famous dispute between justice scalia and chief justice roberts about wisconsin right to life. again, scalia takes the approach that you need to destroy the village to save it. chief justice roberts takes the village approach keep the structure there but make sure it doesn't really mean anything. as you can tell i'm sort of on the scalia side of the debate that if there's a fundamentally -- if there's a president that's fundamentally incompatible with first amendment rights then it should be cleaned up not through this incrementalism step. so that's a long answer to your question which i strongly suspect in light of what the published opinion said that chief justice roberts was relubblingtnt to take the steps that they ultimately took in citizens united as quickly as justice scalia wanted him to take it but ultimately came around to it.

and it's really interesting to talk about quirks. if the solicitor general had not given the completely truthful answer that yes of course this means you couldn't publish a book criticizing hillary clinton, the corporation couldn't do it, we may have had a different result in citizens united. and that's what led to a question by justice alito, by the way, and that's what led to a lot of people rethinking and reargument. so i strongly suspect justice -- chief justice roberts was the one putting the brakes on that. i strongly suspect he wanted to write a more narrow opinion. but once the momentum had developed to overturn austin and restore the first amendment to what it naturally meant, i think he went along with it. >> i want to thank this wonderful panel. i've got my marching orders. thank you very much. [applause]

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption contents and accuracy. visit ncicap.org t extremism. the brookings institution hosted this 90 minute event.

>> all right, everyone. welcome. i direct the project on u.s. relations with the islamic world. today we are here to talk about countering violent extremism through early interventions programs. we are doing this in partnership with the partnership on extremism in the institute for strategic dialogue. is the director of programs on extremism at george washington university. we have a senior fellow at the institute for strategic

dialogue. to my left, the deputy director of life after hate. to her left, a fellow at the program on extremism and founder and director of the institute on radicalization and de-radicalization that he's. -- de-radicalization studies. the discussion has been going along for several years now. you, it iss vague to also very vague inside the u.s. government. no one is quite sure what this thing means. i remember when i was working at the state department, i asked another agency to give me a list of everything that had been justified to the congress as countering violent extremism across all ages into the u.s. government. pretty amazing. everything from building forward operating bases in afghanistan

to english-language programs for young mothers. essentially it became away for the government to protect their budgets and their programs. in an effort to become much more focused, we are here today to talk about one slice of this that is often neglected, but i think is the most valuable in the effort to stop or counter recruitment for terrorist organizations, and that is early intervention. i wanted to begin our program tell by asking daniel to us what early interventions programs are, how they differ from other programs, say de-radicalization for foreign fighters. then we will get to a more wide-ranging discussion. >> thank you for the introduction. i am excited to be here. early intervention as part of

countering violent extremism is an interesting term. usually when we look at western european countries or other states and their counterterrorism policies, we see that there are three types of tools that usually use. the first what is prevention. usually, anything that is related to education, civil society, anything that tries to prevent people from ending up in radical groups can be seen as a tool. the second level is repression, containing an existing radical threat, law enforcement, anything related to courts, sting operations. then we see the third level, which is called intervention. early intervention would mean that we actually have someone who is in the process, in the early process, of potentially violent radicalization, but has

some connection to it, to a radical group, to radical ideology, is on a path that is considered dangerous. tools, wherethose d radicalization programs, counseling programs, are part o f. early intervention programs are tools usually focus on the so cial environment of those persons who are about to be, violent radical. we know from terrorism studies that there is a phenomenon called leakage, where many persons leak some kind of information, sign, directly or indirectly to their friends or families are colleagues are employers, anyone around them. ons are usually the first ones to notice a change, the potential threat. in most cases, these so-called out topers do not reach

authorities, do not reach out to the police or anyone else, because they feel a strong sense of loyalty and obligation to their runs and family members. they fear what might happen to them. the fear that maybe they are making matters worse. maybe they are the ones responsible for their son or daughter being put into jail for 20 years. we need to figure out a way to give these families, friends, gatekeepers, a neutral third it, theyt can address can turn to for assessment or advice, but also for some sort of intermediary between social services and health services, to give them an understanding, an assessment of why this is happening in their family. these early intervention tools, those that focus on friends and family, colleagues, give them the tools as early as possible to reach out and ask for help.

later tools would be hard-core d radicalization programs, or those who are already in prison. those programs are much more specialized focus on an individual level. early intervention tools are more the effects of social tools . family counseling, specialized training for teachers, for police officers, for community leaders. >> daniel, to my mind, these kind of programs make a lot of because it is a small population that you are working with. they have already demonstrated they are interested in radical ideas, but generally they have not committed any violent crimes yet. so you are working very close to the problem, and the game is to try and make sure that these folks don't go over the line and commit a criminal act, particularly of violent criminal act.

but these programs have been -- they haven't caught on in other places, particularly here in the united states. when we talk about encountering violent extremism, it runs the gamut. but this is not part of it. working in this space is usually, for my experience, often left to law enforcement, people that are already entertaining radical ideas, or security risks. then have these early interventions. give us a scene from europe. how does that compare with the united states ? >> it is very different. and thank you for asking us here. it is good to have this conversation in a way that we can partner. comes toience that europe -- that is why we decided to bring people from the european asked areas -- the european experience.

