think it is racial. i think it is the fact that he is a conservative and they can't get anybody, including a very qualified black male, just because he is a conservative. they are not racially biased against the guy. it is just a good example of what the media does when they get disappointed with mr. daudzai: that will be the last call on this topic. don't forget another addition comes your way to mars 7:00 a.m. see you then. ♪ [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> today, here on c-span, live coverage of israeli prime minister, benjamin, speaking at the center for american progress at 3:00 eastern time. and, a hiring our heroes conference. here is a look. while our servicemen and women are deployed, their spouses are the ones who take care of their families at home. they care for the children. they manage the finances. and, they pray that their husbands and wives will return home safely. rodriguez andt in wife joined us at a ranch 2013 at 2014 for the bush center annual warrior bike ride. about hisne talked years in service at the air force, she said, "week, i ."y, we, served 25 years

i did not realize the impact it was going to have. that is why it is so important to make sure that while our servicemen and women receive the support they need, that we care for their families as well. as we have heard this morning, employment support is the perfect place to start. studies show that post-9/11 veterans face higher rates of unemployment than their civilian counterparts. and, the consequences of that unemployment, or underemployment, are not only financial. of course, when when family member is suffering, the entire family suffers. >> more from laura bush, and others tonight here on c-span. over on c-span 2 at 8:00, a debate between candidates to

become louisiana's next governor . live coverage of the debate on c-span 2. c-span has a full lineup of veterans day programming for you. join us starting tonight at 8:00 eastern. former first lady laura bush and labor secretary perez on hiring our heroes, a conference organized by the chamber of and the george w. bush institute. on wednesday, c-span's "washington journal" at 7:00 eastern with your input via calls, facebook postings, and tweets. at 10:00, conversations with freshmen members of .ongress representative steve russell, a former army ranger. at 11:00 eastern, live coverage of the veterans day replay --

wreathlaying ceremony. at noon, more from freshmen members of congress. ikiresentative ryan t talks about his time in iraq, followed by ruben gallego who decided to fight in iraq. watch all the coverage on tv or online at c-span.org. >> a signature feature of c-span 2's booktv is coverage of book fairs and festivals across the country with nonfiction author talks, interviews, and viewer call-in segments. coming up, booktv will be live from the miami book festival. our coverage starts live on saturday at 10:00 eastern. alive call in with "wall street journal" columnist.

judith miller joins us to discuss her book, "the story." out."ed koppel on "lights on sunday, speak with the author's live. o'rourke takes her calls. join us live from miami on booktv starting november trade first. be sure to follow us and tweet us your questions. >> afghanistan's interior minister stocked about the future and stability of his yesterday atking the carnegie endowment for international peace and washington, d.c. he also took questions from the

audience. this is about one hour and half. >> it gives me pleasure to welcome you to the session. i also want to extend a warm welcome to the speaker this afternoon, mohammad umer daudzai . as all of you know, he played an important role in politics. having served twice as the chief of staff and ambassador to

two of afghanistan's most important and problematic neighbors, iran and pakistan, and finally as afghanistan's minister of the interior during the year 2014. our focus today on afghanistan could not be timelier. president obama has recently made important decisions with respect to the continued u.s. troop presence in the country. these decisions serve as a continuing reminder of the high sacrifice that the united states and its nato allies have made to rebuild post-9/11 afghanistan. unfortunately, for all of us, and especially for the afghan people, this task is by no means complete. the recent crises and efforts at reconciliation raise unsettling questions about the prospects

for success in the years ahead. it is in this context that mohammad umer daudzai remarks requireghanistan careful hearing. it is essential if the united states and its allies will consolidate its achievement so far, achievements for which they have worked so long and hard. without further duk ado, i will leave the podium for the remarks, and welcome him once again. [applause] muchaudzai: thank you very

for the very kind introduction. ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon to all of you. outset, let me take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to the foregie endowment international peace for giving me this opportunity to speak here today. let me also take the opportunity to thank the people and government of the united states for their continuous and generous conjuration to contribution to afghanistan. the blood of young afghans and american men and women, soldiers , mixed up for a

to battlese and , marking a bond between the two partners. let me assure you that your in support of freedom and democracy in afghanistan is not wasted, and will not be wasted. see many familiar faces myre, many friends here -- afghan friends and colleagues, with some of them we have worked together in the past decade and a half, and my international we havees, with whom had lots of ups and downs. i'm so pleased to see and pastor

ambassador holden, who we work together in one of those problematic countries. i don't think i have anyone in the room from my experience from the other problematic country. i wish that one day we have that. here,a great honor to be and a pleasure to be amongst you , and see you all here today. headlines that are coming to washington are painting, often, a picture that is gray. assured that be it is not the full picture. , butof them may be true

they are not the full picture. we are certainly increasingly challenged by problematic neighbors. there is still a costly war that hasin our country taken countless lifves. there is a lot that has gone well too. changes can only be judged by in theho have seen it civil war, and can see it now. it is important to note from where we started. ,t is important to recognize

rather than judge the country against unrealistic expectations . in 2001, there were hardly 5000 students, boys only, and enrolled in university. there were only two universities open. on the difficult task of rebuilding estate and nation without functional universities. we have over 100 universities, fully functional, half of them are boys and girls enrolled.

we seethem working here in the united states. by the way, those who come here for study and stay on to work, and those american friends that go and work in afghanistan, and come back here, becoming the binding glue for our enduring partnership. from what were the piles of dust with all itsstate institutions. of course, with a lot of patience. afghans, all of us are committed to continuously safeguard that state. you probably have memories of our troubled elections,

particularly the last one. i'm here to tell you that democratic cultures is entrenched. people participate and people speak up like never before in the history. is made in progress the areas of freedom of speech enoughan rights, but not , and especially not enough for ending violence against women. just this year, we had two very bad examples. lately, the stoning of rosanna.

