused on people who don't pose a risk. we need to get away from that model. a member of congress mr. wahlberg who testified, he's got an i.d. card. sometimes they don't even

recognize a federal i.d. ask you for a driver's license. but i've had hearings here on driver's licenses and i.d.'s that can and have been duplicated. that's one of the easiest things you can do. i can take and make you the fanciest boarding pass i'll challenge you, be glad to go out and take one and i can get through any of your gates at national or anyplace else with st a little bit of work on a computer. so again, we've set up a system that is destined to fail. you'll be back here. maybe slight improvement, training some more folks, maybe a little bit better retention. back to the partnerships. in rochester, one of several dozen public-private partnerships i told you they had at one time 15 to 18 people. most of them making between 60

and a hundred and some thousand dollars. they have 1.1 million passengers. i went to canada. looked at similar operations. they have one federal person. i think you need a federal person, someone charged with the intelligence and conducting the oversight audit on daily basis and making certain it works. is there any hope of getting a reduction of some of the people we don't need at these programs where we have the public/private partnership? >> as you know, we actually have reduced the number of oversight directly from the partnership but there is additional responsibility. there is a surface inspection in transportation so a number of those people are involved in compliance examinations and the surface examinations. >> and is there anything that can't be done through a contract? okay. two, three, four people at an airport like rochester. not 15 or 16. again, i know the game.

you pack it so it makes it look like it costs more or as much for private screening under federal supervision. we'll have a report that be released soon and show some of the -- at least that costs less under that. not that i'm trying to do it on the cheap. they're just more efficient. i support federal wages. no change in that. i support union membership. i put that in the bill in the beginning bill. in fact in the private screening in san francisco they had folks belonging to unions long before the most recent sign up of folks across the area. i have another question the chairman wants me to get in. will you let the committee know today or within the period we a p the record open, we want

complete response on when you will -- you will finish and address all of the recommendations that the i.g. and g.a.o. have put forward. could you give us that today do you think, or do you want to give it to us for the record? >> i'll give you a schedule for the record, but what i will tell you is what i told both the inspector general and director grover. and that is that i am committed to addressing all the remaining open recommendations as well as any that remain that are nonconcurs and getting those closed. >> if you can get the committee in the next what are you going to leave this open, 10 days? 10 days, without objection, so we'll leave it open for 10 days? no i'm not finished. i was just leaving it open and making certain to comply with your wishes, too. but in any event, 10 days and

we would like that made part of the official record and exact a date -- again, i'm going to hold a subcommittee hearing if we don't hold a full one within a year, give you a chance. you're here and i love your attitude, i love your willingness to be open with the committee. you've inherited one of the most difficult tasks. you're the what, sixth administrator i've dealt with them all. i think you're one of the most capable that we've been fortunate to have. we need to look at rerighting the ship on this whole security thing. get you out of the business that gives you the headaches. i know you'll go back and say mica is full of it and don't listen to him. as long as you keep trying to manage a $46,000 department you are going to have problems with recruiting, with training, with

retaining, with managing. you will never get it right. i can assure you. not that it's your fault. you're dealing with human beings. and then using all of that resource to go after 99% of the people who don't pose a risk, not expediting their passage and not redirecting those resources toward the bad guys connecting the dots, security, making certain that you set the standards. then as the inspector general and director grover have said, that you bear down on those that are not meeting the standards that you have. you kick their butts out. you fire them. you terminate their contract. that's your, i believe, your role. so again, welcome. isn't this great? you want to reconsider? no. you are a true hero to come forward. i have the greatest respect for

you and what you're going to try to do. i'm trying to get you to see a year from now what you're going to face when you come back here and where we'll be. with that, thank you. and i want to yield to the ranking member. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to thank all of you for your patience. i know it has already been a long morning. i only have a few questions. as all of you know, our nation as one standard for merchant mariners and employees who need access to secure areas of ports. it is called a quick card. use of the quick was required by the maritime transportation security act and each quisi bryan is issued by the t.s.a. administrator neffenger, i'm curious given your background with the coast guard which model do you think is better? should credentials for access