we have had 10 or 15 years of this kind of experience. everybody makes whatever they want out of it. a lot of the attention in the u.s. has been vocus on -- has been focused on the large target, the counter narratives, the engagement to communities, which is also extremely important. europeans have done that kind of work, with the never-ending dilemma of whether integration is linked to radicalization. there is some social engineering havehe europeans thas spent a lot of money on -- it is difficult to prove a negative, that what you are doing stops people from radicalizing. what we have seen is that the europeans have focused more on the one-on-one intervention. out,e u.s., as you pointed that has not been the case. we have seen a lot of messaging,

whether it is the foreign state department, or on the engagement of communities, which is what we have been on the domestic front. >> can you explain for the audience what we mean by engagement with communities, what that ends up looking like? >> this is what dhs and the buildingf -- trusting dialogues and relationships with communities. right, wesolutely have to specify that this is one of the points of contention, one of the most debated points, that it is unfortunately limited to the muslim community. it is limited to targeting what is traditionally known as al qaeda, isis-inspired radicalization. there is a never-ending debate on whether it is correct and whether we should focus on others. i think most people would agree

are 99% of the resources dedicated to religious inspired extremism. in the u.s., we have been limited to engagement. we are starting to see signs that we are working on this one-on-one intervention. tailoredof -- interventions, which are quite cost-effective. it is much easier to prove the effectiveness. not very easy, but easier than larger programs. they can be very effective. the european experience tells us that. it depends on what degree of involvement the government and a variety of other factors. in the u.s., we are starting now to talk about utilizing these tools. traditionally we have seen a law-enforcement-based approach, the traditional use of sound,

law enforcement techniques. if the european approach on individuals who are clearly radicalized but operating in a criminal space, the european approach is to push people into a pretty radicalization stage. -- into a pre-radicalization stage. have the process go further in a controlled setting, the fbi controlling everything and arresting the individual. there are a variety of factors that contribute to that, but there is a growing realization in the state buthat the tech tatactic cannot be used all the time. it has a very high success rate in court but it cannot always be used. we are seeing more and more cases of minors being attracted to isis ideology.

there are legal and ethical regions with minors. the numbers are also very high. we heard the fbi talk about 900 investigations opened nationwide on individuals linked to syria, mostly to isis. that is a very big number. it is difficult to tackle all these cases with a traditional law enforcement tool. that is something that the dhs understands that is trying to explore alternative tools. just this morning, we had meetings with the department of justice about a particular working group trying to find alternatives to prosecution, because we understand we cannot arrest our way out of this problem. was usefulul -- it

to introduce the tactics that are used in europe. obviously, not all the tactics have been used in europe can be used, transported and adopted here. that, are a lot of ideas with the proper caveats, could be used. >> daniel, i want to come back to you to get a sense of what's going on here. i know in terms of early intervention programs it is uneven across the continent. some countries embracing this, some not. which country would you hold up as the exemplar, including early intervention programs, and why? >> that's impossible to answer, because most western european countries -- you can have a country like germany, where they have almost 20 years of experience in practical work against the far right, and they have at least at last count, 12

to 15 specialized de-radicalization programs, and they all have very different approaches. you can have a country like denmark, with the very state centralizedice run, d radicalization program, where everything runs through the police. you can have countries like sweden, where they have one or two strong ngos doing that work in cooperation with the u.k. where or the they have a strong civil society component, or france with intelligence led -- >> it depends on the political culture. >> absolutely. whether or not ideology should be part of the program. they talk about dismantling a radical ideology -- it is not that popular in denmark or the u.k., very strong in germany. i would say that de-radicalization can be ranked are classified according to three criteria. first, the ideology. technically spoken, do we have

the disengagement program, or just a physical role change? getting someone out to do or to stop committing criminal acts, versus the radicalization, -- v ersus de-radicalization. second criterion, is it state or nonstate? is it organized by a government body, like the police or social services? or is it nongovernmental? thirdly, is it active? is it actively reaching out to the target group in prison or just knocking on the door? some programs do that in germany. they have a list of were neo-nazis live, and a knock on the door and ask if they want to leave. they are waiting to be contacted by those who want to get out. veryrope, we have seen wide, broad array of different

programs. i would argue that the most promising aspect -- usually, some are being done more effective by government bodies, and the other way around, more effectively done by civil societies. we have seen several attempts in germany and sweden in the u.k. where the government bodies start at the core, like hotline, incorporating civil society organizations with long-term counseling. in a specified framework like ideology, how long should it take. i would say germany and denmark are definitely on the forefront of that. >> thank you very much. i want to try and give ebola sense of how one of these programs really works in practice. you work antonin asian that focuses on the are right extremism. i would like for you to talk

about how early intervention works with somebody who hasn't yet broken the law. but i also wonder if you could say a few thoughts about the role of ideology. not necessarily in terms of -- when you are doing these kinds of interventions, do you really need to deal with the ideology, or do you focus on other things first? >> well, it's been a little slow going. we don't have instability programs are now. but with what we've done, we are out there, doing interventions, doing counter messaging. for us personally, we have not found that it is successful to immediately go in and aggressively attack ideology. what we do is share very real, raw human experience and connect on a different level. i think it is important to