today, there is ground for too.rn in other areas doubts are expressed on the national security forces' get to the freefalld that happened after international forces came on. if we go on like this, the list of achievements and concerns is long. discussion, to save time for discussion, i have picked up questions that i have often encountered, and with your permission, i will speak and the we will go on to questions and answers. which manyne, people ask me often is about the capacity and capability of the

afghan national security forces, whether they can hold on to the taliban onslaught, or not. i was lucky that i have the responsibility to lead the afghan national security forces during a very challenging time, which was securing two rounds of intense elections. i continue, with all honesty, that the afghan national security forces is a force to reckon with. we are proud of our fighters. they do a great job every day. forces still have andng way to go to grow further professionalize. the summer was exceptionally challenging. faced a high number -- a very high number and scale of

sophisticated taliban assault. for many, from my experience, this was the worst the afghan national security forces could face. the taliban had prepared for this for many years, and likely, they failed to get what they expected. in addition, the afghan national security forces had to bear the burden of combating international terrorist groups that were pushed from across the line. the afghan national security forces denied the taliban taking control of any geography that could have replaced their headquarters and pakistan. let me explain this a little bit. talks thatthere were taliban were pushing to take

control of certain parts of afghanistan. we thought that they wanted to do that in order to push the headquarters, or pulled headquarters -- the headquarters to afghanistan. in the middlened of that. one might think that it was a major incident, but the truth is that it was a major incident, but provided a lesson learning opportunity to security forces. they are trying to learn their lessons. the afghan national security forces took over of kundis in one week. a protected civilian life and inflicted heavy casualties on the taliban. aspect is the taliban's image was tarnished

because within that one week, they committed so many atrocities that people remember. that is why, after the fall of kundis, many uprisings across the country against the taliban. that seemed making the afghan national security forces increasingly popular within the country, and people look at them as their savior. we know of many uprisings in support of the afghan security forces, but we have not heard of any public uprising in support of the taliban. there is still violence against women. women are victims in afghanistan, but there are

.merging women too i want to give you the example of one m woman. now, thatding a force is why they call her commander. she was the wife of a police officer. thehusband was killed by taliban. to revenge her husband's death, she picked up arms, and formed a small resistance group, consisting of many of her distant relatives, including her daughter in law and son. ,hen i was minister of interior i brought her under the impeller of the afghan local priest. she continues under the umbrella. last week, sadly we heard that she lost a son in the latest

battle. the other frequently asked so far washat i said about the afghan national security forces. secondly, i want to talk about the national unity government, which was, in a way, put together by an ambassador. before, i will say something about the afghan national unity government, let me clarify one thing. the state of afghanistan is the product of efforts of all of us for 14 years. we have invested our sweat, blood, and treasures, and we it at all costs.

as far as the government is concerned, there is always room to improve, but there is one -- some of you are expecting me to criticize the national unity government, you might be disappointed. the national unity government is a new try, although some will argue that it has been tried twice before. before iswice slightly different. it was formed from two factions. people argue that they did not su survive for more than one year.

the second national unity government was that of the anti-soviet union group. they formed the national unity government. it did not take a year before they started fighting. twe are in a totally different era. now, we have a constitution that we are proud of. it is one of the best in our regions. the national unity government may not be 100% in accordance with the constitution, but at least, more than 50% in accordance of the constitution. anybody talking about the national unity government is trying to be within the limits of the constitution. the political arguments about the national unity

it isment into being, supposed to be -- within two in office.eir term the purpose of that is to elevate the position of the chief executive officer, who is that of a prime minister. the that events will on -- events will unfold, i don't know . signs are that they may not be able to hold it because for that, they have to hold elections. under the circumstances, elections for the existing council is not an easy thing to do. thati can say for sure is i know of no afghan political

forces in the country that do not wish that the national unity government completes its five-year terms. there is no force that wants to cut their term short. the political forces across the country are working and preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections, and for the next presidential elections that will be in 2019. there is a tough question that i want to say a few words about, about the prospect of a political settlement. in the past 15 years, while we were busy with reconstruction,

with a great engine of support of international partners, we also were in the midst of a war that was imposed upon us. in between, we never forgot about peace dialogue or political settlement. .his goes back to 2007 it was, from my memory, as the president's chief of staff, we aalized that there was resemblance between the taliban and the afghan population which meant that if we try to eliminate the taliban by force, it meant a very high rate of civilian casualties. the taliban, as part of their warning is they never hesitated to use civilians as shields. whenever there were civilian

casualties, it was sometimes a source of tension between the afghan government and our international partners. we thought of a political alsoement as the other way . while the war continued, we thought of a peace process. we started the process. the address.find the only address we knew of was to go through pakistan. there was no other address where we could find this taliban leadership to talk to. as president's chief of staff, i was moved to be the ambassador there to improve the relationship with pakistan.

coincidence, you call it, i arrived in islamabad and presented by credentials to the president of pakistan, exactly on the day that americans took bin laden. a very difficult start. a very difficult beginning i had. i tried my best, but it took me a couple of years, or less than two years, to realize that what i was doing was a mission impossible. there was not going to be any particular outcome from that. waited,d, and pakistan and everybody waited. as you are all aware, the president took a couple of steps

farther than us. he went to the general headquarters of the pakistan army. i think you did the right thing. i'm not criticizing because ambassador holder would agree with me that when we were in islamabad, we always said that pakistan had two capitals. the decisions made by afghanistan were not made in islamabad. still, we did not get anywhere either. he had a smart beginning, they , whichace-to-face talk was mysteriously halted. while i thought it was mission

impossible, i also concluded that the way to go through pakistan was too much accident prone and too much personality german. i will give you an example. muchi say it was too accident prone, in 2011, i think it was june 2011, i thought we thought pakistan was looking like they would help us through the peace process. there was a time gap of three months that we had to work on a formula. , ahin those three months professor who was the chairman of the high piece council was mysteriously assassinated.