to facilities and secure areas be issued by each individual facility or should they be issued by a national entity like t.s.a.? >> i don't know if i have a good, direct answer to that. by that i mean this. when you have a nationally issued i.d. card that creates a lot of challenge in managing it and issuing it. and it introduces some concerns with respect to its viability across a large organization. that said, i think that both systems have -- can work effectively if the oversight is what it should be. i think as i look at the environment in the airports, airports would argue that they like the fact that the badges are different because it means you can't move from one airport to another and show up and get access. you have to have something that says your airport on it. i think we can do a lot more to

ensure the security of those badges and to ensure the accountability of those badges as we move forward. there is an awful lot of information that came out of what the aviation security advisory committee study told about the way to manage and ensure the integrity of those badges going forward as well as to look at the oversight of those. the inspector general has pointed out some important areas for us to consider so i don't really know which approach is better. i think both approaches can work very effectively but they need a lot of oversight no matter which way you take it. as you know there have been some challenges in the quick program as well. >> are you confident that full implementation of your plans will ensure t.s.a.'s screening systems will pass future cove ert tests by the inspector general and t.s.a.'s own combt testing teams? >> well, testing will tell.

i'm confident we're on the right track. i hope it means we will see dramatic improvement in the future. i believe it will but i don't believe we can just declare it done and move forward. i think this is a continuous process and a continuous attention. this is one of these things that as i said before you can't just fix this and assume you've got it right. this is -- what it's allowed us to do is see that this is an ongoing attention that needs throughout the entire life of the organization. there is no fixing it. there is addressing the challenges, learning from what you've addressed, testing yourself, learning from those testings, and that continuous improvement as we go forward. what i will tell you is that certainly for the duration of my tenure i will never take my focus off continuing to test this system, evaluating the processs and training we put in place, continuing to adjust them as we discover whether they work or don't work and

then looking how to distribute the best practices across the whole system. that includes looking to our international partners for anything that they might be doing that can inform the way we do business. this global system relies on global standards and global consistency. >> now, as you've heard g.a.o. state today, t.s.a. has not always established performance measures that clearly aligned with its goals. how will you know if you have altered the pervasive cultural problems in t.s.a.? and what performance metrics will confirm it? >> we took a look at the entire measurement system. i took a look at it. and essentially said, look. the current way we're measuring isn't leading us to improving the system. there's a readiness component. i want to know if the work force is ready. are they trained? do they know the mission? do they have the support of leadership? is there ongoing attention to that?

i want to look at their performance and test them. did all that stuff work? did what i think about their readiness actually show itself in their performance? the system has to have same sort of measures. you need to know is the system ready meaning have we maintained it appropriately? can we verify we have maintained it appropriately? is it meeting the standards before we deploy it that we expect it to meet? all those other things that go into does it work. then the second piece is how well does it perform when you plug it into the system? then you have to go back and you test that as well. so you're testing the people, the processes, and the technology. both its readiness to do its mission as well as the actual production of that mission. it's a continuous process. i will tell you that right now i get a report on a weekly basis directly to me on those measures. we have a ways to go yet. we're getting this organization used to a new way of thinking. it's measuring effectiveness, focusing on the security component, and the effectiveness of that, defining

that mission in a very clear way. and then looking to see what we're learning as we're studying it. we've actually learned quite a bit already about system readiness. both in the work force as well as in the technology. and it's leading to some things that we have to do to improve that. on both scores. and it's also beginning to fight point the way toward how we'll effectively measure performance including working with the inspector general and g.a.o. as we go forward. i see this as a very valuable partnership even recognizing they have to be independent and they're skeptical and i want them to stay that way but they give me valuable information about how my system is working. >> let me say this. one of the things i pushed with the coast guard, with the secret service, and the city police, is i've said that i want them to create an organization which is the elite of the elite. in other words, a feeling that we are the best.

and that our standards are high. and i believe that when you have, you get there, the people who are caught up in the culture of made yock ritty will fall off because they don't feel like they belong, period. you won't have to fire them. they'll leave. some you may have to fire but most will just back off. as i've heard the testimony today, one of the things that it just gnaws at me is the idea that we have now an agency that's willing to accept the recommendations and director grover i keep going back to some of the things you said about accepting these recommendations. nd then trying to do them. but we still have those gaps. as i was sitting here listening to all of this i was saying to myself, well maybe it's not just all the things you just said. but you have to add something else to it.