mention that we really have to be aware of what propels people into these. what is broken? what is the underlying issue that made them feel they were missing out on something, that they needed to belong? that could be trauma. they could be abuse. it could be a variety of factors that really push people into it. when we go in and we talk to an andividual, we have understanding of what drove them there. that kind of gives us the foundation and the base that we work from. we draw on our own experience. founded andate was is completely run by former violent extremists. so instead of judging the individual, instead of attacking the ideology had on, we ask them

personal questions. what has affected them in their lives? what is important to them? what are they interested in? what are their goals? from there, we fall back on our own personally. in share that -- on our own personal experiences and share that they are not the only one, that it is absolutely possible to disengage and de-radicalized, but they are not concerned with being de-radicalized necessarily. the referrals that we get come from a variety of places, whether it is apparent worried about the child getting involved, some government referrals, human rights, and people who contact us on their own and say, listen, i am thinking about getting involved in this, i have a certain belief about a certain thing, or a have this experience that is really pushing me in this direction. but i don't know. i'm not sure.

can you talk to me about why i shouldn't? what are the consequences? things like that. it has been in that way that we have been able to go out and start having successful interventions. these are literally people who, by their own account, are on the verge of committing acts of violence, and are prevented from doing so. >> are you doing any of these interventions purely online, or is there always a real-world component? >> both. there have been cases where we have traveled in and done face-to-face sit down interventions. we contacted a lot via social media, via our website. we definitely don't have the funds to travel the country and do personal face-to-face every time, but it's part of what we offer, one-on-one mentoring,

whether it is phone calls, text messages, social media. we get these individuals involved. thatve a private group consists of almost 30 former violent extremists, and these individuals, some of them have been disengaged for decades. some have just now come out, literally within days or weeks. we are using that network as a means of support, as a means of talking through issues. some of the issues that propelled them in the first place. of the supportd that daniel talked about, whether it is a family or community that has supported, that is not there to say you were horrible because you believe these things. let me share my experience and how i got beyond that, finding that common ground.

>> have you ever encountered anyone who was radicalized purely by what they had read? normal in every way, high functioning, but just consumed a lot of hate literature? there is always something else underlying it? >> every case is different. some of the information we are finding out is that not every person suffered trauma or abuse or has mental health some people came from perfectly stable, loving homes and for some reason, felt the need to belong better way. a small percentage where raised in an extremist environment. they were taught violence. they are individuals who were raised in a prejudiced household or they were taught racism as

children. some will grow up and rebel against that and others will grow up looking for a place and say, this is what i was taught. there are individuals who will have maybe one experience that, punm that point on, upon intended, it will color their view of the world from that point on. and some will react to history. they will see something unfairly or that one group is represented more than another. we cannot classify across the board. it is case-by-case. you to help give us the u.k. perspective on this. i also wanted to talk about the role on ideology. aremany people, when you thinking about early intervention, the first thing that comes to mind is, you need

to take on immediately the ideas , that political radicals would have felt. have you found that to be the case in your experience when we are talking about islamic radicals? deepes this result from person issues or deep societal issues? >> i think in my experience is, all you have is individual pathways are different. some buy into a narrative. verylook at the world as similar to what was old school. now, you have the evil capitalist west which is

hegemonic late dominating the world. it is a suppressing the natural aspirations of most people in the world. instance, the west is islam. they look at everything in the world through that. they look at israel and palestine through the ideological mindset. they look at any conflict through a manifestation of another attempt of america to dominate the middle east. all of everything is viewed from that lens. then you get others who actually are not as such, but they have had various reasons of personal and social political views. questionsave actually

that shape their identity. they may have grievances related to racism and past experiences of disenfranchisement. they are approaching it because they already feel they need something else. you then have others who have neither had a specific orblematic set of grievances are embracing a political ideology, but are embracing a form of religion that separates them from everybody else. therefore, they are separate. they are analogous to what we have discussed as. technical. are some who have a

religious inspiration for their political worldview. asy look at the world nothing fairly representing the islamic world. it comes from a very direct engagement with scripture. rights exactly what is and what is wrong and what should be enforced. they have this very theological and political ideology. then, you have the other trend suffer different mental health issues. therefore, those things have pushed them toward embracing a black and white perspective and therefore, that ideology is appealing in that context. mix of thosere a things. tackling orhen engaging with individuals, you need to be able to ascertain, what are the push factors. somebody who embraced the

ideology? when they are reading the and i thought that was a good analogy. but if you are reading i scripture in that way, it should be enforced by the government. it is very totalitarian. the only way you can engage with that person is to break down the methodology in the way they are approaching scripture. very narrow particular worldview. the only thing you can do is make them realize the complexity is in the way the world is made up. in the u.k.y works and politics as well.

tony blair is not the most popular politician. the day, thereof th is a complexity to the worldview. that applies to people, society, and religion as well. they do need their needs met. ae u.k. approach is multi-pronged approach. p's.ve the four

we have protect. then pratical measures. then, prepare. pursue,r two areas are which is investigation, gathering,e arresting people and prosecuting them. and last, prevent. prevent is this area of what we have spoken about now. engaging with people who are vulnerable toward radicalization or who have become radicalized. the economic ande and business space public space.