the follow-up and result was -- it took us many more months. i thought,012 that for the second time, that pakistan may be willing to help us. at that stage, pakistan asked us to present a roadmap. surprise,my afghanistan side was the release .f four top taliban commanders at the time, we had them implemented, by confessed to you that as the afghan ambassador, i did not see the logic between the release of taliban

commanders and peace talks. thestan, in response to demand of the high peace council, released 60 taliban commanders, which we did not even know were in pakistani prisons. giantntly, it was a operation of u.s. forces and pakistan forces. we demanded 40, and they released 60. most of those 60 senior commanders are now leading the war inside afghanistan and killing our people. here, i am also excepting a bit of a blame on us that we were taking a piecemeal approach and very much personality driven rather than having clear policies on where to start and go. now.y, that is all past

things are changing now. the situation is changing. that indifferent now is order to provide an opportunity pakistan to rebuild its tarnished image internationally, increasingly establishing themselves inside afghanistan. they are trying to get a hold of a geographic pocket so they can pull their leadership inside afghanistan, and establish it there. if that happens, which so far they are denying that the afghan are underorces attack. assuming that happens, that they get hold of a geographic area

inside the country, they are planning to establish their headquarters there, moving the headquarters from pakistan to afghanistan, and pakistan can say, it is afghans' problem. i think that is what is going on intensewe have these fights in some parts of the country. . area of which i want to , and you cands have discussion. i like discussion. many people ask me what is ahead of us. there is one change inside taliban. they are no longer a united

group or move if. they are divided in four factions. later on i can explain what these four factions are if you are interested. taliban being divided in four factions is good news and bad news. the good news is for the war. lesswill be acting coordinated and there will be differences in fighting between them. of only to be have news fighting between two taliban firstns, this is not the one. bad news for peace is that if we want to talk to them, then which one do we talk to? make the peace process even more complicated than it is. represents then

, they are not representative of the whole problem. there are other emerging every emerging trends that we are faced with. as you all know, isis is one of those emerging threats. it is already causing us problems in the eastern province heardalso you might have that within the last couple of days, isis executed about seven half sisters -- hostages. among those who tell them to headed, there were children and they are, which means going in that area. . there are small pockets of isis

and emerging elsewhere too. i know here in washington they have forgot about al qaeda, but al qaeda is also resurfacing in afghanistan. last summer there were a series of big attacks. two attacks combined caused 500 deaths. that clearly carried the al qaeda hallmark. there are offshoots there are also entrenching in afghanistan. some of them belonged to the , theboring countries chinese version and the lives of uzbekistan version. they're all trying to keep the headquarters somewhere in afghanistan and have become somewhat of a threat for us.

the isis and taliban relationship is not good. they have been fighting in some places. how their relationship will of all, we do not know. that needs a study. there may be some splinter groups of taliban and the form .lliance with isis other dimension and growing challenge, the regional dimension. both iran and russia are seeing as a threat to their interest in the short and long-term. there are reports that both iran and russia are trying to enter into some kind of anti-isis

nexis with taliban. if that happens, that will make our life more miserable. to us, it sounds like the music of the 1990's that one country supports one faction and another one supports another faction. this needs attention because a lotill make our lifes more complicated than it is. in view of all of the above, let me share with you my thoughts and experience on afghanistan's reaction to president obama's decision, extending the presence of troops, not a large number, in small number, but in afghanistan. it is a welcomed approach. it is a good news. we know that as long as boots

are on the ground, the interest will remain with us. this is welcome. is a needately, there for afghan national security forces to be further centered. it is their job to secure their country and protect their people. in addition, we need a stronger state and more cohesive state than it is. also, we need help, and focus on revisiting the whole political settlement process with the taliban. followed,ch we have we have not gotten anywhere. we have not gotten the results. that process will need to be

rethought. anyway, that is what i could say as a beginning. as i said earlier, i usually prefer more discussion than just presentations, when i speak, and others listen. thank you. [applause] >> at this point, i would ordinarily open the discussion to the floor, which i will do in because mr.s daudzai has expressed interest butnswering your questions, since i have you as a captive, i want to start the discussion by asking you to questions, both of which have a certain delicacy. alliested states and its have pursued a military campaign

and afghanistan since the aftermath of 9/11. the logic of our campaign was to be able to press the taliban as hard as we could. .hereby, weakening them if the process continues even if the, -- at thetion effort height of these operations, it is becoming clear that the afghan government was getting more and more uncomfortable with the consequences of some of these military operations, and many occasions, what you were in office, you very forthrightly

complained about the impact of these operations. today, the united states is out of the combat business. why is that any different? the afghan special military forces will face the same challenges. the psychological costs of backing terrorists will have the same effects in terms of .esentment given the fact that you have forces that are probably still some distance to go in terms of capabilities, and yet faces the same kind of operational problems, why should we have to be more optimistic if it now

takes the lead in these operations compared to the nato strategy? mr. daudzai: let me put it this way. if we thought about them taking the lead in 2005, it was impossible. reallyated it was international partners and international assistance. it was about 2010-2009 that the idea came that now it is created, and they will gradually become more strong and professional. the plan was to hand over more more responsibilities to them. there was a mutual understanding that by 2014, the responsibility should be handed over entirely, which happened. of thatyou an example

same year, 2014, the transition responsibility was supposed to of 2014.ted by the end in practice, it was completed .alfway in the year almost at the beginning of the year, the process was completed. the process of securing the two rounds of presence elections across the country. almost all of them were quite safe, men and women went and voted. why were they successful compared to our international colleagues chuckle i would not judge that, but what i would say is the afghan public support, their own forces, more than they forces.international international presence, they support, but international operations in afghan villages, there was sometimes

misunderstanding on that between the government and the international forces. that kind of miss understand -- misunderstanding, it is the sons and daughters of those villages of the afghan population. like i said earlier, in many parts, we have examples of when it fell short, and the afghan public comes forward and starts uprising. more optimistic publiccally, you need support. however, like i said earlier, we are a nation that is still rebuilding and developing. international financial support, training support, and equipment support is needed for a long time to come. at the end of the day, it is the