i think that when you -- when we have recommendations, and then your agency looks at them and says, oh, yeah. we got to do this. yeah. we missed that. we fwot to do that. it may go back to that whole idea of trying to impress or get it done, but not concentrating on why we're doing it. you know, why that's important. and some kind of way i think to get to the elite of the elite i think full understanding of why it is and the fact that bad things can happen and perhaps if you're not on guard they will. and i keep -- for some reason i keep going back to katrina. i think about katrina almost every day. because one of those situations, director grover, where we claimed we were ready. we couldn't even communicate across town. and like i said, when they said the rubber meets the road, we didn't have a road. our country is so much better

than that. so i think one thing is leadership. another is metrics. i'm hoping that i'll talk to chairman chaffetz and he's been very open to accepting the model that we used in the coast guard subcommittee where we constantly brought folks back where uld actually see we were going. one thing as you heard me say many times, a lot of times agencies, and i'm not saying you did this, but agencies will wait out a congress and then so there is no real accountability. going back to what you said ks director grover. you got to have accountability. one of the best ways is set deadlines. then come back and report. and it may be that you don't achieve every single thing you want to achieve but hopefully we can get in, you know, see our progress. by the way, i think when the agency sees its progress, that again helps them feel like the elite among the elite.

finally, you know, i just thank all of you for working together. i thank you for having the attitude that you have. i think one of the biggest mistakes we make is sometimes we act like, you know, the inspector general and director grover, that we're on different teams. but what you're saying is we're all on the same team trying to lift up the american people and keep them safe. that's the team we're on. that's our team. and so if i've got a member of the team that can see things that i can't see, and can bring them to my attention, and help me become better and again become the elite of the elite, i think that's what we ought to be about. i thank you for having that kind of attitude. because that's what's going to get us where we've got to go. i think that when -- i go back to what mr. goudie said a little earlier. i'll tell you, i have had nothing but good experiences

with t.s.a. i mean, everywhere i go. ahn i know that we've got some great men and women working for that organization. and just at the same time inthey're also human. i think we have to constantly find those ways to keep it, you know, refreshing their skills and reminding them how important their job is and how we appreciate them. because i can tell you when you got somebody, you got hundreds of people every day trying to rush to get to a flight, some of them are very upset. they got the kids, got the stroller. all of this and then they got to be checked. an sure that's just opportunity for people's frustrations to get out of hand, but yet i've seen over nd over again where t.s.a. officers have just been very patient, understanding, and trying to do the right thing at all times and at the same time

protect us. again, i thank you all. we look forward to seeing you again. your testimony has been extremely meaningful and i think it can lead us into effectiveness and efficiency. i've often said that there's nothing like having motion, commotion, and emotion and no results. we have to have results. nd i think we can get there. i think you've given us a road map to get there. >> i thank the members for participating. we've gone through all the membership and you all have been most accommodating. realize the task you have about a -- i particularly want to thank the inspector general and also the director. you have an important role with your oversight. the committee conducts some oversight. we rely on you and your independence in going forward

and the goal here is to keep the american public safe to make certain that we don't have another 9/11 and that we do the the that we can with resources given to us by the taxpayers. that being said there being no further business before the committee i will mention to the staff that we will be submitting to you all as witnesses additional questions in this interim time for a response. so we want you to know those responses will also be made part of the record. there being no further

general george armstrong custer. >> she was first to come to his defense and say that was not what happened. he would not have done that. she stood up for him and championed his actions. voice that rose to the top of all of this, not only because she was a woman and people were to -- paying attention to what she had to say that because she outlived all of them. 1933 andnot die until foris therefore -- there the 50th anniversary of the battle of little big horn. she is there for all of the history so she can help shape what is being said about her husband so it does not go so far

to the other end. >> on american history tv we will tour the mansion once owned by leland stanford. as a prounion civil war governor and a union -- railroad railroad executive he helps complete the transcontinental railroad. >> he was our last two-year term governor. he was elected for all of 1862 and all of 1863 and he was part of a group of men who were politically active and had similar ideas, and stafford was their first candidate successfully elected governor. he was our eighth governor and he was the first republican governor of california. will visit the japanese american archival collection of sacrament of state university, which includes letters, photographs, diaries, and artwork from japanese-american community following the attack on pearl harbor.