the authorities tell someone who is appropriate to engage with that individual to make an analysis and put a plan together. >> there has been criticism of the program as well. >> huge. this is an important thing to look at. it are very good ethical questions we need to ask. the first is, what we talking about, the language is pre-criminal. we are talking about engaging with someone before they have committed a file and act. they are natural concerns about how we determined that, how do we know this is the case, etc. these are reasonable concerns to have. the second i guess, is the

question of one engaging with radicals, especially one who has an ideological foundation, what you are going to do, and there are a number of different youoaches, but in some why, will engage with their religious proclivities. in reality, we are a secular state. we have secular, liberal values. then, a comes down to the logic behind intervention. we can actually take an individual who is experimenting with soft drugs and engage with them. d in schoola young ki who starts to get involved with gangs, we have an early

engagement. that is the same idea here. people feel the need to go do something about it. whatever the need may be, it can inform intervention. the other side of that is the problematic criticism. thehey mentioned, difference is huge on the investigative side and the prevention side. prevention has nothing to do with the investigation side. it has nothing to do with intelligence gathering. it becomes, the state must be

using this intelligence gathering. it must be spying. it must be targeting a community. all of these things come into this anti-prevent thought process. many things can be dismissed. withhave nothing to do it. actually, the overriding referralsas mentioned from within the community. you have to remember, people also have political agendas.

they are going to be critical of the prison program because they are pro-al qaeda. to understand, there will be some groups which buy into this. complicated, but actually there are good and bad reasons. this was based on propaganda. >> daniel, i want to turn back to you. the counterterrorism part of my brain hears about prevention and i say, that makes sense. you are focused narrowly on people who may become a problem. they likedemonstrated the propaganda of a violent

group. that is the one you really want to focus on. but then the american part of my brain speaks up and says, well, wait a minute, these folks are entitled to free speech like anyone else. this is not exactly criminalizing speech, but it seems to get right up on the line, if not over. tom trying to figure out how strike this balance. i gather from a lot of your comments that a lot of this has to do with the unique political culture in each country. if we were in germany, they would have a different answer, versus in the united states. how do we find that wine? how do we keep this focus on a very narrow problem without of the tradition of free speech we all value in a liberal society? >> that is the core question of how you make theoretical is

d intervention programs -- make theoretical programs and intervention programs work. we know on the other side, starting one something criminal the prison system is much more ineffective and expensive. we know there is a process leading to that criminal act, leading to violence, that is inherently dangerous to democratic society because it embraces an ideology and a spread an ideology that is actively attacking and trying to destroy the democratic society. in germany for example, have always tried to hide under that freedom of speech, freedom of political opinion, and even though the german version of freedom of is very different.

i would say, to figure out this problem when it is an inherently dangerous process starting and balancing it against what is morally acceptable, in terms of the program, is an sensually a question -- is essentially a question of how to use structure that program. and amhe fact, critical of government run programs that try to change the political worldview. there are programs that are more or less courses in prison that say, you are free to participate, but if you don't, don't expect to get any beneficial treatment, or anything like that. on the other hand, there are nongovernmental programs that will have close to the same

corporation, but they don't own political slots. they say, we are part of the society at large. people come to us when they want help. say, we have our own version of how democracy goes. help, this to us for is what we expect in turn. in these instances, theoretical is a shunt can be completely -- theoreticalization can be completely acceptable. i think it should be somewhere in the middle. i worked with a new dutch program and they are building a new strategy and program. they have set out a very interesting framework. they have specifically set out the framework of where they work and how they work, in close cooperation with ngo's.

they are strong on their own political philosophy and they have recognized that intervening when people have gone to prison is far too ineffective and inexpensive. out,ed to figure it especially in northern america, what is the point that we figure out it is not acceptable. propaganda spreading is trying to destroy that society you are actually living in that protects you. these programs, when there are public partnerships, they can benefits from both sides of it. i can say, you are protected on a certain area, but what i do now is aimed at abolishing these principles, these constitutional rights. ask yourself this question. system you were

propagating would be realized 100% in the u.s., would any person who is not part of your group have a different or the same rights, or how would you treat them? would you violently try to force them to leave? would you put them in camps? would you grant them much lesser rights of speech? with the have to pay an extra tax or be killed right away? these indicators are essential to figure out where you are going. >> thank you, daniel. i hear daniel. response in the audience from americans. it is a very european perspective. county, we let an awful lot of stuff fly. i wonder again, how does the united states, who has barely

of its toe in the water these sort of interventions, how does it find that line? u.k., it is a voluntary process. there cannot be any c oercive approach. they either choose to engage or they don't. if they choose to engage in the --untary process >> if they are radicals, why would they engage? a different question. why do radicals engage? i don't know if i should make any comments. they could be inappropriate. the thing is, why do people put themselves forward? they fundamentally believe they have something for us. the matter how utterly ridiculous it may be, they

believe they have something alternative to offer for the betterment of the society, or their people. it is either a benevolent or nationalistic motive. they want to engage because they want to share with the rest of society around them the radical worldview. they want to present their point of view. secondly, with a lot of individuals, they are devout about what they are doing as well. have leakage is because people also want that intervention. it is the same people who talk about it. they are reaching out for help as well.