job of the afghan national security forces to defend their country and secure their people. >> is there any one single thing the nextould need in few years, beyond money? i think the case for continued financial support is clear. what is it that they would need for success c? mr. daudzai: to be honest with you, 2014 was a bit too early for transfer of responsibility. they did not yet have their and completed. the international forces are providing that, but if there is one area of support that the afghan national security forces need, that is their support -- capability, and air both in terms of supporting the fighting and logistics, but also , my experience is the

evacuation of the wooded and martyred that affects the morel of the soldiers. le of the soldiers. , let me ask you one other question about the reconciliation effort. you made the argument towards the end of the presentation that the long-term requirement is for successful reconciliation. when you suddenly went to very hard you pushed for the reconciliation agenda. one thing i'm struggling with is that to make reconciliation work, you have to posit a fundamental transformation in pakistan's objections with -- with afghanistan. that is that pakistan believes its enemy is india and the goal

of that strategy is to check the -- checkmate india from having any presence and afghanistan. what are the incentives to engage in a reconciliation agreement that satisfies pakistani interests? mr. daudzai: when i was there, it was part of my job, and also for my own research, i tried to understand what pakistan once in nts inistan -- wa afghanistan. is it concerns or ambitions? it was a mixture of both. let me explain the concerns first. the concert is primarily about india. they are uncomfortable with the inel of presence of india afghanistan, particularly in security. that is where they were more

uncomfortable. also, pakistan, since its remained always concerned about internal cohesion within pakistan. intense,ern was more or became more intense after 1971 when pakistan split into two. accusing, again, india for an uprising, which is not true. for anister of india while, and i had access to all kinds of information, there was nothing that i saw. an issue ofmuch pakistan. pakistan had reasons to be concerned, and the right to be concerned. that is one d dimension of

the concern. what they want from us is to withish our relationship india. i think this is one area, in terms of the relationship of cohesion, internal with which they are concerned. some people do ask me, did i a quest. across the . did not see it in that way this is another way of saying the same thing. we never thought, or i never thought that they were pushing it as a priority issue. then, of course, they have ambitions also that they wanted .o use afghanistan

we don't mind. theant to give them corridor, provided they give us the same corridor to india. they are not doing that. goodso not allow our to go. these are the dimensions. what is the incentive for pakistan to help with the peace process? i think incentive is not the right word, in terms of how i view pakistan. i think "pressure" is the right cut fromwhat you can pakistan to make them come help you. they are under a kind of have it that when you get one, they want to, and when you get to, they won three. it is better to take that one from them, and they will help.

the united states is giving billions of dollars in terms of state to state assistance. i think the united states should help conditional. -- they pushed all the terrorists to afghanistan. lately, it was said that they can do more and peace -- war and peace together.

they should make it conditional, their assistance to pakistan. >> if you do the net assessment of where we are now, how do you assess the prospects for something that resembles is accessible reconciliation? at some point in time, it is obvious that pakistan wanted the taliban takeover of afghanistan. them in 1994,d and throughout the 1990's, that was the objective they were pursuing. tell them has almost taken the whole country. then, 9/11 happened, and they were lucky that the u.s. and allies came forward to the rescue. lately, what i understand is

that is not what they want. they are seeking talent and participated state rebuilding processes. that is the phrase i hear from them. satisfied with the taliban government, for instance. >> this participation is supposed to take place through all politics, which is where the taliban joined the process? imagine an extraordinary -- mr. daudzai: i don't know that many details now. when i was part of the argued that the taliban could be transformed into a political force

ultimately, and then they participate in elections. before that, they wanted a revision in the constitution so that the constitution is in such a way that allows for the share ino have a big shif the state rebuilding process. , in my opinion, is not returning back to pakistan, which is an indication that they are trying to become more and more an internal issue for pakistan. if that happens one year from now, pakistan would say there are no taliban leaders on my side, they are all on the side of afghanistan, and it is not my problem, it is an afghan

problem. we must assume that that may be the case, so we must therefore find a new approach, develop a new approach to the peace process. mediated,be afghan afghan manage, and afghan participated. why i say afghan mediated, every peace process needs a mediator. there 9/11, there was northern alliance which was called the islamic state, and the taliban government. there was dialogue between the two. that dialogue with mediated by the united nations. while, we didr a not think of a peace process. when we started the peace process, there is the absence of a mediator and this whole

process. a high peace council is not an mediator, that is just representing the afghan state. our friendly countries such as qatar, they are mediators. is -- opinion, the mediation role should the given to all caps, or they should take role.a mediator , ife there is a conflict you were -- a few forward. elders come we have those elders now that they could come forward and declare themselves as mediators between taliban and the government.

they may need some logistical providedwhich could be from the united nations or mechanism of the united nations. acceptablenot acceptable, thent would be to have an afghan mini jury. they can mediate between the taliban and the afghan state. we cannot ignore the role of pakistan. think that pakistan should be stopped from harming the process. , those under their influence, they could be encouraged to participate. close down all of the safe havens they have. then peace could be more of an afghan if -- afghan issue.

>> i will open the floor. identify yourself. keep your interventions to the point, that would be good. >> hello, i am from the national defense research arm. thank you for your eliminating comments. i am tempted to ask about the current unity government process. you alluded to several things observers here have noted are challenging to make this process work forward in accordance with the elections at a regional level and the constitutional level. i would like to pick up on the about the peas reconciliation process and pakistan's aims, in particular in response to china. he talked about iran, russia, and we have talked about

pakistan's issues in the new york times in march of this year saying pakistan did not change its calculus. your successor testified that it forakistan is the problem peace and security in afghanistan. the chinese have a long-standing relationship with the pakistanis, and they have taken a more active role in trying to find a way to encourage the pakistanis to disassemble international terrorist groups, particularly the east turkmenistan group, and resident gone he has also approached the chinese in terms of activities going forward. i wondered if you could finish, since you have finished as the ambassador to pakistan, what has changed the chinese approach, and if the chinese approach to secure afghanistan and pakistan from terrorists that threaten china might have assistance in

oring the pakistani efforts to get the afghan government moving in a way that you discussed? in my assessment, there are three reasons for china to take interest in afghanistan. security for china itself. thinks it is at least goingg to afghanistan and to china. this is one part of china's in -- china's interest. the human government -- the u.n. government -- with air ministry of interior and their minister for security. i was clearly seeing they were very much concerned over the etim and needed help from afghanistan.