and sacramento city historian shares artifacts related to the 1849 goldrush which bought -- brought three says -- 300,000 people to california. >> we hold the original records from the city and county of sacramento. we go all the way up to present times. when you talk about the whole experience is coming to california to search for gold

we have the first and only national morning show that speaks to the issue of for us, by us.ns i'm glad to be here at claflin. we are live streaming. we have specific issues. nothing about specific policies, something to look forward to. let's not wait any longer. thirdly introduce democratic

presidential candidate, secretary hillary clinton. i've got the eye of the tiger, i am the champion. you're going to hear me roar. lion., louder than a i am the champion, you're going to hear me roar. ♪ we did not coordinate our outfits. clinton: you have to show me how you do that. very good. it.et's jump right into yesterday the job report came out for october. , foropped to 5.8% african-americans it is 9.2%.

is there a kneel for a new marshall plan that targets those most in need as opposed to those who say you cannot do anything race-based, but if you do it it will benefit african-americans and latinos more than anybody else. : first, i'm relieved that overall we are making progress. i have gone across the country making the point that when president obama came into office financialed the worst crisis since the great depression. he does not get credit for digging us out of the hole that he was handed. it has been a long slow effort. his leadership and millions of americans, we are exactly where roland said we are, 5% and

employment, jobs are not coming k.c we have to have incomes for everyone to come back up. we do need, a targeted effort at people and communities that have not had the benefits of recovery thus far. we need to go even further. to haveonce and for all a very big infrastructure roads, bridges, tunnels, infrastructure, where we can put people to work. change bymbat climate becoming the clean energy superpower of the 21st century, putting up wind turbines, installing solar panels, doing thework to enable us to let economy grow and move away from fossil fuels.

we need to invest in small business. be the small business president, and focus on women and minority owned small businesses in our country. all of those things, i think, would make a difference. mr. martin: i'll come back to the small difference question, but first infrastructure. historically, labor unions have frozen us out. african-americans have not been able to get construction jobs or the engineers. what we do stay to the trade unions to get them to stop freezing black folks and other minorities from those opportunities? mr. martin: we have two brought -- ms. clinton: we have two problems with the same result. where people are frozen out or not sought out, i want to make sure the training programs are reflective of the population. toapprenticeship credit

companies, unions, and others to train young people -- but not just young anymore, we have a lot of people that have lost their jobs better of middle age or older, and may need special attention. they were unions are not the problem in much of the south because they are all right to work states. we must be sure anywhere we do infrastructure, if the federal government has money into it, there must be a program for recruiting and hiring, and where necessary, training people from less advantaged communities. mr. martin: we talked about the issue of the small businesses. "the washington journal" had a report where $0.23 billion of the small business model was set 2013. a .2% forbush, it was

african-americans. housing has a lot to do with it. .hey are trying to improve that that is a perfect example. one point 9 million black owned business that cannot get access to capital. how will you utilize the federal government to ensure that expands, as opposed to, getting 1.7% of $23 billion? right.nton: you are when i was a new york senator, the federal government has a lot of contracts. sometimes it is difficult for small businesses to know how to apply. the procurement rules are difficult. procurementn outreach programs and a big conference where we sought out small businesses with a special emphasis on minority and women-owned businesses. we have to do that all the time. have a more vigorous

effort to help people applied for the contracts available. i agree that there is a preference in the law for small businesses that are minority and women owned. thatt to make sure that preference is translated into businesses. mr. martin: and also have bureaucrats -- mrs. clinton: 100%. i want to set goals and tell people that work for me, this is what i want you to do. where we can change outcomes. black and hispanic firms outperformed everyone else in the managerial top funds. did they get more money? the answer was "no."

you have a good old boy system, largely whites in the treasury department. a perfect -- it is a perfect example, of if you are president you will tell your treasury secretary, you were to do with jackson did and say you are going to expand opportunities. if they are outperforming everyone else they should get more business. someone says if that a group is outperforming someone else, or a group, your question is right. will your word that group or person? the answer is "yes." there are opportunities in the economy we are not seizing on behalf of communities and individuals. i do not think there is any