in almost all cases, you have a high rate of people who want to engage. that is a problem because we do similarly, need interventions. the problem is here, it seems like we are controlling the political persuasion of people, or the religious proclivities of people. that is really why we have a problem because we do believe in free speech. in that sense, there are reasonable criticisms to be made. they are talking about disruptions to people who have extreme views. anti-democratic, radical estat.d . whoe are a lot of people

come from the left wing political specter who are fighting. on the other side of that i think there is a moral imperative in a civil society as a whole to stand up and do something about this. what relate you have is a partnership between government and between civil society. we in civil society can engage in the prevention process in countering these arguments. the governments can support or facilitate them. socio-economical process at the same time. in the social and moral's perspective, we can't sit back and do nothing about this.

huge number of migrants coming out of syria and iraq. they are talking about 2 million people. a retaking extremists into europe? extremists into europe? we have a moral responsibility to not send terrorists abroad, which is essentially what we have been doing. and hence my point earlier that we actually have contained, incubated, and created these things. we have a responsibility to do something in a policy space as well. toangela, i am still trying find this balance between public and private. you are deputy director of a private ngo. if you can, and you can talk about it in the abstract if you

like. what is the right relationship between an ngo and the government? or should there not be one at all? >> are you trying to get me in trouble? >> not at all. >> from our perspective, we all in intervention and disengagement, but we have needed andhat is who is best suited for each different aspect. for instance, the easiest example i can give is when i and i waslescent becoming radicalized, i was becoming involved and going toward violence. i am always asked, what could have stopped you? what could have been done? what would you have heard? what would've changed your mind?

i have fun about this for years and i know that the kind of teenager i was, it would have taken someone with real life experience that actually understood what i felt and what i was going through. the obstacles i faced. the issues i dealt with. i think, when we go out and look at these relationships, there has to be support. there have to be people who can go out and act. thereafter be all of these different aspects of it. this may be unpopular and i apologize if it is. i do not believe that a relationship between ngos like mine and say, law enforcement should be anyway intelligence. it should not be telling on people are giving up information. we are going in there to

do this work, we have create communities of trust. feedback, for instance, we originally produced four psa messages. we targeted individuals currently involved in the violent far right in the u.s.. expected a negative response, but in essence, what we are one, we saying, number have been there, we have the experience, and we know what it is like. so, from behind closed doors when you are feeling that this is not what you thought it was going to be. those feelings of shame or doubt are creeping in. we get a response from some individuals that is so intense, so filled with rage. we will hear things like, you are the worst traitors of all

because you knew the truth and you walked away. those of the kind of responses that are telling us, we are striking nerves. we are doing a good job because aree individuals doing that probably the ones having those doubts. they are the ones unde entertaining them and they feel ashamed. when we look at things like that and start to build these relationships between government , between ngos, and people on the ground, we need to keep this in mind. i will be more successful going out and doing intervention work because i am a credible voice, because i have been there. especially with the far right and that the u.s., we are dealing with people who cling to conspiracy theories and paranoia. they already don't trust the government and the law enforcement.

we need to be very clear about those wines and the relationship lines and the relationship there. we'll have a part to play, but we have to define it. the wanted to point out problematic part about the conversation between the rogram andon p the agencies. there are programs that use it for hard intelligence gathering. actually hurts the idea of intervention. it also puts the families at risk, or the social environment at risk. it is accepting the risk to burn them by getting a couple names. but, i am very positive about counterterrorism efforts.

this weird, soft approach by something that they think should be handled by the pros. if you look at, how de-radicalization programs operate, they know what they are doing. they do risk assessment and counter radicalization in an area that overlaps. with facts.tify the group needs to refill that cap, needs to invest resources and train other people. it is proven that this organizational cost that you put on these groups by getting people out can even cause a complete collapse of the terrorist group. call soft i would

intelligence gathering, i am not talking about individual names. that is something you can pass on to the authorities. you can't a lot of special knowledge about connections, radicalization process, skill building that is very influential, very important and you make the work of law enforcement much easier and more effective by providing that additional angle. or peopleth families who want to get help themselves, with thee gap terrorism network and helps to remove a blindfold of that area, that social area where radicalization is and you can actually help the police to become more effective.

i want to open it up for questions, but before i do, i want to ask lorenzo a final one. tankse to think in our about, what kind of policies come out of this stuff. au and i have been thinking lot about why it is we don't have intervention programs in the united states for political radicalism. angela's program is unique in this country. m, there is as it'sram, but it is in beginning stage. i have my own ideas as to why, youi am curious as to why think there has not been a lot of groundswell in the government

for these kinds of programs. >> i think there are a couple of reasons, overlapping reasons. first of all, there is not a debate. the debate is just on the jihadists. how are we going to get them? side, wehe prevent have seen a lot of talk, but in reality, very little action and resources. the day, the thread has not been as big, on the domestic side of it at least. we have never seen the sense of urgency that exist in european countries. if you look at which european countries have been the most active, they are those that have been touched by some kind of attack. >> is anything worth doing?