in my first meeting with china, i realized they were so pakistan byin the afghan national security forces is limited to cobble and not the rest of the country. when they realized that was not the case, and it was a force that was controlling more parts. they came to us from help. -- for help. there were two other reasons, more economical. one was in pakistan one in afghanistan. the economic corridor that links china, they are building in that corridor. area which includes roads and a network to afghanistan and pakistan.

how could they invest $46 iflion in that corridor there is a risk to the corridor within the region of one kilometer? 100 kilometers. iny took a keen interest dissolving the taliban issue there. the third reason was the investment in afghanistan. 2 major contracts, one in the south and one in the north, to extract copper. they needed security. opinion, those are the three main reasons for china to come into the seat. there is a lack of sincerity in our neighborhood. ormatter how much pressure

incentives come from china, there is still a lack of indiaity, the issue of and pakistan not resolved and china will not have a huge impact. >> yes ma'am? the young lady. here.nk you for being .'m from the university of utah i wanted to ask, from your non-western perspective, what is the impact of the iranian nuclear deal in your country, and relation to iran, insight into how iran ron is thinking from a non-western perspective. mr. daudzai: thank you. when i started as the afghan ambassador in iran, we started thinking of a new approach to our relationship.

bilaterally between afghanistan and pakistan. that relationship should not be affected. -- be affected by our friendship with the united states and their animosity with the united states. i think we were successful. we were having good hugeionships despite a international presence, iran participated in the reconstruction and development of afghanistan. problem, pakistan and enron became an alternative, we chose good relief. in terms of trading with india, iran was her only other option. we could not trade with india through pakistan, but we could through iran. the nuclear deal is

concerned, we do not like the nuclear weapons in our neighborhood. we don't like that pakistan and iran is nuclear, russia, china, india. it is very problematic for the neighborhood. it looks like we are sitting on an atom bomb. we don't like that. we can't do anything about it, it is a bigger problem than us. yes, sir. speak into the microphone. nonpolitical and social i highlighted a few points. kunduz, what is the reality? there are rumors that international forces were involved in the fall intentionally.

you were really involved, can you tell the three big achievements qu of the involvement? you be running for the presidential election. i know it is early, that we need to know now so we could have room for a better selection. what would be the difference between you and the president that you are running against? the third one, which is a little saying why youe don't want to create a sizable government. what are you doing diplomatically? mr. daudzai: thank you. i hope i remember. kunduz, never

listen to conspiracy theories. there was no conspiracy involved. what actually happened was that it was a holiday. days thefor three afghan national security forces but all are forces in place, no one goes home. d they takeive ea holiday. many checkpoints are symbolic because many people go home. that is what the taliban thought or the strategist took advantage of, the absence. on the sixth day they started to attack kunduz. course, there are lessons to be learned. there were weaknesses in coordination.

of politicalization of the security forces is also responsible. by the politicalization i mean when the former government, the secretary of defense is mine and the secretary of interior is yours, it becomes two different lines of command and ordination at the senior level becomes difficult. at the lower level it becomes difficult. the weakness in coordination was an additional factor in the fall of kunduz. launched anresident investigation into that and appointed a commission. he offered me first to be the head of the commission. i did not take it. he appointed a commission that has completed its work. based on the findings, i'm sure they will take decisions. do not trust conspiracies.

nobody wanted to take on kunduz but the taliban. as far as the three major --ievements of the president when i think about it, a major achievement was the national unity of afghanistan. within kabul city, you needed a visa to go from one part to the other. you could go to the eastern part shower, butto the you cannot go to the western part of the city. that was the situation. the unity is now complete and reflected in the institutions. you can look at the army, the police, the judicial system, the bureaucrats.

one major achievement, the top one is the national unity. is theond major one quality of the youths trained in the last 14 years. with a lowtart capacity. we did not have enough to man our offices here at education was stopped 20 years before that . in the past 14 years there has been a enormous progress made. like i said in my presentation, right now you have almost half a million youths enrolled in higher education inside the country. my figures are that over 100,000 have been on scholarships abroad in neighboring countries. this is the second major

of the time. the third one is democracy. in a country which was at war for many decades, you now have one of the best constitutions and all of the democratic institutions. of course democracy does not grow overnight, it takes time. this is the third. it is long overdue. as far as running for presidency, you answered it yourself. it is far too early to speak about that. you say, what is better than me compared to the president, not in the context of running, but i would say --

[laughter] why don't i that criticize the national unity government, it is simply because i am not in afghanistan. --you come to get a if you come to afghanistan and asked me the question, my answer would be the same. thank you very much. i'm a scholar with john hopkins university. my focus is southeast asia. pakistan andout iraniane process, the nuclear deal was also asked. my question is a little long-term perspective beyond , which is saudi arabia

and iran's involvement in afghanistan. if you will recall we have 2 mosques inside kabul. both of these countries are influential in terms of bringing these and stability in afghanistan and saudi arabia. , during hisuhani office, he traveled to china and saudi arabia so many times. i think that is the right thing. the previous government did the same thing because they were influential in pakistan and can help the process. looking at the long-term perspective of those involved with afghanistan building a stronger nation, one thing that differentiated iraq from conflict ands that

war was not along the line of sectarianism. if you look at the involvement how do youcountries see that dynamic playing in afghanistan long-term? that competition between saudi arabia and iran is not limited to afghanistan. .t is wider in afghanistan we don't have any sectarian problems that we have ever had. had we deal with that? the rivalry? the president,t they wanted to let the americans figured with soviet matches.

i think we should make good use of both of them. looking at the negatives to rivalries, they have rivalries that might be negatively affecting us. let's look at how we can take a good advantage of those ,ompetitions for reconstruction economic roles, trade, and other trade relationships. we cannot live in a part of the world without good relations with saudi arabia for obvious reasons. iran is also our neighbor. we cannot live in that part of the world without good neighborly relations with iran. we must have a more constructive them together. taking advantage of resources, resources.and i'm sure you must be aware in the past 14 years 55,000 afghans have graduated and are back in

afghanistan and working in the system. are mine and your brothers and sisters. we should look at that more positive aspect rather than looking at the negatives. young lady? >> i work at the carnegie endowment. there is a recently published a state wheree is it is argued that corruption threatens global security. public officials who have been refused a bribe, or a sister who was raped by a judge, fines and the taliban an attractive option.

reasons,ous including an alternate worldview in which a strict imposition of religious morality can undress agreed and public corruption. greed and public corruption. we see members of the inspector general for afghanistan that corruption permeates the political machinery in afghanistan, particularly devastating corruption at the highest levels of government. particularly in the curse i government among the cabinet members. which you were a part of. see, wondering, how you the measures to reign in politicians and corruption among the highest levels of government

, which deals a symbolic blow to ae process of creating sustainable socioeconomic institution in afghanistan. i agree that corruption is a major problem. drug trafficking is also a major problem. i wish that it was not like that . we all wish that we could find an easy way to deal with it, but under the circumstances we started with the way things are, you started rebuilding a country without a grand plan. we are reconstructing the country. that is partly responsible for corruption in contract and -- in contracting.

a huge subject that we need to sure isis what i am that they have all the right intentions to eliminate corruption, but in practice the achievement was not that significant. the rights intentions, but his achievements are limited. it is a major issue, i hope that it was not major. the solution is not the taliban. the solution is in the rule of impunity for the rule of law. gentleman, here. >> thank you for an excellent presentation. -- wastioned that responsible for building unity in the country. when you were citing examples of unity government to only cited

-- negativeernments examples. the perfect example was the government, the interim government. indeed, it could be interpreted that the government was at the first term a complete unity government, including all of the factions except for the taliban and the pic mature faction. is what can the afghan government offer the taliban in peace talks that does not compromise the rise of other afghans? mr. daudzai: the national unity government and national unity itself are two different concepts. often we call a coalition government a national unity government when in reality is a

coalition government. what happened was a coalition government that did not include the taliban. which was wrong, that was a mistake that we realized later. that is when we started the process of reconciliation with the taliban. the only way is a policy of inclusion. included thelso reconciliation process. what we can offer to the taliban, i can only give you my personal opinion which is that we should talk to the taliban only when we are in a position of strength. ande are at a state defending the state we should be in a position of strength. on one hand you have the state of afghanistan and on the other an insurgent group.

this is a talk between the state and is urging groups. when the state is in a stronger position that is when you talk to the taliban. myer conduce -- after kunduz opinion was that we should wait and then the negotiations could restart with the taliban. the incentive for the taliban, or how -- let's say that they wayfor a revision in such a that a compromise our achievements of 14 years? that would not be acceptable for the state of afghanistan. have aey could do is political parties in pakistan, group,s a political running elections, and the taliban should also have one when they become a political

party and afghanistan. if they win majority they can form a government of their choice. that is how i would see it. they will need to be transformed into a political force. it is such a pleasure to see you again. a quick question. ,ou have made in death comments why his comments, about a number of pakistan's neighbors, but you have immediate neighbors to your north. playingee central asia a constructive role in afghanistan in the coming years? yes. not only in the coming years, but also in the past. electricityof her from our neighbors, turkmenistan, uzbekistan, and cause extend. -- and cause extend -- and cause extend --

when trading through pakistan. options. have asian countries, in the past we had good relations for the past 14 years. days seem threatened by what is coming from the south to the north in the name of isis and the taliban, and we need to help them so they feel more secure with us. no particular problem in the north. >> one last question. maybe 2. then we will stop there. you.ank a very warm welcome to washington.

i am a journalist in washington. correct me if i'm wrong but that dead. process is i heard you blaming pakistan a lot. this is also what we hear from kabul, the afghan government blaming pakistan. the way the washington looks at the situation, this is not the case. the prime minister was in d.c. and what we heard from u.s. officials was that they recommending the role that pakistan has played in the support of the afghan is process. why this difference of what afghans and americans see. what do you see or the afghan that thet sees american government does not see. why can't the afghan government convince americans that pakistan is not supporting and they should not be commended? thank you. , what you'rewell

saying, that is what we have been saying for 14 years. our american colleagues, the root cause of the problem is in pakistan. they have safe havens of terrorism in pakistan. , all ofban leadership them are in pakistan. i am sure the united states has been trying to pressurize them one way or the other, but pakistan knows how to handle all of them. to summarize and one or two the way i see it, the united states sees pakistan as an ally, but pakistan is not their friend. friend, but we want to become their ally. that is the difference. , referring to what

you said in the beginning that the peace process is dead, it is not dead, it is suspended for the time being. for everything on pakistan. we have to restart. we have to start something from within afghanistan with the help of the united states, china, and many others around us. we should be more creative and innovative. blaming pakistan and expecting pakistan to help us with the peace process did not work. it did not work. therefore we have to restart it is a more organized way. >> you get the last word. >> ime journalists.

i have an observation and question. it is not very scientific it is more of an analogy. thergent groups with mujahedin have been fighting and ruling back-and-forth since 35 years. they were weakened. they came after mujahedin. i would expect mujahedin to remain a force in afghanistan for at least two more decades. moreis is true, two decades ruling afghanistan and sharing powers, tell you think tell a ban will be having the same inference -- taliban will be having the same inference?

what is the strategic solution? should we take the -- can resolve this issue with more appointment? as we have been witnessing -- the party has not forgotten. actingister of defense, defense, blamed tehe guy. how do we expect the party or the leading member of the party concerned about the taliban overall? it daudzai: let's look at from a different angle. there was a war. that war was between warlords. there was no right and wrong.