the scale is so small? >> yes, of course. active aftere been the assassination. there was always a trigger event. somean argue we have had of those in the u.s.. the boston marathon bombings been a trigger and boston is a pilot city. numbers here are some much smaller than most european countries. there is not much of urgency. add to that that the tools law enforcement have here are some much more powerful than in most european countries and at the end of the day, the fbi can it do it's nice thing which no european law enforcement agency can do. the problems,out the ethical problems, the engagement issues. if you in the fbi, it is a very nice tool to have.

it is effective from that point of view. the fbi is an organization that is very much based on numbers, on effectiveness. fbi field office somewhere, you make a good name for yourself. a career based off of the number of people you are prosecuting, not the number of people you have prevented from radicalizing. i am not trying to say this in a negative way. the fbi prevents a lot of discourse. >> would you also say it is the political culture as well? mean, reading the channel document, it is a very sober document. they talk about risk. they talk about what happens when someone goes through the program, who carries out the ax, who gets the blame.

politically, nobody wants to put their name on this program because they are terrified that one person will go through the program and carry out an attack. the program is done and their career is done. >> what we are seeing is, the fbi and more in general, the counterterrorism community, they need to use these kinds of tools. and they are occasionally doing it, but without clear guidelines. we see cases when it comes to minors. issues in mental denver, where the fbi or other agents, does this kind of intervention. they do not really have guidelines on how to do that. the legal part is a big one. that is one of those things we have advocating at a center, do it, but do it right. do it with the right training,

the right knowledge, the right partner, and the right legal guidelines. that goes for the f the i, but also for -- it goes for the f bi but also people in the community who want to help. so, to burke in that space that most people recognize as the next step for counterterrorism policy, it needs to happen, but it needs to happen right. >> and you mean the department of justice? entitiesare a lot of that are fighting about who should be running that space. the whole alphabet soup of agencies there. everybody sort of claiming one part of the portfolio.

not seem to have a leading agency there. then, you have the federal estate and the local level. all of those come together and nobody has taken charge. >> let me open it up to the audience now. let's see. down in front, please. >> thank you, very much. i write the mitchell report. it is a fascinating discussion. i want to focus, if i can, specifically on the jihadi and isis sort of cluster and post a couple questions. is, as opposed to far right radicals or neo-nazis, etc., some of us attended sessions in

ofs very room on the role messaging and counter narratives and i would be interested to know particularly, as i listen to what angela had to say about how you do this successfully. whethererested to know and to what extent, you think narrativesnd counter in this some success process of keeping people from stepping over the edge? and a second, if it is appropriate or there is time, i am interested to know how you workate the considerable that the saudi's do on this issue and how you evaluate that? >> with a question about the

efficacy of counter messaging and a more particular question about the saudis. who wants to take that? >> obviously, there is a lot of tradition with prevention promise in the middle east and south asia. saudi arabia is leading that. ithink they would classify as an active government highly ideological program. what's they try to do is, with a lots of money and effort to m, which is notts that far away. dohing of what they could work in the western country. what they do have, is a very strong sense of what is necessary in the practical dimension. toting financial support marry. getting financial support to move out.

they finance the families to come in and meet them in prison. the practical dimension is very good and there is no weston country that would put so much resources in to that kind of work. there is no de-radicalization program on that planet that 100% success rate. some programs are different. they say they have a 95% excess rate. a year ago, they arrested a person in saudi arabia. there were a number of terrorist plots led by graduates from the program. the only information that comes out are from people who run it. they say, 95% success rate.

i am very critical and skeptical. i am convinced that the radicalization can be evaluated, should be, and can be affected. there are a lot of questions like data access, relationship with the program, who finances it, highly complex and political. i think the saudi program is popular in the muslim majority world because it is very outspoken in terms of, we teach them the right form of islam. we sit down and debate them out of it. have never seen that work and practice. when you have jihadi kids in prison. this is islam what it should be. they have a reason to listen. they say, you are not a real muslim. i listen toy should you? you are a government paid, westernized muslim.

it because they want to get out of prison earlier. it is an interesting program. it should take into account what can be done practically, in terms of art classes and financial support and sustainability. the ideological component, i am very critical of. i just know what has been written in the media and what has been written in very rare studies about the program. there needs to be a real evaluation. >> on the question of counter messaging. is it worthwhile to do, given that isis has gone out of its way to anger most muslims in the world. sunni not light a fellow muslim on fire unless you want to upset every one. we don't message sa government against neo-nazi is him. the mainstream culture has

already decided it is a violent culture. should we be doing counter messaging? >> the saudi program is essentially saying, you should only really engage in acts of terrorism when we tell you to do so. otherwise, it is wrong. is there kind of theology. that is what it boils down to. be set with all sorts of issues. that is the credibility thing. when you are acting on behalf of it is justified. my experience has been very different. casese looked at over 100 in the past 6-7 years. it that space, in the overriding majority we have looked at where there has been a theological

component in the deep at a class has taken place in this continuous engagement. it can be done. i just don't believe that the perspectiveecific of the saudis is the only way to do it. everyone has various different takes on it. they do the whole ideological dimension, theology, and taking care of the individual and their families. have got a lot we can learn from, in that respect. coming down to this, this is why i say, if it is calibrated appropriately and has the right message, it can be helpful. bloodthirstythe