one was from the islamic emirates. and were warring factions warlords. one of them called themselves the mujahedin, going back to a title they had earlier. that is just a title. no longer hunting, as we can call it, mujahedin. they have transformed into political party. they are no longer a mujahedin party. they are a political party. they have a share in government. % butther one, not 100 maybe 80% has been transformed into political party. my dream is that tell a man will

-- taliban will be transformed into political party. then we can have a solution to the problem. >> i want to thank all of you for coming here this afternoon and i want to extend a special thanks for your time to talk to us and speak with us very patiently answering the questions. thank you very much. guest: my pleasure. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

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be sure to follow and tweet us your questions. institutionings posted a discussion about isis. the discussion ran about an hour and a half. will: all right, everyone. welcome. i direct the project on u.s. relations with the islamic world here at brookings. today we are here to talk about countering violent extremism

through early interventions program. brookings is doing this with the program on extremism at george washington university and the institute for strategic dialogue. joining us today is lorenzo, who directs the program at george washington university. to his right is a senior fellow at the institute for strategic dialogue. to my left is angela, deputy director of life after hate. and to her left is a fellow at the program on extremism at gw and founder and director of the german institute of radicalization and deradicalization studies in berlin. ok. so the countering violent extremism discussion has been going along for several years now. if the phrase sounds vague to

you, it is also vague inside the u.s. government and foreign governments. no one is quite sure what this thing means. i remember when i was working at the state department, i asked another agency to give me a list of everything that had been justified to the congress as countering violent extremism across all agencies of the u.s. government. pretty amazing. everything from building forward operating bases in afghanistan to english-language programs for young mothers. essentially it became a way for the government to protect their budgets and their programs. in an effort to become much more focused, we are here today to talk about one slice of this that is often neglected, but i think honestly is the most valuable in the effort to stop or counter recruitment for terrorist organizations, and that is early intervention.

and so i wanted to begin our program by asking daniel to tell us what early interventions programs are, how they different from other programs and then we will get to a more wide-ranging discussion. daniel? daniel: thank you for the introduction. i am excited to be here. early intervention as part of countering violent extremism is really an interesting term. usually when we look at western european countries or other states and their policies, we see there are three types of tools they usually use. the first one is prevention. usually anything that is related to education, civil society, anything that tries to prevent people from ending up in radical groups can be seen as a tool. the second level is repression, containing an actual existing radical threat. law enforcement, anything

related to courts, house searching, sting operations. and then we see the third level which is called intervention in most western european countries. so early intervention would mean that we actually someone who is in the process of a violent radicalization process but has some connection to it. has some connection to a radical group or radical ideology or is on a path that is considered dangerous. so it is part of those tools we're the -- we're the deradicalization programs, family counseling programs, are part. early intervention programs or tools usually focus on the social environment of those persons who are about to become a violent radical. so we know from studies that there is a phenomenon called leakage, where many people leak

some kind of information directly or indirectly to their friends, their families, their colleagues, employers, anyone around them. and these persons are usually the first one to notice a change, to notice a potential threat or danger. and in most cases these so-called gatekeepers do not reach out to the authorities or the police because they feel a strong sense of loyalty, obligation to their friends and family members. they fear what might happen to them. they fear that maybe they are making matters worse. maybe they are the ones responsible for the son or daughter being put into jail for 20 years. so we need to figure out a way to give these families, friends, these associate gatekeepers the tools, a neutral third party, mentor they can turn to for advice and counseling, but also as some form of intermediary

between authorities, social services, health services, to give them an understanding and assessment of why this is happening in their family or environment. and these early intervention tools are really those who focus on friends, family, colleagues to give them the tool as early as possible, to reach out and ask for help. later tools would be the diehard deradicalization programs for returning fighters or those in prison or in prison, inmates. so these programs are much more specialized and focus on the individual level. early intervention tools are more than the means of social tools, and there are many out there -- family counseling or specialized training for teachers, police officers, for community leaders. will: daniel, to my mind, these kind of programs make a lot of sense, because it is a small population that you are working

with. they have already demonstrated they are interested in radical ideas. but generally they have not committed any violent crimes yet. so you are working very close to the problem. the game is to try and make sure that these folks do not go over the line and commit a criminal act, particularly a violent criminal act. but these programs -- they have not caught on, particularly in the united states. when we talk about extremism, it runs the gamut. but this is not really part of it. working in this space is usually often left to law enforcement, people that are already entertaining radical ideas or thought to be a security risk. better to let law enforcement handle it then have these early interventions. give us the scene from europe.

how does that compare with the united states? lorenzo: it is very different. let me thank you for hosting us here. it is good to have this conversation. we partnered together and tried two mainstream some of this debate and that is why we decided to bring people from the european experience. in some european countries we have seen 10 or 15 years with this intervention. it is a very amorphous term. everybody makes whatever they want out of it. and a lot of the attention has been focused on the large targets, the counter messaging, the counter narratives, the engagement through communities. and the europeans have done that kind of work. the pro-integration work, the never-ending whether a lack of integration is linked to radicalization. but this kind of social engineering programs, the europeans have spent a lot of resources on are very difficult

to assess. it is very difficult to prove a negative. what you are doing stops people from radicalizing. what we have seen is the europeans have focused more on the one-on-one intervention, through some of the reasons that daniel was also mentioning. in the u.s., that has not been the case. we see a lot of counter messaging, whether it is the foreign part with the state department or on the engagement with communities on the domestic front. will: can you explain for the audience what we mean by engagement with communities, what that ends up looking like? lorenzo: this is what dhs and a variety of what the variety of what you have been doing for a long time, which is building trusting dialogues and relationships with communities. you are absolutely right. we have to specify that this is one of the points of contention, one of the most debated points.