sociopath who wants to join isis because they are attracted to the savagery. the book is about how you need to be really savage to win. the other that you mentioned is, he actually talks about the women and children and civilians. direct convention

with a mass transmitted saying. om and academiccted the voice, that's would resonate with the young people i speak to. that is an objective. it is pointing out, religion is not bloodthirsty in that sense. i am seeing that exponentially. in it various different spectrums. if the message is calibrated work.riately, it canw

there will be people at various levels of the persuasion. no matter how much you dislike a it canlar government, have an impact. we have to calibrate and get the right messenger. i firmly believe it can be effective. >> the gentleman in the brown jacket. >> thank you. i am a retired analyst. i worked for, among other places, the counterterrorism communication center. and 2009.n 2008 the strategy that we worked on at that time was to mobilize voices in the islamic community

to do the counter messaging that we have been talking about, not from the u.s. government, but to eobilize people in the use islamic community. those are more acceptable voices to the target audience we are talking about. that is still a valid approach i would be interested in further comments about. please jump in. what happens when the communities don't radicalize? talking about far right extremism. there has not been a big movement to push back against that. you were saying that yours is one of the first in the united states to push back. does the government needs to fill that a space? does it need to quietly encourage nongovernmental

organizations to do it. where should it be more lai ssez-faire about it? from my perspective, i know the numbers are not great, but i don't think we can afford to wait to see what happens. my will give an example. it could be something as simple as a community being empowered with knowledge. what do we do if we see x, y, and z. for that example, i will use the charleston shooting. stateddividual publicly to several people that he was acts to go out and commit of violence. if that community was empowered, if they weren't afraid, and didn't think, do i call the police, who do i go to, i don't know if it is a critical threat.

with that that example, i will say, we can't afford not to do something. we can't say, the numbers are not that big. the numbers are getting bigger. withinly not on the scale other things we have seen, but there is a problem. >> and when you say we, you mean private citizens. we need to mobilize to set up for ngo's. >> came into all kinds of stuff. i told the academic fields. we as a community, all of us who are engaged in this type of work. whether it is on the academic side, intervention, counter narratives, policy. take extremism more seriously. >> absolutely. >> but make it another question. ideologies are different in

different countries. the failure in britain was because society did not stand up against the idea of radicalism. that is what the government now is reacting with a fairly aggressive counter extremism policy. he destroying trying to disrupt extremist activities and ban organizations. we stop individuals from speaking in public because they have extreme ideas. but reaction is terrible, the reaction is because similar societies failed to challenge the idea. what do i mean by that? leadere as an example the e of the opposition in the u.k.

we have bloodthirsty terrorist organizations. civil society has announced them to be incubated within parts of mainstream society. this is one area where we can heed the words. embrace yourn't values in the face of tradition. don't forget why we have the constitution. reasond a able rationale when you created that constitution. we fail to stand up for those

people. that is why we are saying a lot of aggressive measures. that is for the muslim communities, and everybody who shares that stake in standing up for the "american dream." >> i think what he is saying is very fitting to the u.k. dynamic, but does not apply to the u.s.. it is very country specific. it works and saudi, but not other countries. here in the u.s., we don't have a problem with communities radicalizing, it is individuals. occasionally, it is more clustered like an online community, but it is a different dynamic. the counter messaging, the work and the communities, great stuff

all stopped it can't hurt. places, it canme if not done right. we are rejecting some of the more radical messages. it is a very different dynamic here. some of the big roles of the state. .gain, some social engineering the needs of the community is to speak out. i am not saying it would hurt in the u.s., but it is not necessarily needed. it is something about the communities. generally speaking it is a few individuals who are not part of the community. his study we did on crisis in america. individuals who had been indicted in the u.s..

40% of them are converts. they don't really belong to communities. most of them are new converts. there is a fourth category. people who have personal issues who radicalize. we don't do much in that case. does notthis stuff apply to the u.s.. it is country specific. >> let me gather a few questions. the gentleman in the baseball cap in the back. thank you very much for an interesting discussion. my work was with attics. -- my work was with addicts. i wanted to see if there was some comparison with addiction treatment. need information to self diagnose. you can diagnose them forever, but if they don't have a

self-diagnosis they don't take steps. of sickness.sure i have seen that with guys in combat. idf gotple in the disgusted with what they were doing and had to make a journey. they also needed to have charismatic individuals around them. that was almost like a sponsor in aa or recovery. perhaps this is someone who went through this difficult turning back. i am wondering if you might want to talk about that comparison. >> let me gather a few more questions. there was one in the back. nope, her hand is not going back up -- there it is. hello. i would love to the panel's view on some of our "allies' approach

terrorism."iolence israel.key, islam, and >> let's take another. fascinatingfor a discussion. i am curious if any of your groups might actually become a target for some of these violent extremists. when you think about the example that you are saying. itld you dismember a cell, is a soft way of destroying it. ultimately, you are an enemy. i was wondering if that was something of concern. >> we have a question about

you do and what tdo with people who have a problem, but are not willing to take the next step. with a question about how states in the middle east handle radicalization. and then, we have a final question about whether any of heard off you have anyone being a target as a consequence of doing this at the radicalization work. last question, yeah. a lot of people who get involved the come targets, at least in the u.k.. risk for those who get involved. with regards to the psychology threre is aidual,

danger. i think it is fairly normal. the rest of the world is not like that. that comes to the last question. yes, some of the horrific practices of the egyptian government are something we should stay far away from, in terms of suppressing violent means. they are not even terrorists, just political radicals. people we might not see eye to we should not be supporting that horrific suppression. does israel really -- how long have you got? turkey as well has become more and more authoritarian, and that is a problem.