it is unfortunately limited for the most part to the muslim community. it is limited to targeting al qaeda-inspired radicalization and today that would be isis-inspired radicalization. and there is a never-ending debate as to whether it is correct and should be focusing also on other forms. and i think most people would agree that it should be. 99% of the resources are devoted to religious inspired. in the u.s. we limited mostly to engagement. we are starting to see signs that the idea of working on the one-on-one interventions. the fbi used the term off-ramp. the idea of doing this very tailored interventions which if successful are quite cost-effective. it is much easier to prove the effectiveness than some of the larger programs. they can be very effective. the european experience tells us that.

so we have very different models. daniel will talk about that largely. depending on what degree of involvement of governments and a variety of other factors. in the u.s. we are starting now to talk about neutralizing these tools. traditionally we have seen a law enforcement-based approach. the traditional use of sound, very harsh. law enforcement techniques. the fbi in charge of the investigation. if the european approach on individuals who are clearly radicalized, the european approach is to try to pull back people into a pre-radicalization stage. the fbi approach has been in some cases to try to push the individual, to have this kind of sting operations. have the radicalization process go further in a controlled setting with the fbi controlling everything and eventually arrest the individual. so two different philosophies

and a variety of factors that contribute to that. but there is a growing realization in the states that that kind of tactic cannot be used all the time. it is very effective, particularly from a prosecution point of view. very high success rate in courts. we see miners attracted to isis ideologies. it is difficult to use for a variety of legal and ethical reasons, the sting operations. the numbers are very high. we hear the fbi talked about 900 investigations open nationwide on individuals linked to syria and mostly to isis. that is a very big number. it is difficult to tackle all of these cases with traditional law enforcement tools. that is something the department of justice fully understands and is trying to explore some alternative tools. just this morning we had

meetings with the department of justice a group that is trying to find alternatives to prosecutions. we understand we cannot arrest our way out of this problem. the idea and we decided it was useful to introduce some of the tactics they are using in europe. obviously not all the tactics in europe can be used and transported and adopted here in the u.s. there are a lot of ideas with the proper caveats could be used here. will: daniel, i want to come back to you just to get a sense of what is going on in europe. in terms of early intervention programs, it is uneven across the continent. some countries embracing this, some not. which country would you hold up as the exemplar in putting together early intervention

programs, and why? daniel: that is impossible to answer. most western european countries have their own philosophies regarding the radicalization. you cannot have a country like germany where they have almost 20 years of experience and practical work against the far right, neo-nazi groups. and they have 12 to 15 specialized de-radicalized programs in the area of far right extremism. they all have different approaches. you cannot have a country like denmark where they have a very state-focused, police-run centralized deradicalization program were everything runs through the police. you cannot have countries like sweden where they have one or two strong ngo's doing that kind of work incorporation with the government. you cannot have countries like the u.k. where they have a strong civil society component, or france -- >> it depends a lot on the local culture.

daniel: absolutely. it depends on the question whether or not ideology should be part of the program. do they talk about dismantling a radical ideology at all? it is not that popular in denmark, not that popular in the u.k. very strong in germany. i would say that deradicalization can be ranked or classified according to three criteria. first there is the ideology. do we have a disengagement program without ideology? just a physical role change getting someone out to stop committing criminal acts. verses deradicalization, trying to get a dismantling, changing the values. the second criterion, is it state or nonstate? is it run by an organized government body like the police, social services, something like that, or is it nongovernmental-based? thirdly, is it active or passive? is it actively reaching out to

you target group in prison, or is it just knocking on the door. in germany some programs do that. they have a list where neo-nazis live and they go there and asked if they want to leave the movement. or are they passive programs? are they waiting to be contacted by those who want to get out? in europe we have seen wide and broad array of different programs. i would argue the most promising as bigger public and private partnerships because usually there are aspects that are being done more effective and more effectively done by society organizations. so we have seen several attempts in germany and sweden or the u.k. where the government body started to have a program incorporating civil society organizations that do long-term counseling. it is a specified framework like

ideology is part of the program. how long should it take? i would say germany and denmark are on the forefront of that. will: thank you very much. angela want to try and give people a sense of how one of these programs really works in practice. you work at an institution that focuses on far right extremism. i would like you to talk about how an early intervention works with somebody who hasn't yet broken the law. i also wonder if you could say a few thoughts about the role of ideology. not necessarily in terms of inspiring someone to do it, but when you're doing these kinds of interventions, do you really need to deal with the ideology, or do you focus on other things first? angela: it has been a little slow going. and with what we have done we

are out there doing interventions, doing counter messaging, and for us personally we have not found that is successful to go in and aggressively attack ideology. what we do is share very real, raw human experience and connect on a different level. i think it is important to mention we have to be aware of what propels people. what is broken? what is the underlining issue that made them feel they were missing out on something? that they needed to belong. and that could be trauma, abuse or a variety of factors that really push people into it. so when we go in and talk to an individual, we have an

understanding of what drove them there. that gives us the foundation and the base that we work from. we draw on our own experience. life after hate was founded and is completely run by former violent extremists. so instead of judging the individual, instead of attacking the ideology head on, we ask them personal questions. what has affected them in their lives? what is important to them? what are they interested in. what are their goals? and from there we fall back on our own personal experience and share that to show they are not alone, they are not the only ones. that it is possible to disengage. but they are not concern with being deradicalization. and the referrals we get come from a variety of places, whether it is a parent worried about a child and getting

involved. some government referrals, human rights. and then we have people who contact us on our own and say, i am thinking about getting involved in this. i have a certain belief about a certain thing, or i have this experience that is pushing me in this direction. but i do not know. i am not sure. can you talk to me about why i shouldn't? or what are the consequences, or things like that. it has been in that way that we have been able to go out and start having successful interventions. these are people who are on the verge of committing acts of violence who were then prevented from doing so. theseare you doing any of interventions purely online? cases: there have been

where we have traveled and done face-to-face sit down interventions. we get contact a lot by social media, via website. we definitely do not have the funds to travel the country to do a personal face-to-face every time. part of what we offer is one-on-one and touring. whether it is text messages, social media -- we take these with a private group 30 violentnse with far right extremists. some of them have been disengaged for decades. now, orthem have just then days or weeks or months. we are using that network as a means of support