-- thenecdote to that politics from turkey from the police, radicalization -- i talk a lot about intervention and all that. a colleague stood out and said we do that. we kick in the door at 3:00 a.m., we have a big stick and we had them on the head and throw them in jail and they are due radicalized. -- are de-radicalized. i know that they have changed a little bit in their community outreach project, so they have a lot stronger community policing aspects, where police officers would go uninvited and just be present in to be nice and be open, but they don't have individual de-radicalization intubatio intervention programs. threat, i think

you have to differentiate between those who are formers rally feel attacked because they are an inherent threat, and those who are professionals coming from another background. it is how you frame these interventions. to give you another example of counter narrative intervention, i am leading a group with the inspirational christianity -- mothers from nine countries across the globe who all have lost sons and daughters, most killed, in syria and iraq. some of these mothers wrote an open letter to the islamic state, posted it on various social media site. you can find everything on it online. the idea was mothers are in an essential position to challenge beliefs and ideologies, because there is a saying that paradise

lies at the heat of your mother. -- at the feet of your mother. we wrote that letter, deliberately used certain jihadi terms, describing how they felt. we tried to underscore the message, but after a couple days when it was translated, they shifted their response in jihadi recruitment videos, saying you may have a point, but jihad is something different and you misunderstood what we do, and here are our videos. the response shifted from

ridiculing to acknowledging parts of the message and trying to turn around. we were able to engage in the message -- none of these mothers were threatened after that. even me, as the family counselor, i was never threatened directly. ist you said, of course it dismembering the ideology, empowering those who are really dangerous to these groups, by simple natural being. can be done in a way they don't recognize. simply, getting more difficult to recruit, to hold new members. indenly you are engaged internal controversy or argument, why the person left. mothers saying we

should go to syria? we have been told the mothers are so important? we create much more noise within these groups that potentially create doubt, fallout from all the other sites. more have time for two very quick questions. burning questions. good. all right. we have answered everyone's question. lorenzo, a final one for you. and that is, if you had one recommendation to make to the u.s. government -- you have looked at this issue in europe, in the united states -- what would that one suggestion be? >> thank you. i think it's a couple of things. one, it's resources. there has been a lot of talk about resources.

at the same time, we do not need a massive, large l program. -- large-scale program. they are very limited, number was. targeted intervention accompanied by the engagement. securitizing the relationship is problematic, per se. keep the engagement, but start the intervention programs with partnerships and community, open society,ace for civil for ngos, to be partners. clear guidelines for everybody, and it can be done on the cheap. these pre-existing structures would allow law enforcement to zero in on problematic cases. and not just 15-year-olds from facebook googling baghdadi just because it is a phase.

resources use the right way. >> thank you very much. join me in thanking our panel. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national able satellite corp. 2015] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption contents and accuracy. visit ncicap.org >> this week on "q&a," pulitzer prize winning author stacy schiff discusses her latest book, "the witches" about the

salem witch trials and events leading up to them. brian: stacy schiff, author of "the witches," why do people want to read about it? stacy: we go to it, the fascination with the supernatural. partly because it seems so inconsistent with the rest of our history. bizarre, irrational and a bible minded place. partly because we read "the crucible" in high school. half of the people dissented from the families affected in -- half of the people i spoke to dissented --ted -- from the families affected in 1692 were when they were in high school. partly because it has such resonance. brian: when you were here four years ago for cleopatra, you were talking about this book.

i want to look at it for a minute. stacy: something reassuring about a biography, an obvious structure most of the time. a beginning, middle, and end. and a pleasure of killing off your subject. it is gratifying kind of work. brian: what year? stacy: a good question, 1994. the next book about vera nabokov, the wife of the writer. best known for "lolita," and about the marriage. the third book about ben franklin. it was a pleasure, very difficult to research. and changing tasks, cleopatra. one of the blessings of biography is it you do not have to look at your own life. you examine somebody else's life. i am sure there's a reason about that. my new book is about the salem witch trials. i am from massachusetts. i feel like i'm home in some way. brian: when will it come out?

stacy: many years from now. it takes me about 45 years to -- takes me about four to five years to write a book. brian: what change in your mind for years ago to now? stacy: looking back, did you ever hear what george elliott said, beginning the book as a young woman and ended as old woman? i feel like we just came that same distance. everything changed in my mind. i do not generally go into a book with an agenda. i really such a research with an -- i really start to research with an open mind that i can maintain so i can listen to every possible voice and current. and i did not have an overriding theory, an overriding sense of where it would take me. the materials and found the voices that carried through the story. i began to see patterns and one earlier, superimposed on what would happen in massachusetts and begin to understand the political strains and hear from other girls om